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Abstract
We examine to what extent firms adhere to the stated intent of noncompulsory accounting
standards when reporting for intercorporate investments. The Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP) in Norway strongly recommend that a 20-50% intercorporate investment is
accounted for by the equity method rather than the cost method, if the investment is long-term, of
strategic importance, and involves significant influence. Even so, we find that the actual use of the
equity method is independent of the duration of the investment period, the fi-action of equity held, its
recent growth, and the investor's voting power. This lack of compliance suggests that one cannot use
the observed choice between the cost method and the equity method to infer the underlying
characteristics of the investment as specified by the accounting standard. Flexible GAAP may
therefore not induce firms to disclose the information that the GAAP were designed to produce.
© 2004 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
JEL classification: M41; K42; G38
Kepvords: Generally accepted accounting principles; Flexible accounting standards; Compliance; Intercorporate
investments; Cost method; Equity method
1. Introduction
A fundamental concern in accounting regulation is that financial statements are
infonnative; that is, they reflect the underlying economic condition of the reporting firm.
Two key questions in this context are whether firms comply with stated accounting
principles (Zeff, 1995) and whether noncomplying firms ignore the standard to manage
reported earnings (Bernard & Skinner, 1996; Guidry, Leone, & Rock, 1999; Mazay,
Wilkins, & Zimmer, 1993). Whereas earnings management is relatively well explored in
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: oyvind.bohren@bi.no (0. Bohren), jorgen.haug@nhh.no (J. Haug), dag.michalsen@bi.no
(D. Michalsen).
0020-7063/530.00 O 2004 University of Illinois. All rights reserved,
doi: 10. 1016/j.intacc.2003. 12.001
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the academic literature, much less attention has been paid to compliance. This paper
analyzes compliance in a regulatory environment, where the Generally Accepted Ac-
counting Principles (GAAP) make it nontrivial for firm outsiders to determine whether the
accounting standard is adhered to. The GAAP are explicitly stated and strongly
recommended by regulatory bodies, but are still noncompulsory and open to judgment
and interpretation. Such a regime of flexible accounting standards, which is quite common
intemationally (Cooper, 1996; Zeff, 1995), are very different from the rigid (i.e., legalistic,
directive, and nonjudgmental) system in North America.
Our paper asks whether flexible GAAP ensure that the observed accounting method
choice reflects the firm's underlying economic reality in the way intended by the regulator.
We answer this question by empirically analyzing whether firms that account for
intercorporate investments adhere to the flexible Norwegian GAAP (N GAAP) in
choosing between the equity method and the cost method. The N GAAP state that if
the investor has a significant influence over the investee, the investor should, but is not
obliged to, use the equity method (i.e., consolidate to a limited extent) rather than the cost
method (i.e., not consolidate). This general consolidation criterion is operationalized by
requiring the investment (1) to be between 20% and 50% of the investee's outstanding
equity, (2) to give the investor significant voting power relative to other investors, (3) to be
considered a long-term holding, and (4) to be a natural component of the investor's overall
corporate strategy. If these criteria are met, the investment should be accounted for by the
equity method. Otherwise, the cost method is mandatory.
We find that less than 40% of the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) firms with 20-50%
investments chose to consolidate during our sample period 1986-1994. The investors did
not comply with the N GAAP, as the obser\ ed reporting practice is inconsistent with the
predictions of the accounting regulations. Neither the relative voting power of the investor,
the length of the investment period, the size of the investment, the investment's recent
growth, nor its strategic fit influences the choice between the equity method and the cost
method.
This evidence suggests that under flexible GAAP, the firnis" accounting-method
choice may be contrary to the regulators' intent. The regulator may be unable to
influence the accounting practice if the standard lacks objective criteria for when an
accounting method can be used, if there are no mandatory reporting principles ensuring
that the method is used when the criteria are met, or if disciplining mechanisms for
noncompliers are weak.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the regulatory environment, and
Section 3 states the hypotheses about complying reporting behavior as implied by the N
GAAP. The methodology is specified in Section 4, whereas Section 5 describes our data
selection procedures and presents descriptive statistics. The hypotheses are formally tested
in Sections 6, and 7 summarizes and concludes the paper.
2. Regulation and flexibility
The major reason why compliance per se is seldom explored in accounting research is
probably that in some regulatory regimes, separating compliers from noncompliers is
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either irrelevant or trivial. Irrelevance occurs when there is no binding standard to comply
with. Developing countries often have such nondirective systems (Ahmed & Nicholls,
1994; Rahman & Scapens, 1988), and some countries with strict, elaborate standards also
end up here when enforcement is weak (Zeff, 1995). An example is the Australian pre-
1984 GAAP, where firnis were fi^ee to choose between the equity method and the cost
method for 20-50% of investments (Mazay et al., 1993).'
According to Zeff (1995), the United States is the prime example of rigid accounting
regulations, driven by detailed, objective standards issued by the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) and strict enforcement by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC). In such regimes, the GAAP state that according to readily observable
criteria defining a set of contexts, accounting Principle A must be used in Context X, and
Principle B must be used in Context Y. For instance, U.S. GAAP state that a 20-50%
equity investment must be accounted for by the equity method, and that the cost method
must be used if the investment is below 20% (FASB Opinion No. 18 §17, Statement on
Accounting Standards No. 81). There is no room for the reporting firm's judgment and
discretion, neither on the context nor what method to use in a given context. This
inflexible system effectively ensures widespread compliance; thus, separating compilers
from noncompliers is a trivial task.
Norway is between these two extremes of full flexibility and no flexibility. The GAAP
is explicitly stated and strongly recommended by standard-setting bodies, but still open to
judgment and interpretation. Based on the general framework specified in the corporate
law, the details of the regulation are spelled out by the Ministry of Commerce, the state
owned OSE,~ and the private Norwegian Accounting Standards Board (NASB). The daily
enforcement of the accounting standards for listed firms is carried out by the OSE, which
can issue daily fines ofNOK 500,000 (about USD 65,000) if firms fail to comply with the
information requirement of the Stock Exchange Act or the NASB regulations.
According to §11-13 of the corporate law, an intercorporate investment may be
accounted for by the equity method rather than the cost method if the investor has
significant influence in the investee. However, this rule only applies to firms with group
accounting statements, implying that the cost/equity choice is only open to investors who
have at least one other investment of 50% or more, which must always be consolidated in
full. If the 20-50% holding gives the investor significant influence, the investee is called
an associated firm. Otherwise, it is not associated, and the N GAAP mandate the cost
method.
The Ministry of Commerce (1987), the NASB (1991), and the OSE (1986, 1987a,
1987b, 1988) have defined the associate firm concept by four criteria.' The equity method
should be used if (i) the investor is sufficiently powerful relative to other owners, (ii) the
investment is long-term, and (iii) the investment is a natural component of the investor's
After 1984, Australia switched to a system where the cost method is mandatory, but where the effect of the
equity method must be reported in footnotes (Mazay et al., 1993).
" The OSE was privatized after our sample period.
^ The criteria are specified in the first statement released by the OSE (1986), and later statements repeat and
elaborate on them.
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overall business strategy.^ The fourth and final criterion is the time consistency require-
ment that once an investor has chosen the equity method, the investor should continue
using it in subsequent years unless the influence is unquestionably reduced.
This setting differs fundamentally from the inflexible, legalistic standard in the United
States and in E.U. countries." First, except for the 20-50% requirement, insiders of the
investing firm may argue that nobody else has the required information to determine
whether an investment satisfies the associated-firm criterion of the N GAAP. Second, since
the equity method is not mandatory for associated finns, the investor may still choose the
cost method even if the investment qualifies for the equity method. Thus, both the criteria
defining the context (associated or nonassociated firm) and the link between context and
accounting method (equity method for associated firm vs. cost method for nonassociated
firm) are judgmental, despite the fact that N GAAP strongly recommend how to interpret
the criteria and how to choose the method. For the same two reasons, this setting allows us
to empirically analyze how flexible accounting regulations influence observed accounting
practice. In particular, we can explore whether investors using the equity method are more
influential, strategic, and long tenn than investors using the cost method. The next section
uses the N GAAP to generate testable hypotheses about the expected relationship between
characteristics of the investment and the choice between the cost method and the equity
method.
3. Empirical predicrions
The general rule for significant influence is that the investor must control between 20%
and 50% of the investee's voting equity, and no other investor should have significant
influence. The latter restriction reflects the idea that your influence depends not only on
your absolute share of voting equity, but also on the distribution of ownership among the
remaining stockholders. Generally, the more dispersed the remaining ownership structure,
the more influential the large investor. If the holding is below 20%, the investor must
document that the influence is still significant relative to other owners. The N GAAP state
that this should only be possible under ''extraordinary circumstances" (Bettmo, Drake,
Huneide, & Schwenke, 1989, p. 142).
Hypothesis 1 : The propensity to use the equity method is higher the more voting equity
the investor has relative to other investors.
According to the accounting standard, the investment is long term if the owner
currently considers it a long-lived commitment. While the expected remaining holding
period is not observable, the number of years to date that the stake of at least 20% has been
held is public information. We argue in Section 4 that the infonnation content of this
* In a statement released by NASB in October 1993, strategic importance is no longer listed as a requirement.
As this criterion is explicitly expressed in several OSE policy statements in our sample period, we will still use
strategic importance as a criterion.
The International Accounting Standard (IAS) is similar to the U.S. GAAP in that the equity method
is mandatory "unless it can be clearly demonstrated that the investor does not have significant mfluence"
(IAS 28 §4).
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backward looking duration measure is similar with that of expected remaining duration. In
addition, because the past holding period is known to regulators, it becomes increasingly
difficult for investors to credibly contend that the investment is short term as the holding
period increases.
Hypothesis 2: The propensity to use the equity method increases with the number of years
that the shares have been held.
N GAAP partially clarify the meaning of a strategic investment by excluding invest-
ments with no clear relationship to the investor's operational strategy (Bettmo et al., 1989,
p. 141). Although there is no further specification in the standard, we would expect that for
an investment to be of any significance in the firm's overall strategy, it must be of
nonnegligible size and offer an opportunity to gain influence and information access. A
larger investment increases the expected impact on the investor's overall cash flow.
Moreover, the corporate-governance literature suggests that the larger the equity stake, the
higher the probability of exerting monitoring power by communicating directly with
management, voting at the stockholder meeting, and becoming a director (Shleifer &
Vishny, 1997). Hence, the fraction held of the investee's equity may proxy for strategic
importance. Moreover, if this fraction has recently grown, it may reflect the owner's
decision to make the investment a more important part of his operational strategy.
Consequently, if the investor complies with the intent of the N GAAP, we expect that:
Hypothesis 3. The propensity to use the equity method increases with the size and the
growth of the investment.
As the N GAAP define a strategic investment relative to the investor's operations, we
should also consider the strategic fit between the investor and the investee. According to
Porter (1980, 1985), the fundamental concerns in corporate strategy are focus, speciali-
zation, and competence. This view suggests that value-maximizing finns acquire firnis that
strengthen their core competence when making intercorporate investments for strategic
purposes. We would, for instance, expect that a shipping firm tends to invest in the
shipping industry rather than in banking.
The view that intercorporate investments should foster specialization runs counter to
the rationale for conglomerates, where firms buy other firms to become less rather than
more specialized (Weston, Chung, & Hoag, 1990). However, empirical research shows
time and time again that diversifying conglomerates destroy value, and that value is
created once firms are split up into separate, specializing entities (Servaes, Rajan, &
Zingales, 2000). Overall, this suggests that under the assumption of value-maximizing
investors, we would expect that a 20-50% investment is more often strategic if the two
firms' operations are related.
Hypothesis 4: The propensity to use the equity method is higher if the investor and the
investee are in the same industry.
Time consistency requires that the investor does not shift from the equity method to the
cost method, unless the conditions for using the equity method are no longer met. Since an
external party cannot observe whether these criteria are satisfied, consider instead the
weaker requirement that the investment is still in the 20-50% range. Using only public
information, we can state the following testable prediction.
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Table 1
The hypotheses
.V G.-L4P compliance
HI The propensity to use the equity method is higher the more voting equity INF,,,
the investor has relative to other investors.
H2 The propensity to use the equity method increases with the number of years DUR,y,
that the shares have been held.
H3 The propensity to use the equit\' method increases with the size and the y,y„ Ay^,
growth of the investment.
H4 The propensity to use the equity method is higher if the investor and the X(IND,y)
investee are in the same industry.
H5 The propensity to use the equity method in the current year is higher if /(E, _
i
)
it was used last year, provided the investment is still in the 20-50% range.
H6 The propensity to use the equity method increases with its impact on the (5„
investor's reported earnings.
Industry practice
H7 The propensity to use the equity method varies across industries. IND,
The table summarizes the conjectures made in Section 3. The labels in the left column are used for later reference
to a specific hypothesis. The variables in the right column are empirical proxies, which are defined in Section 4.
7,y, is the fraction of voting equity held by investor / in investee j at time ;. A7,y, is the difference between the
fi-action of investee / held this year and last year INF,,, is the voting equity in investeey held by investor / relative
to the voting equity held by the largest of the remaining owners. DUR,y, is the number of years up to and including
time / that the investment is at least 19%. /(IND,,) equals one if firms / and / are in the same industry, and zero
otherwise. /{£, _ i ) equals one if the equity method was used last year, and zero otherwise. d„ is the percentage
change in the investor's reported earnings if the equity method rather than the cost method is used for all 20-50%
investments. IND, is a vector of indicator functions identifying the industry of firm /.
Hypothesis 5: The propensity to use the equity method in the current year is higher if it
was used last year, provided the investment is still in the 20-50% range.
Like the U.S. GAAP, the N GAAP include the criteria of materiality and intent. In our
setting, materiality means that to justify the extra preparation costs of reporting by the
equity method rather than the cost method, the effect of the equity method on the
investor's total earnings should be nontrivial.'' Moreover, the materiality criterion does not
apply to each individual investment, but only to the aggregate effect of using the equity
method on all the firm's 20-50% investments.
Hypothesis 6: The propensity to use the equity method increases with its impact on the
investor's reported earnings.
The principle of intent implies that the criteria of significant influence, strategic
importance, and long-term commitment should be based on forward looking variables
*" The cost method relies only on the dividend received and the historic cost of the investment. The equity
method requires detailed information about the investee's net income, write-offs of net excess value and goodwill,
and intercorporate transactions beUveen investor and investee. PricewaterhouseCoopers estimates that the
marginal preparation cost of the equity method for large Norwegian firms in 1 999 was NOK 440.000 in the
switching year and NOK 210.000 thereafter Vardal (1986) suggests that an impact below 3% is immaterial,
whereas an impact above 10% is material. The intermediate cases should be determined on a case-by-case basis.
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rather than cuiTent or historic ones. We postpone the operationaUzation of this property
until Section 4.
Watts and Zimmerman (1986, 1990) argue that even if the overall GAAP are given, the
set of accepted accounting-method alternatives may still vary across industries. For
instance, manufacturing firms may use the equity method quite frequently simply by
custom, whereas shipping firms may do so very seldom. Such differences may be due to
accounting practices that are shaped by confonnity pressure from industiy organizations, or
simply by a long-lived industry tradition. Although such norms are neither legally binding
nor stated in the GAAP, they may still influence the manager's choice of accounting
method. We therefore control for industry-specific accounting choice by stating.
Hypothesis 7: The propensity to use the equity method varies across industries.
Table 1 summarizes our predictions and names the variables that will be used to
measure the theoretical constmcts in the empirical tests. The proxies are further explained
in Section 4.
4. Methodology
We define a consolidator as a firni that chooses to account for an intercorporate
investment by the equity method. Conversely, a nouconsolidator uses the cost method. To
analyze if a firni's consolidation decision complies with the N GAAP, we specify the
following model:
P{CWO,i,^A) = gilio + /^|INF„ + /i.DUR.v + P,y„ + PAy,„ + f^sXlIND,)
+ hl{E,^\)+ I^A, + A^-i,IND, + £,,) A=EX (1)
where CHO,y, is the accounting choice made by investor / for its investment in investee / at
time t. The available alternatives are to use the consolidating equity method, E, or the
nonconsolidating cost method, C. INF proxies for influence, and DUR reflects the long-term
nature of the investment. The variables y. Ay, and /(IND) proxy for strategic importance,
X{E, 1 ) measures whether the equity method was used in the preceding period, 3 reflects
materiality, and the vector IND controls for industry-specific variations in the set of
accepted accounting principles. We next discuss each of these variables in more detail.
INFIuence (HI). The best measure of influence is probably the fraction of the board
seats controlled by the investor. As this infonnation is not available, and also because the
GAAP make specific references to voting equity, we use:
INF,,, = min^ ^''
k^i
^k/t
where (^,y, is the voting equity held by intercorporate investor / in finn / at time /. As the
minimum is taken over all remaining investors, INF,y, is the investor's voting power relative
to the power of the most influential of the remaining investors. This definition captures the
GAAP criterion that an investee can only be an associated finn if there are no other
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influential investors (Norwegian Accounting Standards Board, 1991; Oslo Stock Exchange,
1986).
DURation (H2) is measured as the number of consecutive years up to and including
time / that the investment has been 19% or higher (period
^i).^ Altematively, we may
appeal to rational expectations and use the remaining duration (/i)^ which is the number of
consecutive years from time /+1 until the investment drops below 19%. As t^+tj is
constant over time for a given investment, the alternative duration measure /t is just this
constant minus /]. The effect on the regression of using t2 rather than /] will therefore be
negligible. We disregard years where the investment is below 19% to ensure we use a time
period in which the investment is large enough to potentially be classified as strategic by
the GAAP. None of our results change significantly if we choose a slightly higher lower
limit, for example 20%, or use t2 instead of/].
Size of the investment (H3), )',y,. This measure of strategic importance is the fraction of
outstanding shares held by the investor.
Change in the investment (H3), Ay,,, = y,/, — y,/,, i ), is the current year's change in the
fraction of equity held.
Related operations (H4), /(IND,y), is the third proxy for strategic importance. As our
partitioning of industries according to IND is quite coarse, we expect finns with different
IND to have unrelated operations. The indicator function /(IND,y) is equal to one if the
two firms are in the same industry and zero otherwise.
Previous consolidation (H5), /(£", i). The N GAAP state that if an investment was
consolidated last year, it should be consolidated this year, if the influence is still
significant. We capture this time-consistency rule by the indicator ftinction /(£,
_i),
which is unity whenever this criterion is met, and zero otherwise.
Materiality and intent (H6): To confrol for materiality, we include the consolidation
impact ratio
<5,7-
E^EC,
Profits before taxes under the cost method,,
where AEC,/, is our estimate of the effect on investor /'s earnings of using the equity
method rather than the cost method, for investee j at time t.' We assume that intent is
stronger the higher the time / values of INF, DUR, y, and d.
The reason we use 19% rather than 20% is explained in Section 5.
' Let EMy, be the effect on investor i s earnings by accounting for investee / by the equity method at
time t, and let CMy, be the effect when using the cost method. The net effect of using the equity method
rather than the cost method is AEC,y, = EM/,, — CM,,,. The effect on consolidated earnings of using the equity
method is EM,y, = •,'„,ANI„, where ANI,, is the adjusted net income in investee / at time /, which corrects for
intercorporate transactions and for write-offs of net excess value and goodwill. Due to missing data, write-offs
of net excess value and goodwill are set to zero, biasing our estimate of ANI upwards. We approximate
intercorporate transactions by the intercorporate dividend. Since the effect of the cost method is
CM,,, = )'„,DrV„, it follows that AEC„, = y,,,(NI„ — 2DrV„), where DIV,, is the intercorporate dividend, and
Nly, is the net income of investee j.
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INDustr)' (HI). We use the UN international classification standard ISIC to assign firms
to industries. When firms are in several industries, we select the industry, in which the
largest number of the finn's affiliates is operating.^ We restrict the classification to the first
ISIC digit, as finer partitions are ruled out by the sample size. In addition, H4 is valid only
for coarse partitions. The industry proxy INDJ enters as a dichotomous variable, taking on
the value of one if firm / is from industry // and zero otherwise. We set IND" = and
define the industry proxies as:
Index value {/;) ISIC group Industry
2; 5
3
7
8.3
8.1
8.2
Petroleum drilling and production
Manufacturing
Shipping
Real estate
Finance and banking
Insurance
Numbers zero through five refer to superscripts of IND, such that INDf is the financials
dummy. Since the real estate and insurance industries contain only one firm each, IND is
used as a joint category. IND^ is the vector of the five industry dummies, and
^l~ 11 ^iPs-- ,l^\\) is the transpose of the vector of industry coefficients.
5. Sample selection and descriptive statistics
5.1. The sample
Our sample consists of firms where both the investor and the investee are listed on the
OSE during the years 1986-1994.'" The ownership data relate to the end of the calendar
year, which also ends the fiscal year. To be included in our sample, the investor must have
group financial statements, and the investment of interest must be in the range
0.19 <}'//,< 0.50. All such investments are included whether they are accounted for by
the equity method or the cost method. We use the lower limit of 19% because the
population of potential equity method users is difficult to quantify. As discussed in Section
2, a firm can use the equity method when }',y, < 0.20 if it exerts significant influence. One
firm in our sample actually consolidates a fraction that is marginally below 20% (19.9%)
in two consecutive years. '
'
We could alternatively assign a fimi to its largest industry as measured by market values. Since major parts
of a conglomerate are often not listed, this approach is infeasible.
Investments in nonlisted finns are excluded due to missing data on ownership structure and the market
price of equity.
One might argue that 19.5% is a more logical lower bound, since this is the lower decimal limit for
rounding off to 20%. Using 19.5% instead of 19% reduces the sample size by just three observations, and there is
no effect on any of our results. Similarly, using 20% as a lower bound has no substantive effect.
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Data were partly obtained from electronic sources, and partly hand-collected from
annual reports. All firms were asked to supply information missing from these
sources. Using the restrictions that 0.19 <)'//,< 0.50 and that the investor is ftilly
consolidating at least one subsidiary, the population contains 161 firm-year invest-
ments. There are 46 distinct investors and 69 distinct investees, implying that the
average investor listed on the OSE holds a 19-50% equity stake in 1.5 other OSE
firms.
As of 1994, the average market cap per OSE firm is roughly 1.8 times the average
NASDAQ firm and 0.2 times the average NYSE firni. Although market cap roughly
doubled over the sample period, the OSE is small by international standards. According to
1994 year-end estimates, the OSE ranks 12th among the 17 European countries from
which comparable data is available (Federation Internationale des Bourses de Valeurs
1995).
Investors in our sample represent about 40% of the total OSE equity-market capital-
ization, and the average investor is about four times larger than the investee. Manufac-
turing, shipping, and finance firms hold disproportionately many intercorporate
investments between 19% and 50%, whereas manufacturing and shipping are also
overrepresented among the investees. These two industries account for 70% of the
investors, while finance represents one fifth.
5.2. Consolidation policy under the N GAAP
Panel A of Table 2 shows that the mean fraction of actual to potential users of the equity
method is 39%. There is an increasing tendency to use this method, as the fraction shifts
abruptly in 1990 from about 25%) to approximately 50% thereafter. For instance, while
28% of the investments are consolidated in 1988, half of them are in 1994.'" Panel B
breaks the sample down according to the equity fraction held. Seventeen of the one
hundred sixty-one investments are between 19% and 20%, and fifteen ofthem probably do
not have the option to use the equity method. The extra noise from including these cases
should have a negligible effect on our findings.
The N GAAP state that an investment should be consolidated if the investor considers it
a long-term commitment (H2). Panel A of Table 3 shows the summary statistics for
investment duration, that is, the number of consecutive years that the investments in our
sample have been strictly positive. The duration of the subsample of these investments that
are actually consolidated is shown in Panel B. To ensure that long-term commitment is
estimated with minimal error, we use 1980 rather than 1986 as the start of the
measurement period. This means that the minimum and maximum duration of an
investment is 1 and 15 years, respectively. The main impression from Panel A is that
large investments between OSE firms are short-lived. Seventy-eight percent of them last
" As this paper studies compliance with the accounting standard rather than the adoption of one of the two
methods specified by the standard, we will not analyze why the propensity to use the equity method changes over
time. Nevertheless, when relating the scores on the equity-method criteria to the actual adoption of the method in
Section 6, we will account for a potential shift in the interpretation of the GAAP in 1990.
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Table 2
The fraction of Oslo Stock Exchange firms using the equity method to account for intercorporate investments
between 19% and 50%. 1986-1994
Sample size Fraction of firms using
the equity method
(A) By year
1986 32
1987 23
1988 18
1989 17
1990 18
1991 13
1992 16
1993 14
1994 10
Mean (S.D.) 17.89(0.17)
Median 17.44
(B) By fi-action ofequit}' held
0.19<7<0.20 17
0.20 <7< 0.30 69
0.30<y<0.40 34
0.40 <)'< 0.50 41
Mean (S.D.) 40.25 (0.15)
Median 37.5
Total 161
0.13
0.35
0.28
0.12
0.56
0.46
0.56
0.57
0.50
0.39
0.12
0.33
0.44
0.41
0.33
Panel A shows the number of observations by year, where the middle column is the total number of 19-50%
investments. The right cokimn shows the fraction of these investments accounted for by the equity method rather
than the cost method. Panel B classifies the sample by the fraction of equity held ("/)•
Table 3
The duration of intercorporate investments between 19% and 50%, and the corresponding duration of equity
method use, for firms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange, 1986-1994
Duration (years) Total Mean Median S.D.
13 15
(A) Duration of the investment (years)
Number of 21 15 9 2 2 58 3.16 2 3.22
Rel. freq. 0.36 0.26 0.16 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 1.00
(B) Duration of the equit}- method (years)
Number of 15 952000000 31 1.81 2 0.95
Rel. freq. 0.48 0.29 0.16 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
The duration of the investment is the number of consecutive years during 1980-1994 that the investment is
strictly positive, provided the investment is at least once in the 19-50% range. The duration of the equity method
is the number of years that the investment is accounted for by the equity method. Panel A shows the relative
frequency distribution of the investment's duration, regardless of whether the investment is accounted for by the
cost method or the equity method. Correspondingly, Panel B shows the duration of the equity method. The mean,
median, and standard deviations are weighted by relative frequency, which is the number of observations of that
duration divided by the total number of observations.
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less than 4 years, and the mean and median duration is 3.2 and 2 years, respectively.'^
Panel B shows that the average consolidation period is roughly half the average investment
period: 1.8 and 3.2 years, respectively. No consolidation lasts longer than four years, and
93% of them do not survive three years.
These results are surprising because the N GAAP strongly recommend that investments
with significant influence be consolidated if they are strategic (H3 and H4) and long-term
(H2). Based on Panel A alone, the short investment periods may suggest that most of these
investments are not strategic. However, not all of them have a short life, and the critical
issue is the relationship between duration and accounting-method choice rather than
absolute duration alone. By relating the figures in Panels A and B, however, we find an
inverse association between the duration of an intercorporate investment and the tendency
to account for it by the equity method (the correlation is — .62). The observed accounting
practice seems to be at odds with the N GAAP.'"*
The same impression is given by Table 4, which shows how the relevant investment
characteristics specified by the GAAP differ across users of the equity method and the cost
method. The average duration (DUR) of the investment in the second row is marginally
longer for the cost method than for the equity method (3.13 vs. 3.11 years), but the
difference is not significant (/= — 0.04). The same is true for the investor's influence over
the investee (INF). As for strategic importance, the average value of two of the three
proxies {y and Ay) are consistent with our hypotheses that investments accounted for by
the equity method are larger and grow more. The third proxy [/(IND)] is not consistent, as
our sample firms use the cost method more often when the investor and the investee are in
the same industry. However, like for the two other proxies of strategic importance, this
difference is statistically insignificant.
The table shows that investors generally adhere to the time-consistency criterion
[proxied by /(£",
] )], as the equity method is used significantly more often by investors
who used the equity method the previous year (H5). Time consistency is the only GAAP
criterion that differs significantly between users of the equity method and the cost method
at conventional levels of significance.
'"^ Similar results are reported by Bohren and Norli (1997), who analyzed every intercorporate investment
between OSE firms in 1980 - 1994, regardless of size (10,189 holdings altogether). They find that durafion tends
to be short (1.74 years on average) and somewhat longer for large holdings than for small. The typical
intercorporate investment is small, as the mean (median) fraction is 2.8% (0.4%), and 82% of the holdings are
below 5%. Bohren and Norli (1997) find that intercorporate investments can be explained as activities in the
market for corporate control, as a source of financial slack for growing firms that want to reduce adverse selection
costs in the market for new security issues, and as a buffer in the investor's liquidity management system.
'^ There is a potential truncation bias in our sample. Table 3 implicitly assumes that investments in 1980 start
that year, and that investments in 1994 end that year. Still, the table indicates that the bias is negligible, as both the
investment period (Panel A) and the consolidation period (Panel B) are very short relative to the period 1980-
1994. To formally check this, we excluded all investments that are positive in 1980 or 1994 when estimating the
investment's duration. As expected, the results are practically unchanged. For instance, when removing
investments that are positive in 1994 (1980), the number of 1-year durations in Panel A decreased from 21 to 19
(21 ). Durations of 2 years decreased ft-om 15 to 13 (15). The number of consolidations in Panel B that last 1 year
decreased fi^om 15 to 13 (15), while the number of 2-year consolidations decreased from nine to seven (five). The
correlation coefficient between the duration of the investment and use of the equity method changed fi-om — .62
to - .60 ( - .56).
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Table 4
Investment characteristics by accounting method for firms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange, 1986-1994
Investment Equity method
N Mean Median Standard
t Cost method
characteristic
A^ Mean Median Standard
deviation deviation
INF 51 2.66 2.01 1.78 -0.19 80 2.74 2.47 2.76
DUR 57 3.11 2.00 3.53 -0.04 104 3.13 2.00 3.04
y 57 0.33 0.36 0.10 1.37 104 0.31 0.28 0.10
Ay 57 0.12 0.01 0.17 0.32 104 0.11 0.04 0.16
Z(IND) 33 0.44 0.00 0.50 - 0.45 61 0.57 1.00 0.50
Z(^/- i) 57 0.44 0.00 0.50 7.96 104 0.02 0.00 0.14
d 47 0.27 0.04 0.51 -1.12 78 0.50 0.06 1.57
S(t) 57 0.67 1.00 0.48 4.48 104 0.32 0.00 0.47
The table reports means, medians, and standard deviations of investment characteristics that are relevant
according to the GAAP for choosing between the equity method and the cost method. Simple averages are
computed across all observations, except for industry closeness [;((IND)] and earnings impact {6). The fontier is
constant over time for a given investment, while the latter is constant across investments for a given investee.
Simple averages for these two variables are computed only across the dimensions in which they vary. A'^ is the
number of observations of the investments' characteristics, and the t is the t statistic for difference in means.
INF is the voting equity held in an investee relative to the equity held by the largest of the remaining owners.
DUR is the number of consecutive years up to and including the current year that the investment is at least 19%. y
is the fraction of voting equity held by the investor in the investee. Ay is the difference between the fraction held
this year and last year. ;((IND) equals one if the investor and the investee are in the same industry, and zero
otherwise. x(E, _ | ) equals one if the equity method was used last year, and zero otherwise. S is the absolute value
of the percentage change in the investor's reported earnings if the equity method had been used instead of the cost
method. S(t) equals one if the current year is 1990 or later, and zero otherwise.
It may still be argued, however, that the tiine-consistency rule can easily be bypassed
without formally violating the GAAP. An owner who used the equity method last year
may reduce the investment to slightly below 20% this year, and thereby switch to the cost
method. We explore this possibility by analyzing a consolidation policy for investments
around the lower qualification limit. Table 5 shows the time pattern of 1 1 intercorporate
investments that are accounted for by the equity method at least once and that are also at
least once between 19% and 22% during the sample period. The first two cases are
consistent with the notion that firms marginally adjust the investment downward to escape
the consolidation requirement. Cases three through eight do not fit such an explanation,
whereas cases nine and ten violate the time-consistency criterion. Overall, there is no
obvious indication that marginal adjustments in investments are widely used to bypass the
accounting standard.
5.3. Industry-specific accounting practice
As discussed in Section 2, the accounting norms of the industry may influence the
accounting-method choice in ways not dictated by the GAAP (H7). The propensity to
consolidate in our sample does indeed vary substantially across industries. The equity
method is widespread in manufacturing (52% of the firms), and hardly used at all in real
estate (0%), finance (11%), and insurance (0%). The petroleum and shipping industries are
in between these extremes (14% and 31%, respectively). This finding strengthens our prior
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Table 5
Dynamics of intercorporate investments between 19% and 22% for firms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange,
1986-1994
Investment" Fraction owned (%)
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
1 16.4 20.2" 18.7 19.5 14.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.0' 29.8' 19.5 0,0 0.0 0.0
3 27.4 20.5' 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
4 20.8^ 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
5 0.0 20.8' 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
6 0.6 20.0' 20.0' 14.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2
7 0.0 0.0 20.0' 0.0 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 0.0
8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.5' 33.4' 32.0'
9 21.1^ 21.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
10 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.3 20.2' 20.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
11 0.0 0.0 0.0 24.5 14.5 19.3 20.5' 20.5' 0.0
The table shows the time pattern of investments that include at least one holding in the 19-22% range over the
sample period, and that are accounted for by the equity method at least once. Investments that are accounted for
by the equity method in a given year are superscripted "e" that year.
" Investments 5-7 belong to the same owner.
belief of a systematic variation in the accepted set of accounting principles across
industries.
6. Statistical tests
When analyzing the multivariate relationship between investinent characteristics and
accounting-method choice, we express Model (1) as a dichotomous logit model. To
account for the increasing propensity to consolidate from 1990 onwards documented by
Tables 2 and 4, we include the shift variable S{t), which is zero for t < 1990 and one
otherwise. The conditional probability that investor z accounts for investee / at time / with
the equity method, P{E)= 1 — P{C), is given by:
p{E) =
,
'"P'^'!;'
^
.
Ax„^;)i" (2)
1 + exp(^ x„)
The vector x„ contains the constant 1, the seven regressors discussed in Section 4 [INF,
DUR, yjji, \yiji, ;^^(IND,y), /(£, _ i), S/j,], the four industry dummies (IND,; recall that
IND^ = 0), and the time dummy S{t). The /3 is the corresponding vector of 1 3 coefficients
to be estimated.
According to our hypotheses summarized in Table 1 , an increase in any of the GAAP
related regressors in Model (2) increases the propensity to choose the equity method
instead of the cost method. Consequently, we predict a positive sign for the corresponding
coefficients, whereas the signs of the dummies representing industry specific accounting
practice are indeterminate. We show the maximum likelihood estimate of Model (2) in
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Table 6. The regression is based on a subsample of 131 observations due to missing
observations of INF. '
"
Panel A compares the log likelihood of the estimated model to a restricted version that
only fits the intercept term. As the restricted model forces all coefficients except /Jq to
equal zero, every investment is assigned the same probability of being accounted for by
the equity method, regardless of individual investment characteristics. The estimated Po
will be such that the probability of any investment being accounted for by the equity
method equals its actual frequency in the sample firms. The x~ statistic shows that the full
model outperforms such a restricted alternative at a significance level below 1%.
Panel B shows maximum likelihood coefficients for the unrestricted model. The results
can be summarized as follows, using 5% as the significance level. '^' First, there is no
significant association between relative voting power and accounting-method choice,
suggesting that managers do not comply with the frmdamental consolidation criterion of
significant influence (H 1 ). Second, neither is long-temi commitment a detenuinant, as the
investment period has no significant influence on the accounting choice (H2).'^ Third,
strategic importance is irrelevant as well. Although neither the size nor the recent growth
of the investment has a statistically significant impact (H3), the signs of the coefficients are
as predicted. Fourth, the tendency to use the cost method increases significantly if the
investee belongs to the investor's industry, which is contrary to our prediction (H4).''''
The materiality criterion receives no empirical support (H6). The only part of the N
GAAP that is generally observed in practice is the time-consistency mle. There is a
significant tendency for an investment that was accounted for by the equity method last
year to be accounted for by that the same method this year as well (H5).
We next use Model (2) to predict whether a given investment will be reported by the
equity method or the cost method. The estimated parameters from Panel B and a given
investment's unique characteristics (i.e., the values of its independent variables) are used to
estimate the probability that either accounting alternative will be chosen. The equity
method is predicted whenever this estimated probability exceeds .5.
According to the bottom row of Panel C, our prediction model is correct in 82% of the
131 cases. To evaluate this hit ratio, the model may first be compared with an uninformed
' The ownership-structure data used to construct INF is based on voluntary information provided in annual
reports. After having contacted all the firms with insufficient data to estimate INF, we are still forced to leave out
30 of the 161 cases. We have no reason to suspect that the firms with missing ownership data differ systematically
from the others in their tendency to comply with the N GAAP.
MulticoUinearity does not seem to inflate the P values. First, pairwise correlations are moderate, except for
the pair (y, INF), where the Pearson product-moment correlation is .5. Still, this is well below the rule-of-thumb
critical limit of 0.8 (see, for instance, Greene, 1993). Second, the inverse correlation measures how well a regressor
/ can be represented as a linear combination of the remaining regressors. It is defined as ( 1 - RjY ' , where Rj is the
coefficient of determination from said regression. DUR is the variable that can best be represented in this fashion,
with an inverse correlation of 2, that is, /?fHiR=-5. This is also comfortably below the critical limit.
We inferred from Tables 3 and 4 that an investment's duration is negatively associated with the propensity
to consolidate. The multivariate test in Table 6 reveals that this relationship is neither robust nor significant once
we control for the impact of the remaining determinants.
One possible explanation is that when firnis make strategic investments in other firms, they primarily build
conglomerates. This means investing in firms that are outside the investor's core industry.
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Table 6
Estimation of the N GAAP compliance Model (2) on a subsample of intercorporate investors listed on the Oslo
Stock Exchange, 1986-1994
(A) Likelihood ratio
Model -Log likelihood x\P>yJ2) N
Unrestricted 54.65 65.14(0.00) 131
Restricted, (fiu- •P\2)-0 87.57 131
(B) Parameter estimates
Source Predicted sign Coefficient Likelihood ratio P value
Intercept -1.80
INF + -0.07 0.34 0.56
DUR + 0.05 0.19 0.66
7 + 1.98 0.28 0.60
^y + 2.14 1.15 0.28
Z(IND) + -1.17 4.80 0.03
yXE,~s) + 3.41 23.90 0.00
3 + -0.83 3.22 0.07
IND' 1.05 0.72 0.39
IND- 0.15 0.01 0.91
IND"* -1.37 0.78 0.38
IND^-^ -6.87 0.38 0.54
S(t) + 0.66 1.75 0.19
(C) Hits ofpredicted consolidation policy
CHO Number of Number Fraction
actual CHO of hits hits
E (equity method) 51 34 0.67
C (cost method) 80 73 0.91
EUC (all) 131 107 0.82
Based on a subsample of 131 investments between 19% and 50%, the table shows statistics of the logit regression
evaluated at
+ f3,_,,{YND,) + fi,:S{t)
The log -likelihood ratio is reported in Panel A. the parameter estimates of the unrestricted model are in Panel B,
and the actual versus predicted accounting-method choice is shown in Panel C.
INF is the voting equity held in an investee relative to the holdings of the largest of the remaining owners. DUR is
the number of consecutive years up to and including the current year that the investment is at least 19%. y is the
fraction of voting equity held by the investor in the investee. A7 is the difference between the fraction held this
year and last year. /(EVD) equals one if the investor and the investee are in the same industry, and zero otherwise.
X{Er- 1) equals one if the equity method was used last year, and zero otherwise. S is the absolute percentage
change in the investor's reported earnings if the equity method had been used instead of the cost method. S{t)
equals one if the current year is 1990 or later, and zero otherwise.
Likelihood ratios are /y distributed. Critical values at the .10 and .01 levels are 2.71 and 6.63, respectively.
Degrees of freedom in the log -likelihood ratio equals the number of restricted parameters, which is 1 x 12. The
/" statistic is computed as
-2(hilresir
-iunrestr). where L is the log -likelihood flmction.
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prediction that simply assigns the same probability to both methods. Such a model would
be correct in half of the cases, which is clearly inferior to our model. A more demanding
alternative is a prediction rule based on the actual fraction of investments accounted for by
the equity method in our sample, which is 39% (from column 2 of Panel C). If one knows
this ratio, but has no firm-specific information about each individual investment's score on
the GAAP criteria, such a model would predict that the cost method is the most likely
alternative and, hence, the best prediction for each of the 131 cases. This rule would be
correct 61% of the time, which, again, is less than the 82% hit ratio of our estimated
prediction model. This finding is consistent with what we learned from the significant
parameters in Panel B. Knowing the industry of the investee and whether it was accounted
for by the equity method last year helps predict the accounting-method choice in the
current year.'^
7. Summary and conclusion
Compared with the United States and the E.U. countries, Norwegian GAAP give firms
considerably more discretion on whether to account for intercorporate investments by the
partially consolidating equity method or the simpler, nonconsolidating cost method. Once
the investment satisfies the GAAP criteria of significant influence, strategic importance,
and long-term commitment, adoption of the equity method is still voluntary by corporate
law, although strongly recommended by regulators and enforceable by the OSE. Under
such a flexible accounting standard, we ask to what extent the firm's accounting-policy
decision produces the information intended by the regulators. We answer this question by
analyzing whether intercorporate investors using the equity method are more influential,
strategic, and long-term owners than investors using the cost method.
Our major finding is that a finn's score on the GAAP criteria is not systematically
related to the firm's choice of accounting method. This means we do not find support for
the hypothesis that the regulators' intent is reflected in the observed accounting practice.
This noncompliance implies that a firm's external analysts cannot use the observed choice
between the cost method and the equity method to infer the underlying characteristics of
the investment as specified by the standard (influential, strategic, long term). In this
respect, the flexible GAAP does not produce infomiative accounting statements.
Still, the observed reporting behavior may reveal valuable information of a different
kind. First, under a flexible regime, rational owners will only use the reporting alternative
with the highest preparation costs (the equity method) if it also produces an offsetting
benefit. For most of our sample firms with high scores on the GAAP consolidation criteria
(i.e., strong influence, strategic importance, and lasting commitment), the consolidation
benefits are too small to justify the extra reporting costs. This means the firm's perceived
net benefit of the equity method does not increase with increasing scores on the GAAP
' To check for robustness, we tested a reduced regression model by removing any variable whose coefficient
is insignificantly different from zero at the 10% level. The two significant coefficients of the full model retain
their signs, and there are only minor changes in their absolute values.
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consolidation criteria. Second, as noted in tlie Introduction, a natural extension of this
paper's focus on compliance per se is earnings management, which asks whether other
determinants than the GAAP are driving the accounting-policy decision. For instance,
when exploiting the inherent flexibility of the standard, managers may choose the
accounting method that maximizes reported earnings to extract private benefits from
bonus contracts or choose the earnings minimizing alternative to reduce the firm's political
costs. Therefore, the flill story of how flexible accounting standards influence infonnation
production cannot be told until one also understands the link to earnings management.
Considering the complexity of the eamings management problem and the opportunity
offered by the regulatory framework to study compliance per se in a detailed way, we have
chosen to ignore eamings management in this paper.""
In a survey paper on the relationship between financial disclosure and stock prices,
Healy and Palepu (1993) ask for more research on what type of accounting principles will
facilitate the communication between the firm and the stock market. "For example, is
communication more effective when standards are detailed but rigid, as in the United
States, or is it more effective to have broad guidelines, leaving managers considerable
reporting discretion?" (Healy & Palepu, 1993, pp. 8-9). Our findings suggest that flexible
accounting standards may create noisy and confusing communication. This problem is
further illustrated by the fact that Norwegian regulators are currently considering making
the equity method mandatory for every finn that satisfies the formal consolidation criteria
explored in this paper. Our analysis suggests that because these criteria will still be open to
interpretation and judgment by the information provider, making the equity method
compulsory once the flexible criteria are met will not solve the inherent communication
problem of the GAAP.
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Abstract
The objective of this paper is to provide an international managerial accounting contracting-based
framework that organizes a broad sample of published research and (based on that sarnple) identifies
research opportunities. Organizations that operate m cross-border markets constantly face
contracting challenges that arise because of different factor and product market characteristics.
Accounting has a role in defining, implementing, monitoring, and negotiating the implicit and
explicit contracts firms use in these markets. Thus, a useful framework for considering international
managerial accounting research would incorporate different international market characteristics that
impact the contracting role of firms. Using such a theoretical framework, this paper examines the role
of managerial accounting by focusing on operating and strategic decisions that require knowledge
transfer, decision-rights assignment, and decision-rights control within international organizations.
© 2004 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Although the growth in international managerial accounting research over the last
decade has been significant, there are no frameworks to organize this literature and help
researchers identify opportunities to add to this body of knowledge. The objective of this
paper is to create a framework based on contracting theory useful for organizing published
research and identifying opportunities for research in international managerial accounting.
Consistent with Gray, Saher, and Radebaugh (2001), we distinguish in our analyses
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between comparative international management accounting and management accounting
at the multinational level of analysis. We focus here on the latter by examining research
that investigates how accounting is used when multinational enterprises (MNEs) resolve
problems that are unique to operating across borders (Gray et al., 2001, p. 46). We do not
consider the descriptive literature that focuses on international comparisons of particular
management accounting techniques such as transfer pricing, costing procedures, or
performance evaluation without considering why these differences exist. Previous reviews
of international managerial accounting research have been broad including both compar-
ative and multinational cross-border operational research. These reviews have generally
lacked an integrative theoiy that points toward opportunities for fiature research.
This paper proposes a framework that allows multiple uses of accounting information
and procedures in contracting efforts that assign and partition decision rights, aid in
decision making, and implement decision control. The contracting framework provides
researchers with a means of understanding and studying many of the roles of managerial
accounting in international organizations. In particular, we provide a categorization of
research across international operating and strategic decision levels that are affected by the
fiinction of managerial accounting through partitioning decision rights and implementing
decision control. The impact of key environmental factors on contracting and the resulting
international operating and strategic decisions is an essential element in the general
integrative framework. Finally, the proposed contracting-based framework points toward
opportunities for research in international managerial accounting.
A framework for organizing management accounting literature could be based on a
variety of existing paradigms. For example, scientific management (Taylor), the bureau-
cratic school (Weber), human resource theory (Maslow, Rickert, and Argyris), the
decision-making school (Simon) and the political science school (Sleznick) provide
ahemative paradigms for considering management accounting issues (for overviews, see
Narayanan & Nath, 1993; Perrow, 1986). Because managerial accounting spans both
behavioral and organizational issues, any of these or other paradigms will provide insights
about potential research opportunities (for a critical review of each of these frameworks,
including a critique of economic theories, see Perrow, 1986).
No single paradigm or theory is likely to be complex or rich enough to provide an
overview of the entire international management accounting research literature. However,
compared to other potential paradigms, economic-based contracting theory provides a
useful and widely accepted paradigm for predicting and explaining variation in the
multiple roles and interrelatedness of accounting information across MNEs and time.
We believe that contracting theory provides an effective perspective from which to
develop a theoretical framework for organizing and understanding existing published
research and for identifying opportunities for future research.
Based on the earlier works of Coase (1937), Hayek (1945), and Williamson (1975),
Jensen and Meckling (1992) develop a theory concerning the economic determination of
decision rights within the firm. They suggest that an important objective of the firm is to
align decision-making rights with those who possess the best information to make the
decision. However, because the decision maker's self-interest may not be congruent with
the welfare of the firm, the economic framework calls for implementing decision controls
via implicit and explicit contracts. Contracting theory implies that managerial accounting
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plays an important role not only in providing information for decision making, but also
both in the assignment of decision-making rights and in the subsequent process of
controlling such decision rights (Fama & Jensen, 1983a, 1983b). Empirical evidence also
suggests that various managerial accounting mechanisms help in the decision-rights
assignment and control process. For example, Shields and Young (1993) used survey
results to show that superiors use participative budgeting to reduce information asymme-
tries and allocate resources (i.e., decision rights). Merchant and Manzoni (1989, p. 549)
interviewed profit-center managers and found that budget targets were used as a
mechanism to allocate decision rights to effective managers.
This contracting framework of providing information, partitioning decision rights,
controlling decision rights, and evaluating and rewarding the subsequent decisions is
embedded in environmental factors (e.g., economic, political, and cultural) and used to
examine how managerial accounting is used in MNEs. The contracting framework is
employed within the context of diverse international (1) operating decisions (e.g.,
management control systems (MCSs), transfer pricing, and budgeting) and (2) strategic
decisions (e.g., market choice, market mode of entry).
The paper proceeds as follows: the prevalence of decentralized decision rights within
MNEs is examined in Section 2. Contracting theory, which serves as the economic theory
on which this paper's framework is developed, is described in Section 3. Also discussed in
Section 3 is the sampling technique employed to create a representative sample of
published international managerial accounting research. The interrelatedness of key
international environmental factors, implicit and explicit contracts, and resulting implica-
tions for future research are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 relates these contracts to
common international operating and strategic decisions and identifies opportunities for
future research. Finally, a conclusion follows in Section 6.
2. Decentralization of decision rights
As a result of the globalization process, decision making is far more decentralized,
resulting in more widely allocated decision rights (Heely & Nersesian, 1993). Successful
growth for modem MNEs requires that international operating affiliates take the appro-
priate actions to improve production, market share, and the company's product line.
Because only the managers at the operating affiliate possess the necessary intimate
awareness of the circumstances surrounding operating decisions, decision rights are
typically allocated to those managers. Examples of such decentralization include the
realization that while major capital expenditures and top management hirings remain as
corporate headquarter decisions, day-to-day operational, marketing, and personnel deci-
sions typically are made at the local level (Heely & Nersesian, 1993).
With many day-to-day decisions being made at the local level (e.g., by operating
affiliates), management accounting systems must be flexible in their ability to create and
communicate information within the firm. Decentralization across international borders
means that management accounting systems must adapt to changing infomiation needs
that accompany changes in international decision-rights allocation and subsequent
preferences and needs for decision-control mechanisms. Management accounting system
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characteristics will differ, for example, on fulfilling the control function under various
types of international market-entr)' modes and international environmental conditions (for
examples, see Groot & Merchant, 2000; Nishimura, 1995). Because of the diversity of
environmental variables across countries, organizational globalization imposes additional
decision-rights assignment and control problems over and above those found in domestic
firms (Gray et al., 2001). The following section discusses the contracting theory
framework and its application to the arena of international managerial accounting.
3. Contracting framework
3.1. Decision rights allocation and control
Organizations are collections of resources. These resources coexist with a set of
associated decision rights. Organizations engage in explicit contracts, particularly with
those outside the organization that identify the specific types of decision rights that coexist
with a particular resource. However, for other assets in an organization, explicit contracts
do not exist that detemiine either who has the right to make decisions associated with that
resource or the limits on those decisions. Implicit contracts (i.e., job descriptions, budget
outcomes) frequently serve the purpose of identifying decision rights within the firm (for
more detailed examples, see Brickley, Smith, & Zimmerman, 1996). Budgeting is
considered an implicit contract because remedies for contract violations are not explicit.
Managers of the organization engage in the ongoing process of implicit and explicit
contracting to partition and control the decision rights associated with the organization's
resources.
Hayek (1945) first identified the importance of knowledge in the decision-rights
assignment problem. He argued that the economic problem of society is how to utilize
differential individual knowledge such that the best use of scarce resources is obtained.
Hayek suggested that decision rights be partitioned either through markets or contracts so
that individuals with the most knowledge about the circumstances surrounding a resource
make decisions about that resource. Unfortunately, for many decisions within organiza-
tions (and in particular cross-border strategic or operating decisions), information
important for the decision is not possessed by the decision maker(s). As a result, firms
engage in costly knowledge transfer from knowledge holders to decision makers.
Knowledge transfer is an important role of accounting within firms. It seems clear that
knowledge-transfer problems can be significant in cross-border operations. Contracting
theory has extended Hayek's pioneering work by offering insights into the organization's
knowledge transfer processes.
In addition to the knowledge-transfer problem, the contracting framework points to two
other organizational problems faced by management: (1) allocation of decision rights
across employees with differential knowledge and (2) control of decisions by motivating
employees to make decisions that are in the best interest of the organization. In
competitive equity markets, these problems are solved by alienability, meaning that
decision rights are partitioned and controlled via the market mechanism (the stock holder
bears the risk and reaps the profits of a decision to hold or sell). Within organizations.
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however, top management must assign decision rights to employees with differing levels
of knowledge. Once assigned, the proceeds associated with their decisions accrue to the
organization rather than to the individual assigned the decision right. If the individual's
interest in the decision outcome does not coincide with the owner's, there is a decision-
control problem. Jensen and Meckling (1992, p. 265) state that organizations solve
decision-rights assignment and control problems by
1. assigning decision-making responsibility to those agents who possess the necessary
specific knowledge, or the necessary specific knowledge is transferred to those
individuals who possess the decision-making responsibility; and
2. creating control systems that (a) provide measures of performance and (b) specify
relationships between rewards and punishments and measures of perfonnance.
This contracting framework shows how the cost (and in some cases the impossibility)
of transferring knowledge encourages decentralization and how decentralization leads to
rights assignment and control problems. In international settings, the knowledge distribu-
tion problems are more difficult because of environmental variables and because the
resulting contracting space for control issues has larger boundaries.
3.2. Knowledge characteristics
A major detenninant of the optimal degree of decentralization is the ability to
efficiently transfer knowledge across agents within the organization to aid decision
makers. Consider, for example, specific and general knowledge. General knowledge is
widely held knowledge that is easily obtained by agents within the finn. Examples of
general knowledge include market prices or general firm goals and objectives. Knowledge
that might be considered general knowledge within a purely domestic firm, however, will
not be considered general knowledge in many international settings. For example, general
beliefs about how business should be conducted in one country do not typically hold true
in other countries (for examples, see Borkowski, 1999; Nishimura, 1995). Thus, general
knowledge in one country can become specific knowledge in an international setting.
Specific knowledge is the knowledge most relevant to the particular decision being
made. For example, for a raw materials purchase decision, knowledge of appropriate
suppliers would be relevant specific knowledge. Idiosyncratic information is one type of
specific knowledge that is typically acquired as a by-product of producing other goods.
Examples of specific idiosyncratic knowledge include knowledge of individual employee
preferences, individual machine's peculiarities and productivity, underemployed resources,
geographic or cultural peculiarities, etc. Specific and, in particular, idiosyncratic knowl-
edge is more costly to transfer than general knowledge. Difficult information-transfer
issues arise in firms when decisions require integration of specific, especially idiosyn-
cratic, knowledge located in widely separated individuals. Globalization compounds this
knowledge-transfer problem (Whitley, 1999).
Another form of specific knowledge is knowledge produced by assembling and
analyzing idiosyncrafic knowledge. Assembled knowledge includes information and
analysis gained through experience. In a global setting, individuals who possess assembled
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know ledge gained through experience in a \ aneu of international business operations
become \'er\ valuable to organizations (Stanek. 2000).
3.3. Knowledge tiansfer, decentialization. and control
Contracting theon' suggests that organizations constantly face trade-offs between
centralization, where poor decisions ma\ result from inadequate information on the part
of the decision maker, and decentralization, where costly control mechanisms are
necessar\- to align the decision-maker's goals with the welfare of the fimi. If the decision
right IS not assigned to the indi\ idual possessing the rele\ant specitlc knowledge, then
costK know ledge-transfer mechanisms must be set-up to ti-ansfer this knowledge to the
centralized decision maker. An example of a costly knowledge-transfer mechanism is the
budgeting process. Budgeting attempts to transfer to top management the kind of
assembled knowledge needed for strategic planning puiposes. Finns devote enonnous
amounts of emplo\ ee time and resources to assembling and analyzing the information
necessan. to create budgets, hi international settings, communication of knowledge
through the budgeting process becomes more difficult because of geographic dispersion.
cultural and language baniers. and other technological issues (a widely cited illustration is
the Daimler- Chiysler merger).
Environmental factors, such as technological sophistication, can have a significant
impact on the nvo costs in\oh'ed with the tradeoff beu\een decentralization and control.
For example, computers can reduce the costs associated with n"ansferring certain types of
infonnation or implementing better control mechanisms, such as the monitoring of
employee beha\ior and decisions. Altemati\ely. incompatible budgeting software can
create technological barriers. Using the contracting framework described previously, the
remainder of the paper examines the role of managerial accounting in knowledge transfer,
decision-rights assignment, and decision-control issues in international firms.
3.4. Sample selection
Our review and analysis of published international managerial accounting research was
constructed by suneying Tlie Accounting Review: Accounting. Organizations and Societ\\
Journal of Accounting Research. Journal of Management Accounting Research, Jlie
International Journal ofAccounting, Abacus, Journal of International Business Studies,
Management Accounting Research, and the European Accounting Review for qualifying
articles during the years 1991-2001.' A qualifying article is defined as one that examines
a cross-border decision making setting and the related role of managerial accounting.
Thus, research articles that examined a managerial accounting issue within only one
country or simply compared the usage of managerial accounting techniques between or
among countries without theory- about why differences exist were not included in our
sample. We adopt this criterion to establish a reasonable boundan.' for our re\iew and to
We consider additional general review articles and books outside of this set of journals throughout the
discussion when appropriate.
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ensure that the included studies examine issues from a mukinational perspective. In
addition, other relevant manuscripts, such as books, were identified through keyword
searches and included in the review.
This sampling procedure is not designed to produce an exhaustive review, but rather a
representative sample of published international managerial accounting research. When
combined with our theoretical framework and environmental variables, the representative
sample allows us to identify and discuss those international managerial accounting areas
that have received the majority of past research attention and areas that possess the greatest
opportunity for fiiture research.
4. Environmental factors and contracting for decision-rights assignment and control
Environmental factors impact the knowledge necessary for both operating and strategic
decision making in international organizations. Fig. 1 displays a graphical representation
of the environmental factors and their interdependent relationships. The fianctioning of the
economy, the political and legal restrictions, culture, and infrastructure impact how
Organization of Political Processes & Culture Infrastructure
Economic Ac livity Legal Requirements Sophistication
— Socialist — External reporting -> Individualism — Education of
— "Japanese" requirements — Power distance workforce
capitalisrr -• Tax/repatriation ~ Uncertainty — Professionalism
— us capital sm treaties avoidance ~ Distribution
— Command -• Control of foreign ^ Time orientation Channels
economy exchange -• Masculinity ~ Technology
@ Affects impact of managerial-accounting in
contracting and decision making:
y r
Operating Level Strategic Level
- Management-control system — Organizational stmt ture
® stmcture — Market choice- Performance evaluation " Market-entry mode choice
- Budgeting
-< Product costing
Audit, transfer pricing, tax
choice
;^
fe
Decision Rights
— Allocation &
^
<
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Fig. 1. Environmental factors and decision-rights allocation and control. Environmental factors [O] affect the
MNEs contracting involving decision-rights allocation, and controls [0], which guide employees in making
operating and strategic decisions [©].
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managerial accounting systems are designed and used in contracting and ultimately affect
organizational decisions." Understanding the role and impact of management accounting
in various international locations requires a consideration of environmental factors.
4.1. Environmental factors in international settings
Environmental factors can be categorized in four areas: the economy, the political and
legal systems, culture, and a country's infrastructure. These categories are not independent.
In fact, it should be clear that they are intractably intertwined. However, because extant
literature uses these general categories (Gemon & Meek, 2001; Gray et al., 2001) and they
provide a convenient framework for considering environmental characteristics of multiple
countries, we also use them here.
4.1.1. Economy
Economies operate with a variety of structures. Participants in these economies have
expectations that inform both implicit and explicit contracts that are made in these
economies. For example, market choices have expanded recently to include numerous
East bloc countries that formerly operated under socialist economic systems. Management
accounting systems from former planned economy countries ha\e significantly different
orientations than those in capitalist countries (McDonald, 1993). Differences in decision-
rights assignment and control in planned economies are evident in their management
accounting systems. For example, employees in fomierly planned-economy countries do
not understand the profit motive driving business in capitalist economies. As a result,
responsibility center designs taken for granted by a U.S. parent are difficult to impose in
acquisitions or joint ventures (JVs) formerly operated under a planned economy. Account-
ing departments under planned regimes focus on collecting data on inputs and outputs and
preparing statistical reports for the government. Firth (1996) showed that Chinese managers
in organizations prior to a JV agreement had very few decision-making responsibilities.
Firth also found a positive association betw een the adoption of accounting techniques in a
Chinese JV and the extent to which the Chinese partner faces competitive markets.
Other examples of the impact of economic differences have been observed in countries
such as Japan and Korea. In these countries, it is not uncommon for related firms to
organize into a group called a chaebol or keiretsu. These groups of firms cooperate and
help each other in many ways that are not typical in the United States and Europe. Jiang
and Kim (2000) study the differences and resulting implication between U.S. corporate-
governance approaches and Japanese approaches. They show that as the level of cross-
corporate ownership increases (as used by keiretsu structures in Japan), there is less
" The contracting perspective used here. Uke other theories, has limitations in its ability to be universally
descriptive. Contracting theory does not address why environmental forces such as political outcomes are enacted
that affect management accounting practices. For example, the IRS requires arms length transfer prices between
international subsidiary and parent, which in some cases has affected transfer-pricing's role in contracts internal to
the firm (see Eden, Dacin, & Wan, 2001). Thus, contracting theory does not explain why or how political forces
result in a particular legal restriction. However, it does provide a positive theory that describes how the
organization might respond to a politically motivated enviromnental change.
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infonnation asymmetry between the firm and market participants. They imply that cross-
corporate holdings discipline managers in the same way that corporate-governance
procedures in the United States provide discipline.
It seems likely that intemational differences in the economic relationships among
domestic firms are likely to impact contracting arrangements. Aulakh, Cavusgil, and
Sarkar (1998) showed that the favorableness of the host country's economic environment
was positively related to the use of royahies-based compensation (rather than lump sum) in
licensing agreements. Anderson and Lanen (1999) studied the impact of the economic
transition in India on the changes made to MCS in both domestic and intemational firnis.
They show that the 1991 liberalization of the Indian economy significantly impacted the
use and importance of management accounting practices.
4. J. 2. Political and legal
There are obvious connections between contracting and the political and legal systems
in a country. In a poorly functioning legal environment (e.g., Russia in the late 1990s),
contract enforcement is highly questionable. Kirsch, Laird, and Evans (2000) examined
the role of the political and legal climate on market entry and growth strategies for
professional services finns entering emerging markets. Kirsch et al. develop a conceptual
model to illustrate the interrelationships among finn characteristics, the foreign environ-
ment, and the foreign subsidiary's structure. Unfortunately, the impact of legal and
political environment on the specific role of management accounting systems in contract-
ing has not been thoroughly explored. For example, little documentation is available about
the relationship between subsidiary rights assignment and control and the parent or host
country's political characteristics (McKinnon & Harrison, 1985).
Intemational JV agreements provide a potential source of determining the importance of
control-system characteristics in intemational operations (Groot & Merchant, 2000). If the
details of the JV agreements could be categorized and correlated with host country and/or
parent political characteristics, we could gain a better understanding of the driving forces
behind decision-rights partitioning and control. Further, long-mn analysis of the success of
cross-border alliances in connection with these correlation studies could provide indica-
tions of successfiil management accounting procedures in intemational operations.
Political decisions about reporting requirements and taxes drive other differences in
intemational management accounting practices. Although there is considerable research
that compares extemal reporting requirement differences and their political causes, very
little analysis documents the impact of these reporting differences on intemal management
accounting systems (for one example, see Choi & Levich, 1991). Research has shown that
transfer-pricing practices are directly impacted by repatriation and tax stmctures (Collins,
Kemsley, & Lang, 1998; Collins, Kemsley, & Shackelford, 1995; Cravens & Shearon,
1996). In addition, it seems likely that reward-incentive stmctures would differ due to
politically detennined personal taxation and repatriation policies. Researchers could
generate evidence documenting these differences. Further, MNEs need to operate with
numerous and varied incentive stmctures as a result of these tax and reporting issues.
Evidence about the variety in incentive stmcture and their relationship to other manage-
ment controls is not widely available from cross-border studies (for one exception, see
Borkowski, 1999).
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4.1.3. Culture
Preliminary research on the role of culture, particularly in implicit contracting situations,
has been done (Chow, Shields, & Wu, 1999; Harrison & McKinnon, 1999). Societal values,
such as individualism versus collectivism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, etc., have
been linked to accounting practices, such as authority of the accounting system, measure-
ment practices, disclosure practices, etc. (Gray, Campbell, & Shaw, 1984; Merchant, Chow,
& Wu, 1995; Perera, 1989). Results of these studies are inconclusive. Harrison and
McKinnon (1999) review 15 years of culture-based MCS research. They document four
major weaknesses of this research: (1) a limited view of the culture domain, (2) failure to
consider intensity of cultural norms, (3) simplistic treatment of culture, and (4) overreliance
on one conceptualization of culture (e.g., Hofstede, 1967). In particular, there is little
acknowledgement that culture is intertwined with other environmental variables such as
economic and political differences (Ueno & Sekaran, 1992). For example, the Japanese
system of "guaranteeing" lifetime employment is often considered to be a cultural
(coUectivist) impact of the Japanese system. However, this lifetime employment policy
would be difficult without the keiretsu economic system that allows flexibility in employ-
ment assignments.
Studying changes made in accounting systems when the parent integrates a newly
acquired subsidiary might provide significant insight into the diffusion of management
control practices (Firth, 1996). Documenting the historical evolution of the managerial
accounting system as it matches the cultural, political, and economic factors in the
subsidiary's environment would provide a preliminary understanding of the impact of
these unmeasurables on accounting systems. Anderson and Lanen (1999) used such an
approach to consider the environmental changes in India over a 10-year period and the
associated changes in management accounting systems.
Harrison and McKinnon (1999) call for new insights into the relation or distinction
between national culture and firm culture. Western and Asian or Far Eastern (e.g., Japan)
national cultures are very different. Western national cultures are relatively less collectiv-
istic (more individualistic) and possess relatively weaker ties between family and company
loyalty (e.g., lifetime employment with the same company). There is some evidence that
management practices successfijl in Japanese firms, such as target costing, continuous cost
improvement, or horizontal communication, are not as successful when implemented in
Western firms. Theory suggests that the control function, fulfilled by Japan's national
culture (Nishimura, 1995), is missing in the West. The relation between national and firm
culture and how it interacts with other environmental factors to affect the use of
management accounting practices in contracting, such as making successfiil strategic
and operating decisions, provides promise for future research.
4.1.4. Technology^ and infrastructure
Included under the infrastructure category are educational level and professionalism for
potential employees, the physical infrastructure of the country, and the available technol-
ogy. These are of particular concern in developing countries and former plarmed-economy
countries. For example, eastern European countries did not have management education
until the first advanced-degree program was established in Budapest in 1988. Thus, the
available professional pool of managers is very low in these countries. Gray (1988)
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proposes that professionalism among accountants is likely to be related to cultural
dimensions. He hypothesizes that in countries where individualism is high and uncertainty
avoidance and power distance is low, the professionalism of accountants will be stronger.
Physical infrastructure barriers can also create significant management accounting
issues in cross-border operations. Logistical nightmares associated with shipping and
transportation issues can create unforeseen delays and increased costs. Anderson and
Lanen (1999) found that Indian firms contracted with domestic rather than international
suppliers because of unreliable infrastructure considerations. Infrastructure issues also
significantly influence market-entry decisions. For example, contracting choices among
licensing, exporting, and creating a JV or a wholly owned foreign subsidiary may revolve
around inlrastructure, economic, or political issues. Designing accounting systems that
identify and provide management with cost estimates that acknowledge international
environmental costs presents significant challenges.
5. The framework for international managerial accounting research
For purposes of organizing the discussion of international managerial accounting
research, the contracting framework outlined in Section 3 and expanded in Fig. 1 is used
to classify the demand for managerial accounting into two categories, partitioning of
decision rights and designing decision control. Fig. 2 provides an overview of the
management accounting system choices firms make that are impacted by the environ-
mental factors discussed in Section 4. The cells of Fig. 2 focus on the bottom two thirds of
Fig. 1 . To organize the diverse research across these two categories, the framework must
capture the contracting impacts on decisions throughout various levels of the firm. A
convenient and widely used categorization of types of decisions is operating- and
strategic-level decisions. The columns in Fig. 2 show several types of decisions faced
by international organizations. These decisions are classified into rows in Fig. 2 according
to decision-rights management and control issues.
The international decisions identified in Fig. 2 and discussed in this section are not
independent. Thus, management accounting knowledge is demanded across a variety of
Strategic Decisions Operating Decisions
Market-Choice Decisions Entry-Mode Decisions Employee Decisions Cross-border Decisions
Partition
Decision
Rights
Differences in Abilities &
Cultures Impact Specific
Knowledge: Organize by
line of business or
geographic segments?
Export or Licensing vs.
Joint Venture or Acquisition is
Influenced
by Firm-Specific Knowledge
Location of Specialized
Expertise:
Economic. Political and
Culmral Knowledge of
Markets
Cross-Border Transactions
and
Transfer-Pricing
Responsibility
Design
Decision
Control
Political Risk. Financial
Risk, And Economic
Exposure: What type of
control system is effective?
Desired Control over Firm-
specific Knowledge;
High Control-export or wholly
owned
Less Control—licensing or
joint venture
Centralized or decentralized
exchange-risk management?
Budgeting process
accountability for foreign
exchange fluctuations?
Country-level choice to be a
net importer, net exporter,
or purely domestic impacts
responsibility accounting
Fig. 2. Global choices and decision-rights allocation and control.
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international decision settings, and in addition accounting processes and practices fill a
\"ariet>' of roles.
Table 1 uses the theoretical frame\\ork illustrated in Figs. 1 and 2 to organize our
sample of published international managerial accounting research. The rows in Table 1
,
panels A and B, reflect decision-rights allocation and decision-control contracting issues,
respectively. The columns show several operating (panel A) and strategic (panel B)
decision categories. These categories are examined in more detail in the following sections.
The companion table. Table 2 in the appendix, provides a more detailed discussion of each
of the published studies included in Table 1
.'
The theoretical framework we use in this paper helps to explain conflicting results in the
literature as well as suggest why firms might use managerial accounting practices
differently in certain operating and strategic decisions.
5. J. Operating decisions
Operating decisions are often countiy specific. These decisions typically occur at local
levels and are. by definition, made by lower-level employees (e.g., plant manager, subsidiary
head. etc.). The choice of what is or is not an operating-level decision belongs to upper
management because upper management usually possesses the associated decision rights.
Operating decisions t>'pically include the design of the local management control, perfor-
mance e\aluation, and product costing systems. The role ofbudgeting at the local level, as a
means of decision-rights assigrmient and control, is usually handled by local managers.
Some operating-le\'el decisions are cross border. For example, transfer-pricing and cross-
border sourcing decisions are the types of operating decisions made at a local level.
5.1.1. Management control system
A large portion of published international management accounting research investigates
MCSs and culture. Several studies are designed to investigate differences in MCS at the
operating \e\e\ that are hypothesized to exist between companies in different countries
because of Hofstede's (1967) culture differences (Chow. Shields, & Chan, 1991; Chow,
Shields, et al.. 1999; Harrison & McKinnon, 1999). For example. Chow, Shields, et al.
(1999) use their study of the relation between culture and seven common MCS
components to link together extant research examining culture's impact on individual
MCS components. Section 4. 1 .3 provides a detailed discussion of culture's effect on MCS
design and directions for fliture study of MCS.
However, only a few studies have begun to address how noncultural variables impact
MCS designs. For example, Jiang and Kim (2000) and Nishimura (1995) both hint at the
idea that observed differences in U.S. and Japanese MCSs might be a result of corporate
governance and labor market differences, respectively. McMann and Nanni (1995)
review the literature relating to Japanese management practices, including managerial
accounting issues such as target costing. The majority of the articles included in their
review are practice oriented and should prove useful in identifying important Japanese
Tables 1 and 2 contain research papers addressing management accounting issues from the set ofjournals
identified earlier Other citations are either review papers or examples and illustrations to support a point.
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managerial accounting issues and how they could be studied empirically."^ From their
review, McMann and Nanni conclude that Japanese managerial accounting techniques
cannot simply be transferred to Western firms and locations without an improved
understanding of how the Japanese employ particular accounting techniques at the
operating level and the multiple goals behind their use. Future research could provide
valuable insights into the design and use of firms' MCS by incorporating the interactive
effects of environmental factors beyond culture that are discussed in this paper.
5.1.2. Performance evaluation and budgeting
Budgeting issues are inevitably intertwined with performance evaluation considera-
tions. Since budgets serve both roles of decision-rights assignment and control of decision
processes, the two are inextricably linked. However, extant research tends to focus on only
one or the other of these roles and primarily uses culture to explain observed international
differences. Schuler and Rogovsky (1998) show broad support for an association between
culture and specific budget-based compensation packages. At the local level, it is not
surprising that culture plays a significant role. Borkowski (1999) also provides some
evidence that specific performance evaluation criteria of transnational corporations vary in
importance by country. One exception to the focus on culture is Noerreklit and Schoenfeld
(2000), who provide insights into the control problems faced by multinationals due to
language, environmental, and communications barriers.
The effectiveness of international managers in budget preparation is a conventional
topic for many published papers. For example, Tsui (2001) shows that the attitudes of
Chinese and Western managers towards budget participation vary due to cultural differ-
ences. Similarly, Chow, Harrison, McKinnon, and Wu (1999) show that information
sharing is affected by culture when comparing Taiwanese and Australian employees.
5.1.3. Product costing, transfer pricing, and taxes
Transfer pricing is a major issue in purely domestic firms. However, because of variation
in taxes, foreign exchange considerations, and repatriation restrictions, international issues
add significant complications to transfer pricing. For example, tax benefits of higher transfer
prices (lower taxable income) must sometimes be offset against the higher import duties that
are assigned to products with higher transfer prices (Emmanuel, 1999). Also, the use of
transfer prices to circumvent dividend repatriation restrictions imposed by the government in
which a subsidiary operates may be part of the equation (Collins et al., 1995, 1998). Collins
et al. (1995) use IRS data to show that MNEs shift income between international tax
jurisdictions to lower their tax liability. These income shifts affect product cost and
potentially performance evaluation. Research involving international transfer pricing-
related issues besides tax minimization could address the interaction among transfer pricing,
performance evaluation, and product cost-related decisions (Heely & Nersesian, 1993).
Leitch and Barrett (1992) provide an extensive review of the analytical and empirical
literature that examines the influence of various environmental factors on multinational
transfer-pricing methods and objectives. For example, they note that firms practicing
^ See Table 4 in McMann and Nanni (1995) for studies involving international (i.e., more than one country)
and Japanese managerial accounting issues.
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aggressive transfer-pricing policies are likely to encounter govemmentally imposed
restrictions designed to counter such MNE policies. Leitch and Barrett also call for
research on transfer-pricing issues related to decision-rights allocation centralization
versus decentralization for negotiated transfer-pricing methods. In addition, they address
related decision control issues such as aligning lower level managers' incentives when
they have transfer-pricing decision rights. Through a balanced use of survey, experimental,
and archival research methods, researchers could gain a better understanding of these
issues. For example, how do transfer-pricing and cost estimation policies influence choices
concerning which market to enter and which mode(s) to employ when entering a market?
5.2. Strategic decisions
Fama and Jensen (1983a) identify the importance of the separation of decision control
(ratification and monitoring) from decision management (initiation and implementation) in
most complex organizations. Thus, strategic decisions involving ratification and monitor-
ing are typically reserved for upper management. Organizational design choices define
monitoring activities. These choices include identifying responsibility accounting systems,
performance evaluation systems, and organization-wide MCSs. In addition, ratification of
new product and market initiatives, market-entry choices, and which market to enter are
typically reserved for upper management.
5.2.1. Organizational structure and design
The strategic decision about how to organize—along geographic or product line—has
far-reaching consequences for decision-rights assignment and control. Anderson and
Lanen (1999) adopt a field-based survey approach to study how changes in firm strategy
and economic structures lead to changes in management accounting practices within 14
Indian finns. Such field-based surveys might provide an effective means for beginning to
develop an understanding of how managerial accounting information is used to assign and
control decision rights within different organizational structures.
Carr and Tomkins (1998) studied strategic investment decisions in four countries. They
concluded that financial calculus offered by organizational systems was more heavily
weighted in U.K. and U.S. companies than in German or Japanese. h\ German and
Japanese companies, strategic links with suppliers and customers were frequently given
more weight and profitability was seen to be the natural outcome of good management, but
not the aim of good management. Finally, Carr and Tomkins show that U.S. companies
complete more thorough competitive analyses. Carr and Tomkins suggest (but do not test)
that the observed differences in strategic decision styles and procedures are related to
differences in economic environments where Japan and German companies can take a
longer term orientation because of the lack of short-tenn financial pressures.
5.2.2. Market choice
The choice of which markets to enter (market choice) also impacts international
strategic decision-rights assignment and control. Choosing a market about which the firm
already possesses extensive knowledge has significantly different implications than
choosing a market dissimilar to a firm's existing markets and knowledge base. The higher
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the similarity to existing markets, the more existing firm knowledge can be applied in that
market. Global organizations are constantly assessing which markets to enter or which to
abandon. In making those choices, companies weigh and evaluate important environmen-
tal factors, such as market risk, political risk, cultural priorities, foreign exchange risk,
resource availability and cost, and access to markets. Additional considerations include
social and legal stability (e.g., does the country's commercial law system have a history of
resolving disputes in an acceptable manner?), existing accounting practices (e.g., are they
acceptable, including tax incentives via transfer pricing?), a labor force with the requisite
skill and desire to work, and a dependable infrastructure of communication, transportation,
and medical services (Heely & Nersesian, 1993).
The role of management accountants and management accounting information in the
market-choice process has had little empirical investigation. One exception is the study
by Kirsch et al. (2000) who examined the penetration of the Big Six international
accounting finns in China. Kirsch et al. created a model showing that growth potential,
client needs, a favorable political/legal climate, and cultural considerations were impor-
tant factors in determining market choice. Although not specifically investigated by
Kirsch et al., the role of the controller could include providing information about fi-
nancing risks, foreign exchange risks, resource costs, operating costs, changes in control
systems necessary for cultural and educational compatibility, appropriate systems for
motivating employees, etc.
An additional consideration for the market-choice decision is caused by a lack of
individuals with management accounting knowledge. This lack of knowledge could be a
crucial barrier to entry. Baydoun and Willett (1995) indicate that accounting systems of
developing countries are frequently incompatible with Western accounting systems. They
document the introduction of the French Unified Accounting System into Lebanon and
investigate its cultural relevance. In another example, Brinkman (1993) details problems
that arose when a McCormick subsidiary, Gilroy Foods, entered into JVs in Egypt and
Mexico. Gilroy found a lack of knowledge about accounting techniques and computer
technology, language and cultural barriers, unreliable communication channels, a hyper-
inflationary economy calling for inflation-adjusted accounting numbers, and distance and
time barriers.
These problems in entering unfamiliar markets create costly decision-rights partitioning
and control problems. An interesting researchable topic is the increased costs imposed by a
lack of accounting knowledge, language and cultural barriers, time and distance, or
inflationary economies, etc., for establishing accounting procedures and processes in
international firms. It is not clear if or how organizational decision makers are aware of
and account for these costs when making market choices. Field-based surveys (e.g., see
Anderson & Lanen, 1999) might prove useful in examining exactly how and what
managerial accounting information is used in deciding which markets to enter (e.g.,
international competitor cost estimation).
5.2.3. Market entiy mode choice
Simultaneously with market-choice decisions, organizations choose market-entry
modes. Although market-entry mode can take on a variety of formats, the focus here is
on the most commonly observed: export, licensing, greenfield sites, acquisition, or JV.
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Since entn- choices in\ oK e legal contracts. the\ can ha\ e considerable impact on resulting
decision-rights assignment and control mechanisms. Thus, the operating costs to the
organization differ substantialK depending on the chosen market-entr\' \ehicle. However.
Httle research exists that empincally explores the detenninants of entr\ -mode choice (for
an example, see Kim & Hwang. 1992) or more specifically the role of management
accounting in those decisions. One related exception is Kemsley (1998). which finds that a
binding foreign tax credit is an incenti\e that significantly increases MNEs" relative
proportion of exports to foreign production. The results suggest that the marginal costs of
changing production location often are lower than the marginal costs of adopting
altemati^ e tax-plannmg strategies, such as income shifting.
Diffenng market-entiy modes require differing degrees of decision-rights allocation. For
instance, foreign production results in a greater allocation of decision nghts than simph'
exporting. Export-only approaches to entering foreign markets protect firm-specific
knowledge, which can be endangered in J\' or licensing agreements. Export only also
in\ oK es low resource commitment m the foreign market and low costs for reassigning
decision-rights and connol s\ stem dexelopment. Howe\er. export-only strategies involve
hea\y transportation costs and frequentK are limited by political considerations. Licensing
agreements can topically overcome the transportation and political problems, but the
organization loses control of firm-specialized knowledge and distribution control (Aulakh
etal.. 1998).
Tlie organization ma\ decide, for strategic or political reasons, that a larger resource
commitment m the foreign country is necessar\- (Kirsch et al.. 2000). Organizations
t>"pically choose either a wholly owned subsidiaiy or a J\' airangement. A A' or a wholly
owned subsidian." can be acquired or built from scratch (greenfield site). Acquiring an
existing business poses special decision assignment and control problems (Blodgett. 1992).
Existing organizations ha\'e established nghts assignment and control systems. Integrating
an acquired subsidiary's (or A"s) nghts assignment and control system into the parent's may
impose major costs. The degree of parent-imposed reporting requirements depends on the
amount of control the parent wants to maintain, the resource commitment of the parent, and
strategic and political considerations. Neither the extent nor the cost of reassignment of
decision rights and control m acquired subsidiaries or into account J\'s has been examined
empirically.
Pre\'ious research shows that cross-border operations ha\"e roughly a 50°o success rate
(Geringer & Hebert. 1991). Further, that success rate is independent of whether the
operation is an acquisition or an alliance, such as a ]\. Howe\er. JVs between strong
and weak companies rareh' work and lead to mediocre perfomiance (Bleeke & Ernst. 1991:
Luo. Shenkar. & Nyaw. 2001). Luo et al. (2001) compared the control -performance
relationship for foreign \ ersus local parents in international A's in China. Their results show
a relationship bet^veen the foreign parent financial stake, control and perfomiance. Other
studies suggest that what matters is clear management control, not financial ouTiership.
Groot and Merchant (2000) completed detailed case smdies of three successful international
A"s. They found significant differences benveen the control feamres in the three JVs and
they call for more research to examine the contingent nature of controls in JV' operations. It
seems clear from Bleeke and Ernst's (1991) and Groot and Merchant's research that
management accounting systems play a significant role in the international J\' agreement
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and in the potential for success of the JV. The role ofmanagement accounting in JV control
calls for further research.
When considering whether an acquisition or alliance is a more appropriate choice in
cross-border operations, the business venture's relation to the existing businesses of the
firm is the key. Acquisitions work well when expanding the existing core business, and
alliances are more successftil when expanding into unfamiliar geographic regions or
entering new business areas. The ability to collocate specialized geographic or business
knowledge with operations in distant geographic locations can provide competitive
advantages to finns. Knowledge of local markets, suppliers, sources of capital, and culture
are important for the successful operation of international subsidiaries. However, the MCS
must be designed to motivate individuals in the alliance to use that specialized knowledge
in the best interests of the parent. Research is needed to investigate when the management
accounting system motivates the acquisition, transfer, and proper use of the idiosyncratic
knowledge needed to operate successfully internationally.
Because firms use their accounting system as a means of communicating when cultural
and language barriers are present, internal auditors or management accountants are
frequently among the first individuals from the parent to be assigned to work at the site
of newly acquired subsidiaries. Communicating the subsidiaries' status through the
language of accounting becomes critical. The operations budgeting, perfomiance evalu-
ation, cost accumulation, capital budgeting, incentive, and asset-measurement systems
provide the cross-border language that conveys the status of the firm's investments around
the world. Further study of the importance of internal accounting reports in the integration
of international operations would provide a basis for understanding decision-rights
assignment and control issues as they develop.
International subsidiary operations can be classified as net exporters, net importers, or
mostly domestic operations. Domestic subsidiaries have the fewest cross-border trans-
actions and less exchange-fluctuation exposure. Net importers and exporters face trans-
action risk from exchange fluctuation. The impact of foreign-exchange exposure on
decision-rights assignment and control has not been well documented. Some decision
rights (e.g., hedging, borrowing, and capital budgeting) are impacted by foreign exchange
exposure (Carr & Tomkins, 1998). Little research has been done to correlate, for example,
the decision-rights assignment and control represented in the budgeting process with
foreign exchange exposure (for examples, see Borkowski, 1999; Kirsch & Johnson, 1991).
Does exposure risk regulate decision-rights assignment? Is performance evaluation
significantly influenced by foreign exchange fluctuation and if so how?
Answers to these interrelated questions may explain observed variation in cost
accumulation and asset measurement systems. For example, would cost accumulation
processes vary depending on the significance of foreign exchange fluctuation impacts on
product input costs? Would asset measurement in highly inflationary environments require
supplementary information to the traditional historical costing approach? Changes in these
basic measurement systems impact decision-rights assignment and control in ways not
understood or well documented.
Table 1, panel A, displays our observation that the majority of international managerial
accounting research relates to operating decisions. We suggested continued research in this
area is needed. However, research involving how MNEs use managerial accounting
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infoimation and practices for strategic decisions (Table 1 . panel B ) is e\ en less explored
and onl\" no\\" beginning to attract researchers. Finally, future research should consider
how environmental factors influence NfNEs' use of managenal accounting in both
operating and strategic decisions.
6. Summarv and conclusion
This paper uses contracting theory as a guide for thinking about the role of management
accounting in the international firm. Contracting theor> predicts multiple uses of
accounting procedures in assigning and partitioning decision rights and in implementing
decision control. These rights assignment and control choices interact with the operating
and strategic-level economic decisions made within the firm. Also, the interdependent
relationship between these decisions and emiroimiental factors is discussed. We use the
contracting framework to organize and classit\ mtemational managerial accounting
research from the past 10 years. Undoubtedly, our classifications and Uterature re% lews
may ha\e o%erlooked papers that should be included in this re\ iew. We hope that the
review and fi^nework of the multiple uses of managerial accounting m MNEs will
identii\" opportimities for and spark research in intemational managerial accounting.
In particular, the lack of research about intemational market choice and enny-mode
decisions ( see Table 1 ) suggests a need for research about the costs of eniermg and operating
in different global market settings. These costs include the cost of additional or different
controls necessary in some intemational settings as a result of culmral. economic,
educational, or pohtical risks. Choice of market-entr> \ chicles is impacted by the firm's
desire to use geographically diverse knowledge and guard firm-specific knowledge that
may pro\ide competiti%"e advantage. Market-entr\" mode has significant influence on the
design and use of management accoimting information m decision-rights assigmnent and
control. \'er> hnle research has docimiented or identified the changes to the firm's decision-
rights assignment pattem (e.g.. budgeting processes) or the decision controls (e.g..
performance monitonng and evaluation) resulting from these intemational strategic
decisions.
On-going intemational operatmg decisions pose additional demands on the fmn's
management accounting system. For example, when using intemal accounting information
to compare performance across intemarional locations, foreign currency exchange issues
become important. In addition, partitioning of decision rights through, for example.
budgeting wiU be dependent on sources of local specific knowledge tliat can proMde
competitive advantage. Emironmental factors, such as economic, pohtical. educational,
and cultural differences, presimiably influence the effectiveness of accounting information
in the firm's decision-rights and control mechanisms. Yet these interdependencies are not
weU imderstood. Interdependencies in intemational operations offer nch enMronments for
smdying the impact of management accounting in firm operations.
.\s with any research, limitations to the current smdy need to be identified, hi panicular.
the use of contracting theon" affects how we categorize existing research and identify
future research oppormmties. In particular, some researchers criticize contracting theon
for msufficiently incorporating beha\ ioral effects, such as altruism and human information
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processing limitations, into analyses and outcome predictions (Fama & Jensen, 1983b).
Therefore, our adoption of a contracting perspective for developing the framework might
fail to recognize certain behavioral-related uses of accounting in MNEs. Other theoretical
frameworks might better identify such uses. Also, to the extent that our sampling
procedure and therefore our research sample is biased by the 10-year time frame, the
selected set of journals, or by our definition of international managerial accounting, our
analysis of existing published international managerial accounting research and identifi-
cation of fiiture research opportunities is similarly biased.
International managerial accounting is in its research infancy and presents opportunities
for understanding the international decision partitioning and decision-control features of
internal accounting systems. The cultural, economic, educational, and political richness of
the global economy provides settings to examine differences in accounting procedures and
to relate such differences to differences in underlying global decisions. This type of
research could help explain the organizational costs and benefits associated with operating
in international markets.
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Abstract
This study examines the association between five societal variables
—
political and civil system.
cultural \ alues. t\pe of legal system, le\ el of economic de\ elopment. and equirv' market features
—
and the amount of corporate disclosure on the Year 2000 (Y2K) technological dilemma. Data are
collected fi^om the 1997 1998 fiscal-year annual reports of 1618 publicly listed firms spanning 17
nations. Empirical findings indicate the amount of Y2K disclosure varied significanth" across
national boundaries. Statistical anah sis indicates a strong positi\"e association between the amotint of
Y2K disclosure and the le\el of (a) political rights and ci\"il hberties and (b) economic development
Results also unph publich listed firms in Common Law nations disclose more Y2K information
than cotmterpans in Roman-German Law nations. Of Hotstede"s [Hofetede. G. (1980). Culture's
consequences: luienwiional differences in work-related values. Beverly Hills, CA; Sage
Pubhcations] four cultural dimensions. onl\ power distance is a significant explanatorN' fector of
\ ariations is the amount of Y2K disclosure.
© 2004 Uni\ ersit\ of Illinois. .AH rights reserved.
Keywords: Infonnation technolog\^ and communication problems: Disclosure practices; Societal \'ariables;
International accountins
1. Introduction
Globalh. organizaiions are mcreasingh dependent upon information technologx" and
the interconnectedness—^both internally and externally—ofnetworks and s>'stems. Despite
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offering numerous benefits, dependence and interconnectedness intensify the risks from
various current information teclinology and communication (ICT) problems that continue
to evolve. Information sharing and disclosure is viewed as an intricate part of a strategic
plan to effectively (a) counter ICT risks, (b) minimize their impact, and (c) reduce their
growth (Bray, 1999). Evidence of the extent of firm disclosure on ICT problems is
primarily anecdotal evidence, with data generally drawn from the United States or United
Kingdom. Empirical investigations of factors explaining ICT disclosure practices are
virtually nonexistent. Given these factors, two principal objectives, therefore, emerge. The
first objective is to provide a large scale international archival evidence on the extent of
disclosure by firms on the Year 2000 (Y2K) dilemma. Since Y2K is perhaps the most
significant ICT problem with significant global implications we have faced, an analysis of
firm disclosure on this issue offers a large potential database. The second objective is to
empirically test the association between the amount of Y2K disclosure and five societal
variables' (political and civil system, cultural values, type of legal system, level of
economic development, and equity market).
Origins" of ICT problems generally vary (Webster, 1999) while their effects, costs, and
consequences show numerous similarities (see Appendix A). Financial and social
incentives may induce corporate management to disclose information on the effects,
costs, and consequences of ICT problems. Direct financial remediation costs (including
prevention and clean-up costs) associated with a given ICT problem could be quite
substantial. Threat of fiduciary legal claims for failing to disclose information of a
material nature, therefore, may provide an impetus for disclosure of more ICT-problem-
related information. Delays in investments into value-added projects, or a need to acquire
additional equity or debt financing, may be an extra financial consequence of an ICT
problem (Goldberg, Davis, & Pegalis, 1999). This could affect fiiture cash flows and
solvency, and/or the rights of a firm's current shareholders and creditors. Corporate
management, therefore, may be spurred into disclosing more information to protect the
firm's reputation, to inspire confidence in stakeholders, and to reduce the costs of capital.
Questions about possible debt-covenant breeches may also arise. Corporate management,
therefore, has the incentive to provide information on ICT problems to protect future
employment prospects. Addifional disclosure information on ICT problems may be
provided with the aim of reducing the perceived risk of the firm. At a social level,
corporate management may perceive it as their social responsibility to preserve social
cohesion and cooperation that could result from a serious ICT problem (Petersen,
Wheatley, & Kellner-Rogers, 1998). An effective communication plan may help maintain
a firm's social contract with society, encourage confidence among end-users, and improve
Societal variables are defined as "factors to which all enterprises within a particular country are subject and
which vary between nations" (Thomas, 1991, p. 42).
Origin refers to the method by which an ICT problem is developed and method introduced into the firm.
Costs for an individual firm to rectify ICT problems can be quite substantial. In the case of Y2K, direct
worldwide costs were estimated to have been between US$300 and 450 billion (Wolf, 2001). If indirect costs
were included, expenses were estimated to have potentially exceeded US$1.6 trillion (International Y2K
Cooperation Center (IY2KCC), 2000). For some individual firms (i.e.. Bank of America and General Electric),
total Y2K remediation costs alone were between US$400 and 500 million.
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the firm's general image. Finally, ICT problem disclosures can avert the scrutiny by special
interest groups and adverse intervention by regulatory agencies.
Data for this study were collected from the 1997/1998 annual reports"^ of 1618 publicly
listed firms from 17 nations. The resuhs of an empirical analysis of the content indicate that
the mean amount of Y2K disclosure varied significantly across national boundaries.
Analytical tests find a significant association between five societal variables (political
and civil system, cultural dimension of power distance, legal system, level of economic
development, and equity market size) and the amount of Y2K disclosure. Firm size,
industry type, listing status, and national Y2K materiality costs are also significant
explanatory factors. The cultural dimensions of uncertainty avoidance, individualism and
masculinity, turnover of the equity market, and a firm's economic performance, however,
were not associated with the amount of Y2K disclosure. These findings imply that despite
growing internationalization, international implications ofY2K, and extensive international
media and scholarly coverage, there was a lack of consensus on Y2K disclosure practices
across national boundaries. Based on these findings, I expect an asymmetry of information
concerns across national boundaries for other ICT problems. The findings also indicate that
factors associated with variations in other disclosure practices across national boundaries
are of significant explanatory power. This implies that societal variables, such as the legal
system and level ofdevelopment, could have broader application to patterns of disclosure to
traditional and emerging international accounting issues.
The remainder of this paper is arranged as follows. A general overview of international
accounting-disclosure research followed by the development of testable hypotheses is
provided in Section 2. The research method and descriptive statistics are outlined in
Section 3, with results in Section 4. Discussion, concluding remarks, and ftiture research
ideas are provided in Section 5.
2. Prior international accounting-disclosure studies and the development of
hypotheses
2.1. Ove)-view of the prior general international accounting literature on disclosure
practices
Salter (1998) argues that, despite a lengthy history, international accounting-disclosure
research is relatively thin in content and largely incomplete. Nonetheless, research findings
infer that corporate disclosure practices vary significantly across national boundaries.
Alford, Jones, Leftwich, and Zemijewski (1993) analyze the relationship between
'^ Two additional reasons support this restriction. First, the 1997/1998 fiscal year approximately marked the
midpoint between the start of remediation action and the primary Y2K rollover date; thus, firms should have been
in a position by this time period to report on the Y2K issue. Second, Y2K disclosure practices prior to 1997/1998
cut-off date were generally voluntary. Subsequently, some nations introduced mandatory requirements. As the
disclosure of information on other ICT problems remains predominantly voluntary, the analysis of Y2K
disclosure practices at a time when it was still largely voluntary provides better justification when generalizing
findings to encompass disclosures on other ICT problems.
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variations in the capital markets of 16 developed nations and the differences in the
usefulness of accounting earnings. They conclude that the relati\ e infonnation content of
corporate disclosures vary across national boundaries." Drawing on data from 17 nations.
Ball, Kothari, and Robin (2000) focus on the association between the legal system and
infonnation asymmetry. Empirical results suggest that institutional features strongly
influence disclosure practices (Ball et al., 2000). The nonfinancial accounting disclosures'
empirical findings indicate that these are significant variations across national boundaries.
Adams. Hill, and Roberts (1998) find significant variations across national boundaries in
the amount of environmental and social infonnation disclosed by finns ni six European
nations. Similarly, Williams (1999) shows that the quantity and quality of environmental
and social disclosures in annual reports of finns from seven Asia-Pacific nations vary
significantly across national boundaries.
Studies show that country-of-origin is a significant explanatory factor of variations in
financial and nonfinancial accounting. However, results show that pattems in financial and
nonfinancial disclosure across national boundaries may not coincide. Meek. Roberts, and
Gray (1995) show that the amount of financial, nonfinancial. and strategic information
multinational finns from the United States. United Kingdom, and continental Europe
(France. Gennany. and the Netherlands) varies significantly across national and regional
boundaries. They show that continental-European multinational firms ha\ e more strategic
information disclosure but less amount of financial and nonfinancial infonnation than U.S.
or U.K. multinationals.
Theoretical frameworks developed to explain variations in corporate disclosure
practices across national boundaries rely heavily on contingency and environmental-based
models, which Cooke and Wallace (1990) call environmental-detenninism models. Early
models are historical in nature and focus on economic factors such as colonial ties, level of
economic development, and education standards (e.g., American Accounting Association.
1977; Mueller, 1968). More recent models incorporate cultural pattems (e.g., Doupnik &
Salter, 1995; Gray, 1988; Salter & Niswander, 1995) and factors of a nation's legal and
political system (e.g., Jaggi & Pek. 2000; Saher & Doupnik, 1992), and financial markets
(e.g., Alford et al, 1993; Riahi-Belkaoui. 1995).'' The research findings suggest that
national culture, a nation's cultural, political economy, and economic (market) environ-
ment affect corporate disclosure. This study seeks to extend prior research by empirically
testing the association between the amount of Y2K disclosure (as a proxy for ICT
problems) and the five societal-level factors
—
political and civil system, cultural values,
legal system type, level of economic de\'elopment. and type of equit>' market.
2.2. Political and civil system
Prior research suggests that finns adjust corporate-disclosure practices in response to
the number, type, and nature of stakeholders (Roberts. 1992). The development, power.
^ Specifically, the corporate disclosures in nations such as Denmark, Germany, and Italy were found to have
less information value than corporate disclosures among firms in nations such as Australia, France, and the United
States.
For a full description, refer to Cooke and Wallace (1990) and Doupnik and Salter (1995).
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and influence of stakeholders, however, can be significantly influenced by a nation's level
of political rights^ and civil liberties^ (Moaddel, 1994). By association, therefore, the
political and civil system may also affect corporate disclosure practices (e.g., Belkaoui,
1983; Goodrich, 1986; Gray, 1988; Jaggi & Pek, 2000). In a geopolitical environment with
more extensive political rights and civil liberties, emerging stakeholder groups are less
likely to face obstacles to establish their identity and express a wider range of diverse ideas
and views. Furthermore, special-interests groups, such as unions, environmentalists, and
consumer groups, are likely to have greater freedom to scrutinize a firm's operations.
Under these conditions, firms may adopt more transparent disclosure policies to meet the
needs of a wider set of interest groups, maintain external relationships and image, and
reduce regulatory scrutiny. Some authors (e.g., Gastil, 1990) argue, however, that the
emergence of new stakeholder groups will not be stifled by a repressive political and civil
system, but that their power and influence is likely to be seriously diminished. In a
repressive political and civil system, power and influence is centralized towards one party
or a few key individuals. With centralization, firms are likely to refine their disclosure
strategies to meet the specific needs of a small (if not a single), concentrated group. In
addition, consolidation of power and influence may enable firms to establish internal lines
of communication through which specific financial reports may be provided and thus
reduce the need to provide generalized financial reports to other parties.
In the context of Y2K, it was anticipated that affected finns will generate significant
direct or indirect consequences on employees, customers, shareholders, and the general
public. If prevailing circumstances enable the interests of these parties to be openly and
vigorously represented by special groups, such as unions, consumer groups, and
environmental factions, firms would be under greater pressure to make suitable disclo-
sures. With a more repressive political and civil system, however, pressure to make Y2K-
related disclosures was likely to have been diminished. Based on this analysis, the
following testable hypothesis is developed:
Hypothesis 1. There is a negative association between the level of political and civil
repression and the extent of Y2K disclosure in the annual reports of listed firms.
2.3. Cultural values
Theoretical frameworks suggest a significant association between culture and disclo-
sure practices (e.g., Doupnik & Salter, 1993, 1995; Perera, 1989; Salter & Niswander,
1995; Zarzeski, 1996). The seminal work of Gray (1988) provides a valuable framework
for analyzing this association. His model highlights this connection via the association
between the cultural dimensions Hofstede (1980) (uncertainty avoidance, power distance,
individualism, and masculinity) and accounting subcultural values. With respect to
' Gastil (1990) defines political rights as an ability of individuals, firms, and other related bodies to play a
part in determining the laws and government of the community. The concept captures political competitiveness,
freedom to organize multiple political parties, rights of political opposition, and self-determination by major
subgroups (Lin, 1993).
Civil liberties encompass freedom of assembly, demonstration, speech, and religion (Lin, 1993).
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corporate disclosures. Gray (p. 11) hypothesizes that "the higher a countr\' ranks in tenns
of uncertainty avoidance and power distance and the lower it ranks in terms of
individualism and masculinity' then the more likely it is to rank highly in terms of
secrecy."''
This hypothesis implies that societies with higher levels of uncertainty avoidance (a
cultural dimension that defines a society's level of comfort with uncertainty and
ambiguity) disclose less corporate infonnation. Information is restricted to avoid possible
conflicts, competiti\e uncertainties, and to preserve greater internal security. The hypoth-
esis of Gray (1988) also implies that information is likely to be more restricted in societies
with higher levels of power distance (acceptance of institutional and organizational
authoritv' by society's individual members). This is because in such societies, indi\idual
members are more willing to accept the restriction of information to the upper echelons of
a firm, government, or agency. With respect to ICT problems, individuals in a high power-
distance societ)' may be more willing to accept a firm's decision to restrict disclosures if
corporate management fears disclosure could undermine its power. Individual in these
societies, respect authority, and rely on the expertise of management in dealing with such
matters.
The cuhural dimension of indi\idualism of Hofstede (1980) is considered synonymous
with a higher level of spirited competition and entrepreneurship. Gray (1988) argues that a
highly competitive environment encourages firms to disclose more information to
adequately compete for capital. In a high-individualism society, the lack of disclosure
on ICT problems may raise concerns about a firm's future viability, leading creditors to
restrict financing or to enforce stricter debt-covenant clauses. In addition, there is likely to
be less reluctance among stakeholders (customers and suppliers) to shift allegiances if
concerns about future services arise. Additional disclosure in an indi\'idualistic society
may help preserxe a relationship with and confidence in a finn. Finally, masculinity
(society's preference for asserti\eness. high achievement, and financial success) is
perceived to ha\e a positive influence on corporate disclosure. Higher masculinity levels
encourage socier\' members (indi\iduals or finns) to actively promote the disclosure of
information about achie\ements, abilities, and successes. In the context of ICT problems,
more disclosure may result when masculinity le\ els are higher \\ ith corporate management
perceiving the need to assert their ability and aptitude for dealing effectively and
efficiently with emerging problems.
Empirical findings generally support hypotheses underlying the theoretical framework
of Gray (1988). Saher and Niswander (1995. p. 394) state "Gray appears to ha\e pro\ided
a workable theor\' to explain cross-national differences in accounting structure and
practice, which is particularly strong in explaining differential financial reporting practi-
ces." Internationalization, however, may moderate the influence of cultural values. Jaggi
and Pek (2000) and Zarzeski (1996) find that cultural values are not a significant
Secrecy and transparency is defined by Gray (p. 8) as "a preference for confidentialiU' and the restriction of
disclosure of information about the business only to those who are closely in\ olved w ith its management and
financing as opposed to a more transparent, open and public accountable approach.'" He hypothesized that "the
higher a countr\' ranks in terms of uncertaintv avoidance and power distance and the lower it ranks in terms of
individualism and masculinity then the more likely it is to rank highly in terms of secrecy" (p. 11).
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explanatoPv' factor of corporate disclosure practices among international firms. Since the
link between culture and corporate disclosure practices is not conclusi\e. it is important to
examine the influence of cultural dimensions on disclosure practices related to ICT
problems, which generalh' transcend international boundanes. Consequently, the follow-
ing hypothesis. deri\"ed from Gray"s (1988) framework, is formed:
Hvpothesis 2. The lower a countn.' ranks in tenns of uncertainr\' a\oidance. power
distance, and masculinit\' and the higher it ranks m tenns of indniduahsm. the more \1K
information will be reported by listed firms m their annual reports.
2.4. Le\el of economic development
Conceptual accounting studies investigating the influence of sociopolitical and eco-
nomic systems identify economic factors as Important determinants of the development of
accounting and reporting practices (Belkaoui. 1983: Belkaoui & Maksy. 1985: Cooke &
Wallace. 1990; Nair & Frank. 1981). The le\el of economic de\elopment is an economic
factor of particular interest (Adhikari & Tondkar. 1992; .A.hmed. 1995; Doupnik &: Salter.
1995; Salter. 1998). with theoretical arguments implying a positive influence on corporate
disclosures (Doupnik & Salter 1995). Some suggest that this association arises because a
higher level of economic de\elopment provides a positi\ e stimulus that increases the range
and strength of special interest groups. Moaddel (1994) argues that economic development
benefits all stakeholders, which promotes growth in the number and strength of pressure
groups such as labor unions and consumer groups. In addition, greater economic
development enables better organized, financed, and articulated special interest groups.
Overall, economic de\elopment is likely to see firms under greater scrutiny fi^om a wider
range of better equipped and funded special interest groups. In response, corporate
management may adopt more transparent disclosure policies aimed at mamtaining the
firm's relationships and image and at a\oiding more intense scrutiny and potential
regulatory inter\ention.
Disclosure on ICT problems is likely to receive higher attention fi^om special interest
groups in nations with a higher le\"el of economic development because a general by-
product of economic dexelopment is the use of more complex ICT s_vstems and
sophisticated and extensi\e interconnected ner\\orks. For instance, the 1999 Information
Society Index (ISI: IDC.com. 1999). measuring the ability- of 55 nations to access and
absorb ICT. shows that Sweden and the United States were ranked 1st and 2nd.
respecti\ely. Conxersely. Mala\'sia and South Africa were ranked 32nd and 38th.
respectively. Higher ICT adoption and interconnecti\'iU' implies that firms in more
developed economies are likeh to be prone to ICT problems. Due to the greater exposure
to risk, these firms would be under more pressure from special interest firms to disclose
information on ICT problems than their counterparts in less developed economies.
While theoretical arguments support a positive association between economic de\ el-
opment and disclosure panems. the empirical e\idence is mixed: Adhikari and Tondkar
(1992) and .-\hmed (1995) find no association. Conversely. Cooke and Wallace (1990).
Doupnik and Salter (1995). and Salter (1998i find suppon for theoretical arguments.
Overall, the association remains an open empirical question. If the risk oi ICT is likely to
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be influenced by a nation's level of economic de\ elopment. it is imponant to explore
further the influence of this economic factor. Thus, the following h\pothesis is fonned:
Hvpothesis 3. There is a positive association between the level of economic de\ elopment
and the extent of Y2K disclosure presented in annual reports of listed firms.
2.5. Equity markets
Findings from se\eral sur\'e\'s and empincal smdies indicate that information on ICT
problems, such as Y2K, are of importance to investors (e.g.. Goldberg et al.. 1999; Menil
L\Tich Global Securities Research and Economics. 1998; McGough. 1999). For example.
an international suney by Taylor and Associates (1999) ranks the disclosure of informa-
tion on ICT risks high among investors" information needs. Interest in such information
stems from a need to fully analyze the effect of an ICT problem on (a) future cash tlows.
(b) additional fmancing needs, and (c) potential postponement of pre\ iousK proposed
projects due to budgetar\' constraints (Webster. 1999).
Some limited prior empirical research attempts to anahze the association bemeen the
equit\" market and corporate disclosure practices across national boundaries. The empirical
evidence of Barrett (197") shows that differences m the extent of corporate disclosures
between countries are explained, in part, by variations in the efificienc}" of the equiu
market.""* Two reasons may explain these results. The first reason stems from the size of
the capital market. Specificalh". as participants in capital markets increase, firms face more
pressure for greater information (Adhikari Sc Tondkar. 1992; .Ahmed. 1995). Doupnik and
Salter (1995) state that a "strong equit>" market with a di\"erse group of shareholders has
generally been viewed as conducive to the production of sophisticated information."" The
level of activit}" within the equin.' market provides the second underh ing explanation of
Barrett's (1977) findings. Doupnik and Salter (1^^5) argue that, as the le\el of acti\ it}.
increases, the information demands of stakeholders about a firm"s activities that help to
differentiate entities also intensify". With more competition for scarce investment capital.
there is an incenti\"e for flmts to disclose more to the market (Ahmed. 1995). Gi\en the
interest of investors in information on ICT problems, analysis of equitv-market features.
such as size and tumo\"er. that can influence disclosure practices appears prudent. Tlius.
the following hypothesis is formed:
Hypothesis 4. There is a positive association between the size and turnover of the equir>
market and the quantit\' of Y2K information presented m the annual reports of listed firms
in the Asia-Pacific region.
2.6. Legal system
Because of the interconnectedness. legal actions are frequently seen to be a significant
by-product of ICT problems (Webster. 1999). For example, while the threat of legal action
"" Barrett's stuch' concluded that the quantity of corporate disclosure in the United Kingdom and the United
States was much higher than that in Sweden, the Netherlands. Germany. France, and Japan.
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itself may encourage corporate management to disclose information on ICT problems, the
legal system within which the firm operates could also influence the amount of disclosure
(Reid, 1998).
Jaggi and Pek (2000) suggest that the legal system is an important element of the
institutional framework within which an accounting system interacts. Salter and Doupnik
(1995) suggest that the effect of a legal system on accounting practices is influenced by the
number of accounting rules determined by law. The influence of the legal system can be
either direct or indirect (e.g., Doupnik & Salter, 1992; Jaggi & Pek, 2000). Direct
influence may occur via such mechanisms as the Companies' Act in the U.K., accounting
regulations, and tax laws. These direct mechanisms generally prescribe the basic require-
ments for the disclosure and the measurement of accounting information. Indirect
influences arise because legal systems are a significant detenninant of the development
of corporate ownership arrangements, the structure of a corporation's capital, and the
nature of capital markets (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997; La Porta,
Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998). In turn, corporate ownership, corporate
capital structure, and capital markets significantly influence disclosure practices (Jaggi &
Pek, 2000).
International accounting research on the interaction between legal and accounting
systems focuses on the differences between firms from nations within the Roman-
Germanic legal family compared with those in the Common Law legal family. '
'
Roman-Germanic Law is based on rules developed from ideas of justice and morality
determined by legal scholars (Salter & Doupnik, 1992). Rules of law are designed to form
a detailed framework for resolving legal issues. Generally, accounting standards, practices,
and procedures are extensively codified in firm law or commercial codes (Jaggi & Pek,
2000). Conversely, in Common Law, the judiciary establishes principles and rules when
providing judgments on specific disputes (Salter & Doupnik, 1992). Rules governing
business entities are not traditionally prescribed in large numbers and details (Berkowitz,
Pistor, & Richard, 2001). Under a Common Law legal system, accounting practices are
predominantly determined by accountants and associated professional bodies and thus
tend to be more adaptive and innovative (Jaggi & Pek, 2000).
It is generally hypothesized that the amount of disclosure in Common Law nations is
likely to be greater than it is in Roman-Gennanic Law nations. Jaggi and Pek (2000,
p. 501) argue, "investors' and debtholders' information needs play an important role in
financial disclosures, a widely dispersed ownership and a high level of debt finan-
cing. . .would place heavy demand on firms for detailed financial disclosures." In addition,
La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) suggest that a Common Law system is more conducive toward
the promotion of diversified corporate ownership structures and a wider use of debt
financing. Consequently, firms from Common Law nations are likely to provide more
corporate financial disclosure to meet the broader information needs of a wider set of
shareholders and creditors. While empirical findings indicate that disclosure levels are
Other recognized legal families having bearing in some nations include the Socialist, Hindu, and Islamic
legal systems. Roman-Germanic Law and Common Law, however, remain the underlying legal systems in the
majority of nations around the world, including the nations covered in this study. See David and Brierley (1985)
and Zweigert and Kotz (1998) for a complete summary of legal families.
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more extensive in Common Law nations relative to Roman-Germanic Law nations, the
evidence remains relatively thin. With the potential for legal claims to emerge in the wake
of ICT problems, an examination of the association between the legal system and
disclosures related to ICT problems is highly relevant. Thus, the following testable
hypothesis is proposed:
Hypothesis 5. Publicly listed firms from Common Law nations will report a higher
amount ofY2K information in their annual reports than publicly listed firms from Roman-
Germanic Law nations.
3. Research method
3.1. Source documentation and measure of total Y2K disclosure (TQY2K disclosure)
Annual reports for the 1997/1998 fiscal-year annual report are the primary source
documentation used in this study.'" Content analysis (e.g., Cooke, 1991; Gray, Kouhy, &
Lavers, 1995; Hossain, Tan, & Adams, 1994) is used to measure the total amount of Y2K
information. Abbott and Monsen (1979, p. 504) defined content analysis as "a technique
for gathering data that consists of codifying qualitative information in anecdotal and
literary form into categories to derive quantitative scales of varying levels of complexity.
"
Consistent with prior empirical research (e.g., Hackston & Milne, 1996; Ingram «fe Frazier,
1980), sentences form the underlying "unit of analysis." After an extensive review of
Y2K and ICT problem literature (e.g., Goldberg et al., 1999; Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development [OECD], 1998; Petersen et al., 1998; Webster, 1999;
Yardeni, 1997), I constructed a checklist instrument to identify the sentences disclosing
Y2K-related information. Then I pretested the preliminary checklist instrument in a pilot
study, using annual reports not included in the analysis of this study. In the pilot study, four
independent coders each reviewed a set of 15 annual reports. We discussed the differences
arising from an initial review to find a consensus coding for conflicting sentences. Then,
we amended the preliminary checklist instrument to reflect and clarify difficulties noted.
We conducted a second test using another set of 1 5 annual reports (also not included in the
final study's analysis) and found few new differences. Consequently, we only made minor
adjustments to the checklist instrument, with no further pretesting and revision deemed
necessary.' Calculating the total amount of Y2K disclosures (subsequently termed
TQY2K Disclosure) using the final checklist instrument involved three steps: (1) before
coding, each annual report is read in entirety to establish a primary understanding; (2) each
sentence deemed consistent with the final checklist instrument is marked during a second
review; and (3) marked sentences are then totaled. To ensure consistency in coding, two
persons independently review all individual scores.
'
" Firms may use a variety of communication mechanisms to disclose information on Y2K. A survey of all
communication mechanisms would yield a more complete picture. Nonetheless, such an analysis was
pragmatically, financially, and technically infeasible.
'^ The final checklist instrument can be obtained from the author upon request.
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3.2. Control factors
Based on a review of the corporate disclosure and ICT problem literature, five control
factors (firni size, industry type, economic performance, listing status, and materiality of
national level Y2K costs) are included in the multiple-regression analysis. Larger firms are
thought to be at greater risk of being affected by ICT problems (including Y2K). Larger
firms have a greater need to invest in ICT to ensure that their dispersed operations and
interaction with a wider scope of external stakeholders are conducted more effectively (e.g.,
OECD, 1 998). Industry sectors that rely heavily on ICT are also likely to be at greater risk to
problems, such as Y2K, than less dependent and interconnected industries (OECD, 1998).
More highly exposed business sectors include telecommunication, airline transportation,
financial, and computer manufacturing industries (Reuters, 1999). With higher exposure
threats, larger firms and those in high-risk industry sectors are likely to disclose more ICT
problem information.
Economic performance may also influence disclosure levels. Relative to poor-
performing firms, strong economic performers are likely to signal the availability of
financial resources at their disposal to address ICT problems. Empirical research also
identifies a positive relaUonship between a firm's foreign-listing status and the extent of
corporate disclosure (e.g., Cooke, 1991; Malone, Fries, & Jones, 1993). Multilisted firms
(foreign and domestic exchange listing) are the subject of scrutiny from a wider set of
stakeholder groups. In response, multilisted firms may disclose more information than
domestically listed firms to meet the information needs of a broader group of stakeholders
and interests. Finally, variations in Y2K disclosure practices across national boundaries
could arise from differences in the perceived impact of such ICT problems in different
nations (e.g., Goldberg et al., 1999; OECD, 1998; Webster, 1999).
3.3. Proxy measurements for the societal variables and control factors
Proxy measures used to represent each societal variable and control factor are
consistent with prior international empirical research. Table 1 summarizes each respective
proxy measure.
3.4. Sample selection: nations andfirms
Sample firms are drawn from nations where the information needed to construct proxy
measures for the respective societal variables is available. Forty-nine nations, with scores
for the cultural dimensions of Hofstede (1980), formed the preliminary list of nations from
which firms were drawn. A fourfold criterion is then applied to screen the preliminary
national list: (1) data availability (for remaining) for proxy measure related to other
societal variables; (2) sufficiently large number of publicly listed firms, with principal
headquarters in the specified nation;''* (3) annual reports published in English;"'' and (4) an
This set of criteria is applied to avoid a potentially lopsided representation.
Financial limitations did not allow for the translation of non-English annual reports. English is the first-
language of the researchers.
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Table 1
Summary description of the societal variables and control factors included in the study
Description societal/
control variables
Predicted
direction
Description of measurement technique of societal variables and
control factors
PCS (political and Negative
civil system)
IND (individualism) Positive
PD (power distance) Negative
UA (uncertainty
avoidance)
MAS (masculinity)
Negative
Positive
LGDP (level of economic Positive
development)
ECGDP (market Positive
capitalization to GDP)
TRP (trading volume to Positive
market capitalization)
LS (legal system) Positive
LTAS (firm size) Positive
ROA (economic Positive
performance)
HILO (exposure of Positive
industry to Y2K)
List Stat (listing staUis Positive
of the firm)
LECOST (national Positive
materiality of
Y2K cost)
Extent of political freedom and civil rights in each nation as
measured by Freedom House { 1998), based on an index developed
by Gastil (1978).
Degree to which the members of a society are not interdependent, as
opposed to collectivism, in which people are organized into strong
groups. Original cultural-dimension scores for each nation gathered
from Hofstede (1980).
Represents the extent that people tolerate unequal distributions of
power within a society. Original cultural-dimension scores for each
nation gathered from Hofstede (1980).
This dimension represents the extent to which a society feels
threatened by unknown and ambiguous simations. Original
cultural-dimension scores for each nation gathered from
Hofstede (1980).
The degree to which people within a society express the need for
achievement, heroism, assertiveness, and material success versus
societies that stresses relationships, modesty, caring for the weak, and
quality of life. Original cultural-dimension scores for each nation
gathered from Hofstede (1980).
Nation's mean gross domestic product in USS for the three periods
prior to 1 997 as reported in the World Development Report (World
Bank. 1995-1997).
Mean market capitalization in USS divided by the nation's gross
domestic product in USS for the three periods prior to 1997 as
reported in the World Development Report (World Bank, 1995-1997).
Mean trading volume as a percentage of the market capitalization for
the three years preceding 1 997 for each nation as gathered from the
Emerging Stock Market Facthook (International Finance Corporation.
1995-1997) and Stockmarket Factbooks for various exchanges
intemationally.
Classification of each nation into one of two legal families:
(1) Common Law; and (2) Roman-Germanic Law.
Natural log of the average total assets of each firm in USS for 1996
and 1997.
Average return on assets of each firm for 1996 and 1997.
Classification using a dummy variable where a firm from an industry
highly exposed to the Y2K problem, as based on OECD (1998)
classification, were coded with a one (1); otherwise a zero (0).
Classification using a dummy variable where a firm listed on a
domestic and foreign stock exchange, were coded with a one ( 1 );
if domestically listed, only coded a zero (0).
The estimated total cost in USS of rectifying the Y2K problem in
each nation, as projected by leading commentator groups such as
Gartner, at mid- 1998 divided by the nation's gross domestic product
in USS for the three periods prior to 1997 as reported in the World
Development Report (World Bank, 1995-1997).
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics of the entire sample with a breakdown by nation
Demographic statistics of sample
Nation Mean total assets Mean operational revenue Average return on assets
(US$ billions)
Mean S.D.
(US$ billions)
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Australia 5.88 17.14 4.95 6.144 7.17 13.42
Canada 8.85 12.18 7.95 11.28 7.59 6.52
Denmark 4.37 8.794 4.20 10.94 8.02 10.76
Finland 1.53 3.565 3.02 2.299 4.07 7.89
France 3.91 15.27 6.14 3.067 3.86 6.67
Germany 6.64 3.147 3.20 8.755 6.65 6.09
Hong Kong 3.69 10.26 5.40 15.18 8.99 7.19
Japan 9.70 12.22 12.06 16.42 2.17 7.89
Malaysia 1.95 3.189 5.21 20.04 9.64 9.21
Netherlands 1.93 1.513 9.11 21.89 9.42 8.36
New Zealand 2.45 5.361 4.30 10.89 8.91 6.96
Norway 1.49 6.156 3.69 9.155 1.19 11.30
Singapore 1.97 3.084 4.65 10.62 8.46 7.96
South Africa 4.21 12.47 1.37 1.962 2.51 8.91
Sweden 4.95 15.64 2.09 4.197 5.45 2.30
United Kingdom 7.00 15.77 4.67 7.843 7.71 6.60
United States 14.10 14.57 15.30 17.01 8.98 6.87
Total sample 5.33 9.81 6.59 11.38 6.43 7.88
established stock exchange. This screening reduced the prehminary national list to 22
nations. A list of firms listed on the major stock exchange of the 22 nations at the end of
1997 is then drafted. To minimize undue exogenous influences, foreign-listed firms (those
without primary headquarters in the nation where a listing appears) are excluded from each
national list of publicly listed finns. Requiring a sufficiently large survey sample from
each nation for purposes of statistical analysis, 150 firms from each national list (i.e., 150
firms from each of the 22 nations)"' are randomly selected. Various techniques, including
direct contact, searches of annual report databases and archives, and a firm's Web site, are
used to collect the required source documentation. We excluded firms fi^om Belgium,
Indonesia, Italy, South Korea, and Taiwan from the final analysis because a small number
of firms met the screening criteria. The final number of usable annual reports included in
the statistical analysis totaled 1618, distributed across 17 nations.'^ Table 2 reports the
basic descriptive statistics (total assets, turnover, and return on assets) while Table 3
reports the frequency (Panel A) and average ainount of Y2K disclosure (Panel B). Each
table includes breakdown by nation.
A review of Table 3 provides some interesting observations. Frequency rates (see Table
3, Panel A) imply significant variations across national boundaries. For example, more
In New Zealand and Finland, publicly listed companies numbered fewer than 150 (122 and 129,
respectively). Consequently, data from all publicly listed companies in these nations were sought.
Analytical tests were conducted in an effort to establish if there was any nonresponse bias. Findings of
these tests did not reveal any nonresponse bias among those firms from whom annual reports were collected
relative to those from whom the source documentation could not be acquired.
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Table 3
Breakdown of the frequency and amount of disclosure on Y2K
(A) Frequency of disclosure (B) Demographic statistics of sample
Nation Number of Number "o Firms Mean number S.D. Maximum
usable annual of firms disclosing of sentences number of
reports disclosing disclosures
Australia 113 94 84.07 8.0973 6.5547 87.00
Canada 96 71 75.00 5.1250 4.8758 51.00
Denmark 48 28 62.50 2.8542 3.8204 44.00
Finland 87 43 52.87 3.8966 5.3852 21.00
France 95 64 69.47 5.1053 5.3960 21.00
Germany 106 67 63.21 3.7925 3.9418 38.00
Hong Kong 111 33 29.73 2.4144 4.7701 15.00
Japan 128 39 30.47 2.3047 4.5516 23.00
Malaysia 94 13 14.89 1.1789 3.6143 12.00
Netherlands 71 42 59.15 3.1127 3.4291 33.00
New Zealand 66 24 37.88 2.4394 4.7268 45.00
Norway 94 65 69.15 5.5532 5.9507 55.00
Singapore 109 24 22.02 1.8165 4.3994 21.00
South Africa 83 59 71.08 6.8675 6.8978 35.00
Sweden 93 47 52.69 3.8925 5.2097 50.00
United Kingdom 106 84 79.25 7.2830 6.3467 67.00
United States 117 105 90.60 9.4701 6.6651 78.00
Total sample 1618 902 56.68 4.5482 5.7698 87.00
than 90% of sample firms from the United States provide at least one sentence of Y2K
disclosure. Conversely, in Malaysia, the frequency rate is slightly less than 15%. The mean
amount of Y2K disclosure also suggests sizeable variations across national boundaries
(see Table 3, Panel B). Again, the United States and Malaysia have the highest and lowest
averages. Finally, regarding Table 3, Panel B, two major generalizations are highlighted:
(1) firms in developed nations (i.e.. United States, Australia, and United Kingdom) provide
more Y2K disclosure than firms in emerging economies (e.g., Malaysia); and (2) Y2K
disclosure is higher in Common Law nations than Roman-Germanic nations. Independent
/ and ANOVA tests (not reported in this paper) '^ subsequently performed support these
two broad generalizations. These general findings provide anecdotal evidence supporting
Hypotheses 3 and 5.
4. Statistical results
4.1. Correlations
Computed Pearson correlations did not exceed .5 (see Table 4). Farrar and Glauber
(1967) argue that bivariate correlation values above .8 (also, see Hair, Anderson, Tatham,
Tests were all statistically significant at the 1% confidence level.
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Table 4
Pearson correlation results
Variables IND PD UA MAS GDP ECGDP TRP LS LTAS ROA HILO List
Stat
LECOST
PCS -.088 .085 -.349 .133 -.365 .334 -.073 .397 .073 .010 -.323 .021 -.177
IND 1.000 -.271 .247 -.116 .395 -.478 .035 -.073 -.076 -.010 .338 -.031 .212
PD 1.000 -.056 .238 -.087 .319 -.154 .292 .100 .002 -.333 -.Oil .072
UA 1.000 .342 .317 -.376 -.301 -.345 .149 .004 -.023 -.051 .354
IVIAS 1.000 .245 .302 .144 .376 .306 -.013 -.173 .002 .318
LGDP 1.000 -.356 .354 -.105 .318 -.006 .131 .115 .354
ECGDP 1.000 -.246 .199 .101 -.006 -.258 -.078 -.246
TRP 1.000 -.298 -.035 .051 .087 -.032 .277
LS 1.000 .026 -.023 -.126 .310 -.028
LTAS 1.000 -.121 .090 .410 .340
ROA 1.000 .020 .191 -.003
HILO 1.000 .036 .048
List Stat 1.000 .091
LECOST 1.000
PCS=political and civil system; IND=individiialism; PD=power distance; UA=uncertainty avoidance;
LGDP=natural log of each nation's gross domestic product; ECGDP=mean stock exchange market capitalization
divided by each nation's gross domestic product; TRP*=mean stock exchange turnover volume to market
capitalization; LS=legal system; LTAS=natural logarithm of average total assets 1996 and 1997; ROA=retum on
total assets; HILO=perceived industry exposure to the Y2K problem; List Stat=listing status of each firm; and
LECOST=natural logarithm of the expected total cost to rectify the Y2K problem in the firm's domestic nation
of origin.
& Black, 1995) indicate hannflil levels of multicoUinearity. As a further test for multi-
coUinearity, variance inflation-factor (VIF) values are calculated with no values exceeding
4.00, substantially below the critical value of 10.00 (Netter, Wasserman, & Kutner, 1989).
In a final check of multicoUinearity, a series of multiple-regression tests were performed.
In the first multiple regression, all but one of the societal variables and control factors
(namely, legal system) were included. For subsequent multiple regressions, the excluded
variable is reinstated and another is removed. This systematic testing did not indicate any
significant changes. Overall, Pearson correlations, VIF values, and systematic multiple-
regression tests imply that multicoUinearity is not a serious concern.''^
4.2. Multiple-regression analysis
Table 5 presents the multiple-regression results. Overall, the model is highly
significant (P<.001), explaining 36.5% of the variation in the dependent variable.
This conclusion is consistent with a variety of other studies. Cormier and Magnan (2000) reported
pairwise correlations as high as 0.54 but did not consider this as having serious multicoUinearity problems for the
purposes of their analysis.
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Table 5
Effect of societal variables
Multiple regression equation; T0Y2K Disclosure=a| - j!|PCS+a2lND-a3PD-a4UA +a5MAS+>:„LGDP+a-^CIR+
asECGDP+ac,TRP+ai„LS +^|LTAS+/?2ROA+/i.,HILO+/?4List Stat+/?5LECOST+£
Variables Predicted sign Coefficient / Statistic Significance
PCS Negative -.625 -2.600 .009^
IND Positive 3.317E-02 1.469 .142
PD Negative -5.910E-02 -2.606 .009^
UA Negative -7.185E-04 -.046 .963
MAS Positive 8.855E-03 -.623 .533
LGDP Positive 1.898 4.356 .000'
ECGDP Positive 2.768 4.390 .000'
TRP Positive -6.561E-04 -.113 .910
LS Positive 4.128 5.441 .000'
LTAS Positive .562 1.357 .000'
ROA Positive 1.263E-04 .0108 .914
HILO Positive 4.634 17.577 .000'
List Stat Positive 2.191 3.142 .005'
LECOST Positive 1.589 4.122 .000'
Constant N/A 3.067 .687 .492
Adjusted /?-=.365; F statistic=69.399; Significance=.000''
PCS (political and civil system): Freedom House (1998) political freedom and civil rights inde.x scores in each
nation: fND (indi\idualism): original cultural dimension scores for each nation gathered from Hofstede (1980);
PD (power distance): original cultural dimension scores for each nation gathered from Hofstede (1980); UA
(uncertainty avoidance): original cultural dimension scores for each nation gathered from Hofstede (1980); MAS
(masculinity): original cultural dimension scores for each nation gathered from Hofstede (1980); LGDP (level of
economic development): nation's mean GDP in USS for the three periods prior to 1997; ECGDP (market
capitalization to GDP): mean market capitalization in USS divided by the nation's GDP in USS for the three
periods prior to 1997; TRP (trading volume to market capitalization); mean trading volume as a percentage of the
market capitalization for the three year preceding 1997; LS (legal system): dichotomous variable with coded one
( 1 ) if firm from nation under a Common Law legal system; coded zero (0) if otherwise; LTAS (firm size); natural
log of the average total assets of each firm in USS for 1996 and 1997; RO.'^ (economic performance): average
remm on assets of each firm for 1996 and 1997; HILO (exposure of industry to Y2K): dichotomous variable
coded one (1) if a firm is from a highly exposed Y2K industry; coded zero (0) if otherwise; List Stat (listing
status); dichotomous variable coded one (1) if a firm is listed on a foreign stock exchange, coded zero (0) if only
domestically listed otherwise; LECOST (national materiality of Y2K cost); estimated total cost in USS of
rectifying the Y2K problem di\ ided by the nation's GDP in USS for the three periods prior to 1997. '*''"*=P<.10.
* P<.05.
**P<Ml.
TQY2K is significantly negatively associated with PCS (P<.05) and PD (P<.05). In
contrast, the coefficients for LGDP (P<.001). ECGDP (P<.001). and LS {P<m\) are
all significantly positively associated with TQY2K. Coefficients representing IND, UA,
MAS, and TRP are not different from zero. Overall, findings support Hypotheses 1, 3,
and 5, but only partial supports Hypotheses 2 and 4. Among the control factors,
coefficients for firm size, industry type, listing status, and national materiality Y2K costs
are all statistically significant (P<.01). The coefficient for economic performance,
however, is not statistically significant. Coefficient directional signs of the control
factors are as expected.
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4.3. Sensitivity analysis
To test the robustness of multiple-regression results and the dependent variable's proxy
measure, we conducted additional empirical tests. The proxy measure for dependent
variables is reliant, in part, on the coder's subjective judgment, who may introduce
potential errors and undue noise into the analysis. To test this possibility, the sample is split
into two groups using the sample TY2KD median as the cutoff. Finns with TY2KD values
above the median are categorized "High TY2KD" (coded 1) and those below "Low
TY2KD" (coded 0). This technique is consistent with prior research (e.g., Connier &
Magnan, 2000). Logistic regression and additional multiple-regression tests are then
performed, which yield findings closely matching those reported in Table 5. In another
sensitivity test, the multiple-regression tests are performed again, using a deflated TY2KD
score (the entire sample's median TY2KD score depresses each firm's actual TY2KD
score), rather than the actual TY2KD score for results reported in Table 5. Results using
the deflated TY2KD measure show no significant discrepancies with Table 5. A third set
of tests, focusing on the dependent variable's proxy measure, involves systematic
elimination of outlier observations that may unduly influence results. Regression findings
following the elimination of outliers also show no significant disparities with Table 5
results.
Data from Belgium, Indonesia, Italy, South Korea, and Taiwan were originally
excluded due to the small representative numbers. As an additional sensitivity test,
the model from Table 5 is perfonned again, but with data from the five previously
excluded nations included. The additional test yields no significant differences.
Multiple regressions based on the Table 5 model are again performed with alternative
common proxy measures for some of the control factors. For firm size, natural
logarithm of total revenue is substituted for natural logarithm of total assets, while
for economic perfonnance, return on shareholders equity is substituted for return on
total assets. All results from these additional tests show no serious alterations in
either the significance or directional sign of coefficients for each respective societal
variable or control factor than that reported in Table 5. Finally, additional tests are
perfonned to ensure that proxy measures for the independent variables capture each
noted dimension rather than being a proxy for country affiliation. For this sensitivity
test, a multiple-regression model, including only the control factors and dummy
variables for each of the 17 nations represented by the data, is first constructed. A
second series of models including control variables and only one societal variable is
then formed. R" values of regressions performed are then compared. Findings
indicate that the explanatory power of each model differed, thereby supporting the
view that proxy measures for the societal variables were not substitutes for countiy
affiliation.
5. Conclusions
A primary contribution of this study is that it provides the first large-scale
investigation of disclosure practices related to a highly publicized ICT problem
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across a wide range of nations with diverse sociopolitical and economic features. In
general, the findings suggest that firnis around the world are reluctant to voluntarily
disclose information on ICT problems, in this case, Y2K. in their annual reports.
Additional empirical evidence implies that at an international level there is likely to
be asymmetry of information concerns across national boundaries on such issues
based on findings related to Y2K. Our findings imply that there are obstacles to
fiiUy evaluating and comparing the risks firms face from ICT problems in different
nations. A second major contribution is that the study provides empirical evidence
of the association between major societal variables and the amount of Y2K
disclosure. The results imply that firms are likely to disclose more information
on ICT problems, such as Y2K, in (a) less repressive political and civil systems;
(b) low power-distance societies; (c) nations with a higher level of economic
development; (d) nations where the underlying legal system is based on Common
Law; and (e) equity markets with a higher ratio of market capitalization to a
nation's GDP.
Various future investigations are possible. One objective of further research could
be to consider disclosure practices related to other ICT problems. One area of
investigation could address disclosure practices in respect to ICT problems resulting
ft-om the conversion to the Euro. With more nations seeking to establish regional ties,
various proposals (though rather tentative in nature) have surfaced that call for the
use of a common monetary domination (the ASEAN is one such region) in such
area. If currency conversions occur more frequently, knowledge of disclosure
practices and strategies adopted in respect to the Euro and its impact on ICT could
be used to draft policies to ensure that infonnation disclosed is more consistent and
comparable. This will enable investors to make better decisions during the period of
transition. Another avenue of investigation could be to analyze the possible influence
of other societal and firm-level factors such as the education level or level of ICT
integration. Being cross-sectional in nature, this study only establishes associations
between the societal variables of interest and the amount of disclosure on Y2K.
Future studies should seek to establish causal relationships to gather a more rounded
understanding of the respective influences on disclosure strategies related to ICT
problems. Finally, this study focuses on Y2K disclosure practices for a single period.
A longitudinal study will help determine if associations hold over time for other ICT
problems.
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Appendix A. Types of ICT problems—their effects and risks, and costs and
consequences
(A) Affects and risks of ICT problems (B) Costs and consequences of ICT problems
Direct Indirect Direct financial
and nonfinancial
Indirect financial/
nonfinancial
Disruption to the
internal and external
services and processes
provided by the firm's
information-technology
systems.
Loss of sensitive and
general data to the
firm.
Injuries, illness, and/or
possible death of
employees.
Contamination,
destruction, and/or
deterioration of the
firm's work spaces.
Damage, destruction,
and/or deterioration
of a firm's software
and hardware.
Loss of moral,
cooperation, and
confidence between
individual employees,
departments, and
divisions within a
firm.
Delay of non-
information-
technology-based
services offered by
the firm (e.g.,
delivery of
merchandise) due
to delays in processing
of orders, etc., based
on information
technology.
Infection of the
information systems of
suppliers, end-users,
and society.
Disruption of services
offered by suppliers to
their end-users and
society.
Disruption to normal
patterns of business
or life of end-users
and society.
Loss of sensitive and
general data of suppliers,
end-users, and society.
Injuries, illness, and/or
death of stakeholders
separate from the firm.
Contamination, damage,
and/or destruction of the
environment (e.g.,
explosion of a nuclear
reactor caused by a
computer virus
originating via the firm).
Delay and loss of
businesses of
noninformation technology
but stemming directly
from the breakdown of
information-technology
Purchase of new
hardware and software
to maintain security.
Purchase of new
hardware and software
to replace affected
systems.
Loss of sensitive data
that could jeopardize
a firm's competitive
advantage.
Lost productivity.
Employment of
additional ICT staff.
Legal costs as a
result of lawsuits.
Lost revenue during
information technology
down times.
Additional employee
compensation and
workplace clean-up
costs.
Imposition of fines
and other regulatory
penaldes.
Devolution of
management and
control.
Additional auditor
costs imposed to
ensure information
presented correctly.
Repair costs and lost
productivity of end-
users/suppliers
infected via firm's
information system.
Damage to firm's
reputation and
image.
Impact on firm's
goodwill.
Costs of the
introduction of
additional regulatory
provisions.
Reduction in a
firm's share value.
Disruption to
society's stability
and decline in
social cohesion.
Loss of reputation,
image, and goodwill
of suppliers and
end-users.
Loss of confidence
in the firm,
suppliers, and
end-users.
Loss of society's
confidence in
infomiation
technology, leading
to economic
downturn; lack of
research and
development; and
negative impact of
progress.
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Abstract
In this paper, we provide an empirical study of the association between the management's
perception of the importance of enviromnental variables and their choice of international transfer-
pricing methods in the context of a developing economy. Given the sizable investment flowing to
developing countries and the amount ofeconomic exchange that occurs through foreign investment in
these countries, we believe this is a significant issue. For this study, we collected the data from field
interviews with the management of large foreign investment enterprises (FIEs) in China. These FIEs
include mainly investors from the United States, Japan, and Europe. Our evidence indicates that the
more important management perceives the interests of local partners and the maintenance of a good
relationship with host government to be, the more likely that the FIE will use a market-based transfer-
pricing method. On the other hand, the more important the management perceives foreign exchange
controls in transfer-pricing decisions, the more likely the FIE will choose a cost-based method. Finally,
there is a moderate agreement between U.S. and non-U. S. FIEs on the relative importance of the
environmental variables.
© 2004 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In this paper, we empirically investigate how the management's perception of
environmental variables influences their choice of international transfer-pricing methods.
The study is based on data collected from field interviews with the management of large
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foreign investment enterprises (FIEs), which include Sino-foreign joint ventures and
wholly foreign-owned companies in China. As the world economy becomes more
globalized, transfer-pricing has become increasingly challenging to multinational corpo-
rations (MNCs) in planning and implementing their global operations. Strategically
selected transfer prices can maximize global tax savings, minimize operating risks, and
circumvent restrictions imposed by host governments. A survey of accounting educators
by Sands and Pragasam (1997) found that transfer-pricing was ranked as one of the most
important topics in intemational accounting. However, there are few empirical studies that
assess how the management's perceptions of environmental variables influence their
selection of transfer-pricing methods in a developing-economy context.
We choose to look at transfer-pricing in China because of China's increasing
importance in the world economy and the significant volume of interfirm trade by NfNCs
with their affiliated companies in China. In the early 1990s, China witnessed a sharp rise in
the inflow of direct foreign investment. China's entrance to the World Trade Organization
has further accelerated the trend of inflows of foreign investment {Business Week, 1999,
November 29). Foreign direct investment in China reached USS50 billion in 2002, and
China overtook the United States as the largest recipient of foreign direct investment in
2002 {SCMP, 2003, February 15). China's foreign trade has also grown substantially in the
past decade, and China has been ranked as a top 10 trading nation in the world since 1999
(United Nations, 2002). FIEs play an increasingly important role in China's foreign trade.
For example, total imports and exports by FIEs accounted for, respectively, 54% and 52%
of the country's total imports and exports in 2002 (52% and 50%, respectively, in 2001;
MOC, 2003; SSB, 2002). As will be explained later, these trades include a large volume of
transactions with their overseas affiliated companies. Although China is unique, due to its
rapid economic growth rate and large population, it is essentially a developing country and
is classified as such by the Intemational Monetary Fund (2003). The findings of this study,
therefore, should serve as a useful reference for other developing economies by enhancing
their understanding of MNCs' transfer-pricing behaviors.
Prior studies on the important environmental variables that MNCs use to make their
transfer-pricing decisions have focused on developed countries. This study extends prior
studies by examining how the management's perception of the relative importance of
environmental variables affects their choice oftransfer-pricing methods in China, which is a
developing economy. Seven environmental variables important to operations in developing
countries are examined in the context of the business environment in China. These variables
are (1) difference in income tax rates, (2) minimization of custom duties, (3) the interests of
local partners, (4) foreign exchange control and risks, (5) restrictions of profit repatriation,
(6) risks of expropriation and nationalization, and (7) a good relationship with the host
govemment.
The analysis of our data reveals that management's perception of three enviromnental
variables, namely, the interests of local partners, foreign exchange control, and the
maintenance of a good relationship with the host govemment, are significant to discrim-
inate FIEs' choice of transfer-pricing methods. The more important the management
perceives the interests of local partners and the maintenance of a good relationship with
the host govemment to be, the more likely that an FIE will use a market-based method. The
more important the management perceives foreign exchange controls to be, the more likely
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a cost-based method will be used. Overall, there is a moderate agreement between U.S. and
non-U. S. FIEs on the relative importance of the environmental variables studied.
The next section describes the research design and methodology. The results of the field
study and of the statistical testing of hypotheses will then be presented. The final section
concludes the paper.
2. Research design and methodology
2.1. Business environment and international transfer-pricing
Leitch and Barrett (1992) sui-vey the literature showing that MNCs emerge to exploit
market imperfections arising from a set of economic and sociopolitical factors that vary
from country to country. Transfer pricing is regarded as a mechanism available for MNCs
to maximize profits by exploiting these market imperfections. Prior studies examined the
relative importance of environmental variables that constitute market imperfections to the
choice of transfer-pricing methods. Most of these studies surveyed MNCs operating in the
United States (Borkowski, 1992, 1997a, 1997b; Bums, 1980; Tang, 1979, 1993; Yunker,
1983). A few studies surveyed MNCs in other developed countries including Japan
(Borkowski, 1997a; Tang, 1979; Tang & Chan, 1979), Britain (Finnic, 1978; Mostafa,
Sharp, Howard, 1984; Tang, 1981), and Canada (Borkowski, 1997b; Tang, 1981). Some of
these studies generated rankings that reflect the relative importance of environmental
variables (Tang, 1981; Tang «fe Chan, 1979). It is, however, difficult to generalize these
findings to MNCs operating in developing countries, as the business environment of
developing countries is quite different from that of developed countries. For example,
more restrictive rules on the movement of capital and the higher financial and political
risks of operations are typically expected in developing countries.
Extant empirical studies on transfer-pricing decisions in developing countries are
relatively limited. Chan and Chow (1997a) examined the transfer-pricing issue in China
from the perspective of tax authorities. They analyzed the characteristics of FIEs being
audited for transfer pricing, the reasons for initiating these tax audits, and the methods
adopted by tax authorities for adjusting FIE profits. Chan and Chow (1997b) provided
evidence of transfer-pricing manipulation in selected industries in China using import and
export data. Chan and Chow (2001) investigated the impact of form and source of
investment, activity orientation, and production technology on transfer-pricing policy. Kim
and Miller (1979) surveyed U.S. MNCs having operations in developing countries, and
ranked the relative importance of nine variables affecting their transfer-pricing decisions.
Their study revealed a great similarity in the ranking of these variables across developing
countries. They argued that many variables inherent in developing countries, such as
foreign exchange controls and restrictions on repatriation of profits, play a significant role
in the transfer-pricing strategy of MNCs operating in developing countries.
Like most developing countries, China offers preferential policies to attract foreign
investment. At the same time it imposes controls on outflow of capital. As analyzed by
Chan and Chow (1997b), the business environment in China gives rise to a mixed
inducement on MNCs' transfer-pricing decisions. Table 1 summarizes the aspects of the
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Table 1
Aspects of business environment in China that are of special relevance to international transfer pricing
Environmental variables Analysis
Corporate income tax
Custom duties
Foreign exchange control
and risks
Form of foreign investment
Restrictions on remittances
Political pressure
Normal income tax rate of 30%, reduced tax rates of 15% and 24%
for FIEs located at designated economic zones and open cities.
Tax incentives include exemption from taxation for the first two
profit-making years and a 50% tax reduction for the following
3 years for qualified investors.
Import tariffs (a simple average of import tariff rates of 22%, 1 6%,
15%, and 12% respectively for 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002) higher
than in developed countries.
Duty exemption for imports used for export production.
Centralized foreign exchange control: The local currency. Renminbi.
not flilly convertible: Consistent devaluation of Renminbi in the
1980s andeariy 1990s.
Strict requirement of balancing foreign exchange expenditure and
revenue for FIEs.
Central control over FIEs" foreign exchange transactions through
monthly reports submitted by banks to the government agencies of
foreign exchange control.
Major forms of foreign investment include joint ventures and wholly
foreign-owned enterprises. Most joint ventures are equity joint ventures.
Profits in equity joint ventures are distributed in proportion to the
partners' equity stakes.
No local partner in case of wholly foreign-owned enterprises.
No restriction on the repatriation of dividends, royalties, and interest
by FIEs. subject to availability of foreign exchange.
Withholding tax on interest and royalties of 20% or at a preferential
rate specified in tax freaties; Allocation of management fees incurred
by the parent companies not allowed.
Withholding tax on interest and royalties are allowed as credits against
home country's corporate income taxes.
Bilateral investment treaties with more than 40 countries: Government
reassures minimal risk of expropriation.
Adapted from Andersen (2001), Chan and Chow (1997b), and China Daily (2002, Dec. 23).
business environment in China that are considered to affect FIEs' transfer-pricing
decisions. Given a particular set of environmental characteristics, management is faced
with the task of achieving a set of objectives through transfer pricing, including
maximizing corporate profits, minimizing financial risks, and taking care of other
behavioral and political aspirations. Achieving these goals within organizational and
environmental constraints entails tradeoffs among objectives. While it is difficult to
examine the management's decisions about these tradeoffs, directly, they are reflected
by the management's perception of the relative importance of environmental variables in
their choice of transfer-pricing methods.
Empirical studies reveal that MNCs rarely adopt transfer-pricing methods developed by
economic models such as the marginal cost and opportunity cost models, because they are
not comprehensive enough to model the global environment of MNCs (Tang, 1979. 1981,
1993; Wu & Sharp, 1979; Yunker, 1983). Market-based methods and methods based on
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accounting costs are most commonly used. Market-based methods use comparable market
prices or adjusted market prices, which reflect the economy of internal transfers. Advocates
of these methods argue that market prices are less manipulative and could minimize the
disputes between managers of affiliates (Anthony & Dearden, 1980; Cook, 1995; Granick,
1975). They are also perceived to be more objective and fair, and are less likely to be
challenged by tax authorities (Al-Eryani, 1987). Cost-based methods include actual ftill
cost, standard full cost, actual variable cost, and standard variable cost. Mark-up may or
may not be added to costs. If the company's policy is to tie the mark-up to prevailing market
price, the transfer-pricing method will be classified as a market-based method. If the policy
is to detennine mark-up based on a desired rate of return on investment or capital, the
transfer-pricing method will be classified as a cost-based method. Cost-based methods are
basically internally determined using internal cost data available. However, the literature
acknowledges arbitrariness in cost allocation and the difficuhies in detennining a fair profit
to add to cost (MaAulay & Tomkins, 1992; Merville & Petty, 1978; Thomas, 1971).
Because of this arbitrariness, these methods provide more room for MNCs to pursue their
corporate objectives in maximizing after-tax profits and minimizing operational risks.
China's transfer-pricing regulations (State Council, 1991) allow the use of the
comparable uncontrolled-price method, the resale-price method, cost-plus method, and
other reasonable methods, which may include cost-based methods acceptable to Chinese
tax authorities. In practice, comparable market prices may not exist for many products
because transactions that appear similar arc often economically different in terms of
underlying facts and circumstances (Picciotto, 1992). Therefore, both cost-based and
market-based pricings are used in practice.
Specific hypotheses for the impacts of management's perception of the importance of
the seven environmental variables on the choice of the two transfer-pricing bases are
elaborated below. While the first two variables are generally relevant to all countries, the
other five variables are of special relevance to developing countries.
2.2. Hypotheses
2.2.1. Difference in corporate income tax rates
Difference in income tax rates among different jurisdictions is one of the most often
quoted variables in the literature, which provides MNCs with opportunities to use transfer
pricing to minimize global tax payments. The greater the difference in income tax rates
between two countries, the greater is the incentive for MNCs to use transfer pricing to shift
income.
The income tax rate applicable to FIEs operating in China is 30%. The government
offers certain tax incentives for qualified foreign investors. A preferential income tax rate
of 15% is granted to FIEs located in special economic zones and in economic and
technological development zones. A preferential rate of 24% is offered to industrial FIEs
located in open economic zones and cities. For FIEs of a production nature scheduled to
operate for a period not less than 1 years, an exemption from taxation for the first two
profit-making years and a 50% tax reduction for the following 3 years are granted.
However, currently, many FIEs are either beyond their tax holiday period or not qualified
for such holidays.
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Although tax minimization has been cited as one of the transfer-pricing objectives,
some argue that the tax variable should not be overrated in transfer-pricing policies in
developing countries because of the existence of other nontax influences in these
countries (Kim & Miller, 1979; Plasschaert, 1985). However, in general, tax consider-
ation remains an important issue in transfer-pricing decisions. The more important the
management perceives this income tax variable, the greater the motivation that manage-
ment will use transfer-pricing to reduce global tax payments, and the more likely
management will adopt cost-based transfer-pricing methods that facilitate the pursuit of
this corporate objective.
Hypothesis 1. The more important the difference in corporate income tax rates is
perceived by management of FIE, the more likely that a cost-based transfer-pricing method
will be adopted.
2.2.2. Minimization of custom duties
Minimization of import duties is an incentive for MNCs to underprice goods transferred
into a country. Underpricing of imports can also circumvent restrictions such as a value
quota on imports imposed by host government. The Chinese government adopts a tariff-
escalation policy, whereby nominal tariffs vary with the degree of domestic processing.
Tariffs are lower for raw materials and semiprocessed materials than for final goods.
Import duties in China are, in general, substantially higher than those in developed
countries, although these duties face a downward trend as China enters the World Trade
Organization. There is a prim.a facie inference that the relatively high ad valorem tariffs in
most developing countries are likely to tempt MNCs to use transfer-pricing to minimize
tariff payments (Plasschaert, 1985). However, underpricing of imports from related
companies to minimize tariff payments will result in higher reported profits by FIEs,
and this is not compatible with the considerations of restrictions on profit repatriation and
foreign exchange control, as discussed later. The impact of custom duties on FIEs'
transfer-pricing decision thus depends on the relative importance of this variable as
perceived by management. The more important the tariffs are perceived by management,
the more likely that the management will adopt cost-based transfer-pricing methods to
facilitate the minimization of tariff payments.
Hypothesis 2. The more important minimization of custom duties is perceived by FIE
management, the more likely that a cost-based transfer-pricing method will be used.
2.2.3. TJie interests of local partners
Like other developing countries, the Chinese government prefers foreign investors to
operate in China, in the form of a joint venture with a local partner. The existence of a
local partner in a joint venture reduces the share of reported profits attributable to foreign
investors and, hence, provides an inducement for the foreign investors to use transfer
pricing to shift profits outward (Emmanuel & Mehafdi, 1994). As more profits are shifted
away from China, the local partner's share of profit will be reduced. To safeguard their
legitimate interests, the local partners may actively get involved in transfer-pricing
decisions. Thus, a local partner may play a monitoring role, which restricts the latitude
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of transfer-pricing strategies practiced by foreign investors (Lall, 1973; Emmanuel &
Mehafdi, 1994).
Parties to some joint ventures in China may enter into a management contract,
whereby full management responsibility is delegated to the foreign partners who
control the production and financial functions of business operations. In other cases,
local partners may participate actively in the business decisions. We hypothesize that
the impact of a local partner on the transfer-pricing decisions depends on the
management role of local partners and the importance of the interests of local partners
as perceived by the corporate management. The more corporate management recognizes
the importance of the interests of a local partner, the more likely that management will
attempt to minimize conflicts between partners over transfer-pricing by adopting a
method that is relatively objective and fair to both parties and with less room for
manipulation. This leads to a greater likelihood of adopting a market-based transfer-
pricing method.
Hypothesis 3. The more important the interests of local partners is perceived by corporate
management, the more likely that a market-based transfer-pricing method will be adopted.
2.2.4. Foreign exchange control and risks
Foreign exchange control imposed by developing countries is regarded as a strong
inducement for MNCs to shift profits out of these countries. Transfer pricing may assist in
managing foreign exchange risks by reducing liquid assets of subsidiaries in countries
where a foreign exchange control is imposed.
Until the early 1990s, China had a centrally managed foreign exchange control system.
Access to foreign exchange was limited. FIEs were allowed to retain foreign exchange
earnings and made payments of foreign exchange therefrom. These enterprises were
required to balance their foreign exchange revenue and expenditure, and were required to
file their annual budget of foreign exchange expenditure with the government. Since 1994,
the government has gradually relaxed its foreign exchange control policy. A system of
limited convertibility of the local cuixency. Renminbi, was introduced. In 1996, Renminbi
became freely convertible for current account items including payments for trading,
transportation, and tourism activities. However, capital account transactions, including
capital investment, are still subject to foreign exchange control.
The limited convertibility of Renminbi and the restrictions on access to foreign
exchange are likely to increase the financial risks for business operation in China.
Shortage of foreign currency has been cited as one of the most serious problems facing
FIEs, especially those aiming at the domestic market or those relying heavily on the import
of raw materials and machinery (Davis & Yi, 1992; Frisbie, 1988). The significance of the
impact of foreign currency exchange controls on an FIE depends on the nature of its
business operations. We hypothesize that the greater the importance of the foreign
currency exchange control is perceived by management, the greater the inducement for
the management to use transfer pricing to circumvent such a control and to reduce the
associated risks. This is expected to increase the likelihood that management will adopt a
cost-based transfer-pricing method that provides management more flexibility in pursuing
this objective.
100 K.H. Chan. A.W.Y. Lo > The IiUematioual Journal ofAccounting 39 (2004) 93 110
Hypothesis 4. The more important the foreign exchange control and risk is perceived by
management, the more likely that a cost-based transfer-pricing method will be adopted.
2.2.5. Restrictions on profit repatriation
Restrictions on profit remittances, including di\ idends. royalties, and management fees,
or high withholding tax on such remittances imposed by host countries, provide an
inducement for MNCs to shift funds through transfer-pricing. As these restrictions are
more likely to be imposed by govemment in developing countries, relative to developed
countries, this variable is considered important to transfer-pricing decisions in developing
countries (Kim & Miller. 1979: Plasschaert. 1985).
While the Chinese govemment does not ban foreign in\estors from repatriating their
legitimate share of profits or royalties, these remittances are subject to the axailability of
sufficient foreign exchange funds that an FIE has for this purpose. Withholding taxes on
payment of interest, rentals, and royalties to affiliated companies are le\ ied at a general
rate of 20%. or at a preferential rate as specified in tax treaties. According to tax treaties
entered into by the Chinese go\ eminent with other countries, these taxes are allowed as
credits against a home country's corporate income tax. However, the Chinese tax law
disallows the repatriation of management fees to parent companies, except for those
incurred for specific and direct ser\ices provided by the parent companies, such as training
the local employees of the FlEs. The impacts of these regulations on transfer-pricing
decisions depend upon the management perception of their importance. The more
important the restrictions on profit remittances are percei\ ed by management, the greater
the motivation of management to circum\ent these restrictions, and the more likely that
cost-based transfer-pricing methods will be used as a mechanism to pursue this objective.
Hypothesis 5. The more important the management perceives the restrictions on profit
repatriation, the more likely that a cost-based transfer-pricing method will be used.
2.2.6. Risks of expropriation and nationalization
The perceived political risks relating to foreign operations, including expropriation and
nationalization, have been concerns to MNCs operating in developing countries. A high
risk percei\'ed by an MNC may direct it to seek an early return on its in\ estment through
the transfer-pricing mechanism. Political risk has been a major concern to foreign investors
in a sociahst country. To alleviate foreign investors' concern, the Chinese govemment has
enacted laws to protect their legal rights and interests. The go\'emment also signed
bilateral investment treaties with more than 40 countries, including the United Kingdom,
Japan. Australia, Germany, and France, which guarantee either no expropriation or
compensation in the event of expropriation. It, however, has not been able to conclude
an investment treaty with the United States. While the possibility of expropriation of
foreign-invested enterprises is small, the risk cannot be ruled out. For example, to
construct the famous Oriental Plaza in Beijing, McDonald's was pushed off the site,
although it had a 20-year lease there. The govemment retains the right to nationalize or
expropriate enterprises under special circumstances. The more important the management
perceives this risk, the greater disposition that management will use transfer pricing to
minimize it by diverting liquid fiinds outward, and the more likely that cost-based transfer-
pricing methods will be used.
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Hypothesis 6. The more important the management perceives the risks of expropriation
and nationaUzation, the more hkely that a cost-based transfer-pricing method will be
used.
2.2.7. Good relationship with host government
Empirical studies reveal that MNCs value maintaining good relations with host
governments in formulating their transfer-pricing policies (Tang, 1979, 1981; Yunker,
1983). Al-Eryani (1987) found that this variable is more important for MNCs operating in
developing countries than for their counterparts operating in developed countries. In
China, a good relationship with government agencies is helpful to smooth business
operations and to negotiate bureaucratic hurdles. This is, in part, cultural and, in part, due
to the relatively low transparency of the legal system in China (Chan & Jiang, 2002). To
maintain a good relationship with the government, FIEs endeavor to avoid any disputes or
conflicts with the tax authorities and the government departments. Thus, we hypothesize
that FIEs will more likely use market-based methods, which are perceived to be more
objective than cost-based methods, in fonnulating their transfer-pricing policies to avoid
such disputes and conflicts.
Hypothesis 7. The more important the management perceives the maintenance of a good
relationship with the Chinese government, the more likely that an FIE will use market-
based transfer-pricing methods.
A summary of these hypotheses is in Table 2.
2.3. Data collection
We conducted a series of interviews to collect data for this study in 2000. The
interview questionnaire consists of three sections. Section 1 deals with the transfer-
Table 2
Summary of hypotheses
Hypothesis Environmental variables Choice of transfer-pricing methods
1 Difference in income
tax rates
2 Minimization of custom
duties
3 Interests of local partners
4 Foreign exchange control
and risks
5 Restrictions on profit
repatriation
6 Risks of expropriation and
nationalization
7 Good relationship with the
Chinese government
The more important this variable is perceived by management,
the more likely a cost-based method will be used.
The more important this variable is perceived by management,
the more likely a cost-based method will be used.
The more important this variable is perceived by management,
the more likely a market-based method will be used.
The more important this variable is perceived by management,
the more likely a cost-based method will be used.
The more important this variable is perceived by management,
the more likely a cost-based method will be used.
The more important this variable is perceived by management,
the more likely a cost-based method will be used.
The more important this variable is perceived by management,
the more likely a market-based method will be used.
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pricing policies adopted by the sample firms (FIEs). Interviewees were asked to
elaborate on their dominant transfer-pricing method (in terms of dollar value transferred)
for trading with their overseas affiliates, and on the transfer-pricing decision-making
process. Section 2 contains demographic infomiation about the FIEs, including source
and percentage of foreign investment, size of firm, volume of trade with overseas
affiliated companies, and income tax rates applicable to the company. Section 3 consists
of questions on the importance of the seven environmental variables when formulating
transfer-pricing policies. Interviewees were asked to assess the importance these
variables played in fonnulating their transfer-pricing policies according to a five-point
scale (1—Extremely important, 2—Very important, 3—Moderately important, 4—Not
too important, and 5—Not important at all).
The interviews were conducted in major cities in China, including Beijing, Shanghai,
Guangzhou, Xiamen, Shenzhen, and the open cities of Pearl River Delta. The sample
FIEs for the interviews were selected from a directory of the top (largest 500) industrial
FIEs in China, as designated by the Chinese government in terms of annual sales. FIEs
in these cities that trade goods or materials with their overseas affiliated companies were
contacted for interview. Our sample comes from 64 FIEs that provided information for
this study.
When arranging the interviews, the local contacts infonned the interviewees about the
nature of our interviews and were assured of the interviewees' familiarity with the
transfer-pricing process in their finn before airanging the interviews. Behavioral research
confirms that an ongoing personal relationship with an interviewee promotes truthfiil
responses (Bazerman, Loewenstein, & Moore, 2002). We chose to interview the financial
controllers of these FIEs who actively participated in the transfer-pricing decisions
because of their expertise. With their first-hand knowledge of and experience in the
operating environments in China, they were particularly able to articulate the importance
of the hypothesized environmental variables and their tradeoffs in achieving the transfer-
pricing objectives. In some cases, interviewees brought their assistants to the interview to
make sure that they could answer our questions comprehensively. All the interviewees
were either expatriates who have come from an overseas head office and who had
extensive experience in China, or local persons who received training from the head
office. They were informed of the transfer-pricing process in their own firms. At the
beginning of the interviews, we explained the objective of the study and assured the
confidentiality of the information they provide. We also explained the various transfer-
pricing methods to assure consistent understandings of the terms and proper codification
of the methods adopted by these FIEs. When explaining the tenns and asking the
questions, we were careful not to reveal any opinion, which might influence the
interviewees' response. We also looked for any inconsistencies in the interviewees'
responses. After the interview, we searched the business directories to verify the
demographic information provided by the interviewees. We also conducted interviews
with four partners in two large CPA firms in Hong Kong and discussed with several CPA
firm partners in China to confirm the reasonableness and logic of the data we collected.
As we knew the identity of the interviewees, we were able to contact them for follow-up
clarifications of our interview notes. These control measures, taken together, provide
reasonable assurance that the data collected are valid and reliable.
K.H. Chan. A.W.Y. Lo / The Intenuitional Journal ofAccounting 39 (2004) 93-110 103
3. Analysis of data
3.1. Profile of the sample firms
The 64 sample fimis are engaged in a variety of manufacturing activities including
chemicals, electronics, electrical appliances, pharmaceutical, and medical equipment. The
sources of foreign investment of these FIEs are mainly from the United States, Japan,
Hong Kong, Taiwan, and European counties, including the United Kingdom, Germany,
Belgium, Netherlands, Switzerland, Norway, and France. About 30% of the sample firms
are from the upper part of the top 500 companies in terms of sales. The annual sales range
from US$60 million to more than US$3000 million. Foreign investors in all sample fimis
hold at least 25% of equity share, including 1 1 wholly foreign-owned companies. On
average, foreign investors hold 63% of the equity shares of an FIE. Most of these FIEs
have a great volume of transactions with their overseas affiliated companies. In 5 1 FIEs
(80% of the sample firnis), interaffiliate trade accounts for more than 75% of their total
trade.
5.2. Transfer-pricing policies
Thirty-eight FIEs (59% of the sample) adopted market-based transfer-pricing meth-
ods, and most of them used adjusted market prices. Adjusted market prices are the
comparable market prices adjusted by an amount reflecting the economic difference
between open market sales and internal transfers, for example, the marketing expenses
saved. Usually, the adjustment can be easily determined and documented. Of the 26
FIEs (41% of the sample) that adopted cost-based methods, more than half of them used
standard full cost plus markups (Table 3A). Methods including marginal cost, oppor-
tunity cost, mathematical programming, and profit-splits were not used. A great majority
of the sample firms (75%) have the autonomy to purchase raw materials and
components from unrelated companies (Table 3B). FIEs with more autonomy will have
larger power when setting transfer prices with their affiliates. In 41 FIEs (64% of the
sample), parent companies of foreign partners were consulted before determining
transfer-pricing policies, and more than half of these were FIEs where the majority
shareholdings were by foreign investors (Table 3C). Fourteen FIEs (22% of the sample)
determined their transfer-pricing policies without direct influence from parent compa-
nies. Nine FIEs (14% of the sample), all U.S. MNCs, adopted parent company's
worldwide transfer-pricing policies. Only 16% of sample firms have had disputes with
affiliates over transfer prices during the past 2 years (Table 3D). Several approaches
were adopted to resolve these disputes, including negotiation between FIEs and related
companies, negotiation with interference from the parent companies, or negotiation with
interference fi^om the tax authorities.
3.3. Importance of environmental variables as perceived by management
Table 4 shows the mean scores of the importance of the seven hypothesized
environmental variables as perceived by the management of the sample firms (range is
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Table 3
Transfer pricing policies
(A) Transfer-pricing Methods
Market-based methods Cost-based methods
Market Adjusted market Actual full Standard Standard variable
prices prices cost plus full cost plus cost plus
No. ofFIEs 10 28 9 16 1
Total FIEs (%) 16 44 14 25 1
(B) Autonomy in external sourcing of materials or components
Having Not having
autonomy autonomy
Number of FIE 48 16
Total FIEs Co) 75 25
(C) Transfer-pricing decisions and foreign equity share
Transfer-pricing decisions Foreign equity share
Over Not exceeding Total (%)
50% 50%
Decided by FIEs with consultation of 26 15 41 (64)
foreign partner's parent company
Decided by FIEs without direct influence 8 6 14 (22)
from foreign partner's parent company
Adopted the worldwide policies of the 9 9(14)
foreign partner's parent company
43 21 64 (100)
(D) Disputes over transfer prices
Having disputes Not having dispute;s
Number of FIEs 10 54
Total FIEs (%) 16 84
from 1 to 5, with 1 being most important). For all sample firms, maintaining a good
relationship with the Chinese government and the difference in income tax rates are
perceived as the two most important variables. Risk of expropriation and nationalization
by host countries is perceived as least influential in the choice of transfer-pricing inethods.
A comparison is made between U.S. FIEs and non-U. S. FIEs in our sample to see whether
these firms take the same environmental factors into account when choosing their transfer-
pricing methods, as revealed by Arpan (1972). The Mann-Whitney tests do not reveal
significant differences in the importance of these variables as perceived by U.S. and non-
U.S. FIEs. The Kendalltau test of the rank-order of the importance of these variables
(correlation coefficient=.586; P=.068) shows that there is moderate agreement between
these two groups on the relative importance of the variables.
Finally, a check of the correlations coefficients among the environmental variables
shows that only differences in income tax rates (Vari) and minimization of custom duties
(Var2) have a moderate correlation of slightly larger than .50. As will be explained later.
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Table 4
The perceived importance of environmental variables affecting international transfer pricing
Variables All sample FIEs U.S. FIEs in sample Non-U.S.
Mean
FIEs in sample
Mean Ranking Mean Ranking Ranking
1 Difference in income tax rates 2.70 2 2.91 3 2.59 1
2 Minimization of custom duties 3.03 5 3.09 4/5 3.00 4
3 Interests of local partners 2.98 3 3.09 4/5 2.93 3
4 Foreign exchange control 3.02 4 2.68 2 3.19 5
and risks
5 Restrictions on profit 3.75 6 3.55 6 3.86 6
repatriation
6 Risks of expropriation and 4.31 7 4.32 7 4.30 7
nationalization
7 Good relationship with the 2.64 1 2.59 1 2.67 2
Chinese government
The importance of variables is measured by a five-point scale as follows: 1—extremely important; 2—very
important; 3—moderately important; 4—not so important; 5—not important at all.
our multicoUinearity and sensitivity tests show that this correlation has no impact on our
analysis.
3.4. Statistical testing of research hypotheses
Table 5 shows the mean scores of the importance of the seven hypothesized environ-
mental variables, as perceived by FIEs using market-based transfer-pricing methods and
those using cost-based transfer-pricing methods. The statistical tests of these mean scores
Table 5
The perceived importance of environmental variables perceived by sample fimis using different transfer-pricing
methods
Environmental variables
Vari Difference in income tax rates
Var: Minimization of custom duties
Var^ Interests of local partners
Var4 Foreign exchange control and risks
Vars Restrictions on profit repatriation
Var^, Risks of expropriation and
nationalization
Var7 Good relationship with the
Chinese government
FIEs using FIEs using Test of significance
market-based cost-based of difference in
methods methods mean scores
Mean score Mean score Mann -Whitney
U (Z value)
2.66 2.77 0.11
2.89 3.23 0.98
2.45 3.77 3.34**
3.39 2.46 2.53**
3.71 3.80 0.55
4.39 4.19 0.43
.39 3.00 1.68=*
The importance of variables is measured by a five-point scale as follows: 1—extremely important; 2—very
important; 3—moderately important; 4—not so important; 5—not important at all.
* Significant at 5% level.
** Significant at 10% level.
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reveal significant differences in the perceived importance of three variables between FIEs
using different transfer-pricing methods. These three variables are the interests of local
partners, foreign exchange control and risks (both significant at the 5% level), and a good
relationship with the Chinese government (significant at the 10% level). FIEs using market-
based transfer-pricing methods perceived the interests of local partners and a good
relationship with the Chinese government as more important, while FIEs using cost-based
transfer-pricing methods perceived the foreign exchange control as more important. Unlike
prior studies, the variable, risks of expropriation and nationalization, is not perceived as
important for FIEs using either the cost-based or market-based transfer-pricing method. This
suggests that the Chinese government has successfully eased foreign investors' concerns
about the political risks associated with doing business in China, which should help open up
the economy and attract foreign investment.
To investigate further the significance of management perception of the importance of
these variables to the choice of transfer-pricing methods in a multivariate setting, a logistic
regression analysis is performed (Balakrishnan & Soderstrom, 2000; Menon & Williams,
1991; Norusis, 1999; Simons, 1987). The logistic regression fiinction is as follows:
TP = ao +^ a,Var„ (1)
where:
TP = binary variable assuming the value of if cost-based methods are used, and 1 if
market-based methods are used;
Var, = the importance of variable /', where /= 1,2,. . .,7, measured by a five-point scale,
with 1 being extremely important and 5 being not important at all. These variables are:
Vari: Difference in income tax rates
Var2: Minimization of custom duties
Var^: Interests of local partners
Var4: Foreign exchange control and risks
Vars: Restrictions on profit repatriation
Varf,: Risks of expropriation and nationalization
Vary: Good relationship with the Chinese government.
ttj values are the regression coefficients.
Because the dependent variable is dichotomous, we use logistic regression analysis
(Norusis, 1999). The results show how the trade-off among the environmental variables
affects the choice of transfer-pricing methods. The results of the regression analysis are
shown in Table 6. Variance inflation factors are all less than two, indicating that
multicollinearity is unlikely to affect our inferences. White's heteroskedasticity test
suggests that the homogeneous-variance assumption was not rejected at the .05 level.
The analysis confirmed that Var^ and Var4, (the interests of local partners and foreign
exchange control and risks) are significant at 1% level and that Vary, that is, good
relationship with the Chinese government, is significant at the 5% level in discriminating
FIEs' choice of transfer-pricing methods. The model is significant at the 1% level.
Indicating a good fit for the model, 87% of FIEs using market-based methods and 65% of
{
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Table 6
Logistic regression analysis of management perception of the importance of environmental variables to the choice
of transfer-pricing methods
Independent variables in logistic
regression function
Predicted sign Logistic regression analysis
Coefficient Chi-square P value
28.063 .001***
.276 0.816 .366
-.175 0.268 .605
-.860 7.102 .008***
.871 7.915 .005***
.024 0.007 .935
-.044 0.018 .892
Model
Vari: Difference in income tax rates +
V'ar^: Minimization of custom duties +
Var3; Interests of local partners —
Var4: Foreign exchange control and risks +
Var5: Restrictions on profit repatriation +
Var(,; Risks of expropriation and +
nationalization
Var-: Good relationship with the —
Chinese government
.675 4.216 .040*
The logistic regression fiinction is as follows:
Z = bo Y^ ''/'Var,
where: Zis the model score of logistic distribution (0=cost-based, l=market-based). h, is the model coefficient for
the independent variables (i.e., the seven environmental variables).
Based on the logit function, 65.38% of FIEs using cost-based methods and 86.84% of FfEs using market-based
methods are correctly classified.
** Significant at 1% level.
*** Significant at 5% level.
FIEs using cost-based methods are correctly classified. The signs of the coefficient for
these three variables are consistent with the hypotheses. FIEs that regard the interests of
local partners and a good relationship with the Chinese government as being important are
more likely to use market-based methods, and FIEs that perceive the foreign exchange
control and risks as being important are more likely to use cost-based methods. These
results are consistent with our univariate analysis. We do not find significant discriminat-
ing power in Var,. Var2, Var^, and Var^,, that is, difference in income tax rates,
minimization of custom duties, restrictions on profit repatriation, and risks of expropri-
ation and nationalization. In other words, FIEs using cost-based methods and FIEs using
market-based methods perceive similar degree of importance for each of these \ ariables.
The increasingly effective tax audits in China may reduce the FIEs' incentive to use cost-
based methods to manipulate these variables. However, foreign exchange control remains
the most important variable for FIEs using cost-based methods (Table 5).
We conducted additional tests to check the robustness of the regression results. First,
we added a dummy variable in the regression model signifying a majority or a minority
foreign investor. Second, we added a variable representing the percentage of foreign
ownership. Third, we added a dummy variable representing having consultation or no
consultation with the foreign head office in setting transfer prices. Fourth, we excluded
from the sample those FIEs that adopted the parent's worldwide transfer-pricing
pohcies. Fifth, we included a dummy variable representing U.S. versus non-U. S.
foreign investors. Sixth, we included the size of the FIE (in tenns of the logarithm
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of sales) in the model. Seventh, we added a variable representing the FIE's exports as a
percentage of total sales. Eighth, we included the FIE's proportion of interaffiliate trade
as a percentage of total trade in the model.
The results of the eight sensitivity tests show that the interests of local partners (Var3),
foreign exchange controls (Var4), and good relationship with the Chinese government
(Vary), which were significant in the original model, remain significant at the .01 to .05
level in all tests. The only exception is that the interests of local partners (Var^) lost its
significance in the second test due to a high correlation between this variable and the
percentage of foreign ownership in an FIE. The interests of local partners become less
important as the percentage of foreign ownership increases. None of the newly added
variables in the above tests was significant at the .05 level.
Finally, we deleted minimization of custom duties (VarT) in the model to assess the
effect of its moderate correlation with the income-tax variable (Vari). The results of the
reduced model are the same as the original model.
4. Conclusion
Despite expressed concerns about the significance of transfer-pricing to the economy of
developing countries, there is limited empirical research that addresses the influences of
environmental characteristics in these countries on MNCs' choice of transfer-pricing
methods. The MNCs' operations in developing countries are subject to more economic,
political, and social risks due to the peculiar business environment in these countries.
These factors provide inducements for MNCs to use transfer pricing to maximize after-tax
profits, to circumvent government restrictions, and to reduce financial risks.
This study provides empirical evidence on how environmental variables influence an
MNCs' transfer-pricing decisions in the context of the business environment in China, a
major developing economy. The analysis reveals that management's perception of nontax
forces, namely, interests of local partners, foreign exchange control and risks, and a good
relationship with the local government, are important in discriminating the choice of
transfer-pricing methods. The greater the importance of the interests of local partners as
perceived by management, the more likely that market-based transfer-pricing methods will
be used. These methods are considered more objective and fairer to both parties of joint
ventures as compared with cost-based methods. This finding is, in general, consistent with
the previous studies that hold the view that a local partner in a joint venture plays a
monitoring role that restricts the latitude of the transfer-pricing strategy practiced by
foreign investors. This study also reveals that the greater the importance of foreign
exchange control and risks as perceived by management, the more likely that cost-based
transfer-pricing methods will be used, as cost-based methods allow more flexibility for
dealing with restrictive laws or regulations. In addition, the more important a good
relationship with the local government as perceived by management, the more likely that
market-based transfer-pricing methods will be adopted to minimize disputes with
government and tax authorities. Certain variables, such as restrictions on profit repatriation
and risks of expropriation and nationalization, were not found to be important because it
appears that these problems have largely been solved by the Chinese government's open-
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door policy. Other variables, such as income tax and custom duties, which are of general
relevance to all countries, were not found to be significant in discriminating the choice of
transfer-pricing methods in China.
A limitation of this study is that the data are based on a convenience sample of FIEs
rather than a random sample, as FIEs in China would not normally grant interviews on
sensitive issues like transfer-pricing without prior personal contacts.
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Book reviews
Applying International Accounting Standards
David Cairns with Brian Creighton and Anne Daniels, Tolley LexisNexis, 3rd ed., 2002,
xxxi+1178 pp.
David Cairns is one of the most active writers in the field of the International Financial
Reporting Standards (IFRS), fonnerly known as the International Accounting Standards
(IAS). The IFRS/IAS are published by the International Accounting Standards Board
(lASB), the successor to the International Accounting Standards Commitee (lASC). As
secretary general of the lASC from 1985 to 1994, Cairns was at the root of many current
developments. The third edition of his most outstanding work. Applying International
Accounting Standards, is the subject of this review. Note that the title of the publication
has not yet been adapted to the change in name from IAS to IFRS. Brian Creighton and
Anne Daniels of BDO Stoy Hayward did much of the revision work on this new addition.
The book runs 1 1 78 pages and includes an extensive index. It is intended to be useful for
analysts, academics, students of accounting, and practitioners.
What are the powerflil points that make this publication successful? In other words,
why use this publication and not just the original IFRS Bound Volume?
First of all, the book is comprehensive and discusses all the important elements of all
IFRS, including the historical context of the relevant standards and chapters on the
history of lASC/IASB, the use of IFRS, and some general characteristics of most
standards.
A second strong feature is that the book is organized along topical lines, not along the
lines of specific IFRS and interpretations. For example. Chapter 10, Income statement,
discusses the elements of IAS 1 on the presentation of financial statements; IAS 8 on profit
and loss, lundamental errors, and changes in accounting policies; and Interpretation (SIC)
1 7 on accounting for the costs of an equity transaction. Moreover, elements of IAS 8 are
also discussed extensively in Chapter 13 on Changes in accounting policies and Chapter
14 on Errors, and are referred to in, among others. Chapter 8 on Financial statements.
Chapter 11 on Statement of changes in equity. Chapter 23 on Intangible assets, and
Chapter 40 on Earnings per share.
A third strong point is the inclusion of the extracts from financial statements of
I companies. Most, but not all, of these companies use IFRS. These exfracts may be very
helpful for companies that are in the process of implementing IFRS in their own
statements.
I The book is up to date, including exposure drafts published as late as September 2002
(ED 1 on the first-time appHcation of IFRS and the EDs on improvements of existing
standards and on amendments of IAS 32 and 39 regarding financial instruments). ED 2 on
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share-based payments and ED 3 on business combinations, two revolutionary proposals,
are not included.
In the limited context of this book review, I cannot discuss all the chapters in detail. To
give an impression of the structure and content of the chapters, I provide an in-depth
review of Chapter 16 on Business combinations. This chapter discusses goodwill only
briefly, referring instead to a more extensive discussion in a separate chapter (Chapter 24).
As in most chapters, the opening section (16.1) begins with an overview of the relevant
standard (IAS 22) and interpretations (SIC 9, SIC 22, SIC 28, SIC 33), followed by a
treatment of the history (Section 16.2). The history section reviews the background of IAS
22, the G4 + 1 paper on business combinations, and the current lASB project, which has.
in the meantime, resulted in the publication of ED 3. It is clearly shown that the choice in
ED3 to eliminate a pooling-of-interests accounting finds its basis in the G4 + 1 paper.
The next section, 16.3, gives an in-depth overview of the advice from the International
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) regarding the acceptability of IAS 22.
The attention given in this book to IOSCO is. in my opinion, rather extensive. It is
probably not fully justified, given the recent developments in the process of European
Union (EU) acceptance and the limited impact of IOSCO itself in the acceptance of IFRS.
In the next edition, I would replace this section by one addressing the endorsement
procedures in the EU and the views of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC).
Section 16.4 contains a brief summary of IAS 22, with a reference to Chapter 24 for the
goodwill issues. The next two sections discuss the definitions of business combinations
(16.5) and the differences between acquisitions and uniting of interests (16.6). Extensive
attention is given to the SEC's interpretation of IAS 22, which is very valuable for
companies required to report in accordance with the U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP). The SEC has allowed foreign issuers to use IAS 22 to determine
whether a business combination should be accounted for under the purchase or the
pooling-of-interest method. However, the SEC has interpreted LAS 22 more strictly than
the lASC had contemplated. Several practical examples are given where the SEC has not
accepted the IAS 22 application of pooling-of-interests accounting for U.S. GAAP
purposes (among others, Novartis, ING, and Stora Enso). This section also discusses
the views in the lASB's business-combinations project in this respect.
Section 16.7 is devoted to the structuring of business combinations, including examples
of creating a new holding company, legal mergers, and reverse acquisitions. An illustration
is given in which the pooling-of-interests method was used in a common-control
transaction: the restructuring of the Polish oil sector in the years 1997-1999. This section
might benefit from a more extensive discussion of the accounting treatment of reverse
acquisitions, both in consolidated and separate financial statements.
Sections 16.8 to 16.15 are devoted to acquisifions and the purchase method, including
discussions on the date of acquisition, the cost of acquisition, the identifiable assets and
liabilities, the measurement of the fair values of the identifiable assets and liabilities, the
minority's share, and step acquisitions. These sections also include several extracts from
financial statements, but only one specific worked-out example. More examples would
have been helpful, both for practice and for the use of this text at universities. Such
examples might illustrate which components to include or not to include when determining
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the costs of acquisition, the practical problems in measuring the fair values of assets and
liabilities at initial recognition, and accounting for acquisitions in stages by successive
purchases. Furthennore, an issue of when control is effectively transferred is discussed
rather briefly, mainly by references to IAS paragraphs, while in practice, this issue is quite
difficuh, especially around the balance-sheet date. The date of the transfer of control might
be perceived differently by the seller from the buyer, and during the period of negotiations
control might effectively rest with no party at all. And sometimes control has been
transferred under highly specific conditions, such as when consent has been given by
governmental agencies, and such conditions might be fulfilled after the balance-sheet date
but before preparing the financial statements. Discussing these sorts of practical issues
might improve the usefulness of this book.
The final two sections, 16.16 and 16.17, discuss the uniting of interests to be accounted
for by using the pooling-of-interest method, and disclosure issues.
Chapter 1 6 is a fine example of very usefiil chapter, extending beyond the original text
of IAS 22 by including historical perspectives, SEC views, extracts from financial
statements, and examples. Other chapters follow the same structure. Including more
examples and discussions of practical issues would be useftil and might improve the
possibilities of the book being used in university studies. However, the current text is
already of great value to practitioners and students in understanding and applying IAS/
IFRS. For most issues, this handbook will be preferred to using the original IFRS Bound
Volume.
Martin N. Hoogendoom
Erasmus University Rotterdam/Ernst and Young, P.O. Box 488,
3000 Rotterdam, The Netherlands
doi:10.1016/j.intacc.2003. 12.005
Following the Money—The Enron Failure and the State of Corporate Disclosure
George Benston, Michael Bromwich, Robert E. Litan and Alfred Wagenhofer, AEI-
Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Washington, DC, 2003; ix+126 pp.
This is a big small book. It contributes to the examination of the ongoing controversy in
financial reporting, which was prompted by the practices of high-profile companies, such
as Enron. However, as its subtitle suggests, the book is more than just an Enron story. The
authors provide an extensive and systematic analysis of suggested remedies for current
reporting and disclosure problems. Some of these proposals will be helpful, while the
authors believe others may be counteiproductive.
The book contains four compact chapters: The Crisis in Corporate Disclosure; What's
Wrong—and Right—with Corporate Accounting and Auditing in the United States; Fixing
Corporate Disclosure; and Disclosure Challenges Ahead. A short appendix provides a
review of selected differences between U.S. GAAP and the International Financial
Reporting Standards (IFRS) of the International Accounting Standards Board (lASB).
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The crisis in corporate disclosure discussed in Chapter 1 goes well beyond disclosure as
such and also assigns blame to a range of practices, individuals, and organizations—for
example, performance-based compensation, regulatory or quasi-regulatory entities (SEC
and FASB). corporate officers, outside accountants, and members of corporate boards. A
key theme is that investors are interested in projections of cash flows because they drive
company valuations. A lack of confidence in disclosed financial information is held to
place a drag on stock valuations.
The case that there is a crisis in corporate financial reporting and disclosure is not
difficult to make. It is accomplished by citing and listing a raft of companies that have
become household names due to their reporting and disclosure misdeeds. In addition, the
plunge in share prices and the explosion in restatements of company financials appear to
document the severity of the problem. However, the authors later note in Chapter 2 that
changes in practices at the SEC may do more to explain the increase in restatements than
"an apparent worsening of corporate accounting practices" (p. 34).
The Enron case is used as an example of what went wrong. While probably somewhat
surprising, weaknesses with existing accounting and auditing standards, including those
for special purpose entities (SPEs), are not seen as the key failings. Rather, blame is
assigned to the simple failure of companies to follow these standards and of their outside
accountants, among others, to enforce them. However, one feature of current GAAP, that
is, fair value accounting and its implementation by Enron, is seen to play a key role in
Enron's misrepresentation of its financial performance. The authors advise, "If accounting
standard setters want to reduce the likelihood of future Enrons, they should abandon
current efforts to rely further on fair values for financial reports" (p. 8). This position is
repeated and expanded upon in subsequent chapters.
For readers with limited time. Chapter 1 provides an excellent overview and summary
of the content of the remaining three chapters.
The wrong and right of U.S. accounting and auditing are discussed in Chapter 2. A key
theme is that investor confidence, something in short supply these days, requires that
information in financial statements be viewed as trustworthy. Once again, the move
towards fair value accounting is held to be part of what is wrong with U.S. GAAP.
However, the general view is that deficiencies in standards are not the central "wrong."
Rather, the key culprit is the failure of companies to follow accounting standards and of
auditors, or others (management, directors, and the SEC), to enforce them. "In short, the
Enron affair does not, in our view, justify a full-scale assault on curtent accounting
standards" (p. 19).
For financial reports to be considered "trustworthy," the authors identify three key
requirements: (1) financial reports should be prepared according to well-accepted
accounting conventions; (2) these reports should be reliable and relevant; and (3)
accounting and auditing standards must be enforced. Characteristic 1 is generally not
seen to be a major problem. However, report reliability (Item 2) is viewed as diminished to
the extent that considerable reliance must be placed upon estimates. Moreover, the greater
the need to exercise judgment in implementing GAAP, the greater the potential for
opportunistic decisions aimed at earnings management. The potential for the erosion of
reliability motivates the authors' objections to the expansion of fair value accounting.
However, market values are considered to be relevant, when and if available, as well as
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values based upon historical costs. The failings at Enron provide dramatic testimony to the
havoc that can follow from the failure to enforce accounting and auditing standards.
While fair value accounting may have been a key issue in the case of Enron, it may be a
stretch to dismiss its potential value simply because it might be exploited for purposes of
earnings management. This is a potential weakness that is inherent in our accrual-based
accounting system. The implementation of accrual accounting demands the exercise of
professional judgment, and with this comes the potential for misuse. There is also very little
evidence from available studies to suggest that firms have been using fair value accounting
as an earnings management tool.
The authors review the accounting and auditing failures found in the Enron case.
The Enron issues involved SPEs, revenue recognition, accounting for stock issuances,
disclosure inadequacies, and fair value accounting for merchant investments. Of these
items, the first four are seen to represent clear failures to apply and enforce GAAP. The
authors provide a detailed discussion of the shortcomings in each case. However, the
last item, fair value accounting, is seen to represent a flaw in GAAP. The authors
believe that Enron improperly applied fair value accounting in a number of very
significant investments. Further, their position is that such exploitation is inherent in
fair value accounting. "We therefore believe that of all of the accounting misdeeds
relating to Enron, its abuse of fair value accounting is the one that indicts the rules
themselves" (p. 28).
In line with comments above on fair value accounting, the distinction made by the
authors between accounting rules that are not properly followed versus those that are
simply flawed is a rather fine one. The implementation of virtually every accounting
standard calls for the exercise of judgment. If the propensity for their use in earnings
management is the key concern, then the difference between the exploitation of a flawed
versus an unflawed standard appears to be a distinction without a difference.
Accounting abuses did not originate with Enron, and the authors cite a wide range of
violations from several studies of SEC enforcement actions. They note that abuses appear
to be moving up the size chain of companies in more recent years. Manipulations of
revenue recognition tend to top the list of the favorite tools employed by, typically, the top
management of offending companies. Perfomiance-based compensation plans, especially
at large companies where they are more common, are seen to be associated with major
accounting controversies. The authors do not oppose performance-based compensation,
but they do argue that plan designs should require employees to bear the burden of share
price declines as well as increases. In this regard, stock options are not seen to be the best
compensation arrangement. A variety of suggestions for improving the employment of
options are provided as well as an endorsement of recording compensation expense when
options are issued.
A key "wrong" is held to be the fact that "gatekeepers" failed to fiilfill their
responsibilities. The authors dismiss (on the basis of few or no changes in the numbers
of lawsuit filings) claims by some that a weakening of federal laws governing auditor
liability contributed to the surge of accounting problems. They also highlight the very
low percentage of financial statement problems among the 17,000 SEC registrants, as
well as the substantial costs that would be incurred to reduce audit and reporting
failures.
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The roles of the AlCPA, state regulators, and the SEC are likewise not seen to be
sufficiently aggressive. Disciplinary actions by these bodies and organizations are viewed
as being generally inadequate. The authors suggest that the disciplining of individual
external auditors might ha\ e a salutary effect on the quality of audits.
Problems with the U.S. standard-setting process are also cited. These include ( 1 ) the lack
of an incentive for the FASB to act quickly; (2) excessively detailed rules as opposed to
concept-based standards; and (3) excessive mtluence on the FASB by special interest groups.
Chapter 2 offers some suggestions for fixing corporate disclosure. Recommendations
break down into those dealing with standards, that is, what needs fixing and what
standards should be followed. SPE accounting is viewed as not broken, but rather simply
neither applied nor enforced. Opposition is registered to standards calling for fair value
accounting, except in cases with "thick" markets or where trustworthy data are available
from actual transactions. Recognizing expense when stock options are issued is supported.
Some possible remedies for the perceived defects in the standard-setting process itself
(too slow, excessively detailed standards, and too much special interest influence) are
offered. Some incremental refonns would include deadlines imposed by the SEC (speed
up the process). It is noted that the FASB itself plans to rewrite U.S. GAAP in a way that
might make them somewhat less rule-based. However, moving to more concept-based
standards is seen as likely to be opposed by accountants and companies because the
presence of specific rules is helpful in reducing exposure to legal liability. No obvious
solution is seen for the excessive political pressure on the standard-setting process.
While no standard-setting process is without flaws, embracing the idea that "excessively
detailed standards"' is a flaw of the U.S. system is open to challenge. This common view of
late probably emerged out of a sense of self-doubt associated with the exceptionally high
profile accounting abuses in the U.S. We have gone through such periods before. For
example, we once viewed our own manufacturing methods and systems as less effective than
those of the Japanese. The detailed rules that are often a part of U.S. standards appear to have
been demanded by many of those associated with the production and use of financial
statements. The legal issues alone cited by the authors make a fairly compelling case against
a move to concepts-based standards. Moreover, there appears to be no current evidence that
suggests that concepts-based standards are superior to our more rules-based approach.
The usefijlness of a single set of world standards is discussed. The global character of
business and financial markets makes this a fairly obvious consideration. The comparison
of financial reports from different countries would become somewhat easier. A reduction
in home country investment bias would also be expected from a worldwide set of
standards. However, on balance the authors are not optimistic about a single set of
standards being a marked improvement.
Harmonization of GAAP issued by the FASB with IFRS issued by the lASB is seen as
a possible improvement and is already underway, with a 2005 deadline to eliminate major
differences in the European Union. This approach may make it somewhat easier for both
bodies to ward off the political pressures exerted by special interest groups.
The standard-setting monopoly held by the FASB in the U.S. is seen to be problematic,
and competition in standards is proposed. With some competition, standard-setting bodies
might be more responsive to user interests than is true with the current monopolies.
Controlled competition is one proposed model. This would peraiit companies listed in the
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U.S. to use either U.S. GAAP or IFRS. Other forms of competition would permit
companies to choose their reporting standards only after greater harmony has been
achieved between U.S. GAAP and IFRS. Mutual recognition of standards would permit,
for example, U.S. companies to list their shares on European markets using U.S. GAAP
while not being required to reconcile U.S. statements to GAAP of the relevant European
country. Beyond improvements in standard setting and possible competition in standards,
the authors also focus on improvements in standards enforcement. As they note,
"However much accounting standards may be perfected, investors will not be protected
if the standards are not properly enforced" (p. 66).
The proposed approaches to improving enforcement center on more effective monitoring
and better incentives. Monitoring refers to the oversight of the auditors, and the incentives
are those designed to induce auditors to carry out their audits properly. The monitoring
activities of the AICPA, SEC, and State agencies are seen as rather ineffective. Weaknesses
due to the self-interest of the AICPA and weak penalties by all involved are highlighted.
The newest monitoring entity is the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB). The PCAOB will inspect firms that conduct audits of public companies, set
auditing standards, and discipline both firms and individuals for misconduct.
Added incentives for top company officers to do the right thing are features of both the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act as well as the more recent SEC actions. CEOs must now sign financial
statements. Signing statements that turn out to be violation of GAAP can lead to fines,
criminal charges, and a requirement to repay performance-based bonuses if earnings are
restated. The authors are somewhat skeptical about the effectiveness of these incentives
because of, for example, difficulties associated with proving fraudulent financial reporting.
A requirement to expense stock options is seen as likely to reduce the granting of stock
options, reducing in turn the incentive for company officers to manage earnings. While
there might in fact be some reduction in earnings management, it is important to recall that
a range of other conditions will continue to provide incentives to manage earnings. As a
common example, eamings might be managed up to avoid the violation of a minimum net
worth covenant in a credit agreement.
Other incentives discussed that may encourage proper behavior by company officers,
audit firms and individual auditors, and directors include: (1) more director independence,
especially for the members of audit committees; (2) private consultations by the audit
committee with intemal and external auditors; and (3) the greater likelihood of legal action
for the failure of key parties to properly perform their duties.
The authors are not supportive of the prohibition of audit firms from engaging in
auditing as well as other services for the same client, for example, management consulting.
Their view is that even with such a prohibition, there will remain an incentive to
compromise the audit if the desire to retain a client is sufficiently strong. They see the
solution to this potential conflict as "prohibiting (company) managers from hiring and
firing auditors" (p. 73). Also discussed is the possible value of audit finn and partner
rotations, as well as a requirement that the engagement partner and confirming partner sign
their own names, as well as the firm's, to the audit report.
The concluding chapter opens by highlighting reasons why even trustworthy eamings
may be of limited value to investors. These include (1) the historical nature of financial
statements; (2) the fact that much of the value of companies is currently driven by
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intangibles that are not accounted for in the financial statements: and (3) important
nonfmancial data are currently not included in financial reports. In addition, infonnation
that is provided may not be organized in a way that investors find most useful. The authors
indicate that dealing with this matter may be assisted by expanding the availability to users
of somewhat rawer data from companies. Newer computer languages, such as Extensible
Business Reporting Language (XBRL), are expected to make it possible for users to
"extract firm-provided data and manipulate and rearrange them in any manner that they
find usefiil" (p. 82).
Intangibles and nonfinancial data are linked in subsequent discussion. It is no surprise
(given their opposition to fair value accounting) that the authors see a proposal to estimate
the value of intangibles and record them on the books as "potentially quite dangerous" (p.
83). Instead, the authors recommend that nonfinancial information be provided that would
be useful to investors in valuing intangibles. The book includes an exhibit with examples
of nonfmancial measures drawn from a variety of sources (pp. 86-87).
"Potentially dangerous" is a rather strong characterization of the consequences of
estimating and recording the value of intangibles on the financial statements. A wide range
of intangibles is already included in the allocation of purchase prices in company
acquisitions. Therefore, the estimation and recording of the value of extant intangibles
would not appear to be such a great leap. It would certainly add to the representational
faithfulness of company financials.
The final section of the book expands upon the earlier introduction of financial reporting
and the Internet, with a focus on the potential future role of XBRL in improving the
financial disclosure system. An increase in the frequency with which financial information
is reported is viewed as likely to reduce the extent of earnings management and increase the
focus on cash flows.
The authors' concluding comments advise against a narrow focus on simply attempting
to prevent fiiture Enrons and WorldComs. Rather, emphasis should be given to dealing
with inadequacies in our current financial reporting and disclosure system. However,
financial infonnation currently being pro\ ided is still viewed as having "great value when
the numbers they report are trustworthy" (p. 93). The provision of nonfinancial
information and the development of advanced data provision and manipulation systems
(XBRL) are two examples of how the value of the current systems might be leveraged.
A review cannot, and is not intended, to take the place of reading the book itself As
noted at the outset, this book is a small volume in terms of length but large in its abundance
of ideas. This book makes significant contributions not only to the recent debate associated
with high-profile accounting problems but also to larger financial reporting and disclosure
issues that we will face in the future.
Eugene E. Comiskey
Faciilt}- and Research. DuPree College ofManagement,
Georgia Institute of Technology; Atlanta. GA. USA
doi: 10. 1016/j.intacc.2003. 12.006
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December 11-13, 2003
Hilton Clearwater Beach Resort
Clearwater, Florida
Friday, December 12, 2003
8:30 a.m. Session I
"Evidence on the Efficacy of Interest Rate Risk Disclosures by Commercial
Banks"
Anwer S. Ahmed, Syracuse University; Anne Beatty, Peimsylvania State
University; Bruce Bettinghaus, Michigan State University
Discussant: Dan Thornton, Queens University, Canada
Linda Allen. CUNY Baruch College
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"Risk Disclosures with Asymmetric Information and Costly Investment in
Information Technology"
Bjom Jorgensen, Columbia University and Michael Kirschenheiter, Purdue
University
Discussant: Robert Verrecchia, University of Pennsylvania
Masako Darrough, CUNY Baruch College
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"Foreign Exchange Sensitivity-Analysis Disclosures and Market-Based
Risk Measures"
Visarut Sribunnak, University of California, Berkeley, and Franco Wong,
University of Chicago
Discussant: Shivaram Rajgopal, University of Washington
Steven Ryan, New York University
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3:30 p.m. Session IV
"How Companies Communicate Risks: Evidence from the Italian Stock
Exchange"
Sergio Beretta and Saverio Bozzolan, University of Padua
Discussant: Terry Shevhn, University of Washington
Christine Botosan, University of Utah
Saturday, December 13, 2003
8:30 a.m. Session V
"Backtesting Value-at-Risk: A Duration-Based Approach"
Peter Christoffersen, McGill University and Denis Pelletier, North Carolina
State University
Discussant: Bharat Sarath, CUNY Baruch College
Steven Huddart of Pennsylvania State University
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"The Integration of Risk Management Activities: Evidence from the P & C
Insurance Industry"
Elizabeth Demers, University of Rochester
Discussant: Leslie Hodder, University of Indiana
Jim McKeown, Pennsylvania State University
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Announcements 123
The International Accounting Conference
Athens University of Economics and Business
Mm-ch 4-6, 2004
The 2004 annual conference of The International Journal of Accounting will be held
in Greece. It will be jointly sponsored by The Athens University of Economics and
Business and the Zimmerman Center of the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign. The conference will be held in Athens, Greece, on March 4-6, 2004.
The conference will begin with a reception on the evening of March 4''^ and will
continue with two full days of presentations, devoted to the presentation of papers on
the theme of
Accounting, Culture and Economic Institutions
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Accepted papers will be published in The International Journal of Accounting after
satisfying the refereeing process.
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The University of Illinois at Athens University of Economics
Urbana-Champaign and Business
1206 S. Sixth Street 76 Patission Street
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USA GREECE
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Tlie Athens University^ ofEconomics and Business was originallyfounded in 1920 under
the name ofAthens School of Commercial Studies. It nas renamed in 1926 as the Athens
School ofEconomics and Business Science, a name that was retained until 1989 when it
assumed its present name, that is The Athens University ofEconomics and Business. It is
the third oldest Higher Education Institution in Greece and the oldest in the generalfields
oj Economics and Business. The University is located at 76 Patission Street in Athens, two
blocks away from the Archaeological Museum.
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Abstract
Gray [Abacus (1988) 1] proposed a framework for a theory of cultural relevance in accounting.
This renewed an interest in culture-related studies in international accounting. To date, much of this
literature has been theoretical or subjectively descriptive because the elements constituting Gray's
framework lack an operational foundation. This paper addresses this shortcoming by presenting
research that operationalizes and evaluates the empirical usefttlness of Gray's accounting subcultural
value constructs of professionalism, unifonnity, conservatism, and secrecy.
The paper presents the results from an accounting values survey (AVS) administered to a sample
of users and preparers of financial statements in New Zealand and India. The data are subjected to
multivariate analysis, and the results provide some support for the usefulness of Gray's accounting
values as empirically based classificatory constructs, although they may require some adaptation and
reinterpretation. Professionalisin appears as the most clearly defined construct and the elements of
the uniformity construct also hold together well, although appearing to attract elements of the
construct of secrecy. The part of the secrecy construct concerned with the level of detail in financial
statements appears to be reasonably well defined by respondents to the survey and conservatism
seems to fragment into two subdimensions, perhaps representing measurement and the disclosure
aspects of that constioict. A question arises as to the possible existence of other, as yet unrecognized,
accounting-value constructs. The findings suggest the importance of fiarther quantitative survey
research of this type to investigate the relevance of cultural factors in understanding international
accounting practices.
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1. Introduction and motivation
Gray's (1988) article in Abacus entitled "Towards a Theory of Cultural Influence in the
Development of Accounting Systems Internationally" was a pioneering paper in the
development of the idea that culture might influence accounting practices. Gray proposed
a theory linking societal and accounting values that bring together constructs from the
social sciences (specifically. Hofstede, 1983, 1997, 2001) and international accounting
literature. The literature has since seen a renewed interest in this area, but the discussion
remains largely theoretical, as few empirical studies have tested Gray's theory in a rigorous
manner. Any systematic test of the Hofstede-Gray framework should presumably be
preceded by a rigorous examination of the elements comprising the framework; that is, are
the theoretical constructs operational and empirically measurable? This paper is motivated
by that question. The study reported in the paper examines Gray's subcultural accounting-
value constructs, which are fundamental to the Hofstede-Gray framework. The analysis is
based upon an approach that tests for the existence of Gray's value constructs as factors
explaining the responses of a large sample of users and preparers of accounting
infonnation in India and New Zealand.
Section 2 outlines Gray's theory of cultural relevance, which is central to this paper.
This section also reviews the literature that was produced in the wake of Gray's theory.
Section 3 details the selection of the sample and methods of analysis. Section 4 presents
the analysis of the survey results using reliability, factor, and cluster analyses. Section 5
contains a discussion of the results and the conclusions of the paper, its limitations, and
some suggestions for future research.
2. Background and relevant prior research
Gray's argument that culture influences accounting rests on the framework shown in
Fig. 1. The framework identifies a variety of factors supposedly affecting cultural or
societal values. Societal values lead to the development and maintenance of institutions
within a society including educational, social, and political systems and legal, financial,
and corporate structures. Once in place, these systems should reflect and reinforce societal
values, as depicted in the loop at the bottom of Fig. 1. This structure is supposed to remain
stable, and changes at the national level are mainly due to major external factors.
Intemational trade, investment, multinational companies, and colonization are examples
of the latter.
Drawing upon Hofstede's (1980, Chap. 1) framework. Gray incorporated accounting to
it by depicting how accounting practices might influence and reinforce societal values.
Gray's theory presents societal values at the level of the accounting subculture. Cultural or
societal values at the national level permeate through to occupational subcultures,
including the accounting profession, with varying degrees of integration. The value
systems of accountants are derived from societal values, with specific reference to
work-related values. Accounting values, in turn, influence accounting practices, including
the reporting and disclosure of information. Thus, depending on the varying degrees of
external and ecological forces shaping societal values, different accounting systems
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Accounting Systems
Reinforcement
[Source: Gray 1988, p7]
Fig. 1. Culture, societal values and the accounting subculture.
develop, reflect, and reinforce these values. Gray proposed that this framework might be
used to explain international differences in accounting practices.
Gray went on to suggest that there should be a close match between cultural areas and
patterns of accounting systems. This appears to be the basic argument supporting the con-
tention that each culture should develop its own accounting systems to serve its own distinct
requirements (e.g., Jaggi, 1975) and is the basis upon which Gray rests his theory of cultural
relevance to accounting. Gray stated the following four hypotheses as part of his theory:
HI. The higher a country ranks in terms of individualism and the lower it ranks in terms of
uncertainty avoidance and power distance, the more likely it is to rank highly in temis of
professionalism.
H2. The higher a country ranks in terms of uncertainty avoidance and power distance and
the lower it ranks in terms of individualism, the more likely it is to rank highly in tenns of
unifonnity.
H3. The higher a country ranks in terms of uncertainty avoidance and the lower it ranks in
terms of individualism and masculinity, the more likely it is to rank highly in tenns of
conservatism.
H4. The higher a country ranks in terms of uncertainty avoidance and power distance and
the lower it ranks in terms of individualism and masculinity, the more likely it is to rank
highly in terms of secrecy.
Empirical testing of the cultural relevance hypothesis requires operational definitions of
societal values, but not necessarily of Gray's accounting-value constructs. For example,
Salter and Niswander (1995) conducted a regression analysis of the relationship between
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the observable attributes of financial statements and the measurements based upon
Hofstede's cultural values. Such direct tests of the cultural relevance hypothesis, using
Gray's constructs only as theoretical intervening or moderating variables, are often
claimed to test Gray's theory. Lanis (2001) has argued that such an approach is not an
appropriate way to test Gray's theory and has proposed a revised Hofstedian theoretical
framework to avoid what he criticizes as a "black box" approach to assessing the cultural
relevance hypothesis. Little or no attempt seems to have been made to confirm the
empirical meaningflilness of Gray's accounting value constructs directly or to measure
them objectively. Some studies that otherwise give the appearance of doing so actually use
subjective judgment to measure the relevant constructs in a manner that depends upon the
undemonstrated assumption that Gray's accounting values are, in fact, meaningful,
empirical constructs. Examples of such studies are Eddie (1991) and Gerhardy (1990).
The study reported in this paper specifically addresses this issue. It attempts to
operationalize Gray's accounting value constructs, by interpreting responses to a ques-
tionnaire survey, and to assess if these value constructs are plausible, empirically, in the
sense that they reveal systematic patterns in the respondent's recorded attitudes to the
questionnaire items.
The questionnaire instrument for this study was designed from scratch, given that there
was no prior study to inform its content and that the literature provided no advice about the
manner in which Gray's accounting constructs should be operationalized. In constructing
the questionnaire, we used three main sources as guides: the general principles of ques-
tionnaire design, the format of Hofstede's value-survey module (VSM) and the objectives of
the Hofstede-Gray theoretical framework, and the implications of previous theoretical and
empirical work on the Hofstede-Gray framework. The literature relating to the second and
third sources are discussed in the following two subsections. The general principles of the
design considered in choosing questionnaire items are discussed in Section 3.
2.1. The VSM and the Hofstede-Gray framework
Hofstede's VSM questionnaire was designed for a large-scale study of work-related
attitudes of 116,000 IBM employees in over 40 countries in the 1960s. The details
underlying the design are discussed at length in Hofstede (1980, 2001). On the basis of a
factor analysis of responses to the survey, Hofstede initially proposed four dimensions and
introduced a fifth dimension in a later study reported in Culture and Organizations:
Software of the Mind (1997). These were described by Hofstede as "individualism versus
collectivism," "large versus small power distance," "strong versus weak uncertainty
avoidance," "masculinity versus femininity," and "long- versus short-term orientation."
A discussion of the precise meaning of these terms is not necessary for present purposes; it
is sufficient to state that Hofstede related the first four of these constructs to the basic
sociological concepts of; the self, relationship to authority, control of aggression, and
gender role differentiation, respectively (Hofstede, 1980). The fifth construct was
distinctly related to "Confucianism" in oriental society.'
Hofstede's dimensions of value have come under increasing scrutiny and criticism for a number of reasons.
A recent critical appraisal of Hofstede's theory is Baskervilie (2003).
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Gray's conceptualization of accounting subcuitural values was influenced by Hofstede's
societal value constructs. More than Hofstede did. Gray based his ideas on a priori reasoning
and the general (and wide) experience of international accounting regimes, as opposed to an
empirically based technique such as the factor analysis of survey data. Much less has been
done to test Gray's accounting value constructs, the operationalization of which is the core
of this paper. Gray's accounting values are summarized in the following subsections.
2.1.1. Professionalism versus statutory control
Gray (1988, p. 8) defined professionalism as a preference for the exercise of individual
professional judgment and the maintenance of professional self-regulation, as opposed to
compliance with prescriptive legal requirements and statutory control. As identified by
Gray, professionalism may be identified at two levels: the level of the individual making
professional judgments and the statutory level, possibly concerning self-governing,
professional, regulatory institutions. Professionalism is considered a core dimension of
accounting values because accountants are required to make professional judgments
regarding valuation and various aspects of disclosure in financial information. Such
judgments are made by accountants to a lesser or greater extent in different parts of the
world, depending on various factors including legal and statutory requirements and
prevalent professional practice (Belkaoui, 1990, 1995). At an organisational level, the
development of accounting bodies in various parts of the world reflects differing degrees
of self-regulation with professional bodies in the United States and United Kingdom
possessing a larger degree of autonomy and self-regulation than those in continental
Europe and developing countries. Writers such as Gray and Coenenberg (1984), Holzer
(1984), Nobes and Parker (1995), and Taylor and Turley (1986) support the above
arguments for professionalism, and there is little disagreement that this is a significant
concept in accounting.
2. J. 2. Uniformity versus flexibility
Gray (1988, p. 8) defined uniformity as a preference for the enforcement of similar
accounting practices between companies and for the consistent use of such practices over
time, as opposed to flexibility in accordance with the perceived circumstances of
individual companies. This dimension thus consists of at least two components: inter-
temporal consistency in accounting practices and unifonnity in the application of
accounting policies and rules across companies. There has been a wide variation in the
application of accounting principles across firms and between countries. In France, for
instance, where, traditionally, there has been a concern with facilitating national planning,
a uniform accounting plan has been followed. This is in contrast to practices in the United
Kingdom and the United States, where there is a perceived need for flexibility in adopting
and following accounting policies. Writers such as Arpan and Radebaugh (1985), Choi
and Mueller (1984), Holzer (1984), and Nobes and Parker (1995) have provided argu-
ments in support of treating uniformity as a central notion underlying accounting practice.
2.1.3. Conservatism versus optimism
Gray (1988, p. 8) defined conservatism as a preference for a cautious approach to
measurement, to cope with the uncertainty of ftiture events as opposed to a more
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optimistic, laissez-faire, risk-taking approach. Conservatism here fiindamentally means
prudence or the use of caution and impHes that accountants who are conservative should
anticipate losses but not gains. It is considered by many as one of the most fundamental
accounting concepts, even being "the most ancient and probably the most pervasive
principle in accounting valuation" (Sterling, 1967, p. 110). Conservatism is usually
thought to contrast widely in different parts of the world, ranging from a strongly
conservative approach in Continental Europe to much less conservative attitudes among
accountants in the United Kingdom and the United States. Gray suggested that such
differences are reinforced by the relative development of capital markets, the differing
pressures of users' interests, and the influence of tax laws on accountants in the countries
concerned. In addition to Arpan and Radebaugh (1985), Beeny (1975, 1976), Choi and
Mueller (1984), Gray (1980), Nobes (1992), and Sterling (1967) have noted the
importance of the concept of conservatism in the practice of accounting.
2.1.4. Secrecy versus transparency
Gray defined secrecy as a preference for a cautious approach to disclosure, considering
it a fundamental accounting attribute that stems from the influence of management on the
quantity of infonnation disclosed to outsiders. Jaggi (1975) had also previously attributed
this dimension to management because firms often disclose minimal information in
financial statements. Some research has claimed that secrecy varies considerably among
countries, especially between continental Europe and the United States (Arpan &
Radebaugh, 1985; Barrett, 1976; Choi & Mueller, 1984). These differences may also be
reinforced by the differential development of capital markets and the nature of share
ownership, which provide incentives for disclosure (Watts, 1977).
Gray (1988) was presented as being "the first step" towards a theory of cultural
relevance, but with much empirical work to follow. It is appropriate to operationalize
Gray's accounting values as empirical constructs if the usefulness of the hypotheses stated
earlier are to be assessed objectively. To facilitate this objective, the following subsection
reviews some research that has attempted to extend, apply, and critique the Hofstede-Gray
framework that developed from Gray's thesis.
2.2. Theoretical developments and empirical assessments of the Hofstede-Gray
framework
2.2.1. Theoretical developments
Perera (1989) and Perera and Matthews (1990) adapted Gray's theory, the former with
special reference to developing countries," in an attempt to trace the impact of accounting
values upon different aspects of accounting practice. Fechner and Kilgore (1994) and
Radebaugh and Gray (1993) also developed Gray's 1988 theory to try to relate accounting
values more specifically to accounting practices. The idea behind these theories is
illustrated by the framework of Radebaugh and Gray in Fig. 2. The key issue with
frameworks such as those identified in Fig. 2 is that these are at an abstract level and are
not readily amenable to empirical testing. To the extent that these aspects of accounting
" This aspect was also discussed by Gray (1988, pp. 11-12).
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Societal values Accounting Values
Accounting systems
andpractice
Individualism Collectivism
Power Distance
Uncertainty Avoidance
Masculinity / Femininity
Professionalism
Unifonnity / flexibility
Authority and
enforcement
Measurement of
assets & profitsConservatism / optimism
Secrecy / transparency Information disclosure
a a
Reinforcement Reinforcement
Fig. 2. Gray's accounting dimensions and measurement and disclosure (source: Radebaugh & Gray, 1993).
practice are validly related to accounting values, they may act as a guide in operationaliz-
ing the latter concepts through appropriately chosen items in a questionnaire instrument.
However, this task requires further theoretical developments.
Baydoun and Willett (1995) and Willett, Nishimura. and Baydoun (1997), in a critical
evaluation of Gray's theory, attempted to operationalize Gray's accounting values in tenns
of GAAP qualitative characteristics of good measurement and reporting practices (see
Table 1) by questioning whether Gray's accounting values really served any usefiil
purpose as intervening variables between Hofstede's dimensions of culture and the
characteristics of accounting. One way of establishing if this is the case would be to
Table 1
Gray's dimensions and the qualitative characteristics of financial statements
.Accounting dimensions Qualitative characteristics Examples of issues relating
- technical aspects relating to disclosure form & content of corporate
reports
Uniformity
Uniform content cS presentation
Consistency Standardised accounts
Comparability Accounting policies
Quality of information:
Timeliness Normal publication date
Materiality Cost versus market values
Conservatism Objecti\ity Cash flow accounting
Verifiabiiitv Lower of cost and market
Secrecy Reliability
Neutrality
Substance over form
Amount of information: Extent ofdisaggregated data:
Accountability Number of items disclosed
Decision usefulness Group accounts
Supplementary statements
(Source: Baydoun & Willett, 1995).
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see if Gray's accounting values could be operationalized as informative empirical
constructs. This is an essential motivating point for the research reported in this paper.
Willett et al. (1997) reasoned that culture most clearly affects those parts of the
accounting en\ironment that are essentially social, such as the management structures of
firms or the abilities, rights, and powers of different user groups to use or demand
information. In particular, it was argued that culture influences disclosure practices more
than measurement practices. If this analysis has \alidity. its implication for our current
purposes is that a questionnaire should endeavor to cover both the social and technological
aspects and. with regard to the latter, to include instances of both measurement and
disclosure practices.
2.2.2. Empirical assessments of the cultural relevance hypothesis
A number of recent studies provide o\er\iews of the cultural relevance literature in
accounting. The cultural relevance hypothesis underpins much current work in compar-
ative management control and envirorunental accounting. In a detailed review of cross-
cultural research in management-control systems, Harrison and McKinnon (1999) iden-
tified several weaknesses in the literature, including what they saw as an excessive reliance
on cultural \ alue dimensions. Related to these matters, Bhimani (1999) provided a critique
of culUiral studies in managerial accounting, and Chow. Shields, and Wu (1999), Lau and
Buckland (2000), and Tsui (2001) reported cross-cultural research in management-control
systems. Chanchani and MacGregor (1999) particularly noted the lack of primary data in
cultural relevance literature.
Eddie (1991) and Gehardy (1990) are examples of the informal use and testing of
Gray's theory. Gerhardy applied the theory selectively and subjectively to analyze the
accounting systems of West Germany. The study of Eddie of 1 3 countries of the Asia-
Pacific region found support for Gray's theory, confirming all the predicted signs of
association between societal and accounting values. However, as with the study of
Gerhardy, the study of Eddie suffered from the possibility of bias because the factors
comprising each of the accounting subcultural value indices and the weights assigned to
the factors comprising the index were determined subjectively.
A variety of approaches to using Gray's theory are evident in the literature. In a
normative analysis. Chow, Chau, and Gray (1995) applied Gray's model to study the
impact of the accounting reforms in China since 1980, concluding that the reform process
would be constrained by cultural imperatives but the empirical import of the paper is
unclear. The Spanish study of Amat, Blake, Wraith, and Oliveras (1999) was based on
Gray (1988) but is mainly descriptive and anecdotal. Willett et al. (1997) used a subjective
assessment of Gray's accounting values, similar with the fashion adopted in Eddie (1991),
to analyze the nature of accounting practices in the Asia-Pacific region finding that
although the Hofstede-Gray analysis was consistent with the facts, a simpler explanation
of the situation could be given in terms of colonialism and the institutional needs of users.
A similar point was made in Nobes (1998).
The study by Salter and Niswander (1995), referred to earlier, is probably the most
objective, published account relating to Gary's theory to date. It was based upon data from
29 countries, utilizing Gray's accounting values as theoretical terms and defining those
values directly as elements of accounting practice. It was concluded that Gray's model was
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successful at explaining actual financial-reporting practices but relatively weak in explain-
ing extant professional and regulators' structures. It was further suggested that both the
development of financial markets and levels oftaxation enhance the explanations offered by
Gray. The present stud\ is probabh best seen as an attempt to support studies such as that of
Salter and Niswander in their use of Gray "s theorv' in international accounting research.
Gray's theory continues to be either referred to or relied upon in ongoing research. A
number of recent studies have related accounting judgments on various matters to
cultural influences. Schultz and Lopez (2001) found that judgments among accountants
in France. German\. and the United States vary significantly. Arnold. Bemardi. and
Neidermeyer (2001) found that as uncertaint\' avoidance increases, materiality' estimates
increase. Other instances of rele\"ant research include the investigation of cross-national
issues in voluntary disclosure and foreign listing requirements (Meek. Roberts. & Gray,
1995). eamings measurement (Cooke. 1993: Gray. 1980: Weetman & Gra>'. 1991),
cultural influence of financial reporting in translation and legal contexts (Jaggi & Low,
2000). uniformity as a cultural or economic phenomena (Roberts & Salter. 1999),
cultural impact on project-exaluation decisions (Harrison. Chow. Wu. & Harrell. 1999),
cultural differences in beha\ioral consequences of performance evaluation and reward
systems (Aswasthi. Chow. & Wu. 2001). the effect of national culture on intellectual
capital and knowledge management (Chow. Deng. & Ho. 2000: Lyim. 1999) and
cultural issues relating to harmonization and regulation (Dyball & Valcarcel. 1999;
Farrell & Cobbin. 2001). For a broad re\iew and commentar>' see Radebaugh and Gray
(2001).
In summary, as ma\' be seen from this brief review, there continues to be a strong
interest in cultural relevance research in accounting and in the application of Gray's
(1988) theory to a variety of issues. The impact of this literature is probably more far-
reaching than may at first appear. For instance. Gray"s \alues have recently been referred
to in a medical teaching journal, which discusses culmral relevance of patient-centered
inter\"iews (Nestle. 2001). Work to date that has attempted to validate the fundamental
basis of the Hofstede-Gray framework has. howe\'er. been unsystematic, limited by the
a\ailability of data or lacking a convincing operationalization of the fundamental
accounting value constructs. One way to address this deficiency is to de\elop a direct
method of assessing Gray"s constructs for \-alidity and reliabilit\'. to begin the process of
accumulating data to answer the question: What is the empirical status of Gray's
accounting values as cultural constructs? The following section describes the method of
operationalizing Gray's accounting ^'alue constructs through a questionnaire instrument,
as it was used in this research and based upon the considerations flowing from the
preceding literature rexiew.
3. Method
3.1. Operatioualizing the variables
The design of the questiormaire instrument for this study was informed from a number
of sources that we briefiy discuss. partK to lea\e a trail of our reasoning and partly to refer
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to later in our analysis of the survey results. A copy of the questionnaire instrument is
found in Appendix A. The covering letter accompanying the questionnaire was brief and
general, explaining the purpose of the research, obtaining informed consent, and assuring
anonymity of response. It did not attempt to provide additional context to the question-
naire, such as whether the items related to public or private companies. It is acknowledged
that some of the items are imprecise in nature and are open to alternative interpretations.
The results reported later suggest some modification of the reasoning used in the first
instance in the design of the questionnaire instrument. These are discussed in the
concluding section.
The basic form and content of the instrument followed Hofstede's VSM and is refeixed
to below as the accounting values survey (AVS). The reason for following Hofstede in this
respect is that the design considerations underlying the VSM are closely related to this
study by the needs of testing the Hofstede-Gray cultural relevance hypothesis. Consid-
erable effort has gone into the theoretical development of the VSM and it has been tested
and used in many different empirical contexts (see Hofstede, 1980, pp. 13-39). Just as
Hofstede's VSM uses four questionnaire items to capture each cultural value construct, so
each of Gray's accounting values is captured in the AVS by four items on a seven-point,
equally spaced Likert-type scale."^ Our questionnaire thus contained 16 content items in all.
The choice of each item and its wording was informed by general principles relating to
the best practice of questionnaire design. The "disagree-agree" format is discussed in
Backstrom and Hursch (1963, pp. 77-79) and Ticehurst and Veal (2000, p. 147) . The
items were designed to be comprehensive, simple, short, understandable, and unequivocal
(Sekaran, 1992, pp. 202-209). In an attempt to prevent the possibility of the items merely
reflecting obvious or linguistic similarities and lazy anchoring, the items relating to each
accounting value were spread through the questionnaire instrument, four items apart. One
issue of a theoretical nature that is still unclear at the present time is the need for
"orthogonality" of the items. This matter generally relates to the exclusivity of the
questionnaire items and, in this instance, it is complicated by the possible overlap of some
of the underlying accounting value constructs implied in the literature cited earlier. Ideally,
the questionnaire items should give comprehensive coverage to all accounting values,
which should divide into statistically recognizable factors. In the design of the instrument,
importance was placed upon simplicity and brevity to reduce the risk of a low response
rate. At the time the survey was developed, we were not aware (and are not as yet aware)
of any other questionnaire study that attempts to test for the existence of accounting values
using primary data, and the questionnaire instrument was therefore designed, more or less,
fi"om scratch. The specific subject matter of each item was guided by the theoretical
considerations described in the literature review. The departure point in this regard was the
classificatory scheme implied by the analysis of Baydoun and Willett (1995) and Willett et
The survey is part of a larger ongoing program of research concerned with operationalizing and testing the
Hofestede-Gray framework.
* Hofstede's original IBM study of work-related values included dozens of questions. The VSM developed
for later use contains four questionnaire items per dimension. See Hofstede (1980, 1994, 1997).
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al. (1997) of the potential differential impact of cultural values on the measurement,
disclosure, and social aspects of the accounting environment. The questionnaire was
designed to give comprehensive coverage of these aspects of accounting.
In the final questionnaire distributed to respondents, two items relating to each of the
conservatism and unifonnity constructs concerned the measurement dimension and two
concerned disclosure. All the secrecy items related to disclosure issues. All the profes-
sionalism items were related to the social dimension of the accounting environment. The
specific content of the items in each construct is discussed below.
3.1.1. Consen'atism
Items 1, 5, 9, and 13 attempted to capture the construct of conservatism. Items 1 and 13
were taken to relate to measurement and Items 5 and 9 to disclosure. Most prior theoretical
work appears to take the view, based upon statements by Gray (e.g., Radebaugh & Gray,
1993), that this accounting value pertains solely to issues of measurement. Despite this, the
construct is discussed here as having both measurement and disclosure aspects. For
example, the idea that historic costs are more relevant than market values are for decision
making, or should be used for decision making, may be interpreted as a preference for
conservatism, but these are, strictly speaking, preferences concerning disclosure, not
measurement, issues. Measurement issues concern what numbers represent and what their
statistical or other properties are. Questions of relevance and usefulness for decision
making concern judgments that determine what information to disclose and whether time
should be wasted measuring something at all, not how it should be measured. Two
preparers may disagree about whether to disclose market values or historic costs (because
one may be more ''conservative" than the other, although not necessarily more "secre-
tive"), but they may still agree on the proper way to measure both concepts. This is
probably a moot point in the context of this paper because, if Questions 5 and 9 are
considered to be about measurement rather than disclosure, it makes little difference to the
findings of the study, as long as it is agreed that the questions do tap the construct of
conservatism.
Item 1 required respondents to state the extent of their agreement as to whether profits
and assets should be valued downwards in case of doubt. Item 1 3 asked the respondents to
indicate the extent of their agreement to the statement that in times of rising prices LIFO
instead of FIFO should be used in calculations as esfimates. The stronger the agreement to
these statements, the greater the extent to which the respondents were judged to adopt
conservative valuation approaches. Items 5 and 9 asked whether market values are more
relevant than historic costs are and whether they should be used in preference to historic
costs, respectively. To the extent that respondents indicated a preference towards historic
costs, they would be considered conservative.
3.1.2. Uniformity
Items 2, 6, 10, and 14 relate to the uniformity construct. Items 2 and 10 were designed
to relate to the measurement dimension. Items 6 and 14 to the disclosure dimension. Item
two required respondents to indicate their level of uniformity by providing a specific
measurement context. Agreement to externally set depreciation rates was taken to
indicate higher uniformity. Item 6 approached the disclosure dimension fi-om a cross-
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sectional viewpoint, eliciting degrees of agreement to a standardized format for the
purpose of reporting information. The stronger the extent of the respondent's agreement
with this item, the stronger the inclination towards uniformity was taken to be. Item 10
approached the measurement issue in a time (consistency) context, asking respondents
for their level of agreement to the statement that accounting policies, once chosen, should
not be subsequently changed. Agreement on this question implied that the respondent
degree of uniformity was high. Item 14 asked respondents about the extent of their
agreement to a statement that the level of detailed standardization disclosed within
financial statements should be increased. The extent to which the respondents agreed
with the statement was taken to indicate their level of preference for unifonn accounting
disclosure practices.
3.1.3. Secrecy
The secrecy construct is represented by questionnaire Items 3, 7, 11, and 15. All 4 items
were classified as being related to disclosure issues. Item 3 required a response to the
statement that financial statements should be available to the general public rather than just
to shareholders and managers. This was designed to capture the "external spread of user"
aspect of secrecy noted in Baydoun and Willett (1995). Item 7 measured the respondent's
attitude regarding the amount of detailed information disclosed in financial statements
capturing an "information quantity" aspect of secrecy. Item 1 1 required respondents to
indicate their agreement to the statement that information about management and owners
should not be included in financial statements. As with Item 7, Item 1 1 relates to the
information quantity and level of detail aspect of secrecy, with agreement to the item
indicafing higher secrecy. Item 1 5 was intended to capture the aspects of secrecy relating
to managerial intentions. It was deliberately framed in an opposite manner to Item 1 1 . To
the extent that the respondents agreed to this statement, they were considered to hold
transparency values, opposed to secrecy. Items 3 and 15 both relate to a transparency
aspect of secrecy.
3.1.4. Professionalism
Items 4, 8, 12, and 16 relate to professionalism. The classification of all these items,
as relating to the social dimension of accounting, is consistent with the theoretical
literature and the interpretation given to this value in previous research. In general, this
construct refers to the attributes of those who perform the accounting function rather
than the characteristics of financial statements. Item 4 is a general and direct regulatory-
framework question asking if the accounting profession should be self-regulated. The
higher the agreement to this item, the higher the level of professionalism is taken to be.
This is consistent with Gray's suggestion that professionalism is correlated with self-
regulation and firmly established professional associafions. Items 8 and 12, while being
concerned with the attributes of accountants, attempt to relate these to the separate
issues of measurement and disclosure. In both cases, agreement to assertions that
accountants are the best judges of how to measure something and what should be
disclosed was taken as indicating high professionalism. The last item (16) queried
respondents' agreement to a statement about the standards of ethical conduct of the
accountant. This was an attempt to tap into aspects of professionalism that may have
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been missed in the other items. As will be seen later, it became apparent that this was
probably not the case.
3.2. Pilot test
In a pilot study of the survey instrument, the questionnaire, along with a cover
letter, was distributed to members of staff in a university accounting department and
selected international accounting academics in New Zealand, Australia, United King-
dom, the Netherlands, Hong Kong, and India to assess the instrument for biases and
to elicit comments. Only 12 usable responses were received. These were subject to
factor analysis to ascertain the construct validity of the questions capturing Gray's
accounting values. The questions relating to each of Gray's four accounting values
were factor analyzed separately. Two of the four accounting values appeared to have
subfactors: uniformity over time and across firms, professionalism at the level of the
practicing accountant and at the level of governing professional body. It was also
noted that in the case of conservatism and secrecy, one question accounted for about
56% of the variation, and the other three together accounted for 44% of the variation.
A number of changes to the form of the final questionnaire resulted from this analysis:
the wording of seven questions was altered for clarity, the introduction to the
questionnaire was altered to eliminate biases, and the wording of the cover letter
was altered slightly.
3.3. Sample
The sample for this study consisted of users and preparers of financial statements in two
countries: New Zealand and India. The reason for choosing the sampled countries was
driven by pragmatic, as well as conceptual, considerations in the context of the larger
study of which this research was a part (i.e., to provide a general assessment of the
usefulness of Hofstede-Gray theory). Conceptually, including as many diverse subgroups
in the sample as possible is desirable from the point of view of the question dealt with in
this paper because the same value dimensions should emerge from the data, whatever the
nature of the subgroups, if Grays' constructs represent robust, subcultural features of
societies. There were two preparer groups and a number of user groups, so that with the
two different source countries, the sample data should provide for a reasonably reliable
assessment of the empirical usefulness of the constructs. In addition to this, the pragmatic
considerations of information, access to support in the target countries, and language
(eliminating the problems involved in translating the questionnaire instrument) were also
considerations in selecting the sample countries.
Users were identified as financial analysts and bank loan officers, and preparers were
identified as practicing and nonpracticing accountants. The objective in adopting such a
sampling strategy was to achieve a balance in respondents who shared professional
subcultural values but who were also capable of being selected from publicly available
national lists distributed across each country. A criticism of Hofstede's original 1968 study
has been the use of a narrow sample: employees of a large multinational corporation
(IBM), with a possibly very strong corporate culture. The sample selected for this study
138 S. CImnchani, R. Willett / The International Journal ofAccounting 39 (2004) 125-154
Table 2
Survey sample: New Zealand
Organisation Survey group Category Mailout Sampling frame
NZ Society of Accountants Practicing accountants Preparers 300 Random
Nonpracticing accountants Preparers 300 Random
NZ Society of Financial Financial analysts Users 280 Population
Analysts
Banks Lending officers Users 320 All branches
Total 1200
attempts to overcome the problein of nanowness, while preserving the benefits of
functional equivalence.
It is possible that the responses of lending officers and managers to questions directly
focused on measurement and disclosure issues in accounting might not be based on
considerations that are important in professional accounting work. However, as noted
above, because Gray's accounting values are meant to represent a set of subcultural values
or preferences, applicable across the entire accounting profession of a given country, this
should probably not be seen as a weakness. To obtain an accurate, country-wide view of a
county's accounting values, it is necessary to survey both the users and preparers of
financial statements. The user-preparer distinction, of course, has a long tradition in
accounting research that uses survey techniques to enquire into the usefulness of financial
information (e.g., Buzby, 1979; Jones, Romano. & Smymios, 1995). In any event, as
subsequent analysis demonstrates, the factor-analysis patterns remained broadly consistent
across all groups of respondents, although perhaps, with some potentially interesting
minor differences.
"^
The sampling strategy that was adopted is summarized in the Tables below. In both
Tables 2 and 3, the first column identifies the source organisation, the second column
indicates the specific group surveyed, the third column categorizes the sample as either
users or preparers, the fourth column indicates the number of questionnaires mailed, and
the fifth column describes the sampling method deployed.^'
In total, 6200 questionnaires were administered to users and preparers of financial
statements, and 1614 useable responses were received. Of these, 510 were from New
Zealand and 1 1 04 were from Indian respondents. The overall return rate was just over
26%, the response rate from New Zealand was 42.5% and that for the Indian sample was
22.8%. The users and preparers in New Zealand responded in almost equal proportion
(4 1% and 44%, respectively), there was a greater variation in the Indian responses (3 1%
and 1 8%, respectively). Table 4 provides a summary of response rates. The respondents
for both the Indian and New Zealand sample are spread from a variety of sources with
The generalisation of the results of the study nevertheless may be limited by the fact that India and New
Zealand appear to differ significantly only on power distance in Hofstede (1980).
*' The sampling process was "restricted" in the case of Indian bank loan officers in the sense that lists of such
officers were only available for two banks at the time of the survey. Questionnaires were mailed out to officers in
both banks, and, when the responses proved insufficient in number, questionnaires were also sent to officers in the
90 banks listed in the Yellow Pages of the Bombay Telephone Directory. The returned questionnaires from these
sources made up the total responses in this group.
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Table 3
Survey sample: India
Organisation Sur\ ey Group Category Mailout Sampling
frame
Institute of Company Secretaries Company secretaries Preparers 2000 Random
Institute of Chartered Accountants Chartered accountants Preparers 1500 Random
in India
Chartered and Financial Analysts Financial analysts Users 500 Population
Bombay Management Association Financial analysts Users 500 Population
Banks Lending officers Users 500 Restricted
Total 5000
practicing accountants accounting for the largest contribution of responses overall (21%
and 40% for India and New Zealand, respectively).
The overall response rate of 26% is comparable with the Melbourne Institute Social
Science Survey, which conducts a monthly telephone survey of about 1200 households
across Australia and achieves a response rate of 25%. The nature and causes of
nonresponse, particularly within the Indian sample, is discussed below, and again, as a
limitation of the study's findings, in the Conclusion. Table 5 presents an overview of the
sample demographics.
In terms of gender, respondents in both countries were male dominated. Ninety-five
percent of all Indian respondents were males, as opposed to 79% in New Zealand. With
regard to age, the respondents in the t\\'o countries fell into roughly the same percentage in
the different categories. The demographic regarding formal education showed the most
disparity, with the Indian respondents reporting having had more fonnal education than the
New Zealand respondents had. The extent of respondent's overseas experience also reveals
differences in that, whereas only 22% of Indian respondents had any overseas experience,
over one half of all New Zealand respondents had more than 1 year's experience working
overseas.
It is not known why the Indian survey had a significantly lower response rate than the
New Zealand survey. The way in which responses were received made statistical testing of
any nonresponse bias ineffective. Dozens of survey returns from India carrying wildly
varying dates were routinely received each day. For example, a response mailed on the 1 st
day of the month, was received on the 25th day of the same month. Other responses,
completed and mailed out on the 1 5th were received on the 20th. Yet, others had no date.
This, as with the problem of selecting a representative sample of Indian bank loan officers,
Table 4
Summary of responses
Survey group New Zealand India
Out In Response
rate (%)
Out In Response
rale (%)
Users
Preparers
Total
600
600
1200
246
264
510
41
44
42.5
1500
3500
5000
474
630
1104
31.6
18
22.8
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Table 5
Sample characteristics
India New Zealand
Response rate (%)
Number of respondents
Practicing accountants
Bank loan officers
Nonpracticing accountants
Financial analysts
Company secretaries
Managers
Others
Number of male respondents
Number of female respondents
Age of respondents
Under 29 years
30-34 years
35-39 years
40-49 years
50 years and over
Overseas experience
None
Up to 12 months
2 Years or more
22,8
1104
234(21.3%)
34(3.1%)
72 (6.5%)
137 (12.4%)
140 (12.7%)
354 (32.2%)
133 (10.9%)
1055 (95.6%)
48 (4.3%)
200(18.2%)
240(21.7%)
218(19.7%)
251 (22.7%)
194(17.5%)
866 (78.4%)
107 (9.7%)
130(12.3%)
42.5
510
208 (40.8%)
125 (24.6%)
59(11.6%)
35 (6.9%)
58(11.4%)
25 (3.9%)
401 (79.4%)
105 (20.6%)
112 (22%)
86(16.9%)
105 (20.6%)
120 (23.6%)
86 (16.9%)
247 (48.4%)
87(17.1%)
174(34.0%)
is one of the many problems of eliciting survey data from a large number of respondents in
a developing country.' In this respect, the study reported here offers some additional
experiences that may help to inform fiiture work in this area.
4. Results
The AVS data are analyzed by means of three statistical techniques: reliability, factor,
and cluster analyses. This section describes the analysis of the returned survey data under
each of these headings.
4.1. Reliabilit}' analysis
This subsection discusses within-construct reliabihty, the sensitivity of the items
composing each construct, and the relative reliability of the constructs based on
Cronbach's alpha. In Table 6, the first column displays the construct and the second
column lists the set of items measuring the construct. Columns 3, 4, and 5 display the
reliability coefficient for New Zealand, India, and the combined data, respectively.
Analysis of various combinations of items was conducted to examine the sensitivity of
^ The development of standards for survey design and implementation in the context of cross-national
research is still in its infancy (see Japec. 2001; Lynn & Clarke, 2001).
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Table 6
Reliability analysis
Construct Items New Zealand India Total
(510) (1104) (1614)
Uniformity 2, 6, 10, 14 .58 .35 .56
Uniformity 2, 6, 14 .60 .41 .59
Professionalism 4, 8, 12. 16 .51 .53 .55
Professionalism 4, 8, 12 .57 .57 .60
Secrecy 3, 7, 11, 15 .38 .31 .34
Secrecy 3, 11. 15 .36 .24 .31
Conservatism 1, 5, 9, 13 .23 .18 .21
Conservatism 1, 5,9 .29 .21 .23
Conservatism 5, 9, 13 .33 .20 .23
This table shows the results of the reliability analysis for the conservatism, uniformity, secrecy and
professionalism constructs, as operationalized by the AVS.
the alpha scores to each of the items. The spht-half method of measuring rehabihty was
used. The results were consistent with those presented here.
Table 6 indicates scores of .56, .55, .34, and .21 for the constructs of uniformity,
professionalism, secrecy, and conservatism, respectively, based on all four items oper-
ationalizing each of the constructs. These scores are less than the recommended threshold
of .70 of Nunnally (1978). The scores for unifomiity and professionalism are highest at
around .60.
In the case of unifomiity, there is a consistent (but probably insignificant)*^ effect on the
Cronbach alpha from dropping Item 10, that is, the item concerning the consistency
principle, that once accounting policies are determined, they should not be changed. In the
case of professionalism, dropping Item 16 appeared to lead to more significantly increased
reliability scores. A similar effect is evident in the factor and cluster analysis results
reported below.
The highest Cronbach score for the secrecy construct (as defined here) was .38.
Excluding Item 15, the item concerning whether management forecasts should be included
in financial statements, rather than Item 7 reduces the reliability score to .34.
The conservatism construct performed most poorly in tenns of Cronbach 's alpha.
Excluding Item 1 , on the downward revaluation of assets and profits in the presence of
uncertainty, seemed to increase the reliability score, although only marginally in the case
of the total sample. A comparison of the reliability scores between the Indian and New
Zealand sample shows that Indian scores are lower than those for New Zealand for almost
all categories, which may be due to the larger degree of variation in the demographics and
the different response percentages across groups of the fonner. It is difficult to judge, with
any confidence, the import of the reliability scores for the validity of Gray's accounting
value constructs, compared with their use elsewhere (e.g., as in Eddie, 1991). Cross-
cultural studies, such as Hofstede (1980, 1997) and O'Connor (1995), did not report
The authors are not aware of a test of significance for changes in Cronbach alpha scores resulting from
dropping particular items.
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reliability scores. These reliability scores are a limitation on this study's conclusions but
may nevertheless provide a usefiil benchmark for use in future research.
4.2. Factor analysis
This subsection discusses the results of factor analysis of the AVS data. Theoretically, if
Gray's framework is correct and the AVS constructs have been operationalized accurately,
the factor analysis of the AVS responses should reveal four factors, each loading the four
items associated with the corresponding accounting value. The same pattern should be
evident for subsets of the data (e.g., when split by country and user-preparer groups) if the
constructs represent empirically meaningful, subcultural accounting values. The results
presented in this and the following subsections give some support to this proposition. They
are similarly supportive of Gray's hypotheses. The detailed analysis reported here is for the
combined data (1614 cases). The analysis for the subsets of data split by country and
user-preparer groups present similar results, although with some additional features
referred to below.
Various extraction methods and rotations were applied to the data, all showing similar
factor patterns. Table 7 details the results.
Only factors with eigenvalues greater than unity were extracted. This limits identified
factors to those that explain more of the variation in the data than do individual variables.
The scree plot shown in Fig. 3 indicates that five factors had an eigenvalue of one or
above. The Kaiser-Meyer- Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy for the factor
analysis of the AVS was just under 0.7, which would be classified as "middling" by
Kaiser (1974). Bartlett's sphericity test statistic was highly significant, suggesting that
factor analysis is an appropriate way of analyzing the data. The five factors explained 49%
of the variation in the data using the principle-components method. The first, second, third,
fourth, and fifth factors explained 16.3%, 11.2%, 7.7%, 7.4%, and 6.4% of the variance,
respectively.
For puipose of reference here and later in the paper, it is convenient to use the following
codes to refer to the combinations of items that appear in the factor analysis: C\ = Items 1
and 13 (measurement aspect of conservatism); C2 = Items 5 and 9 (disclosure aspect of
conservatism); U] = Items 2 and 10 (measurement aspect of uniformity); t/2 = Items 6 and
14 (disclosure aspect of uniformity); /']= Items 4, 8, and 12 (regulatory and technical
judgment aspect of professionalism, excluding the ethical aspect contained in Item 16);
^i = Items 3 and 15 (transparency aspect of secrecy); and ^2 = Items 7 and 11 (level of
detail aspect of secrecy). These codes allow the factors identified in Table 7 and the cluster
analysis reported later to be more readily related to Gray's values and the matters discussed
in the literature review.
In Table 7, all loadings greater than 30% are highlighted. Given the sample sizes, it is
reasonable to claim these are both statistically significant and practically significant,
explaining at least 10% of the relevant variables' total variance (Hair, Anderson, Tatham,
& Black, 1998). All but two of the questionnaire items (variables) can be identified with
the factors in Table 7 according to the standard approach of allocating the variables, that is,
moving along each row of the table and identifying the item with the factor on which it has
the highest absolute loading. The two exceptions to this rule are shown shaded. It is
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Fig. 3. Factor scree plot.
apparent that in the ahemative primary allocation of these items to Factors 1 and 5,
respectively, (i) it makes greater sense in terms of Gray's theory; (ii) the differences in the
communalities between the standard and alternative factor assignments are small and
probably statistically insignificant (less than 3%), and, in addition, (iii) under some other
methods of extracting and rotating the factors (e.g., the image method with an oblique
rotation), the items are factored using the standard approach precisely in this manner. It is
probably unnecessary to focus too much attention on this point, in any case, because the
highlighted loadings relating to Items 2, 3, 13, and 15 that appear in more than one factor
provide information about how they might be interpreted in each factor on which they
load. They also give insight into how either the underlying theory or survey instrument
might be improved.
As can be seen, under this interpretation. Factor 1 attracts both the uniformity items and
S\, the transparency aspect of secrecy. Factor 2 attracts P\, the first three of the
questionnaire items intended to relate to professionalism. Factor 3 attracts 5*2, the level-
of-detail aspect of secrecy; Factor 4 attracts the disclosure aspect of conservatism, Cy, and
Factor 5 attracts the measurement aspect of conservatism, C|, along with Item 16, the
remaining element of the intended professionalism construct dealing with ethics.
With respect to Gray's theory, it may be noted that the items representing uniformity
invariably load highly on the same factor and only sometimes does an item also load
significantly on another factor. Due to Factor 1 attracting ^i, however, it is not clear that
the tag of uniformity is necessarily a good description of this factor. There is, for example,
a marginally significant loading of Item 13 onto Factor 1 . This item split from the others in
a confirmatory factor analysis and may not be important. Its presence might, for instance,
be due to a problem with respondents' interpretations of the technical nature of the item
(regarding the use of LIFO to value inventories). On the other hand, it could conceivably
relate to the belief that LIFO produces a more accurate measure of profit in times of rising
prices. The factoring patterns in Column 1 of Table 7 could therefore suggest a general
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concern with the transparent provision of reHable (accurate, comparable, and objective)
information.
The uniformity items factor clearly as a separate group in the New Zealand data without
attracting 5"!. In the Indian data, the uniformity factor fragments into U2, with Item 10
combining with Item 3, a component of secrecy. Both user-preparer groups collect the
uniformity items under a single factor heading, except for Item 2.*^ Due to reasonably
persistent factoring of three of the four uniformity items and the tentative nature of the
results at this point in the research process, it is probably safe to continue to refer to Factor
1 as "uniformity," but with this term being understood in the extended sense that it
possibly encompasses the aspects of reliability and transparency.
The P\ subset of the professionalism items strongly group together under Factor 2
heading under nearly all extraction methods and in the country and user-preparer subsets
of the data. It seems appropriate, therefore, to use the label professionalism for this factor.
This factor usually fails to attract Item 16, however, so it is reasonable to conclude that the
statement about ethical standards in the questionnaire instrument is not linked to the
construct of professionalism in the minds of the respondents.
Factor 3, as well as attracting S2, also contains a significant, negative loading from Item
3, relating to the transparency aspect of secrecy, and a significant, positive loading from
Item 13, which was meant to represent a measurement aspect of conservatism. The elements
of ^2 consistently factor across extraction methods and in the subsamples referred to above.
The dominance of ^'2 and the marginal appearance of Item 3 might be reasonably claimed to
provide the justification for labeling this factor "secrecy." However, Item 3 factored
separately from ^'2 in a confimiatoiy analysis, perhaps suggesting multidimensionality in
this construct. The remaining secrecy item. Item 15, loads insignificantly on this factor
(with a communality of less than 5%), but in the expected direction. Item 15 (management
forecasts should be included in financial statements) loaded significantly onto three factors,
suggesting a relationship of the proposition both with the extended construct of uniformity
described above and the disclosure aspect of conservatism, described below.
Factors 4 and 5 contain items representing the separate disclosure and measurement
aspects of conservatism, as conceptualized in Section 2. The measurement aspect C2 loaded
onto a single factor without fragmentation under all extraction methods and rotations and in
the subsamples. The just more-than-marginal loading of Item 15 relating to the inclusion of
management forecasts in financial statements could be interpreted as an expression of con-
servatism with respect to the disclosure of information, as opposed to a desire for secrecy. It
therefore seems appropriate to give Factor 4 the name of "conservatism in disclosure."
It is probably reasonable at this juncture to also label Factor 5 as an aspect of
conservatism. Item 1 loads quite significantly on Factor 5 and not significantly on any
other factor. FurtheiTnore, there is a significant loading of Item 13, the other component of
C], on this factor. Factor 5 quite strongly attracts Item 16, the proposition that accountants
should maintain high standards of ethical conduct and there is a sense in which that could
be held to represent conservatism, especially if the reading of the statement is conditioned
upon ethical conduct being interpreted by respondents as following cautious measurement
The results by country and by user-preparer group are available from the authors on request.
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practices with respect to profit. The attraction of Item 2, under the standard method of
allocating items to factors, could be explained in the same manner, that is, the statement in
Item 2 that "depreciation rules should be set externally for separate groups of assets"
might be interpreted as embodying a cautious approach to accounting measurement. The
evidence for this interpretation of Factor 5 is not as strong as it is in the case of the other
factors, however, and the cluster analysis reported below confirms that the need to treat the
interpretation tentatively. Nevertheless, because the Factor 5 pattern is observable under
most factoring methods and rotations in the Indian and preparer subsets of the data (but
less so in the New Zealand and user subsets), the label "conservatism in measurement" for
this factor seems to be as reasonable as any ahematives evident at this time.'"
4.3. Cluster analysis
Cluster analysis was conducted to triangulate the results of the factor analysis reported
in the preceding subsection. It is possible that cluster analyses might, by using different
metrics and assumptions to those used in factor analysis, give different results and perhaps
shed light on some of the points of interpretation arising from the latter. This section
follows the approach to cluster analysis of Aldenderfer and Blashfield (1984).
Of the approaches to cluster analysis, the hierarchical method was adopted. Given the
puipose of the research, the distance measure used was the absolute value of the Pearson
correlation coefficient. The dendrogram presented in Fig. 4 uses the fiirthest neighbor
method of clustering and gives results consistent with the factor analysis. Reading down
from the top. Elements 4, 8, and 12 constitute P|, the professionalism factor. Elements 1
and 1 6 are two of the items loading on what was called the conservatism in measurement
factor in Section 4.2. Elements 6, 14, 2, and 10 are the key items defining the uniformity
factor, based upon the original conceptualization of that accounting value. That cluster
captures Element 13, a component of C| (the measurement aspect of conservatism in the
theoretical analysis), which presents a stronger impression of the relationship of that item
with the uniformity construct than did the factor analysis (although this was marginally
significant, see Table 7). Next, Elements 3 and 15 are the items making up S\, the
transparency aspect of secrecy; Elements 5 and 9 constitute C^, the disclosure aspect of
conservatism; and Elements 7 and 1 1 are S2, the level of detail aspect of secrecy.
The dendrogram offers some evidence of the originally expected relationship between
the ethical aspect of professionalism and the other items intended to define that construct.
This connection appeared to be absent from the factor analysis. In contrast, the cluster on P\
and the relationship between ^i and uniformity (both the U\ and Ui aspects) closely reflect
the results of the factor analysis. The disclosure aspect of consei'vatism (C2) seems to be
more clearly linked to S2 than in the factor analysis and what was labeled as the
conservatism in measurement factor is absent from the cluster analysis. This warrants the
caution expressed in labeling Factor 5 in the preceding subsection. Nevertheless, despite
minor differences, the overall picture presented by the cluster analysis is consistent with the
factor analysis. Both give some support to Gray's theory of accounting subcultural values.
Apart from the two instances relating to Item 13 in Factor 1 and Item 3 in Factor 3, confirmatory factor
analysis showed no other evidence of multidimensionality in the constructs described in the text.
S. Chanchani, R. Willett / The International Journal ofAccounting 39 (2004) 125-154 147
o +
Q S
•a
u
A
"I
(A
0)
u ^
0OCN'*.-ll^\D'*rN rn n LT) tn ON
«;<«;«:«:<
^ o CO in
rH CM 1-t rH CO iH in o\
rt! •a: < < < < < >< < <
148 S. Chanchaiii. R. Willett / The International Journal ofAccounting 39 (2004) 125-154
5. Conclusions, limitations, and future research
This paper reports the first attempt to operationalize and empirically measure Gray's
accounting values. It represents one way of assessing the usefulness of the Hofstede-Gray
framework approach to evaluating the cultural relevance hypothesis in accounting. Gray's
accounting value constructs were operationalized as 1 6 items in an accounting value survey
questionnaire on the basis of theoretical considerations, with four items representing each
of Gray's four accounting values. The questionnaire was used to sur\ey a large sample of
users and preparers of financial statements in India and New Zealand in 1995-1996.
The responses to the survey were analyzed using the reliability, factor, and cluster
analyses. The originally envisaged construct of professionalism emerges most clearly as a
coherent operational accounting value construct. The elements of the uniformity construct
seem to attract aspects of secrecy, as originally conceptualized, and indicate that the
uniformity construct might be contained within a broader accounting value construct. The
secrecy construct also emerged, although less strongly than in the case of either
professionalism or uniformity. Conservatism appears to split into two parts, possibly
related to the two theoretical subdimensions of disclosure and measurement. There are a
number of significant limitations relating to the research framework and method that
require these conclusions to be interpreted cautiously, however.
The research question underlying this paper is, "Are Gray's accounting subcultural
values valid empirical constructs?" An a priori strategy was adopted to answer this
question. Questionnaire items were developed based upon theoretical, rather than empir-
ical, considerations. This approach can be defended as being an appropriate way to attempt
to answer the research question because it is capable of testing the validity of Gray's
theoretical constructs. If the responses had divided nicely into four factors and clusters,
with a clear interpretation consistent with Gray's theory, for example, this would have been
confirming evidence for the existence of accounting values as usefiil empirical constructs
while, if there had been no pattern in the responses at all, it would have cast doubt on their
veracity. In the event, the reliability scores were lower than would have been hoped. The
factor analysis did not produce four factors, but five, and the cluster analysis produced
three large clusters rather than four, although it appears to be possible to interpret the
results from both latter types of analysis in the context of Gray's original values.
One problem with the approach taken to instrument development in this paper, however,
is that it could bias the results in favor of Gray's theory. There was no attempt to look for
the existence of other accounting values, for example. The factor analysis reported in the
paper explains only about 50% of the variation in the data. This suggests that there could be
other, as yet unrecognized, accounting value dimensions. An alternative, more empirical
approach to questionnaire design would be appropriate to investigate this possibility.
A specific issue that arises using the theoretical approach adopted here is the difficulty
of clearly identifying the constructs of interest with particular questionnaire item state-
ments. For example, the statement that "Market values should be used instead of historic
costs" could have several meanings in the context of conservatism. Support for this
statement could depend upon whether market values are greater or less than historic costs
or it could relate to the relative reliabilities of the measurement of market values and actual
costs. The assumed information set, upon which judgments of this sort are conditioned.
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introduces ambiguity into the responses that may obscure the factor and cluster analyses.
The reality of accounting systems, especially in an increasingly globalized environment, is
that they are not directly determined by cultural values. The state of development of capital
markets, the influence of tax laws, an so forth, are conditioning factors that sometimes
reinforce, sometimes obscure, the impact of cultural values on accounting practice. Future
research should try to take explicit account of the impact of such factors so that it may
have greater relevance to practical policy making. '
'
There is also, of course, the general question of the ability of questionnaire surveys to
reveal subtle, cultural traits. It is assumed that the questionnaire responses were truthful
and meaningful, and that reported attitudes, perceptions, beliefs, and values have
significance for the respondents in ternis of social action. The reliability of the responses
can be gauged to some extent from the consistency of the responses to particular
questionnaire items. For example, the factor analysis produced signs on the significant
loadings (e.g., with respect to Items 5 and 9) that give some confidence that they make
sense and are consistent with basic, prior expectations.
It is also assumed that the responses to the questionnaire items reflect substantive
constructs rather than reactions to linguistic cues. The deliberate spreading of what were
intended to be items associated with the same underlying construct was an attempt to
reduce the risk of the latter effect. In addition, the explicit linking of the types of
questionnaire items and their motivation to underlying theories concerning the relation-
ships between accounting values and accounting practices was designed to enhance the
substantive import of the individual items. However, the lack of specificity in the
theoretical analysis and the questionnaire can easily lead to ambiguity of a type that Gray
had not envisioned. It is acknowledged that different instruments may be developed that
better elicit Gray's (and possibly other) accounting values.
With regard to the factor analysis, the process of assigning meaningful labels to a group
of items fonning a factor necessarily involves judgment. This study, as with most factor
analysis, is open to the criticism that others interpreting the factor analysis results might
assign different labels to factors or interpret factor loadings differently. The labeling of the
factors has been guided by the literature relating to the Hofstede-Gray framework, results
from reliability, factor, and cluster analyses, and the questions hypothesized to operation-
alize the constructs. Until such time that other primary data (preferably with as great a
coverage of different countries as possible) prove otherwise, however, the conclusions
presented here may provide a starting point for fiirther AVS research.
The discussion of the interpretation of the factors above suggests three important
lessons for future AVS research. These relate to (i) the problems involved in dealing with
the orthogonality of the factors and questionnaire items; (ii) the possibility that as yet
unrecognized additional accounting value constructs exist and the potential difficulties that
may be caused for analysis by the existence of subdimensions in some of the factors; and
(iii) the fact that the quantitative approach to researching the impact of culture on
accounting can be potentially useful.
The authors are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for the discussion in this and other paragraphs in the
conclusion.
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With respect to Point (i) in the design stage of the research, it was thought that the
orthogonahty of Gray's accounting values concepts might prove to be problematic when
analyzing the respondents' returned questionnaires. Previous theoretical research had
identified the possibility of overlap in these concepts. However, the results of the analysis
were not sufficiently strongly indicative in either direction to determine if this is likely to
be a problem. Orthogonal and oblique rotations of the factors did not produce significantly
different results, suggesting that the natural factors are reasonably robust and independent
of one another. Four of the 1 6 questionnaire items did load onto more than one factor, but
it is not clear that this is a serious problem, or even necessarily undesirable in exploratory
research. The design of more orthogonal survey items in fiiture AVS type studies,
however, should be informed by the experience reported here.
With respect to Point (ii), it was also anticipated that some of the accounting value
constructs might be multidimensional. Those values with the most obvious a priori
multidimensionality, however, had the highest reliability scores. There was some evidence
in the subsamples of the existence of subdimensions but, apart from the dividing of the
conservatism construct, it did not seem to be a strong feature of the total data set. This may
have been a consequence of the simplicity of the survey instrument (which was deliberate)
which resulted with not being able to capture the multidimensional aspects of profession-
alism and uniformity sufficiently well. For example, uniformity potentially has a time
versus company and measurement versus disclosure subdimensions, giving at least four
subdimensions. If this fact is empirically significant, it would require more questionnaire
items than were used in the version of the AVS, on which the results of this paper are
based, to identify these subdimensions of accounting values. Again, this supports the need
for a more extended, empirically based AVS.
With respect to Point (iii), it does seem that whatever the correct choice of labels for the
factors revealed in the factor analysis are, systematic, quantifiable patterns do emerge from
the data and are worthy of further investigation. This remains the case even after taking
into account the many limitations of the study, such as the small size of the pilot study and
the inability to gauge the effect of any nonresponse bias. It is probably a point that pertains
to a more important issue than whether one particular theory about the identity of
accounting subcultural dimensions is confirmed by research. The test of the usefulness
of an approach to research is whether it leads to new and interesting information, including
new questions. This study raises a number of new and interesting questions concerning the
identity and nature of accounting's cultural dimensions that would not necessarily be so
clearly identified by other more qualitative approaches to the subject. Given the viewpoint
that is sometimes expressed in the literature about the impossibility of gaining knowledge
about cultural matters by quantitative means, this point is not without significance.
The AVS needs to be developed to address the limitations and weaknesses of design
noted here and to be applied across different countries and samples of users and preparers.
Such studies would contribute to the development of a repository of accounting values
data for research and would help to address the current problems of lack of data associated
with researching the cultural relevance hypothesis. This study aimed to provide primary
data on an issue about which there is little empirical evidence. Subject to the provisos
discussed, the study found some support for Gray's accounting value constructs. The
development and administration of the AVS provides a potential operational foundation
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for improving the application of the Hofstede-Gray framework in cross-cultural studies
and will, we hope, raise the debate about the cultural relevance hypothesis in the
accounting literature to one based upon a more empirical approach.
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Appendix A. The AVS
Without taking into account the recommendations of your own professional organisa-
tion to what extent do you believe the following practices are desirable? To what extent
would you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. Please indicate your
preference on the equally spaced 7 point scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree.
Stronalv auree Strongly disagree
1
.
Profits and assets should be valued downwards in case of doubt.
2. Depreciation rules should be set externally, specifically for
separate groups of assets.
3. Financial statements should be available to the general public
rather than just to shareholders and managers.
4. Accounting profession should be self-regulated.
5. Market values are generally less relevant than historic costs.
6. Financial statements of all companies should ha\ e standardised
formats.
7. Only a minimum amount of detailed data should be included
in financial statements.
8. Professional accountants are the best judges of how to measure
a firm's financial position and performance.
9. Market values should be generally used instead of historic costs.
10. Accounting policies once chosen should not be changed.
1 1
.
Information about management and owners should not be
included in financial statements.
12. Professional accountants are the best judges of what to
disclose in financial statements.
13. In times of rising prices LIFO instead of FIFO should be
used in calculations as estimates.
14. The level of detailed standardisation in financial statements
should be increased.
15. Management forecasts should be included in financial
statements.
16. Professional accountants should maintain high standards of
ethical conduct.
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Abstract
This study examines the value-relevance of R&D and advertising expenditures of Korean firms,
using a regression model based on the Ohlson [Contemp. Account. Res. (1995) 661] equity-
valuation framework. Results indicate that R&D expenditures are positively associated with stock
price, suggesting that capitalizing R&D expenditures is appropriate. The association is stronger for
the portion of R&D expenditures that is capitalized, rather than expensed, suggesting that investors
agree with management that the capitalized expenditures represent greater future economic benefits.
Investors also appear to interpret fijlly expensed R&D expenditures as positive net present-value
investments, however, suggesting that these expenditure should also be capitalized. Additional
results indicate that advertising expenditures are negatively associated with stock price, and the
magnitude of this negative association is similar to the association between other expenses and stock
price. These findings suggest that investors believe the economic benefits of advertising expenditures
expire in the current period, similar to other expenses.
© 2004 Published by University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In the current environment of rapid scientific advancement and intensified global
competition, many firms in Korea are increasing their R&D investments and launching
new advertising projects. Whether R&D and advertising expenditures represent expected
fiiture economic benefit (are "value-relevant") is an important accounting issue in both
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academia and practice. If expenditures provide future economic benefits, then capitalizing
them is desirable; otherwise, expensing in the current period is preferred. This stud\-
in^•estigates the \'alue-rele\ ance oi R&D and adxertising expenditures of Korean firms,
using an empirical model den\ed from the Ohlson (1995) \aluation framework.
R&D expendimres may be capitalized in Korea, whereas they are fiilly expensed in the
United States. Studies using U.S. data proxide e\idence generally consistent with the
value-rele\ance of R&D expenditures (Bublitz & Ertredge. 1989; Hirschey & Weygandt.
1985; Lev & Sougiannis. 1996). Using Korean data. Choi (1994) shows that capitalized
R&D expenditures are value-rele\ant. but expensed R&D expenditures are not. On the
other hand. e\'idence pro\ided by Cho and Chung (2001 ) supports the \alue-rele\ance of
both capitalized and expensed R&D expenditures.
.A.d\ertising expenditures are expensed unixersalK. Findings of previous studies,
regarding the \alue-rele\ance of ad\ertising expenditures are mixed. Hirschey and
Weygandt (1985) pro\ide evidence supporting the \ alue-rele\ance of ad\ertising expen-
ditures, whereas Bublitz and Ettredge (1989) and Choi (1994) report exidence to the
contrary.
The research methods of pre\ ious sUidies either associate R&D and or ad\ ertising
expenditures with future earnings (Cho & Chung. 2001; Le\ & Sougiannis, 1996) or relate
them to firm market value (Aboody & Lev. 1998; Bublitz & Ettredge. 1989; Choi. 1994;
Hirschey & Weygandt. 1985). This study adopts the latter approach; however, unlike
previous research, we base our empirical tests on a rigorously den\ ed theoretical model,
the Ohlson (1995) valuation framework. Ohlson expresses finu \alue as a linear function
of accounting earnings, the book value of net assets, and other infonnation. By fitting
R&D and advertising expenditures into this framework, we find that R&D expenditures
are positively associated with stock price, indicating that market participants view the
expenditures as providing future economic benefits. This association is stronger for
capitalized R&D than for the expensed portion, however, to the extent that capitalized
R&D is judged to be a positive net present-value investment. Ad\ ertising expenditures are
negati\ely associated with stock price, suggesting that they are regarded as expenses.
To control for the possibility of a self-selection bias, we partition our sample into two
groups based on whether firms fully or partially expense R&D expenditures. We find that
the expensed R&D of finns that at least partially capitalize has no significant price impact.
When firms frilly expense their R&D expenditures, however, their R&D expense is
significantly associated with price. Because the association between price and fully
expensed R&D expenditures is greater than the association between price and net book
\alue. the market appears to regard fully expensed R&D as a positive net present-\alue
investment. The significant difference we find in the value-rele\ance of expensed R&D
between our two subsamples may provide an explanation for the conflicting findings of
previous research on Korean R&D expenditures; pre\ ious research does not control for a
possible self-selection bias.
Advertising expenditures are negati\ely associated with stock price. Because the
magnitude of this negative association closely resembles the association between other
expenses and stock price, these results are consistent with a market belief that the
economic benefits of advertising expenditures expire in the current period, similar to
other expenses.
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The financial press has been critical of various Korean accounting practices, including
the capitalization of amounts that do not represent future benefits (Ehrlich & Mann. 1998).
R&D investments and advertising activities are essential for securing a firm's technolog-
ical superiority and enhancing its brand values. Our findings on the information content of
R&D and advertising expenditures may prove useful in future deliberations about, on
modifying current accounting standards that govern the extent to which these expenditures
should be capitalized.
The next section discusses previous research and the Korean accounting standards that
govern R&D expenditures. Section 3 covers the model, hypotheses, sample selection, and
data. Details of tests and results are included in Section 4, and the final section provides a
summary and conclusions.
2. Background
2.1. Accounting standards for R&D
Press reports have criticized the amount and transparency of Korean accounting
disclosures (Condon, 1998; Webb, 1998). Recently, the Korean government has encour-
aged Korean firms to adopt Western accounting standards, which it feels will help the
country avoid problems like the recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) crisis (The
Economist, 1999). The IMF criticized Korean accounting and auditing practices and has
required reforms (Ehrlich & Mann, 1998; Macrae, 1998). Difficulties cited by the IMF
include disclosure lapses, such as allowing the omission of key liabilities, and pennitting
the capitalization of amounts that do not represent future economic benefits.
Under the previous Korean accounting standard for R&D. promulgated in 1987. R&D
expenditures could be capitalized when the expenditures were indi\'idually allocable to
particular products or technologies, and reasonably expected future economic benefits
were sufficient to cover the expenditures. If these conditions were not met, R&D
expenditures were to be expensed. Under a new standard, effective in 1999, R&D
expenditures are partitioned into an expensed research component and a capitalized
development component. Development costs are expenditures made in the de\elopment
stage that are individually allocable to new products or new technologies (including
software), after technological feasibility is proven, and from which future economic
benefits are probable. The new standard thus reduces the portion ofR&D expenditures that
can be capitalized, by requiring all expenditures incurred in the research stage to be
expensed.
' While the new capitalization rule moves Korean accounting closer to Western
standards, there is still significant flexibility in the capitalization of development costs.
Although considerable subjectivity over capitalization arguably exists under both old and new rules, the
capitalized portion of R&D expenditures dramatically decreased when the new standard was implemented. In
1998, the year before the new standard became effective, the capitalized portion was 0.90% of sales on average;
this portion decreased to 0.25% of sales in 1999. The expensed portion of R&D expenditures increased from
0.53% of sales in 1998 to 1.01% in 1999.
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Because the new standard has only recently become effective, R&D data reflecting the
new standard are not sufficient to provide robust evidence. Thus, data from under the
previous standard (1988-1998) are used in this paper. Regardless of differences between
the new and previous standards concerning capitalizing or expensing R&D expenditures,
the sum of capitalized and expensed amounts is the same under both rules. For
capitalization, the condition that future economic benefits are expected is equally
applicable before and after the new standard. Results would thus be similar if data under
the new standard were used instead."
U.S. GAAP requires the fiall expensing ofR&D expenditures. It allows the capitalization
of software development costs, but only after the technological feasibility of new products
is proven. Advertising expenditures are expensed under both Korean and U.S. GAAR
2.2. Prior studies
Aboody and Lev (1998), Bublitz and Ettredge (1989), Choi (1994), and Hirschey and
Weygandt (1985) infer the value-relevance of R&D and/or advertising expenditures from
their associations with market value proxies, such as Tobin's q or stock returns. On the
other hand, Cho and Chung (2001) and Lev and Sougiannis (1996) investigate value-
relevance by examining its contribution to the generation of fijture earnings.
Hirschey and Weygandt (1985) provide evidence that R&D and advertising expendi-
tures are positively associated with Tobin's q. This indicates that these expenditures are
priced by the market, and thus merit capitalization as intangible assets. Choi (1994)
replicates Hirschey and Weygandt (1985) using Korean data, but reports that only the
portion of R&D expenditures that is capitalized under Korean GAAP is positively
associated with Tobin's q.
Bublitz and Ettredge (1989) examine the association of unexpected R&D and
advertising expenditures with stock returns, after controlling for unexpected revenues
and other ordinary expenses. They find that unexpected R&D expenditures are not
negatively associated with stock returns, but unexpected advertising expenditures are
more negatively associated with stock returns than are other unexpected ordinary
expenses. They interpret these results as suggesting that R&D expenditures are valued
as assets, but advertising expenditures are recognized as expenses.
Although U.S. GAAP requires the full expensing of R&D expenditures, it allows the
capitalization of software development costs when the technological feasibility of new
products can be proven. Aboody and Lev (1998) find that changes in capitalized software-
development costs are positively related to stock returns, unlike changes in expensed
software-development costs. This supports the position of U.S. GAAP on the capitaliza-
tion of software-development costs.
Lev and Sougiannis (1996) estimate, by industry, the contribution provided by R&D
expenditures to the generation of future earnings. Their results suggest that for each
The value-relevance of the capitalized portion ofR&D expenditures could be found to be higher under the
new standard. This would occur if future economic benefits are found to be more highly assured when the
additional condition is imposed: that technological feasibility should be proven in the development stage prior to
capitalization.
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inflation-adjusted dollar of R&D expenditures, earnings of US$1.70-2.60 are generated
over the following 5-9 years, including the year of the expenditures. They present further
evidence that the difference between "as-if" earnings (obtained by capitalizing R&D
expenditures) and reported earnings is positively associated with stock prices. Taken
together, these results suggest that the market values R&D expenditures as assets, not as
expenses, contrary to the treatment prescribed by U.S. GAAR
Cho and Chung (2001) replicate Lev and Sougiannis (1996) with Korean data. They
show that 1 won (Korean currency) of R&D expenditures generates 1.25 won of earnings,
on average, over the following 2-4 years, including the year of expenditures. A separate
examination of the capitalized and expensed portions indicates that the capitalized portion
has an effect on future earnings for a longer period than the expensed portion.
'
Aboody and Lev (1998), Choi (1994), Bublitz and Ettredge (1989), and Hirschey and
Weygandt (1985) constmct hypothesis tests based predominantly on intuition, rather than
on valuation theory. For example, Hirschey and Weygandt and Choi do not include
earnings in their models. Their findings may thus be influenced by a correlated omitted-
variable problem.'^ In contrast, the empirical tests of this study are based on a model
rigorously derived from the Ohlson (1995) valuation framework. Because Korean finns
have considerable discretion over whether R&D expenditures may be capitalized or
expensed, the possibility also exists that the results of previous studies on Korean data may
have been affected by a self-selection bias. We control for this possible influence by
partitioning our sample based on whether the firms capitalize R&D. We then examine the
value-relevance of expensed R&D expenditures separately for the subsamples.
3. Research design
3.]. Regression model
Ohlson (1995) derives an equity-valuation model under the assumptions that (1) the
equity value of a firm is the present value of its expected future dividend stream; (2) the
clean surplus relation is maintained for the change in book value of a firm's net assets; and
(3) abnormal earnings exhibit a first-order autoregressive time-series process. The model is
p, = k{cpx, - d,) + {\ - k)y, + av, (1)
where /?, = market value of a firm's equity at date t, a, = earnings for the period ending at
date t, d, = net dividends as of date r, y, = book value of net assets at date r, v, = other
Cho and Chung (2001) is based on a comparatively small sample, 212 firm years over 2 years, 1995 and
1996.
In Choi (1994), the sample is 1453 firm years over 5 years irom 1988 to 1992. In his regression, R&D and
advertising expenditure variables are all scaled by sales, as in our sample. We find that the correlations between
eamings (before deducting R&D, advertising expenditures, and extraordinary items) and expensed R&D and
advertising expendinires are significantly positive (.23 and .40, respectively), although the correlation between
eamings and capitalized R&D is not substantial ( — .05). Omitting eamings fi'om the RHS of a regression of price
on expensed R&D and advertising expenditures, for example, will thus bias the estimated coefficients in a
positive direction.
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information at date /, (p={\ ^r^lr^, where /7 = the risk-free rate (thus (/)>1), and < ^ < 1,
a>0.'
In Eq. (1), equity value is the weighted average of the book value of net assets (j,) and
the earnings multiple ((p.v,) less net dividends (J,), adjusted for the effect of other
information (\',)- Rewriting Eq. (1),
/?, + J, = (1 — /:)(;', — rdcap, + ^,) + ( 1 — A:)rdcap, + A'(/)(sale, — oexp,
— rdexp, — adexp, ) + ocv,
= (1 — A')v*+ (1 — A')rdcap, + A'(/7sale, — Atpoexp, — A^(/)rdexp,
— A:(/?adexp, + av,. (2)
Above, capitalized R&D expenditures (rdcap,) are separated from the book value of net
assets before dividends (v, + i/,). Thus, y* is v, — rdcap/+f/, , or book value before
dividends minus capitalized R&D. The eamings variable (.v,) is decomposed into sales
(sale,) minus R&D expenses (rdexp,), advertising expenses (adexp,), and other expenses
(oexp,), and R&D expenditures are in part capitalized (rdcap,) and in part expensed
(rdexp,). ^' Furthemiore, because rdexp, and adexp, are expense items, their impact on
market price is denoted as negative in Eq. (2). However, if the market believes these
expenditures have ftiture economic benefits beyond what is reflected in financial state-
ments, R&D and advertising expenditures may be positively related to price. Finally,
although Eq. (2) depicts capitalized R&D expenditures (rdcap,) as having a positive effect
on price in the same magnitude as other assets ( vf), the market may value rdcap, more
highly than other assets due to its potential to generate high levels of future economic
benefits.
Eq. (2) is the basis of the regression model to test the value-relevance of R&D and
advertising expenditures.^ Adding the finn subscript /, and allowing the intercept to vary
yearly over the test period (1988-1998) in the equation, the regression model is:
/>,, + D,v = YL ^^'^^" + ^iBV,7* + /?2RDCAP,, + ^3SALE„ + /)40EXP„
r=S8
+ ZjsRDEXPF,, + /7„RDEXPC„ + />7ADEXP,, + e„ (3)
where P„ = market value of common stock three months after the end of year /,' Z)„ = cash
dividends in year /, YR„ = year dummy (one for the test year and zero otherwise),
^ Refer to Ohlson (1995) for definitions of A' and a.
'' Tests reveal that the amount of R&D expenditures capitalized and the amount subsequently amortized are
highly correlated (Pearson correlation coefficient=.907). Because our research focus is on the amounts expensed
or capitalized, and to avoid problems with multicoUinearity, we do not include a variable for the amortization of
capitalized R&D expenditures in our regressions.
^ Myers (1999) provides empirical evidence that Ohlson's (1995) linear models of information dynamics
tend to understate firm value, and the correlation between market price and the model's implied value is chiefly
attributable to the correlation between price and net book value.
The 3-month buffer is to allow sufficient time for the filing of year / financial statements; see Section 3.3.
B.H. Han. D. Mawy / International Journal ofAccounting 39 (2004) 155-173 161
BVf, =BV„ (book value of net assets at the end of year 0-RDCAP„ + D,„ RDCAP„ =
R&D expenditures capitalized in year /, SALE,, = net sales in year /, OEXP„ = other
expenses in year /, RDEXPF,, = R&D expenditures expensed for full expensers in year t,
RDEXPC„ = R&D expenditures expensed for capitalizers in year t, and ADEXP,, = adver-
tising expenditures in year /.
Net dividends {d, in Eq. (2)) are replaced with cash dividends, as in Collins, Pincus, and
Xie (1999). The precise nature of Ohlson's v, ("other information" in Eqs. (1) and (2)) is
unknown, and may be an omitted variable. However, if v, is both omitted and time
dependent, then the yearly intercepts may proxy for the information.
To estimate the coefficients on earnings-component variables in Eq. (3), we begin by
decomposing Net Income before Extraordinary Items into SALE,, — OEXP,, —RDEX-
P„ - ADEXP,,, as in Eq. (2). Following Aboody and Lev (1998), RDEXP,, is then broken
down into two variables. For firm years with R&D expenditures fiilly expensed, RDEXP-
F„ = RDEXP,/, but RDEXPC„ = 0. For firm years with R&D expenditures at least partially
capitalized, RDEXPC,, = RDEXP,,, but RDEXPF,, = 0. In this way, the coefficient on
RDEXPF,, will capture the market reaction to R&D expensing for "fijU expensers," and
the coefficient on RDEXPC,, will represent the market reaction to R&D expensing for (at
least partial) capitalizers.' All variables, including the yearly intercepts, are deflated by
SALE,,. This causes the variable SALE,, on the RHS in Eq. (3) to become a unit vector, and
the coefficient on the fourth term then becomes the common intercept.'*^'
3.2. Hypotheses
The coefficients on the Eq. (3) variables BV* , SALE,,, and OEXP,, appear in Eq. (2) as
^1 = 1 — A'; b:, — k(p; and />4 = —{k<.p).
Because < A' < 1 and (/)>1, it is anticipated that
Q<b\<\\ /)3>0; and/)4<0.
Similarly, the coefficient on RDCAP,, (^2) is 1 - A:, and those on RDEXP,,, RDEXPC,,,
and ADEXP,, (Z^s, b(^, and ^7) are all
—
{k(p). Thus,
0<62=/)i<l; and ^5, /?6, ^7^0.
We begin by testing whether the coefficient on RDCAP,, is consistent with the above
reasoning. That is, if the expenditures represented by RDCAP,, are expected to provide
The number of ftill expensers, full capitalizers, and partial capitalizers ofR&D are 1511 (47%), 305 (10%),
and 1375 (43%), respectively. We combine the subsamples of fiill and partial capitalizers prior to conducting
statistical tests because fiill capitalizers are comparatively few.
Barth and Kallapur (1996) report that including a scale proxy as an independent variable and reporting
White's (1980) t statistics is more effective than deflation for addressing problems related to scale. In contrast,
Easton (1998) finds that regressions of market value on firm characteristics may lead to coefficient estimates that
capture only scale effects. Our results are qualitatively similar when tests are repeated using SALES,, as an
independent variable and deflating by the number of shares outstanding. These results are available from the
authors.
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future economic benefit, its coefficient, bj, should be greater than 0. Our first (ahemative)
hypothesis is thus
H,: b2>0.
The other R&D expenditure variables, RDEXPF,,, RDEXPC,,, and ADEXP,,, are
expense items. Based on Eq. (2), their coefficients should approximate the coefficient on
0EXP,7, or /)5, h(,, b-j < 0. Market participants may, however, believe that these R&D
and advertising expenditures represent fiiture economic benefits beyond what is implied
by their financial statement presentation. To test for this, alternative hypotheses
concerning the coefficients on RDEXPF,,, RDEXPC,,, and ADEXP,, {b^, b(,, and hi) in
Eq. (3) are:
H2: bp-b^,
H3: b(,>b^,
and
H4: bi>b4.
The above hypotheses suggest that if the economic benefits from RDEXPF,,, RDEXP-
C,„ and ADEXP,, do not expire entirely in the current period, their coefficients will be
higher than the coefficient on OEXP,,, b^.
Stronger forms of the above four hypotheses are:
H,s: b2>bu
His: ^5>/'i,
H3,: b(;>bu
and
H4s: b-i>b^.
In Hi^, we are testing whether RDCAP,, represents future economic benefits beyond
what is implied by its financial-statement presentation. In Eq. (2), the theoretical
coefficients on vT (net book value) and rdcap, (capitalized R&D) are each 1 - k. The
coefficient on BV*, b\, thus provides an estimate for 1 — k. We compare the coefficient
on RDCAP/,, 62, to ^1 to test whether RDCAP,, is viewed by the market as providing
fiiture economic benefits beyond this theoretical value. Alternatively, H|s tests whether
the market expects greater fiiture benefit from a dollar of capitalized R&D than from a
dollar of ordinary net assets. Moreover, if one considers the cross-sectional estimate of
the coefficient on BVf, as the market's estimate of a normal return, the four stronger
hypotheses above test whether the market regards each expenditure (RDCAP,,,
RDEXPF,,, RDEXPC,,, and ADEXP,,) as a positive net present-value investment,
regardless of its classification into asset or expense under GAAP.
Under Korean GAAP, the condition that fiiture economic benefits are reasonably
expected should be met for the capitalized portion of R&D expenditures; otherwise, these
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Table 1
Derivation of research sample of 3191 firm-year observations. 1988- 1998
Listed on Korean Stock Exchange (1988-1998) 6875 firm years'
Necessary accounting and stock price data available for December 4609 firm years
fiscal year-end firms
Book value of net assets positive for years / and / - 1 4118 firm years
Stock return data available for years t — 1, t — 2, and / - 3 3790 firm years
R&D expenditures greater than 3191 fimi years (sample)
''625 firms x ]] years = 6875 finn years.
expenditures should be expensed. We thus expect that the value-relevance of RDCAP,, is
higher than that of RDEXPF,, and RDEXPC,,, or
H5: b2>b^,
and
He'. b2>b(,.
Together, H1S-H4S, H5, and H(, enable comparisons among the market valuations of
ordinary assets (BV* ) and R&D expenditures.
3.3. Sample selection and variable measurements
The sample consists of finns listed on the Korean Stock Exchange from 1988 to 1998, a
period during which firms were allowed to capitalize R&D expenditures when future
economic benefits were reasonably expected from the expenditures. Accounting data are
retrieved from the Korea hivestors Service database, and stock price and returns data are
from the Korea Securities Research Institute database. To be included in the sample,
necessary accounting and market data must be available. In addition, the sample is
confined to firms with December fiscal year-ends, with positive net asset book values for
the sample and previous years, and with R&D expenditures in the sample year. The
resulting sample has 3191 firm years from 1988 to 1998, inclusive. The sample selection
procedure is summarized in Table 1.
In Eq. (3), the market value of common stock ( P„) is as of the end of March in year
/+ 1. This allows a 3-month filing period for year / financial statements, to ensure that
market value is measured after the release of the infonnation. Other expenses (OEXP,,) are
all expenses typically found in earnings before extraordinary items, including amortization
of capitalized R&D, but excluding R&D expense and advertising expense.
4. Results
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 2 reports the means and medians of the main independent variables for the
sample. The number of observations is the smallest (151) in 1988 and the greatest (352) in
i
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics of variables; yeady means medians, 3191 firm years. 1988-1998
(A) Mean median of sample firm attributes'*
Year /( Total assets Book value Market-to-book DE ratio"^^ Capitalization
(W billion") (W billion) ratio intensity
1988 151 278 103 70/28 1.755 1.592 2.972 2.357 0.301 0.000
1989 184 294 102 82/33 1.641/1.519 2.6692.087 0.251 0.000
1990 228 359T05 99/30 1.207/1.124 2.787/2.196 0.271 '0.000
1991 292 448/110 132/32 1.009/0.873 3.169/2.391 0.301/0.000
1992 318 479/117 136/35 1.854/1.074 7.830/2.376 0.350/0.022
1993 327 522/130 154/40 1.501/1.306 3.186/2.236 0.352/0.056
1994 326 611/149 180/49 1.959/1.616 3.068/2.218 0.345/0.044
1995 334 ^51/161 222/53 1.423/1.023 4.762/2.188 0.355/0.028
1996 344 877/194 249/58 1.479/0.933 4.211/2.172 0.378/0.054
1997 352 1067/205 255/55 0.627/0.413 6.537/2.574 0.331/0.008
1998 335 1211/200 348/70 0.823/0.569 3.780/1.669 0.268/0.000
(B) R&D and advertising expenses as percentages of sales
Year n SALE,;
(W billion)
% OEXP,'^ % RDCAP,, % RDEXP,. "o.^DEXP,,
1988 151 351/100 96.6/97.6 0.300.00 0.18/0.07 0.72/0.41
1989 184 329/97 96.5/98.0 0.500.00 0.29/0.10 0.82/0.36
1990 228 353/100 97.1/96.2 0.60/0.00 0.40/0.12 0.84/0.40
1991 292 389/101 96.5/95.8 0.74/0.00 0.47/0.14 0.81/0.46
1992 318 398/99 96.8/91.8 0.81/0.00 0.48/0.13 0.86/0.32
1993 327 450/106 96.6/96.5 0.77 '0.00 0.59/0.14 0.80/0.34
1994 326 510/122 95.6/94.2 0.91 0.01 0.63/0.15 0.99/0.32
1995 334 631/135 95.1/95.0 0.98/0.01 0.69/0.17 0.97/0.34
1996 344 738/163 97.5/95.7 1.10 0.01 0.60/0.13 0.89/0.33
1997 352 873/167 98.6/102.1 0.730.00 0.57/0.16 0.84/0.25
1998 335 1002/157 98.2a00.3 0.90/0.00 0.53/0.17 0.59/0.15
Variable definitions: DE ratio = the debt-to-equity ratio; SALE;, = net sales for firm / in year /; OEXP,, = expenses
other than R&D. and advertising, used to determine earnings before extraordinary items from net sales;
RDC.A.P,, = capitalized R&D; RDEXP,, = R&D expenses; ADEXP,, = advertising expenses; and capitalization
intensity = R&D capitalizedR&D expenditures = R&D capitalized (R&D capitalized - R&D expensed).
^ Total assets, book \alue of net assets, and market-to-book ratio are as of the end of each year.
''USSl is approximately 1200 won (W1200).
'^ There were four observations with DE>500; tvvo in 1992, one in 1995 and one in 1997. Without those
extreme DE observations, the mean DEs are 2.948 in 1992, 2.923 in 1995, and 4.187 in 1997.
'' % indicates the percentage value from dividing the yearly mean/median of the variable by the corresponding
yearly mean/median of SALE. Thus, each mean/median %variable, if multiplied by the corresponding mean/
median of SALE, will become the vearlv mean median of the variable.
1997. Total assets, book value, and SALE,, exhibit distinctly increasing trends. The means
of these variables are much larger than the medians, because there are a few large firms in
the right tails of the variable distributions. Similarly, the yearly DE ratio means are
consistently larger than the medians. The market-to-book ratio means (and most medians)
are consistently greater than 1 until 1997 and 1998. during the Korean "IMF financial
crisis." Capitalization -intensity ratios are calculated as the proportion of total R&D
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Table 3
Pearson product correlations (A'^=3099)
BV* RDCAP,, OEXP,, RDEXPF,, RDEXPC,, ADEXP,,
Pi,+Di, 0.609*** 0.196*** -0.259*** 0.092*** 0.057** 0.007
BV* 0.030 -0.149*** 0.117*** 0.058** - 0.007
RDCAP,, 0.048** -0.176*** 0.121*** 0.026
OEXP,, -0.150*** -0.145*** -0.402***
RDEXPF,, -0.156*** 0.093***
RDEXPC,, 0.132***
All variables are deflated by SALE,,.
Variable definitions: f*„ = market value of firm / 3 months after the end of year /; D„ = cash dividend in year
t; BV,f=BV„ (book value of net assets at the end of year r) - RDCAP,, + D„; RDCAP,, = capitalized R&D;
OEXP,, = all expenses (including cost of goods sold and income tax expenses) other than R&D expense,
advertising expense, and extraordinary gains or losses in year t; RDEXPF,, = R&D expenditures expensed by
finns that fully expense in year t; RDEXPC,, = R&D expenditures expensed by firms that capitalize in year t;
and ADEXP,, = advertising expenses.
Correlations are calculated with the same data used for regression estimates of Eq. (3). Extreme values are
eliminated from the Eq. (3) data if the absolute value of RSTUDENT is greater than three or the absolute value of
DFFITS is greater than 3( /?/«)' ", where p and // are the number of parameters and observations, respectively
(Belsley et al., 1980).
* Significant at .05 (two-tailed).
** Significant at .01 (two-tailed).
*** Significant at .001 (two-tailed).
expenditures capitalized. These ratios also exhibit means consistently greater than their
medians, signifying a skewed distribution.
OEXP,,, RDCAP,,, RDEXP,,, and ADEXP,, are each expressed in the table as a
percentage relative to SALE,,. The mean of OEXP,, ranges from approximately 95% to
98% of SALE,, over the period, with a median of similar magnitude. R&D
expenditures (RDCAP,, and RDEXP,,) increase for the most part until 1996, but then
decrease slightly in 1997 and 1998 during the financial crisis. The mean of RDCAP,,
is 0.30% in 1988, but increases to 1.10% of SALE,, in 1996. The mean of RDEXP,,
increases from 0.18% in 1988 to 0.69% of SALE,, in 1995. ADEXP,, also shows an
increasing trend until 1996, the year before the IMF financial crisis, but the rate of
increase is not as distinct as for RDEXP,, and RDCAP,,. The means of RDCAP,,,
RDEXP,,, and ADEXP,, are all considerably larger than the medians, indicating that
their distributions are highly skewed. In particular, the medians of RDCAP,, are in
most of the years. '
'
Pearson product correlations among our research variables are reported in Table 3.
Outliers are identified from the regression of Eq. (3), using the RSTUDENT and DFFITS
diagnostics discussed in Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch (1980), and are eliminated for
robustness.'" This process reduces the number of observations to a sample size of 3099
To be included in the sample, R&D expenditures should be positive. Because R&D expenditures are the
sum of RDCAP and RDEXP, RDCAP is included if RDEXP is positive.
Observations are identified as outliers in regressions if the absolute value of RSTUDENT is greater than 3
or the absolute value of DFFITS is greater than 3(;7//;)' ", where p and /; are the number of parameters and
observations, respectively.
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firm years. All of the independent \ariables (all scaled hy SALE.) are significanth-
correlated individually with P ~D (also scaled by SALE,,), except for ADEXP,,..
RDEXPF ... RDEXPC,.. and ADEXP.. are negatively correlated with OEXP,., (all P
values<.001). RDC.AP... is positively correlated with OEXP . {P<.0\). Although not
tabulated here, the correlation between earnings (before deducting R&iD. ad\enising
expenditures, and extraordinarv" items) and RDC.AP . is negative ( — 0.048. P<.0\ ). but
the correlations between eamings and RDEXPF and RDEXPC • are substantially positive
(.150 and .145. respectively, both P \alues< .001 ). Together, these correlations suggest
that firms tend to capitalize RiSiD \\ hen eamings are low ( and other expenses are high), but
expense R&D when eammgs are high. While many of the independent variables are
significantly correlated, diagnostics suggest that multicollinearit}' is not a problem in our
subsequent regressions.''
4.2. .Main Jesuits
Table 4 presents pooled regression results. The significance of each regression
coefficient is tested with a \\Tiite"s (1980) ; statistic, against the null that the coefficient
value is 0. Panel A of Table 4 repons coefficient estimates and test resuhs. As stated in
Section 3.2. the theoretical \alues of the coefficients on B\'*. and OEXP,, are b^ = I — k.
and bj^ = — iko). Thus, it is predicted that 0<bi<\. and ^a < 0. The altemati\e
h>potheses about the coefficient on RDCAP ih^] and the coefficients on RDEXP...
RDEXPC,.. and .\DEXP;; {b^. b^. and b-) are b2>0 and b^. b^. and b->b4. The stronger
form of the above altemative h\750theses are b2>b] and ^5. bf.. and b->b]. Although our
alternative h\potheses imply one-tailed P \alues. u e report tw o-tailed P \ alues to be more
informative.
If one assumes that the estimated coefficient on BV^ (0.663. P< .001 ) approximates its
theoretical value of \ - k. then A=.337. If the coefficient on OEXP,, ( - 1.026. P< .001
)
may also be regarded as reasonably close to its theoretical value of — iko). then we can
infer a value for the eamings multiple (o) of about 3. The coefficients on RDCAP . and
RDEXPF,, (7.264 and 4.240) are significantly greater than i P< .00 1 ). suggesting that the
market views capitalized and fully expensed R&D expenditures as pro\"iding future
economic benefits, like assets. Furthermore. Panel B of Table 4 shows that the coefficient
on RDC.\P,, is significantly greater than that on B\'* (i°<.001). indicating that the
market values capitalized R&D expenditures more highh than other assets, that is. as a
positive net present \alue in\estment. These results pro\ide support for H and Hi^.
Because the coefficient on RDEXPF . is significantly positi\e. and the coefficient on
OEXP;,- is significantly negati\ e. H: is also supported; Panel B of Table 4 shows that the
difference between these two coefficients is significant (P<.001). Moreo\er. H:. is also
supported; the coefficient on RDEXPF - is significantly greater than the coefficient on net
book value. B\"* . .As discussed in Section 3.2. this result is consistent wnh fully expensed
R&D representing a positive net present-value investment, and argues m fa\or of (at least
partial) capitalization.
'^ Variance Inflanon Factors (VTF; Belsley et aL 1980) for all independent variables are less tlian 1.4.
Kennedy (1992) suggests a VIF greater tfaan 10 indicates harmful multicoUinearity.
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Table 4
Coefficient estimates fi"oiTi regressions of with-dividend price on R&D-related variables, advertising expenses,
and other control variables; all variables deflated by sales
Model: P„ + D„ =^(lyYR„ + /?|BV* + fc.RDCAP,, + /j^SALE,, + A4OEXP,, + 65RDEXPF„+
/)„RDEXPC„ + bjADEX?,, + e„
(A) Coefficient estimates and test statistics"
Variable Coefficient White's t statistic
BV,f
RDCAP,,
OEXP,,
RDEXPF,,
RDEXPC,,
ADEXP,,
Adjusted R~
N
0.663
7.264
1.026
4.240
0.832
1.454
.542
3099
23.8***
10.5***
10.1***
4.08***
0.91
-7.31***
(B) Coefficient difference estimates and test statistics
Coefficient difference estimate White's t statistic
RDCAP,, - BV*
RDEXPF,, - OEXP,,
RDEXPC,, - OEXP,,
ADEXP,, - OEXP,,
RDCAP,, - RDEXPF,,
RDCAP,, - RDEXPC,,
RDEXPF,, - BV,*
RDEXPC,, - BV*
ADEXP,, - BV/f
6.601
5.266
1.858
- 0.428
3.024
6.432
3.577
0.169
-2.117
Q ^4***
2.07*
-2.56*
2.59**
5.38***
3 44***
0.17
— 10 79***
All variables, including the yearly intercepts, are deflated by SALE,,. Thus, the SALE,, variable in Eq. (3)
becomes a unit vector, and its coefficient is a common intercept. Intercepts are not tabulated here for brevity.
Variable definitions: P„ = market value of firm / 3 months after the end of year t; D„ = cash dividend in year /;
YR„ = a year dummy variable with 1 for the test year and otherwise; BV/f= BV„ (book value of net assets at the
end of year /) - RDCAP,, + D„; RDCAP,, = capitalized R&D; SALE,, = net sales for firm / in year /; OEXP,, = all
expenses (including cost of goods sold and income tax expense) other than R&D expense, advertising expense,
and extraordinary gains or losses in year t; RDEXPF,, = R&D expenditures expensed by fiall expensers in year t;
RDEXPC,, = R&D expenditures expensed by capitalizers in year /; and ADEXP,, = advertising expenses.
' Extreme values are eliminated if the absolute value of RSTUDENT is greater than 3 or the absolute value of
DFFITS is greater than 3(/7//;)' ", where p and // are the number of parameters and obser\'ations, respectively
(Belsley et al., 1980). Regression results are based on 3099 firm years, after eliminating extreme values. WTiite's
(1980) t statistics test the null hypothesis that the coefficient value equals 0.
White's (1980) / statistics test the null hypothesis that the coefficient values are equal.
* Significant at .05 (two-tailed).
** Significant at .01 (two-tailed).
*** Significant at .001 (two-tailed).
Panel B of Table 4 shows that the coefficient on RDEXPC,, is significantly greater than
the coefficient on OEXP,, {P< .05). This result supports H3, suggesting that the economic
benefits of expensed R&D do not appear to expire entirely in the period in which the
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expense occurs, unlike other expenses. H3S, which hypothesizes that the coefficient on
RDEXPC,, is greater than the coefficient on BV*, is a stronger test of the perceived future
benefits of expensed R&D. This hypothesis is not supported; however, the t statistic is not
significant. The evidence that R&D expense from partial capitalizers may represent future
economic benefits as assets is thus somewhat weak. Panel B also shows that although the
difference between the coefficients on ADEXP,, and OEXP,, is significant, the sign of the
difference is incorrect. The coefficients on both variables are significantly less than (both
P values < 0.001) in Panel A. Thus, these results do not support either H4 or H^^, and are
consistent with a belief by market participants that advertising expenditures do not
represent future economic benefits, and thus expensing is warranted.
Our last two hypotheses, H5 and H(„ hypothesize that the coefficient on RDCAP,,
exceeds the coefficients on RDEXPF,, and RDEXPC,,, respectively. The Korean GAAP
prohibits capitalization of R&D expenditures unless future economic benefits are reason-
ably expected; thus, the value-relevance of capitalized R&D is predicted to be greater than
that of expensed R&D. / Statistics at the bottom of Panel B of Table 4 are significant for
both tests of coefficient differences, providing support for both hypotheses (P<.0\ and
P<.001, respectively).'^
Table 5 presents results from the yearly estimation of Eq. (3). White's t statistics are
given for each yearly coefficient estimate, as well as z\ and z2 statistics (Aboody and Lev,
1998) to test coefficient significance across years. '^ The means of the yearly coefficients
in Panel A of Table 5 are close to the pooled estimates reported in Panel A of Table 4,
except for the coefficient on RDEXPC,,; however, the coefficient on this variable is not
significant in the pooled regression, or in tests (zl and z2 statistics) based on the yearly
models. The yearly coefficient estimates on BV*,. RDCAP,,, and OEXP,, are significant in
most years. While yearly coefficient estimates on ADEXP,, and RDEXPF,, are significant
in 4 of 1 1 years and 1 of 11 years, respectively, the z\ and z2 statistics for these variables
indicate strong significance across the 11 sample years (P<.001). The mean yearly
coefficient difference estimates in Panel B of Table 5 are essentially the same as the pooled
difference estimates reported in Panel B of Table 4.
In summary, the results in Tables 4 and 5 suggest the following. First, capitalized R&D
expenditures appear to be not only priced positively but also valued more highly than other
assets, and thus appear to be regarded by market participants as positive net present-value
investments. Second, market participants appear to interpret expensed R&D expenditures
as positive net present-value investments also, in cases where firms entirely expense their
'"'
It could be argued thai our sample may be affected by a self-selection bias, because Korean firms have
substantial discretion over whether they capitalize R&D. When we added the Capitalization-Intensity variable
(CPRATIO. as defined in Table 2) to Eq. (3) as an independent variable to control for the self-selection bias, its
coefficient was not significant, and the significance of the other explanatory variables was basically the same.
Further tests reveal that CPRATIO is largely explained by RDCAR RDEXP, SALE, and OEXR so adding this
variable to Eq. (3 ) is redundant. These data are available from the authors upon request.
'^ Thezl statistic is {\/P'-)YlJ=\((i/i'^i/i^i -2))' ") , where r, is the / statistic for year /, A; is the degrees
of fi-eedom, and 7" is the number of years. The r2 statistic is [the mean / statistic/(standard deviation of/ statistics/
{T— 1)' ')], where T is the number of years. z\ statistics assume residual independence, whereas r2 statistics
account for cross-sectional and temporal residual correlations (Aboody & Lev, 1998; Barth, Clement, Foster, &
Kaznik. 1998; WTiite. 1980).
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R&D expenditures. Third, the portion ofR&D expenditures that is expensed by firnis that
partly capitaHze R&D expenditures is priced significantly less negatively than other
expenses. While this result suggests that these R&D expenses exhibit future economic
benefits, the perceived benefits are not so great as to argue in favor of capitalization;
alternatively, this result could also indicate a market preference for the more conservative
treatment of expensing. Under Korean GAAP, firms may capitalize R&D expenditures
when future economic benefits are reasonably expected. Finns in Korea may thus exercise
discretion over the capitalization of R&D; however, the market seems to value capitalized
R&D greater than net book value, although fully expensed R&D expenditures are also
priced positively.'^' Fourth, as with other expenses, advertising expenditures are not
believed by market participants to represent future economic benefits.'^
5. Summary and conclusions
This study investigates the value-relevance ofR&D disclosures reported by firms listed
on the Korean Stock Exchange from 1988 to 1998. Korean GAAP allows the capitali-
zation ofR&D expenditures when fliture economic benefits are reasonably expected from
the expenditures. Using tests conducted with regression models derived under Ohlson's
(1995) equity-valuation framework, we find that R&D expenditures are, in general,
positively associated with stock price. Capitalized R&D expenditures appear to be
regarded by market participants as a positive net present-value investment. Assuming
capital-market efficiency, this suggests that investors generally agree that capitalizing
rather than expensing these R&D expenditures is appropriate.
Fully expensed R&D expenditures, although priced less than capitalized R&D, are also
found to be regarded by market participants as a positive net present-value investment.
This may signify that at least a portion of R&D expenditures merits capitalization, even
when these expenditures are fully expensed. Although R&D expenses of firms that
partially capitalize R&D expenditures were found to have no significant price impact, the
regression coefficient on these expenditures is significantly less negative than the
coefficient on other expenses. This may indicate a market belief that these expenditures
Ayers (1986), Bowen, Noreen, and Lacey (1981), Daley and Vigeland (1983), DeFond and Jiambalvo
(1991), Dhaliwal (1980). Dhaliwal, Salamon. and Smith (1982), Duke and Hunt (1990), Lilien and Pastena
(1982), Press and Weintrop (1990), Zimmer (1986), and Zmijewski and Hagemian (1981) note that the debt-to-
equity (d/e) ratio proxies for closeness to binding debt covenants. Results of additional tests (not presented)
indicate that the proportion of R&D expenditures capitalized is greater among fimis with higher d/e ratios and
lower earnings, consistent with earnings management by these firms. These results are available from the
authors.
We also tested the sensitivity of our results to macroeconomic condition (annual real GDP growth rates
obtained from the Bank of Korea economic database), firm size (year-end market value of equity), and fimi
technology level (based on the standard industry code of Korea). The sample was partitioned into two groups on
each of these dimensions, Eq. (3) was estimated separately for the two groups, and results were compared. In each
case, our results were not differentiated by the conditioning variable, and the order of magnitude on our
coefficient estimates remained the same (i.e., RDCAP>RDEXPF>RDEXPC). Furthermore, the coeificient on
ADEXP was more negative than that on OEXP in every comparison. We thus feel that it is unlikely that
macroeconomic condition, size, or technology level is behind our results.
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have some future economic benefit, but may also signify a market preference for the
conservative treatment of expensing these expenditures, rather than capitalizing. Finally,
advertising expenditures are found to be negatively associated with stock price, similar to
the association between price and other expenses. This finding indicates that advertising
expenditures, like other expenses, are not believed to represent future economic benefits.
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The Korean evidence
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Abstract
This study investigates the association between discretionary accruals and Big Six and non-Big
Six auditors, and the direction of auditor change. We hypothesize that there is no significant
difference in discretionary accruals between Big Six and non-Big Six clients when there is low
incentive for auditors to provide high-quality audits, as in Korea.
Upon examination of the discretionary accruals of firms listed on the Korean Stock Exchange
from 1994 to 1998. we find there is no significant difference between the discretionary accaials of
firms with Big Six and non-Big Six auditors. This holds true for firms that switch from non-Big Six
to Big Six auditors and vice versa. These resources imply that there may be no difference in audit
quality between Big Six and non-Big Six auditors in Korea. This is consistent with other studies in
Korea, while inconsistent with the findings of previous studies on audit quality in other countries.
© 2004 Published by University of Illinois. All rights reser\'ed.
Keywords: Audit quaiit}': Big Six auditor; Discretionary accruals
1. Introduction
In this study, we examine whether Big Six auditors (before shrinking to four) provide
higher quality audits than non-Big Six auditors in Korea where the institutional setting
does not motivate auditors to provide high-quality audits. Specifically, we compare the
discretionary accruals of firnis audited by Big Six auditors with those of firms audited by
non-Big Six auditors, as well as the discretionary accruals of finns that change from Big
Six to non-Big Six auditors and vice versa, using Korean data. We also investigate whether
discretionary accruals increase (decrease) under the same conditions.
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: Jeong@korea.ac.kr (S.W. Jeong), jhrho(fl'cnu.ac.kr (J. Rho).
0020-7063/S 30.00 t 2004 Published by Universit>' of Illinois. All rights reserved,
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Previous literature suggests that Big Six auditors are more likely to object to
management's accounting choices that increase earnings if auditors are likely to be sued
when financial statements overstate earnings (Becker, De Fond, Jiambalvo, & Subrama-
nyam. 1998; Francis, Maydew, & Sparks. 1999). These findings, however, are based on
data from countries where auditors face high litigation risk when they provide low-quality
audits. However, when there is little risk of litigation and no other effective disciplinary
mechanism to control opportunistic behavior, auditors may choose not to provide high-
quality audits. Until recently, suing auditors has been very rare in Korea and there is no
other effective monitoring mechanism to prevent auditors' opportunistic behavior. In
addition, since the auditors selected by a firm typically have personal ties to management,
they may not bring a high level of independence to their auditing. Independent audits by
external auditors are not necessary to obtain capital in Korea, and managers frequently
regard audit fees and the filing of audited financial statements with regulatory bodies in
Korea as unnecessary costs of doing business (Park, 1990). In such an institutional setting,
where the auditor's incentive to provide high-quality audits is low, it is unlikely that Big
Six auditors would have much incentive to restrict their clients' adoption of aggressive
accounting methods.
In this study we conduct empirical analysis on a sample of 21 17 firm-year observations
over the period from 1994 to 1998. Discretionary accruals are obtained by using a cross-
sectional variation of the modified Jones model. The evidence suggests that there is no
statistically significant difference between the discretionary accruals of firms audited by
Big Six and non-Big Six auditors, or of firms that change from one to the other. We
interpret these results to mean that there may be no difterence in audit quality between Big
Six and non-Big Six auditors in Korea. While these findings are consistent with the results
of other studies in Korea (e.g.. Jeong, 1999; Jeong & Rho. 1999; Park. Jongil. & Won,
1999), they are inconsistent with the findings of many previous studies on audit quality in
other countries (e.g., DeAngelo, 1981; Palmrose, 1988; Becker et al, 1998). Therefore, we
need to examine whether auditor type can be used as a proxy for audit quality in research
on earnings management in different countries and, if so, under what circumstances.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the
institutional setting in the Korean audit market and the motivation for our hypothesis. The
sample-selection procedure is discussed in Section 3. In Section 4 we explain variable
measurement and our research methodology. Results are presented in Section 5, and the
summary and conclusion are presented in Section 6.
2. Motivation, the Korean audit market, and hypothesis
Previous studies document that Big Six auditors charge higher audit fees, spend more
time on audits, and have fewer lawsuits than non-Big Six auditors, which is taken to imply
that Big Six auditors provide higher quality audits than non-Big Six auditors (DeAngelo,
1981; Francis & Simon, 1987; Palmrose, 1988, 1989). Furthermore, Becker et al. (1998)
and Francis et al. (1999) find that clients of Big Six auditors report low discretionary
accruals compared to clients of non-Big Six auditors, even though clients of Big Six
auditors have high levels of total accruals. They argue that Big Six auditors have a greater
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ability to constrain their clients' use of aggressive and questionable accounting methods
and practices, thus increasing the quality of reported earnings for high-accrual firms. Big
Six auditors have better methods for detecting problem areas, interpret GAAP conserva-
tively (thereby reducing the scope for aggressive accruals-based earnings management),
and can take a strong negotiating stance with clients who require more adjustments to the
financial statements. Therefore, the fact that firms' financial statements are audited by Big
Six auditors may indicate that eamings are subjected to less opportunistic earnings
management.
However, if the economic environment and institutional setting does not demand
high-quality audit services, auditors may not restrict the opportunistic behavior of
management but rather may behave opportunistically themselves to attract more clients.
Under the Acts on External Audits of Corporations in Korea, firms with total assets over
a certain amount should report financial statements audited by external independent
auditors. Annually, about 7000 fimis, including 700 listed fimis, issue audited financial
statement under this law. However, since many firms in Korea raise more capital
through debt financing than equity financing, managers do not appreciate the role and
importance of external audits. Rather, they consider audit fees and audited financial
statements filings as an unnecessary but unavoidable cost of doing business (Park,
1990). In addifion, Korean business has traditionally operated on personal relationships
such as family ties, school ties, or regional ties (Kim, Chung-Ki, & Cheong, 2002). In a
relationship-based economy, auditors who are frequently selected on the basis of
personal ties to the manager are less likely to constrain managers' opportunistic
behavior. The fact that audit contracts are renewed every year places auditors in a
weak bargaining position. For all these reasons, auditors in Korea are less likely to
restrict managers from adopting aggressive accounting policies compared to auditors in
other developed countries such as the United States.
In Korea there are two potential risks for auditors who provide low-quality audits: a
penalty imposed by the government agency that reviews audit works and the possibility of
litigation by a third party. Under the Acts on External Audits of Corporations, the
government agency monitors the quality of audits on a sample basis. It reviews about 1 50
finns annually, less than 2% of all audits done in a year. In this environment, auditors may
not believe they have a high likelihood of getting caught if they provide low-quality audits.
Moreover, even when they are caught by the government agency the penalties are not
severe enough to cause auditors to provide high-quality audits. Infractions for which
auditors are penalized include not keeping generally accepted Korean auditing standards
or irregularities in a firm's financial statements. The penalties that can be imposed on
CPAs and their firms range from fines, reprimands, suspension of audit works for a certain
period of time, revoking licenses, or a combination of these. In reality, most penalties on
auditors are light—small fine, reprimands, or the suspension of audits for participafing
CPAs for a limited period. In most cases, these penalties have not been harsh enough to
encourage auditors to change their behavior. In fact, the economic incentives would
encourage them to attract more clients and make more revenues than what they pay in
penalties by providing low- rather than high-quality audits. There has also been a very low
risk of litigation during the period. The first litigation against auditors occurred in 1 99 1,
and during the 1990s there have been only 22 such lawsuits. During the same period, more
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than 60,000 firm-year external audits, including 6000 listed firm-year audits, have been
performed. In addition, the penaUies against auditors by the court have been very small.'
Auditor-selection mechanisms that foster independent external audits did not exist in
Korea during most of the sample period. Auditor-selection committees, consisting of
interested parties, such as internal auditors, outside directors, who are typically the second
largest shareholders, and the largest debtors except the largest shareholders and related
parties, were introduced in 1997 and have been effective since 1998; audit committees
were introduced for listed finns in 2001. (Only one year, therefore, overlaps with our
sample period.) Therefore, we consider socioeconomic and institutional environment in
Korea to provide a generally weak incentive for performing high-quality audits during the
sample period.
Big Six auditors in Korea do adopt standardized audit technology, whereas non-Big Six
auditors use their own audit technology, even when they are associated with other
international auditing finns such as Grant Thornton, BDO Seidman, and so forth. Even
when the institutional environment provides a low incentive for performing high-quality
audits. Big Six auditors may provide high-quality audits because they apply their
standardized global audit technology for all audits and thus deliver the same audit quality
in Korea as in other countries. This is highly probable if Big Six auditors can monitor the
audits of their branches in Korea. However, Big Six auditors do not have mechanisms for
monitoring different local audit reports written in Korean than non-Big Six auditors. They
go through an internal review process to check for global audit quality standards only
when the audit reports are written in English by technical advisors from the Big Six
headquarters. All the audit reports required by the Security Exchange Acts and the Acts on
External Audits on Corporations in Korea are, however, provided in Korean and these are
the accounting numbers most investors in the Korean stock market use for decision
making. Audit reports written in English are not usually available to investors in Korea
unless frnns are cross-listed on international exchanges. During the sample period, there
are very few cross-listed firms. Audit quality between Big Six auditors and non-Big Six
auditors in Korea may, therefore, not be different.
Previous studies in audit quality in Korea provide results consistent with this
conjecture. Audit quality has been proxied by many variables: audit fees, audit hours,
litigation rate, or discretionary accruals, for example. As suggested in previous studies in
the United States, Big Six auditors who provide high-quality audits will charge a premium
fee for their services. Empirical research using Korean data, however, show different
results. Choi and Pack (1998) examine whether Big Six auditors actually charge higher
fees and spend more time on audits than non-Big Six auditors. They document that there is
no difference in audit fees between Big Six and non-Big Six, but that Big Six auditors
spend more time on their audits. This suggests that Big Six auditors are not recognized as
providing a higher quality service than non-Big auditors.
Because litigations against auditors are very rare in Korea, researchers use the detection
ratio in audit reviews by the government agency as a proxy for audit quality. As noted
The largest penalty against auditors totals less than S 1 00,000 during this period. Therefore, auditors rarely
settle the case outside the court.
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above, a Korean government agency reviews only a small sample—the audits of about 150
firms—annually and penalizes auditors when wrongdoings are uncovered. It follows that if
Big Six auditors provide higher quality audits, they should be detected and penalized less
often than non-Big Six auditors. However, Jeong (1999) examines the agency audit-review
results and finds no significant difference between Big Six and non-Big Six auditors.
Jeong and Rho (1999) and Kim and Hwang (1998) examine prior-year adjustments to
measure the differences between Big Six and non-Big Six auditors. If auditors find
accounting irregularities in previous financial statements, it is assumed that high-quality
auditors are more likely to make corrections and report the changes in current financial
statements. Kim and Hwang compare the number of prior year adjustments between
clients of Big Six and non-Big Six auditors and find no significant difference between the
two groups. Jeong and Rho examine the number of prior-year adjustments for firms that
change auditors and find the same results as Kim and Hwang, while documenfing an
overall increase in the number of prior-year adjustments regardless of auditor type. Park et
al. (1999) look into the audit-quality issue using discretionary accruals. They compare the
discretionary accruals of Big Six and non-Big Six clients and find no difference between
them (using only univariate tests). Their results are limited, however, because discretion-
ary accruals could be affected by variables such as firm size, leverage, operating
characteristics of firms, auditor change, and stock offering. We propose, therefore, to
add to the evidence of audit quality in Korea by examining discretionary accruals after
controlling for these variables.
In sum, previous studies suggest that audit quality in Korea may not differ between Big
Six and non-Big Six auditors, whereas audit quality in other developed countries such as
the United States does differ between Big Six and non-Big Six auditors. Because many
previous studies in earnings manipulation in Korea show that managers manipulate
accounting numbers in many cases," it would be interesting to look into whether auditors
play an appropriate monitoring role over the production of accounting information in
Korea. Using discretionary accruals as an indicator of quality, the first hypothesis we
examine is as follows.
HI. Given the institutional environment in Korea, firms with Big Six auditors are likely to
report the same level of discretionary accruals as firms with non-Big Six auditors.
When firms change auditors, the new auditors may have stronger incentives to
provide high-quality audits compared to the old auditors even if there is no effective
market monitoring over audit quality. This is not usually due to the new auditors'
attempt to show that the prior auditors were not competent, which is unusual in a
relation-based economy. Rather, it is because the new auditors want to reduce the
likelihood of being reviewed by the government agency and are penalized for
accounting inegularities made in the prior year, even when there is not a high
litigation risk. Jeong and Rlio (1999) provide evidence consistent with this argument
There are many indications that managers in Korean firms manipulate accounting numbers when a firm is
in financial distress, offer seasoned equities, and want to smooth income, and so forth, similar to managers in
other foreign firms. Yoon and Miller (2002a, 2002b) provide a good summary of recently published papers in this
area.
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by showing that prior year adjustments increase after an auditor change. Therefore, if
Big Six auditors provide higher quahty audits than non-Big Six auditors, they will be
especially diligent when replacing a non-Big Six auditors. This leads us to assert that
there should be a difference in discretionary accruals between firms that change to a
Big Six auditor and those that change to non-Big Six, if Big Six and non-Big Six
provide differential quality audits. That is, if firms change auditors from non-Big Six
(Big Six) to Big Six (non-Big Six) auditors, the discretionary accruals of the firms are
likely to decrease (increase). However, when there is no effective mechanism that
enforces performing high-quality audits, auditors are likely to provide similar quality
audit service and there will be no difference in discretionary accruals between Big Six
and non-Big Six auditors and no change in the discretionary accruals after auditor
change, regardless of auditor change direction. To address this issue we examine the
following two hypotheses:
When there is low incentive for auditors to provide high-quality audits,
H2. Firms that switch from non-Big Six to Big Six auditors are likely to report the same
discretionary accruals as the firms that switch from Big Six to non-Big Six auditors.
H3. Firms that switch from non-Big Six to Big Six auditors are not more likely to increase
discretionary accruals than the finns that switch from Big Six to non-Big Six auditors.
3. Sample selection
To test the hypotheses we use two sets of samples. The first sample, which is used to
examine the first hypothesis, consists of 2117 firm-year observafions listed in the Korean
Stock Market during the period 1994 to 1998. We exclude financial institufions ft^om the
sample because of the differences in estimation of discretionary accruals from firms in
other industries. In addition, we use only December year-end firms. When there are fewer
than 10 firms in an industry (two-digit SIC codes), for the estimation of nondiscretionary
accruals, we eliminate them from the sample. We require that finns' financial data be
available in the KIS-FAS database that contains financial statements of Korean listed
companies since 1980. In addition, we require that firms receive an unqualified audit
opinion because firms with a qualified opinion are likely to report more discretionary
accruals. We include firms that receive an unqualified opinion with an explanatory
paragraph in the sample. This sample-selection procedure yields 2117 firm-year observa-
tions of which 1311 firm-year observations are audited by Big Six auditors and 806 are
audited by non-Big Six auditors.
The second sample, which is used to examine the second and third hypotheses,
consists of firm-year observations that change auditors during the period 1995 to
1998, and meet all other sample-selection criteria used in the first sample-selection
procedure. Two hundred eighty-nine firm-year observations are included in the second
sample. We use the auditor-change sample for Hypotheses 2 and 3 because auditors
have a strong incentive to provide high-quality ser\'ices when they are changed. If the
results in the change sample is not different from the first sample, there is a high
likelihood that the quality of audit services provided by Big Six auditors is not
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different from that provided by non-Big Six auditors. On average, 1 8% of listed firnis
change auditors each year, implying that one out of five or six firms change their
auditor. Among these, 58% of the firms that change auditors are selected for our final
sample. They represent 10.3% of all listed firms in Korea and are spread out across
the sample period.
4. Research methodology and variable measurement
4.1. Estimation of discretionaiy accruals
Previous studies have used various methodologies to estimate the effects of accounting
choices on reported earnings. Healy (1985) uses total accruals and McNichols and Wilson
(1988) use the discretionary portion of an individual account, bad-debt provisions.
However, Healy's model does not separate nondiscretionary accruals from discretionary
accruals and McNichols and Wilson's method does not examine the behavior of total
discretionary accruals. Therefore, to capture the net effect of all accounting choices on
reported income, Jones (1991) uses an OLS model, regressing total accruals against the
change in revenue and property, plant and equipment. Since then, many studies have
adopted the Jones Model. Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) modify the Jones (1991)
estimation model by adding the change in accounts receivable as an additional explanatory
variable in the estimation regression and report better performance of their model in
estimating discretionary accruals. Furthermore, Subramanyam (1996) finds that the cross-
sectional Jones models are generally better specified than their time-series counterparts.
Therefore, we measure discretionary accruals by using the cross-sectional variation of the
modified Jones model.
'
Total accruals can be defined in various ways. Jones (1991) defines total accruals by
subtracting operating cash flows from reported accounting earnings. Specifically, Jones
defines accruals as follows:
TA„ = ACA,, - ACL,, - ACash,, + STD„ - DEP„ (1)
where
TA„ = total accruals for finn / for year /;
ACAy, = change in current assets for firm / for year /;
ACL/, = change in current liability for firm / for year t;
ACash,, = change in cash for firm / for year t\
STD„ = current portion of long-term liability for firm / for year t\
DEP„ = depreciation expenses (including amortization of intangible and deferred assets)
for finn / for year /.
We also estimate the original Jones model using the same definition of discretionary accruals, i.e., net
income minus operating cash flows, as in Becker et al. (1998), and find the results are qualitatively similar to the
results we report here.
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When we define accruals as the difference between accounting earnings and operating
cash flows, the accruals include gains or losses from investing and financing activities.
However, most previous studies use a definition of accruals that does not include the gains
or losses from investing and financing activities. This may be because COMPUSTAT does
not contain the details of the gains or losses from investing and financing activities. If the
data are available, we can explicitly differentiate accruals from gains and losses by
dividing accounting earnings into operating cash flows, accruals, and gains and losses
from investing and financing activities. Bae (1999) argues that separating accruals from
gains and losses from investing and financing activities is a more accurate measurement
and that the data required to measure accurate accruals are available in the Korean
database, KIS-FAS. Therefore, we follow Bae's definition of accruals in this study to
maintain comparability with other studies in Korea. He estimates accruals in a way very
similar to Jones (1991) and other studies, while taking advantage of detailed data in the
KIS-FAS database to calculate accruals. The definition of accruals used in this study is the
following:
0A, = trade receivables, (short term and long term) + inventory, + advance payments,
(short term and long term) + prepaid expenses, (short term and long term) + accrued
income,;
0L, = trade payables, (short term and long tenTi) + advance from customers, (short term
and long term) + accrued expenses, (short terni and long term) + accrued income
taxes, + unearned income,;
NCA, = noncurrent accruals, = depreciation (including special depreciation"*) + amorti-
zation of intangible assets, + amortization of deferred assets, (excluding stock issuance
cost and debenture issuance cost) + severance benefits expenses,;
AOA, = OA,-OA,
,;
AOL, = OL,-OL,_
,;
CA, = current accruals = AOA, — AOL,;
TA, = total accruals = current accruals + noncunent accruals = CA, — NCA,.
Using the estimated coefficients of the modified Jones model, we calculated discre-
tionary accruals as follows:
e„ = TA,y,/A,y,_, - («„[1/A,y,_,] + /),„[(AREV,y, - AREC,y,)/A,y,_,]
+ Z>2/7[PPE,y,/A„V-,]) (2)
where
Uj,, bxji, and ^2/7 are the estimated coefficients of the modified Jones model;
TA/y, = total accruals for finn / in industry / for year t;
Ajji _
I
= total assets for firm / in industry / for year / — 1
;
* In Korea, firms can depreciate tangible assets more than the amount normally calculated by the straight-line
method, accelerated method, and production method when they meet certain conditions in tax law and this
accounting treatment is permitted for financial reporting also.
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AREV,y, = change in net revenues for finn / in industry / for year /;
AREC,y, = change in accounts receivable for firm / in industry j for year t;
PPEy, = gross property plant and equipment for sample firm ; in industry / for year t.
Discretionary accruals are usually estimated by using time-series data of the same
firm or cross-sectional data of the industry that the sample firm belongs to. We adopt
the cross-sectional version of the discretionary-estimation model using two-digit SIC
codes. If we use a time-series model in estimating the modified Jones model, we
would require that sample firms not change their auditors during the estimation period,
usually 8 to 10 years. If firms change their auditors during the estimation period, there
might be a change in the parameter of the estimation model due to the auditor change.
Most Korean firnis change their auditors over a period of 8 years. On average, 17% to
20% of firms change auditors in a given year. Therefore, we use cross-sectional
industry data to estimate discretionary accruals. For the estimation of discretionary
accruals for our sample, we require that there be at least 10 firms within the industry.
The average explanatory power of the modified Jones model, i.e., the average of
adjusted R" over years, is about 16.1%. Bae (1999) shows that the adjusted R~s of
several discretionary-accruals models using Korean data range between 12% and 17%.
This shows that our sample is similar to the samples in other studies that use Korean
data.
4.2. Multivariate test model and control variables
Because the comparison of discretionary accruals between firms with Big Six auditors
and non-Big Six auditors is the main focus of our analysis, we conduct univariate tests as
well as multivariate tests. In the multivariate test we control for potential differences across
the firms that may affect the results of simple univariate tests. We regress discretionary
accruals estimated in Eq. (2) on a dummy variable indicating auditor type and several
control variables. Specifically, we run the following multivariate regressions to test the
first hypothesis.
DA,, = Po + /?|Big^, + /J.OCF,, + /?3Size„ + P^UiLey,, + /JjAbs.acc,,
+ /^^Sharelnc,, + /J7 Change,, + /?i.;Ownship„ + e,, (3)
where
DA,, = estimated discretionary accruals;
Big,, = auditor type dummy variable equal to one if the auditor is Big Six;
OCF„ = operating cash flows;
Size,, = natural logarithm of total assets;
HiLev„ = dummy variable indicating whether firms are among the highest decile
unclear of leverage, by year and industry;
Absacc,, = the absolute value of total accruals;
Sharelnc,, = dummy variable equal to one when there is an increase of more than 10%
of the total outstanding shares during the year;
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Change,, = dummy variable equal to one when there is an auditor change;
Ownship,, = percentage of ownership by the largest shareholders including related
parties.
In this study, we expect no significant coefficient on auditor-type dummy variable
(Big). To control for other relevant variables that affect discretionary accruals, we include
operating cash flows, total assets, leverage, the absolute value of total accruals, increase in
the number of shares outstanding, equity ownership by largest shareholders in the
regression. A variable to control for the effect of management compensation is not
included in the regression, even though previous literature suggests that the management
compensation contract is related to discretionary accruals. Management compensation
based on accounting earnings is not common in Korea.
Dechow et al. (1995) show that operating cash flows are negatively correlated with the
level of accruals. We expect a negative coefficient on operating cash flows. We use the
natural logarithm of total assets as a size variable to control for the political effect on
discretionary accruals and also as a surrogate for numerous omitted variables. Firms that
have a high chance of receiving political attention are more likely to manipulate
accounting numbers to avoid political scrutiny. During the sample period, most firms in
Korea pursue growth in size rather than profitability. Large firms, therefore, tend to show
lower profitability than small firms. However, if a large firm reports very low profitability,
it is more likely to get attention because of its size. During the sample period, large firms
reported lower profitability, and Jeong (1999) provides the evidence that large firms are
more likely to be involved in accounting manipulation than small firms. We, therefore,
expect a positive coefficient for the size variable.
To control for the possible effect of leverage, we include a dummy variable (HiLev),
which takes one when firms have the highest decile leverage in the same industry during
the year of interest in the multiple regression as in Becker et al. (1998). Press and Weintrop
(1990) find that firms with high leverage are more likely to be close to the violation of debt
covenants. DeFond and Jiambalvo ( 1 994) show that debt-covenant violation is associated
with discretionary-accruals choice. Managers of firms with high leverage are more likely
to adopt income-increasing accounting methods. However, finns with high leverage are
more likely to be in financial distress (Beneish & Press, 1995). DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and
Skinner (1994) show that troubled companies have large negative accruals related to
contractual renegotiations that provide incentives to reduce earnings. Therefore, we do not
have prior expectation on this variable.
Francis et al. (1999) argue that firms with greater endogenous accruals-generating
potential have greater uncertainty about reported earnings because of the difficulty that
outsiders have in distinguishing discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals. If we do not
have an accurate mechanism for differenting discretionary accruals from nondiscrefionary
accruals, it is likely that firms with the larger absolute value of total accruals will show
higher discretionary accruals. To control this effect we include the absolute value of total
accruals as a control variable in the regression as in Becker et al. (1998). We expect a
positive coefficient on this variable.
Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) find that managers report higher earnings when they
issue seasoned equities by adjusting current discretionary accruals. Beneish (1997) also
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argues that managers will manipulate earnings upward due to incentives associated with
selling their personal holdings as part of and subsequent to equity offerings. Therefore, we
include a dummy variable that indicates whether the number of outstanding shares has
increased by 10% or more.^ We expect a positive coefficient on this variable.
An auditor-change dummy variable is also included in the regression because new
auditors tend to attribute previous accounting irregularities on previous auditors. Jeong and
Rho (1999) and Kim and Hwang (1998) find that the number of prior year adjustments
increases after finns change their auditors regardless of auditor change direction. We
expect a positive coefficient on the auditor-change variable.
Klassen (1997) argues that closely held firms can infomi shareholders of firm value
more efficiently than widely held finns through communication channels other than
audited financial statements and press releases. As a result, these finns face less pressure
from capital markets. Firms with less capital-market pressure have less incentive to
provide usefial accounting information to decision makers. This implies that finns with
higher inside ownership may have more flexibility in financial reporting than finns with
lower inside ownership. Thus, we include an ownership variable in the regression to
control for the effect of inside ownership on reported earnings and discretionary accruals.
Inside ownership is defined as the percentage of shares held by management. A positive
coefficient is expected on this variable.
To compare discretionary accruals between Big Six and non-Big Six auditors using
auditor-change firms, we divide second sample firms into groups depending on the
direction of auditor change. When firms change from Big Six to non-Big Six auditors, we
put them into the BN change group; when finns change from non-Big Six to Big Six
auditors, we put them into the NB change group. While previous studies imply the firms in
the BN change group are likely to report more discretionary accruals than finns in the NB
change group, we expect no difference as explained in the previous section. For these
groups of firms, we first examine whether there is a difference in discretionary accruals
and change in discretionary accruals without controlling for other variables. Then we
control for other variables that may explain the difference in discretionary accruals across
sample groups to check whether our experimental variable explains discretionary accruals
after controlling for these variables. Specifically, we run the following multivariate
regressions to test the second and third hypotheses.
DA„(orADA,v) = /?o + /?,NB-change„ + /J.BN-change,, + fi^.OCV,, + ^4Size„
+ /JjHiLev,, + /?(,Abs_acc/, -I- ^ySharelnc,, + /?}.Ownship„ + en
(4)
where
DA/, = estimated discretionary accruals;
ADA,, = change in discretionary accruals;
We did not include a dummy variable for a decrease in the outstanding shares because stock repurchase was
not allowed during the sample period.
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NB-change„ = auditor-change dummy variable, when firms change their auditors fi"om
non-Big Six auditors to Big Six auditors assign one, zero otherwise;
BN-change„ = auditor-change dummy variable, when firms change their auditors fi^om
Big Six auditors to non-Big Six auditors assign one, zero otherwise;
Other variables are the same as in Eq. (3).
In this study, we expect no significant coefficients on either variable, while previous
studies imply that the coefficients on NB-change and BN-change are significantly negative
and positive, respectively.
5. Empirical results
5.1. Descriptive statistics and univariate results
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of variables used in the analysis. Operating cash
flows are about 2% of total assets. The median of assets are 156 billion Korean won.
Leverage is about 68% of total assets, which is 15% higher than that of U.S. fums used in
Becker et al. (1998). This implies that Korean firms have 100% higher debt ratio than U.S.
firms.^ Total accruals are higher than that of U.S. fums while the absolute value of total
accruals are smaller than that of US firms.
Size and ownership are significantly different between firms with Big Six and non-Big
Six auditors both on the parametric and nonparametric tests. Leverage and total accruals
are significantly different across the groups on the nonparametric tests. The mean and
median absolute values of total accruals scaled by assets are not statistically different
between finns with Big Six and non-Big Six auditors. Therefore, in addition to univariate
tests, we need multivariate tests that control other variables affecting discretionary accruals
before drawing any conclusions.
The univariate-analysis results of discretionary accruals of pooled observations over
years are presented in Table 2. Table 2 shows mean and median discretionary accruals
and the absolute value of discretionary accruals for firms with Big Six and non-Big Six
auditors. The differences obtained from subtracting the means and medians of non-Big
Six samples fi"om those of Big Six samples are reported in the last two columns along
with the results of / tests and Wilcoxon two-sample tests of the differences between the
two samples. As Table 2 shows, there is no statistical difference in discretionary
accruals, while the mean and median of firms with non-Big Six auditors are slightly
larger than those of firms with Big Six auditors. We also compare the absolute value of
discretionary accruals because the larger they are the more likely managers may exercise
discretion in reporting earnings. The mean and median values of the absolute value of
discretionary accruals are almost the same for the two groups and not statistically
different. Along with the resuks of discretionary accruals, these findings also show that
^ Average debt equity ratio for Korean firms is 2 13% [ = 68 -^ ( I - 68)], and average debt equity ratio for U.S.
firms is 113% [ = 53 -(1-53)].
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics of variables for sample firms (A''=21 17)
Panel A
Mean S.D. Maximum Median Minimum
OCF 0.0238 0.0935 0.4370 0.0237 -1.0061
Size 19.08 1.343 24.01 18.87 16.07
Lev 0.6774 0.2295 4.4659 0.6775 0.1096
Tot_acc - 0.0226 0.0855 0.3970 -0.0223 -0.8752
Abs_acc 0.0637 0.0614 0.8752 0.0487 0.0001
Ownship 26.80 13.92 97.60 25.50 0.80
Panel B
Non-Big Six (A^== 806) Big Six (A^= 1311) Differences
Mean Median Mean Median / statistic Z statistic
OCF 0.0204 0.0204 0.0258 0.0263 - 1.27 -1.50
Size 18.87 18.71 19.21 19,00 -6.09*** -4.10***
Lev 0.6709 0.6639 0.6814 0.6901 -1.03 - 3.29***
Tot_acc -0.0197 -0.0167 - 0.0244 0.0240 1.22 1.90*
Abs_acc 0.0636 0.518 0.0637 0.0469 -0.03 1.54
Ownship 27.47 26.20 26.39 25.00 1.77* 1.68*
OCF = operating cash flows divided by total assets; Size = log transformed total assets, which are measured in
thousand won; Lev = total liabilities divided by total assets; Tot_acc = total accruals divided by total assets;
Abs_acc = absolute value of total accruals; Ownship = the equity ownership percentage of the largest shareholder.
* Significant at 10% level.
*** Significant at 1% level.
the type of auditor make no difference to a manager's accounting flexibility of
discretionary accruals.
To test whether there is a difference in the level of discretionary accruals
depending on the direction of auditor change we run the ANOVA. Table 3 presents
the results of the ANOVA test. It shows that discretionary accruals and the change in
discretionary accruals among auditor change groups are not significantly different
when we use all sample firms. In Korea, the Security and Future Committee (SFC)
Table 2
Comparison of discretionary accruals and absolute value of discretionary accruals between firms with Big Six and
non-Big Six auditors during 1994-1998
Non-Big Six (/V=806) Big Six
Mean
{N= 1311)
Median
Differences
Mean Median Mean Median
Discretionary accruals 0.0078 0.0107 0.0062 0,0040 0.0016 0.0045
( P value) (.000) (.000) (.003) (.031) (.621) (.124)
Absolute value of 0.0535 0.0409 0.0535 0.0395 0.0000 0.0014
discretionary accruals
( P value) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.967) (.708)
Discretionary accruals are measured by the cross-sectional version of the modified Jones model by industry and
year
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has the power to order an auditor change if a firm does not meet the conditions that
the SFC requires/ In this case, firms might have different discretion in choosing
accounting methods from firms that change auditors by their own intention. Therefore,
we separate the sample firms into two groups to detennine whether the cause of
auditor change affects the results of our analysis. There are 129 firm-year observations
that change auditors by their own decision (free-change firms) and 125 firm-year ob-
servations that change auditors by the designation of the SFC (designated-change firms).
Whether we use designated-change firms or free-change firms, discretionary accruals
and the change in discretionary accruals among auditor groups are not significantly
different.
5.2. Multivariate analysis
Because we ignore a number of variables that affect discretionary accruals, we run the
multivariate regression with the control variables discussed in Section 4. Table 4 shows the
results of the estimation of regression equation (3) for the test of Hypothesis 1. The first
two columns show the results of pooled regressions and the last column shows the results
of yearly regressions. The coefficients on the first variable (Big), indicating whether firms
are audited by Big Six auditors, is not significant at all in any of the three regressions. This
is consistent with our expectation and the results of univariate tests. It suggests the
possibility that Big Six auditors in Korea do not provide higher quality audits than non-Big
Six auditors.
Most of the control variables in the multivariate regression are significantly related
to discretionary accruals with expected signs. Operating cash flows are strongly
negatively associated with discretionary accruals, which is consistent with the results
of Becker et al. (1998) and Dechow et al. (1995). The magnitude of the coefficient
on operating cash flows in this study is much larger than that of Becker et al. This
may be due to using Korean data. Most of Korean accounting standards required by
the SFC in financial reporting are based on the abstracts of the U.S. GAAP minus
the specific details, thereby allowing managers more flexibility in reporting. Thus, it
is easier to manipulate earnings in Korea than in other countries such as the United
States. Because discretionary accruals are not related to cash flows, when there are
more discretionary accruals in earnings, the coefficient on operating cash flows is
more likely to be negative. In addition, some of the negative coefficient value may
be caused by the number of nondiscretionary accruals treated as discretionary
accmals due to a classification error in the modified Jones model. Nondiscretionary
accruals may have a negative relation with cash flows from operation due to the
definition of total accruals. The positive coefficient on the size variable implies that
large firms are more inclined to income-increasing accounting policy. This is
consistent with results (Jeong, 1999) that firm size is significantly related to the
possibility of being detected for accounting irregularities in the audit-review process
by the government agency.
The role of the SFC in Korea is similar to that of SEC in the United States in regulating firms" disclosure.
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Table 4
Regression results of discretionary accruals on auditor type and control variables, 1994-1998 period
Pooled Average estimate of 5 yearly
1994-1998 (t statistic) 1994-1997 (/statistic) regressions (/ statistic)"
Intercept -0.0558 (-2.70)*** -0.0495 (-2.33)** -0.0315 (-0.92)
Big -0.0010 (-0.34) -0.0022 (-0.76) -0.0017 (-0.71)
OCF -0.3613 (-23.36)*** -0.3958 (-22.74)*** -0.3748 (-12.59)***
Size 0.0040(3.81)*** 0.0035 (3.25)*** 0.0031 (1.81)*
HiLev -0.0387 (-7.65)*** -0.0336 (-6.66)*** -0.0345 (-5.60)***
Abs_acc -0.2131 (-9.36)*** -0.0915 (-3.38)*** -0.1498 (-0.92)
Shareinc 0.0150(1.67)* 0.0110(3.45)*** 0.0149 (2.20)**
Change 0.0068 (1.79)* 0.0057(1.41) 0.0032 (0.52)
Ownship 0.0003 (2.61)*** 0.0000 (0.33) 0.0001 (0.71)
N 2117 1723
R- 26.86% 25.82%
Big = an auditor type dummy variable equal to 1 if auditor is Big Six; OCF = operating cash flows divided by total
assets; Size = natural logarithm of total assets; HiLev = dummy variable indicating whether firms are among the
highest decile leverage, by year and industry; Abs_acc = absolute value of total accruals; Shareinc = dummy
variable equal to 1 when there is an increase of more than 10% of the total outstanding shares during the year;
Change = dummy variable equal to 1 when there is an auditor change; Ownship,, = percentage of ownership by the
largest shareholders including related parties.
' The /-statistics are calculated using the variability in the yearly coefficient estimate as in Becker et al. (1998).
* Significant at 10% level.
** Significant at 5% level.
*** Significant at 1% level.
The negative coefficient on the leverage dummy variable is consistent with the result of
DeAngelo et al. (1994), that troubled companies are more likely to manage discretionary
accruals to reduce earnings due to contractual negotiations. The coefficient on the absolute
value of total accruals is negative, which is consistent with Becker et al. (1998). This
implies that managers of firms with large accruals tend to reduce earnings. The increase in
the number of outstanding shares is also significantly positively related to discretionary
accruals, suggesting that managers may manipulate earnings upward when there is
seasoned-equity offerings because they may sell their personal holdings higher as part
of and subsequent to equity offerings. This result is consistent with Teoh et al. (1998) and
Yoon and Miller (2002a, 2002b). The ownership variable is also significantly positive,
which is consistent with our expectation.
To check whether the Asian Currency Crisis and related corporate governance changes
in Korea affect the results, we also reestimate the regression after deleting (excluding)
firm-year observations after 1998 because the Foreign Currency Crisis started at the end of
1997 and began to affect the Korean audit environment in 1998. The second column of
Table 4 presents the regression-estimation results without the 1998 finn-year observations.
As you will note, the results are almost the same as those estimated with 1998 firm-year
observations. Big Six dummy is still not significant at all, while most control variables
show significant coefficients with expected signs.
If discretionary accruals reverse, using pooled data may not be appropriate. Because
previous studies show that discretionary accruals reverse, we estimate the regression
equation (3) yearly for 5 years of the sample period, and calculate t statistics using the
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variability in the annual-coefficient estimates as in Becker et al. (1998) and Eiemard ( 1 987)
to check whether the results that use pooled data change. The last column of Table 4 shows
the average coefficients for the five yearly estimates along with related t statistics. The
results are consistent with the pooled regression estimation except that size and ownership
variables lose significance. In particular, the coefficient on the Big Six dummy variable is
—
.0003 and not significant at all at any conventional level. That is, firms with Big Six
auditors show indifferent levels of discretionary accruals compared to firms with non-Big
Six auditors. While this result is not consistent with the results of previous studies in other
countries, it is consistent with the results in Park et al. (1999) and our expectation.
To analyze the effect of auditor-change direction on discretionary accruals after
controlling for other influences on discretionary accruals, we estimate Eq. (4) using the
second set of data. Table 5 reports the results of the multivariate-regression analysis,
includina the control variables.
Table 5
The effect of Auditor-change direction on discretionan,' accruals [DA„ (or ADA„) = /J,i + /i|NB-change„ +
^2BN-change„ + /i.^OCF,, + /i4Size„ + /ijHiLev,, + /?(,Abs_acc„ + ^-.Sharelnc,, + ^sOwnship,, + e„]
All firms Designated-change firms Free-change firms
DA ADA DA ADA DA ADA
(t statistic) (/ statistic) (/ statistic) {t statistic) (t statistic) (/ statistic)
Intercept -0.1370 -0.2001 0.0359 0.0124 - 0.2594 - 0.3066
(-1.28) (-1.27) (0,26) (0.06) (-1.59) (-1.30)
NB-change -0.0136 - 0.0367 - 0.0367 -0.0231 0.0097 -0.0332
(-0.72) (-1.32) (-1.41) ( - 0.60) (0.36) (-0.85)
BN-change - 0.0205 0.0046 - 0.0005 0.0336 - 0.0225 - 0.0048
(-1.21) (0.19) ( - 0.02) (1.03) (-0.87) (-0.13)
OCF - 0.643 - 0.6677 - 0.4579 -0.3202 - 0.8982 -1.1288
(-8.28)*** ( - 5.82)*** (-4.89)*** (-2.31)** (-6.88)*** (-6.00)***
Size 0.0089 0.0123 0.0016 0.0036 0.0131 0.0140
(1.62) (1.51) (0.22) (0.35) (1.51) (1.11)
HiLev -0.0193 -0.0378 0.0013 -0.1470 -0.0518 - 0.0607
(-0.86) (-1.14) (0.05) (-0.41) (-1.12) (-0.91)
Abs_acc -0.0877 0.1564 -0.3316 -0.2536 0.2179 0.5243
(-0.83) (0.46) (-2.46)** (-1.27) (1.31) (2.18)**
ShareInc - 0.0007 - 0.0099 - 0.0039 0.0001 0.0045 - 0.0080
(-0.04) ( - 0.39) (-0.17) (0.00) (0.18) ( - 0.22)
Ownship 0.0003 0.0004 - 0.0006 -0.0017 0.0015 0.0030
(0.67) (0.51) ( - 0.94) (-1.86)* (1.83)* (2.61)***
Adjusted ^- 26.2% 12.4% 28.6% 10.4% 28.9% 21.7%
F statistic 12.20*** 5.49*** 2.82*** 7.43*** 5.44***
N 254 254 125 125 129 129
ADA = change in discretionary accruals; NB-change = auditor change dummy variable, when firms change their
auditor from non-Big 6 auditor to Big 6 auditor assign 1, otherwise 0; BN-change = auditor change dummy
variable, when firms change their auditor from Big 6 auditor to non-Big 6 auditor assign 1. otherwise 0; Other
variables are the same as in Table 4.
* Significant at 10%).
** Significant at 5%.
*** Significant at 1%.
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The adjusted R~% of the regressions for all sample firms, designated-change firms, and
free-change firms are 26.2° o. 28.6° o. and 28.9° o. respectheh'. when discretionar\' accruals
are the dependent variable. Wlien the change in discretionary accruals is used as the
dependent \ariable. the adjusted /?"s of the regression are 12.4°o. 10.5°o. and 21.7°o for all
sample tlrms. designated firms, and free-change firms, respectively. The F statistics show
that all the multi\"anate-regression models are \ alid.
.•\s Table 5 re\eals. auditor change direction vanables (NB-change and BN-change) are
not statistically significant in any regressions when all firms are used. To check whether
this result is dn\"en b\' the method of auditor change, we di\ ide the sample into nvo
groups, free change and designated change, and run the regression. Park (1996) shows that
tlrms with designated auditors report fewer discretionary- accruals than other finns. If firms
that switch from Big Six to non-Big Six auditors change auditors b\- order of the SFC.
while firms that switch from non-Big Six to Big Six auditors change auditors by their own
decision, there is no difference in discretionan." accruals e\en though firms with Big Six
auditors report fewer discretionan.' accruals. Howe\er. either in the free-change sample or
the designated-change sample the auditor change direction \ anables are not significant in
any regression, implying that the sample results are not dn\en by the method or direction
of auditor change. This issue will be examined further in sensiti\'in- anaKsis. .A.mong the
control \'anables. only operating cash flows (OCFs) ha\e a significant expected coeffi-
cient, that is. a significant negative coefficient. The ownership \ariable (Ownship) is
statisticalK signiflcanth' positi\e regardless of the dependent \-anable for the free-change
sample, but is not significant for all samples.
5.3. Sensitivity- test
To check the robustness of our analysis for the first h\pothesis. \\'e replicate the tests of
Becker et al. (1998). That is. we define total accruals as the difference between earnings
and operating cash flows, estimate discretionan.' accruals using the cross-sectional version
of the Jones model, and reestimate Eqs. (3) and (4). Ho\\e\er. the coefficients on auditor
t\pe and auditor change direction variables are not significant. The results are not reported
in the paper. We also calculate the Spearman correlation among the independent variables
to check whether multicollinearit}" exists among the \ariables. We find that there is no
statistically significant correlation among \ariables.
To check the robustness of resuhs for the second and third hypotheses, we reestimate
the regression by using onh' firms that change their auditor from non-Big Si.x to Big Six
(NB change sample), and finns that change their auditor from Big Six to non-Big Sbc (BN
change sample). respecti\'el\. .\uditor-change \ anables are not statistically significant in
all these regressions. The results are not reported in the paper
The statistical insignificance of auditor change ma\' be attributed to the fact that our
sample includes the period when there are significant changes in the accounting and
auditing systems in Korea. There ha\"e been man\- changes in accounting and audit-related
laws and regulations and auditing practices in Korea since the 1997 Foreign Currency
Crisis. Therefore, we separate the sample into nvo periods: before the crisis (1994-1997)
and after the crisis (1998). and reestimate the regressions. Again both auditor-change
variables are not significant in all resressions.
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The reasons for auditor change might affect the relation between auditor change and
discretionary accruals. Therefore, we add a dummy variable for auditor-change reasons to
regression Eq. (3). This dummy variable is one when firms change their auditor because
the SFC in Korea designates the auditor, zero otherwise. The following equation is used in
the regression estimation.
DA„ (or ADA,,) = /?„ + /?|DEG(1 + 7,NB-change + 73BN-change)
+ /^:;OCF„ + fij^Sizeit + fUHiLev,, + /?f,Abs_acc,7 + /^ySharelnc,,
+ /ixOwnship,, + e„
= /?o + /^iDEG + /^i7,DEG x NB-change + fif/jDEG
X BN-change + fi^OCFu + P^Size,, + ^jHiLev,, + /^Abs_acc„
+ ^ySharelnc,, + /i^^Ownship,, + e„ (5)
where DEG is a dummy for auditor-change reason. Other variables are the same as in
Eq. (4).
When auditors are designated by order of the SFC, they are usually assigned to a
finn for 3 years. These auditors, then, do not need to worry about next year's contract,
making them more independent. Previous studies find that auditors are more likely to
constrain aggressive accounting by management when they are independent (Park,
1996). Table 6 presents the regression results of Eq. (5). All the signs of the auditor-
change variable for the designated-change sample are the same as the results in the
previous analysis. That is, none of the coefficients of DEG x NB-change variable and
DEG X BN-change variable is statistically significant in any regressions. Among the
Table 6
The effect of auditor designation on discretionary accruals [DA„ (or ADA„)=/io + /i|DEGx^i7iDEGxNB-
change +
^i 73DEG x BN-change + /i^OCF,, + PSize,, + /jI^HiLev,, + /?,,Abs_acc„ + ^7ShareInc„ + /ixOwnship,, + e„]
Independent variables (expected sign) DA (/ statistic) DA (t statistic)
Intercept -0.1426 (-1.34) -0.2164 (-1.38)
DEG (dummy) -0.0036 (-0.21) -0.0298 (-1.16)
DEGxNB-change -0.0366 (-1.28) -0.0254 (-0.60)
DEGxBN-change -0.0110(0.46) 0.0133(0.38)
OCF -0.6463 (-8.21)*** -0.6739 (-5.80)
Size 0.0089(1.61) 0.0129(1.59)
HiLev -0.0157 (-0.69) -0.0288 (-0.86)
Abs_acc 0.0779 (-0.71) 0.1034(0.66)
Sharelnc -0.0026 (-0.15) -0.0108 (-0.42)
Ovvnship 0.0004 (0.88) 0.0006 (0.79)
Adjusted R^ 26.08% 12.38%
f statistic 10.92*** 4.97***
Af of observations 254 254
,***
DEG=auditor-change-reason dummy. When auditor is changed by the designation. DEG is 1 . otherwise 0. Other
variables are the same as in Table 5.
*** Significant at 1% level.
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control variables, only the operating cash flows variable reveals significant negative
coetTicients.
Overall, several sensitivity analyses do not change the results in Table 5, that auditor-
change variables (BN-change, NB-change) are related to discretionary accruals. This
implies that a finding of no difference in discretionary accruals is not a period-specific or
sample-specific phenomenon.
6. Summary and conclusion
In this study, we investigate the relation between discretionary accruals, auditor type,
and auditor-change direction. We investigate whether there is any audit-quality difference
between Big Six and non-Big Six auditors and whether auditor change affects the number
of discretionaiy accmals. Empirical results show that there is no statistically significant
difference between discretionary accruals of finns with Big Six and non-Big Six auditors.
In addition, the discretionary accruals of finns that change from non-Big Six to Big Six
auditors are not significantly different from those of firms that change from Big Six to non-
Big Six auditors. Furthennore, there is no statistically significant difference in the change
in discretionary accmals between these two groups. This result is consistent after
controlling for other relevant variables that may affect discretionary accruals and does
not change in several sensitivity tests.
We interpret this result as meaning that there may be no difference in audit quality
between Big Six and non-Big Six auditors in Korea during the sample period. The result is
consistent with results in other studies in Korea, while inconsistent with many previous
studies on audit quality in other countries (e.g., Becker et al. 1998; DeAngelo 1981;
Palinrose 1988). In Korea, there may be different incentives for auditors to provide high-
or low-quality audits because the economic and institutional environments in Korea are
different from other countries.
This study adds new evidence to the audit-quality literature by showing that
financial statements audited by Big Six auditors may not provide higher quality
infomiation in certain economic environments. This implies that when we use auditor
type as a proxy for audit quality we may need to consider economic environments. As
Becker et al. (1998) point out there is still questions about the wisdom of using
discretionary accruals as a proxy for auditor quality. In addition, further research is
necessary to find out what other factors motivate auditors to provide audits of different
quality.
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Abstract
This study examines the decision relevance and timeUness of accounting earnings m Saudi Arabia
during the 1995-1999 sample penod. The empincal results suggest that the publication of
accounting earnings does not cause significant re\"ision to the market assessment of future cash flows
of Saudi firms. On the other hand, it appears that the publication of accounting earnings leads
individual in\estors to re^ ise their security' holdings. However, this e\idence is limited to cases
where firms reported profit. The empirical results further suggest that earnings are timeh' in terms of
their association with security' returns and that increasing the measurement inter\al signitlcanth
improves this association. The tests also show that positi\ e and negati\ e earnings have differential
implications for the timeliness of accounting earnings. Further tests show that this e\ idence is not
consistent with the loss liquidation argument [J. Account. Econ. 20 (1995) 125] and. potentially, may
reflect the lack of ta.\ incentives to liquidate investments in loss firms. Finally, the results show that
Saudi managers do not incorporate economic losses into accounting earnings on a timely basis which
may reflect reduced market demand for accounting information, low levels of public debt, low
expected litigation costs, and w-eak monitoring by analysts and other stakeholders.
C 2004 Published h> Universit\ of Illinois. .All rights reser\ ed.
Ke\-\vords: Decision rele\ance; Timeliness: .Accounting eaminas: Saudi .Arabia
1. Introduction
The last three decades witnessed the emergence of a research paradigm that tests the
relation between alternative capital markets metrics (e.g., securit>- prices, security
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returns, and trading volume) and accounting data (such as earnings, book value, among
others). The aim of these tests is to provide insights into the relevance and reliability
of accounting data for members of the investment community and, perhaps, for
standard setters. They test the decision relevance and timeliness of accounting
information.
The majority of research on the decision relevance and timeliness of accounting data
uses data from the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Australian capital markets.
Recently, there has been a growing interest in alternative national accounting models. For
example. Ball, Kothari, and Robin (2000) examine the effect of international institutional
factors on two properties of accounting earnings: timeliness and conservatism. Their
sample includes firms from common-law countries (Australia, Canada, UK, and United
States) and code-law countries (France, Germany, and Japan). Similarly, Ball, Robin, and
Wu (2000) conduct a similar study using a sample of firms from Hong Kong, Malaysia,
Singapore, and Thailand. In addition, some studies examine the relevance of accounting
infomiation in other emerging markets. For example, Chen, Chen, and Su (1999)
investigate the relevance of accounting earnings in China, Choi and Choe (1998)
investigate the effects of annual earnings announcements on investors' trading behavior
in the Korean stock market.
To date, the extant literature lacks significant empirical evidence on the current role of
accounting information in security valuation in the Saudi security market, despite its status
as one of the largest (by market capitalization) among emerging markets.' This paper aims
at addressing this gap by investigating the decision relevance and timeliness of accounting
infonnation in Saudi Arabia during the 1995-1999 sample period. Furthermore, following
Hayn (1995), we assess the differential implications of positive versus negative eamings
on the timeliness of accounting eamings. Finally, we examine the extent to which
accounting eamings asymmetrically incorporates economic losses relative to economic
gain (i.e., the impact of accounting conservatism as defined by Basu, 1997) in Saudi
Arabia.
We argue that the role of accounting information in security valuation warrants an
empirical investigation due to factors that impact both the demand placed on accounting
information and the supply of accounting infonnation in Saudi Arabia. The empirical
evidence gathered by this study helps to understand the role of accounting information in
security valuation in Saudi Arabia and possibly have policy implications for accounting
standard setters in Saudi Arabia.
With respect to the demand placed on accounting information, the government of
Saudi Arabia has recently outlined a number of initiatives that aim to foster a greater
local and intemational private sector involvement in its economic development activities,
and it has opened the door for more involvement by non-Saudi nationals to invest in its
capital markets. These initiatives are likely to increase the demand placed on accounting
information by current and perspective investors. On the other hand, many large, listed
' Notable exceptions include the work of Al-Bogami. Green, and Power (1997), who used an event study to
investigate the market reaction to quarterly eamings announcements of 39 listed Saudi firms during the 1987-
199! sample period.
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Saudi companies are partially owned by tiie Saudi Government. The high concentration
of government ownership for these companies is hkely to mean higher levels of
information asymmetry." Furthermore, some listed Saudi companies are family con-
trolled; one family often holds a controlling interest in various public and private
companies. Some of these companies are tied together by cross holdings and personal
relationships. This form of ownership may lead to direct access to insider information by
government officials while the public continues to face infonnation asymmetry. This
setting, in turn, creates alternative fonns of contracting relationships and is likely to
reduce the demand for public disclosure and the demand for timely and transparent
accounting information.
With respect to the supply of accounting information, in contrast to many
developed economies where the provision of accounting information is governed
by a national set of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), the Saudi
finns have traditionally adopted Anglo-American GAAPs (U.S. GAAP, U.K. GAAP,
and more recently. International Accounting Standards GAAP). While the establish-
ment of a domestic standard-setting body in 1992, the Saudi Organization for
Certified Public Accountants (SOCPA) has helped to reduce reporting diversity.
SOCPA is still veiy much in its early stages, having released only 16 accounting
standards. Both decision relevance and timeliness of accounting infonnation in Saudi
Arabia are likely to be influenced by the degree of alignment between the under-
pinnings for Anglo-American type of GAAP and the principles and doctrines adopted
by the Saudi investment community, hi addition, the low expected cost of litigation
in Saudi Arabia, as well as the lack of a public debt market (due to Islamic
tradition), suggests that Saudi managers and auditors may have low incentives to
produce timely and transparent financial reports. That is, from a supply point of
view, accounting information may have a lower impact on security prices in Saudi
Arabia than in other countries.
The next section provides a brief ovei"view of key Saudi institutional factors. Section 3
discusses the research design. Section 4 discusses the research findings. Section 5
concludes the study.
2. Key Saudi institutional factors
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is an Arabic Islamic monarchy, headed by the King,
who also serves as the country's Prime Minister. The King exercises his authority
through a body referred to as the Council of Ministers. Two other councils advise the
King and Council of Ministers. The first council is the Consultative Council (Majlis
Traditionally, information asymmetry has been interpreted as differences between managers and owners of
firms. That is, managers possess private information about the fimi and its earnings that shareholders do not have.
In the context of this paper, we argue that infonnation asymmetry in Saudi Arabia exists between investors
themselves (government vs. nongovernment). Indeed, these two groups differ in their information resources, their
investment horizons, and their investment strategy.
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Alshoura), which includes academics, businesspeople, government members, and
religious scholars. The second council is the Council of the Assembly of Senior
Religious Scholars (Majlis Kihar al-Ulama), a body that is charged with the
responsibility of ensuring that Saudi Arabia is governed in conformity with Islamic
law and teaching.
Islamic teaching plays the major role in the formulation and development of the legal
system in Saudi Arabia. The Qiir 'an, the holy book of Islam, is the most important
source of legislation, followed by the Siiiina, the teachings of the Prophet Mohammed.
As a matter of Islamic law, if an authoritative legal statement from the Qiir 'an or the
Sunna (collectively referred to as Shari'a) can be cited, it is binding and supersedes all
other sources of legislation (Ernst & Young International, 1998, pp. 56-58). Other
sources of law in Saudi Arabia include Royal and Ministerial Decrees and Departmental
Circulars.
2.1. The Saudi economic and financial system
The Saudi economy, the largest in the Middle East, has been developed through a series
of 5 -year plans. These plans have been fonnulated to pursue economic diversification
through the development of private sector activities as well as greater economic
development from the private sector The government's commitment to foster greater
private sector involvement in its economic development activities suggests that the private
sector will play a leading role in financing these development activities, creating a greater
demand for relevant and reliable financial infomiation to facilitate effective decision
making. It also suggests that financial markets in Saudi Arabia will be more active and
move toward sophisticated trading arrangements.
Saudi Arabia does not have a physical stock market location; the exchange of stocks
is conducted through a computerized network. The Saudi stock market is the eighth
largest stock market by market capitalisation in the developing world, and it is the largest
stock market in the Arab world, accounting for 63% of the volume of shares on all
Arabian stock exchanges. Generally speaking, only Saudi nationals may own or,
otherwise, deal in shares listed on the Saudi exchange. However, nationals of other
Gulf countries (GCC) may also own shares in certain joint stock companies. In 2000, the
government permitted non-Saudi nationals who reside in Saudi Arabia to invest in the
Saudi stock market through existing local funds managed by domestic commercial
banks. As a result of these govemmental initiatives, there are currently 132 investment
funds managed by commercial banks.
2.2. Tlie Saudi accounting profession
The accounting profession in Saudi Arabia is young, but maturing, as it undergoes
continuous development. During its infancy, there was no comprehensive, authoritative
support. This condition changed with the passage of the first Law of Certified Accountants
in 1992. Article 19 of the Law established the first authorized professional association of
accountants, the SOCPA. SOCPA is responsible for regulating the accounting profession
and its practices. The regulatory sources of law governing the accounting profession
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include the Companies Act, the Zakat and Income Tax Act, the Ministry of Commerce
(1986a,b) decision, and SOCPA regulations.
SOCPA introduced a professional qualification for Saudi nationals, modeled after the
certified public accountants designation in the United States. The Ministry of Commerce
license qualified individuals and associations of qualified individuals to practice. At of the
end of 1997, there were over 300 licensed practicing accountants in Saudi Arabia. The
accounting profession is far weaker in Saudi Arabia than that in the West, but the
accountants and their corporate clients' face lower expected litigation cost. While the
Ministry of Commerce and SOCPA host a committee that investigates any wrongdoing in
the profession, the procedures and decisions of this committee are not disclosed to the
public. To date, not a single audit firm has been sued, even in cases of corporate failure.
Since its inception, SOCPA has issued 16 accounting standards. Accordingly, Saudi
companies do not yet have a unified set of GAAP, and Saudi companies are still informally
guided by U.S., UK and/or IAS standards.
3. Research design
3.1. The decision relevance of accounting earnings
We assess the decision relevance of accounting earnings in Saudi Arabia in two ways.
First, we utilize the research design of Ball and Brown (1968) to investigate the association
between the sign of security returns and the sign of annual earnings of Saudi firms
surrounding and during the release week of annual reports.'* If earnings provide a summary
performance measure, we should observe positive (negative) security returns for profitable
(losing) firms. We construct a wealth index to trace the value of US$ 1 invested (in equal
amounts) in all securities at the end of Week 52 (i.e., 52 weeks prior to the week of the
annual report) and held to Week + 13 (i.e., 13 weeks after the week of the annual report).
In other words:
^^"=^En(i+^^t,") (1)
,/ TP
Zakat is a religious wealth tax levied on Saudi and other GCC nationals and their wholly owned companies
and that proportion of mixed-ownership companies that is owned by Saudi or other GCC nationals. Zakat is a
fixed-rate tax of 2.5% on capital that is not invested in fixed assets or long-term investments. Income tax, on the
other hand, is levied on companies wholly owned by foreign nationals and the proportion of mixed-ownership
companies that is owned by foreign nationals. Income tax is levied on taxable income, which is calculated as
gross income less all expenses that are necessarily incurred in earning income and satisfy the deductibility rules.
The current rate of corporate income tax in Saudi Arabia varies ft"om 25% to 45%, with no tax-fi"ee threshold.
Note that Saudi firms do not announce earnings ahead of the annual report release date. Note also that Saudi
investors may have access to private information about firm performance before the release week of the annual
report (a research in-progress by one of the authors of this paper suggests that infomiation leakage is present in
the Saudi market). For these reasons, we examine the market movement surrounding and including the annual
report release date.
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where WI„ is the wealth index during week \v; Ret/,, is the raw rate of return for security y
during week w, and A' is the number of securities.
Similar with Ball and Brown (1968), the wealth index is then plotted for portfolios
constructed for (1) all firms and years, (2) all firms and years in which the reported
earnings level figure is positive, and (3) all firms and years in which the reported
earnings level figure is negative. Chi-square statistics are computed for a 2 x 2
classification of firms by the sign of earnings levels and the sign of raw returns for
each week.
Second, we use the research design of Beaver (1968) to investigate the presence of
any abnormal trading volumes surrounding and during the release week of the annual
report. Benchmarked against trading volume during nonreporting weeks, we investi-
gate the presence of abnormal trading volume movements during (and surrounding)
the annual report release date. Similar to Beaver, a weekly average of daily percentage
of shares traded is calculated for each firm for each week in the report period as
follows:
f number of shares of finn / traded during week w
(2)
number of shares outstanding of finny traded during week vv
1
number of trading days during week vv
The weekly volume is divided by the number of shares outstanding to remove any bias
caused by the presence of firms with a large number of shares outstanding. The
percentage of shares traded per week is divided by the number of trading days to adjust
for nontrading days such as public holidays. The nonnal trading week in Saudi Arabia is
equal to 5.5 days (five full days and one half day on Thursdays). The report release period
is defined as the 7-week period surrounding and including the release week (3 weeks
before the release date, the report release week, and 3 weeks after the report release
week). We compute the average volume across all observafions for each week during the
report period, benchmarked against the average volume during the nonreport period
(Week 52-4, Week +4- + 13).
3.2. The timeliness of accounting earnings in Saudi Arabia
We use the research design of Easton and Harris (1991) to investigate the extent to
which accounting earnings incorporate current period economic income, as proxied by
security returns. We assess timeliness by examining the contemporaneous relationship
between the earnings levels, earnings changes, and security returns of Saudi firms over
1-, 2-, and 5-year intervals. Following Easton and Harris and Easton, Ohlson, and
^ Our index differs from the Bail and Brown (1968) index in that it does not control for market-wide factors.
However, the use of an index identical to that of Ball and Brown does not change our findings.
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Harris (1992), the following regression is estimated for the pooled cross-sectional and
time-series sample, as well as for each of the intervals noted above:
Ret,, = a + p,{E,,,/Pu-\) + p.i^u/P,.,^^) + s,, (3)
where E is the earnings level per share; A£ is the earnings change per share Ret raw
annual security return; and P the price per share of firm / at time /.
Similar with Easton and Harris (1991), we assess timeliness by examining the
explanatory power of the model (adjusted R~) in Eq. (3). Inferences about the impact of
the length of the measurement interval on timeliness are drawn by examining the change in
the explanatory power (adjusted R') of Eq. (3) as the measurement interval increases.
3.3. The differential implications of positive and negative earnings on the timeliness of
accounting earnings
We use the research design of Hayn (1995) to investigate the differential implications of
positive and negative earnings on the relationship between earnings and the annual
security returns of Saudi firms. We divide the pooled sample into four groups. The first
group includes observations where the level of earnings and the change in earnings are
both positive. The second group includes observations where the level of earnings is
positive but the change in earnings is negative. The third group includes observafions
where the level of eamings and the change in earnings are both negative. The final group
includes observations where the level of eamings is negative but the change in eamings is
positive. The regression model outlined in Eq. (3) is then estimated for each group.
Inferences about the role of the sign of reported eamings on the association between
security returns and eamings can be drawn from comparing the adjusted R~ of the pooled
model for each group for annual as well as longer measurement intervals (2 and 5 years).
3.4. Accounting conservatism in Saudi Arabia
We examine accounting conservatism in Saudi Arabia by utilizing the research design
of Basu (1997), in which security retums proxy for economic income. Conservatism is
defined as the extent to which current period accounting eamings asymmetrically
incorporate economic losses relative to economic gain. Following Basu, we estimate a
linear regression of accounting eamings on security retums as follows:
£,,/P,,_i =a + /?,RD,, + /?.Ret,, + ft.Ret.jRD,,, + f.,,, (4)
where RD is a dummy variable equaling one if Ret is negative and zero otherwise.
Following Ball, Robin et al. (2000), we control for market-wide retum by deducting the
sample mean retum in fiscal year / for calculating Ret. The coefficient ^2 measures the
contemporaneous sensitivity of accounting eamings to positive security retums (economic
gain). The coefficient [i^, measures the incremental sensitivity of accounting eamings to
contemporaneous negative retums (economic loss).
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3.5. Viifiiible ciefiniilotis
Ret. ,, The raw seciirin returns tor firm /. adjusted for stock di\ idend. stock split, and capitalization changes
compounded over tlie time period t. where r is either 1 week. 1 year, or 5 years.
I
;
,
The traded volume for security, / adjusted for stock spUt over the contemporaneous \\ eek. r.
£, Earnings per share for firm / for period r excluding extraordinar\ items, discontinued operations, and
zakat and tax obligations scaled by beginning-of-period price."
A£ . Change in earnings per share for firm / for period t. This variable proxies for unexpected earnings for
firm / for period i.
3.6. Sample selccrion pivctdiovs
This stiid\' uses data from the period 19^5- W^^). The sample is drawn from the total
population of firms listed on the Saudi stoek market during the full 5-\ear period. Of the
72 fimis listed. 10 were exeluded heeause they were suspended from trading on the Saudi
Arabian stock market, pending satisfaction of certain operating and financial criteria
imposed b\ the Saudi stock market. Of the remaining 62 finiis. 52 finns satisfy our
selection criteria:
(1) Completing weekh' share pnces series for the 1QQ5-1999 sample period;
(2) completing tlnancial statements data for at least 4 \ears from the W^5- W^9 sample
period;
(3) completing dividend and stock-split data for the 1QQ5- W^^ sample period; and
(4) hy haxing clearly identifiable earnings announcement (annual repon release) dates for
each yearly obser\ ation.
The final sample represents 72° o of the total population b\ number and represents
*:?6.45''o of the total population by market capitalization. The tlnal data set includes 256
annual earnings announcements relating to 52 Saudi .Arabian tlnns for the sample period
3. ~. Dahi sources
Due to the lack of an> fomi of electronic market or financial database in Saudi .\rabia
at the time we conducted this research, all of the required data were hand collected.
W'eekK high. low. and closing stoek pnces and the trading \olume for each securit> were
Zakat and tax obligations are excluded trom ilie measurement of earnings for four distinct reasons. First, the
sample consists of two groups of firms: (1) ftilh Saudi-owned firms that are required to pay only zakat, (2) partly
Saudi-owTied firms that are required to pav botli zakat and income tax. Thus, ignoring zakat and tax obligarions
ensures a measure of consistencv . Second, because the zakat obligation represents a religious dut\. some firms
believe that thev should be in charge of paying onh the minimum amoimt of zakat required b\ law. Accordingh;
many firms may engage in active zakat management practice. Third, certain tinns are entitled to special tax
concessions for cenain periods. Finally, tlexibilit) inherent in the Saudi zakat and tax code generally leads to
disputes betAveen companies and ZITD regarding the amount due for zakat and tax. which suggests that it is
difficult to ascertain a firm's final tax liabihn.
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obtained from Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency. Dividend data were obtained from SSRC.
Stock-split data were obtained from the Saudi Stock Market Review publications issued by
Bakheet Financial Advisors. Financial accounting data were manually obtained from the
rele\ant annual reports, hard copies of which were housed in the library of SOCPA or the
library of the Institute of Public Administration in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Data for a few
missing annual reports were obtained from the microfilm archives of three leading Saudi
Arabian newspapers: Al-Riyadh. Al-Jazeerah. and Okaz.
There is no database that contains earnings-announcement dates for firms listed on the
Saudi stock market. Instead, all firms listed on the Saudi stock exchange are required by
law to publish their complete financial statements in at least two Saudi newspapers within
3 months following the fiscal year-end. Accordingly, earnings-announcement dates were
collected by hand from the microfilm archives of the financial sections of these news-
papers. The archi\es of Saudi newspapers were carefully checked to determine the exact
earnings-announcement date. This is defined as the date on which the complete financial
statements of a firm first appeared in any Saudi newspaper.
4. Empirical results
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the main variables of interest. All accounting
variables are stated on a per-share basis and scaled by beginning-of-period price. As can be
seen in Table 1 . the mean (median) value for annual earnings per share as a percentage of
beginning share price is 4.8% (5.3%). Almost 25% of the firnis reported annual losses.
Two-year earnings are lower than twice annual earnings, and 5 -year eamings are greater
than five times annual eamings. Because the Nariables are scaled by beginning-of-period
Table 1
Descriptive statistics
Vanable Number of Mean S.E. of S.D. Lower Median Upper Percent
observations the mean quartile quartile negative
(.A) .Annual pooled obsen'ations
E 254 0.048 0.008 0.130 - 0.003 0.053 0.103 25.09
RET 254 0.046 0.019 0.299 -0.168 - 0.022 0.243 53.14
iB) Two-yearly pooled obsen'ations
E 100 0.079 0.021 0.209 - 0.039 0.095 0.186 28.00
RET 100 0.178 0.043 0.435 -0.173 0.163 0.420 36.00
(C) Five-yearly pooled ohsenations
E 48 0.258 0.053 0.364 -0.012 0.285 0.543 23.07
RET 48 0.296 0.120 0.831 -0.300 0.140 0.920 30.76
E: eamings per share excluding e,\traordinar> items, discontinued operations, and zakat and tax obligations scaled
^
by beginning-of-period price.
I
RET: annual security returns.
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price, average reported values will tend to increase disproportionately over longer intervals
due to the reinvestment of earnings and the influence of negative values.
The mean (median) value for annual security returns is 4.6% ( — 2.2%) and is
significantly different from zero. Interestingly, while over 53% of the obser\'ations had
negative annual security returns, this percentage is quite similar with those reported in U.S.
studies. Nevertheless, aggregate security returns over longer intervals are positive, and the
proportion of negative return realizations drop significantly.
Table 2 presents the time lag between the end of the fiscal year and the week of the
release of the annual report (earnings-announcement week) for the sample firms. The
average lag period in weeks is 11.50, 10.73, 10.63, 10.80, and 7.10 during 1995, 1996,
1997, 1998, and 1999, respectively. While it is not clear why there has been a sharp drop
in the average lag period during 1 999, the average time lag in each sample year is below
the 3-month rule imposed by SOCPA. By the end of Week 4, 13% of the firms released
their annual report, and by the end of Week 13, 70% of the firms released their annual
report.
As can be seen in Table 3, the most frequent firm year-end in Saudi Arabia is
December, used by approximately 83% of the sample. During the sample period, no firm
studied changed its year-end. The most frequent annual report release month is March,
which accounted for 27% of the sample, and the months of January, February, and March,
combined, accounted for 63%.
4.2. The decision relevance of accounting earnings in Saudi Arabia
Fig. 1 plots the average weekly wealth indices for three portfolios constructed from all
finns and all years. The first portfolio includes all 256 observations. The positive portfolio
includes 191 observations, all of which had positive reported earnings. The negative
portfolio includes 65 observations, all of which had negative reported earnings.
Table 2
Number of weeks between fiscal year-end and annual report release date
Number of weeks Number of releases
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total Cumulative %
4 or less than 4 5 4 7 1 16 33 13
5 3 5 1 4 10 23 22
6 1 2 I 5 7 16 28
7 2 4 4 2 1 13 33
8 1 3 2 1 7 36
9 1 3 1 1 1 7 39
10 5 3 5 6 3 22 47
11 2 5 4 7 18 54
12 4 4 4 7 19 62
13 6 5 7 1 2 21 70
14 3 3 5 5 16 76
15 5 4 1 3 13 81
More than 15 14 10 10 10 4 48 100
Total 52 52 52 52 48 256
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Table 3
Distribution of financial statement and announcements dates
Month Firm year-end
Number ".
Times earnings reports were announced in each month
Number Cumulative %
January
February
March 2
April
May 4
June
July 2
August
September 1
October
November
December 43
Total 52
0.00 39
0.00 54
0.04 68
0.00 34
0.08 14
0.00 9
0.04 12
0.00 12
0.02 5
0.00 1
0.00 4
0.83 1
00 254
15 15
21 37
27 63
13 77
6 82
4 86
5 91
5 95
2 97
98
2 99
1 100
Fig. 1 shows a marked positive association between the signs of the reported earnings
and of the weaUh index. The weekly chi-square statistics for the 2 x 2 classification by the
signs of the reported annual earnings and of wealth index show that it is unlikely that there
is no relationship between the two signs in the majority of the weeks up to that of annual-
report announcement. These statistics are especially strong for the total sample portfolio
and for the positive-earnings portfolio. The chi-square statistics for the negative-earnings
portfolio are only significant during 32 weekly periods.
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Fig. 1 . Wealth index for various portfolios (earnings levels).
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Consistent with the U.S. evidence reported in Ball and Brown (1968) and the
Australian evidence reported in Brown (1970), we infer from Fig. 1 that most of the
information contained in reported earnings is anticipated by the Saudi market before
the annual report is released because the release of the actual earnings number does not
appear to cause any unusual jumps in the wealth index during the announcement week.
The upward and downward drifts begin at least 52 weeks before the annual report is
released. This evidence suggests not only that the Saudi market begins to anticipate
reported earnings 52 weeks before the announcement week but also that it continues to do
so with increasing success. Consistent with international e\ idence. the upward drift for the
positive earnings portfolio continues for approximately 10 weeks after the announcement
Table 4
Average wealth index statistics for total sample portfolio, positive earnings portfolio, and negative earnings
portfolio
Weeks Average Average Average Weeks Average Average Average
wealth index wealth index wealth index wealth index wealth index wealth index
(negative) (positive) ( negative
)
(positive)
-52 1.0018 1.0000 1.0020 - 19 1.0491 0.9666 1.0768
-51 0.9991 1.0000 0.9982 -18 1.0474 0.9477 1 .0806
-50 1.0031 1.0030 1.0031 -17 1.0470 0.9485 1.0799
-49 0.9950 0.9948 0.9950 -16 1.0476 0.9471 1.0812
-48 0.9955 0.9957 0.9954 -15 1.0501 0.9472 1.0844
-47 0.9970 0.9921 0.9984 -14 1.0443 0.9432 1.0780
-46 0.9939 0.9869 0.9960 -13 1.0439 0.9311 1.0798
-45 0.9988 0.9842 1.0033 - 12 1.0429 0.9356 1.0803
-44 1.0048 0.9861 1.0106 -11 1.0498 0.9232 1.0920
-43 1.0120 0.9834 1.0210 -10 1.0500 0.9167 1 .0945
-42 1.0150 0.9824 1.0252 -9 1.0535 0.9171 1.0990
-41 1.0147 0.9776 1.0262 -8 1.0546 0.9135 1.1017
-40 1.0149 0.9744 1.0277 -7 1.0536 0.9117 1.1010
-39 1.0147 0.9708 1.0286 -6 1.0551 0.9119 1.1029
-38 1.0133 0.9691 1.0273 -5 1.0588 0.9118 1.1078
-37 1.0119 0.9679 1.0259 -4 1.0615 0.9077 1.1128
-36 1.0094 0.9654 1.0234 -3 1.0607 0.9026 1.1134
-35 1.0055 0.9567 1.0210 -2 1.0606 0.8999 1.1142
-34 1 .0024 0.9516 1.0186 -1 1.0648 0.8985 1.1203
-33 1.0039 0.9534 1.0199 1.0717 0.9068 1.1266
-32 1.0083 0.9561 1.0251 1 1.0727 0.9112 1.1256
-31 1.0058 0.9562 1.0215 2 1.0780 0.9319 1.1282
-30 1.0130 0.9676 1.0276 3 1.0855 0.9298 1.1365
-29 1.0159 0.9708 1.0308 4 1.0802 0.9257 1.1314
-28 1.0218 0.9726 1.0381 5 1.0743 0.9164 1.1269
-27 1.0256 0.9726 1.0430 6 1.0837 0.9282 1.1349
-26 1.0303 0.9653 1.0516 7 1.0884 0.9135 1.1454
-25 1.0350 0.9663 1.0579 8 1.0865 0.9066 1.1462
-24 1.0396 0.9678 1.0635 9 1.0932 0.9080 1.1576
-23 1.0455 0.9748 1 .0690 10 1.0821 0.9061 1.1414
-22 1.0495 0.9850 1.0709 11 1.0675 0.9022 1.1263
-21 1.0516 0.9829 1 .0746 12 1.0553 0.9091 1.1157
-20 1.0482 0.9713 1.0739 13 1.0563 0.9146 1.1371
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week. Surprisingly, there does not appear to be any posteamings announcement drift for
the negative-earnings portfoho. If anything, it appears that the market goes through a
period of correction for potential overreaction.
Table 4 presents the weekly wealth index values for three portfolios shown in Fig. 1.
The average annual wealth index value for the total sample increased by 7.17% during the
52 weeks leading to the annual report release week. The average annual wealth index
value for the positive (negative) earnings portfolio increased (decreased) by 12.03%
(9.32%) during the 52 weeks leading to the annual report release date.
Only 1 1% (1%) of the increase (decrease) in the wealth index for the positive (negative)
earnings portfolio took place during the 4 weeks leading to the annual report release date.
Consistent with international evidence in the United States and Australia, this finding
suggests that the release of the annual earnings reports is not providing decision-relevant
infomiation to Saudi market participants because most of the infomiation contained in
earnings have trickled into the market throughout the year.
Fig. 2 shows the average trading volume across all observations for each week during
the 7-week report period (3 weeks before and 3 weeks after the report release week, as well
as the report release week itselty
The average trading volume during the nonreport release period is 0.156%, and the
average volume during the week of the release of the annual report is 0. 1 86%, which is
19.23% larger than that during the nonreport release period and is the largest during the
reporting period. This finding clearly shows that individual Saudi investors do shift their
portfolio positions at the time of the annual report release week.
The above analysis is further extended by examining the trading volume of profit-
reporting firms separately from that of loss-reporting firms. Effectively, the calculation of
relafive volume (H is replicated for each group. The average trading volume of profit
(loss) finns during the reporting period is benchmarked on the average trading volume of
profit- (loss-) reporting firms during nonreporting periods.
Fig. 3 shows the average volume across all profit-reporting observations for each week
during the 7-week report period (3 weeks before and 3 weeks after the report release week.
2.00
1.90
1.80
1.70
1.60
1.50
1.40
1.30
1.20
Weeks Relative to Annual Report Release Week
Average Volume for All Firms - Reporting Period
•Average Volume for All Firms - Non Reporting Period
Fig. 2. Volume analysis (all tlmis).
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1.40
1.20
1.00
-3-2-10 1 2 3
Weeks Relative to Annual Report Release Week
Average Volume for Profit Firms - Reporting Period
^^^~ Average Volume for Profit Firms - Non Reporting Period
Fig. 3. Volume analysis (profit firms).
as well as the report release week itself). The average trading volume for profit-reporting
firms during the nonreport release period is 0.13%, which is lower than that for the total
sample. The average volume during the week of the release of the annual report of profit
firms is 0. 1 75%, which is also lower than that for the total sample, but is 34.6% larger than
that during the nonreport release period and is the largest during the reporting period.
Consistent with the evidence reported for the total sample, this finding clearly shows that
individual Saudi investors do shift their portfolio positions at the time of the annual report
release week of profit-reporting firms.
Fig. 4 shows the average volume across all loss-reporting observations for each week
during the 7-week report period (3 weeks before and 3 weeks after the report release week,
as well as the report release week itself).
The average trading volume for loss-reporting firnis during the nonreport release period is
0.23%, which is significantly higher than that for the total sample and for the profit group.
The average volume during the week of the release of the annual report of loss-reporting
2.90
2.70
2.50
2.30
2.10
1.90
1.70
1.50
-3-2-1 1 2
Weeks Relative to Annual Report Release Week
Average Volume for Loss Firms - Reporting Period
^^""^ Average Volume for Loss Firms - Non Reporting Period
Fig. 4. Volume analysis (loss firms).
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firms is 0.22%, which is higher than that for the total sample and for the profit group (mostly
because they represent some of the largest Saudi companies), but is 5% lower than that
during the nonreport release period. Interestingly, all ofthe weekly trading volume averages
during the reporting period are lower than that during the nonreport release period. This
evidence stands in contrast to that reported for the total sample and for the profit group and
clearly shows that individual Saudi investors do not shift their portfolio positions at the time
of the annual report release week of loss-reporting firms. In the spirit of Hayn (1995), this
finding may suggest that Saudi investors perceive reported losses by Saudi firais to be
temporary. However, because there are no tax implications for losses on investments in
shares by Saudi investors, the reported evidence is more consistent with the view that Saudi
investors do not have any incentive to liquidate their holdings in loss finns.
In sum, it appears that the publication of accounting earnings in newspapers does not
provide decision-relevant infonnation that will cause significant revision to the market
assessment of the future cash flows of Saudi firms. On the other hand, it appears that the
publication of accounting earnings provides decision-relevant information that leads
individual investors to revise their security holdings. However, this evidence is limited
to cases where firms reported profit. It appears that reported losses do not lead Saudi
investors to revise their security holdings, mostly because of the lack of any tax incentive
for holders of investments in loss finns.
4.5. The timeliness of accounting earnings in Saudi Arabia
The left-hand side of Table 5 presents the empirical results for the regression outlined in
Eq. (3) for the total sample. To ensure that the inferences made are not affected by any
inefficiency caused by heteroscedasticity. all t statistics are calculated after correcting for
the heteroscedasticity in the manner described by White (1980). The regression using the
pooled sample yields an estimated coefficient for earnings levels of 1 .3 1 (significant at the
1% level) and earnings changes of 0.302 (insignificant at conventional levels). The yearly
Table 5
Regression of annual security returns on earnings and earnings changes
Ret,, = a + ^, {E,,,/Pi,,^ , ) + ^. (A£,.,/P,,,_ , ) + e,
,
Total sample Total sample excluding electricity companies
Year -x Ih Pi Adjusted
R-
N Year •X ^1 P2 Adjusted N
R-
Pooled .028 1.310*** 0.302 .226 202 Pooled -.030 1.939*** 0.156 .345 186
1996 .011 1.350*** 0.174 .380 50 1996 -.021 1.600*** 0.166 .408 46
1997 .197*** 1.067*** - 1.105* .226 51 1997 .116*** 1.822*** - 1.090** .458 47
1998 - .191*** 0.124 0.563 -.016 51 1998 -.270*** 1.419*** 0.173 .352 47
1999 .141*** 2.128*** -0.250 .485 47 1999 .104** 2.771*** -0.634 .485 43
E: earnings per share scaled by beginning-of-period price.
\E: changes in earnings per share scaled by beginning-of-period price.
Ret: annual security returns.
* White-based significant at the 10% level.
** White-based significant at the 5% level.
*** White-based significant at the l°o level.
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coefficients for earnings levels are also significant in every year, except 1998. On the other
hand, none of the yearly coefficients for earnings changes is significant at the 5% level.
The adjusted R~ statistics are quite high in every year, except 1998.
The right hand side of Table 5 presents the empirical results for the same regression after
excluding all Saudi electricity companies. These observations are excluded for two reasons.
First, during December 1998, the Saudi government outlined a plan to merge all electricity
companies. The announcement of this plan positively affected the raw security returns of
these firms during 1998 and 1999. Second, the Saudi government has consistently provided
generous subsidies to all electricity companies and, especially, during periods of reported
losses. During 1998, all ofthe electricity companies reported significant losses, yet their raw
security returns were positive (even after adjusting for market returns), possibly reflecting a
view that the reported losses will be covered by governmental subsidies.
The adjusted R~ from the pooled regression is 34.5% compared with the adjusted R" of
22.6% from the equivalent regression for the total sample. For the year-by-year
regressions, the adjusted R~ statistics are a great deal higher than those for the total
sample, including 1998. The regression using the pooled sample yields an estimated
coefficient for eamings levels of 1.94 (significant at the 1% level) and earnings changes of
0.156 (insignificant at conventional levels).^
We examine whether the timeliness of accounting eamings is affected by the degree of
governmental ownership. We split our sample into two groups: the first group (Group A)
includes 1 8 finns where governmental ownership equals or exceeds 20% and the second
group (Group B) includes 34 firms where governmental ownership is below 20%. Group
A includes all electricity companies as well as certain banks and most cement companies,
among others. The adjusted R~ for the regression outlined in Eq. (3) for Group A is 12%
and the adjusted R~ for the same regression for Group B is 39.2%. This evidence is
consistent with our view that the degree of timeliness of accounting eamings is driven by
the proportion of ownership by the Saudi govemment.
Table 6 presents the empirical results for the regression of contemporaneous retums on
eamings levels and changes, as outlined in Eq. (3), for 2- and 5-year pooled data for the
total and for the reduced samples (after excluding the electricity group). Given the
observed influence of the electricity group on the reported findings of the annual
regressions, the discussion of the estimates reported in Table 6 focuses solely on those
for the reduced sample.
Table 6 shows that the adjusted R~ statistic obtained from the pooled regression for the
2-year return interval is 63%. For the two samples of 2-year retum intervals, the average
value of the adjusted R" statistics is 59.3%. These adjusted R~ statistics are significantly
larger than that obtained for the pooled annual regression (34.5%) and the mean adjusted
^ for the individual annual regressions (42.57%). Clearly, these statistics suggest that
doubling the measurement interval significantly improves the association between
eamings levels and security retums. Table 6 further indicates that the adjusted R~ obtained
from the pooled eamings level regression for the 5-year retum interval is 73.7%, which is
^ We conduct the same empirical test after controlling the effect of the scale variable { 1/P, , . i } by including
it as an additional explanatory variable. In fact, the findings do not reveal any major differences compared with
the original tests.
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Table 6
Regression of security returns on earnings and earnings changes (2- and 5-year analysis)
Ret,,, - a + /i, (£,,//',.,-i ) + /^,(A£,,/P,,_
,
) + £,,
Total sample Total sample excluding electricity companies
Year i. />, Ih Adjusted
R-
N Year y. lU h Adjusted A'^
R-
2- Year- .073** 1.306*** 0.368 .394 99 2 Yearly- -.056 2.047*** 0.333 .629 91
pooled pooled
1996-1997 .175*** 1.319*** 0.209 .462 51 1996-1997 .050 1.839*** - 0.029 .645 47
1998-1999 .031 0.721** 1.986* .234 47 1998-1999 -.171*** 2.492*** -0.129 .542 43
5 Year .141 1.728*** 1.381 .575 47 5-yearly -.379*** 2.237*** 1.402 .737 43
E: earnings per share scaled by bcginning-of-period price.
A£: changes in earnings per share scaled by beginning-of-period price.
Ret: annual security returns.
* White-based significant at the 10"o level.
** White-based significant at the 5% level.
*** White-based significant at the 1% level.
significantly larger than the adjusted R~ obtained for the pooled 2-year earnings level
regression (63%).'
Clearly, these statistics suggest that increasing the measurement interval significantly
iinproves the association between earnings and security returns of Saudi firms. This
evidence is consistent with the proposition of Easton et al. (1992) that "errors" in
aggregate earnings are likely to become less important for longer periods of aggregation.
All of the reported adjusted R~ statistics are comparable with those reported in the
United States (see, e.g., Easton & Harris, 1991; Easton et al., 1992) and suggest that
reported earnings by Saudi firms are timely in that they reflect current period economic
income as proxied for by security returns. The closeness of the reported statistics for the
individual coefficients and for the adjusted R~ to those reported in the Unied States
indicates that Saudi investors do not appear to be discounting the reported earnings figures.
4.4. The differential implications ofpositive and negative earnings on the relationship
between earnings and securit}' returns of Saudi firms
Table 7 presents a breakdown of the annual frequency and percentage of loss-reporting
finns in Saudi Arabia during the sample period 1995-1999. It is clear that the incidence of
We check for the impact of dirty surplus items in the owner-equity section of Saudi companies by
reviewing all the hard copies of the financial statements of our sample during the period 1995-1999. Indeed, we
find that the owner-equity section of Saudi firms does not include dirty surplus items that can violate the clean
surplus assumption. In other words, Saudi firms account for dirty surplus items in their income statements. This
finding reveals that net income (earnings after zakat and income tax) is identical to the comprehensive income of
all our sample firms. Furthermore, we conduct the same empirical tests after substituting the "earning before
Zakat and income tax" with "comprehensive income" to examine the affect of using "comprehensive income" as
the earnings variables. The empirical results were identical to these reported using earnings before Zakat and
income tax as the proxy for earnings.
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Table 7
Frequency of losses
Year No. of Firms No. of loss % of loss
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
All years
52
52
52
52
48
256
12
14
10
14
14
64
23.00
26.90
19.20
26.90
29.10
25.00
loss is quite common in Saudi Arabia in that it ranges from 19.2% in 1997 to 29.1%
in 1999.
As can be seen in Table 8, the adjusted R~ statistic for the eamings level and the
earnings change model for all finns is 22.6%. When loss-reporting firms are excluded, the
adjusted R~ statistic increases from 27% to 28.7%. The adjusted R~ statistic based
exclusively on loss-reporting finns is only 3.5%. This pattern is consistent with that
reported in a U.S. context (see, e.g., Hayn, 1995). Hayn (1995) notes that losses are likely
to be considered temporary because shareholders can always liquidate their investments in
the finn rather than suffer from indefinite losses. This argument assumes that losses are
likely to be recuning and/or have tax consequences. Hayn uses a time series analysis to
show a constant decline in adjusted R~ statistics as the frequency of losses for a given firm
increases. Given the limited data in the Saudi context, time series analysis is not feasible.
Accordingly, we examine this issue by observing the adjusted R' statistics for four
different subgroups constructed on the basis of the sign of reported eamings as well as the
sign of the reported change in eamings.
As can be seen in Table 8, in firms that report a profit as well as a positive increase in
eamings, the adjusted R~ statistic increases to 29.6%). For finns that report a profit
accompanied by a decrease in eamings, the adjusted R~ statistic drops to 20.1%.
Interestingly, for firms that report a loss and a decrease in eamings, the adjusted R~
statistics increases to 30.9%). While our tests differ in fonn from those conducted by Hayn
Table 8
Adjusted R~ statistics based on regression of security returns on eamings and earnings changes (profit and loss
analysis)
Ret,, = a + /?, {E,JP„ , ) + /J,(A£,,,/F,,_
,
) + £,,
Reported eamings Changes in eamings N Adjusted R' {%)
Profit Positive and negative 152 28.70
Profit Positive only 88 29.60
Profit Negative only 64 20.10
Loss Positive and negative 50 3.50
Loss Positive only 19 0.00
Loss Negative only 31 30.90
All observations 202 22.60
E: eamings per share scaled by beginning-of-period price.
AE: changes in eamings per share scaled by beginning-of-period price.
Ret: annual security retums.
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(1995), this evidence may reflect the "lack of tax incentive" argument noted earlier rather
than the "liquidation option"' argument as noted by Hayn.
4.5. Consen'atism in accounfing earnings in Saudi Arabia
We define conservatism in the sense of Basu (1997) as the extent to which current
period accounting earnings asymmetrically incorporate economic losses, relative to
economic gain. As can be seen in Table 9, the P2 slopes for the total sample and for
the reduced sample are significant for the annual, 2- and 5-yearly samples, suggesting
that accounting earnings in Saudi Arabia exhibit a high sensitivity to economic income.
In contrast, the incremental negative return slopes fU are consistently insignificant,
suggesting that accounting earnings in Saudi Arabia exhibit low or no sensitivity to
economic loss.
The lack of income conservatism in Saudi Arabia is consistent with results reported for
other code-law countries (see Ball, Kothari et al., 2000; Ball, Robin et al., 2000). Thus,
despite adopting Anglo-American GAAPs, Saudi firms do not appear to be fully adhering
to them in practice. In fact, similar with the reporting system in Japan, one-time accounting
write-offs are rare in Saudi Arabia. In addition, most Saudi finns do not report any pension
liabilities or postretirement liabilities. Furthemiore, the banking sector is known for not
incorporating economic losses into reported income.
Similar with Ball, Robin et al. (2000), we interpret these results on the grounds that
Saudi managers and auditors may have a low incenfive to incorporate economic losses into
accounting earnings due to a reduced market demand for accounting information, low
levels of public debt, low expected costs arising from stockholder and creditor litigation,
and weak monitoring by analysts and other stakeholders.
Table 9
Contemporaneous association between earnings and returns measuring the extent to which current period
accounting earnings asymmetrically incorporates economic losses, relative to economic gain (annual, 2-, and 5-
yearly intervals)
E,,,/P,,,
I
= a + ^,RD,,, + /5,Ret,, + ^.Ret^RD,, + £,,,
Total sample Total sampk', excluding electricity companies
Year P2 [h Adjusted
R-
N Year P2 Ih Adjusted
R-
N
Pooled- 0.197*** -0.060 .173 253 Pooled- 0.160*** 0.024 .239 233
annual Annual
Pooled 0.399*** -0.133 .407 99 Pooled 0.289*** 0.029 .621 91
2-yearly 2-Yeariv
5 Yearly 0.437*** -0,121 .583 47 5-yearly 0.329*** -0.013 .713 43
E: earnings per share scaled by beginning-of-period price.
Ret: security returns less mean sample return.
RD; a dummy variable equaling one if Ret is negative and zero otherwise.
*** White-based significant at the 1% level.
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5. Concluding remarks
Motivated by the work of Ball, Kothari et al. (2000), Ball, Robin et al. (2000), this
study provides empirical evidence on the decision relevance and timeliness of earnings in
Saudi Arabia. We assess the ability of accounting earnings to convey decision-relevant
information by examining the impact of earnings announcements on security returns and
the trading volume of Saudi firms. We assess the timeliness of accounting earnings by
examining the contemporaneous association between earnings levels, earnings changes,
and security returns of Saudi firms over 1-, 2-, and 5-year intervals. The results of the
empirical tests suggest that the publication of accounting earnings in Saudi Arabia is not
decision relevant, but that earnings figures are timely in terms of their association with
security returns over 1-, 2-, and 5-year intervals. The tests also show that positive and
negative earnings have differential implications for the timeliness of accounting earnings.
However, further tests show that this evidence is not consistent with the loss-liquidation
argument (Hayn, 1995) and may potentially reflect the lack of tax incentives to liquidate
investments in loss firms. Additional tests show that accounting earnings exhibit low
sensitivity to economic losses consistent with the view that Saudi managers and auditors
have low incentives to incorporate economic losses into accounting earnings in a timely
manner.
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Evidence on the efficacy of interest-rate risk
disclosures by commercial banks
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Abstract
This paper documents evidence on the efficacy ofmaturity-gap disclosures ofcommercial banks in
indicating their net interest income that is exposed to interest-rate risk. For the large sample of banks
that filed call reports from 1990 to 1997, a period that includes a wide range of interest rate
movements, we find that (i) one-year maturity gap measures are significantly related to the one-year-
and three-years-ahead change in net interest income, (ii) fixed-rate and variable-rate instruments differ
in explanatory ability, and (iii) the one-to-five-year aggregate gap measures also have some power in
explaining three-year-ahead changes in net interest income. TTiese findings hold after controlling for
the ex post growth in assets as well as the amount of rate-sensitive assets and liabilities (a competing
set of explanatory variables). Because the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)'s [Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), (1997). Disclosure ofaccounting policies for derivativefinancial
instruments and derivative commodity instruments and disclosure of qualitative and quantitative
information about market risk inherent in derivative financial instruments, other financial
instruments, and derivative commodity instruments. Release Nos. 33-7386; 3438223; IC-22487;
FR-48; Intemafional Series No. 1047; File No. S7-35-95 (January 31, 1997), Washington, DC] tabular
disclosures are finer than maturity-gap data, our findings mitigate concerns about the usefulness of the
SEC's market-risk-disclosure requirements. Furthermore, they suggest contrary to the claims of
certain banks that the omission of prepayment and early withdrawal risk fi^om gap measures does not
totally compromise the ability of gap data to indicate interest-risk exposures.
2004 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
Keywoi-ds: Maturity-gap disclosures; Interest-rate gap; Fixed-rate instruments; Rate-sensitive assets; Net interest
income
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1. Introduction
In 1997, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued Financial Reporting
Release No. 48, Disclosure of Accounting Policies for Derivative Financial Instruments
and Derivative Commodity Instruments and Disclosure of Quantitative and Qualitative
Information about Market Risk Inherent in Derivati\e Financial Instruments, Other
Financial Instruments, and Derivative Commodity Instruments (ERR 48). This mandate
calls for market-risk disclosures in addition to financial statements to address widespread
concerns about the adequacy of existing disclosures arising from the recent substantial
increase in the use of instruments to sensitive market risk. ERR 48 states that while these
instruments can be used as effective tools for managing exposures to market risk, they may
lead to significant losses. Critics argue that investors may not only find the SEC's market-
risk disclosures uninformati\e but may even be misled by them (see Culp & Miller, 1996;
Lehn, 1997; Logan & Montgomery, 1997).
This paper provides indirect evidence on the efficacy of the SEC's tabular market-risk-
disclosure requirements ' in indicating commercial bank interest-rate risk by examining the
association between maturity-gap data disclosed in bank call reports and future changes in
net interest income. We study maturity-gap data because they are very similar to the
tabular format required in ERR 48. The release acknowledges, "gap analysis is a tabular
disclosure approach which with minor additions would satisfy the tabular disclosure
requirements" (ERR 48. Secfion VI, B. 2).
Our approach is moti\ated by a number of obser\ations. First, Ahmed, Beatty, and,
Takeda (1997) provide evidence that banks' risk-management policies focus on net interest
income rather than market values. These policies are consistent with changes in net interest
income that represent a significant risk for banks." Second, the change in net interest
income impacts equit>' values both directly and through the persistence of earnings. The
current focus on short-tenn earnings in setting prices makes this an important risk to
measure (see for example Skinner & Sloan. 2002). Third, the risks of changes in income
and equity value are separable (Toe\s, 1983).^ Finally, the disclosure needed to inform
about potential changes in net interest income can be reported in a single number (Toevs,
1983). This paper tests for and shows that a single, disclosed number, maturity gap, could
be very informative about this important risk.
Once the decision to look at the risk of changes in net interest income has been made,
bank-level data ft"om call reports are a logical choice for the empirical setting to test this
^ FRR 48 requires firms to report their market risks in one of three formats: tabular, \alue at nsk (\AR). or a
sensitivity analysis. See Linsmeier and Pearson (1997) for a description of the three formats.
"* There is a related literature that examines the interest-rate sensitivit\- of stock returns foUowmg Flannen.'
and James (1984). Examples include Hirtle (1997) and Schrand (1997). Rajgopal (1999) and Thornton and
Welker (1999) use a stock-retum-based approach in smdying commodit}- price risk for oil and gas producers.
'^ Barton (2001) provides evidence that firms" hedging decisions are related to earnings management.
^ Toevs (1983) demonstrates that the risk caused by unexpected changes in interest rates can be broken into
two separate pieces. The first part of the risk is that fi-om changes in net interest income over some "gapping" or
risk-management period. The other portion of the risk is that of changes in the market value ofbank capital, which
is based on the market values of financial instruments that do not reprice or mature during the risk management
period.
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relationship. While the call reports do not allow us to test for the market values of bank
capital because almost all of the reporting entities in the call reports are not publicly
traded,^ the data provide a powerful setting to test for the relation between gap and future
changes in net interest income. Gap data are readily available on a consistent basis for all
banks that file call reports (8690 to 11,842 yearly observations for our sample). This is a
much larger sample than the sample of firms for which the SEC's market-risk-disclosure
data can be collected.
Another advantage of our approach is that the longer time-series data we examine cover
periods of large increases as well as decreases in interest rates. Specifically, the annual
average change in the one-year treasury rate ranges from —2.02% to 1.88% during our
sample period.^ These changes in interest rates are quite large relative to those that have
been observed over the last four decades. From 1955 to 1998, the largest negative change
in the one-year treasury was — 2.7% and the largest positive change was 2.73%.*^
Although gap data have been available for many years, their usefulness is unclear.
Hodder (200 1 ) notes that the results of prior research on the association between gap data
and the interest sensifivity of stock returns have been mixed. In addition, surveys
conducted by the Financial Managers Society indicate a declining trend in the reporting
of gap data (McGuire, 1998). This trend is motivated by the increasing acceptance of the
view (forwarded by some bank managers) that gap is not a useful indicator of interest-rate
risk exposures because (i) it is a static measure of exposure that does not capture growth or
changes in the asset and liability mix, and (ii) it ignores options embedded in financial
instruments. The extent to which these limitations compromise the association between
gap data and changes in net interest income is an empirical question that has not been
directly addressed in prior studies.
Our primary tests examine the relation between one-year-gap measures and the one-
year-ahead change in net interest income. We are attempting to understand if, on
average, the ex ante gap is helpful in predicting the future changes in net interest
income. We focus on the one-year-ahead changes in net interest income because they are
less likely to be affected by the static nature of the gap disclosures or the embedded
options in financial instruments than are longer-run changes. We perform this analysis
for each year in our sample separately and we perform a pooled analysis by interacting
the one-year gap with the appropriate change in interest rate for each year. In addition to
the one-year horizon tests, we also examine the relation between one-to-five-year gap
measures and longer-horizon changes in net interest income three years ahead and five
years ahead.
The unit of analysis in this paper is the bank; most of these banks are held by publicly traded bank holding
companies. The bank holding company data is not as refined; a better measure of risk exposure can be constructed
from the bank-level data.
We compute this variable by first finding each monthly value for the one-year change in the one-year rate,
then averaging these monthly values for the year. This method is a better indicator of the impact of rate changes
on instruments that reprice during the year. The rate change from January to December does not impact an
instrument that has a life from July to June.
A more negative change in rate than in our sample period occurs in only three years: 1982, 1983, and 1985,
and a more positive rate occurs in only five years: 1959, 1973, 1978, 1979, and 1981.
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Using bank-level data from regulaton filings (call reports), we find strong evidence of
a relanon between both the fixed and \ariable rate onc-ycar-on-balance-sheet matunt>-gap
and the one-year-ahead change in net interest income from 1990 to 1997. This result holds
with or without controls for the e.\ post growth in assets. ^'^ as well as for a competing set of
explanatory" variables (tlie amount of rate-sensitive assets and liabilities). Moreover, the
coefficients on maturit\'-gap measures in the annual cross-sectional regressions are
significantly positively correlated with interest-rate changes, although equalit>" of the
magnimde of the gap coefficients and interest-rate changes, which is implied b> theor> . is
rejected at conventional levels. In our pooled analysis, we find that. \\ ith the exception of
fi-xed-rate gap in periods of small interest-rate changes, these results hold for rate changes
that are positive or negative, that are large or small, and whether the > leld cur\e is
flattening or steepening. We also fmd that the results hold regardless of whether the bank
has interest rate deri\"ati\"es. is growing rapidly or slowl\-. has high or low prepa>"ment risk.
or has high or low withdrawal risk.
We find that one-year-gap measures are also related to longer-term changes in income.
In particular, even after controlling for the amount of rate-sensitive assets and liabilities.
the one-year fixed- and \ariable-rate gap are significantly associated \\ ith the three-> ear-
ahead change in net mterest mcome in all years. The association beuveen the three-year-
ahead change in net interest income and the longer-term interest-rate gap is significant in
only three of sLx years. Specifically, after controlling for both the one-year fixed- and
variable-rate gap and the amount of rate-sensitive assets and liabilities, the one-to-five-year
fixed-rate gap is significant in only one year, and the one-to-five->"ear \ariable-rate gap in
only two out of six years. This is not surprising given that the longer the horizon, the more
likely banks will change their asset liabilin.' mix.
Our findings have several implications for the SEC's market-nsk-disclosure require-
ments. First given the similarit\' between the matunrs-gap disclosures and the SEC"s
tabular disclosures, our findings mitigate concerns about the usefulness of SEC's tabular
market-risk disclosures. Second, our finding of an incremental association bet\veen
changes in net interest income and gap disclosures once the quantir\" of rate-sensitive
instruments is controlled for suggests that gap disclosures may provide additional
mfomiation beyond what is provided m the balance sheet. Third, the greater association
between three-year-ahead changes in net interest income and one-year gap relati\ e to one-
to-five-year gap suggests that the SEC's finer disclosures may be useftil. Fourth, the
decline in the significance of gap measures for longer-honzon changes in interest income
supports the SEC's focus on disclosure of near-temi exposures. Fifth, the difference
beuveen the coefficients on fixed- and variable-rate instruments of gap suppons the SEC's
requirement for separate disclosure of these amounts. Sixth, the lower association beuveen
changes in interest-income and on-balance-sheet gap disclosures for den\ati\e users
suggests that the SEC's requirement thai the effects of denvatues be mcorporated m
tabular disclosures mav be useful. Furthermore, our fmdinas sussest that the static namre
Net interest income changes are likely to be correlated with changes in assets. As we show in Section 3.
the change in net interest income can be decomposed into a component related to gap and a component related to
the ex post change in assets. Therefore, we include the ex post change in assets as a control variable. Our results
are not affected b\ the one-year lagged asset growth ex post change in assets as a control \ ariable.
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of gap disclosures and the lack of disclosure about embedded options do not totally
compromise the ability of gap to indicate banks' interest-rate risk exposures, contrary to
claims made by some bank managers. Perhaps most importantly, all of the previous
statements about our findings apply only to risk of changes in net interest income. What
this implies is that while maturity gap is a good disclosure for this risk, it might not be the
best disclosure for both the risk of changes in net interest income and the risk of changes in
equity prices.
Our study has several limitations. First, gap disclosures in bank call reports do not
reflect the impact of off-balance-sheet instruments. Despite this, we find that gap
disclosures have predictive power for the subset of banks that use interest rate derivatives.
Thus, incorporating off-balance-sheet instruments, as required by the SEC's market-risk-
disclosure requirements, should result in even more useful risk disclosures. Second, we use
a cross-sectional approach that ignores cross-sectional differences across banks (other than
the characteristics that we explicitly control for). Thus, our results should be viewed as
reflecting average effects across banks. Third, we focus on gap disclosures that are static
and therefore ignore dynamic rebalancing of banks' positions. Studying dynamic adjust-
ments may be a useful avenue for ftiture research. Finally, although there are similarities
between the regulatory gap measures and the SEC's tabular market-risk-disclosure
requirements, there are also differences and thus our evidence provides indirect support
for the SEC's disclosure requirements. Examining FRR 48 disclosures directly is another
fruitful avenue for future research.
Section 2 provides a description of the SEC's 1997 market-risk-disclosure require-
ments. We analyze how maturity gap is related to changes in net interest income in Section
3. Section 4 outlines our research design. We describe our sample in Section 5. Empirical
results are presented in Section 6 and the conclusion is provided in Section 7.
2. Background and description of disclosure requirements
In the 1990s, several corporate and noncorporate entities experienced substantial
losses as a result of their market-risk positions. Public concern over these losses led the
SEC to conduct a study during 1994 and 1995 to "(i) assess the quality of current
disclosures about market risk sensitive instruments, (ii) improve the quality of those
disclosure through the comment process, and (iii) determine what, if any, additional
disclosures are needed to help investors better assess the market risk inherent in those
instruments" (FRR 48, Section I). As part of this process, the SEC obtained comments
from several private sector organizations. Among the recommendations received was
one fi"om the Federal Reserve Bank of New York that suggested that quantitative
information about the overall market risk of an entity be required, and one fi^om the
Financial Executives Institute that suggested two distinct approaches to achieving that
objective. "One approach is to provide a high-level summary of relevant statistics about
outstanding activity in market risk sensitive instruments at period end. The second
approach is to communicate the potential loss that could occur under specified condition
using either value at risk or another comprehensive model for measuring market risk"
(FRR 48, Section II).
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The SEC determined that, although the reporting requirements under SFAS 119
improved disclosures in general, there were some remaining areas that needed improve-
ment. One of those areas was the disclosure of aggregate market-risk exposures inherent
in market-risk-sensitive instruments. Based on this assessment, in January of 1997, the
SEC issued new rules that require disclosure of quantitative information about market
risk. To provide flexibility that will "accommodate different types of registrants,
different degrees of market risk exposure, and alternative ways of measuring market
risk", (ERR 48, Section II) the SEC allows three, alternative methods of disclosing this
information about market risk. The three methods allowed are a tabular presentation,
sensitivity analysis, and value at risk. In the subsections below, we compare and contrast
the SEC's tabular market-risk-disclosure requirements with the market-risk disclosures
required by bank regulators in Regulatory call reports for on-balance-sheet and off-
balance-sheet instruments, respectively.
2.1. Disclosure requirements for on-balance-sheet instruments
The SEC's tabular format requires separate disclosures for financial instruments, in
both trading and nontrading portfolios, of information sufficient to determine fiiture
cash flows fi-om market-rate-sensitive instruments grouped by expected repricing or
maturity dates. Thus, the SEC disclosure requirements allow managers to adjust
contractual maturities for expected prepayments and withdrawals. This information
should be provided for each of the next five years and for any remaining years in an
aggregate amount. The market-rate-sensitive instruments should be grouped based on
common characteristics. Specifically, separate disclosure should be made for interest-
rate risk, foreign currency exchange rate risk, and commodity risk. Instruments that are
subject to interest-rate risk should be separated into those that are fixed rate versus
those that are variable rate.
Similar to the SEC requirements, the bank regulatory reports for the period
between 1989 and 1996 require that data for nontrading instruments be reported
separately and require separate reporting for fixed- versus variable-rate instruments.
However, the maturity buckets required for regulatory reporting purposes are some-
what different ft-om those required by the SEC. Specifically, in the regulatory reports,
banks must disclose assets and liabilities maturing in 90 days or fewer, between 90
days and one year, between one year and five years, and over five years. Therefore,
the two categories that are required by both the SEC and bank regulators are the less
than one-year category and the over five-year category. The intermediate categories
between one and five years required by the SEC cannot be reconstructed using the
regulatory data. In addition, for regulatory reporting purposes, the contractual repricing
or maturity date is used rather than the expected date considering prepayments and
withdrawals.
2.2. Disclosure requirements for off-balance-sheet instruments
The SEC's disclosure requirements for off-balance-sheet instruments are similar to the
SEC's disclosure requirements for on-balance-sheet instruments. In addition, the SEC
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requires receive fixed/pay variable interest rate swaps to be reported separately from
receive variable/pay fixed interest rate swaps.
The disclosures related to off-balance-sheet instruments required by bank regulators
during this period are not as extensive as what is required by the SEC. Swaps are the
primary off-balance-sheet instrument used by banks to manage interest-rate risk.
Beginning at the end of 1989, banks were required to report the notional value of
swaps maturing in less than one year and the amount maturing in more than one year.
However, the swaps are not separated by fixed rate versus variable rate and they are
not separated into trading and nontrading portfolios. Furthermore, with respect to other
derivatives, bank regulators require disclosure of notional values only. Therefore, the
regulatory disclosures are likely to be less informative about changes in net interest
income for swap users than the disclosures required by the SEC.
3. The relation bet^^een interest-rate gap and future changes in net interest income
hi this section, we discuss the association between interest-rate gap and changes in net
interest income. First, we illustrate the theoretical relation between the interest-rate gap
measures and changes in net interest income for variable-rate instruments. Next, we show
that given certain assumptions, the relation between gap and changes in net interest
income is similar for fixed- and variable-rate instruments. Finally, we discuss reasons why
these theoretical relations between variable- and fixed-rate gap and changes in net interest
income may not hold empirically.
3.]. Relation between future changes in net interest income and gap with only variable-
rate instruments
To see how the gap is related to the one-year-ahead change in net interest income
for a bank that only holds variable-rate instruments, consider a bank that has variable-
rate-sensitive instruments that reprice in one year, between one and five years, and in
more than five years. For simplicity, assume that the bank acquired these instruments
at the beginning of year t, that no instruments mature or are purchased or sold for two
years, that assets and liabilities have the same interest rate, and that all repricing occurs
in unison. With these assumptions, the net interest income for years t and /+ 1 are as
follows:
Nn„) = /-(i'ljGAP/,;,, + r,;;,_5,GAP(;;,„5, + r;;^^,)GAp;;_^,^ (i)
Nii(,+i) = r;;^,,fiAp;;,^ + r^;;,_5^GAP^;;,_3) + <>5)GaP([>5) (2)
where Nil,,, = net interest income for year /; r,',,/) = interest rate at the beginning of
,
year / on variable-rate instruments repricing in years; and GAP('vo = difference between
j
variable-rate assets and liabilities that reprice within M years that were acquired in
year /.
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The change in net interest income from year / to year r~ \ is:
Axii;.,, =Nn,_, -Nil, =';:, gap;;,) +r(^,_, GAP v,_5,+r^;:;>, GAP
;;>5,
- ('• lu GAP ;:, , + r,;:,_. GAP ;,_„ + r',^, GAP [^,^)
This reduces to:
^NII:-i.r =('\;-Ll)-<iJGAP^M, (3)
Thus, under these assumptions, the change in net interest uicome from penod r to
f-1 will equal the change in the one-year \anable interest rate multiplied by the one-
year G.AP at the beginning of year r. Eq. (3) illustrates assumptions under which there
should be a perfect correlation between \anable-rate gap repncmg in one year and
changes m one-year-ahead net interest income. In this equation, instruments repricing
in more than one year will not affect the one-year-ahead change in net interest
income.
The relation betA\"een longer-run changes in net interest income and gap will depend on
the extent to which instruments repnce m each \ear. For example, if all instruments that
repnce m one to fi\e \ears reprice in three years and \se assume no maturities, sales, or
purchases withm three years, then:
^^'"
.3: = (^(r+3.1) -''(u))gap(^,) -f- (r(r-^3.i-5) -'•,!:i-5))gap(M-5)
Without more retlned gap data, it is diftlcult to predict what the exact relation will be
beuveen further-ahead changes m net interest income and gap.
3.2. Relation between future changes in net interest income and gap with only fixed-rate
instruments
To see how the gap is related to the one-year-ahead change in net interest income
for a bank that only holds fixed-rate instruments, consider a bank that has fixed-rate-
sensitive instruments that mamre in one year, between one and fi\e \'ears. and in more
than five years. As for our \ariable rate instrument example, we assume that the bank
acquired these instruments at the beginning of year t. that no instruments are
purchased or sold for two years, that assets and liabilities have the same interest
rate, and that all mamriU" occurs in unison. Furthermore, we assume that when
instruments mature, they are replaced with the same quantiU' of instruments with the
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same original maturity.
'
' With these assumptions, the net interest income for years t
and t+l are as follows.
NIIw = r(^„GAP(^,) + r(;;,_5)GAP(^,_5) + ;-(^>5,GAP(^>5^ (4)
Nn(,+
,) = r(f^,,)GAP^^,) + r(^,,5,GAP,^,_5) + <>5)GAP(^>5) (5)
where NII(,) = net interest income for year t; r(,j^f) = interest rate at the beginning ofyear / on
fixed-rate instruments maturating in M years; and GAPF^,^^ = difference between fixed-
rate assets and liabilities that mature within M years that were acquired in year t.
The change in net interest income fi^om year / to year /+ 1 is:
ANII(,+i,, = NII(,+ „ - Nil,,) = <,)GAP(^„ + r,[,_5)GAP;;,_5) + <^5)GAP^^^5)
This reduces to:
ANU(,^,,)
=(<+,,,)- <.))gAP,^i) (6)
Thus, under these assumptions, the change in net interest income fi^om period t to
period t+ 1 will equal the change in the one-year interest rate multiplied by the one-year
GAP at the beginning of year t.
3.3. Theoretical versus empirical relation between changes in net interest income and gap
Eqs. (3) and (6) illustrate assumptions under which there should be a perfect correlation
between both fixed-rate and variable-rate gap maturing or repricing in one year and
changes in one-year-ahead net interest income. In each of these equations, the slope
coefficient on the one-year GAP variable will equal the change in one-year interest rates
eamed in year /+ 1 relative to year t. In these equations, assets and liabilities either
repricing or maturing in more than one year are irrelevant to the change in the one-year-
ahead net interest income.'^
Ifwe do not assume that the proceeds from maturities are reinvested, then the size of the bank will change,
and correspondingly, net interest income will change. No reinvestment does not seem like a reasonable
assumption.
With regards to risk of net interest income, Toevs (1983) defines all rate-sensitive assets as "those that
experience contractual changes in interest rates during the gapping period". He also states that the normal gapping
period is one year.
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Several complexities are not considered in deriving the previous equations that may
reduce the observed correlation between one-year gap and one-year-ahead changes in net
interest income.'^ First, these equations do not allow for changes in the mix of financial
instruments held and do not consider the effects offuture growth. Second, the actual maturity
or repricing within the time periods may vary widely. For example, within the group of
financial instruments that mature or reprice within one year, there could be a several-month
difference when the assets versus the liabilities mature or reprice. Third, variable-rate
instruments could be linked to different indices that do not move in tandem. For example,
some financial instruments repricing within one year might be linked to the prime rate while
others might be linked to the LIBOR rate. Furthermore, the instruments may have embedded
options, like prepayment options, that change their effective maturity or repricing. The effect
of loan prepayments is to increase the dollar value of assets maturing within one year and
thus to increase the one-year gap. Thus, in periods of significant decreases in interest rates,
gap may understate the true position ofthe bank. Similar to prepayment risk, banks face early
withdrawal risks in periods of increasing interest rates. The withdrawals are induced by the
attractiveness of higher rates on deposits. The effect of early withdrawals is to increase the
magnitude of liabilities maturing within one year. Therefore, the reported gap may overstate
the true gap in periods ofincreasing interest rates. To the extent that managers can predict the
effects of these embedded options, the SEC tabular disclosures—which account for
management's expectation in contrast to call report gap disclosures, which do not—will
not suffer from problems related to prepayments. Because prepayments and withdrawals
depend on changes in interest rates, they may be difficult to predict.
When we compare Eqs. (3) and (6), we see that the only theoretical difference in the
relation between changes in net interest income and gap for fixed- versus variable-rate
instruments arises fi^om potential differences in the change in the one-year variable rate
versus the one-year fixed rate. In deriving these equations, we assumed that both the
variable- and fixed-rate instruments were acquired in the previous year. Without this
assumption, differences in the change in variable versus fixed rates are likely to occur
because the change in the effective rate on fixed-rate instruments will be the change in the
rate from the time the instrument was acquired, while the change in the rate on the variable-
rate instruments will be the change in the rate since the last repricing date. It is likely that the
fixed-rate instruments will have rate changes over a one-year or greater horizon, while the
variable-rate instruments will have a less than one-year horizon. Furthermore, the empirical
complexities not considered in deriving Eqs. (3) and (6) may cause additional differences in
this relation for fixed- versus variable-rate instruments. We expect that this would be
particularly true if the makeup of the fixed- and variable-rate gap components differ.
While the preceding discussion only relates to interest-rate risk and the financial
instruments that give rise to that risk, many of the features of our models will translate to
commodity and foreign exchange risk, as well as derivatives of all of these risks. The
important research question we are interested in is does the financial reporting of these risks
inform about the future income that is derived, based on current positions in risky assets and
liabilities.
'^ Survey data in McGuire (1998) suggests a decrease in the number of banks reporting gap data in their
annual reports because of these alleged limitations.
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4. Research design
4.1. Association between one-year-ahead changes in net interest income and gap
To test whether gap disclosures are associated with one-year-ahead changes in net
interest income, despite empirical complexities that may weaken this theoretical relation,
we estimate the following model based on Eqs. (3) and (6):
ANn(,+i.,)/Assets,,, = a + jSfGAP(^,^/Assets^,) + ^j GAP^',',yAssetS(,)
-f 71 (AssetS(,^i ) — AssetS(,))/AssetS(,^ + e (7)
where ANII,,^ n = net interest income for year /+ 1 less net interest income for year /;
GAPF,,j/^ = difference between fixed-rate assets and liabilities that mature within A/ years
that were acquired at the end of year t: GAP/, \/)= difference betsveen fixed-rate assets and
liabilities that reprice within M years that were acquired at the end of >'ear t: and
Assets,,) = total assets at the end of year t.
We include an intercept term in our regression model to capture misspecifications due
to empirical complexities not captured in the theoretical model. To the extent that omitted
factors are uncorrelated with our gap variables, the coefficients on the gap variables will be
unaffected by their omission and the intercept term will capture the effect of these
omissions. We also include an asset-growth variable to capture changes in bank size. In
sensitivity tests, we examine other possible proxies for growth, including growth in net
rate-sensitive assets as well as the lagged growth in total and net rate-sensiti\e assets.
None of these substitutions make a material change in test results.
We expect the sign of the coefficient on the one-year variable-rate GAP variable in
Eq. (7) in any gi\en year should be the same as the sign of the a^erage change in the
one-year interest rate, because the weighted average repricing of \ariable rate instru-
ments is slightly less than one year. We expect the sign of the coefficient on the one-
year fixed-rate GAP \ariable in Eq. (7) in any given year should be the same as the sign
of the a\'erage change in the two-year interest rate, given a weighted a\erage maturit>' of
fixed-rate instruments of two years. We test these predictions by estimating Eq. (7) for
each year in our sample.
We further expect that the magnitude of the coefficients on the one-year GAP
\ariables in Eq. (7) will be positively correlated with changes in the interest rates
obser\'ed in the year. We test this prediction by examining the correlations between the
coefficients from our annual estimations of Eq. (7) with the corresponding changes in
interest rates for each period. The results from the previous tests are presented in
Tables 2 and 4.
4.2. Incremental association between one-year-ahead changes in net interest income and
gap
To further examine whether there is an incremental association between gap
disclosures and one-year-ahead changes in net interest income beyond that pro\ided
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by the amount of rate-sensitive instruments, we estimate the following expanded version
of Eq. (7):
ANII(,+i,,)/AssetS(,j = a + ^fGAP('^,j/AssetS(,^ + ft\ G^\P('^ij/AssetS(,)
+ /[ (AssetS(,_Li) — AssetS(,))/AssetS(,)
+ 72SecuritieS(,)/AssetS(,) + y3LoanS(,)/AssetS{,j
+ 74T-Deposits,,yAssetS(,)
+ 75D-DepositS(,^/AssetS(,) + e (8)
where ANII(, + i , = net interest income for year / + 1 less net interest income for year t\
GAPF(,^v/) = difference between fixed-rate assets and liabilities that mature withinM years
that were acquired at the end of year /; GAP,' \/^) = difference between fixed-rate assets and
habilities that reprice within M years that were acquired at the end of year t; and
Assets,,) = total assets at the end of year t; Securities,,) = total amount of investments in
securities at the end of year /; Loans,,) = total amount of loans at the end of year t; T-
Deposits,,) = total amount of time deposits at the end of year t\ D-Deposits,,) = total amount
of demand deposits at the end of year /.
We expect the coefficients on the one-year gap variables to be the same in Eq. (8) as in
Eq. (7) if there is information in the gap disclosures beyond what could be learned fi'om
merely knowing the balance-sheet amounts of rate-sensitive instruments. The results fi"om
these tests are presented in Tables 3 and 4.
4.3. Cross-sectional and time-series differences in the association between one-year-
ahead changes in net interest income and gap
To examine whether the empirical association between gap and changes in interest
income is closer to the theoretical one for certain interest-rate environments, we split our
sample periods into those with positive versus negative interest-rate changes, those with
large versus small absolute values of interest-rate changes, and those with steepening versus
flattening yield curves. Although these differences in interest rate enviroimient do not lead to
theoretical differences in the association between gap and changes in net interest income,
empirically they may lead to difference because they may be related to the empirical
complexities that we have discussed. Specifically, these different interest rate environments
may be related to changes in product mix, growth, or the extent ofprepayments. These time-
series comparisons, therefore, provide an alternative to the cross-sectional comparisons as a
way of assessing the importance of these empirical complexities. Given our limited number
of time-series observations, we test for differences between these groups using a pooled
cross-sectional and time-series regression. Instead of using gap measures as independent
variables, we use the product of our gap measures and the appropriate interest-rate changes
to allow us to combine multiple years in a single regression. The results for this test are
presented in Table 5.
We examine the importance of complexities not considered in deriving the theoretical
relation between gap and changes in net interest income by examining whether the
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correlation between the estimated coefficients from Eq. (7) and tlie changes in interest
rates are lower for banks where these complexities are more pronounced. We first
allow the coefficients to vary for those banks that hold any type of interest-rate
derivative because these derivatives are not accounted for in our gap measures. Next,
to assess problems that arise because of the static nature of gap, we compare high-
versus low-growth banks, and banks that face higher risk or prepayment of fixed-rate
loans, and those with a higher risk of early withdrawal of deposits. We count as a
high-growth bank those whose total asset growth is above the median in each year of
our sample (the cutoff ranged between 0.0323 in 1994 and 0.0682 in 1995). Banks
whose ratio of fixed-rate loans with maturity greater than five-years-to-assets was
above the median (0.0295) were identified as ones that have a higher risk of
prepayment. Banks that had demand deposits to assets above the median (0.1186)
were labeled as high risk of early withdrawal. The results for this test are presented in
Table 6.
4.4. Association between three- and Jive-year-ahead changes in net interest income and
gap
To examine the importance of longer-run gap disclosures, we examine the relation
between one-to-five-year gap measures and both three- and five-year-ahead changes in net
interest income. We examine the three-year change because that is the average maturity of
financial instruments in the one-to-five-year gap measure and we examine the five-year
change because it is the longest maturity in that measure. We examine these relations by
estimating the following equations:
ANII(,+3 ,)AssetS(,) = a + ^{'GAPj'^,) /Assets;,) + fi\ GAP,', ,, /AssetS(,)
+ i?,'L5GAP,;,_5)/AssetS(,) -f- i9,'l5GAP(^;,_5)/AssetS(„
+ )'i (AssetS(,_|.i) — AssetS(,))/AssetS(,) -I- £ (9)
ANII(,+ ,)/AssetS(,) = a + ^fGAP^^iVAssetS;,) + ^j^'GAP,'',, /AssetS(,)
+ /?f:5GAP,^;,_3yAssetS(,) + iS,':5GAP(;;,_5)/AssetS(,)
-I- 7] (AssetS(,+i) — AssetS(,)) /AssetS(,) + y2SecuritieS(,)
/AssetS(,) + }'3LoanS(,) /AssetSf,) + }'4(T-DepositS(,))
/AssetS(,) + }'5 (D-DepositS(,))/AssetS(,) -I- e (10)
Theoretically, the coefficients on the gap variables in these equations should be similar
to those in Eq. (7). However, we expect that the associations will become weaker for
further-ahead changes in net income because the discrepancies between the theoretical
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versus empirical relations are expected to be greater for the further-ahead changes. The
results for these tests are presented in Tables 7, 8, and 9.
5. Sample and descriptive statistics
5.1. Sample
Our sample is drawn from all commercial banks that filed a Report of Condition and
Income (call report) with the Federal Reserve, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, or
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency from 1989 through 1997. We focus on this
period because information about the maturity of fixed-rate instruments and the repricing
frequency of variable-rate instruments was not required in the call reports prior to 1989.
Furthermore, after 1996, maturities of fixed-rate instruments and repricing of variable-rate
instruments were combined rather than reported separately.'"*
5.2. Descriptive statistics
Fig. 1 provides information about the levels and changes in interest rates that occurred
during our sample period. The rates used in computing the changes are an average of the
rate reported at the end of each month during the year. For each rate, the length of the
change examined corresponds to the rate period; that is, we report the one-year change in
the one-year rate, and the five-year change in the five-year rate. In six of the eight years,
the sign of the interest-rate change is the same for both the one- and the two-year rates; in
those years, we expect that the correlation between the one-year maturity gap and the one-
year change in net interest income will be the same as the sign of the interest-rate changes.
In two of the eight years, the signs on the interest-rate changes are not the same for the
one- and two-year rates. In these years, we expect that the sign of the correlation between
the maturity gap and the change in net interest income will depend on the original maturity
or repricing of the securities. Because most variable instruments reprice within one year,
we expect the sign of the correlation between gap and the change in net interest income to
be the same as the sign of the change in the one-year rate for variable-rate instruments. The
average, original maturity of the fixed-rate instruments is unknown, but it appears that for
fixed-rate assets, it is longer than one year because of the persistent positive gap in the
one-to-five-year maturity bucket. Therefore, we expect the sign of the correlation between
gap and the change in net interest income to be the same as the sign of the change in the
two-year rate for fixed-rate instiiiments.
Table 1 presents cross-sectional mean values of the one-year-ahead change in net
interest income, change in total assets, one-year maturity gap measured at the beginning of
the year (Total Gap), and its fixed- and variable-rate components for each year. All gap
measures are based on contractual maturity or repricing dates. The beginning-of-the-year
''* We were able to provide evidence for 1997 because the gap measures used in the tests are based on the
beginning-of-the-year gap positions.
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Table 1
Year
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
0.0030 0.0030 0.0035 0.0041
0.0575 0.0953 0.0928 0.1001
0.1330 0.1383 0.1194 0.0826
-0.0883 -0.0955 -0.1125 -0.1288
0.2212 0.2337 0.2319 0.2114
10,189 9642 9178 8690
0.0129 0.0143
(A) Means of variables for total sample
One-year change 0.0027 0.0032 0.0054 0.0024
in net interest
income
One-year change 0.0859 0.0690 0.0721 0.0618
in assets
One-year total 0.0514 0.0317 0.0438 0.0925
gap
One-year fixed -0.1420 -0.1631 -0.1533 -0.1171
gap
One-year variable 0.1934 0.1949 0.1970 0.2095
gap
Number of 11,842 11,465 11,125 10,695
observations
Three-year 0.0204 0.0134 0.0135 0.0112
change in net
interest Income
Three-year 0.4410 0.2587 0.2545 0.2866 0.3273 0.3765
change
in assets
One-to-five-year. 0.2599 0.2702 0.2792 0.2935
total gap
One-to-five-year 0.2513 0.2608 0.2683 0.2800
fixed gap
One-to-five-year, 0.0086 0.0094 0.0109 0.0136
variable gap
Number of 10,856 10,485 10,081 9537
observations
(B) Means of variables for the portion of the sample that does not use any type of interest-rate derivatives
0.2991 0.3184
0.2830 0.2993
0.0162 0.0191
9023 8507 i
One-year change N/A 0.0032 0.0054 0.0023 0.0030 0.0030 0.0035 0.0041
in net interest
income
One-year change N/A 0.0695 0.0728 0.0609 0.0551 0.0950 0.0920 0.0984
in assets
One-year total N/A 0.0272 0.0385 0.0867 0.1262 0.1313 0.1140 0.0773
gap
One-year fixed N/A -0.1630 -0.1539 -0.1181 - 0.0895 - 0.0968 -0.1129 -0.1293
gap
One-year N/A 0.1903 0.1924 0.2048 0.2158 0.2281 0.2268 0.2066
variable gap
Number of N/A 10,994 10,646 10.219 9639 9166 8780 8360
observations
Three-year N/A 0.0132 0.0135 0.0110 0.0127 0.0140
change in net
interest income
Three-year N/A 0.2579 0.2515 0.2795 0.3188 0.3700
change in
assets
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Table 1 {continued)
Year
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
0.3019 0.3221
0.2857 0.3030
0.0162 0.0191
8659 8221
(B) Means of variables for the portion of the sample that does not use any type of interest-rate derivatives
One-to-five-year N/A 0.2725 0.2823 0.2968
total gap
One-to-five-year N/A 0.2631 0.2713 0.2833
fixed gap
One-to-five-year N/A 0.0094 0.0110 0.0135
variable gap
Number of N/A 10,087 9661 9147
observations
(C) Means of variables for the portion of the sample that uses (any of) interest-rate swaps, interest-rate
futures or forwards, or interest-rate options
One-year change N/A 0.0030 0.0056 0.0031* 0.0029 0.0034 0.0041 0.0049
in net interest
income
One-year change N/A 0.0556* 0.0562* 0.0828** 0.1017** 0.0998 0.1108* 0.1424**
in assets
One-year total gap N/A 0.1375**0.1632** 0.2161** 0.2585** 0.2719** 0.2403**0.2154**
One-year fixed N/A -0.1653 -0.1392* -0.0952** -0.0647** -0.0710** -0.1040 -0.1158
gap
One-year variable N/A 0.3028** 0.3024** 0.3113** 0.3232** 0.3429** 0.3443** 0.3312**
gap
Number of N/A 471 479 476 520 476 398 330
observations
Three-year change N/A 0.0163* 0.0153 0.0154* 0.0185* 0.0208
in net interest
income
Three-year change N/A 0.2773 0.3218* 0.4540** 0.5303** 0.5621**
in assets
One-to-five-year N/A 0.2124** 0.2085** 0.2173** 0.2330** 0.2108**
total gap
One-to-five-year N/A 0.2019** 0.1984** 0.2021** 0.2171** 0.1928**
fixed gap
One-to-five-year N/A 0.0106 0.0101 0.0152 0.0158 0.0180
variable gap
Number of N/A 398 420 390 364 286
observations
Variable definitions: change in net interest income (Nil) is Nil,,, — Nil,, _
i
) scaled by total assets at the beginning
of the year {A,). Change in assets {A) is {A,+
i
-A^IA,. Total gap is the difference between the total rate-sensitive
assets and the total rate-sensitive liabilities maturing or repricing in less than one year. This is measured at the
beginning of the year and scaled by A,. Fixed gap is the difference between the fixed-rate-sensitive assets and the
fixed-rate-sensitive liabilities maturing or repricing in less than one year. This is measured at the beginning of the
year and scaled hy A,. Variable gap is the difference between the variable-rate-sensitive assets and the variable-
rate-sensitive liabilities maturing or repricing in less than one year This is measured at the beginning of the year
and scaled by A,
.
N/A—The call reports do not contain information on interest-rate derivative holdings before 12/31/90.
* Indicates that value is significantly different for derivative users versus nonusers at the 5% level.
** Indicates that value is significantly different for derivative users versus nonusers at the 1% level.
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total assets deflates each variable.'" For example, the 1990 mean one-year-maturity gap
(0.05) is the one-year-maturity gap at the beginning of 1990 scaled by total assets at the
same time. Similarly, the 1990 mean change in net interest income (0.0027) is the
difference in net interest income for 1990 and 1989 scaled by total assets at the beginning
of 1990.
The mean total gap ranges from a low of 3.2% of total assets in 1991 to 13.8% of total
assets in 1995. The fixed gap positions of banks are on-average negative whereas the
variable gap positions are on-average positive. The mean one-year variable and total gap
for derivative users is significantly greater (a<.01) than for nonusers in every year. This
does not necessarily mean that derivative users have positions that are more speculative
because their derivative positions potentially offset their on-balance-sheet positions (see
Ahmed, Beatty, & Bettinghaus, 1999; Gorton & Rosen, 1995). The insignificant difference
in the one-year change in net interest income between derivative users and nonusers in
every year except 1993 is consistent with the derivative positions offsetting the on-
balance-sheet gap.
The one-year-maturity-gap variable represents debt securities (such as Treasury Bills or
Government bonds) and loans maturing in one year minus the time deposits, subordinated
debt, and limited-life capital instruments maturing in one year. Total gap is the sum of
fixed gap and variable gap. Thus, for 1990, the mean total gap of 5% consists of — 14%
fixed gap and 19% variable gap. The different signs on fixed-and variable-rate gap
measures are driven by the differences in the level of fixed-rate time deposits compared to
variable-rate time deposits. On average, the banks in our sample have 10% of their assets
supported by fixed-rate time deposits maturing in less than one year, and only 0.2% of
their assets supported by variable-rate time deposits maturing or repricing in less than one
year. There are also differences on the assets side of the balance sheet. On average, the
banks in our sample held 18.6% of their assets as variable-rate loans maturing or repricing
in less than one year, while holding only 13.6% as fixed-rate loans maturing in less than
one year.
We also present the mean values of variables used in our longer-term tests. For those
banks that have three-year-ahead data, we present the three-year change in net interest
income and the three-year change in assets, along with the total, fixed- and variable-gap
measures in the one-to-five-year maturity bucket. All of these gap measures are positive,
with the fixed-rate instruments being the major portion of the total gap, and the variable
rate maturity gap being close to zero. Table 1, Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for
the fiiU sample, whereas Panels B and C present the descriptive statistics for banks that do
not use interest-rate derivatives and banks that do, respectively. The magnitude of on-
balance one-to-five-year fixed and total gap for derivative users is significantly (a< .001)
larger than for nonusers in each year. Again, this does not imply that derivative users have
larger net gap positions, although the three-year change in net interest income is
significantly (a < .05) higher for derivative users than for nonderivative users in four of
the five years examined. However, these are not independent observations, given the
overlap in the measurement of the three-year change in net interest income.
15 As an alternative deflator, we used total rate-sensitive assets instead of total assets. The results are not
sensitive to the choice of deflator.
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Table 1 also shows that there is a general decline in the number of banks due to
consolidation in the banking industry through mergers and acquisitions. Interestingly,
despite this overall decline, there is an increase in the number of derivative users over the
period 1991-1994.
6. Results
6.7. Relation between one-year-gap measures and one-year-ahead change in net interest
income
Table 2 presents results for annual cross-sectional regressions with fixed- and variable-
rate components of gap. We expect the sign of the coefficient on fixed gap to be consistent
with the sign of the change in two-year interest rates and the sign of the coefficient on
variable gap to be the same as the sign of the change in one-year rates. We find that in five
out of eight years, the sign of the coefficient on fixed gap is the same as the sign of the
two-year change in the two-year rates and is significant at the 0.01% level. The absolute
value of the two-year interest-rate changes in these five years is the largest of the eight,
with the smallest absolute change during these five years being more than six times larger
than the largest absolute change in the three years when the coefficients are insignificant.
Table 2
Results of annual cross-sectional regressions for the full sample
Year
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Predicted sign + — — — + + — —
on fixed gap
Predicted sign - - - - + + - +
on variable
gap
Intercept 0.0003 0.0013 0.0032 0.0003 0.0000 -0.0009 0.0011 0.0006
(2.48) (10.51) (23.89) (2.19) (0.21) (-6.62) (7.52) (4.96)
Fixed gap -0.0011 - 0.0068 - 0.0077 -0.0016 0.0039 0.0091 -0.0001 - 0.0000
(-1.81) (-9.30) (-11.28) (-2.10) (6.41) (14.86) (-0.18) ( - 0.06)
Variable gap - 0.0007 - 0.0053 - 0.0055 0.0004 0.0069 0.0088 -0.0014 0.0022
(-1.40) ( - 7.06) ( - 7.90) (0.64) (12.81) (16.61) (-1.92) (2.84)
Change in 0.0284 0.0269 0.0297 0.0295 0.0307 0.0285 0.0294 0.0297
assets (28.91) (31.07) (33.36) (32.91) (31.37) (31.50) (29.23) (27.74)
Adjusted Fr .3053 .2540 .2850 .2671 .3355 .3127 .2834 .3377
T for 0.68 5.10 11.97 8.95 28.67 0.18 4.69 12.56
Fix = Var
Pr>z' (0.4111) (0.0240) (0.0005) (0.0028) (< 0.0001) (0.6685) (0.0303) (0.0004)
\' 11,842 11.465 11,125 10,695 10,189 9642 9178 8690
The dependent variable in each panel is the one-year-ahead change in net interest income. The independent
variables are the fixed and variable components of total gap and the change in total assets. Beginning-of-year total
assets scales all variables. White-corrected / statistics are in parentheses, following the coefficient estimates.
P values follow the /"values for the /"tests.
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In six of eight years, tiie sign of the coefficient on variable gap is consistent with the
average change in one-year rates and is significant at the 0.01% level.
Because the changes in rates on the fixed-rate instruments generally differ fi"om
changes in rates on variable-rate instruments (due to the differences in average
maturity), we expect the coefficients on fixed gap and variable gap to differ. Table
2 shows the chi-squared test statistic and the associated significance levels for testing
the equality of the coefficients on fixed gap and variable gap. The test statistics
indicate that the equality is rejected at conventional levels in each year except 1990
and 1995. Therefore, decomposing total gap into fixed- and variable-rate components
provides potentially useful information.
In theory, the coefficient on the gap measures should be equal to the change in the
appropriate interest rates. This implies that, over time, changes in interest rates should be
positively correlated with the coefficients on gap. To provide evidence on this prediction,
we examine correlations between our estimated coefficients on gap measures and the
magnitude of the various interest-rate changes. In Table 4, Panel A, we report the
correlations between the interest-rate changes in Fig. 1 and the coefficients on the fixed-
and variable-maturity gap from Table 2. The coefficients on fixed gap are most highly
correlated with the average two-year change in the two-year rate, whereas the coefficients
on variable gap are most highly correlated with the average one-year change in the one-
year rate.
Overall, the evidence provides strong support for the hypothesis that one-year-gap
measures are associated with one-year-ahead changes in net interest income across periods
with different levels and signs of interest-rate movements.'^
6.2. Usefulness ofgap after controllingfor the level ofrate-sensitive assets and liabilities
The tests discussed above provide strong support for the hypothesis that gap measures
are associated with future changes in net interest income after controlling for the ex post
change in assets. However, they do not provide evidence on whether gap measures are
incrementally useful after controlling for other potential explanatory variables of changes
in net interest income, such as the level of rate-sensitive assets and liabilities. To see if one-
year-gap measures are incrementally associated after controlling for the level of rate-
sensitive assets and liabilities, we repeat our tests ft^om Table 2 with the beginning-of-year
demand deposits, time deposits, securities, and loans (all deflated by total assets) as
additional explanatory variables. This information is publicly available and therefore is
potentially useful in explaining changes in net interest income.
Table 3 provides evidence on the incremental useftilness of fixed- and variable-rate
components of one-year gap. The coefficients on fixed-rate gap are significant at the
0.01% level, having the correct sign, in seven out of eight years. In 1990, the coefficient
on the fixed-gap variable does not have the predicted sign. The coefficients on variable-
rate gap also are significant at the 0.01% level, having the correct sign, in seven out of
We further examine the importance of differences in the association between gap and future changes in net
interest income across different levels and signs of interest-rate movements in the sensitivity-analysis section
below.
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Table 3
Results of annual cross-sectional regressions for the full sample
Year
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Predicted sign + - - - + + - -
on fixed gap
Predicted sign - - - - + + - +
on variable
gap
Intercept 0.0098 0.0041 -0.0015 - 0.0022 0.0053 0.0056 0.0051 0.0054
(4.06) (1.60) ( - 0.62) (-1.12) (3.77) (2.47) (2.67) (3.70)
Fixed gap - 0.0034 - 0.0072 -0.0081 - 0.0023 0.0032 0.0081 -0.0018 -0.0017
(-5.59) (-9.94) ( - 12.40) (-2.63) (4.83) (11.79) (-2.91) (-2.13)
Variable gap - 0.0034 - 0.0064 -0.0075 -0.0016 0.0062 0.0084 - 0.0038 0.0008
(-5.29) (-7.78) (-10.26) (-2.10) (9.69) (13.28) (-5.41) (1.06)
Change in 0.0274 0.0265 0.0293 0.0289 0.0302 0.0280 0.0286 0.0290
assets (30.11) (33.22) (33.05) (32.03) (30.29) (30.05) (28.84) (26.80)
D-Deposits -0.0104 -0.0161 - 0.0033 0.0023 0.0050 0.0056 - 0.0065 - 0.0023
(-3.56) ( - 4.64) (-1.06) (0.83) (2.65) (2.48) (-2.84) (-1.07)
T-Deposits -0.0129 - 0.0076 -0.0017 0.0010 0.0022 0.0006 -0.0073 - 0.0027
(-5.28) (-2.66) (-0.67) (0.37) (1.34) (0.28) (-3.97) (-2.20)
Securities 0.0001 0.0048 0.0056 - 0.0006 -O.OIOl - 0.0088 0.0002 - 0.0055
(0.12) (4.09) (4.15) (-0.62) (-9.22) (-4.83) (0.13) (-3.83)
Loans 0.0033 0.0069 0.0096 0.0041 - 0.0078 - 0.0087 0.0045 - 0.0028
(2.54) (5.43) (6.26) (2.71) (-6.08) (-4.50) (2.64) (-1.78)
Adjusted R' .3259 .2775 .2984 .2756 .3516 .3250 .2957 .3426
7' for 0.00 1.52 0.85 0.86 27.34 0.31 10.98 14.24
Fix = Var
Pr>/- (0.95239) (0.2180) (0.3577) (0.3533) (< 0.0001) (0.5766) (0.0009) (0.0002)
N 11,842 11,465 11.125 10.695 10.189 9642 9178 8690
The dependent variable in each panel is the one-year-ahead change in net interest income. The independent
variables are the fixed and variable components of total gap, change in total assets, and the amount of rate-
sensitive financial instruments. Beginning-of-year total assets scales all variables. White-corrected / statistics are
in parentheses, following the coefficient estimates. P values follow the /values for the /tests.
Variable definitions—In addition to the variables that are as defmed in Table 1, the following variables are added:
D-Deposits is the total value of demand deposits held at the beginning of the year and scaled by total assets. T-
Deposits is the total value of time deposits held at the beginning of the year and scaled by total assets. Securities is
the total amount of securities held at the beginning of the year and scaled by total assets. Loans is the total amount
of total loans and leases held at the beginning of the year and scaled by total assets.
eight years. The coefficient is insignificant in 1997. An F test for the incremental
explanatory power of the gap variables is rejected in every year. These results suggest
that there is an incremental association between the gap variables and changes in net
interest income after controlling for the amount of interest-sensitive instruments reported
in the financial statements.
We also repeat the correlation tests to determine if the magnitude of the coefficients is
consistent with the magnitude of the changes in interest-rate changes after the addition of
the new control variables. In Table 4, Panel B, we report the correlations between the
interest-rate changes in Fig. 1 and the coefficients on the total, fixed, and variable maturity
gap from Table 3. These correlations are quite similar to those based on the Table 2
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Table 4
Chglyear Chg2year
(A) Pearson con-elation coefficients between the coefficients on the one-year-gap variables from the model in
Table 2 and the average changes in interest rates found in Fig. 1. There are eight observations in the sample
and all coirelations are significant at the < 0.01 le\'el
Fixed gap .8556 .9179
Variable gap .9229 .8576
(B) Pearson correlation coefficients between the coefficients on the one-year-gap variables fiom the model in
Table 3 and the average changes in interest rates found in Fig. 1. There are eight obserx'ations in the sample
and all correlations are significant at the < 0.01 le\'el
Fixed gap .8562 .8820
Variable gap .9044 .8423
estimates. Both the one- and two-year changes in rates are significantly correlated with the
coefficients.
Overall, the combination of Tables 3 and 4, Panel B, suggests that gap measures do
have incremental explanatory power beyond the amount of rate-sensitive assets and
Uabilities.'^
6.3. Cross-sectional and time-series differences in the association between changes in net
interest income and gap
The tests reported above are based on annual cross-sectional regressions. An
alternative specification is to use a pooled cross-sectional time-series regression with
fixed-firm and time effects. Instead of using gap measures as independent variables, we
use the product of gap measures and the appropriate change in interest rates as the
independent variable. If the change in interest rates captures the true change in rates on
the assets/liabilities that are maturing, then the coefficient on the product of gap
measures and the appropriate change in interest rates should be equal to one in every
period. By allowing us to combine all of the years being examined in a single
regression model, this specification provides several advantages over the year-by-year
analysis.
The motivation for this is threefold. First, this specification allows for a direct test of the
extent to which the observed average changes in the respective interest rates capture the
unobserved true changes in the relevant interest rates. Second, using this design, we can
allow the coefficients to vary across different interest-rate environments and across
I
The tests discussed so far include both derivative users and nonusers. However, on-balance-sheet gap
measures are unlikely to measure the true gap position of banks that use interest rate derivatives. Furthermore,
other variables, such as notional or fair value of derivatives, might also be relevant in explaining changes in future
net interest income for derivative users. Therefore, we repeat our tests for the subsample of banks that use interest-
rate derivatives (results not tabulated). The short-term tests on just the sample of banks that hold any type of
interest-rate derivative reveal a lower association between these banks' on-balance-sheet gap and fiiture changes
in net interest income. For the derivative users, the fixed-rate maturity gap is significant for only one out of seven
years, while the variable rate gap is significant in three out of seven years. These findings lend support for the
SEC's decision to include the effect of any interest-rate derivative holdings in the tabular market-risk disclosures.
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different types of banks. Third, the combined regression will be more powerful than an
individual annual regression, because the number of observations is roughly seven times
greater than in any one of those regressions, and the use of fixed-firm effects allows us to
control for potential bank-specific differences that cannot be controlled for in annual
regressions, which allows us to deal directly with the issue that the annual regressions may
not be independent.
We report the results of the pooled regressions that allow for differences in interest-
rate environments in Table 5. The differing rate environments that we control for are rate
changes that are positive or negative, and/or large or small, and whether the yield curve
is flattening or steepening. We find that the coefficients on both the fixed- and variable-
gap measures are significant and positive in all cases except for the fixed-gap measure
when there is a small change in interest rates. The coefficient on the fixed-gap measure
is significantly lower when changes in interest rates are small and when the yield curve
is flattening. In contrast, the coefficient on the variable-gap measure is significantly
higher when interest-rate changes are small. Although the coefficients are generally
different ft^om zero, we can consistently reject their equality to one.
We report the results of the pooled regressions that allow for differences across
different types of banks in Table 6. The broad classes of cross-sectional differences we
control for include whether the bank has interest-rate derivatives, is growing rapidly or
Table 5
Results of pooled cross-sectional, fixed-firm, and time-effects regressions
Intercept 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002
(5.69) (5.54) (6.58) (5.78) (4.64)
Fixed gap x Chg2year 0.2604 0.2584 0.2551 0.3135 0.4859
(24.96) (10.13) (24.26) (20.47) (11.92)
NEG fixed gap x 0.0048 -0.2122
Chg2year (0.15) (-5.05)
SMALL fixed - 0.7254 -1.1009
gap X Chg2year (-2.81) (-4.03)
FLAT fixed gap x -0.1203 -0.1433
Chg2year (-5.54) (-5.15)
Var gap x Chglyear 0.2961 0.2738 0.2886 0.3345 0.1539
(19.08) (10.53) (18.55) (13.03) (1.04)
NEG var gap x 0.0360 0.2212
Chglyear (0.87) (1.43)
SMALL var gap x 0.2928 0.3589
Chglyear (8.37) (8.75)
FLAT var gap x -0.0611 0.0249
Chg 1 year (-1.53) (0.18)
Change in assets 0.0227 0.0227 0.0227 0.0227 0.0227
(66.45) (66.48) (66.52) (66.59) (66.62)
Adjusted R' .1935 .1935 .1945 .1940 .1955
The number of observations for all models is 80,826. The dependent variable is the one-year change in net interest
income. Independent variables are gap measures interacted with changes in interest rates. The fixed-firm effects
are implemented by adjusting both the independent and dependent variables by the time-series mean for each
bank to control for differences across banks. Fixed-effects year-dummies (which are not presented) are included to
control for changes across time. The White-adjusted / statistics are in parentheses, following the coefficients.
Coefficients in bold type are significant at a level of <0.10.
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Table 6
Results of pooled cross-sectional, fixed-firm, and time-effects regressions
Intercept 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006
(10.54) (10.27) (10.01) (10.23) (10.37)
Fixed gap x Chg2year 0.2599 0.2807 0.2364 0.2500 0.2717
(23.57) (21.54) (16.08) (17.41) (16.07)
IRD X Fixed gap x - 0.0325 -0.0315
Chg2year (-0.48) (-0.47)
GROW x Fixed - 0.0604 - 0.0635
gap X Chg2year (-3.27) (-3.35)
PREPAY X Fixed gap x 0.0243 0.0297
Chg2year (1.31) (1.57)
WITHDRAW X Fixed gap x -0.0021 0.0108
Chg2year (-0.12) (0.60)
Var gap x Chglyear 0.3481 0.3427 0.3314 0.2989 0.3633
(21.61) (18.46) (15.23) (14.32) (15.26)
IRD X Var gap x - 0.2800 - 0.2707
Chglyear (-4.90) (-4.67)
GROW x Var gap x - 0.0465 - 0.0592
Chglyear (-2.08) (-2.62)
PREPAY x Var gap x - 0.0391 - 0.0202
Chglyear (-1.77) (-0.88)
WITHDRAW X Var gap x 0.0322 0.0416
Chglyear (1.39) (1.80)
Change in assets 0.0226 0.0226 0.0226 0.0226 0.0227
(61.00) (59.52) (60.79) (60.53) (59.76)
Adjusted R' .1914 .1901 .1902 .1900 .1918
The number of observations for all models is 70,984 (this is smaller than Table 5 because the information on
derivatives holdings is not available for 1990). The dependent variable is the one-year change in net interest
income. Independent variables are gap measures interacted with firm-specific indicator variables. The four cross-
sectional firm differences that we allow for are the following: derivatives holding, high growth, high risk of loan
prepayment, and high risk of early withdrawal of deposits. The fixed-firm effects are implemented by adjusting
both the independent and dependent variables by the time-series mean for each bank to control for differences
across banks. Fixed-effects year-dummies (which are not presented) are included to control for changes across
time. The WTiite-adjusted t statistics are in parentheses, following the coefficients.
IRD is an indicator variable that is one when a bank holds any type of interest-rate derivative.
GROW is an indicator variable that is one when a bank is above the median growth rate in assets for the year.
PREPAY is an indicator variable that is one when a bank's ratio of fixed-rate loans with maturity greater than five-
years-to-assets is above the median.
WITHDRAW is an indicator variable that is one when a bank's ratio of demand-deposits-to-assets is above the
median.
Coefficients in bold type are significant at a level of < 0.10.
slowly, has high or low prepayment risk, or has high or low withdrawal risk. We find
that the coefficients on both the fixed- and variable-gap measures are significant and
positive in all cases. The coefficient on both the fixed- and variable-rate gap measures
are significantly lower for banks that are growing faster. In addition, the coefficient on
the variable-gap measure is significantly lower for banks with interest-rate derivatives.
Again, as in the case of controlling for different interest-rate environments, the
coefficients are generally different fi^om zero; and we can consistently reject their
equality to one.
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6.4. Longer-horizon tests
Tables 2-4 focus on providing evidence on the usefulness of one-year-gap measures
because the SEC's primary focus is on near-term exposures. The SEC also requires tabular
disclosures for each of the next five years. Regulators do not require these disclosures.
However, regulators require an aggregate disclosure of maturity gap between one to five
years and greater than five years. We examine whether the one-to-five-year aggregate gap
disclosures have explanatory power over two longer horizons—three years and five years.
Table 7 presents results of estimating Eq. (9). To obtain the correct sign of the
coefficients on gap measures, we need to know the precise timing of the acquisition and
maturity of assets and liabilities. The longer the horizon, the more difficult it becomes to
determine the relevant interest-rate changes. Therefore, in the long-horizon tests, we focus
on testing for the significance of the coefficients on the gap measures. In other words, we
examine whether gap measures have any explanatory power, without respect to direction,
but with respect to the longer-horizon changes in net interest income.
Table 7
Results of annual cross-sectional regressions for the fiall sample
Year
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Predicted sign on + - - - - +
fixed gap 1 - 5 years
Predicted sign on + - - - + +
variable gap 1 - 5 years
Intercept - 0.0020 0.0034 0.0019 -0.0011 -0.0010 - 0.0077
(-0.58) (3.03) (2.24) (-0.92) (-0.81) (-1.45)
Fixed gap, 1 year -0.0118 -0.0140 -0.0051 0.0102 0.0114 0.0192
(-6.35) (-7.87) (-3.77) (4.50) (4.76) (2.67)
Variable gap, 1 year -0.0081 - 0.0099 0.0028 0.0152 0.0057 0.0121
(-1.35) (-4.52) (1.57) (2.44) (1.14) (1.45)
Fixed gap, 1 - 5 years 0.0145 0.0029 0.0026 - 0.0005 -0.0041 0.0108
(1.64) (1.33) (1.10) ( - 0.09) (-1.17) (1.84)
Variable gap, 0.0098 -0.0001 -0.0108 - 0.0098 -0.0119 0.0025
1 - 5 years (1.76) ( - 0.04) (-3.27) (-2.22) (-1.74) (0.46)
Change in assets
—
0.0420 0.0343 0.0383 0.0371 0.0459 0.0472
3 years (419.74) (6.86) (23.71) (6.17) (8.27) (3.28)
Adjusted R~ .9976 .7405 .8455 .6989 .8563 .6889
y~ for fix = Var 0.57 9.69 36.11 1.29 2.32 1.80
?x>y- (0.4510) (0.0019) (< 0.0001) (0.2586) (0.1275) (0.1792)
y' for Fix 1 - 5 = 0.97 0.95 13.69 12.13 1.53 1.52
Var 1-5
Pr>/- (0.3244) (0.3299) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.2167) (0.2182)
/V 10,856 10,485 10,081 9537 9023 8507
The dependent variable in each panel is the three-year-ahead change in net interest income. The independent
variables are the total gap for one year, the total gap for one to five years, and the change in total assets for three
/ears. Beginning-of-year total assets scales all variables. White-corrected / statistics are in parentheses, following
he coefficient estimates.
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Table 7 shows that the fixed and variable components of one-year gap significantly
explain the three-year-ahead change in net interest income in six out of six years.
Furthermore, the one-to-five fixed-rate gap is significantly associated with the three-
year-ahead change in net interest income in two out of six years and the one-to-five-year
aggregate variable gap is associated with the three-year-ahead change in net interest
income in four out of six years.
Table 8 presents the results of estimating Eq. (10). Table 8 shows that while the one-
year fixed- and variable-rate gap components are significant in each year, the one-to-five-
year fixed- and variable-rate gap components are significant in three out of six years.
Table 8
Results of annual cross-sectional regressions for the full sample
Year
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Predicted sign on + - — — — +
fixed gap 1 - 5 years
Predicted sign on + - - - + +
variable gap 1 - 5 years
Intercept -0.0186 0.0089 0.0099 0.0046 0.0002 0.0130
(-0.38) (1.27) (2.27) (0.29) (0.02) (1.32)
Fixed gap, 1 year -0.0143 -0.0119 - 0.0036 0.0106 0.0155 0.0171
( - 8.20) (-7.65) (-2.73) (6.16) (7.16) (2.37)
Variable gap. 1 year -0.0169 -0.0116 0.0032 0.0180 0.0112 0.0138
(-8.65) (-7.17) (2.02) (8.40) (4.70) (2.03)
Fixed gap, 0.0015 0.0032 0.0068 0.0064 - 0.0004 0.0125
1 - 5 years (0.35) (1.01) (3.07) (2.65) (-0.12) (1.94)
Variable gap. - 0.0049 -0.0051 -0.0107 - 0.0046 - 0.0072 0.0056
1 - 5 years (-0.88) (-1.46) (-3.17) (-1.61) (-1.12) (1.05)
Change in assets
—
0.0420 0.0342 0.0382 0.0370 0.0460 0.0472
3 years (474.01) (6.80) (23.51) (6.19) (8.20) (3.26)
D-deposits - 0.0067 - 0.0225 - 0.0087 0.0121 0.0028 - 0.0297
(-0.13) (-3.46) (-1.33) (0.75) (0.24) (-1.27)
T-deposits 0.0041 - 0.0008 0.0020 0.0074 0.0115 - 0.0269
(0.11) (-0.14) (0.32) (1.19) (1.29) (-1.73)
Securities 0.0194 - 0.0075 -0.0159 - 0.0205 -0.0118 0.0064
(0.94) (-1.28) ( - 6.44) (-2.10) (-2.30) (0.45)
Loans 0.0258 0.0016 - 0.0085 -0.0170 -0.0154 - 0.0008
(1.26) (0.45) (-2.68) (-1.20) (-2.02) (-0.13)
Adjusted R' .9976 .7438 .8478 .7018 .8570 .6907
X" for Fix = Var 3.75 0.07 27.49 13.55 1.75 0.53
?T>X' (0.0529) (0.7937) (< 0.0001) (0.0002) (0.1854) (0.4648)
r for Fix 1-5 = 2.86 7.58 21.44 10.89 1.06 1.43
Var 1-5
Pr>r (0.0906) (0.0059) (< 0.0001) (0.0010) (0.3027) (0.2310)
N 10,856 10,485 10,081 9537 9023 8507
The dependent variable in each panel is the three-year-ahead change in net interest income. The independent
variables are the fixed- and variable-rate gap for one year, the fixed- and variable-rate gap for one to five years,
and the change in total assets for three years. Beginning-of-year total assets scales all variables. White-corrected /
statistics are in parentheses, following the coefficient estimates.
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Table 9
Chglyear Chg2year Chg3year ChgSyear
(A) Pearson correlation coefficients between the coefficients on the one-to-five-year gap variablesfi-om the model
in Table 6 and the average changes in interest ratesfound in Fig. 1. Tliere are six observations in the sample and
coirelations that are significant at the < 0.10 level are shown in bold type
Fixed 1-5 -.1837 .3272 .6269 .1045
Variable 1-5 -.1499 .3840 .7145 .3180
(B) Pearson coirelation coefficients between the coefficients on the one-to-five-year gap variables from the model
in Table 7 and the average changes in interest ratesfound in Fig. 1. There are six obsen^ations in the sample and
correlations that are significant at the < 0.10 level are shown in bold type
Fixed 1-5 -.1012 .0710 -.0116 -.2889
Variable 1-5 .3673 .6786 .6036 -.1027
Table 9 presents the correlations between the estimated coefficients on one-to-five-year
gap measures and various interest-rate changes. Table 9 shows that the coefficients from
the regressions without the control variables are correlated with the change in the three-
year interest rate. These correlations are all of a lower level and significance than the
shorter-term tests in Table 4.
We also examine the ability of the one-to-five-year gap to explain the five-year-ahead
change in net interest income. The results (not reported) indicate that the gap measures
have a minimal amount of explanatory power in these regressions. This is not surprising
given that the longer the horizon, the more unlikely banks are to maintain the same asset/
hability mix.
7. Conclusion
This paper documents evidence on the efficacy of maturity-gap disclosures of
commercial banks in indicating their interest-rate risk exposures in net interest income.
For the sample of banks that filed call reports from 1990 to 1997, a period that includes
a wide range of interest-rate movements, we fmd that (i) one-year maturity-gap measures
are significantly related to the one-year- and three-years-ahead change in net interest
income, (ii) fixed- and variable-rate instruments differ in association with future changes
in net interest income, and (iii) the one-to-five-year aggregate gap measures also have
some power in explaining three-year-ahead changes in net interest income. These
findings hold with or without controlling for the ex post growth in assets as well as
the amount of rate-sensitive assets and liabilities (a competing set of explanatory
variables). Because maturity-gap data are similar to the tabular-format disclosures
required by the SEC (1997), our findings (i) mitigate concerns about the useftilness
of the SEC's market-risk-disclosure requirements, (ii) support the SEC's focus on
disclosure of information relevant for indicating near-term losses, (iii) support the SEC's
requirement to separate fixed and variable instruments, and (iv) suggest that the
omission of prepayment and early withdrawal risk from gap measures does not totally
compromise the ability of gap data to indicate interest-risk exposures contradicting
claims to the contrary by some banks.
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One of the concerns is that FRR 48 allows firms to choose from three different formats
for market-risk disclosures. The possible confusion these multiple formats might create
lead Hodder, Koonce, and McAnally (2001) to conclude:
FRR No. 48 's flexibility of application will adversely affect users' risk judgments.
Specifically, alternative disclosure formats and measurement bases are not substitutes
and, to the extent that they are viewed as such, investors will form inconsistent risk
perceptions for the same underlying economic situation. If the SEC wants investors to
be able to compare risk-management strategies across companies, then they should
mandate just one type of disclosure format.
Their conclusion assumes that a single type of disclosure format would be adequate
to compare risk-management strategies across different companies. Our results demon-
strate that a simple disclosure of maturity gap is highly associated with the fiiture
changes in net interest income. While we do not address the separate issue of the risk
related to changing equity values, the risk of net interest income is an important one in
and of itself Because these two types of risk are separable (Toevs, 1983), perhaps they
require different types of disclosures. Maturity gap is a simple way to disclose the risk
of net interest income across many different interest-rate environments, and a wide
cross-section of types of banks.
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Linda Allen*
Department ofEconomics and Finance, Baruch College, City University ofNew York,
17 Lexington Avenue, New York. NY 10010, USA
The shortcomings of the repricing model as a measure of bank interest-rate risk
exposure have long been extolled in the literature. The repricing gap is a static measure
that does not incorporate increasingly important off-balance-sheet activity. There is
overaggregation within each maturity bucket, such that, for example, there is no
distinction between assets that reprice in one day versus one year within the one-year
cumulative repricing gap. The problem of runoffs (prepayments) is ignored. This is
particularly problematic for mortgages because prepayments are often driven by
interest-rate fluctuations. Thus, the repricing model would have missed the impact on
bank profitability of the huge refinancing boom of the late 1990s-early 2000s, during
which most mortgages were repeatedly refinanced at lower and lower interest rates. All
of these criticisms make users of the model wary of the results. However, the model is
widely used by banking institutions because of its simplicity and low cost of
estimation.
In this paper, Ahmed, Beatty, and Bettinghaus evaluate the usefulness of the static
repricing model in forecasting bank net interest income over time. Surprisingly, their
conclusions are remarkably sanguine. They interpret their conclusions as evidence in
support of the repricing model's efficacy as a risk-measurement tool. However, without
even criticizing their tests and analysis, one could have drawn the diametrically opposed
conclusion from their empirical results. The initial results in Table 2, based on the fixed
gap and variable gap as independent variables, are statistically insignificant in 25% of the
cases (for 4 out of 16 annual coefficients). The greatest explanatory power comes from the
control variable (change in asset size), which is inconsistent with the assumptions of the
static repricing gap model in that it incorporates ex post realizations of asset size and
* Tel.: +1-646-312-3463; fax: +1-646-312-3451.
E-mail address: Linda_Allen@baruch.cuny.edu (L. Allen).
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neglects the feedback effect on the size of the gap of shifts in portfoHo positions, which in
all but the most pathological of cases will change the gap itself' Moreover, the
coefficients on the interactive model in Tables 5 and 6, in which the gap is multiplied
by the rate shock, as implied by theory, are usually less than 30% and significantly lower
than 100%. Thus, each of the gaps individually explains less than 30% of the fluctuations
in the bank's net interest income. When summing the two gaps' coefficients, the results are
only slightly better than 50%. Thus, the repricing model, at its best, explains only around
50% of the bank's interest-rate risk exposure. And this coin-flip explanatory power is
obtained only after assuming perfect forecastibility of interest-rate shocks by using ex post
realizations of rate changes in the interactive term in the regressions. Instead, if a
contemporaneous interest rate forecast would have been used (e.g., the forward rate for
U.S. Treasury securities on the gap estimation date), then the explanatory power of the
model would have been even lower.
My conclusion on reading this paper is that the repricing model does a poor job of
estimating the impact of unanticipated fluctuations in interest rates on bank profitabil-
ity. Thus, I would have liked to see the explanatory power of the repricing model
compared to that of the tabular model required in SEC disclosures, which the authors
contend is potentially more useful as a risk measure, because the SEC regulations
incorporate off-balance-sheet risk disclosures, as well as control for runoffs. However,
no such analysis was performed. One reason this was not done, presumably, was that
the bank regulators did not require separate disclosure of the fixed gap and the variable
gap after 1997, the year of the introduction of the SEC reporting requirement.
However, this should not serve as a fatal shortcoming, because the distinction between
the fixed and variable gap is artificial; according to the repricing model, it is the total
gap that is used to measure the impact of interest rate fluctuations on net interest
income. Moreover, using a sample period that started in 1997 would have been more
interesting, because it would have tested the repricing model's explanatory power
during the mortgage refinancing boom.
Another modeling choice of the authors was to use annual bank call-report data rather
than quarterly data. The static assumptions of the repricing model are less egregious for
shorter time periods, and therefore, it would have been interesting to see if the repricing
model performed well over the quarterly or six-month period. Moreover, the explanatory
power of different maturity buckets could have been compared. Because of the restrictions
of annual data, only the one year and one-to-five-year periods were analyzed in the paper.
It is not clear why the three-year period was chosen as that does not match the repricing
model's chosen time periods of up to one year and one-to-five years. However, if quarterly
data were used instead of annual data, then the authors could have examined the maximum
forecasting range of the repricing model by comparing the explanatory power of the one-
quarter gap to the two-quarter gap, and so forth. Indeed, this could have been done in some
form even using annual data. Rather than utilize the three-year-ahead changes in net
' The contention in Footnote 8 of the paper, that the net interest income changes can be decoinposed into a
gap effect and an asset change effect, ignores the possibility of interdependence between these tvvo effects. In
particular, changes in asset holdings can be an interest-rate -risk-management tool to respond to undesirable gap
positions.
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interest income in Tables 7 and 8, the authors could have telescoped the repricing models
to test the marginal explanatory power of the one-to-five-year gap on changes in net
interest income over the one-to-five-year period. For example, each of the following
models could be tested individually:
ZlNII,+i = Zlr,+ iGAPi
zlNIWs = ^/VsGAP, 5
ZlNII,+6 = Zlr,+6GAP>5
Table 1 shows that the fixed gap was negative in each year from 1 990 to 1 99 1 , whereas
the variable gap was positive over the same period. However, the signs of the coefficients
on the gap independent variables in Table 2 are the same in all years except 1993 and 1997
(and then one sign is insignificantly different fi^om zero). However, this undermines the
authors' conclusion that the coefficient of the gap can be interpreted as the average change
in the one year interest rate. For example, if net interest income were increasing, a negative
coefficient on each gap independent variable would imply that interest rates were
simultaneously increasing (for the positive variable gap) and decreasing (for the negative
fixed gap). It is not clear that the coefficients to the gap independent variables can be
interpreted as interest rate fluctuations. Table 4 correlation coefficients are unconvincing
because of the small sample size (only eight observations).
This paper has provided some interesting and convincing evidence. However, the
evidence is mostly against the hypothesis put forth by the authors.
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1. Introduction
Canadian researchers and policymakers, who can count the number of domestic banks
on their fingers, surely envy the research opportunity afforded by the availability of data
for more than 10,000 U.S. banks. Ahmed, Beatty, and Bettinghaus (2004) exploit this
opportunity in a novel way. Rather than testing a hypothesis, they describe the extent to
which banks' maturity-gap disclosures "indicate their net income that is exposed to
interest-rate risk." This is an interesting exercise because although it is well known that
customer-relationship issues complicate banks' exposures (Begley, Chamberlain, and Li,
2003), there is little descriptive evidence relating banks' maturity-gap disclosures to their
actual net income sensitivity to interest-rate changes. This paper provides such evidence.
The first section of my discussion addresses its interpretation.
The authors see associations between gap and fliture net interest income as evidence
justifying the disclosure requirements of SEC Financial Reporting Release No. 48 (FRR
No. 48, SEC, 1997). A better basis for such a conclusion, beyond the present study's
scope, would be to reestimate the regression coefficients using actual FRR No. 48 data and
see if the magnitude of the new estimates were more consistent with expectations than the
ones obtained using pre-FRR No. 48 data. The second section of the discussion offers
suggestions along these lines for future studies and some proposals for further exploiting
pre-FRR No. 48 data.
2. Interpretation of results
To facilitate the discussion, I simplify the authors' model as follows. At time t, let a
bank's maturity gap be Gt=A, — L„ where A/ represents the bank's interest-earning assets
* Tel.: +1-613-533-6194.
E-mail address: dbt@qsilver.queensu.ca (D.B. Thornton).
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and L, its interest-bearing liabilities. In a base case, the difference between the bank's net
interest income for the year ending at Time 2 and its net interest income for the year
ending at Time 1 can be represented as ANI] 2 = Gi x Ar. In this expression, Ar is the
beginning-of-year change in an interest rate applicable to both assets and liabilities. The
gap, Gi, is the same as it was during Year 1 and is constant during Year 2 because either
the bank is not growing or any increases in financial assets (loans) are coincidental with
increases in liabilities (deposits). Although it is unrealistic, I find this base case helpfiil in
organizing my thinking about the authors' analyses.
The authors perform cross-sectional regressions of ANIi 2 on G\ and other variables
meant to capture some complexities that the base case omits, finding that the coefficient of
Gx is less than A/-. In a sense, this is like regressing current tax expense on net income
across a sample of firms and finding that the slope coefficient is less than the statutory tax
rate (t). Such results are not surprising. Yet, they are interesting because they raise
questions about why the estimated coefficients are not equal to A;- and t, respectively. We
know that banks can dampen their interest-rate exposures by hedging with derivatives and
dynamically rebalancing their long and short portfolios; but on average, how much do they
hedge and what is the resulting exposure? Similarly, we know that firms can reduce the
sensitivity of current tax expense to accounting income by deliberately altering the timing
and character of income for tax purposes; but on average, how successful is their tax
planning, and what is the resulting effective tax rate? Ideally, the results of such descriptive
studies provide preliminary answers to the questions and set the stage for further analysis
of firms' hedging and tax-planning activities.
The estimated coefficients of Gi are generally much less than Ar. In Tables 2 and 3, the
estimates are often less than 1% of Ar These estimates strike me as being implausibly low,
as would T estimates equal to about 1% of the statutory tax rate. In Tables 5 and 6, which
allow for fixed firm and time effects, the estimates of A/- are generally about a third of their
theoretical values. These estimates are much more reasonable. They are consistent with the
notion that banks hedge a very substantial but plausible portion of their net interest-income
exposure. I think the results also imply that fiiture studies must either control for individual
bank characteristics or divide bank samples into homogeneous subsamples before
performing cross-sectional regression analyses like those underlying the results in Tables
2 and 3.
To explore why the estimates of Ar are so tiny in Tables 2 and 3, one can extend the
base case by adding a term, AG, that represents the change in gap over the period ending at
Time 2. One can then decompose the total change in net interest income, r2G2 — r\G\, into
a rate variance G\ x Ar and a volume variance Vj x AG, that is:
ANIi,2 = r2G2 -rxG\ = GiAr + r^AG
Most U.S. banks provide such a "postmortem" explanation for changes in all of the
categories of net interest income in their annual reports. For instance, the Bank of America
in its 2002 annual report states "[t]he changes for each category of interest income and
expense are divided between the portion of change attributable to the variance in volume
or rate for that category. . ." (p. 60). Thus, it seems that a regression of ANIi 2 on both G\
and AG would be necessary to obtain reliable estimates of the extent to which banks'
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maturity gap disclosures "indicate their net income that is exposed to interest-rate risk."
However, the main regression in the paper takes the following form:
ANI] 2 = Pq + Pi y. G\ + p2 ^ (Asset growth) + other control variables + noise
At the conference, I remarked that AG would be a better regressor than asset growth;
both are observable ex post. In response, the authors tried using "net growth in rate
sensitive assets" and report that the substitution "did not make a material change in test
results" (p. 14, emphasis added). This result is intriguing because, generally, increases in
bank assets (e.g., loans) are associated with increases in liabilities (e.g., deposits). If assets
and liabilities increase equally (dollar for dollar), then A — L is constant and the change in
gap is zero whatever the asset growth. In that case, asset growth is not a valid proxy for
AG because assets could be growing rapidly while G was constant.
More generally, under base case assumptions, the theoretical value of P2 using AG as
the regressor would be 9ANI| 2/9AG = r2; the theoretical value of P2 using A/1 as the
regressor is 9 ANI
1
2/9 A/^, which can be broken down as follows:
9ANIi.2/9A^ = 9ANI,.2/9AG x 9AG/9A.4 = /-2(1 - dL/dA)
Thus, if^ — Z is constant, dL/dA= 1 and the estimated value of ^2 should be zero. This is
not what the authors fmd in Table 2. Indeed, P2 is generally very large compared with
other estimated coefficients in the regression model and highly significant. Thus, the
conclusion that assets do not increase dollar for dollar with liabilities seems warranted.
Another naive but more plausible scenario is that liabilities are a constant percentage of
assets: L, = kA,. In Table 1, the authors report that generally k>\ (i.e., liabilities exceed
assets) for fixed gap and k< 1 (assets exceed liabilities) for variable gap. I conjecture that
while dL/dA is not equal to one, it is far from being zero across firms. Although a
correlation matrix including A and L would be the best way to confirm this, one can
crudely estimate 9L/9^ as follows: Let
..^ A-L
represent the deflated gap values reported in Table 1 . Then:
I = ( 1 - DG) X A
One can then use the quantity (1 — DG) as a rough estimate of 'dL/dA. Because the average
values of DG range from — 0.16 to +0.34 (across both derivative users and nonusers), a
plausible range for dL/dA across the years is 1.16 to 0.66—not one, but not different
enough from one to allay my concern that growth in assets is probably not a good proxy
for growth in gap. The facts that P2 is statistically significant, and that substituting AG for
A/i does not materially change the estimate of /^2. deserve ftirther examination in my view.
The results in Tables 5 and 6, based on regression models incorporating fixed firm and
time effects, are much more plausible. One expects regression coefficients equal to one
under base case assumptions. The actual coefficients are around one third, less for
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derivative users. I think this regression setup provides a much better basis for further
exploring associations between the magnitude of coefficients and bank-specific factors.
3. Suggestions for future research
Banks' omission of derivatives prior to FRR No. 48 introduces measurement error in
gap, contributing to the tiny regression estimate of A/- in Tables 2 and 3 and probably also
reducing the reliability of estimated coefficients in Tables 5 and 6. Aware of this, the
authors report that estimated gap coefficients are less for derivative users than for nonusers
as expected. In my view, however, repeating the exercise with derivatives included in gap
is a priority now that sufficient FRR No. 48 data are available.
Prior to performing that exercise, one can further exploit the study's data as follows.
The authors recognize that banks' exposure to interest rates differs from simple propor-
tionality with gap not only because banks use derivatives, but also because borrowers
often hold prepayment options (banks are short put options) and depositors generally hold
early withdrawal options (banks are short call options). An equally important factor, not
explicitly mentioned, is that banks often offer credit facilities allowing customers to
borrow additional funds at a prespecified rate of interest should the market rate increase
(banks are short call options). Because banks are short of these customer-related options,
favorable changes in interest rates are unlikely to benefit banks as much as unfavorable
changes hurt them. This suggests a straightforward extension: Compare regression
coefficients for favorable and unfavorable values of Ar. A favorable value of A/- occurs
if (a) gap is positive and interest rates increase or (b) gap is negative and rates decrease.
Although the interest-rate changes per se are favorable to banks in both (a) and (b), it is
likely that some customers will exercise their options, so banks will not enjoy the full
benefit of the rate changes. An unfavorable value of Ar occurs if (c) gap is positive and
interest rates decrease or (d) gap is negative and rates increase. In competitive financial
markets, banks need to pass on these rate changes to customers. Therefore, all else being
equal, I expect the coefficient of G] to be higher for unfavorable than for favorable
interest-rate changes.
'
It is costly for banks to hedge their short positions in the options that customers hold.
However, there is a well-developed market for credit derivatives and an emerging market
for the option-like securities that mimic credit facilities. Therefore, it would also be
interesting to repeat the analysis for derivative users and nonusers, to see if derivative
users are more symmetrically exposed to favorable and unfavorable interest-rate changes
than nonusers.
Another potentially fruitful project would involve reestimating all coefficients using
FRR No. 48 data. This approach, similar to that of Thornton and Welker (2004),
emphasizes the incremental information content of FRR No. 48 disclosures." The new
Notice that the authors' examination of positive and negative interest-rate changes does not facihtate such a
comparison because long and short positions differ across banks and for fixed and variable instruments.
" Curiously, the authors measure ""on-halance-sheet maturity gap" (p. 3, emphasis theirs) but then suggest
that "gap disclosures provide additional information beyond what is provided in the balance sheet" (p. 4).
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disclosures are potentially incrementally informative in at least four ways: (1) They
include derivatives. (2) They group financial instruments in time buckets based on
management's best estimates of expected (not contractual) maturity. (3) They offer a finer
breakdown of maturity timing. (4) They enjoin management to discuss the disclosures in
their 10-K Management Discussion and Analyses (MD&A). An MD&A provides
investors with a view of the bank through the eyes of management. Banks are likely to
trade off variables strategically. For example, depending on their geographic location and
clientele base, some banks offer free checking but pay little or no deposit interest, while
others charge for checking but pay competitive rates of interest. Some banks find it cost
effective to hedge with derivatives while others do not. By outlining and discussing the
rationale for such tradeoffs, the MD&A should facilitate researchers parsing bank samples
into subsamples that are likely to yield consistent cross-sectional regression coefficients.
Yet another potentially fiuitful extension of the research would analyze banks' fair-
value exposures to interest-rate changes."* Banks with fixed-rate exposure are vulnerable to
fair-value volatility when interest rates change because of liquidity and capital-adequacy
concerns. Following SFAS No. 133, banks carry derivatives at fair value, so one can see if
banks' derivative exposures implied by FRR No. 48 disclosures eventuate when interest
rates change. The results would be interesting because banks can terminate derivative
exposures by instantaneously settling the contracts or by taking offsetting positions in an
impersonal marketplace. Altering net interest income exposures stemming from loan and
deposit positions is comparatively costly because it can jeopardize fee income and other
benefits flowing fi^om customer-specific capital.^ Thus, inferences concerning fair-value
exposures from static, end-of-quarter positions depicted by FRR No. 48 disclosures may
be less reliable than those concerning net interest-income exposures. Moreover, since
banks successfully resisted marking loans and deposits to market, it is likely that
confirmation of their full fair-value sensitivity will continue to elude both researchers
and financial statement users.
4. Conclusions
Although the authors could have enhanced the description of banks' sensitivity to
interest-rate changes using their existing data, the study is a usefiil addition to the
literature. The results are consistent with the intuition that banks are more than passive
conduits from savers to borrowers. Derivative users generally reduce their net interest
exposures to market-rate changes. Even nonderivative users' net-income sensitivity is
generally much less than the gap times interest-rate changes. This suggests that bank
FRR No. 48 disclosures also have the potential to enhance investor consensus as to banks' exposure to
interest-rate changes (Linsmeier, Thornton, Venkatachalam, & Welker, 2002).
Bodurtha and Thornton (2002) describe the distinction between fair-value exposures and cash flow/net
income exposures.
The authors' finding that banks' 1-year gap helps predict 3-year-ahead net interest income is consistent with
both the existence of customer relationship capital and persistence in banks' lending and borrowing policies.
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activities possess operating as well as financial characteristics (Feltham & Ohlson. 1995).
probably stemming from customer-relationship capital.
The authors' derivation and measurement of gap give fliture researchers a good starting
point in modeling banks' exposures to interest rates, whether they use call report data or
FRR No. 48 data. 1 do not think that the results of the study justify the SEC's issuance of
FRR No. 48. Justification would more logically come from evidence of the incremental
information content of the actual FRR No. 48 disclosures, and regression coefficients that
are closer to theoretical values, given gap measures based on banks" deri\ative and
nonderivative positions.
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1. Introduction
We thank both discussants for their comments at the conference. Their comments
essentially fall into three groups:
D Critique of our methodology
n Issues relating to interpretation
D Suggestions for fiiture work.
2. Methodology
Both discussants note that the estimated coefficients in our regressions are considerably
less than their theoretical values. Dan Thomton suggests that a potential explanation for
this difference may be the omission of change in gap as an explanatory variable. Because
we expect change in gap to be correlated with change in total assets, this limitation is
mitigated to some extent by including change in total assets as an independent variable.
Nevertheless, we repeated our tests after including the change in fixed gap and change in
variable gap as additional explanatory variables. The coefficients on fixed gap and variable
gap in the augmented regressions are not generally larger in magnitude than the
coefficients reported in our tables. Thus, the differences between the estimated value of
coefficients and the theoretical value of coefficients are unlikely to be driven by the
omission of change in gap. Another reason why the estimated coefficients may be below
their theoretical values is that gap measures are noisy because they do not reflect the
effects of off-balance-sheet instruments, dynamic portfolio adjustment, and prepayment
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +1-517-432-2909; fax: +1-517-432-1101.
E-mail address: bettinghaus@bus.msu.edu (B. Bettinghaus).
0020-7063/$30.00 © 2004 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
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options. Including change in gap does not mitigate the noise due to these inherent
limitations.
Linda Allen suggests that we could have used quarterly data and examined different
maturity buckets. There are two reasons why we did not use quarterly data. First, the SEC
requires disclosure of information for instruments maturing in each of the next 5 years
(and an aggregate amount for the remaining years). This suggests the use of annual data.
Second, quarterly changes in rates would in general be smaller in magnitude than annual
changes thereby making it difficult to detect.
3. Interpretation
We respectfully disagree with Linda Allen's interpretation and specifically her
conclusion that "the evidence is mostly against the hypothesis . . .." To our knowledge,
no prior study has empirically documented evidence on the usefulness of gap data. Our
study does show that gap has some predictive ability and that the sign of the coefficients
on gap are mostly consistent with the signs implied by theory, though their magnitudes are
less than their theoretical magnitudes.
An important difference between our interpretation of the results and Linda Allen's
interpretation is that she seems to suggest that the relation between gap and future changes
in interest rates depends on the sign of gap. We disagree with this assertion. Intuitively, a
positive 1-year gap means more assets are maturing or repricing than liabilities within 1
year. If rates increase, the assets can be reinvested at the higher rate leading to a positive
change in net interest income in future. If rates decrease, the assets will be reinvested at the
lower rate leading to a negative change in net interest income in future. Similarly, a
negative one-year gap means more liabilities are maturing or repricing than assets within 1
year. If rates increase, the liabilities will be refinanced at the higher rate leading to a
negative change in net interest income in future. If rates decrease, the liabilities can be
refmanced at the lower rate leading to a positive change in net interest income in future.
Thus, the impact of gap on future interest income depends on the sign of the interest rate
change (and not on the sign of the gap).
4. Suggestions for future research
We agree with the suggestions for future research made by both discussants. In
particular, a more direct examination of FRR48 disclosures would be a fruitful avenue
for future research.
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Abstract
In this paper, we propose a framework for the analysis of risk communication and an index to
measure the quality of risk disclosure. Mainstream literature on voluntary disclosure has emphasized
that quantity can be used as a sound proxy for quality. We contend that, in the analysis of the
disclosure of risks made by public companies, attention has to be paid not only to how much is
disclosed but also to what is disclosed and how.
We apply the framework to a sample of nonfinancial companies listed in the ordinary market on
the Italian Stock Exchange. To verify that the framework and synthetic index are not influenced by
the two factors recognized in the literature as the most powerful drivers of disclosure behavior for
listed companies, we use an OLS model. The regression shows that the index of disclosure quantity
is not influenced either by size or industry. Thus, the synthetic measure can be used to rank the
quality of the disclosure of risks.
© 2004 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Risk communication; Disclosure quantity; Reproducibility; Accuracy
1. Introduction
The increasing complexity of business strategies, operations, and regulations makes it
quite difficult for investors to appreciate financial information on its own without clear,
accompanying explanations (Marston & Shrives, 1 99 1 ). Moreover, shareholders and other
stakeholders require public companies to disclose information concerning their prospects
for future performance and the sustainability of current value-creation drivers. In this
* Presented at the KPMG-University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign Conference on "Risk Reporting" held
in Clearwater Bay (PL), December 11-13, 2003.
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sense, the narrative component of financial communication is an important means not only
of clarifying and \alidating the quantitative measures contained in financial statements
(Chungh & Meador, 1984), but also for offering useful insights into value-generation
drivers (Lev & Zarowin, 1999; Gelb & Zarovvin. 2000; Robb, Single. & Zarzeski. 2001).
A general consensus seems to have been reached also on the point that the more financial
reports look ahead, the greater are their importance for in\estors (Francis & Schipper,
1999).
To effectively fulfil the demands of their stakeholders, listed companies have been
improving the communication of their long-term value-generation capabilities by
increasing the amount of information disclosed with regard to the risks faced and their
expected impact on future profits. However, disclosing current financial risks will not
provide sufficient information about the financial status of a company because financial
performance is also affected (and even more so) by strategic and operating risks (EIU-
MMC, 2001). In this paper, we propose a framework for the analysis of risk
communication.
We contend that the quantity of disclosure is not a satisfactory proxy for the quality of
disclosure. In the proposed framework, quality of disclosure depends both on the quantity
of information disclosed and on the richness offered by additional information. While the
quantity of disclosure has been discussed in previous literature, little attention has been
paid, until now, to the richness of the information in quality. In our view, semantic
properties of disclosures about future prospects, that is. the richness—determines whether
or not the information helps outside investors appreciate the expected impact of disclosed
risks on the firms' capability to create value.
To identify the additional insights and to evaluate the contribution that a more
articulated framework for the analysis of risk communication can offer, instead of merely
counting the number of disclosed items, the proposed framework is applied to a sample of
nonfinancial companies listed in an unregulated financial market. We chose companies
Usted on the Italian Stock Exchange. Because there are no regulations on this topic, the
disclosures about risks offered by the observed companies are almost totally voluntary, and
not driven by rules that can influence both the content of the disclosures and the way in
which the information is presented.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the relevance of the
disclosure of risks. A review of literature is also presented. The major guidelines for risk
disclosure are discussed in Section 3. In Sections 4 and 5, a framework for the analysis of
risk disclosure is presented. In Sections 6 and 7, the research methodology is discussed
and some insights are offered for the analysis of risk disclosure. Conclusions and the
direction of further research follows.
2. The relevance of the disclosure of risks
Investors need to understand the risks a company takes to create value and they want to
have information on the sustainability of current value-creation strategies. Recent surxeys
of institutional investors (pension funds, investment trusts, unit trusts, and insurance
companies) revealed a strong demand for increased corporate risk disclosure to improve
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portfolio-investment decisions (Solomon, Solomon, Norton, & Joseph, 2000). Top
managers must therefore be in a position to assure investors that risks and uncertainties
are well managed (DeLoach, 2000).
This requires not only the implementation of finn-wide risk-management systems, but
also effective communication about the risks affecting a finn's strategies and the actions
management plans to take to capitalize on emerging oppoitunities as well as to minimize
the risk of failures. If listed companies communicate information about existing risks and
uncertainties, the external investors' ability to deal effectively with risk diversification in
the management of their investment portfolios is severely undermined. That may lead to a
general lack of confidence in the reliability of institutional financial infonnation.
Nonetheless, the status of current regulation of risk reporting reveals a piecemeal
approach, focused predominantly on market risk associated with the use of derivatives
(e.g., FAS 119, FAS 133, IAS 32, and IAS 39).
Although the importance of the issue could not be overemphasized, as was recently
proved by unexpected reporting failures involving some of the largest companies listed on
the major stock markets, up to now, little attempt has been made by regulatory bodies to
provide an explicit integrated framework for corporate risk disclosure (Solomon et al.,
2000).
In the United States, Financial Reporting Release No. 48 (FRR 48), issued in 1997,
requires SEC registrants to disclose both qualitative and quantitative information about
market risks (potential losses arising ft^om adverse changes in interest rates, foreign
currency rates, commodity prices, and equity prices). Empirical studies suggest that
these requirements do little to enhance the quality of risk reporting: disclosure provided
by listed companies has wide variations in detail and clarity (Elmy, LeGuyarder, &
Linsmeier, 1998; Roulstone, 1999), it is spread throughout the Management Discussion
& Analysis (MD&A), and the notes to financial statements make it difficult for investors
to gather infonnation and make appropriate risk assessments (Hodder, Koonce, &
McAnally, 2001). Nonetheless, other findings support the usefiilness of this kind of
disclosure to investors (Jarion, 2002; Linsmeier, Thornton, Venkatachalam, & Welker,
2002; Rajgopol, 1999).
In the United Kingdom, the Operating and Financial Review (OFR), the equivalent of
the MD&A, introduced in 1993 for listed companies and still nonmandatoiy, recommends
including a review of key risks. The Combined Code on Corporate Governance, published
by the London Stock Exchange in 1998, requires listed companies to maintain a sound
system of internal control and to explain how it works. The guidance emphasizes the need
for internal risk-management procedures and encourages companies to report externally on
their key risks, but without making it mandatory (Woods & Reber, 2003). A research study
of narrative reporting in the United Kingdom found that, of those companies which had
provided an operating and financial review, only 13% made available some clear
discussion of trends affecting the future and 18% identified some relevant risks and
uncertainties in the main lines of business that may have a major effect on future results
(ICAEW, 1998).
In Gennany, GAS5 requires that infonnation about risks be presented in a self-
contained section of management report that accompanies consolidated financial state-
ments. Because it is acknowledged that risks are finn specific, no specific classification is
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imposed: risks should be classified according to the classification scheme adopted for
internal risk management. Empirical evidence reveals significant deficiencies regarding
these mandatory risk disclosures (Kajiiter, 2003).
Current reporting regulations in highly regulated countries tend to focus either on a
narrow set of risks, primarily market and credit risks and those connected with the use of
financial instruments (Young & Guenter, 2003). Reporting regulation on the disclosure of
risks also tend to focus on special circumstances, like security offerings by the flotation
process due to pressure put on companies prospectuses tend to contain more information
about the risk profile of companies than the annual reports requested by the regulatory
bodies of different financial markets. Unfortunately, and as a general rule, disclosures on
risk tail off after flotation (ICAEW. 1999). Under current provisions, therefore, corporate
risk disclosure is still at the discrefion of the board of directors of individual companies,
more a matter of voluntary disclosure than a question of complying with regulations.
Only a limited number of academic studies have applied a broad perspecti\e to
corporate risk disclosure. The role of forward-looking information in voluntary disclosure
has been associated with a more accurate analysts' earnings forecasts (Barron, Kile, &
Keefe, 1999) and with a more accurate level of share-price anticipation (Schleicher &
Walker, 1999). Carion, Loftus. and Miller (2000) studied the annual reports of 54
Australian companies operating in the mining sector, signaling relevant variations in the
extent and detail of voluntary risk disclosures. Kajiiter (2003) analyzed the mandatory risk
disclosures in management reports of listed German companies and revealed significant
deficiencies. Shrives and Linsley (2002) analyzed voluntary risk disclosures through the
OFR for 82 United Kingdom companies listed on the London Stock Exchange and found
no correlation between risk disclosures and market betas. Lajili and Zeghal (2003)
analyzed the MD&A of 300 Canadian hsted companies and found that voluntary risk
disclosures in annual reports are almost entirely qualitative in nature and lacking in
specificity and depth.
Comparative studies on the disclosure practices of United Kingdom and German hsted
companies (Shrives & Linsley, 2003; Woods & Reber, 2003) reach different conclusions
about the role of regulation in promoting the quality' of risk disclosures. Risk disclosure is
just becoming a serious topic for research. Empirical studies that take a broad perspective
are still rather scarce and offer only tentative and preliminary conclusions.
3. Guidance for voluntan disclosure of risks
In the absence of specific regulafions, managers who decide to disclose risk information
can refer to guidance on effecti\'e \oluntary disclosure provided by professional associ-
ations and academia. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA,
1994) proposed a framework for voluntary disclosure aimed at improving the quality and
effectiveness of fmancial reporting (Jenkins Committee Report). To pro\ide information
for in\estors, companies should consider disclosing data and information along five lines:
financial and nonfinancial data; management's analysis offinancial and nonfinancial
data; forward-looking information; information on managers and stakeholders; and
company background. Recently, due to its increasing importance, the intangible-asset
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dimension has been added to the existing five categories (FASB, 2001). Wallman's (1996)
fi-amework for disclosure complements information that fully meets accounting-recogni-
tion criteria {current financial statements) with information that does not meet (or only
partially meets) these criteria {research and development, forward-looking information,
customer satisfaction, risk measures, and intellectual capital). The Canadian Institute of
Chartered Accountants' reporting guidelines (CICA, 2001) suggest a reporting framework
that includes information concerning company's vision (core business and long-term
business strategy); critical success factors; capabilities {resources) to achieve desired
results; expected results; and connected risks and opportunities. It should be noted that all
the considered fiameworks explicitly propose to enrich financial reporting by including a
section devoted to communicating forward-looking information and to sketching the risk
profile of the company.
More focused guidance on risk disclosure is offered by papers issued by professional
bodies and research institutes (ICAEW, 1998, 1999, 2000a, 2000b; CICA, 2001; IFAC,
2002). All these papers share the common goal of proposing principles and structures for
approaching forward-looking disclosure and communication of a fair and integrated view
of the company risk profile. Best practices taken from listed companies are also provided,
thus filling the void of reporting standards.
According to ICAEW (2000a, p. 14) "risk can only be appreciated in the broader
context of a company's strategy." The reporting of risk must therefore consider
information on strategy, actions, and performance in addition to information specifically
focused on risk. In this guidance, the concepts of risk and forward-looking information are
closely intertwined.
According to the CICA framework (CICA, 2001), forward-looking information
completes retrospective financial and nonfinancial information to facilitate a better
appreciation of the impact of events, decisions, and actions on value creation. Forward-
looking information refers to (i) future events, decisions, opportunities, and risks that can
have a likely effect on future resuhs; (ii) vision, strategies, and objectives expressed by
management; and (iii) explanation of past events, decisions, facts, and results that can have
a significant impact on future results. It is also suggested to disclose information
concerning (i) core business and strategies, (ii) critical success factors, (iii) capacity to
deliver results, (iv) results (past and future), and (v) risks. According to this guidance,
forward-looking information and risks should be communicated as specifically as possible
and they should refer to different objects of external communication.
Both CICA and Icaew frameworks suggest that risk disclosure focuses on the sources
of uncertainty that affect volatility, on the different types of risk, and, finally, on expected
future performance. Accordingly, we defined risk disclosure as the communication of
information concerning firms' strategies, characteristics, operations, and other extemal
factors that have the potential to affect expected results.
4. A framework for the analysis of risk communication
Mainstream literature on voluntary disclosure has focused on quantity and then used
that aspect as a sound proxy for the quality dimension of disclosure. Some researchers
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propose simple quantity -quality indices based mainly on a dichotomous score (Marston &
Shrives, 1991; Sinhvi & Desai, 1971; Zarzeski, 1996). Others hoping to differentiate
quality, adopt weighted indices of disclosure, subjectively assessing the weight to be
attributed to each item disclosed (Botosan, 1997; Wallace, 1988; Wallace & Naser, 1995)
or to the type of measure associated with the information disclosed (Guthrie, Petty, Ferrier,
8l Wells, 1999).
However, little attention has been paid in the extent literature to the semantic properties
of information. We contend that, in the analysis of the disclosure of risks made by public
companies, attention has to be paid not only to how much is disclosed but also to what is
disclosed and how.
We propose a framework for the analysis of risk disclosure that considers four different
but complementary dimensions: the content of information disclosed; the economic sign
attributed to expected impacts; the type of measures used to quantify and qualify the
expected impacts; (the outlook orientation of risk communication) and the managerial
approach to the management of risks.
Without a clear body of academic literature concerning the contents and semantic
properties of corporate risk disclosure, we built the framework using the guidance on
voluntary risk reporting issued by professional bodies (AICPA, 1994; CICA, 2001; FASB,
2001; ICAEW, 2002), in the accounting literature (Robb et al., 2001), and in the guidelines
for risk assessment and analysis proposed by practitioners (Bell, Marrs, Solomon, &
Thomas, 1997; DeLoach, 2000).
In the proposed framework, the content of disclosures is reduced to the following
categories: strategy (goals for performance, mission, broad objectives, and way to achieve
objectives); company characteristics, such as financial structure, corporate structure
(changes in ownership, mergers, and acquisitions), technological structure (core and
support technologies), organization (organizational structure and human resources man-
agement), and business processes (concerning the way operations are managed); and
environment around the company (legal and regulatory, political, economic, financial,
social, natural, and industry).
Moving to the analysis of the semantic properties of the information disclosed, we
propose that disclosure is enriched by the way the expected impact of disclosed risks are
qualified and quantified. The communication measurement of the expected impact can be
articulated in two complementary components:
- the economic sign, that communicates the direction of the expected impact of risks upon
the future performance of the firm;
- the type ofmeasure used in order to specify the economic sign. The measurement can be
expressed in qualitative or quantitative terms, using either monetary or nonmonetary
scales.
The guidance proposed by CICA (200 1 ) and ICAEW (2002) underlines the importance of
communicating management's approach to risks and the capabilities and resources devoted to
it. Accordingly, another dimension of analysis is considered in the proposed framework: the
outlook orientation. Outlook orientation reflects both the time orientation ofthe information
disclosed (information mayjust refer to the actual state or be projected into the future) and the
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Table 1
A classification scheme: risk factors and semantic properties
Category Modalities
Risk factors
Content
Semantic properties
Economic sign
Type of measures
Outlook orientation
Company strategy
Strategy
Company characteristics
Financial structure
Corporate structure
Technological structure
Organization
Business processes
Environment around the company
Industry
Legal -regulatory environment
Environment: political, economic, financial,
social, natural, legal-regulatory
Positive
Equal
Negative
Not disclosed
Financial quantitative
Financial qualitative
Nonfmancial quantitative
Nonfmancial qualitative
No measures
Hypothesis - expectation
Programs
Actions or decisions taken
Actual state
approach management toward adopted risk (disclosed information can simply communicate
general hypotheses or expectations concerning the fiiture, or provide information concerning
management programs or action to be taken in order to face exposed risks).
Table 1 presents the classification scheme proposed.
5. The dimensions for the analysis of risk communication: methodological issues
There are some methodological issues we wish to discuss in connection with the
measurement of the dimensions proposed for the analysis of risk disclosure. As far as
quantity of communication is concerned, two aspects have to be balanced. On the one
hand, the absolute number of pieces of information disclosed has to be considered as a
proxy of the amount of disclosure provided by companies. On the other hand, the
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relevance assumed by risk-related information in voluntary disclosure depends on the
weight it has inside the overall (voluntary) communication. We refer to the first dimension
as quantity (strictu sensu) and to the second as density of disclosure.
As far as the semantic properties of communication are concerned, we consider the
disclosure of the expected impacts of considered risks and the orientation of management
in activating programs, actions, and resources in order to face risks. We refer to the fost
dimension as depth and to the second as outlook profile.
As regards the quantity dimension, many empirical studies have demonstrated that the
level of disclosure is highly influenced by size and industry (Ahmed & Courtis, 1999;
Belkaoui & Kapik. 1989; Cooke, 1992; Firth, 1979; Healy & Palepu, 1994; Richardson &
Welker, 2001; Robb et al., 2001). For this reason we contend that an absolute index (e.g.,
the number of phrases containing risk disclosure) is not adequate to appreciate the relative
quantity of disclosure made by any company. To investigate the overall amount of
disclosure made by any single company, an OLS regression equation was estimated using
size and industry as independent variables. An index that measures the relative quantity of
disclosure is also proposed. As proposed in Beattie, Mclnnes, and Feamley (2002), the
standardized residuals of the regression were used as a proxy' for the disclosure quantity.
The regression model is as follows: Z), =
^o + X]/=i i^/INDy + ^^--iLNSlZE,, and the
standardized residuals (relative quantity) are obtained by using Eq. (1). The RQT index is
greater when a company discloses more information than the average of companies
belonging to the same industry, adjusted by size. As a consequence, the quantity of
information is not measured "as is" in the index: it is adjusted by the two external factors
that are expected to influence the level of disclosure
RQT, = A-
A
(1)
where RQT, = relative quantity index for company /; A = observed disclosure for company
/; and A = estimated disclosure for company /.
As regards the density dimension, it is evident that the style of writing strongly influences
the effectiveness of narrative reporting. We contend that the relevance of risk information
disclosed in narrative reporting is influenced by how much it is diluted into the mass of the
other pieces of information disclosed. On the one hand, from the reader's perspective,
finding a low number of risk-related pieces of information among hundreds of pages of
narrative reporting makes it difficult to appreciate the system of risks affecting a firm's
prospects. On the other hand, from the company's perspective, diluting a limited number of
risk-related pieces of information in a thick document as the annual report may reveal a
strategy of "hiding the needle in a haystack": relevant information is communicated (so they
cannot be changed with holding) but in a way that makes it hard for a reader to find. We
define density of communication as the ratio between the number of sentences in which risk
information is provided o\er the total number of sentences included in the MD&A (Eq. (2)).
As a consequence, the value assumed by the DEN index is between and 1: the index
assumes higher value when the relevance of risk information in the annual report is greater.
1
^''
den, = -Vrpl, (2)
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where DEN, = density index for company /; kj = number of sentences in the annual report of
company /; RFL,y = 1 if the sentence j in the annual report of company / contains risk
information and RFL,y = 0, otherwise.
The third dimension we adopted to quantify the risk communication profile is depth.
Depth concerns the contents of information disclosed regarding the expected economic
impact of identified risks upon future performance. To measure the depth of disclosure, the
index presented in Eq. (3) is proposed. This index summarizes two of the semantic
properties in risk disclosure: the sign of the economic impact and the measures used to
communicate the expected performance. The economic sign is derived by counting the
number of sentences that contain an indication of the sign of the expected impact over the
total number of sentences in the MD&A (ECS). The type of measure used in commu-
nicating the expected impact is determined by using the ratio between the number of
sentences containing a qualitative or a quantitative measure over the total number of
sentences in the annual report (MSR). This ratio is weighted to differentiate the type of
measure: a value of 1 is attributed to qualitative measures and a value of 2 is attributed to
quantitative measures.
^
k,
J
^,
DPT, =
-^E ECS, + -^J2 MSR. (3)
where DPT, = depth index for company /; rfl, = number of risk items disclosed by company
/; A7 = number of sentences in annual report of company y; ECS,y= 1 if the sentence / in the
annual report of company i contains information on expected future performance and
ECS,y = otherwise; MSR,y = 2 if the sentence / in the annual report of company / contains
a quantitative measure of expected ftiture performance, MSR,y= 1 if the sentence / in the
annual report of company / contains a qualitative measure of expected future performance,
and MSR,y = 0, otherwise.
The fourth dimension contributing to the definition of the risk communication profile is
the outlook profile. This dimension concerns how management communicates the
approach it adopted to face identified risks. As a matter of fact, risk disclosure can just
communicate the existence of risks (or management's expectations concerning the fiiture
of the firm and its operating context) or illustrate the risk-management approach adopted
by a company (by providing information about management programs or actions planned
in order to face exposed risks). The index proposed (outlook profile—OPR) is presented in
Eq. (4). The range of the OPR index is between and 1 : the index assumes higher values
when a company discloses more information concerning actions taken or programs
planned to face identified risks.
1 ^^OPR,=—^ACP, (4)
where OPR, = outlook profile index for company /; rfl, = number of risk items disclosed by
company /; ^y = number of sentences in annual report of company /'; ACP,y= 1 if the
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sentencey in the annual report of company / contains information concerning actions taken
or programs planned to face identified risks and ACP,y = 0. otherwise.
The framework and proposed indices can be used to analyze the firms" disclosures of
risk from two different perspectives.
The first analysis perspective builds a synthetic measure of the quality of risk
communication. To calculate this summary index, the four proposed indices are synthe-
sized in an overall measure obtained as their simple arithmetic mean. They also have to be
standardized to a\oid a scale effect. In fact, they have different ranges of variation: density
(DEN) and outlook profile (OPR) vary between and 1; relative quantity (RQT) does not
have a predefined variation range (it is distributed as a standardized normal); depth (DPT)
may assume values between and 3. To standardize these four indices, the following
equation has been adopted (Eq. (5)).
^_, IND, -min,(IND,)IND' = (5)
' max/(IND,) -min,(IND,) ^'
where INDf = standardized index for company z; IND, = observed index for company /.
The summary index (Eq. (6)) that measures the quality- of the risk disclosure by firms is
obtained as follows:
QUALITY, = - (RQT,^ ^ DEN; ^ DPT; ^ OPR^) (6)
where RQT,"' = standardized relative quantity- for company /; DEN,* = standardized density
for company /; DPT/' = standardized depth for company /; and OPR/ = standardized outlook
profile for company /.
The index obtained through Eq. (6) represents the qualitv' of risk disclosure and can be
used to rank companies. It offers an overall impression of how far the disclosure process
has gone in different companies.
As always, when measuring complex phenomena like \oluntar\' disclosure, it can be
argued that while summar>' measures have their own usefulness because they collapse
different perspectives into a single synthetic value, they have, at the same time, limited
appeal (Beattie et al.. 2002). The four indices can help profile the characteristics of
disclosure offered by each company but. by its own nature, the summary index does not
delineate the different risk-communication strategies adopted by each firm. For this reason,
a second perspective is offered that integrates the four dimensions of analysis in order to
depict the communication profile adopted by a firm in risk disclosure. A graphical
representation of the risk-communication profile is obtained by arranging the four
dimensions along two axes and by connecting the points that correspond to the measures
reached in each of the dimensions (see Fig. 1 ).
The graphical representation of the risk-communication profile can help us to
understand and compare the disclosures made by different companies. In Fig. 1 . company
Beta, with the maximum relative quantity of disclosure, makes a better disclosure than
company Alfa, according to the traditional measure of disclosure suggested in the
literature. Nonetheless, the quality of disclosure offered by company Alfa is better on
the other three dimensions.
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•Company ALFA
Company Beta
OPR' RQT
DPT
Fig. 1 . The risk-profile diagram: visualizing risk-communication strategies.
The graphical capabihties of the proposed diagram Umit its usefulness as a diagnostic
tool. For example, it would be quite difficult to represent more than two or three
companies (or groups of companies) on the same diagram at the same time. Given the
limited number of risk-communication profiles that could be depicted at one time, the
diagram could not be used to analyze long, historical series for the same firm, nor for
comparing large populations of fums.
6. Research method
We conducted an empirical analysis to identify all the insights that a more articulated
framework for the analysis of risk communication can capture compared to merely
counting the number of disclosed items.
Our sample is drawn from all nonfmancial companies (chemical, clothing, electronic,
food, media, transport, and utility) listed in the ordinary market of the Italian Stock
Exchange at the end of 2001.' Because the Italian Stock Exchange does not regulate the
disclosure of risks by nonfinancial companies, except for financial and market risks,
almost all such disclosures by these companies are voluntary and, therefore, not driven by
rules that can influence either the content of the disclosure or the way in which the
information is presented.
We collected the data to be analyzed from company annual reports, an influential
source of information because of its wide coverage and availability. In fact, Marston and
To assure homogeneity of listing requirements, those companies listed in the Star Segment and the Nuovo
Mercato Segment have been excluded from the analysis.
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Shrives (1991) defined the annual report as the "main disclosure vehicle," concluding that
it is the most comprehensive financial report available to the public. Even if later empirical
studies (Francis & Schipper, 1999; Lev & Zarowin, 1994) conclude that there is a decline
in the relevance of financial information to investors, the annual report still offers, through
narratives, information in addition to financial statements that explains accounting figures,
sketches and presents perspectives (Beattie et al., 2002), and validates quantitative
measures contained in the financial statements (Chugnh & Meador, 1984). Moreover,
Lang and Lundholm (1993) showed that the disclosure level in annual reports is positively
correlated with the amount of corporate disclosure communicated to the market and
stakeholders using other media.
As the interest of our analysis was on voluntary disclosure, we focused more
specifically on the MD&A. The method chosen for the analysis of MD&As is content
analysis. It is a method widely adopted in corporate-disclosure studies (for a review, see
Guthrie, Petty, Yongvanich, & Ricceri, in press) because it permits repeatability and valid
inferences fi^om data according to their context (Krippendorf, 1980).
The analysis was conducted by five researchers: two senior researchers, one senior
research assistant, and two research assistants. We chose the sentence as the recording unit
as it is considered a more reliable unit of analysis than the printed page or paragraph
(Hackston & Milne, 1996). The coding procedure has been defined as follows: each
sentence is coded as "no information" if it does not contain any risk information, and it is
coded according to the elements of the framework (content, economic sign, type of
measure, and outlook orientation) if it contains risk information.
On the basis of the framework, a list of detection and classification rules was defined
and discussed with research assistants and classification criteria for each dimension of
the Iramework were subsequently identified. Afterwards, a preliminary test of the
coding procedure was conducted to highlight ambiguous or unclear coding rules and to
standardize the classifying capabilities of the researchers: two annual reports of
companies (excluded from the analysis) belonging to different industries were indepen-
dently examined by the five researchers. The results of the individual classification were
compared and the differences discussed. The outcome of this pretest activity was a final
set of detection and classification rules. Using this set of rules, another annual report
was coded by all the coders to test the alignment of the research team on the coding
procedure. After validation of the procedure, each research assistant independently
coded a subset of company annual reports. The five subsets were formed around the
industry classification proposed by Borsa Italiana Spa (the Milan Stock Exchange ruling
body).
When multiple coders are involved in content analysis, the reliability of the coding
procedure has to be verified. Krippendorf (1980) identified three types of reliability:
reproducibility, accuracy, and stability. Reproducibility refers to the assessment of coding
errors when multiple coders are involved; accuracy compares the results of reliability
obtained with a predefined standard set; and stability measures the reproducibility of the
coding procedure across time.
Because the data gathered for this paper covered only one year, we address reproduc-
ibility. As a measure of reproducibility, the Alpha-agreement coefficient proposed by
Krippendorff (1980) was calculated. The level of acceptance for Krippendorff alpha is a
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Table 2
The reliability test: Krippendoifs alpha by category
Content Type of measures Economic sign Outlook profile
Alpha .7511 .8970 .9288 .8619
value of .75 (Milne & Adler, 1999). Reproducibility of the analysis was tested via a
sample of recording units analyzed by one senior researcher. The sample (5% of the total
recording units) was drawn so that all coders and companies belonging to all industries
were covered in order to identify coder subjectivity and industry bias. Because each
sentence was analyzed from different perspectives, reproducibility was tested for each of
the different dimensions of the coding framework. The Alpha Krippendorf was therefore
calculated (Table 2). What emerges from the reliability test is that the Alpha Krippendorf is
higher than the level of acceptance: only the index of the "what is reported" dimension is
near the lower threshold.
7. Empirical evidence
Three areas of concern are addressed: first, an analysis of disclosure by risk factor;
second, an analysis of the relations among risk factors and semantic properties, like
economic sign, type of measures, and outlook orientation, that characterize the disclosures;
and third, an empirical application of the multidimensional measure of the quality of risk
communication. Table 3 presents some descriptive statistics concerning the disclosure of
the risk factors considered by the proposed framework.
On average, an Italian listed company discloses 75 different risk items in its MD&A. The
risk factors mainly concern strategy (35.9%), financial structure of the company (18.4%),
and business processes (12.5%). Information about strategy refers to mission and broad
objectives (67.3%), the way to achieve objectives (12.2%), the goals of performance
(8.2%), and the ways to achieve results (5.3%). The disclosures concerning financial
structure are mainly explanations of past financial results with some elements of prospec-
tive information (75%>). These disclosures refer to economic-profit measures (55.3%) and
financial-gearing indicators (19.7%). The disclosure explicitly related to projected-
expected future results represents 20.1% of the information concerning financial structure.
Moving to the semantic properties of the information disclosed, only 15.5% contains
some indications of the sign of the expected impact of fiature performance and the
majority of these disclosures refer to the expected positive impact (10.3%)). It should
also be noted that the company with the highest level of disclosure on expected friture
performance does not disclose the sign in 39.9% of the information communicated. The
same conclusions can be drawn for the measures adopted in disclosing information: over
half of the disclosed information is not qualified by the estimation of expected impacts.
With respect to the outlook orientation, disclosed items are more focused on the present
and the past than on the friture. Almost half of the information released (49.5%) concerns
the disclosure of action or decisions already taken in order to face risks, while management
programs remain substantially undisclosed. In fact, only 16.2%) of the items communicated
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Table 3
Descriptive statistics: risk factors and semantic properties
A' Mean Minimum Maximum Standard
de%iation
Quantity Disclosure 85 "508 60.68
Content
Economic sign
Type of measure
Outlook orientation
Company characteristics 50.9
Financial structure 85 18.4 58 13.5
Corporate structure 85 7.3 10.1
Teciinological structure 85 7.1 25 5.3
Organization 85 5.6 25 6.6
Business processes 85 12.5 59.4 13.9
Company strategy 35.9
Strateg>' 85 35.9 77.5 16.6
Environment around the company 13.2
Environment: political, economic. 85 3.5 25 5.4
financial, social, natural
Industrv 85 5 65.5 9.6
Legal - regulator)' 85 8.2 63.6 13.4
Negative 85 4.8 30.7 5.8
Equal 85 0.4 6.2 1.1
Positive 85 10.3 59 8.8
Not disclosed 85 84.5 39.9 1 11.7
Financial 34.1
Quantitative 85 9 79.5 11.5
Qualitative 85 25.1 80 16.8
Nonfinancial 12.1
Qualitative 85 5.9 37.2 6.3
Quantitative 85 6.2 30.5 7.2
Not disclosed 85 53.8 6.1 90.9 18.5
Actions or decision taken 85 49.5 87.5 20.8
Programs 85 16.2 57.5 13.2
Hypothesis - expectations 85 14.9 75 12.8
.Acttial state 85 19.4 76.8 r-
pertain to information concerning risk-management programs. This kind of communica-
tion beha\"ior represents a loss of the rele\ance of annual reports for external investors and
other stakeholders.
The second t\'pe of insight comes from the analysis of the relation between the risk
factors and the semantic properties that ennch the disclosure. In Tables 4 and 5. the
relationship between nsk factors and both economic sign and t>pe of measures are
analyzed. WTiat emerges is an e\"ident association in both cases (the chi-square test of
association is statistically significant at the 1% le\el).
Table 4 shows, in addition to the clear evidence ofnondisclosing behavior ofthe analyzed
companies, that the information about expected future performance is disclosed more in
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Table 4
Risk factors by economic sign
Negative Equal Positive Not Disclosed Total
Financial structure 90 16 238 777 1121
% 8.03 1.43 21.23 69.31
Corporate structure 20 1 53 470 544
% 3.68 0.18 9.74 86.40
Technological structure 1 8 184 193
% 0.52 0.00 4.15 95.34
Organization 1 15 339 355
% 0.28 0.00 4.23 95.49
Business processes 15 91 550 656
% 2.29 0.00 13.87 83.84
Strategy 86 6 161 2052 2305
% 3.73 0.26 6.98 89.02
Environment: political, economic. 28 1 32 178 239
financial, social, natural
% 11.72 0.42 13.39 74.48
Industry 29 50 209 288
% 10.07 0.00 17.36 72.57
Legal - regulatory 38 1 7 640 686
% 5.54 0.15 1.02 93.29
Total 308 25 655 5399 6387
% 4.82 0.39 10.26 84.53
Statistics df Value P value
Chi-square 24 488,5671 <.0001
Cramer V 0.1557
association with financial structure (30.69%), industry (27.43%), and external environment
(25.42%), than with business processes (16.16%) and corporate structure (13.60%).
One of the most important dimensions of the disclosure of information assessing future
performance is that pertaining to strategies. Although this dimension is relevant in driving
the disclosure of analyzed companies, only 10.98% of the information explicitly disclose
elements concerning expected impacts of future performance.
Looking at Table 5, we see the relative dominance of different types of languages in
communicating business perspectives: financial measures (both qualitative and quantita-
tive) dominate in the case of financial structures; in referring to industry and environment,
nonfmancial measures typically prevail.
We derive some preliminary conclusions from the analysis made by using the proposed
framework. First, analyzed firms voluntarily disclose some information concerning their
future strategies but avoid communicating about their expected impact, not only in
quantitative terms, but even in economic direction (expected profit or loss). Second,
voluntary disclosure appears systematically biased towards management's self-justification
of expected negative impacts: the rich disclosure of the expected limitations to business
coming fi-om new regulations is a clear symptom. Third, analyzed firms prefer to disclose
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Table 5
Risk factors by type of measure
Financial Nonfmancial Not disclosed Total
Qualitative Quantitative Qualitative Quantitative
Financial structure 353 475 36 34 223 1121
% 31.49 42.37 3.21 3.03 19.89
Corporate structure 9 179 13 71 272 544
% 1.65 32.90 2.39 13.05 50.00
Technological structure 2 57 6 6 122 193
% 1.04 29.53 3.11 3.11 63.21
Organization 3 19 11 62 260 355
% 0.85 5.35 3.10 17.46 73.24
Business processes 31 75 56 117 377 656
% 4.73 11.43 8.54 17.84 57.47
Strategy 127 643 127 41 1367 2305
% 5.51 27.90 5.51 1.78 59.31
Environment: political, economic. 19 45 61 22 92 239
financial, social, natural
% 7.95 18.83 25.52 9.21 38.49
Industry 12 48 63 30 135 288
% 4.17 16.67 21.88 10.42 46.88
Legal - regulatory 19 63 5 12 587 686
% 2.77 9.18 0.73 1.75 85.57
Total 575 1604 378 395 3435 6387
% 9.00 25.11 5.92 6.18 53.78
Statistics df Value P value
Chi-square 32 2,115,884 <.0001
Cramer V 0.2878
management's thoughts and expectations on the future rather than to communicate the
decisions and actions taken in the realm of risk management. Therefore, by using the
semantic properties of the disclosure to deepen the analysis, it is possible to deduce that
analyzed firms are clearly oriented towards a policy of "formal disclosure but substantial
nondisclosure" of the expected impact of risk factors on future performance.
Besides the insights drawn from the analysis of risk factors in relation to their semantic
properties, the framework for the analysis of risk communication allows us to evaluate the
quantify of the disclosure according to the dimensions of relative quantity, density, depth,
and outlook profde.
To evaluate the quality of disclosure using the traditional framework, some factors
which determine the quantity of voluntary disclosure has been studied both in theoretical
and empirical literature. While their effect over the quantity of disclosure appears
controversial for the majority of them, it appears clear for two: size and industry (see
Ahmed & Courtis, 1999; Belkaoui & Karpik, 1989; Cooke, 1989, 1992; Lang &
Lundholm, 1993; Raffoumier, 1995).
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Regarding the size effect, Leftwich, Watts, and Zimmerman (1981) suggest that the
proportion ofoutside capital tends to be higher for larger companies: because companies that
borrow a higher proportion of their assets from banks tend to disclose more to meet the
information needs of their lenders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), it can be argued that size is a
strong driver for disclosure. Moreover, Cooke (1989) argues that, as high level financial
communication requires a wide variety of highly skilled individuals and the larger a
company is, the higher its capability to attract these people, company size is an enabler
for disclosure. Empirical evidence of the size effect has been offered in several studies
(Adihikary & Tondkar, 1992; Ahmed & Courtis, 1999; Belkaoui & Kapik, 1989; Cooke,
1992; Firth, 1979; Healy & Palepu, 1994; Richardson & Welker, 2001; Robb et al., 2001).
With respect to the industry effect, Cooke (1992) reports that companies are pressed to
disclose industry-related information in their annual reports by external investors who
need to assess the company's relative position in an industry (Dye, 1985; Lev & Zarowin,
1 999). However, disclosure within an industry may also be shaped by the behavior of a
dominant company (Cooke, 1992). Historical reasons may cause a bandwagon effect
(Cooke, 1989) and the international exposure of a particular industry might also affect the
extent of disclosure (Raffoumier, 1995). In the specific case of risk disclosure, the role of
industry can be further emphasized because the technological and market constraints
exerted by the competitive, industrial environment on business models significantly
influence the risk profile of companies. Moreover, the types of risks a company faces
are strictly related to both the unique critical-success factors and to the typical business
models of an industry.
Table 6
Regression model for relative quantity
4f F statistics Prob > F
Model 8 9.4 <.0001
Error 76
Total 84
Adjusted R~ .464
Parameter Standard deviation / Statisitic P value
Intercept -212.359 39.370 -5.39 <.001**
Transport - 4.903 18.882 -0.26 .795
Electronic 19.670 16.792 -0.26 .795
Clothing 2.843 16.292 0.17 .707
Food 8.445 22.381 0.38 .707
Utility 14.390 17.990 0.80 .426
Media 25.882 20.266 1.28 .205
Size 21.787 2.905 7.50 <.001**
'Significant at 1%.
QNT — !Xo + cc\ X transport + ai x electronic + a3 x clothing + a4 x food + as x utility + 0C(, x media
+ a? X size
QNT: amount of risk disclosure; transport, electronic, clothing, food, utility, media = if company does not
belong to the industry, = 1 if does; size = natural logarithm of turnover
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To verify that the proposed dimensions for analysis and the synthetic index are not
influenced by factors as industry and size, an OLS model has been estimated for each of
the dimensions. Referring to the relative-quantity^ dimension, it is independent from
industry and size per construction. In fact, it corresponds to the standardized residuals of
the regression where the dependent variable is the amount of disclosure and the
independent variables represent size and industry factors.
The results of the regression (Table 6) confirm the findings of previous literature about
the size effect while showing that industry is not statistically significant in explaining the
amount of disclosure. As a consequence, absolute quantity can be used to rank firms
belonging to different industries because the amount of disclosure does not depend on the
sector in which a company operates.
The four indices obtained from the analysis of the MD&As were standardized
according to Eq. (6) and the quality index has been calculated as their arithmetic mean.
Table 7 contains the descriptive statistics of the four standardized components for the
quality of the disclosure and the overall index.
The four standardized indices and the overall index can be used to rank companies. The
cross-sectional comparison is particularly effective when disclosure is not regulated (as
regulation influences the content and the modalities through which information is
communicated) and when it is not driven by industry. Thus, it is important to verify to
which extent the proposed indices depend on the factors identified in literature as drivers
of voluntary disclosure.
Starting from the theoretical framework for the analysis of the disclosure of risks,
four regression models were calculated: three models refer to three dimensions of the
analysis of risk communication {densit}\ depth, and outlook). The relative quantity was
not considered because it is netted from size and industry effect per construction. The
fourth model refers to the overall quality index. The independent variables of the
regression models are size (the natural log of the turnover was used because the
turnover was positively skewed) and the dummies (ind,) representing the industry to
which the companies belonged. The results of the regression models are presented in
Table 8.
Some of the dimensions proposed for the analysis of risk disclosure reveal total
independence from size and industry. The density and outlook regression models show that
size and industry do not have any effect over each of these two indices. The statistical
results of these models are not significant because the F test did not reject the null
hypothesis {P=.55 and .71, respectively). As a consequence, the density and the outlook
Table 7
Descriptive statistics of the indices for assessing the quahty of risk disclosure
Index N Mean Standard Minimum Median Maximum
(standardised) deviation
RQT 85 0.36482 0.15091 0.33014 1
DEN" 85 0.34925 0.22677 0.33796 1
DPT' 85 0.43335 0.19727 0,43417 1
opr 85 0.58491 0.24286 0.62895 1
QuaHty 85 0.43308 0.10082 0.2 1996 0.44821 0.67871
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Table 9
Regression model for quality
df F statistics Prob > F
Model 8 1.83 .09
Error 76
Total 84
Adjusted R' .1441
Parameter Standard deviation t Statistic P value
Intercept 0.408 0.083 4.89 <.0001**
Transport 0.031 0.040 0.79 .430
Electronic - 0.002 0.035 0.61 .541
Clothing -0.017 0.035 0.61 .541
Food 0.082 0.047 1.74 .085
Utility 0.047 0.038 1.25 .214
Media 0.024 0.042 0.58 .562
Size 0.002 0.006 0.33 .744
** Significant at 1%.
Quality = Xq + ai x transport + a2 x electronic + X3 x clothing + ^4 x food + as x utility + as x media
+ a? X size
Quality: standardized index of risk disclosure quality; transport, electronic, clothing, food, utility, media = if
company does not belong to the industry, =1 if it does; size = natural logarithm of turnover.
profile indices can be used to rank all the companies listed in this specific financial market
independently fi^om size and industry.
On the contrary, size and industry seem to be statistically significant in relation to
depth. The depth regression model shows that two industries (utility and chemical) are
statistically significant in regard to disclosure but not to size. The intense process of
mergers and acquisitions that utilities have undergone during the last 5 years, as a
consequence of the deregulation of the industry requested by Italian law, may explain
this result. Additional qualitative and quantitative information on mergers and acquis-
itions are mandatory according to the requirements from Consob (the regulatory body of
the Italian Stock Exchange).^ Disclosure by chemical companies has a lower depth than
disclosures by companies in other industries. This may be explained by the fact that all
the chemical companies we analyzed also issue an additional social and environmental
annual report in which the quantitative information disclosed mainly refers to business
processes.
The regression of the index of disclosure quality (Table 9) shows that it is
influenced neither by size nor by industry. It implies that this measure can be used
to rank companies according to the quality of the disclosure of risks without any
adjustment because the two main factors were to be drivers of disclosure behavior for
listed companies.
Regolamento di Attuazione del Decreto Legislativo del 24.2.1998, n. 58 (art. 71, Allegato 3A).
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8. Conclusions
In this paper, we argue that, because the disclosure of risk is intrinsically narrative, the
quantity of disclosure is not a satisfactory proxy for the quality of disclosure. We contend
that, while sound disclosure should present the firm's situation and perspectives through
the eyes of management, the quality of disclosure depends both on the quantity of
information disclosed and on the richness of its content. We argue that richness is a
function of the type of content disclosed (risk factors), the type of measures used to
disclose the expected impacts of considered factors (type and economic sign of measures),
and the approach management adopted to disclose identified risks.
A multidimensional framework for the analysis of the voluntary disclosure of risks that
integrates all those dimensions is proposed. For each dimension, an index is calculated that
offers a measure of the intensity of that aspect of communication. Considered together, the
four indices can help profile the disclosure offered by a company. Thus, a diagram that
graphically represents the risk-communication profile of a company is built by arranging
the four dimensions along two axes. Moreover, an overall index of quality-of-risk
communication is calculated that could potentially be used to rank companies.
To give substance to the proposed methodology for quality assessment, the framework
was applied to the disclosure of risks made by Italian nonfinancial listed companies in
their annual MDifeA.
To verify that the proposed dimensions for analysis and synthetic index were not
influenced by factors such as industry and size, an OLS model was calculated. The
regression for the index of disclosure quality shows that it is not influenced either by size
or industry. Thus, this synthetic measure can be used to rank the quality of the disclosure
of risks without any adjustment for the two main factors recognized in the literature as
powerful drivers of disclosure behavior of listed companies.
In conclusion, we firmly believe that the framework proposed here should be
considered as a first attempt to align the methodologies used for the analysis of risk
disclosure with the complexity of the issue, thus avoiding shortcuts represented by the
mere counting of disclosed items. To refine the proposed framework and to improve its
diagnostic properties, fiiture research should address a few critical issues. First, an analysis
of the strategies adopted by investors in analyzing risk disclosure is required to appreciate
the relevance of the different dimensions considered. Second, the proposed framework
should be applied to verify the extent to which the quality of risk disclosure is influenced
by the degree of regulation imposed by external environment in which firms operate.
Third, analysis should be conducted to verify if the proposed dimensions and the proposed
synthetic index are related to the cost of capital.
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1. Introduction
This paper represents an initial attempt to measure the quahty of fums' risk disclosures.
The paper contributes to the literature by eliciting a number of important questions. What
defines disclosure quality? Is disclosure quality measurable? What information aids
investors in their assessment of fum risk and how do investors use this information in
developing their risk perceptions?
I commend Beretta and Bozzolan (BE) (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004) for tackling two
extraordinarily difficult issues: one related to the definition of disclosure quality and the
other related to risk disclosure. However, the paper falls short of achieving its primary
purpose
—
producing a framework for measuring risk-disclosure quality. In the following
paragraphs I explain why.
2. What defines disclosure quality?
BB begin by stating that the quality of disclosure depends on the quantity of information
disclosed and the richness of its content. As the paper progresses, BB further develop the
concepts of quantity and richness, but for now, I wish to focus on their initial basic premise.
BB provide no support for the notion that Quality =y(quantity, richness of content). This
is troubling since it is the crux of their proposed fi-amework for measuring risk-disclosure
quality. While it is true that no universally accepted notion of disclosure quality exists, the
conceptual fi-ameworks of the International Accounting Standards Board (lASB) and the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) provide guidance regarding generally
accepted notions of information quality (lASB, 1989; FASB, 1980). These well-known
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frameworks could provide the foundation needed to support a framework for assessing
disclosure quality.
For example, the lASB framework identifies four qualitative characteristics of infor-
mation that enhance the usefulness of information to economic decision makers: (1)
understandability, (2) relevance, (3) reliability, and (4) comparability. Presumably, high-
quality information is information that helps users make informed economic decisions.
Accordingly, based on this, I offer the alternative premise that Quality =y(understand-
ability, relevance, reliability, comparability).
Whether this or some other premise is employed, it is essential that the development of
a framework for measuring-risk disclosure quality begin with well-supported and
convincing discussions of the characteristics of information that define disclosure quality
and why the characteristics selected are essential ingredients of disclosure quality. At
present, BB's discussion does not exhibit the rigor required to support the development of
a framework for assessing disclosure quality.
3. Is disclosure quality measurable?
BB suggest that their framework, which captures disclosure quality as opposed to
quantity, overcomes the shortcomings associated with prior disclosure-measurement
frameworks buih upon counts of disclosure items. I contend, however, that all disclo-
sure-measurement frameworks designed to date, including the BB framework, ultimately
rest upon mere counts of disclosure items and the maintained hypothesis that quantity and
quality are positively related. It may be that disclosure quality has defied direct
measurement despite our best efforts to quantify it because disclosure quality is inherently
immeasurable.
To illustrate the potentially insurmountable problems associated with any effort to
quantify disclosure quality, I will begin with the premise that Quality =y(understand-
dability, relevance, reliability, comparability). I focus on this premise because it has the
advantage of being grounded in the lASB's and FASB's generally accepted conceptual
frameworks, and, as discussed above, I believe it is critically important to begin with a
well-supported premise of disclosure quality. However, concerns, similar to those
expressed below, could also be offered to question the quantifiability of BB's notion
of richness of content.
Consider first the qualitative characteristic of understandability. In assessing whether
risk disclosures are understandable, one must first consider the question: Understandable
to whom? For example, a researcher might assume that the relevant consumers of firms'
risk disclosures are sophisticated investors. Altematively, one might argue that high-
quality risk disclosures are those that are understandable to less sophisticated investors.
Different perspectives regarding the target group may lead to differences in instruments
and/or cross-firm rankings of the understandability of frnns' risk disclosures. Ultimately,
the perspective adopted must be a function of the research question for which the
disclosure rankings are developed. Thus, frameworks for assessing disclosure quality
cannot be created in a vacuum, but must be created for use in addressing a particular
research question.
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Having identified the target group, to truly measure the degree of understandabiUty of
firms' risk disclosures to that group, one would have to design an instrument or procedure
that allows the researcher to measure and quantify the essentially qualitative characteristic
of understandability without resorting to mere counts of disclosure items. To do otherwise
yields an instrument that captures disclosure quantity and then invokes the maintained
hypothesis that quantity and quality are positively related in an attempt to produce a cross-
firm ranking of the degree of understandability of risk disclosures. It is difficult to
conceive of an instrument or procedure that measures the degree of understandability, does
not incorporate counts of items, is not too subjective, and is not prohibitively costly to use.
Consider next the qualitative characteristic of relevance. Relevance is also a function of
the user group of interest. Someone assessing the risk associated with an equity position in
a firm may focus on risk disclosures that are irrelevant to someone assessing bankruptcy
risk. Consequently, the researcher must begin by considering the question: Relevant to
whom? And this determination must be made in the context of an immediate research
question. Having identified the target group, the researcher must then have some idea of
which risk disclosures are relevant, but presently, little evidence exists in the literature to
guide this selection. Thus, before a researcher could attempt to design an instrument to
measure risk-disclosure relevance, the researcher would have to undertake a study to
identify which risk disclosures are the relevant ones to consider. Finally, the researcher
would have to design an instrument or procedure that allows the researcher to measure and
quantify the essentially qualitative characteristic of relevance without resorting to mere
counts of disclosure items.
The third qualitative characteristic, reliability, may be the most difficult to assess. The
lASB conceptual framework states that reliable information represents the underlying
economics of the transaction faithfully, captures the economic substance of the transaction
as opposed to its legal form, is free from bias, and complete within the bounds of
materiality and cost. Thus, the researcher must be able to observe the underlying
economics of the transaction before the researcher can assess the reliability of the firm's
risk disclosure. Frequently, however, this information is not observable to parties external
to the firm. Consequently, designing an instrument or procedure that allows the researcher
to measure and quantify the essentially qualitative characteristic of reliability without
resorting to mere counts of disclosure items may be impossible in many settings.
The final qualitative characteristic of disclosure quality that the lASB framework
evokes is comparability. Higher quality risk disclosures are comparable across time for a
given firm and comparable across firms at a given point in time. This suggests that the
researcher undertake a time-series analysis of firms' risk-disclosure practices to assess the
intertemporal comparability of those disclosures. Moreover, each firm's risk disclosures
should be compared with some standard of disclosure (an industry norm, e.g.) to assess the
cross-firm comparability of risk disclosures. Finally, these comparisons should employ
more than a mere count of the items disclosed. Instead, the quality (i.e., degree of
understandability, relevance, and reliability) of the risk disclosures should be compared in
time series and cross-section.
In summary, quantifying the qualitative characteristics underlying disclosure quality is
extraordinarily difficult for several reasons. First, the issue of what defines disclosure
quality must be satisfactorily addressed. Second, the researcher must recognize that
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effective frameworks for assessing disclosure quality are likely to be context specific.
Finally, even if it is possible to conceive of a procedure for quantifying the attributes of
disclosure quality, it may be virtually impossible to employ the procedure in an
empirical setting due to lack of information, the need for excessive judgment, or
prohibitive cost.
4. Does the BB framework capture disclosure quantity or quality?
I believe that a carefiil assessment of the measures comprising BB's disclosure-quality
metric reveals that their framework is no different from the frameworks designed to date in
the following important respect: BB's framework employs counts of disclosure items.
Accordingly, the authors measure the quantity of disclosure provided and, consequently,
must invoke the maintained hypothesis that quantity and quality are positively related if
they wish to interpret their metric as a measure of disclosure quality.
BB's quality metric (QUALITY) is comprised of four components: relative quantity
(RQT), density (DEN), depth (DPT), and outlook profile (OPR). RQT is the number of
sentences in a firm's annual report containing risk disclosures in excess of the average
number of such sentences provided by firms of the same size and in the same industry as
the firm in question. ' DEN is the number of sentences in the annual report containing risk
disclosures, scaled by the number of sentences in the annual report. DPT is the sum of two
ratios. The first ratio included in DPT is computed by dividing the number of sentences in
the annual report containing forecast information by the number of risk items disclosed.^
The second ratio included in DPT is computed by summing the number of sentences
containing qualitative forecasts and twice the number of sentences containing quantitative
forecasts and dividing the sum by the number of risk items disclosed. Finally, OPR is the
ratio of the number of sentences that identify risk-related actions or programs to the
number of risk items disclosed.
It is clear that each component of BB's quality metric is comprised of a scaled count of
disclosure items. Thus, regardless of how the measure is described, it is clear that
QUALITY is the outcome of a weighted count of the number of items disclosed. In this
sense, BB's metric is no different from prior attempts to quantify disclosure levels, and, as
such, it is inappropriate for BB to claim that their framework overcomes the shortcomings
of prior attempts to assess disclosure quality by measuring the quantity of information
provided.
' It is not entirely clear from the paper whether the authors consider the entire annual report in their analysis
or limit their analysis to the MD&A. For example, in Section 5 of the paper in the discussion preceding Eq. (2),
the authors state, "We define density of communication as the ratio between the number of sentences in which
risk information is provided over the total number of sentences included in the MD&A (Eq. (2))." However, in
their description of the variables employed in Eq. (2), the authors refer to the number of sentences in the annual
report. This discrepancy also arises in the authors' discussion of their measure of depth found in Section 5. For
purposes of my discussion, I assume that the authors considered the entire annual report when forming their
sentence counts.
^ It appears the authors use the phrases "risk items" and "sentences in the annual report containing risk
disclosures" interchangeably.
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5. From richness of content to density, depth, and outlook profile
The development of BB's framework from their initial premise that Quality =y(quantity
and richness of content) to their empirical measure, QUALITY, which is based on the
arithmetic mean of standardized values of RQT, DEN, DEP and OPR, is difficult to follow
and is not sufficiently well developed. To illustrate, I will sketch out the development of
BB's framework.
BB begin by stating that Richness of Content =y(semantic properties of information
concerning future prospects). The link between risk disclosures and information about
future prospects is not sufficiently well-developed in the paper. Perhaps my confusion
stems from a lack of understanding of what BB mean when they use the term "risk." Are
they referring to the nondiversifiable risk that a given investment presents? This is
consistent with their statement in Section 2 that "Insufficient or inaccurate communication
of existing risk and uncertainties by listed companies can severely undermine the
capabilities of external investors to deal effectively with risk diversification in the
management of their investment portfolios." But, if so, why is information concerning
friture prospects particularly helpftil in assessing nondiversifiable risk? Or are they
referring to the volatility of future cash flows, which may reflect both diversifiable and
nondiversifiable risks? This is consistent with their statement in Section 3 that "Both
CICA and ICAEW frameworks suggest to focus risk disclosure on the sources of
uncertainties that affect volatility. . .". But again, if this is the case, why is information
concerning future prospects helpful to investors in assessing the volatility as opposed to
the level of ftiture cash flows? Or are they referring to information that enhances investors'
ability to forecast the level of future cash flows, which is consistent with the authors'
statement in Section 2 that "The role of forward-looking information in voluntary
disclosure has been found to be associated with a more accurate analysts' earnings
forecasts. . .". But if this is the case, why is information useful in deriving a point estimate
of a future outcome considered a "risk disclosure," when that term generally refers to the
uncertainty (i.e., variance) of ftiture cash flows as opposed to the level?
BB continue the development of their framework for the analysis of risk disclosures by
stating, in Section 4, that Quality =y(content, economic sign, type of measure, outlook
orientation). They then state that content =y(strategy, firm characteristics, technological
structure, business processes, environment) and the semantic properties of information
concerning future prospects =y(economic sign, type of measure). At this point, it is unclear
whether outlook orientation is a semantic property of information or a different type of
factor. Moreover, the critical link between each of the four factors (content, economic sign,
type of measure, and outlook orientation) and their components and investors' assessment
of risk is not entirely clear.
Continuing with the development of their framework, BB state in Section 5 that
Quantity =y(quantity (strictu sensu), density) and semantic properties =y(depth, outlook
profile), but throughout the development of the framework, the reader is left wondering
why. Why is quantity a function of density? Why is depth or outlook profile a semantic
property of information? Why does disclosure with these attributes inform investors'
perceptions of risk? BB then go on to develop their empirical measures of quantity (strictu
sensu), density, depth, and outlook profile based on scaled counts of various risk items
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disclosed, but with little support for the move from theoretical construct to empirical
measure. For example, density captures the extent to which risk-related information is
dispersed throughout the financial statements corresponding to a "hiding the needle in the
haystack" problem. BB measure density by taking the ratio of risk-disclosure sentences to
the total number of sentences in the annual report, but is this an effective measure of the
"needle in the haystack" effect? Perhaps density should be measured by computing the
average number of non-risk-disclosure sentences between risk-disclosure sentences? How
density should be measured empirically is not clear, and perhaps, the authors' approach is
the most appropriate, but at present, the authors provide insufficient support for the move
from theoretical construct to empirical measure for this and their other variables.
At the end of the day, BB finds that their index of disclosure quality is not influenced
by either the size of the firm or its industry membership. They conclude that their measure
can be used to rank risk-disclosure quality without any adjustment for the two main effects
identified in prior literature as "powerful drivers of the disclosures behavior of listed
companies". However, an alternative interpretation of BB's finding is that given the issues
discussed above, the resulting index fails to adequately capture cross-sectional variation in
nsk-disclosure quality and, for this reason, is not related to firm characteristics found in
prior research to explain disclosure behavior.
6. Where do we go from here?
As I noted at the outset of my comments, this paper elicits a number of important
questions related to disclosure quality. What defines disclosure quality? Is disclosure
quality measurable? Is the maintained hypothesis that disclosure quantity and quality are
positively related descriptive? These are critically important questions about which we
know very little. They are worthy of careful assessment, and addressing these questions
may represent a necessary next step in the advancement of disclosure research. 1 suspect
that while some of these questions may be answerable in a general setting (e.g.. What
defines disclosure quality?), others and the development of frameworks for assessing
disclosure quality must be addressed in the context of a specific research question.
This paper also elicits a number of important questions related to risk disclosure. What
information aids investors in their assessment of risk? How do investors use this
information in developing their risk perceptions? Do investors use risk disclosures to
assess diversifiable risk, nondiversifiable risk, volatility of fiiture cash flows, or in forming
risk-adjusted forecasts of future cash flows? How do investors' perceptions of risk impact
stock price? These too are difficult but critically important questions to consider. But, these
questions extend well beyond the boundaries of accounting research, such that it may be
that some of them will be best addressed in partnership with researchers outside the field
of accounting, in the field of behavioral finance for example.
In conclusion, I commend the authors for attempting an ambitious project related to the
assessment of the quality of firm risk disclosures. I believe their paper will engender
interest into the definition of disclosure quality and the assessment of risk disclosure.
However, I believe much remains for future research to accomplish in terms of developing
a framework for the analysis of firm risk communication.
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1. Introduction
As a discussant of a conference paper, one is faced with the issue of writing up your
discussion of the conference paper or with writing up a discussion of the revised
postconference paper (sort of a moving target). Under the former strategy, some of the
comments made at the conference are no longer relevant, as the revised paper has
incorporated responses to these comments. In the latter strategy, the discussion could be
extremely short if the paper has incorporated responses to many of the discussant
comments. In this discussion, I use a mixed strategy—I present some of my comments
from the conference and how these comments were addressed in the revision as well as
some additional comments on the revised paper.
As I noted at the conference, I questioned why I agreed to act as a discussant on
this paper—I have yet to conduct a voluntary-disclosure-based study and I have no
work in the area of risk disclosures. About my only qualifications are that I am an
archival empiricist and that also early in my career I proposed a new method of
estimating corporate marginal tax rates using computer simulations.
2. Brief summary of the paper
The objective of the paper is to develop an index that measures a firm's voluntary
disclosures about its risks. The index is composed of four elements that are aggregated
into an overall measure between zero and four. The proposed index is illustrated by
application to a sample of Italian firms. The motivation for the development of a
disclosure index is that prior indices (e.g., Botosan, 1997) focus mostly on the quantity
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of disclosures (number of sentences or references to a particular disclosure issue). This
is certainly a worthwhile motivation, and thus, the paper can be viewed as a
methodological paper proposing a new methodology.
How does one evaluate a paper that proposes a new methodology? New method-
ologies are generally welcomed if they are easy to implement by other researchers and
if they are valid measures of the underlying construct. Examples of widely cited new
(at the time of their introduction) models are the simple market model in capital
market studies, the residual-income model (Ohlson, 1995), the Jones discretionary
accrual model (Jones, 1991), the simulated marginal corporate tax rate (Shevlin, 1991),
and so forth. Note that the Botosan disclosure index approach has not been widely
used because it requires extensive hand collection by the researcher. The proposed
index in this paper requires even more extensive data collection and subjective
judgment in its compilation. The simulated corporate marginal tax rate is very difficult
to program and estimate. When approached by other tax researchers, I supplied the
Fortran program that performed the simulations, but the general consensus was that the
benefits were not worth the cost of learning the program. The approach really gained
momentum when John Graham at Duke (Graham, 1996) posted his simulation
estimates of marginal tax rates for a large-panel sample of U.S. corporations—this
lowered the costs to researchers of using the methodology. In the corporate governance
area, Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (200 1 ) have made available a measure of the power
of top management relative to shareholders for a large sample of U.S. corporations in
the 1990s (the G score). This score is currently being used by a number of
researchers. Short of the current authors preparing and making available their
disclosure index scores for a large sample of U.S. corporations, I conjecture,
unfortunately, that the index will not be widely used. However, that does give the
current authors the opportunity to exploit the index they have constructed on the
current sample.
How does one validate a new methodology? There are a variety of ways—by
analysis of the logic underlying the methodology, by comparing its results with other
related or prior models, by simulation (e.g.. Brown & Wamer, 1980, 1985 evaluating
event study methodologies; Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995 and Kothari, Leone &
Wasley, in press evaluating discretionary-accrual models), and by analytical analysis
(Beaver, 1980, econometric properties of abnormal-return metrics). In this paper, the
only way to really evaluate the construct validity of the index is by detailed analysis of
the logic and components underlying the index. And because I do not have the
background in this area, I will leave this task to others.
Many papers that propose a new methodology do so in the context of conducting a
study in which the new method/measure/index is an integral part of the study (e.g.,
Jones, Shevlin, Botosan, etc.). That does not appear to be the case here. The index is
proposed and developed, then illustrated by application to a sample of Italian fums;
there is no testing of hypotheses about cross-sectional variation in firms' incentives
and costs related to voluntary disclosure. Such an addition would substantially enhance
the MS; however, this does leave the authors topics for future research with their
index. In this regard, I think the authors will benefit by structuring the suggested
extension around the costs and benefits of voluntary disclosure. The benefits include a
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reduction in asymmetric information between the firm and investors such that the firm
might lower its equity or debt cost of capital, a reduction in litigation risk or to
explain poor performance, or managers might voluntarily disclose to reveal their
managerial talent. Some costs related to voluntary disclosure are unexpected outcomes
inconsistent with disclosures (possibly increasing litigation risk), provision of infor-
mation useful to competitors, and, after attending this conference, uncertainty about
how exactly to disclose (especially quantify) information about the risks facing the
firm (e.g., see the papers by Ahmed, Beatty, & Bettinghaus, 2004; Christoffersen &
Pelletier, 2003; Sribunnak & Wong, 2003). The conference paper contains a discussion
about the costs and benefits of voluntary disclosure, but the discussion is fairly generic
and not specific to voluntary disclosures about risks facing the firm. I think the
discussion continues to need to be more specific about the voluntary disclosures of
risk.
3. The index
The conference draft of the paper was somewhat difficult to follow in regard to the
conceptual development of the index and its components, and the revision, while
improved, is still a little difficult to follow. To aid the reader (and myself), I summarize
what I perceive to be the fi^amework. The authors argue, "attention has to be paid not
only to how much is disclosed but also to how and what it is disclosed" (p. 7). They
then develop their fi-amework which considers four different dimensions (p. 7): "The
content of information disclosed; the economic sign attributed to expected impacts; the
type of measures used to quantify and qualify the expected impacts; the outlook
orientation of risk communication; (the managerial approach to the management of
risks.)" Content is fiirther "redirected "(?) to three categories: (i) strategy (goals for
performance, mission, broad objectives, and way to achieve objectives); (ii) company
characteristics, such as financial structure, corporate structure (changes in ownerships,
mergers, and acquisitions), technological structure, organization, and business process-
es; and (iii) environment around the company (legal and regulatory, political, economic,
financial, social, natural, and industry). At this point, I think the authors have a very
broad view of voluntary risk disclosures, and I would like to see examples of what
they have in mind to make the discussion more concrete for, at least, this reader. I
could envision nearly every sentence in a company's MD&A section (the discussion
used to construct each firm's index) as being concerned with some element of the
above three categories and dimensions.
Interwoven through the discussion here is the phrase/concept semantic properties,
used to describe the economic sign and type of measure used to specify the economic
sign. It is not clear that the phrase semantic properties adds anything to the
development and discussion (other than to confijse me). Finally, outlook orientation
is added to the index to capture "management's approach to risks and the capabilities
and resources devoted to it" (p. 7). The above discussion is summarized by the authors
in their Table 1, which I found extremely helpfiil to help organize their discussion in
the text.
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After having presented the above framework, the authors then propose four empirical
measures:
RQT—relative quantity of disclosures
DEN—density index
DPT—depth index
OPR—outlook profile index
RQT is the difference between the number of sentences of actual risk disclosure
less the number predicted based on industry and size. DEN is the proportion of total
sentences in the MD&A that are risk related. DPT is the sum of two components: the
proportion of total risk-related sentences containing information on expected future
performance and a summation of a variable coded two (one) if a sentence contains
quantitative (qualitative) information on expected future performance (and zero if
there is no risk disclosure). This latter sum is also deflated by the total number of
risk-related sentences. Finally, OPR is the proportion of risk-related sentences
containing information concerning actions taken or programs planned to face
identified risks.
While one might think that these four measures map one-to-one into the four
categories (content, economic sign, type of measures, and outlook orientation), this
does not appear to be the case. RQT and DEN both relate to content. The term
"semantic properties" reemerges but now covers type of measures and orientation of
management. DPT captures the former, while OPR, as the name implies, relates to the
latter (outlook orientation). That is, DPT captures the economic sign and type of
measures. I would like to see a diagram or clearer links between the four empirical
measures and the four categories. My point here is that while I think the empirical
components of the index are all reasonable, I found a gap between these components
and the underlying theoretical development—and recall that this is one approach to
analyzing the validity of any proposed new measure. Nevertheless, I think that the
index, conceptually and operationally, is a large step forward in the construction of a
measure that researchers can use in voluntary-disclosure research.
The authors combine the four elements, after transforming each into variables in the
range zero to one, by simply summing the four elements; thus, the elements are equally
weighted. In the absence of any theory or compelling reason to do otherwise, equal
weighting seems like a reasonable approach. The authors also present a figure
graphically illustrating the four indices and showing how different conclusions (not
surprisingly) might be arrived at using the four indices rather than just the quantity
measure (RQT). hi the conference version of the MS, much was made of the figure as
a useful device to researchers examining voluntary disclosure—the geometric pattems
can be compared across companies to infer disclosure strategies. While this is
technically correct, such comparisons can only be meaningfully conducted on a small
number of firms. In the revised version, the authors correctly point out that the graph
has limited ability in large samples (across firms or across time) to help researchers
analyze disclosure practices (e.g., how does one conduct significance tests on geometric
pattems across a large number of firms?).
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4. Empirical application
The authors then analyze the MD&A disclosures for 85 nonfinancial listed Italian
firms. Italian firms are chosen not only because the authors are Italian but also because
there is very little apparent regulation of the required disclosures on risk factors in the
Italian market. Tables 3-6 present various descriptive statistics on the types of
information underlying the compilation of the four components of the quality index.
Distribution statistics on the components are given in Table 7, while Tables 8 and 9
present the regression results of each component and the overall quality index on
industry dummies and firm size. While there are lots of data presented, it is not clear to
me what the big takeaway is from much of these analyses. The regressions on industry
and firm size are a start to examining cross-sectional variation in voluntary disclosure,
but the two variables are not motivated via links to any hypotheses. I think the paper
would benefit from more development of hypotheses about why we might expect
cross-sectional variation in voluntary disclosure (and this would provide an indirect test
of the validity of the index). Thus, a first extension is to develop a model explaining
the firms' choice of the level of voluntary disclosure. A second extension is to examine
whether firms' voluntary disclosures, as reflected in their index score, is associated
with the firm's equity or debt cost of capital. In this regard, there are several issues to
be considered. First, to be priced as a risk factor, it must be the case that investors
cannot diversiiy the risk arising from differences in the voluntary disclosures. While
some researchers question this assumption, Easley and O'Hara (in press) present a
model where information risk is priced; also, see Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and
Schipper (2004) for an application. Second, because the level of voluntary disclosure
is a choice variable facing the firm, one has to be careful making cause and effect
statements from observed empirical associations. Another way of stating this point is
that the level of voluntary disclosure is an endogenous variable that needs to be
modeled. Thus, this extension can use the model developed in the first extension.
Third, as noted by Ittner and Larcker (200 1 ), if firms are at equilibrium in their choice
of disclosure, then we might reasonably expect no association between the firm's cost
of capital and (1) the firm's predicted level of voluntary disclosure and (2) the level of
voluntary disclosure after modeling (controlling) the underlying determinants of the
firms' choice. This latter is equivalent to predicting no association between the cost of
capital and the residuals (deviations of the actual from the predicted level of voluntary
disclosure) from the first stage disclosure model. However, as noted by Ittner and
Larcker, this is an extreme characterization, and if one thinks firms are not at
equilibrium but are learning, then one might predict that it is costly to be off-
equilibrium, such that there will be a positive association (increasing cost of capital)
between the cost of capital and the absolute value of the residuals.
5. Concluding remarks
The authors are to be commended for thinking about, developing, and then
spending the time to construct an index related to voluntary risk disclosures. The
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underlying approach can be applied to other areas of voluntary disclosure. I
encourage the authors to exploit their data set by (1) developing and testing
predictions about the cross-sectional variation in the disclosure index (and possibly
subsets of the disclosure index) and (2) examining whether the index is associated
with firms' equity and debt cost of capital (as in Botosan, 1997) while noting the
difficulty in conducting such tests.
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Reply to: Discussions of
"A framework for the analysis of firm
risk communication"
Sergio Beretta, Saverio Bozzolan*
Department of Economic Sciences, University of Padova, Via del Santo 33, Padua 35J 23, Italy
The comments made by the discussants on our paper raise legitimate questions. While
we agree with some of the remarks and will take advantage of the many useful suggestions
in our future work, we leave it to the reader to utilize those comments as useful tools to
critically analyze the content of our paper.
What we intend to do in the limited space of this reply section is to clarify some of the
methodological issues underpinning the paper. In particular, we would like to briefly
discuss two basic questions implicitly raised by the discussants. First: why did we center
our framework on the denial that quantity is a sound proxy for quality of disclosure?
Second: why did we feel the need to introduce the concept of "richness" in our framework
when other generally accepted notions of information quality are already available?
Let us start with the first question. The analysis of the Management Discussion &
Analysis (MD&A) sections of the annual reports released by the companies listed on
major financial markets provides evidence of significant differences in the communication
strategies pursued by different firms, both in terms of the content disclosed and how the
content is presented. In particular, we analyzed the MD&As of a large number of
companies listed on the Italian Stock Exchange. At the end of the analysis, we found
for some firms that the MD&A section of the annual report did not add any knowledge to
what we could get from the compulsory sections of the report. For other firms, the
additional content and the way it was presented helped us gain a clearer view of the firm's
situation and prospects. What struck us was also the fact that while some MD&As were
able to concentrate, in a few pages, a variety of relevant information which helped us
better appreciate the corporate risks pending on future results, other MD&As, that were
hundreds of pages long, did not clarify those issues for the reader. This experience
convinced us that disclosing more pieces of information did not make a disclosure more
understandable or relevant. We examined several guides for the voluntary disclosure of
* Corresponding author. Tel: +39-49-827-4233; fax: +39-49-827-4211.
E-mail address: saverio.bozzolan@unipd.it (S. Bozzolan).
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- ::.::'.: is the qualiu" of narrative disclosure. It is seen as
pivotal to the qualit\? of over./ - : : : • c? -g As is pointed our b> the discussants
C^ .:" "^"':'. "" ;:";":--^"' .k.^:-":.:
"
* c -c o>.;re quality' exists. Nonetheless, we
r. , ... —
.
-
^ -
- . : .
"
;- .. .-- -^ : ?: -:..c:ed. Communication is a complex
concq?t iBeame. \'.. .- .v :-.::-:;, I Z >; us. measurement cannot be reduced to
simple, single mea->.^:e>. V\e arg-^e. mereiore. that the one-dimensional approach to
coimnunicalion issues currenth- found in the Uterature—-using the quantir>- of disclosure
as a proxy for qua'.:?.—cir.r.o: p:o\ide meaningful results for what is inlierenth" a
muttidiin^isiGnal c c " : : ~
"
To give substaDv. ' . :ev.:3nve finamework for the analysis of fimi communication.
we focus on risk ^ ::.:.:.•: on and apply our multidimensional framework to the
disclosure of ri^ks - . "onfinancial listed companies in their yearly MD&A.
Our reasons 1^ chc _ . g issue and die population are discussed in the paper.
On this point, we _:.:.:.. ...;;?: : c ^..ggestion to apply this multidimensional
fiamewoik to c^^^e- :- ^ : . . ^.:ntarv^ disclosure (possibly replicating
Aeanalysis o:: ;v..i: ,.;..: . _. fvoluntar." disclosure than the Italian
maiket), and to exploit our c.::.: -.: ; i^ .. r -_ .: ,: ".- _ predictions about the cross-
seddonal variar " - ''^e di^v:lo^a^e uiUcx
Coming to : . . . "d questiorL we felt that the quahtatne characteristics of mfonna-
tion suggested r;- _;;:.: a ';. accepted fr^ameworks like "The Framework for the Prepara-
tion and Presen:auv:.n vif Fmancial Statements" (LASB. 1989) were too abstract to be
operationalized. The problem of operationalizing general principles for purpose of
measuran^t :> : :: : e • Solomons, 1986). It is a problem well known in the field of
quality certifier: r -ji' oiiality management: the principles suggested by standard
setters (e.g., ISC' .-re .:.
:
^adly so they can offer guidance for most simations. But
to be of use in ::?-.. _ , . . nve qualit}' of an operating system or of a business
process, flie s:.v -^ - ^'";^>]e to concrete attributes that can be measured
(Lanqnecht,2L o-ovide a multidimensional framework based on
four measurable .•.?::-.,:. ^ .;- present the multifaceted nature of the
quality of discIvi-^-j-e. ...:... . _ .,: : . -_;v.c time an appreciation of the different
strategies of commimication .•; r:.^ :; irr^rent conaqpanies (the risk-profile diagram).
Again, we received some usetiil comments from the discussants. Like the discussants.
webelie\e diat one of the central issues of our meflxMlological approach is the selection of
flie dim^isions through v^.iiich the qualitx' of \oluntar\" narrative disclosure can be
assessed. Future research should address the issue of how to identifi." rele\"ant dimensions
that could integrate wnth or even substimte for the ones adopted in our proposed
fiamewoik.
We also agree that die quality of voluntary" disclosure should be defined from the user's
pCTspective. In this regard, multidimensional frameworks should be based on a detailed
analysis of the infomiation needs expressed by specific segments of users on specific
issues. This se^ns particularly inqxntant in the case of risk commtinication, given the
muM&ceted nature of ri^
In ctHictusion, we agree tiiat our papa should be considered as an exploration of the
ttqnc a pioneering work and we are conscious of the fact that our choice not to adopt
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consolidated approaches in favor of more experimental ones necessarily bnngs abou: some
limitations—and opportunities for mipro\'ement. Some of the lines for future refinement
(or even for rethinkmg) of the proposed framework are in the comments made by
discussants. Others will come and will contribute to raising the quality of the dd^ate
and to mo\ ing towards better solutions.
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Referral as a determining factor for changing auditors
in the Belgian auditing market: An empirical study
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Abstract
Traditional research on auditor choice and auditor switching focuses on company and audit (or)
characteristics such as size and reputation, level of fees, or audit opinion. These studies seek causal
relationship between changes in these characteristics and changes in auditor. This article claims that
the conclusions of existing research have limited application to smaller companies in a small open
economy like Belgium. We see a need to supplement the research model to reflect the fact that the
decision to choose or switch auditors in subsidiary companies often occurs at the parent level and is
determined by group characteristics rather than local characteristics of the subsidiary. In this article,
we show that "referral," the situation whereby the subsidiary—encouraged by the parent
company—appoints the same auditor as the parent company, must be considered as an explanatory
variable to understand audit-switching behavior in Belgium.
© 2004 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Audit switching; Referral; Subsidiaries
1. Introduction
The increased competition and dynamics of the external market for audit services has
provoked the need to understand the reasons why companies change auditors. One
motivation for the present study is that no previous research has ever dealt with this
subject in Belgium, a country known to have a small open economy, where only a limited
number of large companies exist and where many companies are subsidiaries owned by
other companies (the parent company). Another motivation for this study is that previous
international studies about the factors that determine a change of auditors rely on samples
that mainly include large (e.g.. Top 500, Fortune 1000) and/or listed companies. These
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studies ignore the possibility that small or medium-sized companies engage in specific
audit-switching behavior as a result of their specific characteristics. Part of this oversight
might be due to the assumption that these smaller entities were mainly subsidiaries of
larger companies, and as such were audited by the parents' auditor and therefore would
follow the parents' lead when switching auditors. Our empirical study shows, however,
that this concept of "control unity" dominates but cannot be assumed automatically and
less so in a cross-border setting. This study broadens to include all Belgian audited
companies (not only large companies) and does not assume that control unity exists. We
assume that enlarging the sample will help us gain a better understanding of the causes of
auditor switching in Belgium and, by inference, many other small open economies.
This paper seeks to investigate the importance of referral in the Belgian audit market. In
this article, referral is defined as the situation where "the subsidiary, encouraged by the
parent company, appoints the same auditor as the parent company. " ' Two representations
of referral are tested: (1) the referral conditions at a specific point in time and (2) the
referral action causing audit switching. To test the first representation, a sample of audited
companies was selected. The framework adopted for testing can be described as follows:
Given that an audited company is a subsidiary, is the auditor of the subsidiary the same or
does the auditor belong to the same (international) organization as the parent company?
Results from previous international literature indicate that changes of auditors are
mainly initiated by the audited company and are due to some dissatisfaction with the
former auditor: for example, an excessive audit fee, an unfavorable audit opinion, a
professional error made by the auditor, a search for extra nonaudit services, or the
reputation of the auditor. However, a subsidiary will often be limited in its ability to
change or retain its auditors. The parent company, striving for control unity, is likely to
appoint the same auditor for the subsidiary as for the parent company. Economies of scale
and efficiency are obvious advantages. This referral behavior also suggests that if a parent
company changes auditors the subsidiary will switch to the new auditor. Similarly, if a
subsidiary is acquired by a new parent company, it will take the auditor of the new owner.
Clearly, the initiator of the change in auditor is the parent company, not the subsidiary. To
test our second representation, that referral is a determining factor in changing auditors, we
gathered information from questionnaires completed by the financial managers of
companies that changed auditors during a certain time period. The results of this second
test reveal that the existence of a group relation and the ensuing referral behavior must be
added to the list of characteristics that create conditions conducive to switching auditors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the
literature on referral and auditor changes and defines the research questions. The research
design is described in Section 3, followed by a discussion of the results (and their
limitations) in Section 4. The final section summarizes the study and its principal
conclusions.
' Cf. Cambridge, The International Dictionaty ofEnglish: referral or refer to means "to send (someone or
something) to (a different place or person having more knowledge and power) for information, help, a decision,
etc." The referral concept is also used by the audit practitioners. The auditor of the parent company is granted a
so-called "referral" fee if the auditor is able to "refer" the audit engagement of the subsidiary to an auditor
belonging to the same (international) organization.
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2. Theory, literature review, and hypothesis formulation
This section consists ofthree parts. The first reviews the reasons why a parent company is
hkely to encourage the subsidiary to appoint the same auditor as the parent company
(referral). The second reviews the empirical evidence as well as some of the limitations of
previous international studies on auditor change, and the third formulates the research
questions to be tested.
2. 1
.
Theoretical formulation
If a group relation between two audited firms exists, whereby one company (the
subsidiary) is owned by another company (the parent company), one can justify the
presence of "referral" behavior. In many cases, the auditor of the parent company will
audit both the individual accounts of the parent company and the consolidated accounts of
the group. These consolidated financial statements include data that are audited at the
subsidiary level. Because of this group relation, parent companies strive for control unity.
This offers obvious advantages such as economies of scale and efficiency to both the
group and the auditor of the group. A single audit firm has a comparative advantage over a
consortium of firms. It can prescribe uniform audit procedures, exercise a greater authority
over auditors who are employees or partners, use a monitoring mechanism already in
place, and present the client with a single, continuing firm rather than with a consortium
that might be unstable (Benston, 1985). Thus, the parent company is likely to encourage
the subsidiary to appoint the same auditor as the parent company. Davison, Stening, and
Tan ( 1 984) found evidence for this referral behavior. They conclude that most companies
with interlocking directorates appoint the same auditor. The auditor of the parent company
is often influential in persuading the parent company to strive for control unity. In addition
to the efficiency advantages, the auditor of the parent company may be granted a so-called
referral fee if he is able to "refer" the audit engagement of the subsidiary to an auditor
belonging to the same (international) organization.
2.2. Empirical literature on auditor change
Previous international literature considers several factors that can be associated with
"voluntary" auditor changes. A voluntary auditor change is defined in this paper as a
change that is "initiated by the audited company."
As depicted in Table 1 , the empirical studies show a variety of variables related to an
auditor change. The thinking of the most significant variable is not straightforward
because the findings of these studies differ considerably. Differences in time periods,
research methods, type, and nationality of the companies might explain these differences.
The studies do show, however, a general trend. The level of audit fees seems in most
studies a significant factor for changing auditors. Disputes over accounting principles and
audit opinion on the other hand do not seem to be a significant determinant of auditor
change. The studies also associate changes in client ownership and/or management with a
higher likelihood of a subsequent change in auditors. The incumbent auditor is historically
linked with former management, shareholders, or both. New managers and/or shareholders
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Table 1
Summary of results of main empirical studies
multivariate analysis or questionnaires
investigating the determinants of auditor changes based on
Study author (year) Sample definition Sample Variables tested surrounding auditor changes
size {/;)
Significant Nonsignificant
Burton and Roberts
(1967)
Bedingfield and Loeb
(1974)
Eichenseher and
Shields (1983)
Addams and Davis
(1994)
Addams, Davis, and
Mano (1996)
Marten (1995)
Beattie and Feamley
(1995)
Williams (1988)
USA Fortune 500
USA, all listed
companies
USA, all listed
companies
USA—INC. 500,
All no/zlisted
companies
USA, all listed
companies
Germany, 4850
Untemehmen
United Kingdom,
all listed companies
USA, all hsted
companies (intra
Big-Eight
auditor changes)
137
246
331
237
300
212
Auditor merger
Changes in
management
Additional audit
services
Audit fees
Dissatisfaction
with services
provided by the
auditor
Company mergers
Dispute over
principles
Audit fees
Poor working
relationships
Dissatisfaction
with services
provided by the
auditor
Audit fees
Audit fees
Changes in
shareholders/
management
Audit fees
Audit fees
Dissatisfaction
with audit quality
Changes in
management
Auditor mergers
Company merger
Switch of audit
parmer
Industry expertise
Dispute over
accounting
principles
Audit fees
Company mergers
Rotation policy
New financing
Rotation policy
Switch of audit
partner
Industry expertise
Dispute over
accounting
principles
Rotation
policy/personal
conflicts
Dispute over
accounting
principles
Dispute over
accounting
principles
Opinion shopping
Client size
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Table 1 (continued)
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Study author (year) Sample definition Sample
size (/;)
Variables tested surrounding auditor changes
Significant Nonsignificant
Haskins and Williams USA, all listed 209 Financial distress Audit opinion
(1990) companies (intra of the company
Big-Eight Size and growth of the Initial public
auditor changes company
Audit fee (companies
with weak financial
performance)
Industry expertise
offering
often prefer another auditor with whom they had a favorable relationship in the past. Our
study extends this area of research. We will, however, also consider changes at the
ownership/parent company level and see how these changes—via referral related behav-
ior—affect the auditor choice of the subsidiary company."
Virtually all previous empirical studies base their studies on data from large and/or listed
companies, a very small subset of the total number of audit clients. This makes the findings
difficult to generalize to the population at large. Because prior studies have not considered
smaller companies, many of which are subsidiaries owned by another company (the parent
company), the referral phenomenon is neglected because these studies do not consider in
detail the existence of a group relation between two audited firms, where one company (the
subsidiary) is owned by another company (the parent company). Referral suggests a positive
association between a takeover of a subsidiary by another parent company or a change in
auditor in a parent company, both of which result in a subsidiary's involuntary change in
auditor to the parent company's (new) auditor. We define an involuntary auditor change as a
change that is "initiated by a company other than the audited company (e.g., parent
company), whether or not the audited firm prefers the proposed change."
2.3. Focus of the present study
The previous sections have suggested that there are strong incentives for referral, but
these incentives have not yet been empirically tested in depth. To determine whether this
referral phenomenon is present and important in the Belgian auditing market, the
following two research questions are tested:
( 1 ) Given that an audited company is a subsidiary, is the auditor ofthe subsidiary in a given
year the same as or belongs to the same (international) organization as the parent company?
Some other reasons for voluntary auditor changes include the need for additional services, dissatisfaction with
the (services of the) incumbent auditor, auditor or company mergers, regular rotation policy, and the switch or
retirement ofan audit partner. Francis and Wilson ( 1 988) and DeFond ( 1 992) also suggest that clients in anticipation
or reaction to changes in agency conflicts seem to change auditors. Carpenter and Strawser (1971) and Menon and
Williams ( 1 99 1 ) found evidence that companies going public switch to a larger auditor with a better reputation than
the incumbent auditor because it would add prestige and credibility of the financial statements. A change in the
client's operational, financing, or investing characteristics may also result in an auditor change, as the production
characteristics of the incumbent auditor may no longer be adapted to the changed characteristics of the client and
consequently create inefficiencies (Gigler & Penno, 1995; Johnson & Lys, 1990).
312 J. Branson, D. Breesch / The International Journal of Accounting 39 (2004) 307-326
If this question is answered in the positive, then strong support that referral takes place
will have been found at a given point in time. Our sample of the Belgian auditing market
illustrates that most Belgian firms are subsidiaries.
(2) Given an auditor change, is it initiated by the parent company who proposes its own
auditor?
If this question is answered in the positive, then evidence will have been found that the
referral condition is a determining factor in changing auditors. This evidence can also be used
to gain a better understanding ofthe causes ofauditor switching in many other small countries.
The present study differs from earlier research in one or more of the following ways.
First, we broaden the research to all audited Belgian companies, not only the large and/or
listed audited companies and, second, the tests developed in the present study allow for
specific control of the referral phenomenon and involuntary auditor changes that have so
far not been considered in the auditor change literature.
3. Research design
3.1. Belgian auditing market and legal background
According to Belgian Company Law, companies must appoint an auditor to express an
opinion on the true and fair view of their financial statements, if these companies are
"large," that is, exceed at least two of the following criteria: turnover (excluding VAT)
>6,250,000 euro, asset total >3, 125,000 euro, and number of employees (yearly average)
>50.^ These criteria need to be considered on a consolidated basis ifthe company belongs to
a group that publishes consolidated statements or if the company is a holding or a listed
company. If the total number of employees exceeds 100, the company is always considered
to be large and must appoint an auditor even if the other criteria are not met. Companies that
are not considered large are not obliged but have the option to appoint an auditor. Listed
companies, whatever their size, are obliged to appoint an auditor.
In Belgium, auditors are appointed by the shareholders of a company for a 3 -year
period based on a proposal by the board of directors and with the approval of the Workers
Council, if one exists. Previous research on dominating audit firms (Weets, 2000) shows
that Big Six firms are important in the Belgian auditing market, especially for listed and
affiliated companies. Weets (2000) indicates, however, the existence of a strong compe-
tition between these Big Six firms and other large non-Big Six audit firms. Concentration
ratios in Belgium appear to be lower than in most other countries.
3.2. Sample selection, data sources, and research model
The first research question investigates the extent of referrals in the Belgian auditing
market at a specific point in time and examines information regarding Belgian subsidiaries
^ These criteria are valid for financial statements ending from December 31, 1999. Criteria for financial
statements ending December 31, 1994, till December 30, 1999, were turnover (excluding VAT) >4,957,870 euro,
asset total >2,478,935 euro, and number of employees (yearly average) >50 [1 euro = 40.3399 Belgian francs as
of December 3 1 , 1999].
J. Branson. D. Breesch / The International Journal ofAccounting 39 (2004) 307-326 313
Table 2
Frequencies of country of origin of the parent company of Belgian subsidiaries
Country of origin Frequencies
Belgium 931 48%
The Netherlands 343 18%
France 162 8%
United States 117 6%
Germany 98 5%
United Kingdom 83 4%
Sweden 30 2%
Switzerland 29 2%
Japan 27 1%
Luxembourg 23 1%
Italy 16 1%
Finland 13 1%
Others 50 3%
Foreign 991 52%
Total 1922 100%
and their Belgian or foreign parent companies. The data for this research were collected
from the national database of the Belgian National Bank (November 1997 edition) using
the membership list of all auditors as of December 1995 and December 1996. The sample
includes mainly trade companies governed by company law. Companies governed by
special accounting regulations were not considered. In total, we obtained a list of 15,244
Belgian companies that appointed an auditor in the period 1993-1995/1996 ( = Belgian
auditing market). We then randomly^ selected 3555 of these companies and further
investigated whether they were a subsidiary of a Belgian or foreign parent company.^ Of
the 3555 companies, 242 were removed due to insufficient and/or outdated information.
Of the remaining 3313 companies, 1962 (or nearly 60%) appeared to be subsidiaries of
Belgian or foreign parent companies, illustrating that subsidiaries represent the majority of
the Belgian auditing market. This is a further indication that research on the extent to which
parent companies extend their choice of auditor to their subsidiaries is relevant. Ofthe above
1962 companies, 40 were excluded from the investigation because the subsidiaries were in
liquidation or the information regarding the parent companies was incomplete.
Further analysis of the parent company's country of origin for the remaining 1922
subsidiaries revealed that 48% or 93 1 subsidiaries had Belgian parent companies, whereas
52% or 991 subsidiaries had foreign parent companies. These foreign investors were
mainly based in the Netherlands (18%), France (8%), United States (6%), Germany (5%),
and the United Kingdom (4%) (Table 2).
To investigate whether and to what extent referral exists and parent companies
encourage their subsidiaries to appoint the same auditor, we checked all selected
subsidiaries to determine whether they had the same auditor or an auditor belonging to
'' Using the random fixnction in Microsoft Excel (based on the VAT number), 4000 companies were selected
out of the Belgian auditing market. Elimination of doubles resulted in a sample of 3555 companies.
in the disclosures of the financial statements, which are made public, Belgian companies are obliged to give
information concerning their parent company (name and address), if any.
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the same (international) organization as the parent company's auditor in the year 1995/
1996. All subsidiaries were considered because a single parent company may not
necessarily control all its subsidiaries in the same way.
Our test only considered the auditors of the individual (statutory) accounts and not the
auditors of the consolidated accounts.^ This could bias (understate) our referral results
because a local auditor might be chosen for individual and fiscal purposes, whereas the
same (international) auditor might be chosen for consolidated accounts.
Using the Belgian national database, we found most Belgian parent companies'
auditors (with exceptions due to incomplete and/or incorrect information).'' The identity
of the foreign parent companies' auditors was obtained by contacting foreign professional
organizations, examining specialized publications, and consulting the Intemet. In addition,
we sent out a questionnaire to 456 parent companies. We could identify the auditors of the
related parent companies for 1434 (or 75%) of the subsidiaries. This includes 809 Belgian
parent companies (out of a total of 933 or 87%) and 625 foreign parent companies (out of a
total of 991 or 63%)).^
To test our first research question we consider referral to exist "if, in a given year, the
auditor of the subsidiary is the same or belongs to the same international organization as
the auditor of the parent company." This survey only considers existing parent- subsidiary
relationships and did not consider how these relationships were established (e.g., by
takeover). Incidentally, situations can occur in which a parent company and a subsidiary
have the same auditor, without the parent company having encouraged the subsidiary to
appoint the same auditor as the parent company. In these cases, some "fake" referral could
be observed. In our opinion, however, these cases and the resulting bias are very limited.
Sometimes companies (both parent and/or subsidiaries) appoint more than one auditor
("college of auditors"). If such a college of auditors is appointed, we consider a referral
to exist if one of the auditors of the college of the parent company or subsidiary is the
same or belongs to the same organization as the auditor of the parent company
or subsidiary.
Audit firms belonging to an international organization do not always use their
international brand name in the different countries in which they are located. Often they
use their own local name. We identified the local representatives in the different countries
for the different international Big Six and non-Big Six organizations. An overview of the
local representatives for the leading auditing networks in Europe is included in Appendix A.
Next we examined the second representation, that is, the extent to which referral is a
determining factor in changing auditors. The Belgian auditing market (slightly adjusted
due to database inconsistencies for 15,968 companies who appointed an auditor in 1993-
Belgian companies are obliged to maice up individual accounts without including subsidiaries (statutory
accounts) as well as consolidated accounts including subsidiaries.
If the Belgian parent company appeared to be a bank or an insurance company, for which no information is
included in the national database, other sources were used to identify the auditor (e.g., public annual report by the
Board of Directors, Intemet, or direct communication with the organization).
A bias can occur as a result of the way the auditor information was collected. We could identify the auditor
for the majority (87%) of Belgian parent companies in our research. For the foreign parent companies, only 63%
of the auditors could be identified. This data collection bias can lead to differences between Belgian and foreign
referral percentages.
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1995/1996 (see above)) was also the primary data source for this part of the study. A total
of 1688 changes were found for the 15,968 companies in 1994 and 1995. This corresponds
with a yearly average audit-switch rate of 5.3%.
To gather information on the rationale behind these changes of auditor, we conducted a
mail survey in January 2000. The questionnaire (included in Appendix B) was sent to the
financial controllers of all companies that switched auditors. They were asked to indicate the
most important reason(s) for their auditor change out of a list of 1 4 possible reasons. This list
was compiled based on the existing international literature, our referral results, and an in-
depth examination of all structural changes on the supply side of the Belgian auditing
industry. The 14 possible reasons take into account involuntary as well as voluntary
changes. The involuntary changes include changes initiated by the parent company (referral)
and the auditor. The voluntary changes include changes initiated by the audited company
due to changes in management and/or shareholders and/or due to some dissatisfaction with
the incumbent auditor (insufficient experience in the company's industry, limited supply of
nonaudit services, not enough prestige, professional error, high audit fee, disagreement
regarding accounting policies and audit opinion, not enough personal treatment). In
addition, a blank space was left for additional remarks and other possible reasons.
4. Results
As demonstrated in Table 3, our survey revealed that 76% of Belgian subsidiaries have
the same auditor or an auditor who belongs to the same international organization as the
parent company's auditor. These results confirm the general assumption that parent
companies encourage their subsidiaries to appoint the same auditor as the parent company.
Despite the generally high referral rate, important differences in referral rate are noted
depending on the countries of origin of the parent companies. We notice a low referral rate
in France, Germany, and Luxembourg (less than 50%) versus a high referral rate in
Belgium, United Kingdom, United States, and the Netherlands (more than 70%). To
determine whether the referral rate is dependent on the country of origin of the parent
company we used the chi-square test. The observed value for the statistic amounts to
415.73. This is much higher than the expected value of 23.59 at the 0.5% significance level.
This confirms that the country of origin of the parent country influences the referral rate.
A possible explanation for the differences in referral rate per country of origin of the
parent company is the type of auditor (Big Six [B6]/non-Big Six [NB6]) the parent
company appoints. In an international environment, referral can only occur if the parent
company makes use of an audit firm with offices in the country of both the parent and the
subsidiary. The most important international audit firms in the research period are the Big
Six firms: Arthur Andersen, Coopers & Lybrand, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young,
KPMG, and Price Waterhouse. NB6 audit firms include local audit firms that are either
fully independent or belong to an international NB6 audit organization.
Table 3 shows that 64% of the parent companies appointed a B6 audit firm. We also
notice important differences in the type of auditor depending on the country of origin of
the parent company. The most striking difference is found between Belgian and foreign
parent companies. Whereas 87% of the foreign parent companies appoint a B6 audit firm.
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Table 3
Descriptive statistics: referral results and type of auditor (66X36)
Parent company. Total number of Referral (R) Auditor parent compan\,; B6/NB6
country' of origin subsidiaries Nonreferral (NR)
R % NR % B6 "o NB6 "o
Belgium 809 677 84 132 16 365
R
306
84%
XR
59
16%
45 444
R
371
84%
NR
73
16%
55
The Netherlands 234 166 70 68 30 208 89 26 11
France 88 39 44 49 56 67 76 21 24
United States 86 78 91 8 9 82 95 4 5
Germany 71 34 48 37 52 53 75 18 25
United Kingdom 58 42 72 16 28 55 95 3 5
Sweden 21 17 81 4 19 21 100
Luxembourg 12 4 33 8 67 9 75 3 25
Italy 11 7 64 4 36 10 91 1 9
Others 44 26 59 18 41 39 89 5 11
Foreign 625 413 66 212 34 454
R
396
73%
NR
148
27%
87 81
R
17
21%
NR
64
79%
13
Total 1434 1090 76 344 24 909 64 525 36
the majority (55%) of Belgian parent companies appoints an NB6 audit firm. This result
can probably be explained by the fact that companies investing abroad are normally larger
than companies investing exclusively in their own home country. Moreover, a Belgian
parent company with a Belgian subsidiary' probably represents a national rather than an
international group. It is most likely because of the compliance of production character-
istics that national and smaller groups often appoint local and smaller audit firms.
For Belgian parent companies with Belgian subsidiaries, the international character of
an auditor is less important within the framework of referral, because both parent company
and subsidiary are in the same country. Our survey revealed that whether the Belgian
parent company appoints a B6 or an NB6 auditor, referral occurs in 84% of the cases. The
data for foreign parent companies are quite a different picture. Referral occurs in 73% of
the cases in which the foreign parent company appoints a B6 auditor, and this figure drops
to only 21%. if the foreign parent company appoints a NB6 auditor, resulting in an average
referral rate of 66% for all subsidianes with a foreign parent company.
Whereas the majority of foreign parent companies (87%) appoint a B6 audit firm. Table 3
shows that there are material differences per country of origin of the parent company. In
France, Germany, and Luxembourg only 15% of the parent companies appoint a B6 audit
firm, whereas in the United Kingdom and the United States more than 95% of the parent
companies appoint a B6 audit firm. A correlation between the country of origin and the type
of auditor is confirmed by the results of the chi-square test. The observed \alue for the /'
statistic (excluding Belgium) amounts to 272.21. This is much higher than the expected
value of 21.95 at the 0.5% significance level.
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Table 4
Presence of the B6 audit firms in the United Kingdom, United States, and the Netherlands for parent companies
included in our sur\ev
Big Six Roots Big Six UK (°o) USA(%) The Netherlands {%)
.\rthur .\ndersen USA 10 20 2
Coopers & Lybrand UK-USA 24 20 33
Deloitte & louche UK-USA 9 14 9
Ernst & Young UK-USA 22.5 23 15
KPMG The Netherlands
-
Germany-UK-USA
22.5 11 28
Price Waterhouse UK 7 7 2
Total 95 95 89
The fact that all B6 audit firms ha\e an Anglo-American origin—with the exception of
KPMG, which also has Dutch and German roots—may explain the noted country
differences. Companies show a tendency to appoint audit firms with matching historical
roots. This is illustrated by the fact that 95% of the UK and U.S. parent companies in our
sample appoint an Anglo-American B6 audit firm (see Table 4). In the Netherlands. B6
audit firms also are well represented (89° o). KPMG. the only audit office with Dutch roots,
is strongly represented in the Dutch parent companies of our sample. Its presence is less
strong in the United Kingdom and the United States.
The results of our sample, reported above, are in line with the results of other country
surveys^ based on fee data of the audit firms. These surveys indicate that KPMG is the
leading firm in the Netherlands, whereas Andersen (with pure American roots) was the
leading finn in the United States.
The differences noted and the conclusions reached concerning B6/NB6 partly explain the
existing differences in referral percentages per country of origin of the parent company. In
France. Germany, and Luxembourg, we note a lower share ofB6 audit firms as well as a lower
referral percentage. In countries where the B6 audit firms are strongly represented (the United
Kingdom, the United States, and the Netherlands) the referral percentage is the highest.
When interpreting the above (statutor\') referral results, we need to consider some
limitations. The noted referral results may be overstated or understated due to possible
classification errors.
Despite our in-depth analysis to identify the local representatives in the different
countries for the different international Big Six and non-Big Six organizations (see
Appendix A), we could not confirm whether or not all NB6 audit firms belong to an
intemational audit organization. Clearly, some do, but because we had insufficient data,
they were all classified as independent, local, audit firms. It is possible, therefore, that
some referrals would have been incorrectly classified as nonreferrals.
The understatement of referrals may also result Irom the short period under investigation
(only 1 year). As mentioned earlier, Belgian auditors are appointed by the shareholders for a
.
period of 3 years. Only certain legal reasons (e.g., grave error) authorize a company to
^
The Netherlands: International Accounting Bulletin (no. 214). September 12, 1997. UK: International
Accounting Bulletin (no. 219). December 1, 1997. USA: Intemational Accounting Bulletin (no. 202). February
17, 1997.
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replace their auditor during that period. A takeover by another company or a change in parent
company's auditor is not a legal reason to replace the auditor at the subsidiary level. Whereas
some auditors voluntarily resign in favor of the (new) auditor suggested by the parent
company, this is not a legal obligation. Some nonreferrals in our research are therefore the
result of an auditor who refiises to resign during his 3-year mandate.
While we may have accounted for some of the nonreferrals in our survey, we carmot
overlook the fact that despite the obvious advantages to having one audit firm for the
group, still 24% of Belgian subsidiaries do not have the same auditor or an auditor who
belongs to the same intemational organization as the parent company's auditor.
These nonreferrals may reflect the parent companies' granting their subsidiaries the
independence to make some of their own decisions, including the choice of an auditor. The
majority of these nonreferral subsidiaries have their own local management (general and
finance administrators) and are not dominated by the management of their parent companies.
A historical relationship of confidence between subsidiary and auditor confirms and
continues this nonreferral'" situation. Some groups may "intentionally" install a consortium
of auditors as they might opt for no transparency at all. In addition, group characteristics like
size might explain a nonreferral behavior. If a group is considered small and is therefore
exempted from the obligation to publish consolidated accounts, the advantages of referral
are smaller. According to Belgian Company Law, groups are considered small and are not
obliged to publish consolidated financial statements if they do not exceed more than two of
the following criteria: turnover (excluding VAT) >25,000,000 euro; asset total > 12,500,000
euro; and number of employees (yearly average) >250." If the total number of employees
exceeds 500, the group is always considered big. A more in-depth study ofthe prime reasons
for a nonreferral situation could be an interesting topic for further research.
These results provide evidence that the Belgian auditing market consists of approxi-
mately 60% subsidiaries of which 76% is encouraged by their Belgian or foreign parent
company to appoint the same auditor as the parent company. These figures shed a new
light on audit switching behavior in small countries. In almost half of the Belgian cases,
referral determines who will audit the Belgian company. Consequently, to understand audit
switching in small countries, apart from the traditional rationale, we must also consider
referral as an explaining variable.
The rationale behind auditor changing in Belgium, as collected from our mail survey,
are reported in Table 5. (The response rate on the survey was 36%.'") The results of the
The reasons for nonreferral behavior are mainly based on the answers to a Hmited questionnaire sent to 20
nonreferral parent companies (response rate 30%). Considering the small sample size, one should be prudent in
interpreting the results.
These criteria are valid for Financial Statements starting from January 1, 2000 (1 euro = 40.3399 Belgian
francs as of December 31,1 999).
This response rate includes only useful answers. Blank and inconsistent responses were eliminated. To test
for a nonresponse bias, we compared the answers of late respondents with the answers of early respondents, since
the characteristics of late respondents can be compared with the characteristics of nonrespondents (Oppenheim,
1966). If the response of late respondents is similar to the response of early respondents, one can say that the
nonresponse bias is limited. In our mail surxey—at the 0.5% significance level—the null hypothesis for the
similar distribution of response between late and early respondents could not be rejected. We could therefore
accept that the nonresponse bias would not materially influence our resuhs.
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Table 5
Rationale behind auditor changing
Takeover by (another) parent company that proposed its auditor 62.0%
Parent company switched auditor and proposed this new auditor. 30.0%
Striving for unity of controf 5.0%
The parent company's auditor changed its international affiliation and the parent company 3.0%
proposed the changed international affiliation's auditor.
Involuntary (refen-al) 79%
Change in management andor shareholders (physical person) 7.0%
Audit fee 3.3%
Supply of nonaudit services 2.5%
Personal treatment 1.9%
Professional error by the auditor 1.5%
Reputation of the auditor 1 .2%
Experience in the company's industry 1.2%
No longer a subsidiary 1 .0%
Opinion shopping 0.4%
Other reasons 1 .0%
Voluntary 21%
Total 100%
^ In all cases of involuntary (referral) changes, the subsidiary, encouraged by the parent company, appointed
the same auditor as the parent company and thereby established "control unity." In 5% of the referral changes this
striving for "control unity," occurred, however, without a current change at the parent company's (auditor) level.
survey confirm that the referral condition is a determining factor in changing auditors
—
79% of the auditor changes were initiated by the parent company who proposed its own
auditor to the subsidiary. Only 21% of all changes in auditors were determined by
voluntary factors. '^ These results are in line with a survey conducted by the
Organization of Belgian Auditors (histituut der Bedrijfsrevisoren-Institut des Reviseurs
d'Entreprises, 1999), which indicated that the majority (72%) of Belgian management
is very satisfied with their auditor Only 3% of the Belgium managers questioned were
dissatisfied with their current auditor A legal prohibition on solicitation, a limitation
on advertising by Belgian auditors, and the absence of public data on audit fees might
partly explain this high satisfaction amongst managers. As managers are not fully
informed of the services, quality, and prices offered by other auditors, the eagerness to
change could be tempered.
The majority of the referral-related changes (62%) were the result of a takeover of a
Belgian subsidiary by (another) parent company. The rest were almost all due to the parent
company's change of auditor
The larger part of the parent companies (68%) was foreign, indicating a higher takeover
activity amongst international groups. As aheady noted above, Belgian parent companies
with their Belgian subsidiaries represent national groups. In general, national groups are
smaller and more often represent a family-ovmed business than international groups.
These results exclude the auditor-related changes due to structural changes at the supply side of the Belgian
auditing market. An in-depth examination of all structural changes at the supply side of the Belgian auditing
industry during the period 1988-1998 (i.e., mergers and acquisitions between audit firms, audit partners leaving
the audit profession or transferring to another audit firm, etc.) showed that 38% of all changes were auditor related.
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Moreover, the number ofBelgian listed companies is very limited. '"* The takeover activity of
national groups might therefore be lower. The influence of national groups might also be
the reason why in only 58% of the referral-related changes involving a Belgian parent com-
pany was a switch made toward (another) B6 audit firm. For foreign parent companies, a
switch toward (another) B6 audit firm counted for 82%. This result confirms our earlier
statement that for national groups the international character of an auditor is less important
within the framework ofreferral, because both parent company and subsidiary are in the same
country. In addition, the lower concentration ratios in Belgium might account for this result.
The main drivers for the limited share of voluntary changes of auditor were a change in
management and/or shareholders (7%), the high audit fee (3.3%), and the limited supply of
nonaudit services (2.5%). The evidence did not suggest that Belgian companies change
auditors because of a qualified opinion (opinion shopping). A bias can influence our results,
however, because companies might be reluctant to admit opinion shopping as a possible
reason to change auditors. The development of a multivariate model to investigate the
relation between an auditor change and an unfavorable audit report could resolve this bias.
The change in auditor due to a change in management and/or shareholder is in most
cases not due to dissatisfaction with the current auditor but is merely the result of an
historical relationship of confidence with previous auditors.
The audit fee as an explanatory variable for changing auditor might be due to strong
regulations in the Belgian audit market. If the appointment of an auditor is a legal
requirement, some companies might only appoint an auditor because they "have" to and
not because they "want" to. For these companies, the cost of obtaining audit reports will
prevail over quality.
5. Conclusion
Audit-switching behavior of Belgian companies cannot be fully explamed using the
traditional research approach. Local company and audit(or) characteristics do play a role.
However, when a subsidiary-parent relationship exists, we find that referral behavior is an
important and, in most cases, decisive determinant for auditor choice. First, we find that
more than half the companies in Belgium have to accept—willingly or unwillingly—their
parent company's choice of auditor. Second, 8 out of 10 Belgian companies that switch
auditors do not initiate this change, but, rather, follow a switch at the parent-company
level. Whereas these results apply to the Belgian auditing market, it is reasonable to accept
that similar results will be found in other small open economies.
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Locating accounting in its national context: the case of Italy
By Stefano Zambon, Franco Angeli, viale Monza 106, 20127 Milano, Italy, 2002, 236 pp.
The author aims to provide with this book "an insider enquiry on a national
accounting context taking as much as possible an 'external' and international
perspective" (p. 20). The book is aimed primarily at an academic readership. The
title suggests that as a piece of research, the work may be considered as a case study
of one country, that is, Italy as an "empirical site." In this connection, Yin (1994, pp.
38-40) states that single case study designs are justified in the following three kinds
of circumstances:
1
.
The case is a critical case in testing a well-formulated theory;
2. The case is extreme or unique;
3. The case is 'revelatory' in that it deals with a phenomenon previously inaccessible to
scientific investigation.
The author poses the question: why Italy? His answer is twofold. First, in spite of
Italy's leadership in accounting method during the late middle ages and the early modem
period, and notably its role in disseminating double entry, present-day Italian accounting
is depicted in the English language literature as "undeveloped," "enigmatic," or
"jumbled and confiised" (the author's words, p. 17). This contrast, he says, makes
Italy an interesting case for examination. But, second, according to him, such a depiction
of present-day Italian accounting is inaccurate. The case of Italian accounting can thus
be considered as unusual (if not extreme), and moreover, there exist widely accepted
characterizations (if not a well-formulated theory) of present-day Italian accounting that
are inaccurate and should be refiited. Ex ante, it seems fair to accept these reasons for
writing the book as valid, and to judge it on the basis of how well it achieves its
objectives of showing Italian accounting to be both interesting and, in its present-day
manifestations, neither "undeveloped," "enigmatic," nor "jumbled and confused." It
should be noted that the book is essentially devoted to financial accounting or external
financial reporting, rather than management accounting.
After an introductory chapter, which explains the book's motivation, objectives, and
structure, the book proceeds with a review of the English language literatures on
comparative intemational accounting and on accounting from a critical perspective, that
are relevant for the purpose of examining the case of Italian accounting in its national
context. This is a meaty chapter, in which both literatures are criticized: the critical
accounting literature for its lack of a comparative intemational perspective, and the
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international accounting literature for its reductionism and lack of attention to social
embeddedness, which result in its "offering crude and superficial notions of accounting
diversity and the reasons for it" (Hopwood & Tsui, 1998, pp. iii, 55). It is argued that,
as a result of these shortcomings, both literatures "run the risk of perpetuating and
reinforcing national accounting stereotypes" (ibid.). Noting that some recent work,
notably Puxty et al. (1987) and Willmott et al. (1992), suggests a blurring of the
boundaries between the critical and the comparative, the author states that the book will
seek to combine both approaches and "contribute to reducing the dearth of knowledge
on the social fiinctioning of accounting in a non-Anglo Saxon context" (p. 56). In my
view, this second chapter well serves the purpose of indicating the kind of gap in the
literature that a book such as this might seek to reduce.
After these two chapters, introductory in nature, there follow four "empirical"
chapters dealing with what the author describes as "four loosely related aspects of
accounting in Italy, . . . selected [to]. . . represent a reasoned choice of subjects designed
to offer a broad brush view of accounting phenomena in Italy" (p. 205). A brief
concluding chapter ends the book.
Chapter 3 is devoted to the development of auditing in the Republic of Venice, fi^om
the late middle ages, through the early modem period until the fall of La Serenissima in
1797. The Venetian audit ftinction described here was a public sector fiinction; there is
no mention of auditing (or accounting) in the private sector. Hence, although the
chapter succeeds in showing the considerable technical development in Venetian public-
sector accounting and auditing, and is interesting from an historical perspective, its
relevance to present-day private-sector accounting in Italy is not clear. On the other
hand, the fact that these developments were elicited by public-sector requirements
serves to refrite the view that accounting and auditing developed in response to the
needs of capitalism.
I have long been intrigued by the Italian Economia Aziendale school of thought,
which seeks to link accounting theory to microeconomic theories of the firm, and
looked forward to reading chapter 4 (to which Luca Zan contributed) in order to
increase my minuscule knowledge of this topic. I was, however, quite disappointed.
The chapter is mainly concerned with how the conceptual boundaries of an accounting
entity are set and the implications of this for calculating its financial result (income or
profit). Thus, the ways in which these boundaries are considered in Economia
Aziendale are compared to accounting theories of the firm in the English language
literature, namely, various versions of the Proprietorship and Entity theories (there is no
mention of Vatter's Fund Theory). I would have welcomed some comparison of
Economia Aziendale with other approaches developed in Europe in the first half of
the last century, in which accounting is integrated with a theory of the firm, such as
those of Limperg, Schmidt, and Schmalenbach. A concluding remark in the chapter is,
however, insightfiil: "The existence of distinct traditions seems to be based on the
different ways in which the links between the theory of the firm, accounting theory and
income measurement are construed which become locally entrenched and succeed in
getting institutionalised within academic and professional accounting curricula" (p.
120). The chapter contributes to the overall argument of the book by casting a certain
amount of light on this.
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Chapter 5 deals with the reception in Italy of externally driven regulatory changes in
financial reporting standards (the Fourth and Seventh EC Directives) and the recognition of
professional audit qualifications (the Eighth Directive). By comparison with the "soft
transformations" to the Fourth and Seventh Directives in Germany that were analyzed by
Ordelheide (1990), the author refers to ''gattopardo changes" in Italy (including those
which the Eighth Directive was intended to bring about). Gattopardo changes (named after
the celebrated novel by Tomaso di Lampedusa known as The Leopard in English) are
superficial changes, the essential fianction of which is to allow matters at a deeper level to
remain much the same.
The chapter is in fact concerned with, but does not highlight, a pervasive problem in the
international harmonization of financial reporting: the dominant model offinancial reporting
(as exemplified to some extent in the EC Directives and to a much greater extent in the
lASB's standards) originates in countries where medium- as well as large-sized companies
typically look to the external market for equity capital and corporate governance follows the
"outsider" model, so that "fair presentation" and decoupling fi^om tax accounting are
required for financial reports that are intended for outsiders. In contrast, in many of the
countries whose financial reporting is supposed to be "harmonized," the external equity
market is much less important, medium-sized and even many sizeable firms are largely
family owned and rely for funding on a combination of retained profits and bank finance,
corporate governance follows the "insider" model, and so there is little reason to consider
the information needs of outsiders. Italy, as the author points out, is one of the latter
countries.
A more detailed examination of the impact of international harmonization processes on
financial reporting in Italy is given in chapter 6. This includes a comparison of financial
report data produced by Italian companies using national accounting rules with data
produced by them using U.S. GAAP and lASs. One important finding in this chapter is
that in following national rules in the preparation of consolidated financial statements,
Italian companies have frequently arrived at figures that are close to what would have been
obtained using U.S. GAAP. This appears to have been a deliberate policy on the part of
these companies, and it points to the way in which the flexibility of the Italian rules could
be exploited to minimize divergences from U.S. GAAP. It is noteworthy, also, that towards
the end of the 1990s, market forces were pushing such companies towards U.S. GAAP
rather than LASs. Hence, as the author notes, market forces appear to have been a more
potent influence in promoting the convergence of Italian financial reporting practices
towards those that were internationally recognized, than de jure harmonization.
The brief final chapter retums to the question: why Italy? The author mentions the
following contributions to knowledge made by the book:
1
.
An empirical contribution of descriptive material on accounting in Italy not hitherto
available and thus contributing to a valuable empirical database;
2. A double theoretical contribution: first, the problematization of some taken-for-granted
assumptions about accounting in general, notably that accounting (and auditing)
developed in response to the needs of private capitalism—the example of Venice in
chapter 3 shows otherwise; and second, the challenge to the notion (which according to
the author is prevalent in Anglo-American accounting thought) that "accounting is just
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about accounting," a view of accounting as a self-enclosed body of knowledge, rather
than one that is intertwined with other bodies of knowledge, such as economics, law,
sociology, and so on;
3. Finally, a methodological contribution through the portrayal of Italian accounting in its
national and historical context, taking due account of the national factors in terms of
which the characterizations of it as "undeveloped," "enigmatic," or "jumbled and
confused" can be seen as ill informed, not to say crass.
I find myself in sympathy with most of these claims that the author makes for his book,
but am not in complete agreement, as noted below.
In the first place, not all of these claims bear on the question: why Italy? The example
of Venetian auditing apart, several other countries might have played a role similar to that
in which the author casts Italy; for example, Ordelheide's Germany. Secondly, the view of
accounting as a self-enclosed body of knowledge is not typical of present-day academics
in English-speaking countries, although it may be true of accounting practitioners, and
was certainly evident in the approach of the FASB in its conceptual framework project
two decades ago (Archer, 1993, p. 99). Finally, I wonder whether there may not be
diminishing returns fi"om the preoccupation with the "social embeddedness" of account-
ing. Academics in the critical tradition have rendered invaluable service in pointing out
how accounting, far fi-om being a neutral set of techniques, can be (and often is) used as a
tool by the powerful in society to pursue their own interests; in some ways, accounting is
even more inaccessible to the less privileged than law. A fiinctionalist approach to
explicating the role of accounting in society is thus shown to be Panglossian', to say the
least. But the international convergence of financial reporting rules and practices is taking
place within a context of global markets in which competitive pressures extend beyond
factor markets to the search for cheaper capital; and in that search, international
accounting standards have a recognized role to play. The fiiture role of "socially
embedded" practices that hamper this search, especially without conferring any recog-
nizable social benefits, is not so obvious.
Zambon's book is thought provoking, as well as being well written and well structured. I
can recommend it as a worthwhile read for any academic or doctoral student interested in
international accounting or accounting history. But I wish chapter 4 had lived up to my
expectations.
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International financial reporting and analysis
David Alexander, Anne Britton, and Ann Jorissen, Thomson Learning, London, UK,
2003, xiii+656 pp.
Beginning in 2005, companies hsted in European Union countries will report to their
shareholders and other external stakeholders according to international accounting stand-
ards and international financial reporting standards (hereafter, L\S). As the reporting and
investing communities prepare for this event, the press is fiill of intemational accounting
scandals, ft-om Ahold Corporation in the Netherlands to Parmalat in Italy. Never has the
need for clarity about accounting seemed so great.
Clarity about intemational accounting is precisely the aim of International Financial
Reporting and Analysis, a new book focused directly on IAS and their application in
Europe. The book is wide ranging in its topic coverage and, as the authors note in their
Preface, not for beginners. It provides a broad overview of accounting history, theory, and
standards, suitable for students with a firm foundation in basic accounting.
The first two parts dominate this four-part book. Part 1, "Framework, Theory and
Regulation," contains 11 loosely connected chapters on topics often taught in accounting
theory courses. Part 2, "Annual Financial Statements," examines 12 specific areas of
accounting that would typically appear in intermediate accounting courses. Many of these
chapters focus on individual intemational accounting standards. The final two parts,
"Consolidated Accounts and the Multinational" and "Financial Analysis," respectively,
consist of two chapters each. These provide brief introductions to topics often covered in
advanced accounting and financial statement analysis courses.
The ambitious breadth of coverage makes it difficult to imagine completing the entire
text in a single 13- to 15-week term. I suspect that most instructors so constrained will
choose a subset of chapters to suit their needs, and that many will choose to focus on Parts
2 and 3, which present the actual IAS.
The authors position Part 1 as essential background for understanding IAS. I found
it a mixed bag of historical details of external reporting in general and the
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international harmonization effort in particular, articulation of theories of income and
valuation, and characterizations of different systems of accounting. In some instances,
I struggled to fmd the relevance for understanding how to use or analyze IAS. Does
understanding how Hicks and Fisher defined income (pp. 58-62) help us understand
how companies will apply IAS, how users will evaluate IAS disclosures, or how
international standard-setters will make future choices? I believe that the time-pressed
instructor will find whole chapters of the "Framework, Theory and Regulation"
secfion expendable.
Parts 2 and 3 present IAS in topical fashion, and represent the heart of the text. I found
the separafion of Part 3, "Consolidated Accounts and the Mulfinational," from Part 2,
"Annual Financial Statements," mysterious. Many consolidated entities operate within a
single country, and many single-enterprise companies deal with foreign currency issues.
Both logically and in format, these two parts of the book work as one. Within these two
parts, I found the topic coverage good, and each chapter self-contained. Thus, an instructor
can omit or reorder chapters within these parts relatively freely, with little fear of having
omitted critical knowledge needed fi^om another chapter.
Within chapters, the authors intersperse their own exposition of topics with frequent
acfivities, that is, questions intended to engage the reader in active learning. Some
activities are concept questions, like Activity 13.2 (p. 228): "Does goodwill on acquisition
meet the lASB's own definition of an asset?" Others ask for calculations, like Activity
20.6 (p. 368): "Calculate the actuarial value of accrued benefits for Mr. Dupont in each of
the five years he is in service...." Acfivity feedback follows immediately after each
activity, presenting the authors' suggested response to the question. In this respect, I fear
the activities will not function as the authors intend. Although the activities appear to
invite the reader's involvement, the immediate feedback serves as a disincentive to answer
independently. I believe most students will nod along with the authors' proposed response
without first creating their own responses, and therefore without truly engaging in the
learning activity. It is best, therefore, to regard the activities as illustrations, like the
worked examples provided in most textbooks. Viewed in this way, they work well.
Each chapter ends with a set of exercises, for which the authors provide answers in a
password-protected lecturer's area of a companion website. I am a firm believer in the
value of exercises that give students a chance to grapple independently with the content,
and especially to work out the relations among accounts, as a means of cementing
understanding. The exercises in this text ask students to recap concepts, not to work
through mechanics, nor to interpret or analyze disclosures. I found myself wishing that the
authors had held back a few of the activifies for the ends of the chapters. I suspect that
many instructors will want to supplement the text with their own exercises to ensure that
students have some opportunity to work examples and perform analysis on their own.
Although the self-contained chapters, especially in Parts 2 and 3, offer instructors
flexibility, I found the lack of real integration of ideas across the four parts of the text to be
an area of weakness. Part 1 offers some intriguing discussions of how and why different
countries' generally accepted accounting principles differ. In Chapter 2 (pp. 22-37), the
authors discuss how companies raise capital differently in different countries, how the
legal and tax systems to which they are subject differ across borders, and how the cultural
values that characterize different nations manifest themselves in their accounting regimes.
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In Chapter 3 (pp. 40-42), they describe the Hmited success of European Union directives
in creating uniformity of practice in the face of language, cultural, and legal differences.
These ideas suggest that IAS may be implemented differently in different countries. This
notion is absent from the discussion of specific IAS in Parts 2 and 3, which tend to
describe accounting practice as if it will be homogeneous.
Part 4, "Financial Analysis," is another missed opportunity for integration. In two
chapters, the authors present a very brief introduction to some financial analysis
techniques, primarily ratio analysis. I found the relegation of the topic to two chapters
at the end of the book disappointing, given the title of the book. In Part 1 , the authors
emphasize that accounting is a form of communication between companies and stake-
holders. Why, then, segregate preparers' concerns in Parts 2 and 3 from users' concerns in
Part 4?
In weakness we often find opportunity. I can imagine successfiil instructors supple-
menting this text with challenging, integrated, analysis exercises and examples of cross-
border differences in application of IAS. Overall, I found International Financial
Reporting and Analysis a well-timed and welcome addition to the library of international
accounting texts.
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Abstract
This study investigates the value relevance of operating income vs. below-the-line items in
the Chinese stock market. The motivations for this study are twofold. First, there is a need for
empirical evidence of the value relevance of earnings components given that previous findings
of value relevance in China at the aggregate level have often been questioned in the literature.
Second, the reporting environment for earnings components in China provides an interesting
opportunity to present additional evidence on the pricing of persistent vs. less persistent
earnings. Chinese GAAP is more specific in defining the scope and specifying the format of
reporting earnings components with different levels of persistence. In addition, differing from the
U.S. evidence in the extant literature, below-the-line items in China is overwhelmingly income-
increasing and frequently account for a large percentage of a firm's reported net income. By
linking valuation analysis with earnings time-series properties, we present additional evidence to
support value relevance in China: An earnings component is impounded in stock prices as long
as it is persistent and nonpersistent below-the-line items are value irrelevant. However, the time-
series properties of earnings components are not ftilly priced by the market. The earnings-
response coefficients are larger for below-the-line items than for operating income, although
below-the-line items are less persistent and have lower predictive power. In discussing this
* Corresponding author. Department of Accounting, Lingnan University, Tuen Mun, Hong Kong.
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pricing anomaly, we identify some unique institutional factors that may be responsible for the
results.
© 2004 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Value relevance of recurring vs. nonrecurring earnings; Special items; Below-the-line items; Earnings-
response coefficients; Persistence of earnings
1. Introduction
The pricing of earnings components is of universal interest because generally accepted
accounting principles (GAAP) around the world require reported earnings to be
disaggregated into coinponents in income statements. Explicitly or implicitly, perceived
differences in persistence among earnings components are the primary basis for various
schemes of decomposition. In recent years, special attention has been given to time-series
properties and the pricing structure of recurring earnings vs. nonrecurring special items
due to the increasing frequency and magnitude of such items reported in the United States'
(Burgstahler, Jiambalvo, & Shevlin, 2002; DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & Skinner, 1992; Elliott
& Hanna, 1996; Elliott & Shaw, 1988; Francis, Hanna, & Vincent, 1996; Hanna, 2001;
Kinney & Trezevant, 1997; Moffitt & Rai, 2002). Evidence tends to show that the U.S.
market places a higher valuation weight on recurring earnings than on special items. The
international accounting literature contains a limited number of studies on earnings
components (Giner & Reverte, 1999; Herrmann, Inoue, & Thomas, 2000; Herrmann,
Inoue, & Thomas, 2001; Schadewitz, 1996).
This study investigates the pricing of operating income vs. items below operating
income (below-the-line items)" in the Chinese stock market. Motivations for this study are
twofold. First, there is a need for empirical evidence beyond the value relevance of
aggregated accounting information in China. Due to the unique information environment,
there has been a steady interest in the international accounting literature about if and/or
how accounting information is reflected in stock prices in China (e.g., Abdel-khalik,
Wong, & Wu, 1999; Bao & Chow, 1999; Chen, Chen, & Su, 2001; Eccher & Healy, 2000;
Lee & Cao, 2002). Contrary to the expectations of many researchers, studies have
consistently shown an association of accounting infonnation with stock valuation to a
degree similar to, if not stronger than, what has been documented in a mature market, such
as the U.S. market. The evidence is often considered perplexing given the relatively short
history of the stock market and accounting reform in China since the early 1990s. In
' Special items in the U.S. literature are not formally GAAP-specified line items in the income statement;
instead, they are Compustat-defined items consisting of certain nonrecurring items identified from the income
statement and the accompanying notes. Furthermore, the terms recurring vs. nonrecurring should not be taken
literally; instead, they are better considered as describing different degrees of persistence because some special
items occur year by year
" All items below the operating-income line are generally considered less than recurring in China. While
there is a large overlap between these items in China and special items in the United States, the scope of below-
the-line items examined in this study is wider than that of special items in the U.S. literature. A more detailed
discussion of the Chinese reporting environment will be provided in a later section.
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addition to the value-relevance studies, many other papers have also provided detailed
descriptions and analyses of events and developments related to Chinese accounting and
stock markets (e.g., Chen, Sun, & Wang, 2002; and Chen & Yuan, 2001; DeFond, Wong,
& Li, 2000; Xiang, 1998; Xiao, Zhang, Xie, 2000). A consensus of this literature is that
the stock market in China is in its infancy, market-oriented accounting standards are still
developing, and supporting infrastructure, such as preparer professionalism, quality
auditing, and effective enforcement, is often inadequate. Apparently, the inconsistency
between empirical and anecdotal evidence calls for additional research. Examining how
market prices impound earnings components with different degrees of persistence is an
important step in this direction; such a differential valuation implication requires a higher
level of sophistication among market participants and a finer information environment in
the market.
Second, the institutional environment surrounding the reporting of recurring vs.
nonrecurring items in China is vastly different from that of the extant literature that is
primarily based on the U.S. market. Chinese GAAP is more specific both in defining the
scope of below-the-line items and in specifying the format of reporting them. As such, there
is less ambiguity between earnings components that are supposed to be more or less
persistent for users of the income statement. Furthermore, in sharp contrast to special items
being dominated by charges to the income statement in the United States, reported below-
the-line items in China are overwhelmingly income-increasing and often account for a large
percentage of a firm's reported net income. Anecdotal evidence repeatedly suggests that
using below-the-line items to increase earnings and meet profitability targets is a primary
tool for earnings management in the Chinese stock market. Consequently, China offers an
interesting opportunity to enhance the extant literature by examining how the stock market
prices operating income vs. below-the-line items in a very different environment.
Based on four-year data from 1997 to 2000, we address three research questions. First,
does the pricing of operating income and below-the-line items agree with perceived
differences in persistence between these earnings components? Using a return and a price
model, we find that both operating income and below-the-line items are value relevant, but
contradictory to the perceived difference in persistence, price-earning multiples are
significantly larger for below-the-line items than for operating income.
Second, are the time-series properties of the earnings components consistent with
perceived differences in persistence? Based on an autoregression and a one-year-ahead
eamings-prediction model, our findings confirm the theoretical and perceived patterns of
persistence in the sense that recurring operating income is more persistent and has
significantly larger predictive power than below-the-line items. However, different from
many U.S.-based studies, we find that below-the-line items in China persist into the fiature
and are of significant predictive values. We seem to have mixed evidence from the first
two research questions about pricing mechanisms in the Chinese stock market. Pricing is
rational in that persistent earnings, no matter whether they are recurring operating income
or below-the-line items, are reflected in stock prices. However, the time-series properties
of the earnings components are not fully impounded in stock prices as demonstrated by the
unexpected relative magnitudes of earnings multiples.
Finally, is the evidence on persistence and pricing of below-the-line items interpretable?
To answer this question, we identify various subsamples based on earnings-management
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variables and observed persistence. For three earnings-management subsamples, we obtain
some evidence consistent with stock prices properly reflecting time-series properties of
below-the-line items. In particular, we find that below-the-line items resulting from the
"big bath" do not have any valuation implications because they represent an interperiod
transfer of expenses. For a sample of observations containing only transitory below-the-
line items identified based on observed persistence, we provide strong evidence that
nonpersistent below-the-line items are completely value irrelevant.
In sum, we find rational pricing of operating income and below-the-line items in
China: An earnings component is impounded in stock prices as long as it is persistent and
nonpersistent items are value irrelevant. Such evidence is important and casts an
additional vote of confidence in the ability and sophistication of Chinese investors with
respect to the use of accounting information. Despite the emerging nature of the stock
market, less than fully developed accounting standards, and inadequate financial-reporting
infi-astructure, this study provides additional evidence to support value relevance in China.
Not only do stock prices impound earnings information as demonstrated in many
published studies, but they also reflect some differences in persistent vs. nonpersistent
earnings as shown in this study. However, the study also shows that time-series properties
of earnings components are not fully reflected in stock prices. Although below-the-line
items are less persistent and have a lower predictive power than operating income,
eamings multiples for these items are larger than that for operating income. This is an
anomalous finding. Although we do not have direct evidence, we conjecture that the
larger valuation weight placed by Chinese investors on below-the-line items may be due
to the institutional environment in China where hsted companies are somehow able to use
these items to increase eamings whenever such a need arises. A more conclusive answer
awaits future research.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses related
literature, followed by a description of the institutional environment in China surrounding
the reporting of below-the-line items. The fourth section describes data and the research
design, followed by the fifth section where empirical results are presented and analyzed.
The final section concludes the paper with a summary of findings.
2. Related literature on earnings components
Many studies of eamings components examine special items in the U.S. financial
reporting environment. Elliott and Hanna (1996) examine the information content of
eamings in the presence of large, multiple, nonrecurring charges. They find that eamings-
response coefficients (ERCs) for eamings before special items decline following the
recognition of large, special items and ERCs decline further after subsequent special items
are reported. They also document a decline of ERCs for special items with an increasing
frequency of special items and show that investors attach significantly less weight to
special items than to eamings before special items. Their interpretation of the findings is
that these special write-offs may be viewed by investors as being finite-horizon as opposed
to recurring events and/or as being associated with unusual and difficult-to-interpret
economic circumstances. A recent study by Moffitt and Rai (2002) reexamines the resuhs
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of Elliott and Hanna using both seasonal random walk and analysts' forecasts to estimate
expected eamings. They find that ERCs for earnings before special items decline first, but
then rise as the frequency of special items increases. However, they fail to document any
stable patterns for ERCs on special items.
Elliott and Shaw (1988) find a significant one- and two-day industry-adjusted negative
return around the write-off announcement and an association of these negative returns with
the size of write-offs. Francis et al. (1996) attempt to examine whether the stock-price
reactions to write-off announcements depend on the nature of write-offs. Although their
overall tests show negative market reactions to the write-off announcements, suggesting
that the market responses are driven by write-offs revealing information about asset
impairment, they find that investors' responses become significantly positive to
restructuring charges, which is interpreted as conveying information about future
improvement in performance. Both Elliot and Shaw and Francis et al. focus on the
stock-price reaction to write-off-type special items without examining the relationship
between pricing of recurring eamings vs. special items.
Several studies examine the time-series relationship between special items and reported
or forecasted eamings without attempting to explore the pricing aspect of special items.
DeAngelo et al. ( 1 992) investigate the effect of special items on the time-series properties
of eamings and find a negative association of current-period special items and next-period
annual eamings, suggesting an interperiod transfer relationship between special items and
future eamings. Kinney and Trezevant (1997) document firms' differential reporting
behavior with respect to positive vs. negative special items. They find that negative special
items are more likely to be reported separately in the income statement to emphasize their
transitory nature; however, positive special items tend to be reported together with others
and discussed in notes to de-emphasize their transitory nature. Hanna (2001) examines the
impact of special items on analysts' eamings forecasts and finds an increasing error in
analysts' forecasts when special items exist.
Burgstahler et al. (2002) simultaneously examine the time-series properties and stock
market pricing of recurring eamings vs. special items. Focusing on quarterly eamings, they
demonstrate that special items are less persistent than other eamings components, and
show significant differences between the time-series properties of positive vs. negative
special items in that negative special items are more than completely transitory, reflecting
interperiod transfers, while positive special items are not completely transitory. With
respect to pricing, they find that the market recognizes differences in time-series properties
between special items and other eamings components as well as between positive and
negative special items. However, stock prices do not fully impound the information of
time-series properties in either special items or other eamings components, suggesting
irrational pricing mechanisms in the U.S. market.
Research on pricing and/or time-series properties of eamings components is both scarce
and less focused in the international accounting literature. Using Spanish data, Giner and
Reverte (1999) find that the separate disclosure of extraordinary earnings^ does not
As in many other countries, extraordinary items in Spain are much broader than the narrow definition
adopted by U.S. GAAP. Most, if not all, of the Compustat-defined special items would be included as
extraordinary items.
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provide incremental information beyond aggregate earnings. Herrmann et al. (2000) report
extraordinary items in Japan to be less persistent than either operating or nonoperating
income. But neither study directly examines the pricing of recurring vs. nonrecurring
earnings. Schadewitz (1996) investigates the information content of interim eamings
components based on Finnish data and finds higher earnings-response coefficients for
perceived permanent eamings than for perceived transitory eamings. However, the study
does not make a direct connection between pricing and the time-series properties of
eamings components. Different from other studies, Herrmann et al. (2001) examine both
the time-series properties and stock-market pricing of parent eamings vs. subsidiary
eamings in Japan. Although subsidiary eamings are found to be more persistent than
parent eamings, this persistence in subsidiary eamings appears to be ignored by the
Japanese stock market.
Similar in spirit to Burgstahler et al. (2002), this current study connects the pricing of
operating income vs. below-the-line items to their time-series properties to examine
whether prices reflect observed differences in persistence between these eamings
components. Applying a different research design to the institutional environment in
China, we provide new evidence to the international accounting literature. The findings of
this study help improve the understanding of how market participants use income-
statement information to price eamings components with different levels of persistence.
3. Institutional environment in China
3.1. Stock market and accounting information
China opened the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges in late 1990 and early
1991, respectively. Listed companies were originally authorized to issue only A-shares to
domestic investors. In 1992, some companies, most of which had already issued A-shares,
started to issue B-shares to overseas investors. While A-shares are traded in Renminbi, B-
shares are traded in U.S. dollars on the Shanghai Exchange and Hong Kong dollars on the
Shenzhen Exchange. Since the establishment of the stock exchanges, the equity capital
market has grown rapidly in China. By the end of 2000, which is the last year of the period
covered in this study, the two stock exchanges had 955 listed companies issuing only A-
shares, 86 with both A- and B-shares, and 28 with only B-shares.
The overwhelming majority of the listed companies were formerly stated-owned
enterprises, and the Chinese government has normally retained a majority ownership in
these firms after the initial public offering. The rapid development of the market, coupled
with weak corporate governance due to government dominance in ownership, has created
an environment prone to repeated corporate and/or market scandals in recent years, such as
insider trading and fraudulent financial reporting. In addition, as compared with mature
markets, the history of the Chinese market has not been sufficiently long to allow capital-
market infi-astructure, including professional intermediaries and legal rights and investor
protection, to fully develop. Many papers in recent years (e.g., Abdel-khalik et al., 1999;
Chen et al., 2001; Eccher & Healy, 2000; Xiang, 1998; Xiao et al., 2000) have identified
these problems that impede efficient operation of the capital market in China.
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The development of the stock market has been a driving force behind accounting
reforms. Before the 1990s, the purpose of Chinese accounting systems was to provide
information to help safeguard state assets and facilitate centralized planning and control,
with a focus on tangible measures, such as physical assets, production outputs, and
appropriations and uses of the state funds. Profitability was never an emphasis of the pre-
stock-market era accounting in China. The formation of the stock market created a need
for value-relevant accounting information to help equity capital flow to the most efficient
uses, and thus, started the process of accounting reform that is still going on today. In
1992, the Chinese government issued Accounting Regulations for Experimental Listed
Companies, which moved away fi^om the traditional fund-based accounting model and
incorporated many Western accounting practices reflected in International Accounting
Standards (IAS). To fiirther move Chinese accounting in line with IAS, a revised
regulation, Accounting Regulations for Listed Companies, was issued in 1998 to
supersede the 1992 experimental regulation. The success of the 1998 regulation in
harmonizing Chinese GAAP with IAS was well recognized both inside and outside China
(Chen et al., 2002). Two years later, in 2000, the government further revised and
expanded the 1998 regulation and issued Accounting Regulations for Business Enter-
prises, which governs financial accounting and reporting of all business enterprises (listed
or not listed).
Although China has made remarkable progress in standard setting within a relatively
short period of time, many lingering problems exist in the areas of information
environment and the infrastructure necessary for the production and dissemination of
high-quality accounting infonnation. As analyzed in many papers (e.g., Abdel-khalik et
al, 1999; Chen et al., 2001; Chen et al., 2002; DeFond et al., 2000; Eccher & Healy, 2000;
Xiang, 1998; Xiao et al., 2000), these problems primarily include weak corporate
governance, lack of qualified accountants and professionalism, low-quality auditing, and
ineffective regulatory enforcement. As a result, the quality of accounting information in
China has been generally perceived as low in the literature. The different reporting
requirements for A- and B-shares imposed by the Chinese government implicitly
recognize this perception. While A-share annual reports are based on Chinese GAAP
audited by local CPA firms, B-share reports are required to follow IAS, typically audited
by large international firms, presumably to ease overseas investors' concerns over the lack
of quality in Chinese GAAP-based annual reports.
These well-recognized problems in the stock market and financial reporting lead to
two conjectures in the extant literature: (1) Value relevance of accounting information in
the Chinese market should be lower than what has been observed in mature markets; and
(2) Value relevance is higher for lAS-based B-share reports than for Chinese GAAP-
based A-share reports. However, empirical studies (e.g., Abdel-khalik et al., 1999; Bao &
Chow, 1999; Chen et al., 2001; Eccher & Healy, 2000; Haw et al., 1998; Lee &. Cao,
2002), using data from different years and various valuation models, have provided
consistent evidence that contradicts both expectations. Given the suboptimal information
environment, researchers are typically perplexed and unwilling to accept the results as
evidence for the value relevance of accounting infonnation in China; instead, various
interpretations and conjectures, some of which disagree with each other, have been
offered in the literature.
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E\idently. more research is needed. One way to provide additional evidence is to
examine the value relevance of disaggregated accounting information instead of
aggregated eamings and or book value of equity as done in preMous research. Our
current study makes an etTort in this regard. Since operating income and below-the-line
items are supposed to differ in persistence, this difference should be reflected in stock
prices if the pricing mechanism m China properly impounds accounting information.
Differential pricing of eamings components based on ditferent levels of persistence
requires investors to have higher sophistication and accountmg information to be of higher
qualit\'. Consequently, such e\"idence will provide additional support for value relevance in
China beyond previous smdies.
3.2. Reporting of eamings components
As reviewed earlier, the extant literature on pncmg and time-series properties of
eamings components is primarily based on U.S. data. Howe\er. income statements in the
United States do not unambiguously separate persistent eamings from nonpersistent
eamings components. Officialh; extraordinary items and discontinued operations are
separately reported as nonrecurring items on the face of the income statement. An item
that is infrequent but not unusual is classified as nonoperating income part of income from
contmuing operations. However, companies are required under APB No. 30 to report
material events or transactions that are either unusual or infrequent as separate line items
of income from continuing operations, presumably to help users better distinguish
recurring from nonrecurring eamings. These separatel}' reported line items are the basis of
the Compustat data item "special items" that has been the subject of many studies
reviewed earlier. Although there is a growing concern about how these items should be
reported, there has been no GAAP to formally define these special items. No wonder
practice varies with respect to reporting special items (Kinney & Trezevant. 1997).
Compustat's own definition includes such items as restrucmring charges, current-year
results of discontinued operations, natural-disaster losses, and nonrecurring gains or losses
from the sales of assets, investments, and securities. E\idently, the composition of special
items is hea\ily influenced by management discretion about which items are reported as
separate line items."^
"*
Ironically, the ambiguiu regarding recurring vs. nonrecurring eamings in the U.S. income statement is a
consequence of standard-senmg etTorts. APB Opinion No.9 (1963) was the initial U.S. G.\AP in which
extraordinary items were broadly defined to include e\ ents and transactions that would not be expected to recur
frequently such as gains or losses from the sale or abandonment of a plant or a significant segment of the business,
gains or losses from the sale of an investment not held for resale, the write-ofif of goodwill owing to unusual
events, the condemnation or expropriation of properties, and major de\aluations of currencies in a foreign coimtry
where the compam' was operating. Reporting abuses during the next ten years led to a review of extraordinary
items in 1973 and the promulgation of .\PB Opmion No. 30 (1973) that substantially narrowed the scope of
extraordinary items to onl\- e\ ents and transaction that are both unusual in nature and infrequent in occurrence.
Furthermore, the board specifically excluded se\ eral transactions from extraordinary, items, such as write-downs
of recei\ables. inventories, equipment leased to others, deferred research and development costs, or other
intangible assets: gains or losses in foreign currency transactions or devaluations; gains or losses on disposals of
segments of a business; other gains or losses on the sale or abandonment of property', plant, and equipment used in
the business: effects of strikes; and adjustments of accruals on long-term contracts.
S. Chen. Y. M'aiig / The Intenuitional Journal ofAccounting 39 (2004) 339-364 347
The ambiguity of distinguishing persistent from nonpersistent earnings components
seems less Hkely in China because Chinese GAAP takes a current-operating-performance
approach to income reporting and specifies operating income as recurring persistent
earnings, and all other items below the operating income line as less persistent or
nonrecurring components. Specifically, four belovv-the-line items, including investment
income, goxemment subsidy, nonoperating re\enues. and nonoperating expenses, are
required to be separately reported after operating income. Presumably, this format better
helps users distinguish recurring from nonrecurring or less persistent earnings.^
Investment income is related to all income or loss from external investments, including
dividend income, interest income from debt securities, gains or losses from disposal of
investments, and valuation adjustments. Government subsidy resuUs from the unique
ownership and social political structure in China. Because the state is the majority
shareholder, local governments often view the number of listed companies in their
jurisdictions as an indicator of performance and are motivated to provide assistance of
various types to listed companies, especially those in financial difficulty. Specific forms of
subsidy may include direct financial subsidies from local governments or state-owned
enterprises acting as the majority shareholders, various tax exemptions or refunds, and
debts forgiven by state-owned majority shareholders. Nonoperating income and expenses
include most of the other items not included in the previous two categories, such as asset
overages and shortages, gains or losses from asset disposals, revaluation gains or losses,
debt restructuring gains or losses, donations received or given, approved write-offs of
payables, and other irregular losses.
There are many similarities between below-the-line items in China and special items in
the United States, although the scope of below-the-line items is wider than that of special
items.^ In addition, reported frequencies of positive vs. negative items are substantially
different between the two markets. A majority of the studies reviewed earlier examine
negative special items. Even for studies of both positive and negative items, composition
tihs significantly toward more negative special items. For example, 78.49% of the material
special items in the sample of Burgstahler et al. (2002) are negative. In comparison, below-
the-line items in China are overwhelmingly positive. In this current study, about 80% of
the below-the-line items are positive, with both the mean and median statistics of positive
items substantially larger than negative items.
The primary reason for overwhelmingly positive below-the-line items is that listed
companies are under tremendous pressure to improve profitability due to several unique
Some of the special items in the United States are not even reported as separate Hne items in the income
statement; instead, they are discussed in the accompanying notes. Conceivably, it is not a trivial matter for a user
to come up with a single total amount of special items as reported by Compustat.
Arguably, there are some below-the-line items that may be recurring year after year such as investment
income. Even so. they may still differ from operating income in persistence. Operating income comes fi^om the
primary operations of the business that are determined by its long-term mix of capital deployment, while
"recurring" below-the-line items can be easily changed by short-term managerial decisions. Consequently, the
ability to predict the business's long-term profitability should be different between the two and this difference
should be reflected in prices if the pricing mechanisms are efficient. In fact, some of the special items in the U.S.
htcrature are not transitory one-time items anymore. For example, it is well known that some companies take
restructunng charges, a major special item, several years in a row for a long period of time.
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institutional factors. First, the controlling shareholders of listed companies are either state-
owned enterprises or government agencies, both of which rely heavily on earnings to
evaluate performance of listed companies. The tenure, promotion, and political future of
top management depend on eamings performance in the eyes of controlling shareholders
(Chen et al., 2001; DeFond et al.. 2000; Xiao et al., 2000). Second, many listed companies
run into financial difficulty soon after an IPO. creating urgent incentives to use noncore
activities to improve the bottom-line figure (Ahamoy. Lee, & Wong. 2000; Lee & Cao,
2002). Third, Chinese security regulations contain explicit profitability targets that govern
the ehgibility for raising additional capital through rights offering or determining delisting
status, leading to strong incentives for eamings management (Chen et al., 2001; Chen &
Yuan. 2001; DeFond et al., 2000; Lee & Cao, 2002). Finally, a documented lack of quality
auditing (DeFond et al., 2000; Xiang, 1998; Xiao et al, 2000) may ftirther exacerbate
eamings management. There ha\e been many cases reported in the Chinese media andy'or
accounting literature that describe how listed companies use below-the-line items to
manage eamings to a desired level within this unique environment (e.g., Wei, Tan, & Lin,
2000, pp. 178-190; Zhou & Jiang, 2001). Consequently, we expect a significant difference
in persistence between operating income and below-the-line items. Given the clear-cut
reporting format, this difference in time-series properties should be reflected in stock
prices if pricing mechanisms are efficient.
4. Data and research methodology
The data used in this study is taken fi^om the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) China
Database. All listed A-share companies with sufficient information over a four-year period
from 1997 to 2000 are included in the study, resulting in a total of 2202 firm-year
observations after deleting extreme and outlying values.^ Since only A-share companies
are sampled, all market data are based on A-share prices, while accounting variables are
fi'om Chinese GAAP fmancial statements. Both stock splits and stock dividends ha\e been
adjusted in the TEJ database. Although Chinese GAAP specifies four below-the-line
items, the TEJ database reports asset revaluation gains or losses (REV) separately from
nonoperating income and expenses, and also includes a residual item (OTH) to report
anything that caimot be easily classified.
Table 1 presents descriptive information for each of the below-the-line items. Both the
fi-equency and magnimde of positive vs. negative items clearly demonstrate the tendency
of Chinese listed companies to use below-the-line items to increase the bottom line. For
example, about 80% of below-the-line items are posifive. and both the mean and median
statistics, either scaled by income before tax or by total assets, indicate that positive items
^ We took tu'o steps to ensure that extreme and outlying observations would not unduly influence our results.
First, we deleted obser\'ations outside tn e standard deviations from a mean for each variable in Table 2. A total of
2420 firm-year observations were available after this procedure. Second, both the return and price models in Table
4 were estimated for each of the four years, and an observation was further deleted if the absolute value of the
Standardized Residual was greater than three or Cook's Distance greater than one. which led to the final sample of
2202 observations in this studv.
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Table 1
Reported below-the-line items in China
Frequency (%) Scaling variable Magnitude in%
N <0 >0
Mean Median
<0 >0 <0 >0
INV 1964 328 1636 NI -10.37 138.11 -0.82 10.47
(16.70) (83.30) TA -0.64 1.26 -0.14 0.61
SUB 1048 8 1040 NI -6.40 21.13 -1.33 5.17
(0.76) (99.24) TA -0.14 0.68 -0.16 0.27
REV 640 112 528 NI -6.11 2.70 -1.07 0.77
(17.50) (82.50) TA -0.36 0.25 -0.07 0.06
NOI 2116 2116
(100.00)
NI
TA
26.70
0.39
2.00
0.11
NOE 2166 1 2165 NI -76.82 7.70 -76.82 1.44
(0.05) (99.95) TA -0.51 0.35 -0.51 0.10
OTH 103 49 54 NI -1.36 46.65 -0.29 1.13
(47.57) (52.43) TA -0.74 0.57 -0.10 0.10
Bl 2199 473 1726 NI -7.93 167.97 -1.93 19.16
(21.51) (78.49) TA -1.25 1.80 -0.28 1.16
INV=investment income; SUB=govemment subsidy; REV=asset revaluation gain and loss; NOI=nonoperating
income; NOE=nonoperating expense; OTH=other below-the-line items; and BI=total below-the-line items.
Scaling variables; NI=income before taxes; and TA=total assets.
are substantially larger than negative items (e.g., 167.97% vs. 7.93% based on an income-
deflated mean or 19.16% vs. 1.93% based on income-deflated median).
Table 2 contains descriptive statistics for all the variables used in this study and Table 3
reports correlations among earnings components. Panel A of Table 2 presents both
individual and total below-the-line items using assets as a deflator. For asset revaluation
(REV) and nonoperating expense (NOE), a positive number represents a loss or expense
while a negative number represents a recovery or reversal of a loss or expense. Although
we have already deleted extreme observations, descriptive statistics still show a wide
variation in below-the-line items. On average, 1.14% of total below-the-line items (BI)
over assets suggest a material effect of these items in China. Among the individual items,
investment income (INV) is clearly the most important with a mean of 0.84% of total
assets, while government subsidy (SUB) and nonoperating income (NOI) are the next two
items contributing to the positive total. Panel B reports descriptive statistics for other
variables used in this study, again after deleting extreme observations.
The correlations in Table 3 reveal several patterns of relationship among earnings
components consistent with either information reflected in the descriptive statistics of
Table 2 or anecdotal evidence discussed earlier. A strong correlation of .768 between BI
and INV confirms the dominance of investment income in below-the-line items. Again,
government subsidy and nonoperating income are two important positive components of
below-the-line items, as reflected by their significantly positive correlations of .287 and
.322 with BI. The negative correlations of REV or NOE with Bl (-.204 and -.517,
There is only one negative observation for NOE, and deleting this observation does not change any of the
empirical results presented in this study.
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics
Variable \ Mean S.D. Min Median Max
(A) Below-the-line items variables
INV 2202 0.84 1.97 -25.17 0.28 19.33
SUB 2202 0.31 0.79 -12.61 7.20
REV 2202 0.04 0.55 -7.59 16.52
NOI 2202 0.37 1.00 0.10 27.95
NOE 2202 0.34 1.21 -0.51 0.10 37.79
OTH 2202 0.40 -10.12 12.63
BI 2202 1.14 2.87 -59.03 0.74 27.95
(B) Other variables
Price 2202 10.44 4.44 1.88 9.72 31.69
Return 2202 22.01 46.53 -69.56 14.72 279.60
BV 2202 2.09 0.90 0.09 1.96 6.11
01 2202 0.16 0.21 -1.37 0.17 1.49
NI 2202 0.20 0.24 -1.66 0.22 1.46
INV=investment income; SUB=govemment subsidy; REV=asset revaluation gain and loss; NOI=nonoperating
income; NOE=nonoperating expense; OTH=other below-the-line items; and BI=total beiow-the-line items. All
below-the-line items variables in Panel A are scaled by total assets.
Price=April 30th closing price; Retum=buy-and-hold return; BV=book value of equit\' per share; OI=operating
income per share; and NI=net income (before taxes) per share.
respectively) suggest the loss/expense nature of these items. Finally, the significantly
positive correlation of .525 between BI and NI is consistent with below-the-line items
being an important component of the bottom-line figure in China. However, the
dominance of operating income is also evident as the correlation of .914 between 01
and NI is substantially larger.
To analyze our first research question, how the perceived difference between
operating income and below-the-line items is priced in the stock market, we use both a
return and a price model. The two models address related but different value-relevance
questions. The return model provides information about whether an accounting amount
is promptly reflected in changes in value over the return period, while the price model
indicates whether an accounting amount is value relevant with respect to its association
with firm value (Barth, Beaver. & Landsman. 2001). Kothari and Zimmerman (1995)
specifically suggest the use of both models to permit more definitive inferences, which
has become a common practice in the literature (e.g., Barth & Clinch, 1998; Easton,
Eddey, & Harris, 1993: Francis & Schipper, 1999). As shown below, our retum and price
models are the two most frequently used models in the value-relevance literature (e.g.,
Amir, Harris, & Venuti, 1993; Bao & Chow, 1999; Chen et al, 2001; Collins, Maydew
& Weiss. 1997; Bason & Harris, 1991; Eccher & Healy, 2000; Haw et al, 1998; Lee &
Cao, 2002). We disaggregate earnings in each model for the purpose of comparing the
value relevance of operating income vs. below-the-line items. We first estimate the two
models with a restriction that earnings-response coefficients (ERC) are the same for
different below-the-line items, and then again without this restriction. ERCs for operating
income and below-the-line items are compared to examine whether the stock market
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prices them dififerently and whether the differential pricing is consistent with percei\ed
difference in persistence.
Return.. = ao — aiOl, - a;BI, -a (1)
Return, = ao + aiOI- - a:IN\', - x:SUB: - y.ARE\% - a.^NOI- - a6N0E;
- a-OTH. - £ (2)
Price, = ^o-r- i3,B\'.. - ^^OI, - I^^Bl, + e (3)
Price, = i5o-/^lB^^ - ^;0I,, - /?3lN\% - I^^SUB^ - /^.REV, - /^^NOI,
+ iS-NOE, + i^gOTH, ^ £ (4)
where Remm- is a 12-month bu>' and hold return ending on April 30th of year f-1 and
Price, is a closing pnce on Apnl 30th of year t-\. The restricted models (Eqs. ( 1 ) and
(3)) contain only operating income (01) and total below-the-line items (BI). while the
unrestricted models (Eqs. (2) and (4)) contain 01 and sLx individual below-the-line items
as defined in Table 1. All independent variables are on per-share basis, and those in the
return model are further scaled by a closing price at the beginning of a return year.
To examine our second research question—whether the time-series properties of
operating income and below-the-line items are consistent with a perceived difference in
persistence—we employ both an autoregression and a one-\ ear-ahead earnings-prediction
model. The following autoregression model is estimated for the bottom-line earnings as
well as for each of the earnings components, and a larger coefficient for a particular
earnings item suggests a higher degree of persistence in this item.
Xi = 'X()-+- 3:iZ,_i -+- £ (5)
where X is an earnings or earnings component figure scaled h\- total assets.
In addition, a prediction model with and without assuming coefficient equalit}' among
individual below-the-lme items is estimated to examine whether earnings components
ha\ e different predictive powers. Consistent results for the first tA\ o research questions
provide supportive evidence that information about earnings persistence is properly
impounded in stock prices. The prediction models with and without restriction on
coefficient equality is as follows:
NI,-M=Vo + 7iOI, + -,sBI,^£ (6)
NI,^i = vo + -/lOI, + VjINV, + -/jSUB; - : 4RE\-, - y.XOI, - y6N0E,
+ y^GTH, + £ (7)
where NT,_i is one-year-ahead net income before taxes and other variables are the same as
defined earlier. All variables in models (6) and (7) are scaled by total assets.
April 30th is the oflBcial date by which each hsted company has to issue its annual report in China.
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FinalK. we panition our sample based on earnings-management \'ariables and obsened
persistence, and estimate models (Eqs. (1H7)) again on the partitioned subsamples.
Earnings management presumabh' affects eamings persistence, and obsened persistence
allows us to identitA companies with known transitory below-the-line items on an ex post
basis. B>' mtroducing these two dimensions into the analysis, we are able to examine
whether eamings management interferes with eamings persistence, how stock prices
reflect this interaction, and whether the market properly discounts below-the-line items
without persistence. This analysis will provide additional evidence on the robustness of the
results based on the first nvo research questions.
5. Empirical results
5.7. Market pricing of operating income \s. below-the-line items
Table 4 presents \aluation results based on return models in Panel A and Panel B on
price models. '° All regressions are estimated for individual years as well as for pooled
firm-year obser\ations. with WTiite-corrected r-statistics presented in the table. 0\eraU,
each and e\er\' model is highh' significant with predicted signs for most of the
independent ^ariables. In particular, operating income (01) and total below-the-line items
(Bl) are consistently significant with positive coefficients in all regressions. These results
confirm the role of eamings information in stock valuations in China.
To compare pricing of operating income vs. below-the-line items, we examine the
coefficients of 01 and BI. first based on the restricted model. In Panel A. the coefficient of
Bl is larger than that of 01 in each annual regression as well as in the pooled regression,
and the difference is significant for all regressions except for 2000 according to the F-tests
of coefficient equality-. This suggests that the market places more weight on below-the-line
Items than operating income, which is contradictory to the perceived difference in
persistence beUveen the two eamings components. The results based on the unrestricted
model pro^"ide a very similar picture with significant i^-tests for all regressions, although
details differ with respect to which below-the-line items have larger coefficients than
operating income. 0\erall. the results of the unrestricted model seem driven by three
positive items, i.e.. in\"estment income (INV), government subsidy (SUB), and non-
operating income (XOI).^^
Although the return model in Panel A includes onl\- earnings-level variables, we ha\e also estimated the
model wirh both the le\ el of and change in eamings and eamings components. Since the conclusion remains the
vame. we present the results from the eamings-le\ el model for the sake of parsimony.
'
' Different from expectation, in both panels of Table 4. the regression coefficients on RE\' and NOE are
mostly positi\e. There are nvo possible explanations. First, as shown in Table 1. about 18"o of the REX" cases are
income-increasing, representing recoNeries of asset write-downs. Second, many of the asset write-downs are
^ oluntan, and an important NOE item in China is a restructuring charge, both of which may signal the potential
tor impro\ement in futtire performance. The market responds positively to information with a signaling \alue. A
recent smdy by Chen. Chen. Su. and Wang (2004) pro\ides evidence about asset write-downs in China that is
consistent w ith this signaling explanation.
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The findings based on the restricted and the unrestricted price models shown in Panel B
are overall consistent with the return-model results. The coefficients for below-the-line
items tend to be larger than operating income. Although the results of the restricted models
in Panel B are weaker than Panel A, as the F-tests show an insignificant difference
between 01 and BI for 1997, 1998, and the pooled regression, the unrestricted models
provide strong evidence that some below-the-line items have significantly larger
coefficients than operating income. In sum, both the return and the price model
demonstrate that, rather than placing more weight on recurring operating income, the stock
market in China seems to assess a premium on below-the-line items. This evidence
certainly contradicts the perceived difference in persistence. If the observed time-series
properties of these earnings components confirm the perceived difference, our results then
point toward mispricing in the Chinese market.
5.2. Obsen'ed persistence and predictixe power of operating income vs. special items
Table 5 presents the results of observed time-series properties of earnings components.
Panel A presents data on whether observed persistence is consistent with perceived
persistence for each component. The results clearly show that operating income is much
more persistent than either total or any individual below-the-line items. The one-year-lag
autoregressive model produces an R~ of .38 and an autoregression coefficient of .64 for
operating income, in comparison to an R~ of .06 and a regression coefficient of .25 for the
total amount of below-the-line items. Individually, government subsidiary (SUB) is the
most persistent below-the-line item, with an i?" of .15 and an autoregression coefficient of
.37. Investment income (INV) and nonoperating income (NOI) rank as the second and the
third in persistence.
The results fi-om a one-year-ahead eamings prediction model in Panels B and C are
overall consistent with the evidence of observed persistence in Panel A. When comparing
the ability of operating income vs. total below-the-line items to predict next year net
income. Panel B shows significantly larger regression coefficients for operating income
than for below-the-line items in the annual as well as in the pooled regressions according
to the F-tests of coefficient equalit\'. In fact, the BI \ariable is insignificant in the 2000 and
pooled regressions. The results in Panel C provide qualitatively similar evidence without
the restriction of an equal coefficient for individual below-the-line items. While some
below-the-line items are not significant in annual or pooled regressions, operating income
is always significant and tends to have a larger coefficient for predicting future eamings.
Combining the market-valuation results in Table 4 and the time-series-properties
evidence in Table 5. we seem to have two interesting findings. First, both operating
income and below-the-line items are value relevant in the Chinese equit>' markets. Given
that they both persist into the future to a certain degree, the results suggest a rational
pricing mechanism in the market. Second, the time-series properties of operating income
vs. below-the-line items are not fully reflected in stock prices. Although operating income
is more persistent and has larger predictiv e power than below-the-line items, the market
somehow places a higher premium on below-the-line items as reflected in their larger
eamings-response coefficients. The next two sections present additional evidence to check
the validity and robustness of our findings.
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Table 5
Persistence and predictive power of operating income vs. beiow-the-line items
{A)X,=ao+aiX,_,+£
Earnings N Autoregression Adj. R-
components coefficients
01 2202 0.64 (0.00) 0.38
BI 2202 0.25 (0.00) 0.06
INV 2202 0.33 (0.00) 0.12
SUB 2202 0.37 (0.00) 0.15
REV 2202 -0.13 (0.13) 0.01
NOI 2202 0.23 (0.01) 0.10
NOE 2202 0.23 (0.03) 0.02
OTH 2202 0.02 (0.16) 0.01
(B) NI,.,=yo+)' OI,+;sBI,+e
1997 1998 1999 2000 Pooled
Intercept 0.01 (0.98) 0.77 (0.13) 0.10(0.89) 0.39 (0.44) 0.64(0.14)
OI 0.80 (0.00) 0.66 (0.00) 0.70 (0.00) 0.57 (0.00) 0.65 (0.00)
BI 0.41 (0.01) 0.43 (0.00) 0.42 (0.00) -0.10(0.56) 0.16(0.27)
A' 392 532 610 668 2202
Adj. R- 0.36 0.34 0.28 0.18 0.27
F-test' 8.70 (0.00) 4.68 (0.03) 4.23 (0.04) 39.32 (0.00) 71.93(0.00)
(C) NI,H=7o+7 OI,+-;2lNV,+730NO,+74REV,+75NOI,+75NOE,+-/70TH,+£
1997 1998 1999 2000 Pooled
Intercept -0.47 (0.54) 0.03 (0.95) 0.20 (0.80) -0.01 (0.98) 0.001 (0.99)
01 0.84 (0.00) 0.69 (0.00) 0.70 (0.00) 0.60 (0.00) 0.70 (0.00)
INV 0.57 (0.00) 0.53 (0.00) 0.51 (0.00) 0.03 (0.81) 0.32 (0.00)
SUB -1.16(0.28) 0.47(0.10) 0.20 (0.37) 0.72(0.13) 0.30(0.13)
REV -0.83 (0.00) -0.01 (0.95) 0.07 (0.93) 0.04 (0.97) -0.11 (0.76)
NOI 0.50 (0.08) 0.50 (0.06) 0.44 (0.08) -0.94 (0.22) 0.38(0.01)
NOE 1.53(0.16) 1.45(0.25) -0.94 (0.28) 0.40 (0.24) 0.42 (0.27)
OTH 0.39 (0.25) -12.78(0.00) 8.76 (0.27) 1.71 (0.00) 0.34 (0.28)
A^ 392 532 610 668 2202
Adj. R' 0.37 0.35 0.28 0.19 0.28
F-tesr 2.80(0.01) 1.88 (0.08) 3.17 (0.00) 5.20 (0.00) 7.71 (0.00)
Panel A contains autoregressions, where X is an earnings-component variable, such as 01, BI, etc.
NI=net income (before taxes); OI=operating income BI=total below-the-line items; INV=investment income;
SUB=govemment subsidy; REV=asset revaluation gain and loss; NOI=nonoperating income; NOE=nonoperating
expense; and OTH=other below-the-line items. All variables are scaled by total assets.
F-test' is a test of coefficient equality between OI and BI, while F-test~ is a test of coefficient equality among all
earnings components, i.e., 01. INV, SUB, REV, NOI, NOE, and OTH.
Numbers in parentheses are p-values.
5.3. Additional evidence on the earnings-management sample
Anecdotal evidence suggests earnings management as an important reason for the
large and frequently positive below-the-line items in China. Presumably, earnings
management may change the inherent pattern of eamings persistence in a company, thus
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creating one-time, transitory components within earnings. If pricing mechanisms
properly reflect eamings' time-series properties, we expect to observe that below-the-
Hne items resulting from eamings management are less persistent and the stock market
places a discount on these items accordingly. Table 6 presents the results of such
analysis based on three possible earnings-management samples.
First, we use a dummy variable. Right, to define a group of companies that may use
below-the-line items to meet profitability targets for stock-rights offering as specified in
the Chinese security regulations. As shown in Table 6, two small profitability ranges
above the ROE targets of 10% and 6% are used in different years due to a 1998 change
of the stock-rights regulation in China. Before 1998, the ROE target for the eligibility
of stock rights offering was 10%, and during 1998, the Chinese authority lowered the
ROE target to 6% for any individual year as long as the three-year average ROE is
over 10%. Second, another dummy variable, DL, is used to identify companies that
may manage eamings to avoid delisting. Since companies reporting negative ROEs for
three consecutive years will be delisted in China, we classify a company to this group
if below-the-line items are used to turn a loss into a profit. Several studies have
employed this dummy-variable approach to identifying eamings-management samples
Table 6
Additional tests: eamings-management sample
Model A Model B Model C
Intercept 4.90 (0.00) 6.65 (0.00) -0.23 (0.62)
BV 1.19(0.00)
OI 5.30 (0.00) 4.71 (0.00) 0.73 (0.00)
BI 10.50 (0.00) 9.39 (0.00) 0.53 (0.00)
Right -6.96(0.16) -1.79(0.00) 0.62 (0.36)
DL 9.47 (0.04) 0.73 (0.21) -4.59 (0.00)
BB 25.72 (0.00) 2.31 (0.00) 0.19(0.89)
RightxBI -6.37 (0.03) 0.95 (0.83) 0.04 (0.83)
DLxBI -0.53 (0.85) -0.32 (0.92) 0.54 (0,00)
BBxBI -13.23 (0.00) -13.45 (0.00) -1.01 (0.00)
N 2202 2202 2202
Adj. R- 0.08 0.16 0.31
F(BI+RightxBI) 1.14(0.28) 5.67 (0.01) 4.55 (0.03)
F(BI+DLx BI) 25.77 (0.00) 12.26 (0.00) 50.62 (0.00)
F(BI+BBx BI) 1.76(0.18) 2.64(0.11) 26.36 (0.00)
Model A: Retum,=7o+3(iOI,,a2BI,+a3Right,+a4DL,+a5BB,+a6rightxBI,+a7DLxBI,+XxBBxBI,+£.
Model B: Price,=^o+i?iBV,+i?20I,+^3BI,+^4Right,+/?5DL,+j9(,BB,+j?7rightxBI,+^sDLxBI,+/?9BBxBI,+£.
Model C: NI,.|=7o+)'|OI,+72BI,+73Right,+y4DL,+}'5BB,+y6rightxBI,+y7DLxBI,+7s;BBxBI,+£.
Retum=buy-and-hold return; Price=April 30th closing price; NI=net income (before taxes); BV=book value of
equity; OI=operating income; and BI=below-the-line items. The independent variables are on per-share basis and
further scaled by April 30th closing price in the return model, on per-share basis in the price model, and deflated
by total assets in the earnings-prediction model.
Right is a dummy variable with a value of one if 10%<ROE<1 1% in 1997, or 10%<ROE<1 1% or 6%<ROE<7%
in 1998, or 6%<ROE<7% after 1998. DL is a dummy variable with a value of one if OKO and NI>0. BB is a
dummy variable with a value of one if both OI and NI<0.
Numbers in parentheses are p -values.
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based on the Chinese regulations regarding rights offering and dehsting (e.g., Chen et
al., 2001; Chen & Yuan, 2001; Lee & Cao, 2002). Finally, we identify a "big bath"
sample as companies that report both negative operating income and negative below-
the-hne items.
We examine the impact of earnings management on pricing and time-series properties
of operating income vs. below-the-line items by joining each of the three dummy variables
with the total amount of below-the-line items in the return model (Model A), the price
model (Model B), and the earnings-prediction model (Model C). If the pricing mechanism
is efficient, we expect the dummy-BI interaction to be significantly negative, which means
a smaller BI coefficient for the earnings-management subsample, and/or the F-test to be
insignificant, which means an inconsequential BI variable in the regression for the
earnings-management subsample.
Overall, this analysis leads to mixed results. For companies with earnings management
to meet the ROE targets for rights offering, the return model produces a significantly
negative interaction between Right and BI, suggesting that the earnings-response
coefficient for BI is smaller for these companies. The F-test of [(BI+RightxBI)=0]
fiirther shows that the coefficient of BI is indeed insignificant for this subsample. This
evidence is consistent with price impounding time-series properties in the sense that the
market only values those below-the-line items that do not result from rights-offering-
motivated earnings management. However, the price model does not provide corroborat-
ing evidence. The insignificant interaction term and the significant F-test indicate no
difference in the valuation implication for BI between companies with or without earnings
management motivated by rights offering. Similarly, the earnings prediction model is not
able to detect any difference in the predictive power of BI between these two groups of
companies.
When companies are classified based on the delisting variable, DL, none of the
three models provides expected results as indicated by the insignificant interaction
terms and the significant F-tests. The market does not seem to distinguish below-the-
line items from companies with and without delisting motivated earnings management,
and to the contrary, the power of below-the-line items in predicting future earnings is
larger for the DL subsample as shown by the significantly positive interaction term in
Model C.
However, for companies taking a "big bath" through below-the-line items, we obtain
consistent and strong evidence that the pricing of below-the-line items properly reflects
their time-series properties. The significantly negative interaction terms and the
insignificant F-tests from both the return (Model A) and the price model (Model B)
indicate that below-the-line items resulting from "big bath" type of earnings management
do not have any valuation implications, which is consistent with the evidence of time-
series properties from the earnings prediction model. As shown in Model C, the significant
F-test [(BI+BBxBI)=0] together with the larger and significantly negative interaction
terni, BBxBI, suggests a negative relation between below-the-line items and fiiture
earnings for this "big bath" subsample. This is consistent with the U.S. evidence reported
by DeAngelo et al. (1992) and Burgstahler et al. (2002). Negative below-the-line items
represent an interperiod transfer of expenses, i.e., the larger the "big bath" this period, the
larger the eamings next period.
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Table 7
Additional tests: nonpersistent sample
Adj. R-
(A) Return,= Xo+o[ I OIi+oijBIi+e
Intercept 16.71 (0.00)
01 4.43 (0.00)
BI 6.85 (0.26)
441 14.88 (0.00) 0.06
(B) Pricer-Po+ P.,BV,+ fi:OI,+pjBI,+e
Intercept 8.72 (0.00)
BV 0.48 (0.05)
OI 4.00 (0.00)
BI 5.57 (0.42)
441 11.38(0.00) 0.07
(C) NI,^,=yo+y,OI,+y2BI,+E
Intercept -1.48 (0.02)
OI 0.90 (0.00)
BI -4.49 (0.00)
441 104.14(0.00) 0.32
Retum=buy-and-hold return; Price=ApriI 30th closing price; NI=net income (before taxes); BV=book value of
equity; OI=operating income; and BI=below-the-line items. The independent variables are on per-share basis and
further scaled by April 30th closing price in the return model, on per-share basis in the price model, and deflated
by total assets in the earnings-prediction model.
The nonpersistent sample contains only observations above the 90th percentile or below the 10th percentile of
ABI=(BI,-BI,-,)/|BI,|.
Numbers in parentheses are /> -values.
5.4. Additional evidence on nonpersistence sample
Finally, we repeat our three-model analysis using a sample of firm/year observations
that contain only nonpersistent below-the-line items identified on an ex post basis. An
observation is included in this special sample if the change in below-the-line items during
a two-year period is either above the 90th percentile or below the 1 0th percentile threshold
computed as: ABI=(BI,— BI,+i)/|BI,|. This sampling procedure results in 441 observations
over the four-year period with below-the-line items that are extremely transitory in the
sense that they completely reverse in the next period. Table 7 presents results from all three
models.'"
Both the return (Panel A) and price models (Panel B) provide consistent evidence that,
while operating income is value relevant, transitory below-the-line items are not, as
demonstrated by the highly significant 01 but insignificant BI variable. Furthermore, Panel
C confirms that operating income, persisting into the future, has an expected positive
coefficient in predicting next-year earnings, but below-the-line items are negatively
associated with future earnings because of their transitory, reverting nature. Consequently,
this analysis based on the special sample strongly suggests that stock prices properly
In addition to combining BI obser\'ations above the 90th percentile (BI decreases between the two years)
with those below the 10th percentile (BI increases between the two years), we also analyze each group separately.
The results are qualitatively similar.
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impound the time-series properties of persistent operating income vs. transitory below-the-
line items in China.
6. Conclusions
This study investigates the value relevance of operating income and below-the-line
items in the Chinese stock market. Motivations for this study are twofold. First, there is a
need for empirical evidence beyond the value relevance of aggregated accounting
information in China. Although previous studies consistently find value relevance in
China, the findings have been questioned and often are considered counterintuitive, given
the low quality of the information environment. Examining the value relevance of
earnings components with different levels of persistence allows us to provide additional
evidence in this area. Second, the extant literature on earnings components is primarily
based on examining special items in the United States. Studies using data from other
countries are both limited and less focused in the international accounting literature. By
comparison, the reporting environment for nonrecurring or less persistent earnings
components in China is very different from the U.S. environment. Chinese GAAP is
more specific in defining the scope and specifying the reporting format of these items.
The Chinese income statement is clearly divided into two sections: recurring operating
income and below-the-line items that are supposed to be less persistent. Furthermore, in
sharp contrast to the special items being dominated by charges to the income statement in
the United States, below-the-line items in China are overwhelmingly income-increasing
and often account for a large percentage of a firm's reported net income. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that using below-the-line items is a primary tool of earnings
management in the Chinese stock market. These institutional features make China an
interesting setting to examine how stock prices reflect earnings components with
different levels of persistence.
We report empirical results in three areas. First, we find that both operating income and
below-the-line items are value relevant, but price-earning multiples are significantly larger
for below-the-line items than for operating income, which is contradictory to the perceived
difference in persistence between these two types of earnings. Second, we demonstrate that
the time-series properties of operating income vs. below-the-line items are both consistent
with and different from the perceived difference. While operating income is more
persistent and has significantly larger power in predicting fiiture earnings than below-the-
line items, we find that below-the-line items in China also persist into the future and are of
predictive values. Combining the first two findings, we conclude that the pricing of
operating income and below-the-line items in the Chinese stock market is rational to the
degree that persistent earnings, no matter recurring or below-the-line items, are reflected in
stock prices. However, the time-series properties of operating income and below-the-line
items are not fiilly impounded in prices as evidenced by the unexpected relative
magnitudes of earnings-response coefficients.
Finally, we provide additional evidence to explain and check the validity of the first
two findings. We identify three subsamples of companies that are likely to manage
earnings through below-the-line items and examine whether the pricing and time-series
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properties of below-the-line items in these companies differ from other companies.
Although the results are mixed, we provide some evidence consistent with the notion
of stock prices properly reflecting time-series properties of below-the-line items. In
particular, we find that below-the-line items resulting from a ''big bath" do not have
any valuation implications because they represent an interperiod transfer of expenses.
Furthermore, we present strong evidence that transitory below-the-line items whose
identity is based on observed persistence are not value relevant in China.
In sum, we present additional evidence of value relevance in China beyond
aggregated earnings. An eamings component is impounded in stock prices as long as
persistent and nonpersistent below-the-line items are value irrelevant. This result
supports both the sophistication of the pricing mechanism and the quality of eamings
information. As such, our findings cast a vote of confidence in the value relevance of
accounting information in China. Given the evidence of this study, we believe that the
findings of previous studies' on value relevance are less likely to be statistical artifacts;
rather, they represent an important role that accounting information plays in the
Chinese stock market. Although the information environment in China is less than
perfect, accounting information is so fundamental for equity investors that stock prices
reflect not only aggregated eamings, but also eamings components. However, we also
show that the time-series properties of eamings components are not fully priced in the
market. The earnings-response coefficients are larger for below-the-line items than for
operating income, although below-the-line items are less persistent and have a lower
predictive power. While this is a pricing anomaly, our finding of a partial reflection of
eamings time-series properties in stock price is consistent, in spirit, with the recent
evidence by Burgstahler et al. (2002) based on the U.S. data. They find that stock
prices do not fully impound time-series properties for either special items or recurring
components of earnings.
Although we do not ha\e direct evidence, we conjecture that Chinese investors
place larger \aluation weight on below-the-line items because of the unique
institutional environment in which listed companies are somehow able to improve
their bottom-line eamings through below-the-Iine items whenever such needs arise. The
majority shareholders of listed companies are state-owned enterprises, and it is
relatively easy and convenient for state-owned parent companies to arrange some
favorable nonoperating transactions to help their listed companies boost eamings
through below-the-line items. In addition, local go\emments often consider the number
of listed companies in their jurisdictions as an important performance indicator and are
motivated to help listed companies through \'arious government subsidies when listed
companies face financial difficult^'. Future research can explore these issues, possibly
using longer time-senes data, to further enhance our understanding of the pricing of
eamings components.
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Abstract
Despite empirical research and theoretical validity, there is mixed evidence on whether employee
stock options align interests between management and shareholders by turning managers into
owners. What used to be a functional tool introduced in the 1950s, has gotten out of hand, as
perceived by the press and popular literature. The main catalyst is the accounting treatment stock
options receive. This paper provides an overview of the empirical research in the field and discusses
the current accounting treatment of employee stock options and impending changes. We conclude by
proposing alternative compensation tools.
© 2004 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The foundations for Employee Stock Option ("ESOs") were laid by the United States
Congress, and adopted by President Truman in 1950. On September 23, Truman signed
the 1950 Revenue Act, which included a section that changed the prevailing tax code. The
change made it legal for companies to pay employees with what we would now call stock
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options (Fortune, 2 July 2001). At first, ESOs uses increased primarily at the board of
directors and management levels. Gradually, the use spread to the lower ranks, and today
they are widely used in every industry.
As the use of ESOs increased, so too did the interest of academics. From the academic
as well as the practical viewpoint, ESOs affect everything—from a company's
compensation policy to its capital structure, and from accounting earnings to investment
decisions. If implemented properly, ESOs can be used as a functional tool to streamline a
company's compensation policy or capital structure. If implemented improperly, they can
destroy shareholder value, overpay or demoralize employees, or even bankrupt the
company. It is therefore crucial that management understands the mechanics of ESOs, as
well as the benefits and downsides, before implementing an Employee Stock Option
Program.
The mechanics of ESOs are similar to traded stock options when the major
determinants of options (right to purchase shares, strike price, maturity date) are taken
at face value. But there are some caveats: ESOs are inalienable, normally the options
cannot be exercised until vested, and exercise of the options creates new shares. A key to
understanding of ESOs, and their popularity, can be found in the applied accounting
treatment, which is held in high regard by a majority of companies that use stock options,
and is widely criticized by the popular and business press. Basically, the embedded and
implied costs associated with ESOs are not recognized in the profit and loss statements,
which essentially suggest that ESOs are free to the company. The perceived low costs have
caused companies to issue large amounts of stock options instead of standard paychecks,
which in some cases led to an over-issue of ESOs (Marconi pic is a prime example of this
case (www.marconi.com), Marconi, 2003).
As the most widely used incentive-compensation tool, ESO has been widely researched
from a variety of perspectives. While most prior research on the topic agrees that the use of
ESOs has advantages, shifting academic and public opinion on this subject prevents ftiU
agreement on specific benefits. Although no one advantage emerges as the undisputed
driver of ESO use, most agree that stock options provide (i) an alignment of the interests of
management as decision makers and shareholders as risk bearers, (ii) incentives for
managers to assume a responsible level of risk-taking, (iii) higher accounting profits, (iv) a
non-cash payment currency for companies facing liquidity constraints, and (v) an
opportunity to award managers when data noise makes it difficult to determine
performances.
Despite empirical research and theoretical validity, there is mixed evidence on whether
stock options provide a solution for the horizon problem, and whether tax advantages
provide a driver for companies to use stock options. Furthemiore, academic theory and
business-literature releases suggest that stock options provide both an opportunity to issue
shares at a premium and a tool to retain key personnel. However, there is no empirical
research on either proposition. However, the use of stock options is by no means
undisputed. Aside from the hype in the press and popular literature, academic literature
shows that stock options cause (i) a deadweight loss to firms because employees values
their options substantially below market value, (ii) opportunistic behaviour by manage-
ment with respect to the timing of the stock-option awards, and most importantly (iii)
dilution of share capital. There is also some mixed evidence and academic theory
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suggesting that companies should discard stock options due to the loss of tax shield, an
important driver of firm value according to business literature. Finally, there are practical
and academic examples suggesting that stock options result in an agency cost inducing
anti-takeover tool.
In the following sections, we will examine the accounting treatment of stock options.
The remainder of the paper summarizes the empirical literature regarding the benefits and
costs of ESOs, discusses the possible upcoming changes in accounting regulations, and
provides an overview of the most important alternatives to ESOs.
2. Accounting for employee stock options
In 1972, the Accounting Principles Board issued Opinion No. 25: Accounting for Stock
Issued to Employees ("APB 25") to replace Accounting Research Bulletin No. 43 (AICPA,
1953). APB 25 requires accounting for ESO compensation costs the intrinsic value" of the
options on the measurement date, i.e. the first date both the number of shares under the
stock-option plan and the strike price are known (Harter & Harikumar, 2002). The
resulting costs are then, much like accrual-based accounting, spread over the period the
employee is supposed to work to be entitled to the options. The result is clear: with the
sole measurement date being the grant date and strike price at-the-money, no costs of
ESOs is ever recorded. Interestingly enough, stock options with variable exercise prices'
or Stock Appreciation Rights ("SARs") were to be included as compensation expense in
the income statement. The rationale for this inconsistency was the concern that stock
options could not be reliably valued at the grant date.
This anomaly in the accounting regulations caused a surge in stock-option awards such
that the Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB") acknowledged its heightened
importance in 1984 by issuing an Invitation to Comment: Accounting for Compensation
Plans Involving Certain Rights Granted to Employees. After receiving over 200 replies,
the FASB unanimously agreed that employee stock options in fact resulted in a
compensation expense. However, the scope of the replies turned out to be much wider
than a focus on stock options only. Much like convertibles, stock options seem to float
somewhere in the grey area between debt and equity. When a company issues stock
options, it is in effect selling naked call options, i.e., the holder has the right to convert his/
her options and receive newly issued shares. In other words, stock options are equity
instruments or at least equity-like instruments. On the other hand, in practice, companies
are reluctant to issue new shares and dilute their current shareholders. These companies
can therefore either purchase shares or equity instruments in the open market, which locks
in the cost of the stock-option program at the moment of the purchase of equity or equity
instrument, turning the option program into a contingent liability. From the Invitation to
Comment, the FASB picked up a multitude of similar distinction problems between equity
The maximum of share price minus exercise price, or 0.
For instance. Indexed Stock Options, where the strike prices of the options are adjusted for by the
I
performance of a benchmark index.
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and liabilities. The FASB therefore shifted its focus to this broader question (Dechow
Hutton & Sloan, 1996).
After the sudden surge in ESOs in the early 1 990s and the accompanying attention it
received in the press, the FASB was forced to react. After much debate and public
attention, the FASB finally published its now notorious Exposure Draft in June 1993. In
the Draft, the FASB proposed to require income-statement recognition of the "fair market
value" of the ESOs. Strong opposition fi-om the industry and even Congress forced the
FASB to reconsider the proposed recognition. The fair market value of ESOs, as proposed
by the FASB in 1993, states that ESOs should be treated as compensation just like salaries,
bonuses, and pensions. The ESO cost calculation consists of two parts: the valuation of the
options and the determination of the number of options. First, the FASB stipulates that
companies can value their stock options using either a Black-Scholes-based formula or a
binomial options-pricing model, where the company can estimate the time to maturity by
assuming that employees will exercise their options when (i) the share price reaches a
certain level, (ii) the underlying share reaches a certain volatility, and (iii) the share price
has increased by a certain percentage over a given time fi^ame."* Second, the company can
estimate the number of options that will eventually vest. The total ESO costs are simply
the estimated option value multiplied by the expected number of vested options. This fair
value is subsequently amortized and included in the income statement over the life of the
option. Any subsequent changes in the option value are not accounted for, but any changes
in the number of vested options" are accounted for (Mozes, 1998).
Where there is an impact on the income statement, there is also an effect on the balance
sheet: the accounting eamings are permanently reduced and therefore the retained-eamings
account is reduced. This problem is nullified by the creation of the option account, an
equity account, which in turn is closed to paid-in capital, resulting in the same reported
total equity under APB 25 and the 1993 Exposure Draft (Dechow et al., 1996). Although
the 1993 Exposure Draft was largely in line with public demand, and perhaps even
common sense, the FASB received more than 1700 official comment letters, including
1000 form letters, mostly opposing the FASB's proposals. The opponents included the
(then) six major accounting firms, venture capitalists, the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") and even U.S. senators (Dechow et al., 1996). With this pressure
from all angles, in 1995 the FASB finally adopted Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards 123 ("SFAS 123"), a middle-of-the-road strategy, requiring disclosure of the
before-described fair market value of ESO as costs in the form of a pro-forma income
statement in the footnotes. Furthermore, it recommends, but does not require, recognition
ofESOs in the income statement. Although SFAS 123 was introduced as a replacement for
APB 25, and the FASB encouraged the adoption of SFAS 123, companies were free to
^ The freedom allowed by the FASB with regards to the "fair market value" is consistent with the abundance
of academic literature on valuation and exercise of ESOs. With the specific attributes of ESOs and the holders'
irrational exercise behaviour, the Black Scholes formula seems insufficient to price ESOs. see for instance
Lambert, Larcker and Verrecchia (1991), Hudart (1994), and Mozes (1998).
' For instance, certain corporate actions such as takeovers or restructuring automatically trigger vesting of all
outstanding stock options, or a larger than expected number of forfeited options decreases the number of vested
options.
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elect between SFAS 123 and APB 25.^ However, once a company chooses to adopt SFAS
123, it cannot revert back to APB 25. An overview of the differences and similarities
between APB 25 intrinsic-value approach vis-a-vis SFAS 123 fair-value approach is
presented in Table 1.
Where APB 25 is crystal-clear, SFAS 123 is considered rather vague, this is not solely
due to the (widely viewed as insufficient) recommendation to recognize ESO costs.
Rather, the FASB does not stipulate when to disclose the costs of the ESO, which could be
the grant date, vesting date, or the exercise date. Additionally, the FASB allowed for
interpretation of certain items by the companies, such as the above-described expected
exercise date, which Mozes (1998) points out.
An accompanying problem with ESOs is dilution. The FASB requires companies to
disclose dilution in their annual reports and present two different types of Earnings per
Share ("EPS"), the normal EPS and the fully diluted EPS. The FASB has issued a
Statement (SFAS No. 128, FASB, 1997) to calculate the dilution and diluted EPS
according to the "treasury stock method":
Dilution = A^o*inax
EPSoiluted =
E
Ns + A^o*niax 0-'-^
where: //s^number of outstanding shares, jVo=number of options, £'=eamings, iS'=share
price, X=strike price.
The last remaining aspect of stock options is taxes. Only when the stock option is
exercised, is it absolutely certain that the holder of the option has been able to extract value
from his/her options. And since the option holder's position is opposite that of the
company, the holder's assured gain must mean the company's certain loss. Or so the FASB
argues. The opportunity loss of the option for the company (i.e. the difference between the
prevailing share price and the exercise price) is therefore made tax-deductible, even though
the opportunity loss is not recognized in the income statement nor disclosed in footnotes.
Not surprisingly, this particular feature of ESOs has caused a large part of the commotion
in the press.
The accounting treatment of stock options is one of the main drivers behind the large-
scale upswing in adopting stock options as a key part of corporate compensation policy.
As can be derived easily from the above overview of accounting, the anomalous
accounting treatment in itself causes higher reported profits and a tax-deduction for all
"opportunity losses" upon exercise of the options. On the negative side, however, stock-
option accounting also causes a loss of tax-deduction upon issuance of the options, and the
reporting of lower, fully diluted EPS figures.
"[...] The fair-value-based method is preferable to the Opinion 25 method for purposes of justifying a
change in accounting principle under APB Opinion No. 20, Accounting Changes. Entities electing to remain with
the accounting in Opinion 25 must make pro forma disclosures of net income and, if presented, earnings per
share, as if the fair-value-based method of accounting defined in this Statement had been applied" (SFAS 123,
1995).
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Table 1
Overview of APB 25 and SFAS 123
APB 25—Intrinsic value
approach
SFAS 123—Fair-value approach
Costs
Disclosure
Fair value
Date of cost
recognition
Equity account
Profit and Loss
Statement impact
Balance
Sheet impact
The compensation cost for
stock option is measured as
the excess of the quoted
market price of the
company's share over
the strike price on
the day shareholder
approval is obtained
See Table 2
Fair value of options
granted and pro forma
impacts need to
be disclosed in footnotes
The compensation cost
that corresponds to the
intrinsic value amortized
over the vesting period
remains constant over time
and reduces reserves
No amortization or
Profit and Loss impact
following the vesting
period
Paid in capital increases
by the same amount thus
offsetting the reduction
in reserves
After the initial cost
recognition, the only
impact will be a Balance
Sheet impact
If the stock option is
settled by the issue of
new shares, shareholders'
equity increases by the
strike price of the option
granted
If the stock option is settled
by the delivery of existing
shares, the impact on equity
will depend on the
difference between the strike
price of the stock option and
the purchase price of the
shares delivered to
employees
The compensation cost for stock
option is measured as the fair
value of the option; i.e., the
value of the option as
measured via an option-pricing
model (Black-Scholes/Binomial)
on the day shareholder approval
is obtained
See Table 2
-No amortization or Profit
and Loss impact following
the vesting period
Paid in capital increases
by the same amount
thus offsetting the
reduction in reserves
After the initial cost
recognition, the only
impact will be a Balance
Sheet impact
If the stock option is settled
by the issue of new shares,
shareholders' equity
increases by the strike
price of the option granted
If the stock option is settled
by the delivery of existing
shares, the impact on equity
will depend on the difference
between the strike price of
the stock option and the
purchase price of the
shares delivered to employees
The compensation cost
that corresponds to the
fair value amortized
over the expected life of
the option remains
constant over time and
reduces reserves
Source: Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123 and Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 25.
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When keeping in mind the accounting treatment of stock options, (in particular that
awarding stock options is not a recognized cost in the profit and loss statement and the
tax deduction granted upon exercise), it would come as no surprise if these two reasons
would actually be the most popular reasons for the heightened use of stock options.
According to the companies' statements, however, the most quoted reasons for using
ESOs are to motivate employees to create shareholder value and to align management
objectives and shareholder objectives. Two recent examples are given by Eni S.p.A.
("Eni") and Telecom Italia Mobile S.p.A. ("TIIVF'), which introduced ESOs in 2000 and
1999, respectively. Eni stated that "In order to create an effective incentive tool, the
Extraordinary Shareholders' Meeting of August 2, 2000, delegated to the board of
directors the power to increase Eni's share capital up to a maximum of lire 30 billion (or
about 0.375% of the current capital stock) through the issue of up to a maximum of 30
million ordinary shares. . ." (Eni S.p.A., 2000, 20-F, p. 78). A similar filing was posted by
TIM: "During the course of the year, the Board of Directors executed the mandate
conferred to it by the Shareholders' Meeting of December 1998 and implemented a stock-
option plan. The transaction represents an effective means for the achievement of the pre-
set objective of deeply involving management in reaching the Company's growth targets
and in the shareholder value creation" (Telecom Italia Mobile S.p.A., 1999, Annual
Report, pp. 7).
The reasons presented by companies to initiate or continue ESOs, or similar
programs such as Share Appreciation Rights, Bonus Shares, etc., are all similar to the
abovementioned reasons from Eni and TIM, namely to align interests. However, both
the academic and popular press literature argues that there are more reasons than mere
incentive alignment and the aforementioned favourable accounting treatment for
companies to issue ESOs. A popular press view is presented strikingly by shareholder
activist Nell Minow, when asked about the share-option packages awarded to Dell's
CEO Michael Dell and Oracle's CEO Larry Ellison. Between 1996 and 1998, Mr. Dell
received 38 million options, despite the fact that he, as the sole founder of Dell,
already held 535 million shares. Mr. Ellison received 20 million share options,
although he already held 700 million shares outright. Minow comments: "If they
weren't already motivated enough to protect the owners' interests, then their
shareholders are in worse trouble than they think" (Fortune, 2 July 2001). Although
incentive alignment and accounting are indeed unmistakably features and drivers of
ESO-utilization, they are not the only two reasons. Empirical research into the
rationale for issuing ESOs indicates that there is other, perhaps more subtle, reasons.
Some of the reasons mentioned below may not be actual drivers for management to
adopt an ESO program; they are certainly beneficial side effects. Unfortunately, ESOs
are a sort of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde story. The flipside of the ESOs is described
below as well. Although some might argue that the costs outweigh the benefits for
some companies, the widespread use of ESOs suggests that the professional world begs to
differ.
The following section surveys the academic literature to determine whether these
perceived advantages and disadvantages of stock options provide drivers or stumbling
blocks for companies to issue shares. The accounting-driven benefits and costs of stock
options are examined as well as other benefits and costs.
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3. Benefits of employee stock options
3.1. Alignment of interests
The natural starting point for assumptions about managers is that managers are
appointed by shareholders and that their main responsibilities are to protect shareholders'
interests and increase shareholders' wealth. However, this notion neglects one important
phenomenon: agency problems. Agency theory is based on the assumption that managers
(as decision-takers) and shareholders (as risk-bearers) have ill-aligned objectives (Jensen
& Meckling, 1976). Agency problems arise when shareholders have to bear the cost of
manager's investments or actions that do not render sufficient returns. A well-documented
example is RJR Nabisco 's enormous fleet of corporate jets, which in the 1980s were used
to fly the CEO's wife and dog around the world (Burrough & Helyar, 1990).
Agency problems are controllable, but controlling brings about monitoring costs-the so-
called agency costs. Agency costs include (i) setting up and enforcing contracts, (ii)
monitoring of management by shareholders, (iii) cost of rewarding optimal decision-
making by managers and enforcing shareholder compensation for sub-optimal decisions,
(iv) a residual loss which might arise due to too strict enforcement of the monitoring
contracts (Weston, Chung, & Siu, 1990). Despite the costs associated with monitoring,
Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that the separation of ownership and control encourages the
separation of decision management and decision control, and thereby effectively argue in
favor of the two-tier corporate-governance system characterized by a management board
being supervised by shareholder-appointed board of directors. A non-executive director is
usually a professional who works part-time for the company and ftill time for another, non-
associated company. Weisbach's research (1988) supports this statement by concluding
that firms with a higher percentage of outsiders, or non-executive directors, were more
likely to fire their CEO, which for Weisbach is a clear indication that the monitoring role is
functioning. However, the two-tier system as described is not beyond criticism: the system
caries the distinct air of nepotism.
The two-tier system is scrutinized by Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999), whose
findings include a higher CEO compensation when the CEO is also chairman of the board
of directors, the board is larger, the board contains a larger percentage of outside directors,
the directors are appointed by the CEO or when the directors are considered "grey"
directors. Core et al. continue to summarize other literature that states that boards of
directors are ineffective, such as Jensen (1993), Crystal (1991), Lambert, Larcker, and
Wiegelt (1993), Boyd (1994) and Yermack (1997). With the two-tier system under such
heavy scrutiny, the last line of shareholder defence is the ultimate agency-control
mechanism: the hostile takeover (Manne, 1965). Takeovers, and especially hostile
takeovers, can circumvent manager support or even approval by directly approaching the
shareholders through a tender offer or proxy fight.
^
As the old adage in healthcare goes, it is better to prevent than to heal. Fama (1980)
therefore supports the proposal to tie managerial compensation to performance. He
advocates that the stock market serves as an external monitoring device, which in turn
^ Interesting enough, ESOs can actually serve as an anti-takeover tool.
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determines managerial compensation. Aside from compensation, it is widely assumed that
ownership spurs results. However, the performance implications of executive incentives
are not that obvious.^ Himmelberg et al. (1999) argue that if incentives are set
endogenously and optimally, one does not expect to find a relation between the level of
executive incentives and performance. Some firms use more incentives because they are
trying to resolve more serious agency problems, but other firms use fewer incentives
because their agency problems are less severe. As a result, neither type of firm performs
better or worse in this setting, yet both types of firms would perform worse if they use
either more or less incentives. They state that previous studies fail to control for
unobserved firm heterogeneity that affects both ownership and performance and
consequently the result of their studies are likely to show non-existing correlations (Zhou,
2001). Himmelberg et al. largely focus on stock ownership due to the lack of sufficient
data on options. In light of Himmelberg et al.'s (interesting) findings, ESOs take on
heightened importance. Fortunately, this is also the focus of the majority of the research.
Fama (1980) is only one in a string of academics and practitioners to argue that pay
should be linked to performance, thereby turning the stock market into the uhimate
external monitor. Jensen and Murphy (1990a, 1990b), however, conclude in their study
into 1970s and 1980s compensation structures that pay is becoming increasingly
insensitive to performance as a result of the decreasing percentage of ownership that
management (and particularly the CEO) has in the company. Jensen and Murphy therefore
hypothesize that increasing political forces in the public sector and inside organizations
restrict a perfect relation between performance and reward. Their conclusion, is that CEOs
are in fact increasingly paid as bureaucrats, something that confimied the common notion
in the popular and business press at the time. Despite the fact that the use of old data made
the Jensen and Murphy study outdated upon publication, they set boundaries and
limitations for the research, which future researchers were all too willing to embrace as a
starting point for research into pay-performance sensitivities, mostly citing Jensen and
Murphy as the "common academic view."^ For instance, Hall and Liebman (1998) claim to
rectify this common view of low correlation between firm performance and CEO pay, by a
direct link to Jensen and Murphy (1990a, 1990b). Specifically, they document that this
relation is almost entirely created by increases in stock and stock-option values. According
to their findings, the relation has increased since the 1980s (after the Jensen and Murphy
study), largely due to the increase in the value of stock-option grants. At the same time,
they also deftise Himmelberg et al.'s findings by stating that the major link between firm
performance and pay is created by stock options, something Himmelberg et al. could not
research due to insufficient data. It is, however, important to note that Hall and Liebman 's
research and Jensen and Murphy's research are conducted over different time frames,
using different methodologies and different definitions of ESO compensation.
Zhou (2001) mentions that options are similar to shares only when the options are
negligible compared to the shareholdings, or when the options are perfectly correlated with
We thank the referee for his comments on that issue.
An example is Hall and Liebman (1998) who not only start by stating: "A common view is that there is little
correlation between firm performance and CEO pay", but actually name their article: "Are CEOs really paid like
bureaucrats?," referring to Jensen and Murphy's (1990a, 1990b) chief findings.
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the shares.'" Zhou, like many others such as Hudart (1994), Yermack (1995), Huddart and
Lang (1996), Carpenter (1998), and Heath, Huddart, and Lang (1999), concludes that this
is almost never the case and that stock options should always be viewed independently
from share ownership in testing ownership-performance relation. Combining Zhou's and
Hall and Liebmann's conclusions, Himmelberg et al.'s results seem to be of little interest
for ESOs. Since managers of companies in highly regulated industries can exert less
influence, the awarding of options as an incentive aligner is expected to be lower.
Empirical studies on the subject provide evidence of this: Smith and Watts (1992) and
Yermack (1995) find that in most, though not all, regulated industries companies award
less ESOs, with the notable exception of the banking industry. The results of the two
studies (and earlier work, according to Yermack (1995)) provide strong evidence that
ESOs are indeed used to align interests and provide incentives for management to excel
whenever possible (i.e., in non-regulated industries).
More evidence of incentive alignment is presented by Datta, Iskander-Datta, and
Raman (200 1 ), who investigate the relation between the market reaction to takeovers and
merger announcements and equity-based compensation. Their study shows that, after
controlling for exogenous variables, there is a significant and highly robust negative
relation between the acquisition premium paid and equity-based compensation. The
incentive-alignment argument is recognized by investors: Datta et al. also document a
significant positive relation between abnormal share price performance around the
takeover announcement date and equity-based compensation at the purchasing firm.
One of the few researches finding evidence against the common notion of incentive
alignment is DeFusco, Zom, and Jolinson (1991) study. They make an interesting
observation that contradicts agency theory—their study finds an increase in stock options
is accompanied by a significant decline in research and development ("R&D") ex-
penditure, and an increase in selling, general and administrative expenses ("SG&AE"). A
decrease in R&D would suggest an attempt to boost short-term earnings at the expense of
long-term growth, whereas an increase in SG&AE would suggest decreased efficiency.
DeFusco et al. refer to the limitations of their study, stating that they rule out a causal effect
between stock options and the observed accounting data. Since incentive alignment is the
key (communicated, at least) reason to issue ESOs, it has received the majority of attention
in the academic press. Although there is no consensus on whether there is indeed a relation
between stock options and share-price performance, the scale does seem to tilt towards the
protagonists of ESOs and incentive alignment, like Smith and Watts (1992), Yermack
(1995), Datta et al. (2001) and Core and Larcker (2002), among others. Of the researchers
finding no relation between incentive alignment and ESOs and/or managerial ownership,
Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) focus solely on shares, whereas DeFusco et al.
(1991) rule out any causal relation in their findings that contradicts agency theory due to
severe limitations in their study.
In summary, as Perry and Zenner (2001) conclude, Jensen and Murphy are not to be
disregarded, but rather are to be used as a benchmark for comparing the 1970s and 1980s
"^ What Zhou calls the correlation between the share-price movement and option-price movement is called
the option's delta. A low delta typically means that the option is far out-of-the-money; conversely a high delta
means that the option is deep in-the-money.
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with the 1990s. Although different studies use different research methods, sometimes
making comparison difficult, the concluding observation is that CEOs are no longer paid
as bureaucrats; the pressure of investors and policy makers seems to be paying off.
3.2. Mitigate risk-related incentive problems
The theory behind this benefit of stock options is that managers without equity-based
compensation are oftentimes too focused on reporting short-term accounting profits, and in
particular on short-term stability to increase their own job security. The rationale for this is
that the manager's financial upside is capped, whereas his/her downside includes, amongst
others, his or her job. Consequently, these managers sometimes pass up risky, yet
profitable, investments in favour of stable, but less profitable investments. Stock options
should mitigate this problem, since managers are forced to focus more on profitability to
increase their own compensafion package.
Conversely, the downside of the risk-related incentives ofESOs is that managers may be
motivated to take excessive risks to increase the value of their ESOs. After all, managers
can influence the value of their current stock option package by making riskier decisions,
since riskier decisions are eventually translated into a higher stock-return volatility, which
in turn increases the Black-Scholes value of the stock options. An example: Assume a
company without any activities, worth $ 1 00 per share. Consider two projects, where project
A has a 50% chance ofeaming $20 per share and a 50% chance of losing $ 10. Project B has
a 40% chance of eaming $40 per share and a 60% chance of losing $60. Project A has an
expected payoff of $5, and project B an expected payoff of —$20. A rational manager
chooses project A. Now add at-the-money stock options to the equation. Suddenly the
manager's payoff profile changes radically: project A has an expected payoff of $10 per
share and project B has an expected payoff of $16. The increase in volatility, although
uhimately negative for the company, has added 60% to the value of the stock options.
Although there is much anecdotal evidence, academic conjecture, and hefty speculation
in the popular press, hard empirical evidence of increased managerial risk-taking directly
resulting Irom ESOs is scarce.
Bizjak, Brickley, and Coles (1993) claim to be among the first to provide some
empirical evidence that ESOs provide incentives for managers to adopt long-term views
and invest in profitable, yet risky investments. They claim managers know that the market
is sophisticated enough to recognize profitable projects and will reward the company in the
long run, thereby incentivizing managers to invest rationally, instead of over- or under-
investing to create short-term paper gains. Unfortunately, Bizjak et al.'s research is subject
to flaws, according to Wruck (1993). Wruck comments that Bizjak et al.'s empirical tests
do not focus on the relation between investment decisions and the structure of
compensation contracts as the model suggests, but rather on the cross-sectional relation
between the sensitivity of CEO pay to stock-price performance and various asymmetric
information proxies. Instead, from Bizjak et al.'s study, Wruck concludes that companies
with high information asymmetries (manager's vis-a-vis investors) adopt a compensation
plan that concentrates on equity-based compensation.
Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) mention numerous other studies that provide circum-
stantial evidence such as Jensen and Meckling (1976), Haugen and Senbet (1981), Smith
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and Stulz (1985), Lambert (1986), Copeland and Weston (1988), Lambert, Larcker, and
Verrecchia (1991), Hirshleifer and Suh (1992), Murphy (1999), Hemmer, Kim, and
Verrecchia (1999), which all fail to provide empirical evidence. Rajgopal and Shevlin's
own research does provide empirical evidence on the relation between ESOs and
managerial risk taking by treating (oil and gas) exploration risk and ESO risk incentives as
endogenous variables. Using the Sunder model (Sunder, 1976), their research into oil and
gas producers shows that the coefficient of variations of future cash flows from exploration
activity exhibits a positive association with the sensitivity of ESOs to stock-return
volatility. Interestingly, the research shows that the ex-ante opportunity set, and not the ex-
post exploration risk, determines the ESO risk-incentive setting. According to Rajgopal
and Shevlin, this conclusion supports the earlier findings of Holthausen, Larcker, and
Sloan (1995). The research also shows that ESO sensitivity to stock-return volatility is
negatively related to hedging of oil and gas price exposure. In other words, managers with
ESO exposure are more inclined to rely on the old finance fundamental that investors can
hedge for themselves, if so desired, and forgo costly hedging activities. '' In sum, the
research finds that ESOs do indeed motivate managers to invest in high-risk, high-retum
projects. An important and obvious limitation of the study, however, is the lack of a broad
cross-section of firms and industries.
Further evidence is presented by Datta et al. (2001) in their study of mergers and
acquisitions. Since their study reports a significant positive relation between equity-based
compensation and the growth potential of the acquired firm, they suggest that managers
with a high equity-based compensation package are more inclined to engage in risky
takeover projects. Their results are consistent with Smith and Stulz's (1985) argument that
shareholders can reduce the risk that managers will pass up positive Net Present Value
("NPV"), yet risky projects, by increasing the convexity of the relation between manager's
compensation and firm performance.
The perceived risk that managers are motivated to take excessive risks for personal
gains as a result of ESOs is contradicted by the research of Carpenter (2000), who shows
that for risk-averse managers, the preferred asset volatility converges to the Merton
constant as asset value goes to infinity. Even more so, with the asset value at infinity, the
manager's might actually reduce the volatility to reduce their own exposure to the
volatility. In addition, giving managers more options also encourages them to reduce risk.
One of the assumptions implied above still holds its ground though: options with a far out-
of-the-money strike price do provide an incentive to increase risk.'"
To summarize, both Datta et al. and Rajgopal and Shevlin present empirical evidence
that stock options do indeed induce riskier decision making. In addition, Rajgopal and
Shevlin describe prior empirical research that provides circumstantial evidence, which
does not provide evidence to refute the academic theory. Moreover, Carpenter's research
shows that ESOs do induce optimal decision making, but only to a certain extent; when the
options are far in-the-money, the risky decision making is actually reduced, whereas far
out-of-the-money options induce excessive risk taking. However, it would be unwise to
" Unlike finance theory sometimes leads us to believe, hedging is a costly activity. Since there is no perfect
market, hedging entails bid/ask spreads, broker fees, potentially costly margin calls, etc.
'" The repricing of ESOs after a bad share-price performance is partly explained by this (Carpenter, 2000).
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apply Rajgopal and Shevlin's findings in the oil-and-gas exploration industry and Datta et
al.'s mergers and acquisitions findings to the economy at large; before accepting the
validity of this theory, further empirical results in a broader setting have to be presented.
3.3. Higher profits
Although considered unimportant in academic literature, reported earnings are held in
high regard in the professional world. Because of the accounting-fi'iendly treatment of
ESOs, it is natural to assume that companies use ESOs as a large part of their
compensation package to artificially inflate earnings. A less obvious phenomenon is that
many companies have outstanding loan agreements, which include so-called debt
covenants. Under a typical debt covenant, the interest rate of a loan increases if the
borrower's financial position worsens, e.g., when the net income, EBIT or EBITDA drops
below a certain threshold. By using non-recognized options as compensation, the company
can avoid breaching the debt covenants. Matsunaga (1995) indeed finds that firms
otherwise engaged in "window-dressing" (such as inventory accounting (LIFO/FIFO),
depreciation schedules, amortization schedules, and the accounting for tax credit using
flow-through methods) are more likely to use ESOs as a form of compensation.
Furthermore, Matsunaga finds a negative relation between the extent to which a firm is
below its target income level and the use of ESOs. The latter conclusion suffers fi^om a
notable limitation, namely that the implied relation is to some extent mechanical, resulting
from an unmanaged income.
Consistent with Matsunaga (1995), Yermack (1995) uses interest coverage as a
common proxy for large financial reporting costs, since firms with low interest coverage
are more likely to adopt the non-recognized ESOs to reduce the risk of violating debt
covenants. Whereas Matsunaga does find some evidence, Yermack does not find any
significant results to support the hypothesis. The profit argumentation is of heightened
importance for R&D-intensive industries, such as the oil and gas industry and the biotech
industry. Aboody (1996) concludes from his research into recognition versus disclosure of
R&D expenditure at oil and gas companies that recognition of a write-down causes a
significant negative market reaction, whereas disclosure causes no significant reaction. ^^
In a comment letter to the FASB in response to the proposed mandatory recognition of
ESO costs,^'^ the biotech industry claims that, as a result of compliance, reported earnings
would be reduced, limiting its access to capital, which in turn would cripple R&D
(Dechow et al., 1996). In research examining (i) share price reactions to events that
increase the likelihood of mandatory expensing of ESOs, (ii) lobby against mandatory
expensing of ESOs, and (iii) the likelihood that cash-starved companies are more inclined
to compensate employees with ESOs, Dechow et al. investigate the merit in the biotech
industry's and Aboody's argumentation. Their findings are surprising and contradict
Although Aboody's research is fundamentally unrelated to the ESO question, it does shed interesting light
on the general Recognition versus Disclosure question to which ESOs are subject. Moreover, it is reasonable to
assume that R&D disclosure/recognition will have an impact similar to ESO disclosure/recognition.
On 30 June 1993, the FASB issued an Exposure Draft, requiring the estimated value of ESOs to be
recognized as an expense.
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Matsunaga's (1995) and Aboody's (1996) results. Dechow et al. find no proof that
mandatory expensing of ESOs would limit a firm's access to capital, and claim these
findings are consistent with the popular view that the cost of capital argumentation is
abused to disguise management's self-interested behaviour. Dechow et al. give a plausible
explanation for their findings by claiming that the probability of the proposed mandatory
expensing of ESOs always remained negligibly small, thereby limiting share-price
fluctuations at announcements.
Espahbodi, Espahbodi, Razaee, and Tehranian (2002) take Dechow et al.'s research
(1996) to the next level by focusing solely on the share-price impact of proposed changes
in accounting regulations by issuance of Exposure Drafts. Although similar at first sight,
the studies are actually quite different: Dechow et al. mainly focus on the lobbying against
the Exposure Draft on stock options; Espahbodi et al. focus on actual FASB actions in the
run-up to the issuance of SPAS 123 in 1995. Whereas Dechow et al. does not record a
relation between higher reported profits and the use of ESOs, Espahbodi et al. do find a
relation. They confirm that firms show significant negative and positive abnormal returns
around the issuance of Exposure Drafts, proposing recognition of ESO costs and
disclosure of ESO costs, respectively. Moreover, confirming the biotech industry's views,
abnormal returns were most significant for high-tech, high-growth and start-up firms.
There is also a positive relation between the share-price reaction and the tax-loss of carry-
forwards, implying that a positive EPS impact is of even more importance when it is not
cancelled out by the loss of a potential tax shield of ESO costs. The results show that,
although investors are aware of the costs of ESOs due to disclosure, actual inclusion in
bottom-line EPS does affect the company's equity value.
Except for the notable exception of Dechow et al. 's research into the biotech industry,
the empirical findings show that the profit argument is an important benefit of ESOs: firms
with low interest coverage increasingly issue stock options to improve the interest
coverage; firms otherwise engaged in window-dressing increasingly award stock options;
and proposed changes of regulations to recognize stock-option expenses depresses share
prices. Moreover, Dechow et al.'s contradictory findings are at least partly explained by
the fact that their research focuses on potential changes in accounting regulations that were
never very likely to occur.
3.4. Liquidity constraints
ESOs cause no-cash outflow for the firm, and can even cause a cash inflow in the case
of a good share-price performance. One would therefore expect that firms facing liquidity
constraints would divert a larger part of the compensation package to ESOs. The currently
available research defines liquidity constraints in a number of ways, for instance, as a low
dividend yield or as a low payout ratio (which is essentially a derivative of the dividend
yield). Using dividends as a proxy for the liquidity position is a disputed measure among
researchers; most researchers present caveats warning that low dividends do not
necessarily imply liquidity constraints. For instance. Miller and Modigliani (1961) state
that investors (in a perfect market) should be indifferent towards firms' dividend policies,
implying that a company's dividend policy is subject to numerous factors, of which the
liquidity position is only one. In addition, some might argue that the dividend vs. stock-
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option subject is a chicken-and-egg story: managers might lower or even abandon
dividend payout to increase the value of their options. The ultimate indicator of liquidity
constraints is bankruptcy; if a company is truly cash-starved; it cannot meet its financial
obligations and will have to file for bankruptcy.
Gilson and Vetsuypens (1993) investigate just that, examining 77 companies that have
filed for bankruptcy or privately restructured debt to avoid bankruptcy during 1981-1987,
the era for hostile takeovers and corporate raiders. They find that 60% of the companies
replace their CEO with an outsider in a given year around the bankruptcy event, and that
new CEOs are on average paid 36% more than their predecessors. Although the higher
wage for the new CEO might seem illogical, the newly appointed CEOs typically receive
larger option grants as part of their compensation package.
Both Yermack (1995) and Smith and Watts (1992) investigate the liquidity
argumentation from the dividend perspective. Yermack finds that the ratio of the stock
option vs. cash component in the package almost doubles in firms paying no dividends.
Smith and Watts, as part of their broad research, also find a negative relation between
dividend yield and the use of ESOs.
Lambert, Lanen, and Larcker (1989) investigate the dividend hypothesis by using
Miller and Modigliani's (1961) classic article as a starting point. Lambert et al. use this to
link the increase in ESOs to the decrease in dividend level compared to the level that
would have occurred in the absence of ESOs. To normalize the dividend level, Lambert et
al. use a model devised by Marsh and Merton (1987). They find weak evidence that the
most pronounced decrease in dividends occurs for firms where the increase in stock-option
value is greatest. However, they are quick to point out the limitations to their study, namely
that the study bypasses the major questions of why companies pay dividends and why
companies award ESOs. These limitations are exactly the basis of Yermack's (1995)
conclusion.
Using different data, DeFusco et al. ( 1 99 1 ) conduct similar research, and reach a similar
conclusion as Lambert et al. They find that the payout ratio increased, while the debt ratio
decreased, which in turn appears to be driven by a decline in profitability that occurred in
the 5-year period following adoption of the ESO plan. However, they take the same point
of view as Lambert et al. (1989) in the sense that they expect the payout level to decrease
since ESOs are not dividend protected. Even though Yermack (1995) admits that there is
some merit in Lambert et al. and DeFusco et al.'s (1991) argumentations, he states that
they fail to explain the magnitude of the shift of cash-based compensation to option-based
compensation. A decrease in dividend yield from 3% to 0% increases the value of the
ESOs by about 60%—too low to account for the observed near doubling of the ratio of
options to cash compensation.
In conclusion, the liquidity constraint should provide a theoretically valid rationale for
increased ESO use, but empirical evidence disputes this. The reason for this is that most
researchers focus on dividends as a sign of liquidity constraints, such as Yermack (1995),
Smith and Watts (1992), Lambert et al. (1989) and DeFusco et al. (1991). However, all the
research that finds a negative correlation between dividends and stock options (as does all
the before mentioned research) suffers from the limitation that dividend payment is
increasingly affected by the internal causality that stock options might cause lower
dividends, instead of the assumption that low cash flow might cause both low dividends
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and stock options as a non-cash expense. Although Yermack's study suffers from the same
Hmitation, he defends his findings by stating that the magnitude of the shift away from
dividends is not solely explained by the existence of stock options, making the liquidity-
constraint more compelling. Empirical evidence from the true hquidity constraint angle is
provided by Gilson and Vetsuypens (1993), who find that bankrupted companies
increasingly switch to stock options as a compensation method in the years surrounding
the bankruptcy or restructuring event.
3.5. Risk reduction
Finance theory suggests that equity-linked compensation, and in particular highly
leveraged compensation such as stock options, spurs managers on to take excessive risks.
The rationale is simple: more risks in the business result in a higher volatility of the
underlying share price, which, ceteris paribus, result in a higher value of the stock options.
3. 6. Horizon problem
According to Yermack (1995), the "horizon problem" hypothesis predicts that CEOs
nearing retirement will forgo valuable R&D and investment opportunities, as the operating
results of profitable investments will not crystallize during the current CEO's reign,
leaving all the profit for the successor. Since sophisticated investors can identify profitable
investments and reward the company accordingly, the literature suggests that increasing
the performance-based component of the compensation package could offset the horizon
problem.
In his broad research, Yermack (1995) finds no increase in stock options as the CEO
approaches retirement age. Yermack leaves open the possibility that companies gradually
increase the stock-option component so that CEOs will have an extensive stock option
package when they near retirement age, but some further investigations indicate no
significant difference in vested options or stock for CEOs between the ages of 58 and 65.
Yermack mentions that his resuhs contradict Lewellen, Loderer, and Martin (1987) results,
but fails to note a major limitation of Lewellen et al.'s study. Lewellen et al. use data for
the period 1963 through 1973, which they identified as a shortcoming to their study, even
in 1987. They claim an update of the data is virtually impossible to obtain given the
changes in regulations by the SEC for the filing of 10-Ks and proxy filings. Yermack's
results confirm Eaton and Rosen's (1983) earlier findings, who investigate the structures of
various compensation packages for a number of variables. On the subject of age, they find
that older executives, as they approach retirement age, typically receive a high level of
delayed compensation in the form of pensions, but are less tolerant towards uncertainty
about their compensation. Younger executives were more likely to receive compensation at
risk in the form of stock options.
With a more recent sample than Lewellen et al., Dechow and Sloan (1991) also find
that the horizon problem may be an incentive for companies to increase the performance-
based part of the compensation package. First, they confirm the validity of the horizon
problem by finding a significant decrease in R&D spending by CEOs nearing retirement.
Second, they find that the decrease is mitigated through the CEO holding stock and stock
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options. Dechow and Sloan do not necessarily contradict Yermack's results. As Yermack
himself mentions, even though he finds no increase in ESO awards towards retirement, he
cannot exclude the possibility that the executives have amassed enough outstanding ESOs
from previous years to provide incentives to mitigate the horizon problem. The research
published on stock options as a potential tool against the horizon problem is sparse and in
some cases outdated. Lewellen et al. find that companies do indeed award stock options to
circumvent the horizon problem, but their research focuses on 1963-1973, and it is
therefore not surprising that subsequent researchers such as Yermack contradict their
results. Overall, the sparsely available evidence is insufficient and contradictory; stock
options might be a suitable solution to the horizon problem according to theory, but
empirical research does not fully support the theory.
3.7. Noisiness of data
When accounting data contain substantial noise, monitoring management's perform-
ance and consequently awarding bonuses become increasingly difficult tasks for the board
of directors. By relying on the fact that the effects of managerial decisions will crystallize
in the fiiture, it makes sense for the board of directors to base the compensation
increasingly on future share-price performance, which will inevitably incorporate the
quality of today's managerial decisions.
A first shot is made by Eaton and Rosen (1983), who define firms with fewer workers,
low assets, less advertising expenditure, and a low variance of rate-of-retum as firms with
low monitoring costs and low noisiness of data. Their research finds a positive relation
between the noisiness of the data and the use of stock options at the expense of salary,
bonus, and pensions. By defining noisiness of accounting data as the time-series variance
of changes in retum-on-equity divided by the time-series variance of stockholders' returns
(consistent with Lambert and Larcker, 1987), Yermack (1995) finds a positive relation
between noisiness of the data and utilization of ESOs. However, the results are only
significant at the 20% level. When eliminating industry dummy variables, the significance
improves to the 9% level, but the findings still do not support Eaton and Rosen's (1983)
and Lewellen et al.'s (1987) more significant findings (the before mentioned limitation to
Lewellen et al.'s research regarding the outdated sample still applies). A possible
explanation might be that Eaton and Rosen's and Lewellen et al.'s results are related to the
use of ex post gains on ESOs as the dependent variable, since companies with the greatest
variances of stock returns should also experience the greatest ex post increases in equity
value, regardless of monitoring considerations (Yermack, 1995).
Sloan (1993) investigates the use of accounting earnings-based compensation versus
stock price-based compensation for top management. He finds that earnings-based
compensation is more frequently used in firms where (i) firm-specific stock returns have a
higher association with market-wide movements in equity values, (ii) earnings have a
higher association with firm-specific changes in value, and (iii) earnings have a less
positive association with market-wide movement in equity values. From the second
finding, we can conclude that stock-based compensation is used more often when earning
changes do not automatically translate into stock-price changes, or in other words, when
the accounting earnings contain a large amount of noise. As before with the horizon
382 R. Muurling, T. Lehnert / The International Journal ofAccounting 39 (2004) 365-401
problem, the available data is in some cases outdated. However, while using various
definitions of noisiness of data, the available research is consistent in its conclusion that
noisiness of data provides an incentive for companies to award stock options. The results
and the conclusions drawn from the empirical research are consistent with the theory and
expectations, and it is therefore plausible to assume that noisiness of data induces
companies to award stock options.
3.8. Issue shares at a premium
Provided ESOs are struck out-of-the-money, they give the company an opportunity to
issue shares at a premium vis-a-vis today's share price. Disregarding the above-
mentioned benefits and the costs (noted below), ESOs once again show a similarity to
warrants. If management deems its share price to be undervalued, it might decide not to
issue shares at the current price, but instead issue warrants with a strike price above the
current share price. According to some, it now has the best of both worlds: if the share
price rises, the warrants will be exercised at a premium to current levels. Conversely, if
the share price remains constant or even drops by a small margin, the warrant will not
be exercised. Unless the company really needed the cash from a share offering, it still is
in a fairly good position: it has not issued shares at what it deems a low share price, but
it still received the premium paid by investors for the warrants. Additionally, for
declining share prices, the company did not burden its new investors with losses on their
shares, which could close the equity markets for issues in the future. The case for ESOs
is identical, except that ESOs do not induce a cash inflow, but rather prevent a cash
outflow in the form of compensation payment. When considering the fact that
companies issue convertible bonds to benefit from low interest rates and the opportunity
to issue shares at a premium in combination with the similarities between convertible
bonds and stock options, the rationale for issuing convertibles and stock options must be
similar as well, ceteris paribus. However, no empirical research is available to support
the theory.
3.9. Key personnel
Due to the vesting period, ESOs can serve as a particularly useful tool to attract and
retain key personnel. An employee with a large package of options will forgo the value of
all his/her unvested options if he/she decided to leave the firm and is forced to exercise her
vested options immediately, an irrational exercise since it is before maturity. And, the
employee might expect to be compensated for the loss of his/her ESOs, making him/her
expensive for any future employer.
Because this assumption seems so obvious, there has been little academic research into
the subject, except some human-resource studies investigating at which price employees
are willing to leave a current job for a new challenge. The merit of the argument has,
however, been recognized by companies. Aegon, a well-known example of a company in
financial trouble due to recent market turmoil, recognizes its decreased appeal by stating:
"AEGON 's ability to attract and retain key personnel, in particular senior officers,
experienced portfolio managers, mutual fund managers and sales executives, is dependent
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on a number of factors, including prevailing market conditions and compensation
packages offered by companies competing for the same talent, which, may offer
compensation packages that include considerable equity based incentives through stock
option or similar programs" (2001 20-F, pp. 8).
3.10. Tax advantage
If ESOs are not recognized expenses, while cash wages are, how do ESOs
create tax advantages?'^ They do so in two ways: first, upon exercise of stock options
companies can deduct the intrinsic value from taxes, as described before in the accounting
section.
Second, top executives wages may not be fully tax-deductible in the United States since
1993, when pubhc pressure forced the SEC to issue its Section 162(m) of the Internal
Revenue Code (Section 162(m)). The spirit of Section 162(m) is best captured by the
House Ways and Means Committee:
Recently, the amount of compensation received by corporate executives has been the
subject of scrutiny and criticism. The committee believes that excessive compensa-
tion will be reduced if the deduction for compensation (other than performance-
based compensation) paid to top executives of publicly held corporations is limited
to $1 million per year." (1993 U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News
877, taken from Perry & Zenner, 2001).
The advantage ESOs hold is therefore not that they become tax deductible, but rather
that cash payments lose their tax deductibility above $ 1 million, immediately decreasing
bottom-line EPS with constant cash wage payments. This provides an extra incentive for
companies to shift towards stock options.
Perry and Zenner (2001) investigate whether companies increasingly use ESOs in
favor of cash payment after the introduction of Section 162(m) in 1993. They find
that, although the regulations did not reach its prime stated objective of reducing
compensation, the regulations do change the structure of the compensation contracts.
Specifically, they find that firms with compensation packages of more than $1
million increasingly shift towards performance-based compensation, with finns citing
Section 162(m) as a key reason for the shift. The performance-based compensation
increase is not solely at the benefit of stock options, but also bonus payments
feature heavily. Empirical research on the subject is sparse, with only Perry and
Zenner providing support for the theory. Since their research substantiates the theory,
and a substantial number of companies cite Section 162(m) as a key reason to
switch towards a performance-based compensation, we believe the theory holds
merit.
Although this advantage of stock options is only relevant for U.S. corporations, it is included since it plays
an essential part in compensation decision-making. Furthermore, the other quoted studies all focus solely on the
United States, and this part is therefore required to present the full picture.
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4. Costs of employee stock options
4.1. Deadweight loss
Since stock options are usually subject to restrictions such as a minimum holding
period, inalienability, and barrier features, the option-receiving manager is forced to hold a
substantial part of his/her portfolio in his/her employer's options. Moreover, the manager
is usually not allowed to take risk-mitigating equity positions such as short call options or
shares, or put options. Because of the manager's resulting inability to diversify, his/her
position will be substantially below Markowitz's efficiency frontier (Markowitz, 1952).
From this inefficiency, it follows that the manager's equity-based compensation renders
too low an expected return to compensate for the concentration of risk. Consequently, the
manager values his/her equity-based compensation below its market value. This difference
between the manager's perceived valuation of the equity-based compensation and the
actual market value is the deadweight loss to the firm. Since the company could have sold
the equity-based instrument in the market to diversified investors and receive the full
market value, it is effectively destroying value.
Meulbroek (2001) acknowledges the fact that firms face a tension between incentive
alignment and portfolio diversification. The optimal trade off between costs and benefits
differs from firm to firm, but in every case there is a "deadweighf ' loss. Meulbroek's research
shows that this deadweight loss is the greatest for managers of high volatility firms (such as
internet or technology firms) who hold a substantial part of their portfolio in the company's
equity instruments. For instance, a completely undiversified manager ofan Internet firm will
value his/her stock options at only 53% of the market value, whereas a completely
undiversified NYSE firm manager values her stock options at 70% of the market value. '^
Since Meulbroek is the only researcher providing empirical evidence on the deadweight
loss, we cannot automatically assume that her finding constitutes sufficient supporting
evidence for the theory. However, given the validity of Markowitz's efficiency frontier, the
intuitively sensible conclusion drawn fi^om the portfolio and stock-option theory, and the
robustness of Meulbroek's results, it is reasonable to consider Meulbroek's theory.
4.2. Dilution
As mentioned before, dilution makes ESOs quite similar to warrants in this respect.
Since the seller of the option is the company itself, the instruments have a dilutive effect
fi"om the moment the employee decides to exercise his/her stock options. Companies can,
and oftentimes do, hedge against this dilution. From the fact that the hedging activity itself
is a costly exercise and that most companies still engage in hedging, it follows, ceteris
paribus, that the dilutive effect is a costly side effect of ESOs. ^^
The above sheds an interesting light on insider share deaUngs; an undiversified Internet manager can truly
believe and announce that her firm is undervalued (by less than 47%) and sell part of her shares to diversify and
still benefit.
'^ Assuming a perfect economy, the negative dilution effect of ESOs should be equal to the costs of
neutralizing the effect.
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SFAS 128 requires disclosure of dilution effect on the share capital and the
corresponding EPS. As mentioned before, the popular press is quick to criticize most
aspects of ESOs, and the disclosure requirements do not escape their wrath. For instance,
the cover of the Forbes May 1998 issue read: "Stock Options Dilute Future Earnings," and
the related article, which assumes that investors are largely unaware of the dilutive effect of
ESOs, describes them as a mortgage on future earnings (Morgenson, 1998). Huson, Scott,
and Weir (2001) investigate whether investors are indeed as oblivious towards dilution as
Morgenson suggests. They explore the extent to which shareholders incorporate earnings
into share price in the light of outstanding dilutive instruments, assuming that investors
should place a lower value on unexpected earning changes for firms with many dilutive
securities. Concurrent with their assumptions, Huson et al. find that expected dilution fi-om
currently outstanding instruments significantly weakens the relation between contempora-
neous earnings changes and returns. Additionally, investors perceive dilution costs to be
greater for firms with rising share prices—a correct assumption when studying the dilution
formula issued by the FASB. Huson et al. conclude therefore that investors do in fact
understand the dilution costs associated with ESOs and other dilutive instruments, contrary
to what the popular and business press leads us to believe, but they stress that the current
accounting regulations for dilution are still too conservative to fully capture the costs.
However, using proxies for both unexpected abnormal earnings and, particularly,
expected dilution posts a major limitation on Huson et al.'s study. Using treasury shares
held for conversion as a proxy for dilution assumes that companies use delta hedging to
counteract the dilutive effect of stock options. Although a sensible theoretical assumption,
since delta hedging is in fact the best way to hedge against dilution, it is practically flawed.
Hardly any firms use delta hedging in practice; they use one of the following methods
instead: (i) repurchase all shares under option, (ii) buy matching call options, (iii) enter
into forward or fiiture contracts, (iv) allow for dilution. With firms using any of the above
methods, or a combination of them, Huson et al.'s assumption is fundamentally flawed in
the sense that it either grossly over- or understates the real dilution costs. Furthermore,
companies regularly keep shares in treasury even though the options they are supposed to
hedge are so far out of the money that conversion is highly unlikely (with conversion
probability denoted by the delta, so that Treasury Shares > Delta). Huson et al.'s defense is
that since they cannot quantify dilution precisely, they do not presume to tell accountants
how to account for dilution.
Core, Guay, and Kothari (2002) attack the treasury stock method and propose a new
measurement. Using their proposed measurement, they find that the dilution is, on
average, 100% greater than the treasury/stock method leads us to believe, and that,
therefore, reported diluted EPS is overstated. They propose an alternative method of
accounting for dilution, which, contrary to FASB diluted EPS, is consistent with the stated
SFAS No. 128 (FASB, 1997). They argue that any diluted EPS measure should take into
account the economic claims posed by option holders, something that SFAS No. 128 fails
to do. Core et al. propose to define the diluted EPS with the following formula:
E
Options — diluted EPS =
-^
,
A^s+A^o^
where 0=value per option.
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The value per option, in turn, is defined by Core and Guay (2002) as an adaptation of
Merton's (1973) dividend-adjusted version of the Black and Scholes model (1973).
Although the basic argument sounds solid, in the sense that option holders can convert
and increase the equity of the firm, the combined equity value (i.e. the diluted share
capital) is not simply the combined common stock and option value. Since Core et al.
realize that ESOs are different from the plain vanilla options, they adjust for the early
exercise of options by estimating the Black-Scholes value using two alternate times to
maturity; 5 and 7 years. However, Core et al. forget to take into account two important
features of ESOs compared to plain vanilla options. ESOs are non-alienable and
employees are restricted to share trading in their own company's stock. This means that
employees cannot sell their options, nor extract the embedded option value by derivative
structures or delta hedging. As a direct consequence, ESO exercise becomes a binary
event: either the employee exercises his/her option, or he/she does not in which case the
option expires worthless. There has been plenty of academic research and debate on the
topic of early exercise, Hemmer et al. (1999), Huddart and Lang (1996) to name but a few,
but one thing remains evident: if and when the employee exercises her option, she pays the
strike price, making the option value the difference between strike price and the prevailing
share price, i.e. the intrinsic value. ^'^ Although the options unmistakably have a theoretical
value close to the Black-Scholes value, this value cannot be used to determine dilution.
When applying Core et al.'s proposal, the dilution is indeed perfectly linked to the value of
the option, but the option value will always remain a theoretical value. Due to the specific
ESO features (most notably the inalienability and the trading restrictions), the employee
has no means to extract the embedded value from the options. The value will therefore
inevitably either erode slowly over time due to the option's or be lost to the employee in
a split second due to early exercise.'^
That dilution is a major negative aspect of stock options is acknowledged by companies,
regulators, academics and (as Huson, et al.'s research suggests) investors. But despite being
the sole, undisputed, identifiable drawback of stock options, com^panies, regulators,
academics, and investors are all at a loss to quantify the magnitude of the costs. The FASB
prescribed the treasury/stock method in SPAS 128, but the method is under scrutiny by all
involved parties and is currently being investigated by the accounting ruling bodies. Core et
al. propose an akemative to the treasury stock method, but their proposal looks flawed and
appears to overstate dilution. Accounting changes, as will be described in the accounting
section, seem inevitable and dilution reporting might well be one of the altered items.
4.3. Anti-takeover
Whereas ESOs are in fact meant to mitigate agency problems, they can actually create
agency problems as well. When a company has a large number of ESOs struck just out-of-
the-money, a takeover premium can lift the share price above the strike price. The exercise
This is of course assuming rational behaviour: employees do not exercise out-of-the-money options and
always exercise in-the-money options on or before maturity.
'** The presented view on dilution echoes the rationale for an overall accounting proposal for ESOs. the
Exercise-Date Accounting.
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of the options will not necessarily cause a huge increase in the total takeover price, since
the exercise price paid by the option holders will remain within the company. It can
however create a poison pill. A prerequisite of course has to be that the employee cannot
sell his/her shares to the potential acquirers (Couwenberg & Smid, 2001).
A well-known example arose in the banking industry, which saw a consolidation wave
in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Although Deutsche Bank bought Bankers Trust, Chase
Manliattan bought JPMorgan, Morgan Stanley bought Dean Witter, UBS bought Warburg
Dillon Reed, and Allianz bought Dresdner Bank, no bank on the Street dared to touch
Lehman Brothers. It was rumoured that despite their good reputation for especially high
yields, Lehman Brothers was ignored due to the extensive option packages of management
and high-ranking employees. Because the company largely resembles a partnership,
potential buyers regarded management and high-ranking employees as '"hostile" share-
holders and snubbed Lehman as a takeover target. The available evidence on stock options
as an anti-takeover mechanism is purely anecdotal, and the academic theory is sparse.
There is, however, ample evidence that insider shareholding can serve as an anti-takeover
mechanism—but, as shown earlier, shareholdings and options are only similar where these
are either large or small deltas of the options. With relatively low equity values and
historically very low interest rates, a new era of hostile takeovers and corporate raiders
could emerge—empirical research into this subject could indeed soon prove to be relevant
and provide interesting results.
4.4. Tax reduction loss
The flipside of the before mentioned higher accounting profits is the loss of tax-
reduction. Although higher accounting profits should be considered irrelevant and
meaningless from a shareholder-value perspective, tax reductions translate directly into a
reduction in cash outflow and therefore create shareholder value. As advocated in most
academic and popular literature, Cash is King (Stewart, 1999). However, we know from
the same literature source that managers still attach high value to accounting earnings, and
are eager to forgo tax shields in favour of higher reported accounting eamings.
Espahbodi et al. (2002) find some evidence that companies with tax-loss carry-
forwards, consistent with the corporate-finance propositions, are more likely to award
stock options. Since these companies cannot benefit immediately from the tax shield that
cash compensation provides, the value loss of the foregone tax shield is minimal.
Espahbodi et al. (2002) investigate the share-price impact of proposals to recognize stock
options on companies with tax-loss carry-forwards, and find that the stock-price impact
was positively related to the existence of tax-loss carry-forwards. Their results can be
interpreted as follows: after implementation of compulsory recognition of ESO costs,
companies with tax loss carry-forwards are more likely to issue ESOs, since these
companies cannot benefit fully from the tax-loss carry-forwards. Espahbodi therefore
concludes that the loss of tax reduction provides a barrier for firms to use ESOs, and
conversely that when firms have tax-loss carry-forwards, the shift to ESOs does not
sacrifice the tax shield, and thus becomes an incentive to issue ESOs.
A different empirical analysis is conducted by Yermack (1995), who approaches the tax
reduction from the existing tax situation instead of investigating potential changes in
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accounting regulations. He hypothesizes that firms with tax-loss carry-forwards are more
likely to award options since they are likely to benefit least from the tax deductibility of
cash compensation. His original research, including Stock Appreciation Rights (SAR),
finds the expected, although insignificant, correlation. After taking into account
Matsunaga's (1995) comments that the tax advantages of ESOs are lower when the
options are awarded in the form of SARs, he readjusts the model to account for ESOs only
omitting SARs. The results are that the coefficient found earlier moves even closer to zero,
while remaining insignificant. That stock options cause foregone tax shields is not
disputed—using stock options instead of cash payments causes higher reported profits,
which in turn leads to a higher tax bill, ceteris paribus. Whether it affects corporate
decision-making is disputed. As the abundant academic research and business press show,
managers oftentimes do not follow the discounted cash-flow method and opt for higher
reported earnings instead. The limited empirical evidence, which is also contradictory,
does not allow one the possibility to draw a relevant and sensible conclusion on whether
companies view the loss of the tax shield as a motive not to issue stock options.
4.5. Timing ofESO awards
Although the awarding of ESOs is not always the choice of management itself, it is
widely accepted that management always has at least some influence in the awards.
Management is therefore in the unique position to manipulate the timing of the awards.
Since nearly all ESOs are struck as a ftmction of the share price on the day of the award, it
is beneficial for management to opportunistically award stock options just prior to issuance
of positive news (Yermack, 1997). Ahematively, management can time the announcement
of bad news to coincide with the scheduled issuance of stock options, thereby effectively
lowering the strike price of their options.
Yermack's study focuses on the good timing of the unscheduled award of ESOs and
finds that companies making unscheduled awards to their CEO outperform the market
by more than 2% over a period of 50 trading days. Based on these results, Yermack
argues that ESOs are awarded to align long-term interests of management and
shareholders, but that the role of the managers in the process remains complex. He
argues that the 2% out performance has little to do with managerial skills, efforts, or
performance, but rather with the remarkably good timing of the awards just prior to the
positive news. Yermack tested various hypotheses against his findings, but found none
to contradict his results.
Yermack's finding is confirmed by Aboody and Kasznik (2000), who conduct their
research from the opposite angle to Yermack's. Where Yermack focuses on the timing of
unscheduled ESO awards just prior to good news, Aboody and Kasznik focus on
opportunistic disclosure of bad news just prior to the scheduled award of ESOs, which
results in the same thing: management receives stock options struck at a relatively low
price. While they argue that executives manage shareholder expectations and advocate the
timing of ESO to be changed to directly following eaming announcements, they hasten to
say that the management's activity does not necessarily affect shareholders' wealth. The
board of directors might for instance allow the disclosure strategy as an implicit form of
incentive compensation (Aboody & Kasznik, 2000).
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4.6. Repricing of stock options
As shown before, management can influence its own compensation package, for
instance by adjusting the composition of the remuneration package, adjusting the dividend
pohcy, or by opportunistically timing the issuance of bad news or stock options. Repricing
is perhaps the most obvious and direct method to manipulate the value of stock options.
Repricing is the act of changing the strike price of the ESO (or cancelling the ESO and
reissuing a new option) to a level that, according to proxy statements, "better reflects
current market conditions." Judging by HealthSouth's proxy, a repricing typically occurs
"when market conditions have, in view of the Board of Directors, artificially depressed the
market price of the Common Stock for a protracted period, so that outstanding options are
significantly out-of-the-money for reasons not related to the Company's performance."^^
(HealthSouth, 1994)
According to both theory and business, there are multiple reasons for companies to
reprice stock options. One reason might be, as described by HealthSouth 's proxy, that the
loss in option value might indeed have resulted fi-om poor market or industry performance.
In other words, the recent underperformance of the company was solely due to factors
outside managerial control and therefore based on chance. The sheer argumentation defies
logic. If we assume a normal distribution of chance, and therefore of under- or out
performance, why would a company issue ESOs (which are solely based on share-price
performance) as a form of performance-based compensation? When issuing ESOs,
managers should realize they are subjected to the market's mercy, for good or bad. Further
arguments against the above-presented defense of repricing is given by the fact that,
although chance can in fact work both ways, strike prices are rarely, if indeed ever, raised
to reflect the artificially inflated share prices (Chance, Kumar, & Todd, 2000).
A second reason is presented by Chance et al. (2000), who state that companies reprice
stock options to maintain managerial talent. As indicated before, a prime benefit of stock
options is the retention of key managerial talent; however, when far out-of-the-money,
stock options are worthless and therefore offer no incentive for the managers to stay at the
firm. By repricing, the initial benefits and rationale of the stock options are restored and
management in effect receives a second chance to set things straight.
A third reading by Gilson and Vetsuypens (1993) points to outside pressure. With stock
options far out-of-the-money, management will become too entrenched and might
consequently be induced to take excessive risks in a desperate attempt to create a payoff
from the options. Excessive risk taking is always ultimately at the cost of the bondholders
and creditors, and Gilson and Vetsuypens therefore argue that firms in financial distress
might be persuaded by creditors to lower the strike price to dissuade managers from taking
excessive risks."'
An interesting detail: HealthSouth's opportunistic management is from 20 March 2003 under investigation
for fraud and overstating income statements.
That excessive risk taking is always detrimental for bondholders becomes immediately obvious when
assessing the bondholder's payoff profile, which resembles a short put option on the company's assets. With, as
explained before, increased risk taking increasing the volatility of the underlying share price, the short put option
immediately increases in value, at the cost of the bondholder
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Feeding fuel to antagonist's fire, research finds (contrary to wiiat the above proxy fihng
suggests) that the poor performance prior to repricing is not driven by market or industry
factors. However, it is inconclusive evidence, since it also fails to show that management
is to blame for the poor share-price performance (Chance et al., 2000). Chance et al. find
that the impact of repricing is negligible for shareholders, but the gain is approximately
10% of the executive's total compensation. It is therefore understandable that repricing is
not normally accompanied by abnormal returns either way. It is also more than
understandable that repricing creates a media frenzy, comparable to Jensen's (1991)
described perception of LBOs.
This is increased by the fact that the options would have been at the money in 19
months even without repricing. In addition, whereas the average share price decline is only
25%, the options are on average repriced by 40%. Recent research focuses on the lowering
of the strike price, and ignores the possibility of increasing the value of options through
changing controllable variables: increasing maturity of the option. ASML used this exact
strategy and extended the maturity of four of its option programs by 4 years. The move
increased the value of the options by 141 million Euros at the shareholders' expense (NRC
Handelsblad website, 14 March 2003). ~~ Although the eventual impact on the option
valuation is identical, the "Greeks" are impacted in a totally different way and therefore the
provided incentives are different as well. With these different provided incentives, the
"maturity repricing" merits its own field of research like the "strike repricing."
In conclusion, since resetting the strike price of ESOs is (if the share price is low
enough) effectively nothing more than discarding worthless options and issuing new ones,
the same rationale applies to repricing as to issuing options in the first place. This view is
confirmed by research stating that repricing is most likely to occur within firms with
substantial agency problems.
4.7. Dividend policy
As mentioned before under the advantages of ESOs. ESOs can mitigate the liquidity
problems of a firm, where liquidity problems are defined as low dividend payments.
However, as observed by the researchers (most notably DeFusco et al. 1991 and Lambert
et al. 1989), this hypothesis suffers from the internal causality that ESOs can cause lower
dividends since ESOs are not dividend protected. An opportunistic manager might
therefore be inclined to lower the dividend payout compared to the expected dividend
payout to protect the value of his/her options.
Prior research such as Lambert et al. and DeFusco et al. find a negative relation between
ESOs and dividends, which are primarily explained by the liquidity-resfraint hypothesis.
However, Kahle (2002) partly explains the results by arguing instead that the lower
dividends are caused by the ESOs and argues that the excessive cash is returned to
shareholders via share repurchases. Her starting point is studied by Vermaelen (1981) and
To illustrate the mixed reactions to repricing, the corporate action prompted P. de Vries, the director of
Vereniging van Effectenbezitters ("VEB", the Dutch shareholder rights watchdog), to say: "This is the same
exorbitant self-enrichment (former prime minister Wim) Kok already mentioned six years ago" (NRC
Handelsblad website, 14 March 2003).
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Dann (1981) who both find abnormal returns of 3^% at the announcement of a
repurchase program. The two commonly accepted explanations of the abnormal retums are
the signalling theory and the free cash-flow theory (Kahle, 2002). The two theories still
apply, but the increase in repurchases since the early 1990s remained unexplained. Kahle,
however, finds that companies are more likely to repurchase if the number of outstanding
stock options is high compared to outstanding shares or when many options have recently
been exercised."" Furthermore, her study shows that companies decide to distribute cash to
the shareholders not by dividend payments but by share repurchases to protect the value of
the executive stock options. From a corporate-finance standpoint, the repurchase has
exactly the same result; from a practical standpoint the manager will destroy his/her option
value by paying dividends, and enhance it by repurchase shares.
In what is essentially a combination of Yermack (1995) and Kahle (2002), Fenn and
Liang (2001) reach the same conclusions as the two prior studies. By assuming that stock
options can indeed mitigate agency problems as ample studies suggest, they presume that
stock options affect corporate payout policy in one of two ways: (i) better incentive
alignment can increase the total payout level to resolve the free cash-flow problem and
attain a better leverage ratio (Mehran, 1992; Berger, Ofek, & Yermack, 1997) and (ii) stock
options change the composition of the payout, specifically companies will favour
repurchases over dividends (Kahle, 2002; Lambert et al., 1989). From their results, Fenn
and Liang conclude that (i) firms increase total payout in the form of dividends and
repurchases to control the agency costs of free cash flow, and that payout choice is
influenced by factors such as firm characteristics, market valuation, permanence of cash-
flow shocks, and management incentives such as stock options.
To conclude, the studies by Kahle (2002) and Fenn and Liang (2001) indicate that
outstanding ESOs exhort managers to lower dividend payout in favour of share
repurchases. From a corporate-finance standpoint, the result of a dividend payout and a
share buyback is identical. Moreover, according to Miller and Modigliani (1961), investors
should be indifferent towards the firms' dividend policies, implying that investors can
imitate a dividend payout by selling part their shares. However, the reason that managers
are forgoing dividends in favour of share buybacks is an opportunistic one. The result is
that managers can influence their personal pay package without adding significant value to
the company and its investors.
5. Current changes in the accounting regulations
As should be recognized by now, one of the main catalysts for stock options is the
anomalous accounting treatment of stock options. Of course, the reasons and drivers for
stock options are numerous as shown above, but the rationales are equally relevant for
similar-incentive alignment tools or incentive-compensation packages. What truly sets the
This is consistent with cross-sectional firm pohcies, as for instance at ING: "ING Group purchases,
directly or indirectly, its own shares at the time options are granted in order to fulfil the obligations with regard to
the existing stock-option plan and to hedge the position risk of the options concerned. The purpose of this policy
is to avoid an increase in the number of shares, causing a dilution of the net profit per share" (2001 20-F, pp. 128).
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Stock option apart from its peers is the accounting treatment. To clear the way for other,
and potentially superior, incentive-compensation packages and perhaps even more
importantly, to breed confidence in the accounting community—sorely needed in the
wake of the recent debacles—the accounting regulators decided to act. The understanding
of the need for a hard-line stance to restore public confidence led to the release of
Exposure Draft 2: Share-based Payment by the International Accounting Standards Board
("lASB") in November 2002. The proposals may be modified in the light of the comments
received before it is issued as an International Financial Reporting Standard ("IFRS")."'*
According to the LASB, "the objective of [draft] IFRS X Share-based Payment is to
ensure that an entity recognizes all share-based payment transactions in its financial
statements, measured at fair value, so as to provide high quality, transparent, and
comparable information to users of financial statements" (LASB, 2002). In what looks
similar in both substance and form to Exposure Draft: Accounting for Stock-based
Compensation (FASB, 1993), "The [draft] IFRS requires an entity to recognize all share-
based payment transactions in its financial statements, including transactions to be settled
in cash, other assets, or equity instruments of the entity, and transactions with employees
or other parties. There are no exceptions to the [draft] IFRS, other than for transactions to
which more specific standards apply. For example, there is no exception for employee
share-purchase plans" (lASB, 2002).
With respect to what exactly will be recognized in the income statement, the IFRS
allows the company to use either side of the transaction, i.e. either the fair value of the
services rendered by the employee or the fair-value of the compensation the company paid
the employee for mentioned services. Since the IFRS assumes a fair payment for the
services rendered, the two fair value assumptions should render identical values, and the
IFRS therefore allows the company to use whichever fair value is more readily
determinable. If the company chooses to determine the value of the awarded stock
options, the same methodology as under SFAS 123 applies: the company can use either an
option-pricing model, such as the Black-Scholes model, or a binomial model. As input for
the model, the company uses:
(i) The exercise price of the option
(ii) The life of the option
(iii) The current price of the underlying shares
(iv) The expected volatility of the share price
(v) The dividends expected on the shares
(vi) The risk-free interest rate for the life of the option.
For non-transferable options, the option's expected life rather than its contracted life
shall be used in applying an option-pricing model. For transferable options, the option's
contracted life shall be used. If accepted before year-end 2003, companies will start to
apply IFRS in its annual financial statements for periods beginning on or after 1 January
2004. The lASB encourages earlier adoption of the LFRS. Contrary to what happened in
^'* Since the exact name and number of the potential fUture Standard is as yet unknown, it will be referred to
as [draft] IFRS X Share-based Payment, or simply [draft] IFRS.
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1995, when the FASB recommended recognition of SFAS 123, a string of companies
actually started to recognize ESOs in the income statement. The introduction lists
JPMorgan, Amazon.com and Philips as more recent examples. For instance, in its second
quarter lOQ 2002, Amazon.com mentions: "The Company announced that by the
beginning of 2003 all stock-based awards granted thereafter will be expensed."
Reactions in the press resembled reactions to earlier announcements of expensing of
ESOs, and mainly focused on the recent accounting scandals. "Amazon.com, the Internet
retailer, yesterday broke ranks with other technology-related companies by announcing it
would treat stock-option cost as expense from next year. [. .
.] The treatment of stock
options has come under fire since the Enron bankruptcy last year because critics believe
excessive option grants have encouraged top U.S. executives to pump up their companies'
share prices before selling stock" (Financial Times, 24 July 2002).
6. Alternatives to employee stock options
Stock options are the most widely used incentive tool in top- and middle management
compensation. According to Rappaport (1999), they account for half of total top-
management pay, and 30% of middle management pay. Despite their current negative
aftertaste, academic literature suggests that options do in fact provide incentives for
management to deliver a superior performance. However, the fact that stock options are
the most widely used tool does not automatically mean that options are the best way to tie
managerial pay to performance, as the prime goal of options is supposed to be. In fact,
there are numerous alternatives to the plain vanilla stock options, which, at least in theory,
provide a far better link between pay and performance. The reason these alternatives are
hardly used lies in the anomalous accounting treatment of the plain vanilla options versus
their alternatives
—
plain vanilla stock options are not recognized, whereas all the
alternatives are. With the (at least presumed) importance of reported earnings, the plain
vanilla stock option was the obvious choice. With the upcoming accounting changes
perhaps close at hand and the recent negative press about plain vanilla options, the playing
field should be levelled, ft is therefore worthwhile to investigate some of the alternatives to
plain vanilla options in more detail.
6.1. Indexed stock options
Indexed stock options exist in different forms, but they all share the main principle that
the underlying share price outperforms a certain benchmark to determine or create a
payoff. The most commonly used forni of indexed stock options is where the option pay
off is based on the out performance of the underlying share price over a certain index, or is
zero when the underlying share price underperforms the index.
The logic for indexed stock options is obvious; the option only creates a payoff when
the underlying share price outperfonns a relevant benchmark, ensuring that only superior
performance will be rewarded. Among the many criticisms stock opfions received recently
(aside from the sheer magnitude of some of the grants), one of the main one's was that
stock options rewarded sub-par performances. The 1990s saw booming share prices for
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virtually every company, even the ones in dire straits. Individual share prices rose on the
back of rising equity markets in general, creating an undeserved payoff of stock options.
By indexing, the rise in the underlying share price is adjusted for by the rise in the index.
For instance, if the underlying share price rises 25% and the relevant benchmark rises
20%, the payoff is 5%.
BASF uses indexed stock options as part of its compensation strategy and describes
them as follows in its 2001 20-F: ". . .The second subscription right permits participants to
purchase one BASF Share at a discount, provided that the performance of BASF Shares
exceeds the performance of a benchmark index. For options granted in 1999 and 2000, the
benchmark index is the DOW Jones EURO STOXX^'^ Total Return Index (the EURO
STOXX) and for options granted in 2001 the benchmark index is the Dow Jones Global
Chemicals Total Return Index (the DJ Chemicals). The discount is equal to twice the
percentage by which BASF Shares have outperformed the benchmark index since the date
of issue of the relevant right." The use of indexed stock options is advocated by Johnson
and Tian (2000a,2000b), who state that indexed stock options filter out the effects over
which management can exert no influence, resulting in a more effective incentive-
compensation package. Johnson and Tian hasten to state that, although indexed stock
options have a superior incentive alignment and a high sensitivity to changes in the share
price, they also exert an extremely high sensitivity towards changes in volatility. Indexed
stock options might therefore lead to non-prudent levels of risk taking, as is argued by
Guay (1999) as well. As documented by Johnson and Tian (2000a,2000b), Guay (1999)
finds that firms with a greater investment-opportunity-set structure their executive
compensation package to increase convexity in order to stimulate risk taking.
Rappaport (1999) points out a limitation to indexed stock options, namely that indexed
stock options have lower value than plain vanilla stock options due to their comparative
nature—the holder is in fact long the underlying share and short the index. "^ Rappaport
therefore advocates either lowering the strike price or awarding more options. Awarding
more options has the drawback of increased dilution, whereas a lower strike price might
reward a sub-par performance and the option's delta is still lower than plain vanilla
options.
6.2. Knock-in hairier
Knock-in barrier options are awarded with an out-of-the-money barrier level and will
only vest once the barrier level is breached. Notwithstanding the fact that the barrier level
is out-of-the-money, the strike price can be set at any desired level.
Enel uses knock-in barrier options and describes its option program in its 2001 20-F:
"Options vest if the average reference price of our shares on Telematico over the last three
months of the year of the grant is higher than a target price determined by the board of
directors at the time of the grant. The board sets the Target Price with reference to
securities analysts' estimates of the future price of our shares. If the Target Price is not met
For more elaborate pricing methods of indexed stock options, refer to Johnson and Tian (2000a,2000b).
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in a given year, all of the One Year Options and 30 percent of the Three Year Options
granted in that year do not vest and expire."
6.3. Step-up options
An ahemative to regular stock options is the so-called step-up options, where the strike
price of the options is increased every year by a fixed amount or percentage. The rationale
for step-up options is that they circumvent the common complaint for "standard" options
that their payoff is high because on average equities rise. With the annual increase in strike
price, the share price needs to outperform the historic annual increase in share price in
order to payoff.
An example of step-up options is given in Volkswagen's 2001 Annual Report:
"The basis for the initial conversion price of the third tranche is the average price of
the Volkswagen ordinary share on the Frankftirt Stock Exchange on the five trading
days prior to the resolution of the Board of Management of VOLKSWAGEN on
March 6, 2001, concerning the issue of convertible bonds. It will increase in each of
the following years by five percentage points, so that the first purchase of ordinary
shares will be possible at a price of 65.37 from July 14, 2003, after the minimum
waiting period.""^
6.4. Accounting earnings
Under an accounting earnings compensation plan, the top-management compensation is
directly linked to the accounting eamings the company reports. As with plain vanilla stock
options, and other performance-based compensation plans, the stated objective is to align
incentive between top management and shareholders. The popularity of accounting
eamings is, according to Sloan (1993), explained by the fact that accounting numbers are
under management's influence, contrary to stock options, which depend on the
uncontrollable noise in equity markets to determine its value. The "controllability" of
the accounting numbers is, given the current environment of accounting scandals, also
cited as the main drawback to accounting eamings. Watts and Zimmerman ( 1 986) focus on
the increased incentive for opportunistic behaviour provided by accounting-based
compensation.
Sloan (1993) finds that accounting-based compensation helps shield executives' pay
from market-wide fluctuations and that accounting-based compensation tracks firm-
specific performance better than plain vanilla stock options. Sloan's findings imply that
CEO salary and bonus are more sensitive to eamings when (i) stock returns have a higher
correlation with market-wide movements in equity values, (ii) eamings have a higher
association with market-wide movements in equity values, and (iii) eamings have a less
positive association with the market-wide equity values.
For reasons of German law applicable at the time, the options granted under this plan took the form of
conversion rights attached to convertible bonds rather than "standard options."
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6.5. SVA bonus
Plain vanilla stock options are considered by boards of directors and shareholders to
successfully align incentives for both CEOs and unit-managers (Rappaport, 1999). The
alternatives mentioned in this section prove to be even better at aligning incentives.
However, almost all alternatives suffer from the same restriction: the eventual payoff of the
instruments are based on share price, and, therefore, total firm performance. Since
individual business units are essentially private companies falling under one corporate
umbrella, inconsistent pay-for-performance links are the logical consequence.
A superior method for unit managers would therefore be to tie compensation to the
performance of the specific business unit. According to Rappaport (1999), eamings,
retum-on-invested-capital ("ROIC") and retum-on-equity ("ROE") are often used.
However, all of them have critical shortcomings."^ Rappaport (1999), therefore, advocates
the superior shareholder-value-added approach ("SVA"), which measures the incremental
value of the business unit's operations over its invested capital. The SVA attaches a value
to the change in fiiture cash flows of the business unit, and applies standard discounted
cash-flow techniques to determine the value of those cash flows. The next step is to
compare the expected future cash flows from operations with the current and anticipated
investments. The advantages are well documented: the approach uses cash flows instead of
the manipulable accounting numbers; the business unit's SVA should in fact translate
immediately into the overall share price and, therefore, the shareholder's value; and the
SVA approach takes all the important value drivers (cost of capital, retum on invested
capital, capital structure, growth, sheer size of invested capital (Stewart, 1999)) into
account.
Ittner and Larcker (2001) evaluate the abundantly available literature on economic-
value-added ("EVA") and its relation with market measures such as market value and
shareholder return."*^ From Anctil (1996), Rogerson (1997), and Riechelstein (1997), Ittner
and Larcker conclude that the use of residual income measures, such as EVA, as a
compensation determinant can ensure goal congruence between shareholders and
managers. However, according to Ittner and Larcker (2001), the literature is inconclusive
as to whether divisional EVA provides a good proxy for share-price performance.
Zimmerman (1997) argues that divisional EVA measures can be highly misleading
indicators of value creation and may provide wrong incentives, even though corporate
EVA tracks changes in the share price. The stock market seems to disagree with
Zimmerman: Wallace (1997) finds some weak evidence that the stock market responds
positively to the adoption of residual income-based compensation plans. Moreover, the
long-term effects are clear: residual income-based firms decrease new investments,
increase payouts to shareholders, and utilize assets more intensively, leading to greater
residual income (Wallace, 1997). However, Hogan and Lewis' (1999) results disregard
''' The measures all have their distinct drawbacks; for more detailed information we refer to Brealy and
Meyers, Principles ofCorporate Finance: Copeland, Koller and Murrin, Valuation, and Stewart III. The Quest for
Value.
^** EVA is the more common term for what Rappaport calls SVA. EVA® was introduced by J.M. Stem and
G.B. Stewart III and is a registered trademark of Stem Stewart.
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Wallace's (1997) results, prompting Ittner and Larcker (2001) to point out the limitations
applicable to all residual income-based studies: the information compensation is based on,
namely the management-accounting data, differs significantly from the data researchers
use, namely the publicly available financial-accounting data. Changes to every individual
statement are required to make the data consistent—an error-prone activity.
6.6. Exotics
The alternatives described above can be combined in any desired way to create
particular incentive alignments for particular situations. The altematives are endless, and
Enel S.p.A.'s (2001) 20-F provides an example of a combination of plain vanilla stock
options and accounting earnings: ''Options vest if both the earning before interest, taxes,
depreciation and amortization, or EBITDA, of the Group for the fiscal year 2002 exceeds
the estimated EBITDA as indicated in the budget approved by the board of directors and
the price of our shares on Telematico outperforms a specified reference index over the
same period. If any of these conditions is not met, all the options expire."
6. 7. Share appreciation rights
An earlier-mentioned alternative to stock options is the Share-appreciation-right
("SAR"), which is in essence a cash-settled stock opfion. Deutsche Bank uses SARs as part
of its extensive compensation package and describes the program as follows in its 2001
20-F: "The Group has share appreciation rights plans ("SARs") which provide eligible
employees of the Group the right to receive cash equal to the appreciation of the Group's
shares over an established strike price." Deutsche Bank's 20-F also highlights the main
difference between stock options and SARs (aside from settlement): "Compensation
expense on SARs, calculated as the excess of the current market price of the Group's
common shares over the strike price, is recorded using variable-plan accounting. The
expense related to a portion of the awards is recognized in the performance year if it relates
to annual bonuses eamed as part of compensation, while remaining awards are expensed
over the vesting periods."
7. Concluding remarks
Current events seem to point in the direction of big changes in accounting regulations,
but so did events in 1993, when the FASB issued its Exposure Draft. Eventually, 1993's
Exposure Draft led to the largely inadequate SFAS 123. Will November 2002 's Exposure
Draft 2 suffer the same fate? Time will tell. The final date for comments was 7 March
2002, and maybe this time around the regulators will win. The environment does seem
ripe. The once unified front is showing cracks, with some of the big guns such as
JPMorgan, Coca Cola, Amazon.com, and Philips leading the way in recognizing stock
options. But the regulators should not declare victory prematurely: Colvin (2002), for
instance, believes that the good side will lose "the good fighf yet again. The research
surveyed in literature review has been conducted over different timeframes, use various
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methodologies, focus on many areas, and are set against various backgrounds.
Consequently, the findings are often contradictory, but each has its intrinsic merits. We
have noted the advantages and disadvantages of the different research results. The
academic world tends to agree that stock options improve the performance of a company,
provided that the stock-option plans are set in the right manner. The widespread use of
stock options indicates that the professional world also belie\'es the advantages outweigh
the disadvantages. However, in the near future, with the probable disappearance of the
anomalous accounting treatment of stock options, we might see the curtailment of stock
options in favour of some of the alternatives. The alternatives we described in this survey
are the most important competitors to the plain vanilla stock options, but the list is by no
means exhaustive. On the contrary, the imminent accounting changes are bound to trigger
a revolution in compensation policies. The extraordmary combination of the loss of non-
recognition of stock options, the collapsing equity markets, the escalating accounting
scandals, and the accompanying negative aura of stock options will provide an extremely
fertile ground for innovative and we hope, effective compensation plans.
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1. Introduction
In this paper, we investigate the difference in the value relevance of accounting
information in the A-share and B-share Chinese stock markets.^ Consistent with recent
studies in the literature (e.g., Chang, 1999; Core, Guay, & Buskirk, 2003; Francis &
Schipper, 1999; Kothari & Shanken, 2003), we define the value relevance of accounting
information as the ability of accounting numbers to summarize the information underlying
the stock prices. Our paper compares the value relevance of accounting information
prepared under international standards for international investors with that under domestic
accounting standards for domestic investors. Specifically, we conduct cross-sectional
analysis on the difference between the A-share market and the B-share market, and annual
cross-sectional analysis on the variation of value relevance of primary accounting
information over time.
The relative value relevance of accounting information in the A-share and B-share
markets, which are prepared and audited, respectively under the Chinese generally
accepted accounting principles (Chinese GAAP) and the international accounting
standards (LAS), has implications for the recent moves toward the IAS replacing local
GAAP. A-shares and B-shares are two types of public shares in China. A-shares are
denominated in RMB and issued only to Chinese citizens, while B-shares are denominated
in U.S. dollars on the Shanghai Stock Exchange or in Hong Kong dollars on the Shenzhen
Stock Exchange and issued only to foreign residents before year 2001 ." Both A-shares and
B-shares convey equal rights to the same company though they are different in terms of
ownership (Fung, Lee, & Leung, 2000). However, A-share investors receive accounting
information prepared under the Chinese GAAP and audited by local CPA firms, while B-
share investors receive accounting information prepared under the IAS and audited
primarily by international accounting firms. This diversity exists even for the firms issuing
both A-shares and B-shares. Therefore, Chinese emerging markets provide a unique
environment that allows us to examine whether accounting information issued by the same
company and prepared and audited under the IAS has higher value relevance than that
prepared under local GAAP
This paper is motivated by recent research in the value-relevance literature and
developments in stock markets and accounting practices in China. In accounting literature,
' The basic reason for excluding H-shares in our study is that companies listed on the Hong Kong Stock
Exchange are required to prepare their financial statements under Hong Kong accounting standards. Thus, the
inclusion of H-shares could blur the implication of our study regarding the relative advantage of implementing
IAS or domestic GAAP. Besides, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange has more developed trading mechanisms
than the domestic Chinese exchanges. However, as a sensitivity test, we also include the H-shares in our
sample. The resuhs of combining B-shares and H-shares were not qualitatively different from the results of
using only B-shares.
^ Since February 19, 2001. B-shares have been sold to domestic investors who have foreign currency
accounts. However, the market segments still remain because ( 1 ) the foreign-currency market is administered by
the China Bank, the only place individtials could trade authorized amounts; (2) foreign investors have little access
to the A-share market, and they still receive the accounting information prepared and audited under IAS. The
major purpose of the paper is to investigate the role of Chinese GAAP vs. IAS regarding the value relevance of
accounting information, but not the role of market segmentation.
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earnings and book values have been empirically shown as significant variables in
explaining stock price and price changes (e.g., Barth, Beaver, & Landsman, 1998;
Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997; Collins, Maydew, & Weiss, 1997). In the emerging A-share
and B-share markets, however, the value relevance of accounting information has been
questioned. Accounting information based on domestic standards may be considered noisy
because of sloppy accounting, inadequate regulation, and crony capitalism (Fox, 1998;
Rask, Chu, & Gottschang, 1998). Besides, accompanying the rapid development of
securities markets are some inevitable problems such as lagging legislation issues and
multiple regulatory authorities (Liu & Zhang, 1996). However, the institutional changes in
emerging markets, including the reform of the accounting-information system, could
increase market liquidity, reduce transaction cost, and improve pricing efficiency (Feldman
& Kumar, 1995). In addition, the paucity of competitive information sources other than
accounting information, and the relative short-term horizon of Chinese investors could
influence the value relevance of accounting information. Thus, it is an impending
empirical issue whether or not the accounting infonnation is relevant to the investors'
decisions in these emerging markets.
Only recently have researchers begun to pay attention to the value-relevance issue of
accounting information in the Chinese emerging markets. Chen, Chen, and Su (2001)
investigated the value relevance of accounting information in the A-share market. Using a
sample of all A-shares listed in the period from 1990 to 1997, they found both book value
and earnings are value relevant in the A-share market under the price model and the return
model.
Haw, Qi, and Wu (1999) studied the value relevance of accounting information in B-
share and H-share markets. Based on the entire population of B-shares and H-shares from
1994 to 1996, they found positive and significant results for eamings under the Chinese
GAAP in retum models but did not find any significant results on the reconciliation items.
Thus, they concluded that IAS and Hong Kong GAAP did not provide incremental
information to foreign investors. Instead of using reconciliation items as a proxy for the
incremental value of the IAS, Bao and Chow (1999) used the Davidson-MacKinnon J-test
to study whether B-share markets incorporate more IAS than Chinese GAAP accounting
information.^ They obtained opposite results and found that along with A-share
accounting information, the estimated B-share prices from the IAS model is significantly
related to the actual B-share prices, indicating that the IAS model has additional
explanatory power over that contributed by the Chinese GAAP model. Hence, they
concluded that, for international investors, book value and eamings reported under the IAS
have greater information content than those based on the Chinese GAAP. However, Hu
(2002) repeated Bao and Chow (1999) by focusing on companies only listed on the
Bao and Chow (1999) compared the following two sets of modified price models: the IAS Model and the
Chinese GAAP Model. The Chinese GAAP Model is a regression of B-share prices on eamings and book value
based on Chinese GAAP and estimated B-share prices from the IAS Model; and the IAS Model is a regression of
B-share prices on eamings and book value based on the IAS and estimated B-share prices from the Chinese
GAAP Model. Hence, their results are only related to the relevance of IAS and Chinese GAAP accounting
information for B-shares and do not address the issue of A-shares versus B-shares.
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Shanghai Stock Exchange and found that book value and earnings reponed under the
Chinese G.\-\P ha\"e greater infomiation content than those based on L\S.
Other than the difference in the samples, one primar>- reason for the mixed results of the
studies cited might be problems in the design problems of their research models. For
instance. Chen et al. (2001) point out that the implication of the Haw et al. (1999) model is
inconsistent with the disclosure practice. Haw et al. (1999) examined the association
between market price in the B-share market and accounting mfomiation in the A-share
market, but in disclosure practice reconciliation of discrepancy m G.A„A.P is disclosed only
m the A-share reports. B-shareholders in the B-share market recei\e a complete set of
financial statements prepared under LAS."^ Consequenth . problems in the research design,
which lead to mixed results, require further research to shed light on the empirical question
of whether the usefulness of accounting information under L\S is the same as under
Chinese G.A.AP.
Abdel-Khalik. Wong, and W'u ( 1999) investigated the association between eamings and
share prices of A- and B-shares using an event smdy. Their sample included 2 years
obser\"ations o\er 1994-1995. Contran." to their expectations, they found significant
association beuveen eamings and abnormal returns for A-shares but not for B-shares. They
attributed their results to high pnce volatility', dominance of government officials, and the
thin trading volume in the B-share market. Besides Abdel-Khalik et al. (1999). no other
smdy has directly examined the relative \'alue rele\'ance of accounting information
prepared under L\S for the B-share market \ ersus that prepared under Chinese GAAP for
the A-share market. For instance. Eichenseher (2000) examined the role of book value in
pricing securities on the Shanghai Stock Exchange from 1996 to 1997 and found that
eamings were relcNant to pnces in both markets while book \ alues were not. However, he
did not directly address whether there is an>" difference in the \alue rele\'ance of primary
accounting information beu\een the x\\o different market segments other than whether
book \'alue or eamings are rele\ant to the pncing process. In one recent working paper.
Chen. Firth, and Kim (2003) showed the same concem and tried to address this issue by
examinmg the value relevance of the accounting information under Chinese GAAP and
the reconciliation under LAS in the t\\ o segments. However. the\ did not directly address
the difference in the value relevance of primar>- accounting information between the two
different market segments other than the information content of reconciliation.
In this smdy. we directly investigate the relati\'e \alue re!e\ance of accounting
information in the two segments to provide further e\idence on the value-relevance issue
in the emerging market. Our basic intention is to test whether the two market segments
B-share m\ estors can access the A-share information, including the reconciliation from Chinese G.-V.\P to
L\S. if they are interested in it. Howe\er. B-share in\"estors ma\- be uninterested in the reconcihation data simph
because they are more interested in the complete financial-statement information prepared and audited under the
L\S. Otherwise, it is difficult to explain the moti\ation for pubhc companies being required to prepare their
financial statements under L\S and in\ ite Big Six (now Big Four) companies to audit their financial statements. In
other words, although the reconcihation data issued to A-share in\ estors are costless to obtain, we could not see
the motivation of B-share investors to obtain the information, while they ha\e access to the fiill financial
statements prepared imder LAS and audited by Big-six auditing firms. Based on this reasoning, the reconcihation
data should not have any direct relationship with B-share price acri% ities. which is also pointed out by Chen et al.
(2001).
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differently \alue the major accounting information disclosed by the same company, but not
to test whether and how one market segment \alues the major accounting mformation
—
such as whether the A-share market \alues the accounting information of firms with
foreign in\estors (firms issuing both A- and B-shares) more than others (A-share only
firms) as in Chen et al. (2001). or whether the B-share market \alues accounting
information under LA.S more than that under Chinese GA.AP as m Bao and Chow ( 1999).
Following most studies in the \ alue rele\'ance literamre. we use the pnce model m this
paper.' The relatne significance of coefficients and explanatory' powers of the models m
the A-share market and the B-share market, as well as then" relati\e significance o\'er time.
are assessed through respective r-statistics. the Chnstie ( 1990) Z-test. R~. and the Cramer
(1987) test. The results indicate that accounting information is rele\'ant to the pncmg
process in both the A-share and B-share markets. Also, the accounting information in the
B-share market is more \alue rele\'ant. This result points to the supenonr\' of accounting
information prepared under the IAS and audited b\' international auditors versus those
prepared under domestic G.A.AP and audited b>' local auditors in the pncmg of stocks. In
addition, for the A-share market, there is some evidence that the \alue rele\"ance of
accounting information significantly increased since 1996. although this increase was
modest when domestic in\'estors became familiar with the accounting mformation.
The remainder of the stud\" proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the background of
A-share and B-share stock markets. re\iews the related research, and develops h\"potheses
for the smdy. Models and empirical testing are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 repons on
the data collection and results. Implications and limitations of the smd\'. as well as the
perspecti\e for fumre research, are addressed m Section 5.
2. Backgrounds and hypotheses development
2.1. Institutional background
2.1.1. De\elopment of the Chinese stock market
The Chinese stock exchanges ha\"e expanded rapidly since the tvso national securities
markets—the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange—were
established in 1990 and 1991. respectively. The numbers of publicly listed companies
mounted fi-om 14 in 1991 to 1059 in December 2000. \Mth an increasing trading volume.
The rapid growth of stock companies and stock markets is illustrated in Table 1 .^
In addition to shares issued to domestic imestors (called A-shares). after 1992.
companies were allowed to issue shares to foreign in\'estors (called B-shares) through the
two nafional exchanges. B-shares and A-shares are listed and traded on both exchanges.
As illustrated in Table 2. up to December 2000. 114 Chmese companies had issued B-
' We also investigate the return model and find qualitati\ely similar results as rejxjrted under the price model.
According to the China Daily Press (June 2. 2001. Sunday), on May 25. 2001. the value of market
capitalization of the nvo Chinese exchanges exceeded that of the Hong Kong Exchange for the first time. This
made the Chinese stock market the second largest Asian capital market, second only to Japan.
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Table 1
Overview of A-share stock trading (1991-2000)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Number of listed companies 14 53 183 288 312 515 720 826 924 1059
Market capitalization 0.109 1.048 3.531 3.515 3.317 9.475 17.078 19.185 26.173 47.615
(in 100 billion RMB)
Annual trading volume 0.003 0.038 0.234 0.999 0.685 2.483 2.491 2.109 2.807 4.556
(in 100 billion shares)
Annual trading amount _ _ _ 8.116 39.912 21.257 30.500 23.529 30.940 60.156
(in 100 billion RMB)
Source: data from 1991 to 1993 are from Lin, Yang, and Wang (1998), Accounting and Auditing in China, 75 pp.
Data from 1994 to 2000 are calculated based on data from the Taiwan Economic Journal Database.
shares, with market capitaUzation of 61.1 billion RMB.'' In general, the rapid development
of the stock markets contributes to the reform of the investment system and the
privatization of state-owned enterprises, but it also produces problems such as insufficient
institutional supports, lagging legislation and multiple regulation authorities (Liu & Zhang,
1996).
2.1.2. Accounting infonnation disclosure practice and the Chinese GAAP
To standardize the disclosure practice, in 1992, the Ministry of Finance and the State
Commission for Economic Reforms issued Accounting System for Companies with Listed
Shares, the first accounting regulation for listed companies. Listed companies are also
subject to the Bylaws of Information Disclosure for Publicly Traded Companies (issued in
1993) and the Content and Format of Annual Reports (issued in 1994 and revised in
1997), which were issued by the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC).
The issuance of Accounting Standard for Enterprises No. 1—Basic Standards (ASFE,
issued by the Ministry of Finance in 1992) represented the first step to bring Chinese
accounting in line with international practice and the IAS (Liu & Zhang, 1996; Winkle,
Huss, & Chen, 1994; Xiang, 1998). These standards, while familiar to outside investors
due to their familiarity with the IAS, were new to domestic investors.^ Following the
ASFE, a series of specific accounting standards was scheduled and issued. From May
1997 to December 2001, there were 16 specific standards promulgated. A series of
auditing standards was also issued to regulate the auditing practice, starting in 1996
(DeFond, Wong, & Li, 2000). These standards were claimed to improve corporate-
accounting disclosure both in terms of quality and quantity.
However, there are still some differences between the Chinese GAAP and the IAS. For
instance, the Chinese GAAP has a more restrictive policy on estimating the bad debt
To achieve the comparability of data across different segments of the market, all data are converted into
RMB. The U.S. dollar prices of the Shanghai B-shares are translated into RMB at the rate of 8.29 RMB per U.S.
dollar, and the HK dollar prices of the Shenzhen B-shares are translated into RMB at 1 .07 RMB per HK dollar.
These currency rates have been held roughly constant by the Chinese government in recent years (Eichenseher
2000). We also used the exchange rate on the same trading date and the results are qualitatively the same.
** However, it is also recognized that there are certain variations from western standards. For example, ASFE
is less detailed and less complex than westem standards, especially in the omission of many complex liability
issues. For details, see Winkle et al. ( 1 994).
40 58 70 85 101 107 108 114
148 133 134 346 356 216 331 611
16 25 31 71 88 61 123 201
310 914 539 990 2056 756 1346 3204
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Table 2
Oveniew of B-share stock trading (1993-2000)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Number of listed companies
Market capitalization (in 100 million RMB)
Annual trading volume (in 100 million RMB)
Annual trading amount (in 100 million RMB)
Source; calculation based on data from the Taiwan Economic Journal Database.
expense, depreciation expense, measuring inventory, and investment. These differences,
along with the differences in auditing practices and professional judgments by domestic
auditors versus international auditors, cause the major differences between the domestic
financial reports in the A-share market and those based on IAS in the B-share market.
Under these regulations, listed companies prepare their financial statements based on
the Chinese GAAP, as well as the IAS if they also issue B-shares. They should have their
annual reports audited by authorized CPAs and submit copies to government agencies,
such as state-owned-asset management agencies, tax authorities, securities regulatory
agencies, and banks. They are also required to have copies available for investors. In
addition, listed companies are required to publish their annual reports in at least one of the
authorized securities' publications before April 30th the following year.'*^ For companies
with both A-shares and B-shares, the audited annual reports for B-share investors are
published in Hong Kong on the same day as those for A-share investors in China. The
reconciliation information on the two sets of accounting statements is released to only A-
share investors, but not to B-share investors.
2.2. Hypotheses development
Although there are shares similar to A-shares and B-shares in other countries (Bailey &
Jagtiani, 1994; Domowitz, Glen, & Madhavan, 1998), pricing behavior in Chinese A-share
and B-share markets is unique (Fung et al., 2000). In other countries, the price of B-shares
is higher than the price of A-shares, whereas B-shares in China are traded at a discount rate
(Bailey & Jagtiani, 1994; Wo, 1997). hi addition, Fung et al. (2000) argue that the
inconsistent impact of political factors on the stock markets, as well as price volatility,
could reflect market segmentation. Using the latent variable-asset-pricing model, Fung et
al. (2000) found that the latent risk premiums for the A-shares and B-shares were only
weakly correlated, and they concluded that the two markets reflected different fundamental
forces.
^^
For detailed information on the difference between Chinese GAAP and IAS, see Table 1 and footnote 2 of
Bao and Chow (1999).
Chinese companies are required to use the calendar year as their fiscal year.
" For instance, the Shanghai A-share index jumped up by 113% from July 29, 1994 to August 5, 1994, and
by 208% to September 16, 1994. A similar situation happened to the Shenzhen A-share index. In confrast, neither
the Shanghai nor the Shenzhen B-share indices experienced similar growth in the same periods. The price changes
could be primarily attributed to the announcement that in the A-share market foreign companies were allowed to
set up joint mumal funds with local companies. Thus, the A-share market was expecting foreign money to enter
and responded immediately to the news.
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The dual reporting and auditing systems affect the value relevance of accounting
information in the two market segments. Companies issuing A-shares prepare their
Chinese-GAAP-based accounting statements that are then audited by local CPA firms.
Companies issuing B-shares are required to follow the IAS in preparing accounting
statements and usually have these audited by intemational CPA firms. When there is a
discrepancy between the two sets of audited financial reports, companies issuing both A-
shares and B-shares need to reconcile their accounting statements with the IAS for
domestic investors. Because the IAS is considered to be of higher quality than local
GAAP, and intemational auditors such as Big Five (Big Four) firms are thought to provide
higher quality audits than their Chinese counterparts (Chui & Kwok, 1998; DeFond et al,
2000; Lam & Jing, 2000), the accounting information in the B-share market should be
more relevant to the pricing process, compared with its counterpart in the A-share market.
Based on the discussion above, we develop the following hypotheses:
Hla (In alternative form). The accounting information is value relevant in both A-share
and B-share markets 12
Hlb (//; alteniative form). The value relevance of accounting information in the B-share
market would be higher than in the A-share market.
3. Research design
3. J. Models
In accounting literature, some studies support the value relevance of accounting
eamings (e.g.. Ball & Brown, 1968; Collins & Kothari, 1989; Kothari & Zimmerman,
1995), while others indicate that stock price is associated with the book value of firm
assets, assuming that measures of assets and liabilities imply the expected results of fiiture
activifies (e.g., Barth, 1991; Shelvin, 1991). In these studies, the models based on eamings
and those based on book values are typically viewed as ahemative approaches to valuation
models (e.g., Barth & Landsman, 1995; Solomons, 1995), especially under the assumption
of a complete and perfect market.
However, recent studies argue that in more realistic settings with market imperfections,
accounting systems can provide information about book value and eamings which are
complementary, rather than redundant, components of equity value (Chang, 1999; Feltham
& Ohlson, 1995; Ohlson, 1995; Pennman, 1998). Using the concepts of adaptation value
and recursion value, Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) explicitly argue that book value
provides the net value of the firm's resources primarily in terms of historical cost and it is
largely independent of the success with which the firm currently employs its resources. In
contrast, eamings provide a measure of value that reflects the results of employing firms'
current resources. Hence, a multivariate valuation model is preferred to a univariate one.
" Hypothesis la is stated to test the consistency of the data with prior studies. Though this hypothesis is not
new, we think it is important to include it in the study since Hypothesis lb would be unnecessary if Hypothesis la
does not hold.
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Following Burgstahler and Dichev ( 1 997) and Barth et al. ( 1 998), this study uses the price
model to test the relationship between price and accounting information. In such a valuation
model for equity securities, price is a weighted linear combination of book value and
eamings per share, and other non-accounting information about future abnormal earnings:
Pt^aQ + axBVt+aiEj + a^Vt + e (1)
Wliere P, is the price per share at time t, BV, is book value per share at time t, E, is eamings
per share for the period ending at time t, and V, is other non-accounting information about
future abnormal eamings per share available at time /.
Assuming that BV and E are not correlated with unobserved V, the explanatory power
of a regression ofP on BVand E can be taken as a measure of the materiality of V. Thus, a
high level of R" in the regressions suggests that investors use accounting information in
their decisions (Eichenseher, 2000).
3.2. Research design
To test the hypotheses, we estimate the model separately for the A-shares and B-shares
using pooled samples as well as yearly samples. That is, we estimate the following two
models with a superscript indicating the particular share:
Pf = aj, + flf^BVf + a^^Ei" + ef (2a)
Pf^al + alBVf + alEf+ef (2b)
For the A-share model, we use all the data disclosed under Chinese GAAP and for the
B-share model, we use all the data disclosed under IAS. We expect that the value relevance
of accounting information would be higher in the B-share market than in the A-share
market. Hence, the related R~ are expected to be higher in the B-share market than in the
A-share market. Also, /-statistics of a^ and aif are expected to be significantly lower
than those of a if and a^, respectively. We use the respective /-statistics and the Christie
(1990) Z-tests to address the relative significance of coefficients in the A-share and the B-
share markets. While prior studies (e.g., Collins et al., 1997; Francis & Schipper, 1999)
provided intuitive R~ comparisons, the lack of test statistics places limitations on assessing
the strength of the findings. Therefore, we use the Cramer (1987) test to test for the
difference in the adjusted R".
Because the estimations are made over many observations of the same firms in each
cross-section, there is a lack of independence between /-statistics. Christie (1990)
developed Z-statistics that allow an assessment of the level of significance. In this test, a Z-
statistic under an assumption of cross-correlation is calculated, based on the reported Z-
statistic and the average degree of cross-correlation. Since the degree of cross-correlation
cannot be directly calculated, this study calculates Z-statistics under both the assumption
of zero correlation and that of perfect correlation.'''
According to Christie (1990), the small number of time-series observations typically precludes the use of
actual sample correlation to calculate the Z-statistics.
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Brown, Lo, and Lys (1999) argue that the between-sample comparisons of 7?"^ from
regressions of stock prices on per-share value of accounting earnings and book value
are invalid unless one controls for difference in the scale factor's coefficient of
variation. In their study, they examine the changes in R~ of time, that is, the between-
year comparisons of R^ from annual regressions of the price model. Our comparison
of R~ between A-shares and B-shares does not suffer from this problem simply
because the deflator is total outstanding shares of the company, which is the same for
the A-share sample and B-share sample since we use companies issuing both A-share
and B-share. Therefore, there is no difference in the scale factor's coefficient of
variation (scale factor in this case is total outstanding shares) between the two
14
groups.
4. Data collection and analysis
4.1. Data collection
The sample selection starts with the entire population of A-shares and B-shares
from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) Database. For comparison, the sample is
comprised of 81 industrial firms that issued both A-shares and B-shares on the
Shanghai Stock Exchange or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange before December 2000.
For these companies, after deleting firm-year observations with missing data, there are
401 A-share observations and 401 B-share observations with both financial and price
data available from the TEJ Database.''^ The data on price, book value, and earnings are
ftirther truncated at two standard deviations to reduce the effect of outliers.' Table 3
presents the distributions of sample firms by exchange and by year.
4.2. Results
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for the variables. The market data for A-shares
and B-shares are based on the dividend-adjusted prices, provided by the TEJ
''* However, the between-year comparison of/?" in A-share markets may suffer from this issue because the
number of outstanding shares (scale factor) is changing over time and so is its coefficient of variation. We are not
able to repeat Brown et al. (1999) study to investigate whether the changes in R~ over time are caused by the
difference in the scale factor's coefficient of variation over time simply because of the limited observations in our
sample (only less than 10 years). Nevertheless, our results of using a different scale (book value) are qualitatively
the same, which implies that our conclusion based on the price-per-share model may not be significantly biased
due to the potential specification problem regarding the between-sample comparisons of /?". In addition, using R~
as a measure of value relevance is consistent with several recent studies (Core et al., 2003; Kothari & Shanken,
2003).
'"'' Excluded are financial firms (banks and insurance companies). According to previous studies, the specific
financial attributes of these firms could result in a different information content of their earnings. For the purpose
of comparison, also excluded are the firm-year observations when the firm only has A-shares or B-shares (some
firms issued A-shares and B-shares in different years).
'^ As sensitivity analysis, the data are truncated at three and four standard deviations as well. However, the
results qualitatively remain the same.
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Table 3
Sample distribution
Year Shanghai Stock Exchange Shenzhen Stock Exchange Total
1994 25
1995 25
1996 27
1997 29
1998 33
1999 34
2000 34
Total 207
14
21
28
29
33
33
36
194
39
46
55
58
66
67
70
401
Database.'^ Accounting data for A-shares are from the Chinese GAAP-based financial
statements, and those for B-shares are from the lAS-based financial statements.
The average price of A-shares is 9.998 (with a median of 8.825), and that of B-
shares over the same period is 3.266 (with a median of 2.016). This is consistent
with prior studies that show that B-shares in China are generally traded at a
discount relative to A-shares (Bailey & Jagtiani, 1994; Wo, 1997). There are some
differences in earnings {E) and book value (BV) between A-shares and B-shares.
The mean of earnings is lower for the B-shares, which indicates that the IAS is
more conservative in recognizing earnings than the Chinese GAAP. The mean book
value is also lower for B-shares. Finally, the A-share trading volume is higher than
the B-share trading volume, which might mean that the demand was low in the B-
share market.
The Pearson bivariate correlation coefficients and p-values are presented in Table 5.
These results provide preliminary evidence that prices are positively related to book
value and earnings for both the A-shares and B-shares.'^ In addition, consistent with
Hlb, the price correlation with earnings and book value is much higher for B-shares
compared to those for A-shares on an overall basis (Table 5) or year-by-year basis as
plotted in Figs. 1 and 2. In general, correlations among the independent variables are not
high except for the correlation between book value and earnings, which is slightly higher
than 0.70. Because these are the two major variables of the price model, no attempt is
made to exclude either one from the model. In addition, the correlation between the IAS
and Chinese GAAP income numbers is 96% and that between book values is 97% (not
reported in the tables).
Table 6 presents the slope coefficients, /-statistics, differential /-statistics, the
Christie (1990) Z-statistics, and the Cramer (1987) test for models (2a) and (2b). The
columns report the slope coefficients and the related /-statistics in parentheses, adjusted R^
and F-statistics for A-shares, those for B-shares, the differential /-statistics, and the Cramer
Because the deadline to publish the annual reports is April 30th in the following year, we use the price on
the last trading day of the month of April of the subsequent year
The test for normality indicates that the data do not depart, to any significant degree, from the normal
distribution.
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Table 4
Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean S.D. Minimum Median Maximum
Panel A. Ashares
P 9.998 4.744 1.521 8.825 20.582
E 0.215 0.350 -0.651 0.197 1.051
BV 2.547 1.059 0.070 2.379 5.073
Panel B. B-shares
P 3.266 2.723 0.431 2.016 9.542
E 0.174 0.364 -0.706 0.156 1.026
BV 2.493 1.207 -0.510 2.316 5.577
Definitions: P is the price per share at the end of the fourth month after fiscal year t\ BV is book value per share at
the end of fiscal year /; E is earnings per share for fiscal year t.
(1987) test. The mean of differential /-statistics and Christie (1990) Z-statistics are
reported at the bottom of the table.
For the pooled sample, the GLS estimates (and White r-tests) are reported to solve
the heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation problems. According to the F-test, both
models are highly significant. The two independent variables (BV and E) have
different significant levels in the two markets. The year-by-year regressions show that
the model performs well for B-shares in all years and for A-shares in most of the
recent years, as suggested by highly significant F-statistics. BV is significantly
associated with A-share prices in later years except year 2000. For the B-share market.
Table 5
Pearson correlation coefficients
BV
Panel A. A-shares
P 1.000
0.000
E 0.171***
0.001
BV 0.169***
0.001
Panel B. B-shares
P 1.000
0.000
E 0.331***
0.000
BV 0.314***
0.000
1.000
0.000
0.708***
0.000
1.000
0.000
0.715***
0.000
1.000
0.000
1.000
0.000
Definitions: P is the price per share at the end of the fourth month after fiscal year t\ BV is book value per share at
the end of fiscal year /; E is earnings per share for fiscal year /; *, **, *** statistically significant at 0.10, 0.05,
and 0.01, respectively.
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Year
Fig. 1 . Pearson correlation coefficients between price (?) and book value (BV).
E is significantly associated to B-share prices over all years in the study and so is BV
after year 1997. The results are consistent with Hypothesis la, which proposes that
accounting information is relevant to the pricing process in both A-share and B-share
markets.
In the pooled A-share and B-share samples, both BV and E are significantly
related to prices. The coefficient for A-shares' earnings (£") is only marginally
significant, which suggests that domestic investors relied more on BV to make their
decisions. The yearly analysis fiirther indicates that the marginal significance of
Fig. 2. Pearson coirelation coefficient between price (P) and earnings (E).
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earnings in the pooled A-share sample is driven by the observations in year 1996,
while the earnings of B-shares are always significantly related to the prices over all
years. This might be reasonable if domestic investors perceive earnings management
behavior by listed companies in response to security regulations (Haw, Wu, & Zhang,
1998).''^
To meet the required retum-on-equity ratio for public offerings or to reduce the risk
of suspension, the managers could execute transactions or manage accounting accruals.
If domestic investors perceived these earnings-management behaviors, they might
ignore the information content of earnings in making their decisions.
Comparing A-shares with B-shares, the R" for pooled samples and yearly samples (as
plotted in Fig. 3) suggest that in the B-share market the value-relevance level of
accounting information is always higher than in the A-share market, as expected by
Hypothesis lb. Results of cross-sectional differences in /-statistics show the B-share
accounting information has higher value relevance than A-share. The mean /-statistics'
differences between B-shares and A-shares for BV and E are both positive. The
Christie (1990) Z-test indicates that under the zero-correlation assumption, the average
difference in /-statistics is significant for E (/7<0.01) but not for BV. However, the
zero-correlation assumption is more likely unreasonable in that many of the same firms
are in the cross-sectional sample in more than 1 year. The differential /-statistics for E
remains significant at p<0.01 under an assumption of perfect correlation and that for
BV remains insignificant. The true significance level obviously lies somewhere
between the two extremes.
We calculate the standard deviation of the estimated R" of each model, suggested
by Cramer (1987) and also used by Ball, Kothari, and Robin (2000), to check the
significance of the differences in R". According to Cramer (1987), the estimated R" is
a fiinction of sample size, the number of independent variables, and the true R". For
three independent variables including intercepts, a true R~ of 2.9% and the sample size
of 401, the standard deviation of the estimate is 0.5%. For a true R" of 11.7%, it is
0.5%. Thus, the pooled A-share sample R~ is significantly smaller than that of the
pooled B-share. The standard deviations of the R" estimates for the A-share annual
samples range from 3% to 5%, while those for B-shares range from 3% to 6%.
Therefore, the R~ for A-share annual samples are all significantly smaller than their
counterparts for B-share annual samples, except for year 1996.
Overall, the results indicate that the accounting information is associated with the
prices in both A-share and B-share markets, consistent with Hypothesis la. In
addition, the explanatory power manifested in adjusted R^ of earnings and book value for
B-shares is higher than that of A-shares. Also, B-share earnings, in terms of magnitude of
significance, show a significantly higher degree of relevance than A-share earnings. These
results support Hypothesis lb.
Book values may also be affected by earnings management, given that clean surplus relation would hold in
most cases under PRC GAAP. However, the noise created by earnings management is, usually, more severe for
earnings than book value due to their relative magnitude. Hence, there is more impact on the information content
of earnings.
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Year
Fi2. 3. Adj. R~ from estimatina models i2a') and (2b') bv vear.
4.3. Additional test: value relerance over time
In this section, we test whether the \'alue-rele\'ance le\'el has significantK' changed over
time in the two markets. The continuous economic reform and related institutional reform
could improve the accounting and auditing functions, modify the disclosure practices, and
improve the im estors" decisions. Therefore, in the emerging market, there is an increase in
the usefulness of accounting information for investors" decision making, which is
suggested by Jermakowicz and Gomik-Tomaszewski (1998). Their results from the
Warsaw Stock Exchange in Poland indicated that the value rele\ance of eamings w^as
insignificant in 1995 when National Investment Funds were first created, while m 1996
and 1997 it became significant. Thus, we also expect that in the Chinese A-share market
more domestic investors would use accounting information m later years, and the\ \\ ould
rely on accounting information more frequently. Howe\"er. B-share investors receive
financial statements prepared under the IAS and audited by international CPA firms:
hence, they might rely on the disclosed infomiation constantly. As a result, the \'alue
relevance of accounting information in the B-share market might sho\\' no significant
changes in later years.
Table 7 presents the year-by-year comparisons of r-statistics and the Christie ( 1990) Z-
statistics for the time-senes differences. The adjusted R~ \alues for A-shares are ver\- low
in the first 2 years, peak in 1996. and remain high in 1997 and 1998. then decrease
substantially in the last 2 years, which is consistent \Mth pnor smdies on A-shares (e.g..
Chen et al.. 2001). By contrast, the adjusted R~ \alues for B-shares show no substantial
changes over the years except in 2000 (an unusual year discussed later). This is reasonable
because international investors consistently receixed accounting infomiation based on the
IAS. With recent changes in China's regulator}' environment, one might expect to see an
increase in the relevance of accounting information for A-shares. The empirical effects of
these changes may be pnmanK' incremental for our sample. howe\"er. In addition, the A-
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Table 7
Value relevance over time: regression results for models (2a) and (2b)
Time-series Model (2a) Model (2bl1
differential
T-statistics^
BV
(2a)
E
(2a)
Adj. Cramer
(1987) test
BV
(2b)
E
(2b)
Adj.
R-
Cramer
(1987) test
1994 vs. 1995 0.083 0.119 -0.010 vs.
-0.013
0.050 vs.
0.043
0.301 0.165 0.320
0.354
vs. 0.061 vs.
0.055
1995 vs. 1996 1.972 2.671 -0.013 vs.
0.357
0.043 vs.
0.047
0.845 -0.207 0.354
0.403
vs. 0.055 vs.
0.050
1996 vs. 1997 1.909 0.357 0.357 vs.
0.315
0.047 vs.
0.042
0.836 -1.227 0.403
0.423
vs. 0.050 vs.
0.049
1997 vs. 1998 2.217 -0.273 0.315 vs.
0.232
0.042 vs.
0.034
1.152 -0.116 0.423
0.482
vs. 0.049 vs.
0.049
1998 vs. 1999 -1.395 -0.75 0.232 vs.
0.078
0.034 vs.
0.031
1.000 -1.320 0.482
0.418
vs. 0.049 vs.
0.043
1999 vs. 2000 -3.961 0.512 0.078 vs.
0.067
0.031 vs.
0.029
1.709 1.422 0.418
0.199
vs. 0.043 vs.
0.032
Adjusted mean 0.138 -0.042 0.974 -0.214
time-series
F-statistics
Christie (1990) 0.325 -0.103 2.345*** -0.514
Z-statistics under
zero-correlation
assumption
Chnstie (1990) 0.133 -0.042 0.958 -0.210
Z-statistics under
perfect-correlation
assumption
Defmitions: P is the price per share at the end of the fourth month after fiscal year /; BV is book value per share at
the end of fiscal year /; E is earnings per share for fiscal year /; *, **. *** statistically significant at 0.10. 0.05.
and 0.01, respectively.
" The differential /-statistics for BV(E) are calculated using the /-statistics for BV(E) in the year minus the t-
statistics for BV(E) in the previous year. Results of the \^Tiite /-test are reported when there is a heteroscedasticity
problem.
share investors may require more time to become familiar with the new auditing and
accounting standards issued and implemented from 1996 to 1999."°"' Finally, the new
regulations may have less direct influence on the value relevance of accounting numbers
than expected if, for example, earnings increasingly reflect news with a lag relative to
other information sources or if earnings increasingly reflect good news and bad news
asymmetrically (Ryan & Zarowin, 2003).
The first batch of auditing standards was issued on December 25, 1995, and became effective on January I
,
1996. These auditing standards represent the first regulation on the auditing service in the Chinese stock markets.
For detailed contents of these standards, please see www.china-cpa.com.
For instance, batches of specific accounting standards were issued in these years. These accounting
standards included Disclosure of Related Party Transactions (1997), Events after the Balance Sheet Date (1998),
Revenue (1999), Debt Restructuring (1999), Construction Contracts (1999), Investments (1999), and Changes in
Accounting Policies and Accounting Estimates, and Corrections of Accounting Errors (1999).
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The Christie (1990) Z-test in Table 7 indicates that (with an assumption of zero
correlation) average differences in time-series /-statistics are positively significant for B-
share BV (/?<0.01), but not for B-share E. The differential /-statistics for BV and E are
insignificant under the assumption of perfect correlation. This result holds after adding
volume as a control variable. The true significance level lies somewhere between the two
extremes. Combined with the results of adjusted R~, the value relevance of accounting
information in B-shares valuation does not appear to change over the years. However, the
evidence for changes in the value relevance of B-shares' BV is limited. This is consistent
with the notion that international investors considered B-share financial statements reliable
from the start because they are prepared under IAS and usually audited by international
accounting firms.
As to A-shares, the average difference in time-series /-statistics is not significant for
either BV or E. This could be caused by the expectation of some unusual events in year
2000, as suggested by the relevant insignificant coefficients and low adjusted R" reported
for this year. For instance, in February 2001, the B-shares market began to open to
domestic investors who have foreign-currency accounts, which could shift funds from A-
share to B-share with corresponding changes in trading volume due to the discount rate in
the B-share market (Bailey & Jagtiani, 1994; Wo. 1997). In addition, besides reacting to
accounting information, domestic investors might focus on short-term trading gains or
trade on speculation compared to international investors. The investor's tendency to focus
on short-term trading and speculation manifests itself in the volume of trade.
Consequently, as suggested by Eichenseher (2000), including the trading volume in our
model should control for the effects of these factors on stock prices. The modified pricing
model takes the following form:
Pf = flj; + af,BV, + a^,Et + 4V0L, + ef (3a)
Pf = al + af,BV, + a^Et + fl^,VOL, + ef (3b)
The results (not reported in tables) show that, as expected, the adjusted R~ for the
A-share model increased in year 2000 (increasing from 6.7% in Table 6 to 29.5%),
while other years remain qualitatively the same. To further examine the effect of the
trading volume in year 2000 on the overall results, additional analysis excluding year
2000 data is performed. The Christie (1990) Z-statistics under both assumptions
indicate that the average differences in time-series t-statistics for A-shares BV become
positively significant while those for E remain insignificant. Viewed together with the
obser\'ed adjusted /?", the A-share market did present a picture of increasing value
relevance of accounting information especially for BV, though the evidence for E is
not found.
Other possible reasons for the unusual results in year 2000 could also be the
expectation of some events that happened in the earlier part of year 2001: (1) the
expectation of China's entering the World Trade Organizations (WTO); (2) the
designation of Beijing as the site for the Olympic games, raising all Olympic-associated
stocks; (3) the west development policy; and (4) the restructuring of securities markets.
These events, acting as non-accounting information {V,) in the price model, could also
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drive up the stock prices since these events might enhance investors' confidence in the
future of the economy.
4.4. Additional test on alternative explanations: accounting standards or traders'
behavior?
In the previous section, we investigate and fmd the difference in the value relevance of
accounting information in the A-share and B-share Chinese stock markets. In particular,
we fmd that accounting infomiation issued by the same company and prepared and audited
under the IAS has higher value relevance than that prepared under local GAAP. However,
the difference in the traders in the two segments could also be a factor in explaining the
difference in value relevance. For instance, in the A-share market, domestic investors
focus on short-term trading gains or speculations so they might rely less on accounting
information. In contrast, in the B-share market, the overseas investors emphasize the
intrinsic value so they might rely more on accounting information. Hence, in this section,
we address the reason why the B-share market has higher value relevance than the A-share
market.
As mentioned in the previous section, the trading volume in models (4a) and (4b)
should, to some extent, control for the effects of investors' behavior. Domestic investors
might focus on short-term trading gains or trade on speculation compared to
intemational investors, which can be manifested in higher trading volume and trading
turnover. When we use trading volume as a control variable, the results indicate
qualitatively the same results as reported; implying that our results are attributable to
differences in accounting standards, given that trading volume properly measures
trader's behavior.
An alternative measure of the difference in trader's behavior in different markets is
the synchronous stock-price movement. Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) hypothesize and
fmd that stock prices move together more in under-developed economies than in
developed economies because (1) political events and rumors in low-income economies
could cause wide stock-price variation in the market; (2) unreported, related party
transactions and insider trading in low-income economies could make firm-specific
information less usefiil to risk arbitrageurs and hence make the firm-specific
information less value relevant. If the traders are oriented toward short-term trading
gains or speculations, then the traders could be more sensitive to political events and
rumors and more susceptible to insider trading. Therefore, the stock-price-synchronicity
measure could be a proper measure of a trader's behavior and related property-rights
issues in two different segments. Following Morck et al. (2000), the stock-price
synchronicity is measured by the R" of regression statistics for the following linear
regression:
R„ = at + biRrnx + e, (4)
\\ here R,t is stock /"s retum in week t and R,„, is a market index return. A high R~ in
tliis regression model indicates a high degree of stock-price synchronicity.
We calculate the stock-price synchronicity for each stock share in our sample in each
\ ear and then include it in the following model to examine how much the stock price can
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be interpreted by the synchronicity as a measure of the trader's behavior and property
rights:
P;;=a5; + af;RSQ, + cf (5a)
P,^=a?, + a?,RSQ, + cf {5b)
Where RSQ,, is stock Vs synchronicity in year t. The resulting c^ and vf,
representing the portion of the stock price that is unexplained by the synchronicity
variable, are included as dependent variables in the following regressions to examine
whether our primary results of R~ are robust when the stock prices are adjusted with
synchronicity:
Cj = oj, + af,BV,v + a^,Ei, + ef (6a)
ct = al + af,BV„ + af,£„ + ef (6b)
The results (not reported in tables), again, indicate that B-share accounting information
typically has higher value relevance than its A-share counterpart. While we find that the
price synchronicity plays a certain role in explaining the stock price, it does not eliminate
the role of accounting information as manifested in the r-statistics and R~ in models (6a)
and (6b), indicating that our primary results are attributable to the difference in accounting
information.
4.5. Other sensitivity tests
Early research documented that the value relevance of earnings (earnings response
coefficient) can be influenced by factors such as firm size (Collins et al., 1997; Collins
& Kothari. 1989), systematic risk (Collins & Kothari, 1989), economic growth (Beaver
& Ryan, 2000; Lee & Sami, 1998), trading volume (Eichenseher, 2000), and
privatization degree (Ali & Hwang, 2000)."" To further analyze the impact of those
" Audit opinion might also be an omitted variable in this study. To m\ estigate whether audit opinion affects
the reported results, we estimate a model including both the intercept term and interactive term of a dummy
variable for audit opinion which is coded as one if a company received an unqualified opinion with explanatory
notes, a qualified opinion, or disclaimer of opinion. Audit-report information is hand-collected fi^om annual
reports published on http://www.stock2000.com.cn and China Securities Information Library 1999 (provided by
http: "www.jetech.com.cn). The results of BVand E for A-share obser\ations (305 obser\ations) remain the same
quahtatively. No significant results are found for terms with dummy \ ariables of audit opinions. Besides, the F-
statistics are weaker for the model with audit opmion as control variables. For B-shares. no estimates are made
due to the availability of data. For a sample of 12 firms (30 observations), all the audit opinions are unqualified
except for one firm (two observations) in which the auditor issued no opinion. The insignificant resuhs might be
attributed to the difference between the price model and the remm model. The price model evaluates a firm's
value based on aimual accounting information rather than the market reaction to the disclosure of audit opinion in
a short-term event window as in Chen, Su, and Zhao (2000).
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factors on the value relevance of accounting information in the Chinese emerging market,
as well as the difference between their impacts on A-shares and B-shares, we form
portfolios based on the magnitude of the control variables and conduct separate analyses
for each portfolio."^ The results are mostly consistent with the predicted effect of the
control variables. More importantly, B-share portfolios have accounting information,
especially eamings information, more relevant to market prices than their counterparts in
the A-share market, as suggested by the coefficients and adjusted R~. This further
supports Hypothesis lb.
For firms with negative eamings, the increased frequency of negative eamings in
later years could contribute to the temporal decline in the incremental value relevance
of eamings. For instance, early studies document that firms reporting negative eamings
have smaller eamings response coefficients than those reporting positive eamings
(Barth et al, 1998; Collins et al., 1997). To investigate whether the changes in value
relevance is due to some noises caused by firms reporting negative earnings, we
performed the test using companies with positive eamings and the results are
qualitatively the same.
In this study, we obtain the data for all companies issuing both A- and B-
shares during the research period. To check whether the results on changes in
value relevance over time are caused by the different composition of the sample
over time, we use a fixed sample of companies issuing both A and B shares,
which include 38 companies and 266 observations. The results are qualitatively the
same. Also, to check the extemality of the research, we examine a fixed sample
of companies issuing all A-shares (51 companies and 357 observations) and the
results of time-series changes in A-shares' value relevance are also qualitatively the
same.
Kothari and Zimmerman (1995) indicate that the price models are more likely to
generate unbiased coefficients than return models. However, their study also suggests
using both return models and price models to make the results more robust, because
return models have less econometric-specification problems. Therefore, we also estimate
the results based on the return model, in addition to the price model. As reported in this
paper, the results of B-shares are more robust than A-shares and R" for the middle years
are relatively higher than earlier years and later years for A-shares as reported in the
price model.
In addition, the literature also suggests that the price model is sensitive to the
deflator used (e.g.. Brown et al., 1999; Kothari & Zimmerman, 1995). In this paper,
we deflate the independent variables by total number of outstanding shares. To check
the robustness of the results, we also try book value of equity as an alternative
deflator. The adjusted R" for the book-value-deflated price model are generally much
higher than those of the total-share-deflated price model and qualitatively support our
hypotheses.
In addition, to consider the simultaneous effect of these factors, we estimate a regression mode! with
I
dummy variables for these factors and their interaction terms with book value and net income. The results are
I qualitatively the same.
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5. Conclusions
Overall, the results indicate that accounting information is relevant to prices in both
the A-share and B-share markets. Furthermore, the results show that the value
relevance of accounting information is different between the two markets. The
accounting information in the B-share market is more value relevant, as expected.
Also, we find that in the A-share market, the relevance level of accounting information
to the market price was low in early years, peaked in 1996, and then decreased in the
last 2 years.
The limited time-series results are inconsistent with the recent movement in China's
regulatory environment, which could be explained be one or any combination of the
following: (1) China's regulations in most recent years may not empirically impact the
value relevance of accounting information although theoretically it should be; (2)
China's regulations in recent years may not immediately impact the value relevance of
accounting information—the time-series observation is only 7 years; in addition, the
issuance and implementation of new auditing and accounting standards during the
period of 1996-1999 might imply that the A-share investors need more time to
become familiar with the new accounting information and use it properly; (3) China's
regulations in recent years may not dominantly impact the value relevance of
accounting information—as discussed in Ryan and Zarowin (2003), the value
relevance may decline because eamings increasingly reflect news with a lag relative
to stock prices and also eamings increasingly reflect good news and bad news
asymmetrically. Future studies could investigate the third possibility to examine the
different factors in explaining the declining value relevance of major accounting
information over time.
We addressed some of the differences between our study and the prior research in
the introduction. In our paper, we do not investigate the information content of
reconciliation (which is done by Haw et al., 1999), nor the eamings conservatism
(which is done by Ball et al., 2000), nor the comparison of value relevance between
different sets of accounting information for the same companies in the same market
segment (as Bao & Chow, 1999) or between companies with different ownership
structures in the same market segment (as Chen et al., 2001). We simply compare
the value relevance of accounting information between the two different market
segments. Thus, our conclusions could be different from these studies due to
different perspectives (different research issues). Our paper is not the only one to
reach such a conclusion. For instance, the same conclusion is also drawn in Chen et
al. (2003).
The findings of our study have several implications for a variety of users. First, it
provides both foreign and domestic investors with useful information regarding the
relevance of the firm's accounting performance to its market value. Because in the
emerging markets accounting data may be considered noisy due to sloppy accounting,
inadequate regulation, and crony capitalism, it is not clear whether financial
statement-users rely on accounting information in making their decisions. This study
adds to the body of the evidence that accounting information is relevant to the
pricing process in both the A-share and B-share markets.
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Second, for policymakers, the value-relevance information may indicate a direction for
policy-making. For instance, the cross-sectional comparison of accounting information
prepared under local GAAP and the IAS has implications for recent moves toward
replacing the local GAAP with the IAS.
In our study, we identified firms that issued both A- and B-shares on either the
Shanghai Stock Exchange or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. The sample of A-shares in
this study might not be generalized to the whole population of firms that issued A-shares
on Chinese stock exchanges."'* Due to the dual reporting and auditing systems, as well as
better corporate governance, companies with both A- and B-shares might reflect a higher
quality in their financial reporting, and thus their accounting information could be more
value relevant to pricing in the market. To shed light on the general value relevance of
accounting information in the A-share market, future studies could compare the value
relevance of accounting information for firms that have only A-shares and firms that have
both A- and B-shares and address the reasons underlying the differences in value
relevance.^^
Finally, this study only takes a value-relevance approach to investigate the
association between accounting information and stock price, rather than an
information approach. Future studies could examine how much accounting
information contributes incrementally to equity value in these markets, by testing
the price movements during short windows surrounding the release of accounting
information."''
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The major purpose of this study is to compare the value relevance of accounting information prepared and
audited under two different accounting standards. To control for the effects of firm-specific factors, the sample is
identified as those companies that issue both A- and B-shares. If a company only issues A-shares, it does not have
to reconcile with IAS, so these firms are excluded fi-om the study. Nevertheless, we investigated all firms that
issue A-shares as a sensitivity test. The results qualitatively remain the same. These A-share groups have
substantially lower coefficients, t-statistics, and adjusted R-squares than B-share groups. The level of value
relevance is also generally similar to those reported in the paper, which adds support for the results of our matched
samples.
Chen et al. (2001) investigate this issue in their sensitivity test. They find that accounting information
under Chinese GAAP was more value relevant for firms issuing only A-shares than for firms issuing both A- and
B-shares. They explain that the latter have more alternative sources of information other than fmancial reporting
in comparison to A-share only companies. This may imply difficulties in simply generalizing the results of A-
share sample in our study to the A-share market. However, we also find in our study that the adjusted R-square
and the coefficient of A-share earnings peak in 1996, the same pattern as that of the A-share sample in Chen et al.
(2001).
For an example of these event studies, see Ball and Brown (1968).
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Bill Scott, Financial Accounting Tlieoiy has been recognized as one of the best
textbooks on accounting theory since the first edition was pubhshed in 1997. The book
steps back from the usual discourse about the standard-setting process, and places
accounting in its environment. The main topics facing accounting research for the last 40
years are discussed in the different chapters.
Wliat is accounting theoiyl Few textbooks in accounting theory provide a straightfor-
ward answer to this question. And, when they do, the answer is often related only to
accounting. Scott, however, defines \\\q fundamental problems (p. 8) of accounting theory
as the provision of different relevant information for both internal and external users. For
external users, the principal purpose of the information provided is to reduce adverse
selection while for internal users the goals are to motivate managers and avoid moral
hazard. His definition, based on a situation of fiindamental information asymmetry, offers
a substantial improvement over past definitions expressed clearly or implicitly.
Zeff and Keller (1987) discuss in detail the standard-setting process and the constitution
of a conceptual framework that is, for them, the basis of accounting theory. Their book
reprints some of the most important articles written in accounting in the last 40 years.
Underdown and Taylor (1985) classical book of accounting theory discusses standard
setting, accounting measurement, and the disclosure of many different accounts. It is clear
that their definition of accounting theory: ". . . to provide a framework for (1) evaluating
current financial accounting practice and (2) developing new practice," cannot apply
anywhere outside the accounting domain. Wolk et al., 1992 propose another "standard
setting" definition of the accounting theory, while, in the same spirit, Kam (1990) writes a
definition that had been contested by Watts and Zimmerman: "A comprehensive theory of
accounting should provide rules for recognizing certain relevant economic objects and also
provide a basis for judging whether a given practice is 'good' or 'bad."' Most (1982)
confounds the conceptual framework, establishing the objectives of accounting, with the
theory itself "(. .
.), at the present time there is an unmistakable drive toward the
formulation of an accounting theory, often referred to as a conceptual framework."
Belkaoui (1992) definition seems to enter the modem era: "The primary objective of an
accounting theory is to provide a basis for the prediction and explanation of accounting
behavior and events." Mathews and Perera (1996) also have some problems with the
concept of accounting theory. Their epistemological discussion of the question in chapter
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four seems to have universal acceptance, but in chapter five, when they try to apply this to
accounting, they change the meaning of the words: "There is a definite link between
accounting theory and accounting practice, in the sense that accounting theory
construction stems fi^om the need to provide a rationale for what accountants do or
expect to be doing." Finally, Christensen and Demski (2003) are, after Scott, the first to
propose and apply a really coherent definition of accounting theory: 'The short answer is
that we want to study, to illuminate, the choice of accounting method. Our focus is on the
choice, not how to do the accounting per se (. . .). (. . .). This leads us to use economic
theory, in particular the economic theory of choice under uncertainty, as the workhouse in
studying this accounting choice."
With Scott's book, accounting theory enters a new era. The basis of accounting
becomes an object of research and his discourse is theoretical. Since accounting is
supposed to provide information for decision making, the theory of accounting is firstly a
theory of decision.
Description ofthe content. After introducing the topic and establishing the theoretical
basis of the approaching chapter two provides a discussion of information under
certainty and uncertainty. Chapter three discusses the usefiilness of decisions in
economic terms. Since these decisions are about investment in the market, Scott then
discusses the efficiency of security markets and includes a section on the Social
significance of properly working securities markets. Unfortunately, this section, based
implicitly on the Walrasian notion of equilibrium, presents an efficient market with
reasonable information as a possibility although none has ever been observed in the real
world. Accounting research had been driven by the notion of market efficiency for
decades. This book provides a very relevant survey of the economic, informational, and
financial implications of the provision of financial information. There is also a chapter
on measurement, which does not belong to accounting theory, per se. It is brought into
the debate, however, to demonstrate the great need for information to be accurate if it is
to be usefiil for the market. From this perspective, measurement becomes relevant for
theory as an object of research.
Next, the positive accounting theory is introduced and its economic and financial
origins are described at length. Its positivist origins, however, are totally ignored. There is
no mention of Comte as a possible epistemological source of the theory. The ties between
positive accounting and positive economics through the Rochester School are also totally
ignored. In this presentation, the positive theory results from adding one hypothesis (the
political cost) to agency theory and it can be added in a conttactual-political paradigm.
Although this view obliterates at least half the message contained in the positivist position,
it is widespread in accounting research.
The next section reviews subsidiary topics. For example, the author underlines how
executive compensation has been revolutionized by agency theory. The question of
eamings management is also scrutinized, although there is no serious discussion of the
effect of such a practice on the efficiency of the market. A discussion of this topic is
also missing in the literature. To ignore the relationship between eamings management
and market efficiency can be intellectually risky. After the Enron affair, we can hardly
deny that there are some effects, and they seem to constitute a negation of market
efficiency.
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Finally, the book discusses the standard-setting question against an economic
background. However, the question of standard setting as a market failure is discussed
only slightly as are transformations of the theory by notions such as Simon's bounded
rationality or Stiglitz's asymmetry of information. To ignore this topic is like saying that
accounting theory never evolves and that the basic notions had not been modified since
Jensen and Meckling (1976) or Watts and Zimmerman (1978). Even the most blind and
stubbom researcher in finance can no longer seriously contend that markets are efficient.
But, in accounting research it continues to be done explicitly or implicitly. If the possibility
of inefficiency is discussed, it is through the question of anomalies and is rapidly discarded
in favor of the notion of imperfectly efficient markets.
The question and problems at the end of the chapters are more practical than in many
other textbooks. Students have to prepare statements under specific conditions, calculate
probabilities, adjust utility functions, or calculate Beta. There are also questions that are
more traditional in accounting theory, as well as more original questions about important
pieces of research.
New edition. I compared the third edition with the first. The changes are not very major,
in part because the fu-st edition was published in 1997, not very long ago. The most
important change is in regard to measurement. In the first edition there was a long chapter
on measurement and a relatively short one on the economic consequences of accounting
standards. In the new version, the topic of measurement situated in two chapters and the
discussion of economic consequences has been shortened and presented together with
positive accounting theory. The content of the book has not really changed appreciably
since the first edition. But, that edition constituted a radical improvement in financial
accounting theory textbooks.
In substance. The book flows well and although it is research oriented, there are
practical examples to illustrate various points that should make them easy for students to
grasp when they do the work at the end of the chapter.
If I had to pick a book to use to teach an undergraduate accounting theory course, it
would be this one, which I think this is actually the best on the market, by far. It can also
be used in many master-level courses as a main or subsidiary reference, as intended by the
author. Although there is no mention of the international context, where accounting is
supposed to inform the participants about the stock market, the topics covered are mostly
relevant.
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A. Pierce, N. Brenman, Principles and Practice of Group Accounts: A European
perspective, Thomson Learning, London, 2003 (XX+564 pp.).
For most large companies, consolidated financial statements are the preferred channels
of financial communication with investors. Textbooks on consolidation, group accounts,
or business combinations consequently are important. This textbook deals with
consolidation, so it is highly relevant, and because it has a European focus, it is especially
welcome. Few accounting textbooks cover accounting practices in different European
countries, and those that do focus on specific accounting regulations in just one European
country. The books that go beyond a specific institutional environment generally discuss
the entire domain of financial accounting, devoting only one or two chapters to
consolidation.
This book will be especially welcomed by European accounting academics. In
European universities, curricula for accounting degrees often include separate courses on
consolidation. In many continental European countries, there is a significant difference
between single-entity accounts and group accounts. The single-entity accounts often serve
as the basis for tax declaration, resulting in distortions of accounting figures for tax
reasons. Although fiscal consolidation is the rule in some countries, other countries require
that consolidated financial statements be corrected for tax-driven entries in the underlying
single-entity statements.
The decision of the European Commission to require the use of International Financial
Reporting Standards for the consolidated financial statements of listed companies fi^om
2005 onwards will lead to the adaptation of local accounting laws and regulations. It is
hoped that the increased comparability of financial statements of listed companies will
have a positive effect on the European financial markets. In light of this development, this
book has a significant market potential. Although it begins with the U.K. and Irish
accounting regulations, it later emphasizes lAS/IFRS GAAP.
The regulatory fi^ameworks are discussed in the fourth part of the book. The preceding
chapters deal with the mechanics of preparing consolidated financial statements. The book
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adopts a rather technical perspective on consoHdation. This makes it more suitable for use
in programs that focus on accounting, rather than broad-based programs which offer only
one course on financial reporting, such as typical MBA programs.
The book is also quite useftil for self-study purposes. For each chapter, learning
objectives are briefly defined. There are multiple-choice questions, self-assessment
exercises, and examination-style questions. Solutions to the multiple-choice questions are
at the end of the book; solutions to self-assessment exercises can be found on the
textbook's website, where lecturers can also access the examination-style questions.
All chapters include worked-out examples. The numerous quotes from the financial
statements of the largest European companies give a touch of "real life" to the book.
The first part of the book is introductory in nature. It highlights the objectives of
consolidated financial statements and introduces the major types of business combinations
and group accounting methods.
The second part of the book focuses on the consolidated balance sheet. Starting fi^om
the basic working accounts, it moves to consolidation adjustments and intragroup
dividends. All major items are illustrated with numerical examples, including journal
entries. The chapters move fi^om the simple to the more complicated, such as acquisitions
during the accounting period, changes in percentages of acquired shares, and complex
group structures with indirect holdings. One chapter discusses equity-method accounting,
and another chapter deals with merger- or pooling-of-interests accounting.
In the third part, the consolidated profit-and-loss account is analyzed. Two chapters deal
with its preparation and the impact of equity accounting, respectively. A third chapter
discusses the disposal of shares in subsidiaries. Again, numerous worked-out examples
allow the reader to check for her- or himself whether the content of the chapter is mastered.
The regulation of consolidation is the subject of the fourth part. This starts with an
introduction to European, U.K., and international regulations. The chapter includes a
comparafive table of the differences between U.K. GAAP and IAS GAAP (pp. 241-242).
It is based on the 2000 PricewaterhouseCoopers' study of the differences between IAS,
U.S., and U.K. GAAP. Similar publications by PwC and other accounting firms are
available for other European countries, so it should not be too difficult for adopters of the
book in other countries to prepare a similar table that is relevant for their country. The
discussion of the regulatory framework then distinguishes parent and subsidiary
undertakings fi^om associated undertakings and joint ventures. In these chapters, the
discussion of U.K. GAAP is more detailed than the analysis of IAS GAAP. The
international sections not only look at the international accounting standard, but also the
SICs. This part of the book concludes with chapters on the regulation of acquisition and
merger accounting and on goodwill.
Finally, the fifth part includes specific topics such as foreign-currency transactions,
consolidated cash-flow statements, off-balance-sheet finance, and segmental reporting.
The Irish background of the authors probably explains why some topics that generally
are prominently discussed in continental European textbooks are more or less absent fi^om
this book. A typical example is the analysis of deferred taxation.
As the book was published in 2003, it is based on accounting regulafions as of
December 2002. Things are changing fast, however, especially in the area of lASB
standards. The book refers to IAS 22 and 27. However, IAS 27, on consolidated financial
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Statements, underwent a number of changes at the end of 2003, and IFRS 3 replaced IAS
22 on business combinations. Consequently, part of what is written in the book is no
longer valid. A few examples can illustrate the significance of the changes. The standards
now reject pooling of interests, and purchase accounting remains the only acceptable
method of accounting for business combinations. Goodwill can no longer be amortized but
should be recognised at cost minus any accumulated impairment losses. In IAS 27. the
number of allowed alternatives to account for subsidiaries in consolidated financial
statements and to account for investments in the separate financial statements of a parent,
venturer, or investor was reduced.
These changes in regulation call for a new edition of this textbook. A textbook based on
the current ^'ersion of accounting standards would be welcomed by lecturers in Europe
who teach consolidation. The numerous worked-out examples, the self-study materials,
and the examples taken fi^om real financial statements will be strongly appreciated. If such
a new edition would be considered, my suggestion would be to reduce the number of
pages devoted to U.K./Irish accounting. Currently. Chapters 14 and 15, dealing with
company legislation and professional accounting regulations, spend 34 pages on U.K./
Irish accounting regulations against only 25 pages on intemational accounting standards.
Obviously. non-U.K./Irish adopters will be less interested in the U.K./Irish part. Given the
decision on the European le\el. most likely, these standards will also gradually become
less important in a U.K. and Irish context. More pages could then be devoted to an analysis
and discussion of some of the more complex issues in group accounting. Ob\iously. not
very much should be changed in the first parts of the book, as these are rather independent
of framework.
Ignace De Beelde
Ghent University; Ghent, Belgium
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Abstract
This study provides evidence that Mexican firms that choose to trade in the United States as
exchange-listed American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) have significantly weaker ex-post
(subsequent to cross-listing) financial performances than Mexican firms that are eligible to list in
the United States but choose not to do so. Our study is related to the generalizabililty of two streams
of international research: global equity offerings studies (e.g., (Errunza & Miller 2003; Foerster &
Karolyi 2000) [Errunza, V & Miller, D. 2003 Valuation effects of seasoned global equity offerings.
Journal of Banking and Finance (September). 1611-1631; Foerster. S. & Karolyi, G., 2000. The
Long-run performance of global equity offerings. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
(December). 499-527]), based on large, multi-country samples, which show that ADR firms
substantially underperform local-market benchmark company returns in years following issuance
and accounting characteristics ofADR firms research (e.g., (Lang, Raedy, & Yetman, 2003) [Lang,
M., Raedy, J. Smith, & Yetman, M. (2003). How representative are firms that are cross-listed in the
United States? An analysis of accounting quality. Journal ofAccounting Research}), which employ a
multi-country sample and conclude that ADR firms are less aggressive in terms of earnings
Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources, as indicated in the text.
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: pfridayiS nd.edu (P.Y. Davis-Friday), tfrecka@nd.edu (TJ. Frecka), jrivera@nd.edu
(JM. Rivera).
, 0020-7063/$30.00 © 2005 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
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management and that they repon accounting data that are more strongly associated wth share prices.
The cited studies abo\e use relati%el\' large samples, which are usualh' considered to be
ad\antageous. but such studies tend to mask individual coimtn.' differences in market efficienc>;
legal protections for shareholders, disclosure environment, and shareholder-class features that make
generalizations tenuous.
W'e show that cross-listed lADRi Mexican firms, on average, are smaller, more highly levered,
and less profitable than non-cross-listed (NCL) firms. Further, logistic regression models for
classit\ing various .\DR and NCL groupings of firms, using financial variables and other firm
characteristics, are highly significant. \MiiIe supplemental tests of earnings quality- suggest that NCL
firms exhibit nominalh" smoother earmngs. that evidence is not sufficient to explain the stronger
financial performance reported for those firms relative to .\DR firms. Finally, our tests of value
relevance, using book value and earnings to explain pnce. show significantly higher explanators
pow er for the .\DR firms and generalh non-significant explanaton. power for the NCL firms. The
value-relevance results may indicate that investors in Mexican ADR firms benefit from U.S.
regulation and that rej>orted market inefficiency" in Mexico may result in low demand for financial
statements ofNCL firms.
This smd>" has the ad\ antage of focusing on a single, emerging-market economy (Alexico. the
United State's second-largest trade parmer) m contrast to most pre\"ious .ADR research that uses
multi-cotmtry samples dominated by developed-market coimtries. It is also one of the first ADR
smdies to deal with selection-bias issues b\ comparing .ADR and NCL firms. To gain these
ad\ antages. however, we must conduct tests on and draw conclusions fi-om a relati\ ely small sample.
© 2005 L"ni\ ersit\" of Illinois. .A.11 rights reser\ ed.
JEL classification: E31: GI5; M41; N26
Key-iiords: American I>epositar\ Receipt: Mexico: Cross-listing
1. Introduction
This paper investigates whether there are systematic differences in the financial
perfomiance. capital strucmre. and quality' of financial information for Mexican firms that
choose to trade m the United States as .Amencan Depositary' Receipts (.ADRs) and
Mexican firms that are eligible to trade in the United States, but do not. This question is
especially important in light of recent research findings in Lang et al.. (2003). Their
results, based on samples from 21 countries (including both developed and emerging
markets but not Mexico), indicate that cross-listed firms are less aggressive in terms of
eamings management and that the>' repon accounting data that are more strongly
associated with share pnces. The implication is that the qualir>" of eamings is higher for
cross-listed firms.
Houe\er. Foerster and Karohi (2000) suggest that companies cross-listing on major
U.S. exchanges from countries with significant investment bamers for foreigners
underperform local benchmark market-remm indices. Lins. Stnckland. and Zenner
(2000. 4) suggest that the law and the qualit>' of its enforcement are likeh' to be
important factors in determining the success of etfons to raise capital b\' firms from
emerging markets that seek financing outside their home countries. Therefore, results
based on multi-countp." studies ma>' not appK" to firms from emerging-market economies.
p. Y. Davis-Friday et al. Tlie International Journal ofAccounting 40 (2005) 1-30 3
We consider the implications of the Lins et al. (2000) study for firms from an emerging
market that cross-list in the United States by investigating firms from Mexico, the United
States 's second-largest trade partner and the emerging-market country with the largest
number of finns cross-listed on U.S. exchanges. Mexico has unique institutional features,
such as the use of segmented share classes to pre\ent foreign control of Mexican
corporations, as well as other country- and firm-specific characteristics that may cause the
type of cross-listed firm from Mexico to differ from those from other countries.
Our results indicate that, on average. Mexican cross-listed (ADR) firms are smaller,
more highly levered, and less profitable than the non-cross-listed (NCL) firms. While
supplemental tests of earnings quality suggest that NCL firms exhibit smoother earnings,
this evidence does not explain the stronger financial performance reported for Mexican
NCL firms since ADR firms also exhibit weaker operating cash flow performance. Finally.
our tests of value relevance, using book value and earnings to explain price, show
significantly higher explanator>' power for the ADR firms and generally non-significant
explanatory power for the NCL firms. The value-rele\ance resuhs may indicate that
investors in Mexican ADR firms benefit from U.S. regulation and that evidence of market
inefficiency in Mexico (Bhattachar>'a. Daouk. Jorgenson. & Kehr. 2000) may result in low
demand for financial statements of NCL firms. This study has the advantage of focusing
on a single, emerging-market economy in contrast to most previous ADR research that
uses multi-countr\' samples dominated by developed-market countries. It is also one of the
first studies to deal with selection-bias issues by comparing cross-listed and non-cross-
listed firms. To gain these ad\ antages, however, we base our tests on and draw conclusions
from relatively small samples.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides additional justification
for a single country—Mexico—cross-listing study. Section 3 reviews prior research and
pro\ides additional background information about the ways Mexican companies have
accessed U.S capital markets. Section 4 develops our hypotheses and describes the
research methodology used to test the hypotheses. Section 5 describes our data sources,
the composition of our samples, and presents the results of our analyses. Section 6
concludes the paper.
2. The importance of a single country focus: Mexico
Much of the pre\ ious ADR research e\idence is based on test results dra\%'n from large,
multi-country samples (Amir, Harris. & Venuti. 1993; Lang et al.. 2003; Rees & Elgers.
1997). However, LaPorta. Lopez-De-Silanes. Shleifer. and \'ishny (1998) suggest that
country-specific legal rules regarding the protection of shareholders and creditors, and the
quality of enforcement of those rules, help define the rights that \ anous secunties afford
their owners. These rights in turn determine whether or not firms can raise external capital
(LaPorta et al. 1998. 1114). Therefore. countr>'-specific legal rules may create different
incentives for firms to seek financing outside their home countries and. as important.
in\estors may respond differently to the efforts of firms from different countries to issue
capital. These considerations bring into question the wisdom of generalizing from multi-
country resuhs, leading us to suggest the need for individual-countr>' tests.
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Because the environment for corporate-finance decisions in Mexico differs
substantially from that in the United States, research in this area has the potential
to yield rich results. First, the efficiency of the market is open to question based on
recent evidence in Bhattacharya et al. (2000) that Mexican restrictions on insider
trading have not been enforced. Second, as LaPorta et al. (1998) point out, Mexican
accounting rules and investor protections are rooted in the civil-law tradition of France
rather than in the common law tradition of the United States, and countries from the
French civil-law family generally provide the worst legal protections to shareholders.
Third, Mexican companies use inflation accounting in their domestic financial
statements. Since they are not required to change the measurement model when
reconciling to U.S. GAAP, they reduce one of the costs of cross-listing in the United
States. Fourth, the Mexican environment provides a sharp contract to the United States
when considering the effects of ownership structure. As is the case for several other
emerging-market countries, Mexican firms typically issue multiple classes of equity
that differentiate between foreign and domestic investors.' For example, non-financial
companies can issue Series A shares restricted to Mexican investors, granting full voting
rights and collectively representing legal control with 51% or more of the voting shares.
On the other hand. Series B shares are open to all investors, regardless of nationality, grant
ftill voting rights, but cannot collectively represent legal confrol because they may not
exceed 49% of the voting shares." Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan (1997) have
documented significant price premia for Mexican shares not restricted to domestic
investors. In another study, Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan (1998), showed that in the
Mexican domestic market, liquidity increases and volatility decreases after ADR cross-
listing for those series of shares open to foreign ownership. An explanation for this might
be a migration of foreign investors away from the domestic market, i.e., the order-flow
migration. In addition, the observed, positive excess returns associated with ADR listing
largely accrued to those same series of unrestricted shares open to foreign investors prior
to cross-listing. This last result implies that the cost of capital benefits of cross-listing
equity shares might be smaller than originally thought. It might well be that the peculiar
characteristics of the Mexican share ownership, with private control held by a few
Mexican investors, limit the benefits associated with the expanding ADR shareholder
base, but this is a contention that deserves investigation.^ One alternative explanation for
See Davis-Friday (2001) and Gordon (2001) for more information regarding Mexican financial reporting
institutions.
" These unrestricted B shares are held in deposit as the equivalent ofADR securities listed and traded in foreign
(U.S.A.) markets. For Mexican financial companies. Series C shares are similar to the B series described here, but
they are limited to 30% of the total capital. In addition, though less irequently issued, there are Series O, L, and N,
available to all investors but with limited or no shareholders' voting rights. Finally, in addition to these, though
less fi"equently used, Mexican firms can issue CPOs (Certificates of Ordinary Participation) which are traded in
the Mexican Bolsa and represent a cocktail of various series of a company's shares available in the market. These
CPOs have features similar to stock warrants and are exchangeable for the shares that the CPO package
combination represents.
This relates to corporate governance and minority shareholders rights, issues that have attracted attention,
especially when related to firms with globally diverse shareholders (Foerster & Karolyi 2000; LaPorta, Lopez-
De-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny 1999).
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abnormal returns to the unrestricted Mexican B shares prior to cross-Hsting is that
investors (either national or foreign) foresaw the option of added dollar liquidity for those
equivalent shares in a developed foreign market. Likewise, the tax benefits of these B
shares in the Mexican market, where neither capital gains nor dividends are taxable
income for individual investors, constitute another enticement for investors, a benefit that
would certainly dissipate when those gains or dividends were cashed in foreign (USA)
security exchanges.
These market efficiency, legal, disclosure, and shareholder-class features, coupled with
Mexico's traditionally heavier reliance on banking institutions as opposed to capital
markets as a source of capital, as well as a tendency for companies to be closely held, may
make Mexican firms significantly different from U.S. firms and firms cross-listed from
other countries.
Finally, the focus on Mexico is important due to the growth of Mexico as a
U.S. trading partner, fri 1998, Mexico surpassed Japan as the United States's
second largest trading partner (Canada is the largest)."* Furthermore, over the past
decade, there has been a sizable amount of trading of Latin American securities within
U.S. markets as well as capital issuance using ADR and Rule 144a listings. For example,
in 1995, 10 (six) of the 25 most actively traded foreign stocks in the United States in terms
of share volume (dollar volume) were issued by companies domiciled in Mexico, Brazil,
Argentina, and Chile.' Currently, of the 458 non-U. S. companies listed on the NYSE, 95
are from Latin America and 26 are from Mexico.^ Thus, a focus on Mexico is important in
its own right.
3. Background and prior research
3.1. Accessing U.S. capital markets
Most non-U. S. exchange-listed companies trade in the form of American Depositary
Receipts (ADRs). ADRs are dollar-denominated derivative instruments. A depositary bank
(primarily the Bank of New York in the case of Mexico) obtains claims on foreign
securities and issues dollar-denominated claims against them. The ADRs pay U.S. dollar
dividends and are processed through the U.S. clearance and settlement system.^ A
See Migration Policy Institute, "US-Canada-Mexico Fact Sheet on Trade and Migration," 2002, at
www.migrationpolicy.org.
See Cochrane, Shapiro, and Tobin (1996) for this and additional evidence concerning the internationalization
of U.S. investment.
NYSE website, www.NYSE.com, statistics as of November 2001.
Pulatkonak and Sofianos (1999) note that NYSE-listed non-U. S. companies trade in several forms including
ADRs, Global Depositary Receipts, home-market "ordinaries" in the case of Canada, and New York Registered
Shares. The instruments differ in the degree of fiingibility with the corresponding home-market securities. For
instance, Canadian ordinaries are fiiUy fiingible because a trade made in the United States will be denominated in
U.S. dollars while the same trade made in Canada would be denominated in Canadian dollars.
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company that wishes to Hst and trade securities in the secondary market will choose either
Level 1 or Level 2 ADRs. The advantages of the Level 2 listing are the availability of price
quotes and the greater visibility associated with exchange listing. The primary
disadvantage is the need to meet U.S. disclosure requirements, including reconciliation
to U.S. GAAP.
In order to raise new capital in the United States, the non-U. S. company must
choose a Level 3 ADR and meet the standard SEC requirements for issuing
securities, such as issuing an F-1 Registration Statement, providing annual 20-F
filings, and reconciling financial statements to U.S. GAAP, or choose a semi-
private offering via Rule 144a. Rule 144a allows privately placed securities to be
sold to qualified institutional buyers (e.g., large insurance companies, banks, and
investment companies). Such sales are exempt from SEC registration requirements.
However, such issuers must provide buyers with information about the nature of
the business and recent audited financial statements, generally prepared under home
country GAAP. Furthermore, Rule 144a offerings are restricted to smaller
companies since registration with the SEC is generally required if the assets of
the foreign issuer exceed US$10 million or if it has 500 or more equity holders.
We investigate firms that have chosen to raise capital across all of these
dimensions as well as firms that are eligible to trade on U.S. exchanges, but have
not cross-listed.
3.2. Evidence regarding cross-listing
Saudagaran (1988, 1990) argues that the potential benefits of foreign listing relate to
financial, marketing, political, and employee-motivation considerations. The primary
financial considerations are access to larger capital markets, reduced dependence on
domestic sources of capital, avoidance of a decline in stock prices due to saturation of
domestic markets, access to foreign capital to finance foreign expansion, and the
opportunity to meet operating and long-term debt obligations abroad. Market consid-
erations relate to greater visibility and product identification abroad and enhanced
corporate image. Political considerations include improved international relations and
employee motivation considerations include improved labor relations and the use of stock
in employee compensation plans abroad.
Baker, Nofsinger, and Weaver (1999) investigate changes in visibility associated with
cross-listing, using analyst coverage and media attention as proxies. Their results from
analyzing changes in analyst coverage are consistent with the "investor-recognition"
hypothesis of Merton (1987), which indicates that an increase in the size of the investment
base lowers expected return, lowers the cost of capital, and increases the market value of
shares.
We do not explore visibility issues in this paper, but instead focus on access to
capital as the primary firm benefit fi-om cross-listing in the United States. Limited
access to extemal capital is a primary motive for foreign listing in Bruner,
Chaplinsky, and Ramchand (1999); Miller (1999); and Stulz (1999). Later, we
provide evidence of substantial raising of capital for our exchange-listed ADR firm
sample.
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Lins et al. (2000) empirically investigate whether cross-listing in the United States
reduces the costs of market segmentation by improving access to capital.*^ Using an ADR
sample covering the period 1986-1996 and data from Worldscope, the authors document
that the sensitivity of investment to cash flow decreases significantly for firms from
emerging markets but does not change for firms fi^om developed markets following cross-
listing and that firms access international capital markets more often following cross-
listing. They suggest that this may be the case because emerging markets are often
segmented. Market segmentation may arise from direct (e.g., ownership restrictions) and
indirect (e.g., information production, accounting standards) barriers. These barriers
impede the flow and fonnation of capital in non-U. S. markets (Lins et al., 2000, 1). Lins et
al. (2000, 2) argue that relative to their home markets, greater disclosure requirements,
shareholders' rights protection, liquidity, and analyst following reduce the information
asymmetry for non-U. S. finns listed on U.S. equity markets, especially those from
emerging markets.
4. Research design and hypothesis development
We develop and test three hypotheses based on the results from previous research. First,
the major motivation for cross-listing is to reduce capital constraints. Second, the firms
that are capital constrained and cross-listed are financially weaker than those that do not
cross-list. Finally, because of the lack of enforcement of insider trading regulations in
Mexico, Mexican ADR firms' share prices will be more associated with their accounting
information as a result of the additional U.S. regulation.
4.1. Financial characteristics oj ADR firms
Prior research does not compare the financial performance of Mexican cross-
hsted companies with eligible companies who have not cross-listed, so we instead
rely on the results of prior global equity offerings research to suggest a directional
hypothesis.
Consistent with the Lins et al. (2000) idea that foreign companies issue equity on U.S.
exchanges to relax capital constraints, we expect our ADR firms to exhibit higher financial
leverage than the benchmark NCL firms. The need for external financing may be
especially great for certain firms from Mexico because of the nature of the Mexican debt
market and the condition of the Mexican equity market during our sample period. LaPorta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Zamarripa (2002) report that related lending, where banks lend to
firms controlled by the bank's owners, is prevalent in Mexico and it takes place on better
We borrow the following quote from Lins et al. (2000) because it is so relevant for our study: '"Stock markets
from Mexico City to Sao Paulo have sunk in importance recently with trading shifting to Latin stocks listed in
New York as American Depositary Receipts, or ADRs. . . The focus abroad means the only Latin American
companies that can raise financing nowadays are those that have access to international markets. Thousands of
small and medium-sized businesses the bulk of Latin America's productive capacity-are left behind." ("Latin
American Stock Trading Migrates North," Wall Street Journal, October 27, 1999).
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terms than borrowing from non-related parties.^ The majority of the lending in Mexico
during our sample period occurred between banks that were acquired by local families
(during the privatization of Mexican banks that ended in 1992) who already controlled
industrial groups and therefore had the financial resources to acquire the newly privatized
banks (LaPorta et al., 2002, 14). This would suggest that the majority of related lending,
and therefore favorable debt financing, occurred between closely (family) held industrial
firms and their related banks. Because all firms were affected by the 1995 peso devaluation
that led to significant decreases in equity market values, the most capital-constrained
Mexican firms (i.e., those without related banks) would have to seek debt or equity
financing outside Mexico. Whether or not these firms are successful in loosening capital
constraints subsequent to ADR-listing depends on post-ADR-listing performance. While
we do not posit a reduction in financial leverage subsequent to ADR-listing, we do provide
evidence for a small sample of firms for which we have data. Our first hypothesis
describes our expectations regarding the need for capital. It is stated in the alternative
form:
HI. ADR firms are more capital-constrained (i.e., are larger relative to the domestic
market and have more leverage) than NCL firms.
Errunza and Miller (2003) empirically test the impact of first time ADR fum listings on
the cost of equity capital for the firm. The authors suggest that the effect on the cost of
capital is the most important benefit of international cross-listing. Their research uses a
modified event study methodology where a sample of 126 first-listed ADR firms are
compared to a portfolio of matched non-ADR firms of the same size from their country of
origin that are traded in their respective domestic market. The sampled firms are those
selected from among foreign companies that entered the U.S. market as ADR issues during
the 10-year period 1985-1994. The firms included in the sample represent Levels 1, 2 and
3 ADRs and also Rule 144A firms. To test the impact of cross-listing on the cost of capital
of the firm, the authors use realized monthly buy and hold returns over 30 months prior to
and 30 months after the year when the announcement of the ADR placement occurred.
The cumulative average returns for the portfolio of the 126 ADR firms for —36 to —7
months before the cross-listing announcement and +7 to +36 months after the same
announcement were compared against the retums of the matched firm benchmarking
portfolio for the same pre- and post-announcement time windows. The differences of stock
retums between the ADR stocks and those of the matched non-ADR firms for the periods
of analysis provided the measure of cumulative excess retums for the ADR sample firms.
The results of the statistical tests demonstrated a significant decrease in the cumulative
retums (16.8% per year) for the ADR firms from their pre-announcement to the post-
announcement periods. Likewise, there was an observed decline in their cumulative excess
retums from the pre-announcement to the post-announcement windows of 1 1.3% per year.
All this was indicative of a significant (42%) reduction in the cost of capital brought about
by the infroduction of the ADRs in the U.S. capital market. Contrary to previous research,
^ LaPorta et al. (2002, 3) indicate that the banking structure in Mexico is common in many developing
countries.
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Errunza and Miller (2003) did not detect excess performance of the cross-listed firms in
the post-announcement period. The cumulative excess return during this post-announce-
ment period was insignificant and negative (— 1 .04% per year), a result that was consistent
with asset-pricing models under barriers to capital flows that predict companies earn a
normal rate of return af^er their liberalization (cross-listing). As a consequence of the
reduction in the cost of capital experienced by the newly cross-listed firms, there was a
corresponding revaluation effect experienced by the sample firms prior to and including
the announcement month that decreased dramatically in the post-announcement period.
Overall, our results support the hypothesis that financial market liberalizations (in this
case represented by the cross-listing of foreign shares that reduces capital market
segmentation) have significant economic benefits.
The Foerster and Karolyi (2000) results suggest that ADR financial performance declines
subsequent to ADR issuance. Their results are consistent with the documented results for
domestic equity offerings (e.g., Loughran & Ritter, 1995; Ritter, 1991; Spiess & Affleck-
Graves, 1995). Foerster and Karolyi (2000) also investigate regional differences in their
overall results, and after separating the returns for private and public issues, they show that
the key driver of poor perfomiance in Latin America is the public-issues program.
Segmenting their sample into developed- and emerging-market groups, global-equity
offerings for developed markets outperform emerging markets for all horizons and
benchmarks. No specific country results were reported. In another test of the market-
segmentation hypothesis and its implications for the cost of capital, Errunza and Miller
(2003) identify a significant decline in returns (i.e., decrease in investment risk and
corresponding decrease in the cost ofcapital) for a set of firms after their stock cross-listings.
Using a sample of 127 firms (101 ADRs and 26 Rule 144-A issuers) from 32 countries, they
find a 42% reduction in their annualized excess returns between the pre-announcement
period (26.8%) to the time of placing their securities (15.45%)) in the U.S. market. After
cross-listing, the stock returns of the firms in their sample decreased substantially.
Based on both the domestic and global-equity-offering literature, we expect weaker
fmancial performance after cross-listing for our Mexican ADR population relative to
Mexican NCL firms (benchmark). We also attempt to analyze before- and after-cross-
listing performance for a small sample of ADR issuers for which we have sufficient data.
Again, based on prior literature, we expect to observe weaker fmancial performance after
cross-listing for these firms and this is the basis for our second hypothesis stated in the
altemative form:
H2. ADR firms exhibit weaker financial performance relative to NCL firms and relative to
their own performance prior to cross-listing.
4.2. Information environment and the value relevance of accounting information
The cost of greater transparency has the potential to be a more binding constraint on
cross-listing for Mexican firms than out-of-pocket costs. In a series of papers, LaPorta et
al. (1998, 1999) show that the observed prevalence of widely held corporations in the
United States does not hold as a pattern throughout the world and that widespread
corporate ownership, where it does exist, is consistent with strong legal protection for
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minority shareholders. LaPorta et al. (1999) analyze the ownership of the top 20 market-
capitalization firms in each of 27 countries, including Mexico. Ownership-structure
information is not available for non-cross-listed Mexican companies, so they focus on the
20 largest ADR firms. All are classified as "family owned" by the authors."^ Thus, even
though privacy concerns exist as a potential constraint on cross-hsting since Mexico has
one of the highest incidences of family ownership, the majority of eligible Mexican firms
has cross-listed in the US.
In two papers focused on Mexico, Domowitz et al. (1997, 1998) explore the effects of
ownership restrictions and cross-listing on stock prices and market liquidity. Their share-
price analysis of 24 equity issues on a daily basis and 46 equity issues on a weekly basis
for 21 firms over the 1990-1993 period indicates significant price premia for shares held
by foreign investors (B shares). They also examine the impact on the Mexican stock
exchange (BMV) around the time of ADR issuance and present strong evidence of
increased volatility' and weak evidence of reduced liquidity (stronger evidence of reduced
liquidity for B shares). In examining the impact of ADR listing on bid-ask spreads, they
observe decreased spreads in the majority of cases.
Additionally, Mexican firms are more likely to benefit fi-om cross-listing than are firms
from many other countries because of time-zone considerations. Pulatkonak and Sofianos
(1999) indicate that the six countries with the greatest U.S. market share are aU within one
time zone ofNew York and that 68.7% of the trading of Mexican cross-listed firms occurs
in the United States. The importance of time zone relates primarily to trading-session
overlap facilitating arbitrage trading, simultaneous security pricing in the U.S. and home
markets, and the ability to disseminate new information during business hours.
Finally, in their tests of the efficiency of the Mexican stock market, Bhattacharya et al.
(2000) note that in spite of laws against insider trading, there has never been an indictment,
trial, or conviction for insider trading by the Mexican equivalent of the SEC. Their
examination of daily price reactions to corporate news announcements for a sample of
Mexican A and B shares over the period July 1994-June 1997 shows no difference in
retums, volatility, trading volume, or bid-ask spreads for event and non-event periods.
They provide further evidence that the retum volatility of A shares leads the return
volatility of B shares (consistent with insider trading), but not strongly enough for trading
rules to arbitrage it away.
These issues relate directly to the results in Lins et al. (2000). Their results demonstrate
that U.S. hsting reduces the indirect costs of market segmentation by improving access to
capital, especially for emerging-market firms. In the case of Mexico, ADR shares traded in
the United States may represent underlying B shares or A shares (those previously
restricted to ownership by Mexican nationals). Therefore, the cross-listing reduces market
segmentation and potentially improves the informational efficiency of the cross-listed
share prices. Thus, a potential benefit of cross-listing for investors in Mexican securities
may be improved market efficiency resulting fi^om U.S. regulation.
Much of the prior research related to the SEC disclosure debate has focused on the
value relevance of GAAP reconcihations. Amir et al. (1993) examine the value relevance
'" We verified the high incidence of family ownership of Mexican firms by referencing a sample of 20-F
registration statements a\ ailable to us.
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of both the aggregate reconcihations of earnings and shareholders' equity and the value
relevance of the individual components for a sample of 101 firms based on Form 20-F
filings over the period 1981-1991. They find value relevance for both aggregate
reconciliations and for the capitalized goodwill and asset revaluation components of the
reconciliations. Their sample is dominated by firms from the United Kingdom, the
Netherlands, Australia, and Sweden and includes only three Mexican firms.
Rees and Elgers (1997) extend the work of Amir et al. (1993) by focusing on the
reconciliations found in initial Form F-1 registration statements for a sample of 140
(mostly UK, Australian and Canadian) firms for the period pre- 1985 through 1991. The
authors regress ROE (book value deflated eamings) and the reconciliations (change in
stockholders' equity and the change in eamings) on price-to-book value for up to three
retrospective years and find statistically significant results for the stockholders' equity
reconciliation and some individual components of the reconciliations (goodwill, asset
revaluations, and "all else" categories). Regressions of reconciling items on returns were
not significant.
Davis-Friday and Rivera (2000) investigate the value relevance of Form 20-F
reconciliations for a sample of Mexican ADRs. They find that while both Mexican
GAAP and U.S. GAAP eamings and book values are significantly related to ADR prices,
the reconciliation from Mexican to U.S. GAAP is not statistically significantly related to
ADR prices. The authors suggest that a likely reason for the apparent lack of value
relevance for the reconciliation is that Mexican financial statements are adjusted for
inflation and the reconciliations exclude the inflafion adjustments. The inflation adjust-
ment is likely the largest difference between Mexican and U.S. GAAP.
To our knowledge, no prior study has compared the value relevance of accounting
information reported by Mexican ADR and NCL firms. We expect to observe significantly
greater value relevance for our ADR firms in comparison with NCL firms. This result is
anficipated due to the different information environments in which the two sets of firms
operate and not to addifional disclosures provided by ADR firms since the U.S. SEC does
not require reconciliation of the largest discrepancy between U.S. and Mexican GAAP
(i.e., inflation accounting). According to evidence from Bhattacharya et al. (2000), the
U.S. capital market appears to be more highly regulated than the Mexican market.
Therefore, investors may be more willing to use financial-statement information to set
security prices for the ADR firms than for the NCL firms. Our third hypothesis, stated in
the altemative, is as follows:
H3. Eamings and book values explain more of the cross-sectional variation in stock prices
for ADR firms than for NCL firms.
5. Results
5.7. Data and sample selection
Our primary data source for financial-statement and market data is Economatica, a
commercial database for Latin American companies. Economatica obtains its firm
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Table 1
Sample-selection procedures
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Number of companies traded on BMV
Number of companies eligible for NYSE
Number of companies traded on U.S. exchanges"
Less firms missing data on Economatica or Bolsa
ADR sample
Eligible companies not traded on NYSE
Companies traded OTC
Less banks
Companies traded rule via 144a''
Eligible companies not traded in US
Non-ADR sample
^ Telefonos de Mexico is traded both on the NASDAQ (A shares) and NYSE (L shares). It is only included once
in the NYSE totals.
^ Several of the companies traded on U.S. exchanges also have shares traded OTC or listed under Rule 144a.
The number of OTC and 144a listings does not include firms that are also listed on ASE, NASDAQ, or NYSE.
financial statement data from the Mexican stock exchange (Bolsa). We obtained security-
market betas from Bolsa statistical summaries {Anuario Biirsatil de la Bolsa Mexican de
Valores) and data for return calculations from the same source. The number of analysts
following our sample firms was obtained from IBES International.
The financial statement data used in subsequent analyses were prepared using Mexican
accounting principles. The accounting data are general price-level-adjusted and translated
to U.S. dollars using peso-to-dollar exchange rates at each year-end." We do not analyze
reconciliations to U.S. GAAP for level 2 and level 3 ADR companies for two reasons.
First, we want to be able to compare financial characteristics of ADR and NCL firms on
the same basis. Second, previous research (e.g., Davis-Friday & Rivera, 2000) indicates
that the reconciliations are not value relevant for Mexican companies. We summarize the
sample-selection procedures in Table 1.
The ADR sample consists of all Mexican non-financial services firms with available
data that were ever listed on U.S. exchanges during the 1995-1999 period.'" At the end of
1995, there were 22 Mexican ADRs listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE);
three traded on the NASDAQ, and two on the American Stock Exchange (AMEX). By the
end of 1999, there were 34 Mexican firms trading on the NYSE, NASDAQ, or AMEX.
After excluding the two banks,'" the ADR sample ranges from 23 to 32 firms for a total of
" Two inflation adjustment accounts are normally shown in Mexican financial statements. First, any gain or
loss in net monetary position is shown in the income statement as part of a comprehensive financing cost category
that also includes interest and foreign-exchange gains or losses. The offsetting account for the price-level
adjustments for nonmonetary items is included as a component of Shareholders' Equity.
'" Banks were eliminated due to their differing financial characteristics in comparison with the rest of the
sample. This constraint eliminated two financial-services firms (Banca Quadrum and Grupo Financiero Serfin)
from the ADR sample and three financial-services firms (Grupo Financiero Banamex Accival, Grupo Financiero
BBVA Bancomer and Grupo Financiero Inbursa) fi^om the NCL sample.
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140 firm-years.'"^ However, in subsequent analyses, two firm-year observations with
negative book values and three outliers (ROE greater than three standard deviations fi-om
the mean) were eliminated. Additional missing data (especially price data) fiirther limited
the sample in some years (see Table 4). All the sample firms have December 31 fiscal
year-ends. The sample includes slightly more Level 3 ADRs than Level 2 ADRs.
The non-ADR sample is also drawn fi^om Economatica, and includes all additional
Mexican firms that meet the NYSE international listing requirements, but are not
exchange-listed.'"* This sample includes firms that are listed over-the-counter (OTC) or as
private placements (144a).'^ It also includes firm-years for three companies that later listed
as Level 2 ADRs: Cemex (1995-1998), Fomento Economico Mexicano (1996-1997), and
Grupo Maseca (1995-1997). The annual non-ADR sample-size ranges fi'om 14 to 29 firms
(40 different firms) and a total of 121 firm-years.
A summary of the listing status of the sample finns is provided in Table 2. A key
difference between the ADR and non-ADR firms (NCL and OTC/ 144a) is that the
exchange-listed firms are much more stable in terms of meeting the NYSE listing
requirements. Panel A shows that of the 32 ADR firms in the sample 23 were listed for all
5 years of the sample period. The average number of sample years per firm is 4.38. In
contrast. Panel B shows that only 1 1 of the 40 non-cross-listed (NCL) and OTC/ 144a firms
in the eligible but not exchange-listed sample meet eligibility requirements for all five test-
period years. Further, 16 of the 40 firms meet the eligibility requirements only
intermittently and, again, three of the firms later become ADRs. The average number of
sample years per firm is only 3.03 for the non-ADR sample.
It appears that the majority of eligible Mexican firms have cross-listed their securities in
the United States as Level 2 or 3 ADRs. Many of the rest of the firms have only recently or
intermittently met NYSE eligibility requirements. For others, we suspect there are
idiosyncratic reasons for not cross-listing. For example, Kimberly Clark de Mexico, Sears
Roebuck, and Wal Mart de Mexico have U.S. counterparts and there appear to be few
benefits to cross-listing for these firms. Grupo Bimbo, an eligible, but non-cross-listed
firm, acquired a bakery in Texas in order to take advantage of distribution channels and
capital resources in the United States.
It appears that, at least for eligible Mexican companies, the SEC disclosure
requirements are not a major constraint to cross-listing. Apparently, the benefits of
cross-listing (primarily access to capital, we believe) exceed the costs. Over-the-counter
The ADR level designations in panel A of Table 2 are the current level designations as disclosed by the Bank
of New York. Note that three previous Level 2 or 3 ADR firms have downgraded to Level 1-Bufete Industrial,
Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo and Grupo Sidek. All three firms traded on the NYSE during our test period, but
they presently trade OTC.
The alternate international requirements are: 5,000 worldwide round-lot holders, 2.5 million worldwide
public shares, US$100 million worldwide public market value, and aggregate 3-year pre-tax earnings of US$100
million together whh a minimum of US$25 million of earnings in each of the two most recent years. The financial
conditions may also be fulfilled using operating cash flow.
^ We conduct our empirical analyses separately on firms that are not cross-listed at all (NCL), OTC and 144a
firms, and exchange-listed ADR firms.
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Table 2
Sample firms
Panel A: Mexican firms traded on U.S. exchanges through December 1999
Company name Exchange Level Sector Effective date
95 96 97 98 99
Altos Homos de Mexico^
Biper
Bufete Industrial^
Cemex
Coca-Cola FEMSA
Consorcio G Grupo Dina''
Controladora Comercial Mexicana
Desc
Empresas ICA
Fomento Economico
Mexicano (FEMSA)''
Gruma''
Grupo Casa Autrey (Saba)
Grupo Elektra
Grupo Imsa
Grupo Industrial Durango
Grupo Industrial Maseca"^
Grupo lusacell
Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollol^'^
Grupo Radio Centre
Grupo Sidek^'*^
Grupo Simec
Grupo Televisa
Grupo Tribasa
Industrias Bachoco
Intemaciona! de Ceramica*^
Pepsi-Gemex
Savia (Empresas la Modema)
Telefonos de Mexico (A)
Telefonos de Mexico (L)
Transportacion Maritima Mexicana
Tubos de Acero de Mexico
TV Azteca
Vitro
Total
Panel B: Mexican firms eligible to list on the New York stock exchange
NYSE 2 Steel
NASDAQ 2 Communications
NYSE 3 Construction
NYSE 2 Cement Production
NYSE 3 Beverages
NYSE 3 Transportation
NYSE 3 Retail
NYSE 3 Holding Company
NYSE 3 Construction
NYSE 2 Beverages
NYSE 2 Food
NYSE 3 Food
NYSE 2 Retail
NYSE 3 Steel
NYSE 3 Paper Products
NYSE 2 Food
NYSE 2 Communications
NYSE 3 Construction
NYSE 3 Communications
NYSE 3 Holding Company
AMEX 3 Steel
NYSE 3 Communications
NYSE 3 Construction
NYSE 3 Food
NYSE 3 Construction
NYSE 2 Beverages
NYSE 3 Holding
NASDAQ 2 Communications
NYSE 3
NYSE 3 Transportation
AMEX 2 Steel
NYSE 3 Communications
NYSE 3 Mineral Products
23 26 28 31 32
Company name Exchange Sector Effecti\ e date
144a OTC Amex
Nasdaq
NYSE
95 96 97 98 99
Alfa
Apasco
Ara Consorcio
Argos Embotelladora
Bimbo Grupo
Carso Global Telecom
Cementos Chihuahua
Holding Company
Cement
Construction
Beverage
Food
Communications
Cement
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Table 2 {continued)
Panel B: Mexican firms eligible to list on the New York stock exchange
Company name Exchange Sector Effective date
144a OTC Amex
Nasdaq
NYSE
95 96 97 98 99
Cemex
Cintra
Coppel
Corp Moctezuma
Cydsa
El Puerto de Liverpool
Empaques Ponderosa
Fomento Economico Mexico
Grupo Azucarero Mexico
Grupo Carso (96-99)
Grupo Continental
Grupo Gigante
Grupo Industrial Saltillo
Grupo Maseca (Gruma)
Grupo Modelo
Grupo Palacio de Hierro
Grupo Sanboms
Hylsamex (96-99)
Industrias CH
Jugos del Valle*'
Kimberly Clark de Mexico
Mexichem
Nuevo Grupo Mexico
Nutrisa
Panamco
Penoles Industrias
Posadas Grupo
San Luis Corp
Sears Roebuck
Seguros Com America
Situr Grupo
Soriana Organizacion
Wal Mart de Mexico
(97-99)
Total 10
Cement
Airlines
Retail
Cement
Holding Company
Retail
Paper Products
Beverage
Food
Holding Company
Beverage
Retail
Holding Company
Food
Beverage
Retail
Retail
Steel Plant
Metallurgy
Beverage
Paper Products
Petrochemical
Mining
Retail
Beverage
Mining
Tourism/Hotel
Automotive Parts
Retail
Insurance
Tourism Hotel
Retail
Retail
14 29 29 26
" These firms delist after the test period. They are included in the analysis during the time period when they are
listed on exchanges.
These firms are categorized as exchange-listed firms after they cross-list in the United States and they are also
included in the non-cross-hsted, but eligible sample during the years before they cross-list.
These firms trade shares on an organized exchange as well as over the counter (OTC). In the analysis that
follows, they are only included in the "exchange" firm analysis.
(OTC) and 144a firms also have the opportunity to benefit from raising private capital, but
without incurring the costs of SEC registration. Later, we provide evidence bearing on the
viability of this option.
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5.2. IndustiT classifications
Our analysis of the differences between ADR and non-ADR firms begins with a
description of their respective industry (sector) distributions in Table 3. Based on the
sector names from Economatica. the ADR and non-ADR firms represent 18 different
sectors. The 32 ADR turns are in 1 1 different sectors and the 40 non-ADR firms are in
16 different sectors. While we find broad industry representation for both samples, there
are also substantial industn.' differences. The top four industries represent over 59% of
the firm-year observations in the ADR sample (communications 18.7%, construction
15.6%, steel 12.5%, and food 12.5%)). In contrast, even though the non-ADR sample is
more diverse in terms of industry representation, the top four industries (retail 22.5%.
be\erages 12.5%, cement 10.0%, and holding companies 10.0%) comprise 55.0% of that
sample.
The apparent sector self-selection for cross-listing creates tw'o potential problems.
First, any observed differences in the overall financial characteristics of the samples have
the potential to be industry-specific. Second, the lack of comparable industry data for the
ADR and non-ADR samples makes it difficult to perfonn a matched sample analysis
along the lines of pre\ious smdies (e.g.. Ely & Pownall. 1999; Lang et al.. 2003). In an
attempt to deal \\ ith both problems, we present overall sample results and also discuss
results for a reduced sample of fi\e industries that ha\e sufficient comparative data.
Table 3
Industn' distribution of the exchange-listed ADR firm and ehgible firm samples
Sector name" Exchange-listed firms Elic!ible tirms
= \ Firm years % = % Firm years %
1 Airline 0.00 0.0 1 2.5 4 3.31
2 Automoti\ e Parts 0.00 0.0 1 2.5 4 3.31
3 Be\'erages 3 9.37 12 8.6 6 12.5 16 13.22
4 Cement 1 3.13 1 0.- 4 10.0 12 9.91
5 Construction 5 15.62 24 P.l 1 2.5 1 .83
6 Communications 6 18.-5 25 1-.9 1 2.5 1 .83
7 Food 4 12.50 15 10." 3 7.5 9 7.43
8 Holding Company 3 9.37 15 10.
"
4 10.0 16 13.22
9 Insurance 0.00 0.0 1 2.5 1 .83
10 Metallurgy' 0.00 0.0 1 2.5 1 .83
11 Mineral Products 1 3.13 5 3.6 0.0 0.0
12 Mining 0.00 0.0 2 5.0 7 5.78
13 Paper Products 1 3.13 5 3.6 2 5.0 8 6.61
14 Petrochemicals 0.00 0.0 1 2.5 4 3.31
15 Retail 2 6.25 10 7.1 9 22.5 28 23.14
16 Steel 4 12.50 18 12.9 1 2.5 4 3.31
17 TourismHotel 0.00 0.0 2 5.0 5 4.13
18 Transportation
(Machinery and Equipment)
") 6.25 10 7.1 0.0 0.0
Total 32 100.0 140 100,0 40 100.0 121 100.0
The sector names are from Economatica.
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5.3. Descriptive statistics
Table 4, Panel A, presents descriptive statistics pooled over the 1995-1999 test period
for financial statement and market variable comparisons of three groups: ADR, OTC/I44a,
and NCL firms. Panel B presents various ratio and growth-performance measures for the
three groups and significance tests are summarized in Panel C. The data are somewhat
skewed by larger firms, so the medians are better measures of central tendency than the
means.
Panel A of Table 4 shows that Mexican ADR firnis tend to be nominally smaller than
both the NCL and OTC/144a firms. For example, for the six financial statement variables,
five of the ADR medians and four of the six means are smaller than those of the other two
groups. In addition to the size differences, of particular interest is the apparent higher
financial leverage and lower profitability of the ADR sample compared especially to the
NCL firms.
Several market-value measures are presented in Panel A. Market value of equity (MVE)
is nominally highest for the OTC/144a firms and lowest for the ADR firms. The relative-
size variable (ratio of MVE to total market capitalization of the Bolsa) is also highest for
the OTC/144a firms and lowest for the ADR firms. We were only able to obtain small
samples of beta and returns data, therefore it is difficult to generalize much fi^om these
results, but there is some evidence of lower returns for the ADR firms. Finally, analyst
coverage tends to be highest for the OTC/144a finns with little difference in coverage
between ADR and NCL firms.
An overall conclusion from Panel A of Table 4 is that, after meeting threshold size
requirements for listing on the NYSE, the relative size of a firm is not a determinant of
cross-listing (i.e., relatively smaller eligible firms do not avoid cross-listing) status for
Mexican firms.
Panel B of Table 4 summarizes financial and market-performance measures for the
three groups. Even after deleting outliers, the distributions remain somewhat skewed so we
again focus more heavily on the medians. Here, the overall conclusion is that the financial
performance of the ADR firms is weaker than that of both the NCL and OTC/144a firms
over the 1995-1999 test period. For example, the mean (median) ROEs for the ADR
sample of -10.5% (10.1%) is significantly lower than the mean (median) ROEs of 13.7%
and 14.7% (16.2% and 13.2%) for the respective OTC/144a and NCL samples. Further,
the relatively lower ROEs for the ADR firms are impacted by significantly higher leverage
(Assets/Equity) in comparison with the NCL firms. The ROA measures are also
significantly lower for the ADR firms. Further analysis shows that the ROA results are
driven by both significantly lower profit margins and asset turnover for the ADR firms.
Based on the growth in total assets variable, it also appears that historical growth has been
lower for the ADR firms than for the other two groups.
Further analysis shows that an important difference in the distributions of ROE and
ROA for the ADR firms in comparison to both the OTC/144a and NCL groups is the
presence of 36 negative observations for the ADR group compared with only four negative
observations for the other two groups combined. The negative observations remain even
after deleting negative book-value observations (2) and outliers greater than three standard
deviations from the original means of the distributions (3). In fact, 19 of the 32 ADR firms
p. Y. Davis-Friday et al. / The International Journal ofAccounting 40 (2005) 1-30
Table 4
Descriptive statistics (1995-1999)
Panel A: Financial statement and market variables
Variable A^ Exchange-listed ADR firms'" N OTC and 144a firms'" A^ Non-cross-listed firms^
Mean S.D. Median Mean S.D. Median Mean S.D. Median
Assets 135 2105 3040 1172 48 2477 2810 1634 73 1936 2094 1389
Liabilities 135 997 1071 682 48 1151 1293 600 73 786 1142 467
Equity 135 1027 2098 488 48 1021 855 983 73 975 830 742
Net income 135 113 378 39 48 153 181 73 73 148 180 97
Operating 135 227 663 81 47 265 500 147 73 233 296 161
cash flow
Investing 135 -143 339 -63 47 -220 461 -96 72 -192 260 -99
cash flow
MVE 135 7755 16,418 3263 48 16,302 21,216 7025 73 9500 9429 6253
Relative size 135 0.075 0.167 0.030 48 0.15 0.19 0.07 73 0.092 0.097 0.055
Beta 67 0.653 0.404 0.670 31 0.85 0.30 0.93 42 0.660 0.315 0.629
Returns 29 1.082 2.736 0.101 26 1.19 3.07 0.19 21 1.336 3.028 0.313
Analysts 91 12.396 6.031 13.000 37 16.51 6.48 19.00 42 13.214 7.380 12.500
Panel B: Performance measures
Variable A'^ Exchange-listed ADR firms'' N OTC and 144a firms'' A'^ Non-cross-listed firms''
Mean S.D. Median Mean S.D. Median Mean S.D. Median
roe" 135 -0.105 1.645 0.101 48 0.137 0.162 0.162 73 0.147 0.078 0.132
Leverage 135 3.724 11.042 2.372 48 2.599 1.745 2.090 73 1.952 0.945 1.616
ROA 135 0.037 0.086 0.042 48 0.075 0.058 0.078 73 0.081 0.040 0.074
Asset turnover 135 0.697 0.482 0.604 48 0.643 0.292 0.602 73 0.865 0.365 0.777
Profit margin 135 0.042 0.222 0.060 48 0.112 0.132 0.125 73 0.111 0.078 0.096
Growth (TA) 135 0.344 0.476 0.291 47 0.635 1.466 0.379 61 0.342 0.512 0.319
EPS 135 0.117 0.683 0.041 48 0.254 0.288 0.155 72 0.243 0.281 0.139
BVS 135 1.886 2.938 0.630 48 1.745 1.455 0.884 72 1.639 1.427 1.012
PE 88 19.895 24.293 13.760 38 15.339 10.212 13.355 55 20.250 25.316 15.580
PB 125 1.864 1.768 1.410 44 2.217 1.442 1.785 61 1.974 0.876 1.910
Revenue ratio 135 0.767 0.233 0.822 48 0.838 0.216 0.907 72 0.772 0.225 0.815
Panel C: Tand Z statistics irom1 comparisons of mean and median differences
Non-cross-listed firms vs. OTC and 144a fums vs. Non-cross-listed firms vs.
exchacige-listed ADRs" exchange-listed ADRs*^
Mean Median
OTC and
Mean
144 A fums*^
Mean Median Median
Panel A: Variable
Assets -1.48 0.58 -0.52 1.27 -0.84 0.90
Liabilities -2.76^*+ -2.35** -1.23 0.09 -1.38 1.58
Equity -0.25 2.63** -0.03 2.03** -0.29 0.00
Net income 0.90 4.66*** 0.95 3 39'*'*** -0.14 -0.20
Operating cash flow 1.53 3.46*** 1.22 2.81*** -0.40 0.18
Investing cash flow -0.52 -3.10*** -1.25 -2.41** 0.39 0.61
MVE 0.29 1.87* 2.51** 4.35*** -2.21** 2.77**
Relative size 0.89 2.13** 2.36** 3.25*** -1.91* 1.23
Beta 0.10 -0.02 2.74** 2.66** -2.67** 9 ^y###
Returns 0.30 0.80 0.14 0.63 0.16 0.57
Analysts 0.63 0.50 3.32*** 3.46"" -2.12** 2.12**
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Table 4 {continued)
Panel C: T and Z statistics from comparisons of mean and median differences
Non-cross -listed firms vs. OTC and 144a firms vs. Non-cross-listed firms vs.
exchange- listed ADRs' exchange-
Mean
listed ADRs'
Median
OTC and 144 A firms'
Mean Median Mean Median
Panel B: Variable
ROE 1.78* 3.53*'* 1.69* 3.24""" 0.41 0.72
Leverage -1.85* _4_54### -1.14 -1.23 -2.35** 2.01*"
ROA 5.00*** 4.62"'* 3.37*** 3.47""" 0.65 -0.09
Asset turnover 2.82*** 3.90*"* -0.92 0.15 T -1 1 *** -3.33'**
Profit margin 3.23*** 3.45"'* 2.57** 3.46""" -0.04 1.26
Growth (TA) -0.03 -0.09 1.33 1.88" -1.31 1.83*
EPS 1.86* 5.85"** 1.90* 4.74""" -0.21 0.25
BVS -0.81 3_29### -0.43 2g3### -0.39 -0.14
PE 0.08 0.77 -1.48 -0.48 1.29 1.25
PB 0.57 2.23"" 1.31 1.93" -0.99 0.19
Revenue ratio 0.16 0.60 1.94* 1.63 -1.63 0.77
Variable definitions
Assets
Liabilities
Equity
Net income
Operating cash flow
Investing cash flow
MVE
Relative size
Beta
Returns
Analysts
ROE
Leverage
ROA
Asset turnover
Profit margin
Growth (TA)
EPS
BVS
PE
PB
Revenue ratio
Book value of total assets;
Book value of total liabilities;
Book value of common equity;
Total net income;
Net cash from operating activities;
Net cash from investing acdvities;
December 3 1 market value of common equity per share times the number of
outstanding shares;
The ratio of the firm's market value of equity in year t to the total Bolsa market
capitalization in the same year.
The coefficient of variation between the firm's stock price and the market as
reported by the Bolsa;
Annual percentage change in the market value of common equity;
The number of analysts providing estimates in the I/B/E/S international database;
Return on common equity (net income/equity);
Total assets/equity;
Return on assets (net income/assets);
Sales/assets;
Net income/sales;
The 36-month change in total assets;
Earnings per share (net income/outstanding coinmon shares);
Book value per share (equity/outstanding common shares);
Price-earnings ratio (market value of common equity per share/earnings per share);
Price-to-book ratio (market value of common equity per share/book value
of common equity per share);
The ratio of domestic revenue to total revenue.
^ The data, except ratios and percentages, are totals in terms of millions of U.S. dollars.
' There are 36 negative ROE observations in the ADR sample, three in the OTC and 144a sample and one in the
NCL sample.
c ***,,* *^###.##,#^
^j^^ jgg^ ^^^^^ ^^^^ (median) difference is statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10%
level, respectively, two-tailed, based on a /-test (Wilcoxon Rank sum test).
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in the sample had at least one year of negative ROE/ROA. The wide distribution of net
income/net loss particulariy impacts the standard deviation of ROE (1.645) for the ADR
group. The negative observations are indicative of weaker financial performance after
cross-listing for the ADR firms, since the stock exchanges require at least 3 years of
positive earnings prior to cross-lisfing.'^
The weaker financial performance for the ADR sample (and expectations of weaker
fiiture performance) is also reflected in the price-to-book (PB) and price-to-eamings (PE)
rafios. The median PB ratio of 1.410 for the ADR sample is significantly lower than the
median PBs of 1.785 and 1.910 for the respective OTC/144a and NCL samples. While the
differences in the PE ratio means and medians are not significant, the median ratio is
nominally lower for the ADR sample.
Panel C of Table 4 summarizes the results of pairwise comparisons ofmean and median
differences for the three groups. Most of the significant differences have been noted above.
The primary additional insight is that there are significant differences in the variables for
all three groups. Based on ROE and ROA measures, financial performance is strongest for
the OTC/144a firms and weakest for the ADR firms. The NCL firms differ most
prominently from the ADR and OTC/144a firms in terms of their lower financial leverage.
The significant differences among all three groups cause us to analyze each group
separately in Tables 6-9.
We now report on untabulated analyses of ADR and NCL differences for a small
sample of industry-matched fi.rms. We include all firms with at least 4 years of data fi"om
the following industries (number ofADR and NCL firms, respectively, from each industry
in parentheses): food (2,1), holding companies (3,3), paper products (1,1), retail (2,3), and
steel (4,1). Thus, the reduced sample includes only 12 ADR and nine NCL firms, and at
most, 56 (47) pooled observations for the ADR (NCL) groups.
The results for the reduced sample are very consistent with those for the fiall sample
reported in Table 4. For example, we still observe the significant size difference between
the two groups. One indicator of the size difference is MVE (market value of equity). The
mean (median) for the NCL group is 22,197 (17,817) in comparison with 5351 (3317) for
the ADR group. The results for the performance measures are also generally consistent
with those in Table 4. While the nominal difference in ROE (NCL lower) is no longer
significant, the ROA and leverage differences remain significant, indicating that ROE is
impacted by higher leverage for the ADR group. For the full sample, the ROA difference
was driven by significant differences in both profit margin and turnover; for the reduced
sample, only the difference in turnover is significant. The results for PB and PE are
consistent with those for the full sample. Finally, we note that the revenue ratio (ratio of
domestic revenue to total revenue) difference is now significant for the reduced sample.
This suggests that, after controlling for firms' industry membership, the exchange-listed
ADR firms earn more of their revenues outside Mexico.
"" Ball, Kothari, and Robin (2000) suggest that financial-reporting environments differ in terms of the timeliness
of loss recognition. This explanation does not explain the weaker financial performance that we observe for
Mexican ADR firms, however, since in subsequent analyses we find that these firms also exhibit weaker operating
cash flow performance.
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Table 5
Descriptive statistics before and after cross-listing
Panel A: Financial statement and market variables for exchange-listed ADR firms^
Variable" N Before N After
Mean S.D. Median
Difference tests
Mean S.D. Median 7* ( p-value) Z"" (;7-value)
Assets 26 2.896 4.288 1.178 30 3.071 4.492 1.501 -0.15(0.88) -0.86 (0.39)
Liabilities 26 1.133 1.524 0.580 30 1.430 1.792 0.842 -0.66 (0.51) -0.83 (0.41)
Equity 26 1.697 2.957 0.547 30 1.674 2.954 0.490 0.03 (0.98) -0.42 (0.68)
Net income 26 0.269 0.536 0.063 30 0.192 0.463 0.050 0.57 (0.57) 1.19(0.23)
Operating cash 26 0.367 0.858 0.004 30 0.289 0.924 0.020 0.33 (0.75) 0.06 (0.95)
flow
Investing cash 26 -0.323 0.543 -0.139 30 -0.318 0.765 -0.46 -0.03 (0.98) -0.45 (0.65)
flow
Panel B: Performance measures for exchange-listed ADR firms
Variable N Before N After
Mean S.D. Median
Difference tests
Mean S.D. Median T (p-value)*" Z (/?-value )'^
ROE 26 12.40 11.25 10.89 30 2.56 22.43 9.96 2.03 (0.05)* 1.08(0.28)
Assets/equity 26 1.97 1.19 1.97 30 2.36 1.56 1.83 -1.04(0.30) -0.43 (0.67)
ROA 26 5.63 3.88 5.35 30 3.65 7.01 3.98 1.28 (0.21) 1.17(0.24)
Sales/assets 26 0.44 0.75 0.17 30 0.88 1.17 0.45 -1.65(0.10)* -1.17 (0.24)
Net income/sales 19 5.49 0.22 0.24 25 0.61 1.44 0.10 1.55 (0.13) 1.80(0.07)*
Revenue ratio 26 0.83 0.22 0.92 30 0.79 0.27 0.86 0.75 (0.46) 0.77 (0.44)
^ The data are totals in terms of millions of U.S. dollars.
''
*(#) The test of the mean (median) difference between non-ADR and exchanged-listed fuins is statistically
significant at the 10% level or better, two-tailed, based on a paired t-test (Wilcoxon Rank sum test).
" Refer to Table 4 for variable definitions.
Using our non-ADR sample as a reasonable local-market benchmark, the weaker
performance for Mexican ADR firms, based on financial characteristics, is
consistent with the results of Foerster and Karolyi (2000) for their combined 35-
country sample based on returns.'^ In an attempt to compare the before-and-after-
exchange-listing performance of ADR firms, we work with a reduced sample of levels 2
and 3 ADRs for which we can obtain data for at least 1 year prior to cross-listing. Table 5
compares the financial performance of these firms for 1 or 2 years preceding and for 2
years after ADR listing. While the sample is very small and our tests lack power, an
overall conclusion is that financial perfonnance did not improve after cross-listing.
Foerster and Karolyi (2000) also provide evidence that while companies issuing equity on major exchanges
in the United States modestly outperform their benchmarks (in contrast to under-performance of private
placements), firms that come from emerging markets with low accounting standards (Mexico included)
significantly outperform their benchmarks. We do not have enough data to separately analyze private placements
versus public placements in terms of fmancial performance. However, our ADR sample is dominated by public
placements (see Table 6), and we believe our results for Mexico are consistent with Foerster and Karolyi (2000)
results for emerging market companies in general.
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Although the results are not significant, ROE and ROA means and medians are nominally
lower after cross-listing. Also note that there does not appear to be any significant
reduction in leverage after cross-listing. Again, we caution that this analysis is based on
extremely small samples.
Based on the limited beft)re and after cross-listing evidence in Table 5 along with the
results of the benchmarking comparison of the performance ofADR firms with non-ADR
firms in Table 4, and the prevalence of negative eamings after cross-listing, as noted
above, we conclude that the financial-performance results for Mexican ADR firms appear
consistent with the resuhs of prior global-equity-offering research; that is, there is no
evidence that greater access to capital is associated with improved financial performance
for Mexican firms after cross-listing. We know that firms in the exchange-listed sample
had to meet the listing requirements of the U.S. exchanges, including 3 years of profitable
performance. One potential explanation for the subsequent poor performance is proposed
by Ritter (1991), who suggests that firms cross-list when they experience strong
performance thereby seizing a "window of opportunity".
5.4. Capital issuance analysis
As previously noted, Lins et al. (2000) provide evidence that non-U. S. firms issue
equity on U.S. stock exchanges to relax capital constraints. Evidence of this constraint is
the significantly higher financial leverage of Mexican cross-listed firms in comparison
with non- cross-listed (NCL) firms. Further, in a dynamic capital structure environment,
Myers and Majluf (1984) and Palepu, Bernard, and Healy (2000) argue that the issuance of
new equity represents last-resort financing.
Table 6 summarizes debt and equity issues by Mexican firms in the United States
broken down by our sample categories of firms. '^ Several insights are evident from the
table. First, much more capital is raised by Levels 2 and 3 ADR firms than by NCL firms.
Level 2 or 3 ADR firms raised over 83% of total debt and almost 87% of total equity.
Improved access to capital markets, at the expense of meeting SEC disclosure
requirements, is clearly a benefit of cross-listing as a Level 2 or 3 ADR. Second,
substantially more equity (US$11.8 billion) has been issued than debt (USS4.3 billion).
The substantially higher equity issuance is consistent with the idea of accessing U.S.
markets to loosen financing constraints. At the same time, the issuance of relatively less
debt in the United States may be indicative of the close ties Mexican firms have to their
domestic bankers (LaPorta et al., 2002). Finally, we note the limited amount of capital that
has been raised by OTC and 144a firms.
5.5. Logistic regression results
Tables 3-6 provide evidence of individual differences in various financial and market
characteristics among the ADR, OTC/ 144a, and NCL firms. We now use a Logistic
"* Data were obtained from the Bank of New York. \Miile Level 2 ADRs may not raise new capital in the
United States by issuing new shares, they are not prevented from raising equity capital through private issues.
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Table 6
Debt and equity issuance
Classitlcation Debt Equity
No. ofNo. of Amount Amount
issues (USSmil) issues (USSmil)
NCL Total (number and amount)
Average
Median
Standard deviation
3 315.2
105.1
35.3
129.7
14 4579.6
327.1
117.8
554.1
144a Total (number and amount)
Average
Median
Standard deviation
0.0 3 54.9
18.3
13.8
8.5
OTC Total (number and amount)
Average
Median
Standard deviation
1 165.9
165.9
165.9
4 215.9
54.0
41.6
49.4
Level 2 ADR Total (number and amount)
Average
Median
Standard deviation
0.0 13 1450.2
111.6
119.4
68.0
Level 3 ADR Total (number and amount)
Average
Median
Standard deviation
8 3603.9
450.5
160.7
671.2
29 8802.3
303.5
85.0
441.1
regression model to examine the conditional relation between the variables we identified
above and the likelihood of cross-listing.
Under the Logit model, the odds of a firm's cross-listing in the United States are
described by the conditional ratio of: P{Gj/X,)/U-P{Gj/Xj)\ where P{Gj/Xj) is the
probability of being a member of G given X^. The log-linear ftinction of this probability
can be expressed as follows (Maddala, 1991):
Log{Pj/\-Pi) =Ao+A,{LogXj,) + ... +Ak{LogX,k[ V
where: P/=probability of firm j cross-listing and Xy^=the explanatory variables for
firm j.
We test the classificatory power of a model that includes the following independent
variables from Table 4: MVES (size), ROA (profitability), LEVERAGE (capital
structure), GROWTH, REVRATIO (ratio of domestic to total revenue), and INDUSTRY.
The variables are chosen based on theoretical considerations and previous empirical
research; for example, LEVERAGE is based on the capital-constraint hypothesis (Lins et
al., 2000), ROA is a profitability proxy based on prior global equity offering research
(Foerster & Karolyi, 2000) and MVES is a proxy for the firm's size and its need for
foreign capital based on Saudagaran (1988). GROWTH is also related to the firm's need
for capital. We include REVRATIO as proxy for firms' exposure outside their home
country (Saudagaran, 1990) and INDUSTRY based on our previous analysis. To avoid
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Table 7
Estimate of U.S. cross-listing probability during 1995 1999
Variable (coefficient) Exchange-listed ADR
firms (;7 = 128) vs. non-
cross-listed firms (n=6\
Exchange-listed ADR
firms («=128) vs. OTC
and 144a firms (h=47)
OTC and 144a firms
(a7=47) vs. non-cross-
listed firms («=61)
Coefficient (chi-square) Coefficient (chi-square) Coefficient (chi-square)
Intercept (xo) -4.98(11.97)*** 3.31 (10.56) -17.02(19.75)***
MVES (/?,) 0.02 (5.82)** -0.02 (3.66)* 0.06 (8.05)***
ROA (/?2) -0.97 (0.09) -6.20(5.51)** 12.02 (2.73)*
LEVERAGE {pi) 1.75(22.67)*** 0.00 (0.00) 3.46(17.30)***
GROWTH ()84) -0.00 (0.00) -0.00(2.15) 0.00 (0.37)
REVRATIO iPs) 3.29 (9.52)*** -1.93(3.74)* 11.25 (16.15)***
INDUSTRY (jSe) -0.07 (3.96)** 0.01 (0.05) -0.14(5.88)**
Model statistics
Concordant percent 80.80 72.60 89.00
Likelihood ratio x' (p-value) 54.00 (<0.00) 19,90(0.00) 60.93 (<0.00)
Pseudo R' 24.85% 10.75% 43.12%
Statistically significant coefficients (two-tailed test) are denoted by: ***less than 0.01, **less than 0.05, *less than
0.10.
There are 32 firms listed on the NYSE, NASDAQ, or AMEX, ten firms traded over-the-counter, five firms traded
via rule 144a, and 25 firms that are not cross-listed in the United States during the 1995-1999 period, but are
eligible to list on the NYSE. P(ADR)=Probability of cross-lisfing in the United States; MVES is the market value
of equity per share; ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets; LEVERAGE is the ratio of total assets to
stockholders' equity; GROWTH is the 36-month percentage change in total assets; REVRATIO is the ratio of
domestic revenue to total revenue; and INDUSTRY is a dummy variable taking on the value of one when it is
equal to category n (defined in Table 3) and zero otherwise.
over-fitting models to our relatively small samples, we do not use the full set of
variables in Table 4.''^
The first column of Table 7 summarizes the results for the ADR/NCL comparison.
First, the model exhibits reasonable classificatory power, as evidenced by the concordant
percentage of 80.80%, in comparison with the naive hypothesis that all sample firms are
ADRs (128 out of 209, or 61.2%). All variables except ROA and GROWTH are
significant. As expected, the variable with the highest classificatory power is
LEVERAGE. REVRATIO was generally not significant in the univariate tests in Table
4. However, it is highly significant here, but not in the hypothesized direction. MVES is
also significant and there is some evidence of an industry effect.
The second column of Table 7 reports the results of the logistic regression for a
comparison ofADR and OTC/144a firms. The variables do not improve the classification
compared to the naive hypothesis that all sample firms are ADR firms (concordant
percentage, 72.6, naive percentage of 73.1). Importantly, the LEVERAGE variable is not
'^ We also performed stepwise logistic regressions using various combinations of variables fi^om Table 4
without any improvement in results.
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significant. This suggests that these two groups are very similar in terms of the
characteristics that we investigate.
The third column of Table 7 reports the results of a comparison of OTC/144a firms with
NCL firms. Compared to a naive hypothesis that all sample firms are OTC/144a firms (47/
108=43.52%), the concordant percentage of 89.5% shows the model is very effective in
distinguishing between the two groups. Again, the most highly significant variable is
LEVERAGE, followed by REVRATIO. All other variables add classificatory power
except for GROWTH.
Overall, these results support our first and second hypotheses that ADR firms are more
capital-constrained (levered) than NCL firms and they exhibit weaker financial perform-
ance after cross-listing.
5.6. Value-relevance hypothesis
The final analyses investigate whether there are differential associations between
accounting information and stock prices for ADR firms, which, due to cross-listing, may
operate in a different information environment than NCL firms. Our tests are based on
standard regressions of accounting book value (BVS) and earnings (EPS) on market value
of equity (MVS) as in Amir et al. (1993).^° In Table 8, we present both individual-year and
pooled (1995-1999) results for the ADR, OTC/144a and NCL samples."'
While we report results for all three groups, we focus primarily on the NCL and ADR
comparisons here. Table 8 provides evidence of a significant difference in the explanatory
power of the accounting variables for the two groups."" The pooled, adjusted R~ for the
ADR sample in Panel A is 0.71 and individual-year 7?"s range from 0.55 to 0.88. In
contrast, the adjusted R~ for the pooled NCL sample in Panel C is essentially zero, and
only in 1 year, 1995, is there evidence of explanatory power on a par with the ADR
group. "^ Both BVS and EPS are significant in the pooled regression for the ADR group.
BVS for the ADR group is also highly significant in all of the individual regressions, while
EPS is only significant in 1997. The anomalous result for the NCL sample is the highly
significant result for 1995 and the corresponding low explanatory power for the other 4
24
years.
We also estimate pooled regression results for separate Level 2 ADR, Level 3 ADR,
OTC, and 144a samples (untabulated). The results are interesting. There is significant
explanatory power (adjusted R~ of 0.63) for BVS for the 144a group; however, the result is
based on only 14 observafions. For the OTC group, the adjusted R~ is 0.44, and both BVS
and EPS are significant. We find the strongest results for the Level 2 ADR group (adjusted
R~ of 0.83) where both BVS and EPS are significant. Finally, the adjusted R^ for the Level
The results are the same whether MVS is measured at December 3 1 or March 3 1
.
Correlation analyses for both pooled samples indicate significant associations among all the accounting and
narket variables and no significant association with the time period (year).
We estimated F-statistics for comparing nested regression models and found that, except in 1995, the
idjusted R~ is significantly higher in the ADR sample estimation.
Again, we caution that individual-year regressions, particularly as reported in Panels B and C, are for
xtremely small samples.
However, this anomaly results from a regression with only eight observations.
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Table 8
Relation between annual stock prices and summary financial-statement measures^
MVS„ = 70 + -/lEPS,, + y.BVS,, + £„
Variable Coefficient Pooled 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Panel A: ADR sample
Obs
Intercept >'o
EPS y,
BVS 72
Adjusted R'
Panel B: OTC and 144a sample
Obs
Intercept yo
EPS 7,
BVS 72
Adjusted R'
Panel C: Non-cross-listed sample
Obs
Intercept yo
EPS 7,
BVS 72
Adjusted R~
MVS=December 31 price, BVS=Book value per share, and EPS=Net income per share. T-statistics are in
parentheses. Statistically significant coefficients (two-tailed test) are denoted by: ***less than 0.01, **less than
0.05, *less than 0.10.
^ Each estimated coefficient is expected to be positive.
3 ADRs is 0.65, but only BVS is significant. These results support the third hypothesis that
ADR (and OTC/ 144a) firms' accounting information is more highly associated with stock
prices than that of NCL firms.
5.7. Sensitivity analysis: quality of earnings
So far, we have provided consistent evidence that Mexican NCL firms are financially
stronger than ADR firms, based on the measures we examine. However, Lang et al. (2003)
find evidence of greater income-smoothing behavior by NCL firms. The authors' results
are for data pooled over 26 countries. In the case of Mexico, there is also reason to expect
greater smoothing behavior on the part of NCL firms due to the belief that domestic
regulatory control may not be very effective.
132 21 22 24 28 29
2.69 3.91 3.84 1.52 2.41 1.11
(2.42)** (1.76)* (1.72)* (1.19) (1.47) (0.55)
2.71 12.63 5.28 4.40 3.01 -9.80
(1.66)* (1.39) (0.93) (2.98)** (0.62) (-1.41)
5.98 4.39 3.94 8.28 4.54 7.53
(15.49)*** (4.07)*** (2.86)** (12.44)*** (5.95)*** (5.28)***
0.71 0.69 0.60 0.88 0.55 0.64
47 2 6 10 13 12
9.11 NA 16.21 9.78 10.39 3.34
(3.96)*** (2.27)* (2.65)** (2.79)** (0.97)
30.45 NA 131.43 67.09 50.02 66.81
(4.13)*** (1.26) (4.07)*** (2.83)** (3.96)***
3.66 NA -29.10 -3.42 1.29 -1.63
(2.61)** (-1.09) (-0.97) (0.62) (0.72)
0.61 NA 0.24 0.83 0.47 0.83
ole
71 8 16 16 14 13
13.49 -1.94 15.41 12.36 13.19 19.35
(5.88)*** (-1.02) (2.52)** (2.40)** (2.12)** (3.43)**
-2.76 12.75 2.79 -25.90 78.12 29.24
(-0.36) (1.43) (0.16) (-1.38) (1.12) (0.53)
0.74 12.57 -0.35 4.52 -14.56 -6.15
(0.48) (3.99)** (-0.13) (1.19) (-0.94) (-0.83)
NA 0.91 NA NA 0.05 NA
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In Table 9, we summarize the results of smoothing tests based on relations between the
cash flow and accrual components of earnings. First, in Panel A, note that the variability of
accruals and cash flows from operations is always nominally greatest for the ADR firnis in
comparison with the other two groups. Particularly in the case of cash flow from
operations, the greater variability may indicate that Mexican ADR firms are riskier than
Mexican NCL firms. Ceteris paribus, the NCL firms should exhibit smoother earnings
than the ADR firms. Thus, evidence indicating a difference in smoothing measures
between the groups is not necessarily indicative of a difference in the quality of earnings.
Finally, these tests provide additional support for our financial-performance analyses since
the mean and median cash flows from operations are significantly lower for the ADR firms
in comparison with the other groups.
In Panel B of Table 9, we present the results of correlation tests between accruals and
cash flows for the two groups. As in Lang et al. (2003), a more negative cash flow/
accrual correlation is indicative of earnings management in the sense of using accruals to
Table 9
Quality of earnings analysis
Panel A: Descriptive statistics^
Variable A'' Non-cross-listed firms N OTC and 144a firms A^
Mean S.D. Median
Exchange-listed ADR firms
Mean S.D. Median Mean S.D. Median
Accruals 73 -0.037 0.054 -0.040 47
Cashflows 73 0.118 0.052 0.130 47
from Ops
-0.020 0.076
0.095 0.080
-0.033 135
0.110 135
-0.043
0.080
0.102
0.111
-0.035
0.078
Panel B: T and Z statistics fi-om comparisons of mean and median differences
Variable Non-cross-listed firms vs.
exchange-listed ADRs
OTC and 144a firms vs.
exchange-listed ADRs
Mean Median
Non-cross-hsted firms vs.
OTC and 144 A firms
Mean Median Mean Median
Accruals
Cash flows
0.44 -0.13
2.79*** 4.08"""
1.46 0.86
0.87 2.13""
-1.54 0.85
1.91*
-1.26
Panel C: Spearman correlations among cash flows and accruals (1995-1999)''
Group Coefficient Z-statistic (p-value)
Non-cross-listed firms
Exchange-listed firms
OTC and 144a firms
Exchange-listed firms
Non-cross-listed fimis
OTC and 144a firms
Variable definitions
-0.75
-0.54
-0.67
-0.54
-0.75
-0.67
-1.92(0.05)
0.24(0.81)
1.37 (0.17)
Accruals
Cash flows fi-om
operations
The difference between net income and cash flows Irom operations scaled by total assets
Net operating cash flows scaled by total assets
a *** ** *^###.#«.#j j^^ jg^j ^j-jj^g i^ggj^ (median) difference is statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10%
level, respectively, two-tailed, based on a r-test (Wilcoxon Rank sum test).
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smooth variability in cash flows. We find that the correlation between cash flows and
accruals is significantly more negative for NCL firms than for ADR firms. The
differences for the ADR versus OTC/144a and NCL versus OTC/144a comparisons are
not significant.
In untabulated results, we also examine the fi'equency distributions of earnings to assess
the fi'equency of small, positive earnings for the two groups as in Burgstahler and Dichev
(1997). There is no evidence of any difference in the distribution of small positive earnings
between the groups. This result is contrary to the results for Lang et al. (2003) as expressed
in hypothesis four. Taken together, these results suggest that the differences in financial
characteristics we observe are probably not an artifact of accounting.
In summary, our tests of various financial characteristics indicate that Mexican ADR
firms are more highly levered and that they have raised significantly more capital in the
United States than non-exchange-listed firms. Further, the results indicate that, after cross-
listing, Mexican ADR firms are financially weaker than NCL firms. While there is some
(weak) evidence that reported eamings for NCL firms are smoother than reported eamings
for ADR firms, it is more likely that such differences reflect real differences in economic
performance (e.g., lower mean and higher variability of cash flows for ADR firms) rather
than differences in the prevalence of eamings management for the two groups.
6. Conclusion
This paper examines the characteristics of Mexican companies that cross-list their
securities in the United States. It has been suggested that the SEC disclosure requirements
serve the purpose of restricting the access of weaker foreign companies to U.S. capital
markets. However, we provide evidence that Mexican ADR firms exhibit weaker financial
performance than non-cross-listed (NCL) firms. For example, we document a high
percentage of negative eamings observations for ADR firms and relatively few negative
eamings numbers for NCL firms. Additionally, our comparisons of Mexican ADR and
NCL companies indicate that ADR firms are more highly levered than non-cross-listed
(NCL) companies and we document the significant amount of equity capital they have
raised in the United States in an attempt to loosen capital constraints. Logistic regression
models using financial variables as inputs are highly significant in correctly classifying
ADR and NCL firms. The results indicate that the substantially higher leverage for ADR
firms is an important financial characteristic that differentiates the two groups. Finally, we
test the relative quality of financial-statement numbers for ADR and NCL firms, and
conclude that accounting-quality differences do not explain the differences in financial
performance.
We also hypothesized that financial disclosures for Mexican ADR firms will be more
value relevant than for NCL firms. Our regressions of share price on book value per share
and eamings per share reveal significant explanatory power for the ADR firms and
generally insignificant results for NCL firms. The results indicate that financial statements
are value relevant for ADR investors, but not for investors in Mexican companies that do
not cross-list in the United States. The results may indicate that the SEC regulations add
credibility to the fmancial statements of ADR firms. In contrast, the lack of value
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relevance of financial statements for NCL firms may be indicative of market inefficiency
(e.g., insider trading) in the Mexican market as suggested by Bhattacharya et al. (2000).
The results from our research underscore the importance of focusing on a single country
where market institutions and corporate-governance mechanisms can be carefully
considered. Our focus on a single country is also important due to the tendency of
previous studies to generalize based on multi-country samples, particularly samples
dominated by Australian, Canadian, and U.K. firms. Of course, the benefits of our single
country, Mexican market focus are offset somewhat by data limitations and constraints
fi-om working with relatively small samples.
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Discussion of "The financial performance, capital
constraints and information environment of
cross-listed firms: Evidence from Mexico"
Irene Karamanou
University of Cyprus, Cyprus
1. Introduction
The paper by Davis-Friday, Frecka and Rivera (2005) provides new evidence regarding
Mexican firms cross-Usted in the United States (CL) as Level 2 and Level 3 ADRs (i.e.,
exchange-listed ADRs). The paper's main research question is to examine whether there
are systematic differences between the pre- and post-listing performance and capital
structure of Mexican firms choosing to list on a United States stock exchange and non-
cross-listed Mexican firms that were nevertheless eligible to list (NCL).
The paper identifies three major reasons why looking at Mexican CL vs. NCL firms
is important. First, Mexico represents one of the largest United States trading partners.
Second, Mexican accounting rules and corporate environment differ substantially from
those in the United States. Third, even though Lang, Raedy, and Yetman (2003) compare
CL to NCL firms in terms of accounting quality, Mexican firms are not included in their
sample.
The authors develop three hypotheses. First, they expect that CL firms will be more
capital constrained than NCL firms and this will force them to cross-list to raise equity
capital. Second, they expect that CL firms will exhibit poorer performance after the
cross-listing relative to NCL firms and relative to their own performance prior to the
listing. They base this expectation on research showing that return performance
decreases, on average, after the listing (Errunza & Miller, 2003). Their final hypothesis
states that CL firms are expected to have greater accounting relevance after the cross-
listing relative to NCL firms. In general their results support all three hypotheses.
I0020-7063/S30.00 © 2005 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
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The paper is well motivated and addresses a very important question with policy
implications regarding the ongoing debate about United States foreign-listing policy. My
discussion will focus mainly on the hypotheses and results.
Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis one states that ADR firms have greater pre-listing leverage
compared to NCL firms.
Even though the hypothesis is well supported the method used to test it can be
improved in a number of ways. The hypothesis assumes that, given that ADR firms are
highly levered, they cross-list in the United States to raise capital. So if raising capital is
an important factor in the decision to cross-list then why do firms list as Level 2 ADRs,
which precludes them from publicly raising capital? To put it another way, how can we
explain the decision to cross-list based on leverage if our sample includes firms that list
in the United States without the intention of making a new public-equity issue? A
simple way to avoid this problem is to perform the analysis by splitting cross-listed
firms into two groups. Those that list with the intention of raising equity (ADR Level 3
and listings under Rule 144A) vs. those listing without this intention (Level 2 ADRs and
OTC listings).
If firms cross-list in need of new capital as evidenced by high leverage, what precludes
them from raising capital in the home market? In other words, leverage by itself can only
explain the need for additional capital. The need to raise capital in another market can only
be explained by the firni's inability to raise new equity in the home market. Thus the
authors can consider a variable that captures not only the need for new equity, but also the
need to raise equity abroad. This can be captured by the relative size of the firm in the
home market (for example the percentage of the firm's market capitalization in relation to
the capitalization of the market). The larger the relative size of the firm in the home market
the greater the need to raise capital outside the home market and, hence, the greater the
probability of cross-listing (Biddle & Saudagaran, 1989).
The authors test Hypothesis 1 using logistic regression. They break their sample in
groups of two (ADRs vs. NCL firms, ADRs vs. OTC/144A firms, and OTC/144A firms
vs. NCL firms) and explain the decision to cross-list based on a number of variables
including leverage. Conference participants suggested the use of ordinal logit to explain
the effects of leverage on the cross-listing decision through the creation of three groups:
i.e., ADRs, OTC/144A, and NCL firms (assuming that the parallel lines assumption is not
violated).
Hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 2 states that ADR firms will exhibit weaker post-listing
performance compared to NCL firms or their own performance prior to the listing.
Even though prior papers have shown that return performance is weaker after the listing
these papers based their expectations and findings on solid theoretical grounds. The paper
seems to be underplaying the importance of theory for this hypothesis. Even though results
show the return underperformance the paper would benefit fi-om a more thorough
discussion on possible causes and perhaps fiirther tests. For example, is this post-listing
return underperformance due to decreased risk (Errunza & Miller, 2000) or is it due to
poorer than expected earnings? If it is the former, is this due to increased information
(Botosan, 1997) or market segmentation/risk sharing effects (Foerster & Karolyi, 1999)?
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The paper would benefit from a more adequate development of the hypothesis and better
explanation of results.
Hypothesis 3. According to Hypothesis 3, earnings and book values explain more of the
cross-sectional variation in stock prices for ADR firnis than for NCL firms.
The authors suggest that this expectation is based on differences in financial-
reporting environments rather than the additional disclosures provided by ADR firms
since ADR firms are not required to reconcile the largest difference between Mexican
GAAP and U.S. GAAP, inflation accounting. It is quite plausible that the additional
disclosures and reconciliations that Mexican firms are required to provide may still be
important even in the absence of the inflation-adjustment given that Mexico is
classified as a country with very low disclosure levels and very high conservative
accounting practices (Radebaugh & Gray, 1997). Since Mexico and U.S. information
environments are so different, the reconciliations to U.S. GAAP could increase the
usefiilness of accounting information. In addition, measuring prices on December 31
may be exacerbating the differences between NCL and CL firms. Measuring the
association between earnings and prices on December 31 assumes that the market
anticipates the earnings information to the same degree for both CL and NCL finns. If
Mexican eamings are more difficult to predict, due to lower transparency, such an
association will be weaker for NCL firms by construction, possibly not because
eamings are less associated with prices but because prices do not incorporate the
eamings information on the measurement date. The revised version of the paper
includes a sensitivity test measuring price on March 31.
It would also be interesting to test for differences in the relevance of accounting
information between the pre- and post-listing period for the ADR sample firms. In other
words, instead of comparing the post-listing relevance of accounting infomiation of ADR
firms with NCL firms, the authors could have looked at the change in the post-listing
performance of ADR firms compared to their own performance prior to the listing. This
way firms would serve as their own control, thus alleviating self-selection issues. In
addition, the sample size would marginally improve.
2. General
In general the paper is well written and adequately motivated. The hypotheses are
: clearly stated and the method well executed. However, I think the paper's scope could
have been expanded. For example the authors could have looked at the issue of Mexican
firm cross-listings from two angles. First, they could have expanded the scope of
Hypothesis 1 by looking at the determinants of the decision to cross-list by including
explanatory variables other than just leverage. These could include, for example, the size
of the firm relative to the domestic market, the importance of the U.S. product market, the
percentage of shares held by U.S. investors, the intention to get involved in M&A activity,
etc. Second, the authors could have looked at the effects of cross-listing (Hypotheses 2 and
3) by performing longitudinal analysis on perfomiance, relevance of accounting
information, and perhaps cost of capital and liquidity effects.
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performance, capital constraints and information
environment of cross-listed firms:
Evidence from Mexico"
Paquita Y. Davis-Friday*, Thomas J. Frecka, Juan M. Rivera
1. Introduction
We thank the discussant for her comments. We beheve that where possible we have
addressed them in the revised version of the manuscript and we beheve they have
improved the document. The comments focus primarily on our hypotheses and results and
we provide responses to them in that order.
2. Hypotheses
The discussant notes that Hypothesis 1 assumes that given that ADR firms are highly
levered they cross list in the United States to raise capital. She suggests that if raising
capital is an important factor in the decision to cross list then firms should list as Level 3
ADRs, as opposed to Level 2, which would allow them to raise capital publicly. She,
therefore, suggests that we should compare firms that list with the intention of raising
equity (ADR Level 3 and listings under Rule 144A) to those listing without this intention
(Level 2 ADRs and OTC listings).
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 574 631 7628; fax: +1 574 631 5255.
E-mail address: pfriday@nd.edu (P.Y. Davis-Friday).
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We explain that while it is true that the majority of capital raised is by Level 3 ADR
finns, the other cross-listed firms are able to raise capital through private placements.
Additionally, we identify five firms that shift from Level 1 to Level 2 or 3, which would
suggest that they do intend eventually to raise capital. Finally, the descriptive statistics
from individual groups (NCL, 144A, OTC, Level 2 and Level 3) indicate that the OTC
firms are most like 144A firms and Level 2 and 3 firms are most similar. Therefore, we
behave that the current groupings provide the most powerful setting for our tests.
The discussant asks if firms in need of new capital, as evidenced by high leverage, cross
list, what precludes them from raising capital in the home market? She suggests that the
need to raise capital in another market can only be explained by the firm's inability to raise
new equity in the home market. Therefore, as she suggests, we attempt to assess the need
to raise equity abroad by examining a variable that measures the relative size of the firm in
the home market (the percentage of the firm's market capitalization in relation to the
capitalization of the domestic market as in Biddle and Saudagaran, 1991).
Variable Non-cross-listed firms vs. Non-cross-listed firms vs. OTC and 144A firms vs.
OTC and 144 A firms'" exchange-listed ADRs" exchange-listed ADRs^
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Relative size *-1.91 1.23 0.89 ""2.13 **2.36 "''*3.25
The results indicate that OTC and 144a firms on average represent significantly larger
portions of the domestic market cap than non-cross-listed firms while exchange-listed
ADRs are not significantly different from non-cross-listed firms and have relative sizes
that are significantly smaller than OTC and 144a firms. This would suggest that the most
capital-constrained firms are those that seek capital over-the-counter and through private
placements.
The discussant and conference participants suggested the use of ordinal logit to explain
the effects of leverage on the cross-listing decision through the creation of three groups:
i.e., ADRs, OTC/ 144A, and NCL firms (assuming that the parallel-lines assumption is not
violated).
The results from the ordered logit simply capture the shift in intercept across the three
groups and the intercepts differ significantly according to the expected ordering: NCL,
OTC/144A, and ADR. The results also indicate that size (market value of equity or
relative size), industry, and ROE are the most important determinants of the ordering.
When ROA is used instead of ROE, the leverage variable becomes significant while
ROA is not.
3. Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 states that ADR firms will exhibit weaker post-listing performance
compared to NCL firms or their own performance prior to the listing. The discussant
suggests that the paper seems to underemphasize the importance of theory for this
hypothesis. She suggests that we provide a more thorough discussion on possible causes
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and perhaps conduct further tests. We reviewed the suggested hterature and included an
additional discussion of Errunza and Miller (2000) in Section 4.1 of the paper.
4. Hypothesis 3
The discussant suggests that the expectation that earnings and book values explain
more of the cross-sectional variation in stock prices for ADR (i.e., CL) firms than for
NCL firms is based on differences in financial-reporting environments rather than the
additional disclosures provided by ADR firms, since ADR firms are not required to
reconcile the largest difference between Mexican GAAP and U.S. GAAP, inflation
accounting.
The discussant suggests that it would also be interesting to test for differences in the
relevance of accounting information between the pre- and post-listing period for the ADR
sample firms so that firms would serve as their own control, alleviating self-selection
issues.
While we agree with the discussant that the more direct way to examine the effect of the
information environment on the value relevance of ADR firms' accounting information is
to examine the relation between earnings and book values and stock prices before and after
cross listing, we are constrained by the lack of data in the pre-cross-listing condition. For
example, the analyses in Table 5 provide univariate statistics for exchange-listed ADR
firms before and after cross-listing. The number of firm-year observations ranges from 26
to 30. Regression results based on such data could only be viewed as descriptive.
However, the results indicate that the relation between ADR book values and eamings is
stronger after the firms cross list. The adjusted R" values increase abnost monotonically as
the firms approach cross-listing and are significantly larger after cross listing.
5. General
The discussant suggests that the paper's scope could have been expanded to look at the
issue of Mexican firms' cross-listings from two additional perspectives. First, the
determinants of the decision to cross list could have included explanatory variables in
addition to leverage—for example, the size of the firm relative to the domestic market, the
importance of the US product market, the percentage of shares held by US investors, the
intention to get involved in M and A activity, etc. Second, the effects of cross listing
(Hypotheses 2 and 3) could have been eliminated by performing longitudinal analysis on
performance, relevance of accounting information, and perhaps cost of capital and
liquidity effects.
Since our primary objective has been to investigate whether the ex post performance of
Mexican cross-listed firms, based on accounting analysis, is consistent with the
underperformance results documented in a variety of domestic and global offering/
multi-country research studies, data availability prevents us from doing large sample
before-and-after cross-listing tests (refer to the discussion related to Hypothesis 3), so
instead we do a comparison of the performance of cross-listed versus non-cross-listed
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firms. The underperformance result obserxed for Mexico is consistent with the resuhs
observed in the multi-country-sample studies.
The discussant suggests that we examine additional determinants of the decision to
cross list, however, we are limited by available data. Based on the higher leverage
obser\'ed for the cross-listed sample in comparison with the non-cross-listed firms, our
results are consistent with a capital-constraint hypothesis. Our proxies for two additional
determinants suggested by the discussant - relative size of the domestic market and
importance of the US product market - were not significant in our tests. As far as we have
been able to determine, data on percentage of shares held by US investors and indicators of
"intention to get involved in M and A activity are not available."
Finally, the discussant suggests that further longitudinal analysis of a variety of
variables could have been performed. Again, we are constrained by the lack of available
data and we are hesitant to draw conclusions fi-om very small samples.
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Abstract
Barter, which has dominated the Russian economic landscape for years, has significant
economic and accounting implications. Barter often camouflages Russian businesses' financial and
tax statements making true costs, prices, values, and profits a mystery, thereby compromising
financial-statement transparency. Contemporary literature suggests that barter is still rampant in
Russia.
For this study a group of Russian businesspersons were asked to complete a survey regarding the
levels of barter in Russia since 1996. The empirical evidence we collected provides insight into
recent trends in barter in Russia, including indication that the incidence of barter has dramatically
decreased. These findings have significant implications for Russian business and economic
development. A reduction in barter is likely to enhance financial-statement transparency, thus
minimizing information risk for potential investors and creditors.
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1. Introduction, motivation and purpose
Barter has dominated Russia's economic landscape for years and has significant
imphcations for the country's future economic development and its ability to attract
foreign investment (Aukutsionek, 1998; Goldman, 1998; Makarov & Kleiner, 2000;
Mardak, 2002; Van Schaik, 1998). Barter significantly affects and distorts the aggregate
Russian economy. For example, barter embellishes prices, costs, and wages, impelling a
cashless virtual economy (Brady, 1999; Ericson, 1999; Ericson & Ickes, 2001; Gaddy &
Ickes, 1998a; Lindberg, 2002). Barter can be a detriment to the forces of supply and
demand, and can create higher transaction costs (Commander, Dolinskaya, & Mumssen,
2000) while eroding the equilibrium pricing structure (Baneijee & Maskin, 1996;
Yakovlev, 2000). Barter creates a barrier to exit for inefficient organizations by
discouraging enterprise restructuring (Brady, 1999; lakovlev, 2000; Ramey, 1992), by
weakening enterprise competition, and can also lead to declines in output (Kim & Pirttila,
2004).
Barter is an accounting issue as well as an economic one. In the United States, APB
Opinion No. 29 recognized the valuation and reporting problems related to such
"nonmonetary transactions" (Accounting Principles Board, 1973). Without cash, barter
transactions are easily hidden from view. Networking inherent in barter negotiation
obfuscates market values (Enthoven, 1999; Ericson, 1999), hindering the ability of firms to
measure their true costs and profitability because of misleading numbers (Bush, 1998;
Enthoven, 1999; Ericson, 1999). Furthermore, barter clouds the financial position of a
business, making it harder for investors and creditors to screen and investigate efficiently
(Commander, 1999). Barter also increases risk for foreign investors by hindering time-
series and cross-sectional analyses (Coker, 1999b; Coyle & Platonov, 1998; Enthoven,
1999; Higgins, 1998; Lindberg, Lindberg, & Razaki, 2000) and complicates internal and
extemal monitoring of managers in particular and corporate governance in general by
reducing accounting transparency (Commander, 1999; Defond & Hung, 2004; Guriev,
" While this manuscript defines barter as direct or commodity (pure) barter, some researchers utilize the term
more broadly. Three definitions and related descriptions of barter and non-monetary exchange include (1) direct
barter, (2) offsets (often called Zachety or Vzaimozachot): and (3) veksels. Lindberg (2002. p. 6) defines direct
(or coitmiodity) barter simply as ". . .an exchange of goods or services, or a settlement of an obligation, without
the use of money as either a means of payment or a unit of account." Commander et al. (2000. p. 3) define direct
barter as follows: ".
.
.goods are exchanged for goods, either bilaterally or in chains." Commander et al. (2000,
p. 3) and Commander (1999, p. 19) state that offsets may involve exchanging debt for goods and are
commonly "used to clear transactions among groups of firms; between firms and tax authorities; between firms
and utilities or government." These non-monetary transactions may involve debt swaps and roll-overs
(Commander, 1999, p. 19). According to Lobacheva (2003), settlements involving several entities without the
use of cash are called Vzaimozachot, and this technique is often used because of general illiquidity issues. A
third, common type of non-monetary exchange in Russia involves the use of veksels. Commander (1999,
p. 19) defines veksels as promissory notes "issued by enterprises, banks or government with specific
mamrides and discount rates..." Goldman (1998) mentions that veksels are essentially lOUs from one
enterprise to another. "Like barter, the veksel is designed to fill the void caused by the unavailability of
cash, and is widely used not only by private businesses but by the government itself (Goldman, 1998, p. 219).
Additional information regarding Russian barter may be obtained from the University of Michigan's William
Davidson hisdtute website: http://www.wdi.bus.umich.edu/.
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Makarov, & Maurel, 2002). Barter is associated with Russian business tax evasion
schemes and corruption that hamper the Federation's fiscal poHcy and tax collection
system (Coker, 1999a; Enthoven, 1999; Halls, 1999; Lindberg, 2002; Moberg, 1998).
Moreover, barter distorts accounting data, which compromises internal decision making
(Commander, 1 999), and consumes tremendous amounts of managerial time to arrange
such transactions (Coyle & Platonov, 1998; Goldman, 1998).
J.J. Motivation and purpose
The preponderance of the Russian barter literature cited above suggests that barter
rapidly increased during the 1990s, and predicts that it will not diminish anytime soon. It is
noteworthy that a contrary view was presented by Russian Prime Minister Mikhail
Kasyanov in his speech made to the Duma on May 15, 2002: "If in 1999 barter was about
40% of settlements, in 2000—25 percent, in 2001— 16 percent, then in February 2002 we
reached the lowest level of I2%" (Kasyanov, 2002). Similarly, a 2001 study conducted by
the Center for Citizen Initiatives of their Russian program participants found only 20% of
those surveyed currently used barter for receiving and making payments (Center for
Citizen Initiatives, 2001).
Given barter's significant impact on the Russian aggregate economy, accounting
transparency, and business stakeholders, such a declining trend would signal that Russia is
indeed embracing a conventional market economy and may be poised to be an eventual
contender in the global marketplace. Since the authors are unaware of any comprehensive,
publicly available post-2000 empirical study of Russian barter that investigates the
relationship between barter and business receipts as well as payments to suppliers,
employees, and tax authorities, we are motivated to investigate barter-incidence trends in
Russia. Consequently, the purpose of this study is to empirically assess trends in Russian
barter since 1996, using data collected via a 2003 attitudinal survey of Russian
businesspersons.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. The next section presents the
literature review and hypotheses of the study followed by the method and statistical
results. The paper concludes with a discussion of implications pertaining to the empirical
findings.
2. Literature review and hypotheses development
2. J. Data and theoreticalframework to assess Russian barter trends
Data to empirically assess Russian barter generally come from two main sources,
surveys, and archival data sources such as Goskomstat or information directly derived
from business financial statements (Ivanenko & Mikheyev, 2002). Surveys provide an
advantage in assessing Russian barter trends because specific information may be directly
acquired from Russian businesspersons that is not otherwise obtainable publicly (Ivanenko
& Mikheyev, 2002). Contemporary economic theory has been used to assess Russian
barter trends, including neoclassical macroeconomics, and neoclassical microeconomics,
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as well as evolutionan.' and neo-institutional approaches (hanenko. 2003; Makarov &
Kleiner. 2000).
2.2. Why barter increased in Russia from 1992 through 1996: a threefold taxonomy
Iako\le\' (2000. p. 82) asserted that the precipitous increase of barter in Russia during
the 1990s was a function of the following three key factors: (1) scarcity' of monetary
capital; (2) tax e\asion; and (3) businesses with high fixed costs that wished to avoid
failure and restructuring. Other noteworthy scholars of Russian barter have suggested
similar preconditions for the pre\ alence of Russian barter, although the exact terms vary.
For example, Woodruff (1999. p. 143) espoused a "triple movemenf towards barter
composed of (1) an overall credit squeeze: (2) a way for otherwise failing firms to avoid
restructuring (due to high fixed costs) (termed "barter of the bankrupf); and (3) e\entual
government acceptance of barter through policies such as accepting in-kind payments for
tax liabilities. Lindberg (2002. p. 13) pro\ided a similar list of preconditions, including (1)
tight economic poHcy and liquidity squeeze, (2) tax evasion, and (3) delayed restructuring
(fixed costs). Commander et al. (2000. p. 5) enumerated four explanations for the abrupt
1990s increase in Russian barter: (1) liquidity and credit squeeze; (2) implicit
governmental subsidies such as accepting in-kind payments for tax which reduced the
pressure to restructure business; (3) rent seeking made possible by lack of financial
transparency which fostered tax evasion; and (4) historical bartering relationships that
dated to Soviet times.
Because each of the above preconditions for barter may be loosely categorized using
lakovlev's (2000) three broad and parsimonious classifications, this review of literature is
also organized using this threefold taxonomy. We will first assess literature that addresses
the scarcity of monetary capital during Russia's early economic transition that uses a
backdrop of neoclassical macroeconomic theor\' that promulgates the "liquidity
hypothesis" (Makarov & Kleiner. 2000). Second, w^e will review neoclassical macro-
economic- and microeconomic-based studies pertaining to Russian tax evasion and in-kind
payments of tax as well as related accounting-transparency issues that spurred barter
prevalence. Thirdly, we will highlight literature based on neoclassical macro- and micro-
economic theory that discusses the fixed-cost structure of many Russian businesses that
made barter an attractive means of survival while also enabling many firms to avoid much
needed operational restructuring, which is part of the "\irtual-economy hypothesis"
(Ericson & Ickes, 2001; Guriev & Ickes, 2000; Krueger & Linz, 2002). Noteworthy
changes in these three factors during the period 1996 to 2002 will provide the basis for our
a priori hypotheses, since major political e\'ents and policy changes during this time had
significant implications for financial markets in general (Ivanenko, 2003), and for barter
activity in particular.
The literature suggests that Russian businesses were initially forced into barter in order
to sur\i\e due to an exogenous hquidit>' crisis "shock"" durmg the early to mid-1990s,
which is addressed by the "liquidity hypothesis" (lakovlev, 2000; hanenko. 2003; Linz &
Krueger. 1998: Makarov & Kleiner. 2000). Subsequently, however, scholars suggest that
barter became an endogenous deliberate-choice \ariable for firms, which partially explains
the persistence of barter beyond the initial liquidity crisis. For example, some firms
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continued to use barter because the related networking provided an institutional "support
group" that created a barter "lock-in effecf (Guriev & Ickes, 2000; Makarov & Kleiner,
2000), which was exacerbated by significant networking entry and exit costs (Ould-
Ahmed, 2003). Furthennore, the "virtual-economy hypothesis" suggested that failing,
inefficient firms in need of significant operational restructuring were not allowed to fail by
various levels of the government (Guriev & Ickes, 2000). The following sub-sections
review the three broad factors that most scholars believe explain the rapid increase in
Russian barter during the period 1992 to 1996.
2.3. Factor 1 : the scarcity of monetaiy capital (1992 to 1996)
The economic shock of attempting to shift to an open market capitalist system fi-om
communism, combined with governmental policy that tightened the money supply, limited
credit, and weakened the monetary system, plunged Russia into a vicious cycle of
nonpayment during the 1990s (Commander & Mumssen, 1998; Coyle & Platonov, 1998;
Ivanenko & Mikheyev, 2002; Knobel, 1994; Ould-Ahmed, 2003; Woodruff, 1999).
Russia's communist heritage had already institutionalized barter in Russian businesses as a
means of achieving Soviet targets, while the lack of cash exacerbated barter's hold on the
country (Ericson & Ickes, 2001; Makarov & Kleiner, 2000). Russian barter increased in
the post-Soviet era because of a fragile monetary system (Yakovlev, 2000). "(T)he mass
borrowing of the government again artificially increased the demand for monetary capital,
increased its opportunity cost, and made the repayment of monetary working capital to the
real sector inefficient for production enterprises" (lakovlev, 2000, p. 89). Mounting debts
encouraged offset operations, which added to the growth of non-monetary transactions
(Commander et al., 2000).
Generally, the banking system was underdeveloped and lacked financial transparency
(lakovlev, 2000; Kim & Pirttila, 2004). Lending by banks in the private sector declined
sharply in the 1990s, causing a credit squeeze that essentially forced companies to use
barter due to the tight money supply and associated liquidity constraints (Commander,
1999; Linz & Krueger, 1998). The lack of cash in Russia (Commander et al., 2000;
Grimond, 1997; Van Schaik, 1998), due to poor monetization and unavailable credit,
forced Russian businesses to engage in self-financing techniques that increased barter,
offsets, and the use of veksel promissory notes (Ericson, 2000; Gedeon, 2000; Woodruff,
1999). Scholars have termed this general state of affairs as the "liquidity hypothesis" (Linz
& Krueger, 1998; Makarov & Kleiner, 2000). More companies engaged in barter over time
because of this scarcity of cash, leaving most companies unable to pay even their workers
in rubles. Additionally, hyperinflation caused a lack of faith in the mble (Lindberg, 2002;
Woodruff, 1999).
2.4. Factor 2: tax evasion, in-kind payments of tax, and accounting transparency (1992 to
1996)
Barter compromised tax accounting in Russia and often surfaced as a means of tax
evasion (Coker, 1999a; Enthoven, 1999; Halls, 1999; Hendley, Ickes, Murrell, &
Ryterman, 1997; lakovlev, 2000; Lindberg et al., 2000), which included schemes
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involving hidden or "black cash" and sham companies (Yakovlev, 2001). Goldman (1998,
p. 217) noted widespread tax evasion: ". . .out of 2.7 million companies that should pay
taxes, 33 percent neither paid taxes nor filed tax declarations." Goldman (1998, p. 217)
added, "Of those that did pay taxes, one third used barter as a form of mutual settlements,"
which signaled that even the Russian government used barter extensively in its own
transactions.
Barter and related non-monetary settlement forms were essentially encouraged by local
and central govemments because tax authorities and public utilities regularly accepted
payments in-kind (Commander et al., 2000). In a related vein, "the state's reluctance to
enforce timely cash payments for tax and utility, in part motivated by an unwillingness to
let poorly performing firms fail, is central to understanding the growth and persistence of
non-monetary forms of payments in Russia" (Commander, 1999, p. 20). This central
government capitulation corresponded with Woodruffs (1999) third stage of Russia's
triple movement towards a barter economy, and marks a distinct contrast with the Russian
government's initial fight against barter during the early 1990s. Barter accounted for at
least 40% of Russia's national tax payments towards the end of the 1990s (Lindberg et al.,
2000, p. 157).
The onerous Russian tax system caused more businesses to use barter in order to evade
a taxation system that most businesspersons considered arbitrary and grossly unfair
(Black, Kraakman, & Tarassova, 2000; Woodruff, 1999). Lindberg (2002) and Linz (1996)
concurred, noting that if firms actually paid all their state and local taxes they would likely
owe more than two-thirds of total revenues (as opposed to total profits). The high levels of
tax, the number of taxes, and the draconian enforcement policies utilized by the tax police
are well-documented atrocities associated with the Russian business climate of the 1990s
(Fleischman & Herz, 2002; Ivanenko, 2003). Because of this onerous tax system, business
resorted to barter in order to survive (Gaddy & Ickes, 1998a). In short, Moberg (1998)
argued that the tax problems in Russia's barter economy of the 1990s were worse than
Russia's problem with crime and gang corruption. A corrupt legal system further
stimulated barter's renaissance (Coker, 1999b).
Linz and Krueger (1998) noted that financial transparency in Russia had been very poor
because employers were reluctant to make financial statements available at all, and if they
did, they often misrepresented the numbers. The lack of financial-statement transparency
also played a role in encouraging barter. For example, because business financial
information was so poorly disseminated and accounting standards were so lax, a situation
of widespread information asymmetry arose where a business could promote apparent
illiquidity even when ample cash existed in order to obtain barter exchange rather than
having to transact in scarce cash (Guriev & Ickes, 2000). The lack of financial
transparency fostered a lack of investor control over managers and thus compromised
corporate governance (Guriev et al., 2002; Kim & Pirttila, 2004). This lack of financial-
statement transparency inherent in barter enabled rent-seeking behaviors by managers and
state bureaucrats which fostered "tax evasion and overpricing of goods in procurement, as
well as distortions in the federal revenue-sharing system" (Commander et al., 2000, p. 5).
This lack of transparency effectuated what Brady (1999), Ericson (1999), Gaddy and Ickes
(1998a), and Lindberg (2002) referred to as the Russian virtual economy since it lacked
validity in the sense that barter essentially overstated prices, sales, and wages. Barter also
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created opportunities to impair corporate governance through fraud, which ftirther
compromised pubhc capital markets (Black et al, 2000).
2.5. Factor 3: fixed costs and avoidance of operational restructuring (1992 to 1996)
Ideally, inefficient, unprofitable manufacturing firms will be encouraged by market
forces to engage in cost cutting and operational restructuring of fixed plant and
equipment through replacement and reinvestment which is deemed to be a key
ingredient to firm survival (Linz, 1996) and enhances the pace of transition and related
economic growth (Krueger & Linz, 2002). If such failing firms are unable to
restructure in order to become more competitive, they likely will fail due to eventual
financial collapse. However, the "virtual-economy hypothesis" (Ericson & Ickes, 2001;
Krueger & Linz, 2002) partially explains why barter permitted many firms in Russia to
avoid restructuring during the 1990s. For example, the second stage of Woodruff's
(1999, pp. 113-114) triple movement to a barter economy essentially described this
virtual-economy hypothesis which he termed the "barter of the bankrupf: ". . .rather
than simply going out of existence, enterprises were able to convince key suppliers to
accept payment in kind at effectively lower prices." Woodruff's (1999, p. 119) noted
that local officials exacerbated the situation because they did not want firms to fail in
their region because of the possibility of massive unemployment and related economic
effects. Brady (1999, pp. 30-31) described industry's reaction to the Russian
government's planned "painful restructuring of industry": ". . .most factories hardly
changed their behavior. . .producing and shipping as they always had. . .[and] made no
effort to cut costs."
lakovlev (2000) argued that this economic phenomenon occurred in the Federation
because many large Russian enterprises had a nontraditional cost structure (inherited from
Soviet times) for a developed market economy because their fixed costs were unusually
high. These fixed costs included maintenance of the social infrastructure, surplus
equipment, production spaces, and even surplus labor (lakovlev, 2000, p. 82).
Maintenance of the social infrastructure could include payoffs associated with corruption
(Brady, 1999) in order to increase relational capital with local government officials
(Guriev & Ickes, 2000).
"The 'fixed' nature of these costs was in practice only a condition of a series of
historically extant institutional limitations (the absence of a market for real estate and
capital goods; the lack of development of the manpower market; the limitations on the sale
of equipment at prices less than balance sheet value, etc.)" (lakovlev, 2000, pp. 82-83).
Therefore, there was not a positive link between costs and output, but rather an "atypical
U-shape" with respect to average unit costs and output, which essentially created a barrier
to exit for these inefficient firms (Guriev & Ickes, 2000; lakovlev, 2000, p. 83). Indeed, a
decline in production below a certain level led to an increase (rather than decrease) in
average costs and there was also no compensation of a price increase for products sold
(because of limited supply) due to the absence of a true market (Ivanenko & Mikheyev,
2002). These inefficient firms were thus able to survive via barter exchanges that were
possible because of long-established internal markets due to networking arrangements
(Commander et al., 2000), including the support of the local government that permitted
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enterprises to save face and avoid much-needed restructuring in return for their own
support of local officials (Brady, 1999).
In the virtual economy, businesses needed cash primarily to pay their workers (Brady,
1999). Russian businesses generally did not consider firing employees during difficult
economic times or when excess business capacity existed due to declining demand, which
rendered labor an essentially y?xe^ cost (see, e.g., lakovlev, 2000). For example, Russian
businesses employed far more workers than was warranted by their output and labor in
general exhibited low labor elasticities (Gaddy & Ickes, 1998b; Linz, 1996, 2002). During
the early to mid-1990s, Russian businesses did not have the liquidity to pay their
employees in rubles, so they resorted to barter as a means of paying in-kind wages. For
example, a logging company paid its lumberjacks in tampons in the early 1990s (Knobel,
1994) while some Russian citizens paid for their coal with cars, office fiimiture, or holiday
packages (Grimond, 1997). Workers who were paid in non-monetary commodities found it
that much more difficult to leave the region, which eliminated their outside options
(Friebel & Guriev, 1999).
2.6. Estimates of trends in Russian barter prevalence. 1992 to 2002
The above discussion highlights that most scholars agree barter gradually increased
during the 1990s for the multitude of reasons presented. Table 1 presents a summary of
Russian barter literature that explicitly offers estimates of the percentage of business
transactions that involved barter since 1992, including the recent information that Prime
Minister Mikhail Kasyanov mentioned in his speech to the Duma on May 15, 2002
(alluded to earlier regarding this manuscript's motivation). For purposes of comparison
and parsimony, estimated barter percentages obtained fi^om five interviews of prominent
Russian businesspersons conducted by the authors in 2003 are also presented in the
table.
All the studies listed in Table 1 pertaining to the preceding literature review highlighted
that barter either increased during the 1 990s or was at least a very significant percentage
during that time. Few studies, however, presented barter estimates for years after 1999.
The estimates of barter obtained from the 2003 interviews, along with the data from the
CCI survey and the Kasyanov speech, however, suggested that barter started to decline in
1998, and continued to decline through the last year of the study, 2002.
2.7. Development of hypotheses
As enumerated in the above literature review, lakovlev (2000, p. 82) asserted that the
precipitous increase of barter in Russia during the 1990s was a fiinction of the following
key factors: (1) scarcity of monetary capital; (2) tax evasion; and (3) businesses with high
fixed costs.
Conversely, if some or all of these key preconditions to barter prevalence reversed in
later years, one would expect barter to decrease correspondingly. This section summarizes
changes that occurred in Russia during the period 1996 to 2002 pertaining to each of these
three key categories that should suggest that barter in Russia likely decreased during these
years, probably after peaking in 1998 (Ivanenko & Mikheyev, 2002).
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Table 1
Approximate Russian barter trends: 1992 through 2002
CITEA'EAR Basis
for
measure^
1992-
1994
1995 1996 1997 Late 1999
1990s;
1998
2000 2001 2002
Literature review
Hendley et al. A 5% 40%
(1997 p. 34)
Goldman B 70-80%
(1998 p. 218)
Van Schaik B 50%
(1998 p. 2)
Bush (1998 p. 32) A 40^5%
Enthoven C 80%
(1999 p. 35)
Woodruff A 50-70%
(1999 p. 2)
Commander et al. A 10-20% 25% 40% 46% 50% 35%
(2000 p. 8)
Yakovlev A 50%
(2000 p. 279)
Lindberg et al. B 50%
(2000 p. 157)
Makarov and Kleiner D 40% 75% 90%
(2000 p. 54)
Center for Citizen B 20%
Initiatives,
(2001 p. 27)
Kasyanov B 40% 25% 16% 12%
Speech (2002)
Author inten'iews in early 2003
Barilenko and B Starting 20%
Plotnikov (2003) to decline
Knyazev (2003) B Starting
to decline
10-15%
Lobacheva (2003) B Little
in-kind
Pay
In-kind
pay now
rare
Makarov (2003) B Declining 10-15%
Zhelihovskaya B 15%
(2003)
Basis for measure: A=Barter as % of sales; B=Barter as % of all business transactions; C=Barter as % of all
transactions, includes setoffs; D=Barter as % of total production.
2.8. Changes in factor I: the availability^ of monetary capital (1996 to 2002)
Russia emerged a stronger country economically after survival of the ruble crisis of
1998. In hindsight, it appears that the policies enacted during and shortly after the ruble
crisis helped provide the "shock" that the Federation needed to re-establish itself
monetarily, and this subsequent currency stability and liquidity, spurred by an increase in
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aggregate demand (Commander et al., 2000), helped ease barter's recent stronghold on
Russian business.
Specifically, the Russian government was able to initiate more stable policies regarding
credit availability and monetization. Banks were more willing to extend credit and became
more de\'eloped by Western standards. Inflation also stabilized, which further increased faith
in the ruble. In essence. Woodruff's (1999, p. 217) prediction seemed to come true, since
".
. .Russia's chance to overcome its nonmonetary economy depends on its ability to
stabilize its monetary economy."
Additionally, Commander et al. (2000, p. 8) postulated that barter and related non-
monetary transaction incidence started to decline after the 1998 ruble crisis, as
corroborated by their estimate that the share of barter in industrial sales was about 50%
in 1998 but only about 35% a year later (see Table 1). Specifically, there was a growth in
barter transactions before the August 1998 ruble crisis and a subsequent decline thereafter
(Commander et al., 2000). This decrease can "be partly explained by liquidity conditions
in the enterprise sector: while enterprises were faced with scarce bank credit both pre- and
post-crisis, liquidity was squeezed by the decline in aggregate demand for domestic goods
before the crisis and rebounded as demand picked up after the crisis" (Commander et al.,
2000, p. 28). Ivanenko and Mikheyev (2002) asserted that it is no coincidence that non-
monetary trade has fallen in importance after the 1998 ruble crisis because the money
markets started to operate better after this significant event. "The 1998 devaluation led to
improvements in competitiveness and the liquidity position for Russian firms with a
concurrent reduction in the use of barter" (Kim & Pirttila, 2004, pp. 300-301). These
events should lead to a decrease in barter during the period 1996 to 2002.
2.9. Changes in factor 2: tax evasion, in-kind payments of tax and accounting
transparency (1996 to 2002)
In response to the high level of barter in the business community, the Russian
government addressed barter in the Tax Code as well as in the Civil and Labor Codes
during the late 1990s and early 2000s (Civil Code of the Russian Federation: Parts 1 and 2,
2001; Labor Code of the Russian Federation of 31, 2001). The country is also reforming
its accounting standards to increase financial transparency in accordance with international
accounting standards (IAS).
The Tax Code of the Russian Federation (2000) now specifies cash as the acceptable
means of settlement of tax payments as well as lien procedures for monetary accounts
(Article 45) and maps a "step-by-step" approach for collection in the event a business or
person cannot pay the entire tax obligation in cash (Articles 47 and 48). The steps begin with
cash and move to securities and non-productive property payment forms before impacting
resources necessary for the production process. The associated Tax Code instructtons now
call for the formal conversion ofsuch property to cash since barter is no longer authorized as
a means of tax settlement. The Tax Code ftirther addresses barter transactions conducted by
businesses, granting tax authorities the right to assess additional charges when barter
exchanges deviate from more than 20% of the market price (Article 40).
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In addition, the Federation radically reformed the business VAT and profits tax effective
1 January 2001 and 2002. respectively. Both taxes have been streamlined to make them
more parsimonious and the profits tax rate has been cut from 35% to 24% (Fleischman &
Herz, 2002). These business-tax changes, combined with a reform to the new 13% flat tax
for Russian individual taxpayers that became effective 1 Januar\' 2001. mark a distinct
shift from the tortured attempts at tax-revenue assessment and collection during the 1990s.
The new, reformed tax systems focus on reducing the oxerall level of the tax burden and
the sheer number of taxes that previously existed (Enthoven et al. 2001). and encouraging
more systematic and fair tax collection policies as opposed to the "fear-driven" draconian
collection procedures of the 1990s. The reformed tax and collection system is an attempt
by the Russian government to encourage transparency of tax burdens while increasing
perceptions of equity and fairness (Fleischman & Herz. 2002).
Russia is also reforming her accounting standards in order to encourage financial
transparency, consistency, and fairness. A key goal of Russia's accounting reform program
is to align Russian accounting standards (RAS) with international accounting standards
(IAS) (Enthoven et al. 2001). which should decrease information asymmetr>' (Leuz,
2003). Additionally. Russia is implementing sweeping changes to increase the integrity
and competence of its approximately 60.000 professional accountants which is necessary
to transition to IAS (Enthoven et al., 2001). In summary, these collective events should
lead to a decrease in barter during the period 1996 to 2002.
2.10. Changes in factor 3: fixed costs and avoidance ofoperational restructuring (1996 to
2002)
Decreases in barter associated with changes to factors 1 and 2 abo\e likely impact the
inherent fixed-cost nature of industrial Russia which had inad\ ertently established a
barrier to exit for unprofitable finns. For example, reduced barter incidence in Russia
should enhance the relevance of market values (Enthoven, 1999; Ericson. 1999). prices
(Banerjee & Maskin. 1996). and supply-and-demand equilibrium (Commander et al.,
2000). These trends should correspondingly lessen the former institutional-market
limitations (Iako\'lev, 2000) that had obfuscated the link between costs and output and
should reintroduce marginal profits for price increases associated \\ith limited supply
products as well as cost decreases for reductions in production. Costs that were essentially
fixed because of the former U-shaped cost-to-output relationship may now exhibit variable
cost behavior in relation to output because of this enhanced market efficiency. Ultimately,
these directions should mitigate barriers to exit and operational restructuring for failing
firms by enhancing enterprise competition and inno\ation (Brady. 1999; Commander et
al., 2000; lakovlev. 2000; Woodruff. 1999. 2000).
Labor cost has traditionally been a fixed cost for practical puiposes in Russia because
employees viewed work as a place to spend time rather than a place to be concemed with
efficiency and output (see. e.g.. Brady. 1999; lakovlev. 2000). However, labor-hiring
practices have changed in recent years in Russia and anecdotal evidence (Barilenko &
Plotnikov, 2003; Knyazev, 2003; Lobacheva, 2003; Zhelihovskaya, 2003) suggests that
many enterprises wish to hire workers who are younger than 30 because they tend to ha\e
a more westem attitude towards the relationship between work and productivity. This trend
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indicates that labor may now exhibit variable-cost tendencies, reducing the fixed-cost
nature of Russian firms that has inhibited restructuring.
In summary, it appears that Woodruff's (1999) triple movement that was a theoretical
precursor to rapid increases in Russian barter is now abruptly changing. For example,
enhanced credit and liquidity and the central govemment's recent legislative onslaught
against barter associated with in-kind tax payments and wage payments to employees^
signal that the first movement (credit squeeze or "liquidity hypothesis") and the third
movement (central government encouragement of barter) have reversed. The reintroduc-
tion of market factors described above combined with a lessening of the fixed-cost
structure also likely mitigate Woodruff's (1999) "barter of the bankrupf (second
movement) which is associated with the "virtual-economy hypothesis." Furthermore, the
central govemment's Herculean attempts to minimize barter puts added pressure on local
govemments to discontinue encouraging barter in order to sustain local failing industry.
Ultimately, it appears that inefficient, failing industrial firms will have to choose between
restructuring their operations and processes versus going out of business, since the barter
"crutch" is being removed due to enhanced market competition, changing cost structures,
and central government discouragement of non-monetary exchange.
This recent downward trend in barter incidence suggests the following hypotheses:
Hal. Barter activity in Russia decreased during 1996 to 2002.
Specifically, because of the overall downward trend in barter, we also expect that (1)
the percent of total Russian business receipts and payments (overall measure) settled by
barter have decreased during this time period. We also expect a corresponding decrease in
(2) barter as a percent of receipts from customers, as well as (3) barter as a percent of
payments to suppliers, and (4) barter as a percent of payments for equipment, because
these dealings represent the core business transactions discussed in the literature review.
We also expect on an a priori basis the following decreases during 1996 to 2002: (5) barter
as a percent of payments for employee salaries (due to changes in the labor law, added
liquidity, and aggregate demand), and (6) barter as a percent of payment for taxes (in-kind
settlements are now essentially banned by the new tax code). These contentions are
formalized as sub-hypotheses la through If:
Hal a. The percent of total Russian business receipts and payments settled by barter
decreased during the period from 1996 to 2002.
Ha lb. The percentage of receipts from customers settled by barter decreased during the
period from 1996 to 2002.
Hale. The percentage of payments to suppliers settled by barter decreased during the
period from 1996 to 2002.
Hgld. The percentage of payments for equipment settled by barter decreased during the
period from 1996 to 2002.
For example, even with employee authorization, the Labor Code (2001 ) restricts the amount of non-monetary
payment to 20% (Article 131).
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Hale. The percentage of payments of employee salaries using in-kind non-cash methods
decreased during the period from 1996 to 2002.
Half. The percentage of payments for taxes settled by barter decreased during the period
from 1996 to 2002.
Finally, because of shifts in the Russian business climate since 1999, one would expect
that the use of barter among Russian businesses may be for different reasons in 2002 as
compared to 3 years prior ( 1 999) when these above changes first started to take affect and
to be discussed and experienced by the Russian people. This contention is formalized as
follows:
Ha2. The purpose and use of barter activity in Russia has changed during the 1999 to 2002
time period.
Specifically, barter is less likely to be used to obtain a better exchange price on a sale or
purchase in 2002 as compared with 1999 because of the Russian government's explicit
discouragement of barter transactions in general. Russian businesses are also less likely to
use barter in 2002 to compensate for a lack of cash, to hide profits, or to avoid taxes as
compared with 1999. Cash and credit became more available in 1999 after the ruble crisis
of 1998, accounting standards were being transformed to make financials more
transparent, and the tax system was radically transformed in 2001 and 2002. The
following sub-hypotheses reflect these a priori contentions:
Ha2a. Russian businesses were less likely in 2002 to use barter to obtain a better exchange
price on a sale or purchase as they were in 1999.
Ha2b. Russian businesses were less likely to use barter in 2002 to compensate for a lack of
cash as compared to 1999.
Ha2c. Russian businesses were less likely to use barter in 2002 to hide profits as compared
to 1999.
Ha2d. Russian businesses were less likely to use barter in 2002 to avoid taxes as compared
to 1999.
The following section presents a summary of the study's data-collection process,
including interview and survey data-collection procedures and survey scale development,
followed by a discussion of our empirical findings. The final section of the study discusses
the implications of the results as well as the study's limitations and suggestions for future
research.
3. Method
3.1. Data collection
The authors queried opinions of Russian businesspersons about barter in Russia to test
the working hypotheses enumerated immediately above using two separate and distinct
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data-collection techniques: ( 1 ) tne prominent businesspersons were inter\ie\\'ed person-
ally by one of the authors: and (2) a short questionnaire regarding barter was used to query
99 other respondents regarding barter acti\it\' in Russia during the 1996 to 2002 time
penod. The results of the personal inter\iews are presented in Table 1."*
One of the authors, who tra\"eled to Russia, hired a Russian national certified as an
interpreter to translate the above sur\ey from English to Russian, and a number of Russian
professors and businesspersons comprehensi\"eh' re\'ie\\ed the sur\'ey for clarity and
accuracy as a pilot stud\'. Because anecdotal e\"idence suggests that Russian people are
generally skeptical after the So\"iet experience, the authors deemed it necessan." to hire four
Russian nationals with considerable business expenence and professional contacts to
personally administer the sur\'e\'s. Consequently, the four Russian suney administrators
were able to ( 1 ) explain the purpose of the sun'ey in a personable and unbiased manner to
minimize demand effects; (2) answer subjects" questions in an unbiased fashion"; (3)
encourage subjects to complete the suney; and (4) reassure respondents that their answers
were anonymous. Altogether the four nationals obtained 99 sur\"eys from Russian
businesspersons during the first 6 months of 2003.
"* The five Russian interviewees were: (1 1 Ilya Knyazev. a professional accountant in Sarotow Russia; |2)
Natalya Zhelihovskaya. a Saratov entrepreneur and small business owner: (3) Madimir Barilenko and Meter
Plotniko\': who are both professional accountants and professors at Saratov State Socio Economic University: (4)
Sergei Makarov. Professor of Civil Law at Saratov State University.'; and (5) Alina Lobacheva. an instructor and
medical doctor at the Sarotov Medical University. These five interviewees were selected because of their
prominent positions in Russian business and society. The authors believed that these key members of society
would be familiar with significant changes, if any. in the Russian barter landscape. These persons did not also
participate in the formal questioimaire.
' The Russian business people who administered the surveys for us were extensively trained to conduct
interviews in a manner that should minimize demand effects and the\' did not discuss their personal beliefs with
the subjects.
^ As mentioned in footnote 2 above, there are three key definitions of non-monetary exchange, although most of
the literature blithely assumes that Russian barter refers to non-monetan." exchanges of goods (direct or
commodity barter). Researchers who are more concerned with barter definitional nuances are usually careful to
distinguish barter fi-om offsets and \eksels. However, because the authors believed that explicitly discussing
possible definitions of barter would lengthen the time it would take for subjects to complete the questionnaire and
increase confusion, thus further comphcating the data gathering process, no explicit definition was mentioned.
Therefore, it is possible that respondents included offsets and or veksels in their personal definition of what
comprises barter when completing the survey. However, even if there was some variance in the respondent's
definitions of barter, the trend in barter over time should be robust since each respondent answered the
longitudinal questions in the survey using his her same personal classification of barter, which created a built-in
within-subject defmitional control. Therefore, the studv "s conclusions regarding overall trends in barter are not
likely to be sev erely compromised, although the absolute percentages of barter activity on a year-by-year basis
may include some business activitv' associated with offsets or veksels. necessitating interpretive caution.
The authors paid the four Russian nationals USS6 for each businessperson who completed the questionnaire.
as well as additional money for out-of-pocket items such as copying and mailing fees as well as travel and meal
costs, for a total cash outlay of approximately SI 000 US. The four nationals were encouraged to travel to different
Russian cities in order to increase the external validity of the study. Some subjects did not answer all the survey
questions because apparently they were unsure about some of the particular questions on the survev-. The surveys
were then sent back to the United States for data input and analysis.
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3.2. Sun-ex scale developineni
The authors emplo\ed a number of different scale formats when designing sur\ey
questions to quer>' respondents about their opinions regarding barter trends in Russia.
Subject responses to these questions form the basis for assessing the \ahdit>" of our
working hypotheses, which is subsequently discussed.
For Hypotheses la- If subjects were asked to specify the percentage of barter
associated with the specified barter acti\it>' pertaining to finns similar to that of the
respondent for three time periods: 1996. 1999. and 2002. The authors believed that
asking such detailed, quantitative questions would be appropriate only if they pertained
to business activity' with which the businesspersons would likely be intimately
familiar.
Initially, the authors designed the sun e\ to ask each respondent to address the le\ el
of barter '"in the firm where \"ou are employed." Howexer. during field testing it
became apparent that such a question would act as a cultural trigger and arouse
suspicion that the survey was fishing for answers for the government that could bring
trouble to the respondents" firms. The result might be refusal to participate in the
sur\"ey or deliberate falsification of infonnation. The Russians who participated in field
testing suggested changing the phrasing to ask about the level of barter "in firms
similar to yours." These Russians reasoned that the subjects would now be tmthful in
their answers but would likely still be reporting the amount of barter in their own
firms, since their own businesses would be the only organizations about wliich they
would ha\e such direct knowledge.
Finally, for Hypotheses 2a-2d. subjects were asked to e\aluate stated reasons why
Russian businesses in general use barter in 2002 versus "3 years ago" (1999) using a 7-
point Likert scale anchored by 1 (strongly disagree) and 7 (strongly agree).
4. Results
4.1. Results of the husinesspersou sun-eys
In addition to pro\iding a summan,' of barter percentages suggested in the
preceding literature re\ iew. Table 1 also pro\ides a summary' of the trend in barter
incidence suggested by the five prominent businesspersons (or group of business-
persons) inter. iewed by the authors in 2003. These inter\iews coiToborated the
generalization of a recent downward trend in barter suggested by Kasyanov (2002) in
his speech to the Duma. Knyazex (2003) and Barilenko and Plotnikov (2003) stress
that barter declined significantly after the devaluation of the rtible in 1998. Makarov
(2003) estimates that barter in Russia declined substantialK- in recent years, and
probably now comprises only 10-15% of business transactions, consistent with
Zhelihovskaya's (2003) suggestion of 15% and Barilenko and Plotnikov's (2003)
approximation of less than 20%. Lobacheva (2003) comments that in-kind wage
payments in lieu of cash declined significantly after the 1998 crash of the ruble and
are now very rare.
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4.2. Sample characteristics
Table 2 provides descriptive demographic statistics regarding the study's 99 subjects.
The average age was just over 41 and the average salary was slightly less than RUR
136,000 (approximately US$4500). Subjects on average had worked for their current
employer for about 1 1.5 years and had worked in their present occupation for abnost 15.5
years. Almost 59% of the subjects were female, and most (over 70%) were married; just
over 16% were separated or divorced. All but 5% of the respondents had graduated from
secondary school and almost 65% had some university training, while over 20% were
university graduates. All the respondents were white and almost 56% worked in
accounting/finance, while fewer than 13% were managers and 14% were marketers/
salespersons.
Table 3 provides a summary of organizational characteristics. About 35% of
respondents indicated that they worked in manufacturing/construction while another
26% noted that their industry was wholesale/retail. About 77% of respondents indicated
that they worked for businesses with fewer than 200 employees and over 85% of
respondents' firms were located in the South Volga region of Russia.
Table 2
Sample characteristics
Variable Category M SD Frequency Validity
(%)
Age 41.46 9.71
Gross salary RUR 135,817
US $4,527
185,230
$6,174
Job tenure (years) 11.56 8.00
Occupational 15.40 8.88
tenure (years)
Gender Male
Female
40
57
41.2
58.8
Marital status Single
Married
Widowed
9
69
4
9.2
70.4
4.1
Education level
Separated, divorced
Some secondary school
Graduated secondary school
Some university
16
5
63
16.3
5.2
64.9
Race
Graduated university
Some post-university or
Black
Hispanic
Oriental/Asian
White
graduate degree
20
9
99
20.6
9.3
100
Job classification Management
Marketing/sales
Accounting/Finance
Other
12
13
52
16
12.9
14.0
55.9
17.2
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Table 3
Organization ciiaracteristics
Variable Category Frequency Validity (%)
Industry classification Wholesale/retail 24 26.1
ManufacUiring construction 32 34.7
Services g 8.7
Accounting 11 12.0
Advertising and marketing research 2 2.2
Other 15 16.3
Number of employees Fewer than 1 9 9.1
10 to 29 23 23.2
30 to 49 g 8.1
50 to 99 9 9.1
100 to 199 27 27.3
200 or more 23 23.2
Geographic region Moscow 5 5.2
Saint Petersburg 1 1.0
North Volga 5 5.2
South Volga 83 85.5
Other 3 3.1
4.3. Analysis of hypotheses
Table 4 presents the results of repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) F-test
procedures to test within-subjects contrasts as well as paired /-tests relating to Hypotheses
la-lc, where subjects were asked to compare various forms of barter activity as a
percentage of overall business activity for firms similar to the respondent's during 1996,
1999. and 2002. The percent of total Russian business receipts and payments settled by
barter decreased during this time period (approximate mean percentages: 2002 M=14%;
1999 M=39%; 1996 M=62%) and all differences were statistically significant (p<.001),
providing strong support for Hypothesis la. Hypothesis lb was similarly supported, given
that respondents indicated a significant decrease (p<.00\) in the percent of receipts from
customers settled by barter (approximations: 2002 M=9-10%; 1999 M=23-26%; 1996
M=46%). The percent of payments to suppliers settled by barter also decreased {p<.00\)
(approximations: 2002 M=8-10%; 1999 M=22-26%; 1996 M=46%). which supports
working Hypotheses Ic. All repeated measures ANOVA F statistic within-subject
contrasts were significant (/7<.001), with partial eta squared explanation of variance
figures ranging from a low of .459 to a high of .815.
Table 5 provides results for Hypotheses Id-lf that are almost identical to those
contained in the previous table. The percent of payments for equipment settled by barter
(approximations: 2002 M=2%; 1999 M=10-13%; 1996 M=29%) significantly decreased
over time (/7<.001), providing substantial support for Hypotheses Id. Similarly, the
percent of payments of employee salaries and payments for taxes settled by barter
decreased substantially {p<.00\) during this time period, providing support for
Hypotheses le and If All repeated measures ANOVA F statistic within-subject contrasts
were again significant (/7<.001), with partial eta squared explanation of variance figures
ranging from a low of .257 to a high of .522.
56 G. Fleischman. P. Herz / The International Journal ofAccounting 40 (2005) 39-63
Table 4
Hypotheses la-lc paired /-tests/repeated measures ANOVA
Hypothesis pair/year M SD A^ / F Partial eta squared
Hi, la: The percent of total Russian business receipts and payments settled by barter decreased during the
periodfrom 1996 to 2002.
2002 14.34 16.08 94 17.633*** 310.925*** .770
1999 38.73 19.65 94
2002 14.38 16.49 88 19.545*** 382.021*** .815
1996 62.51 22.28 88
1999 39.25 19.90 87 12.474*** 155.602*** .644
1996 62.71 22.33 87
H^,lb: The percent ofreceiptsfrom customers settled by barter decreased during the period from 1996 to 2002.
2002 9.27 15.23 87 9.108*** 82.955*** .491
1999 23.37 22.94 87
2002 10.05 15.75 71 11.462*** 131.373*** .652
1996 46.31 32.43 71
1999 26.25 23.71 71 9.610*** 92.352*** .569
1996 46.31 32.43 71
Hale: The percent ofpayments to suppliers settled by barter decreased during the period from 1996 to 2002.
2002 8.07 16.16 89 8.644*** 74.713*** .459
1999 21.99 22.26 89
2002 9.98 18.13 67 10.071*** 101.430*** .606
1996 45.79 32.04 67
1999 25.97 23.52 68 8.123*** 65.990*** .496
1996 46.15 31.93 68
For Ha lb and Hale, respondents were asked to estimate the barter percentage associated with firms similar to
theirs while Ha I a asked for barter estimates for a typical business in Russia.
Due to surveys with some unanswered questions, matched-pairs statistics result in slightly different averages for
the same years.
*** P<001.
Table 6 summarizes the results pertaining to the four parts (Ha2a-Ha2d) of the second
hypotheses. Subjects were asked to rate their agreement/disagreement regarding four
business reasons to engage in barter using a 7-point Likert scale, and were also asked to
compare the situation in 2002 versus 3 years earlier (1999). The evidence suggests that
subjects do not believe there was any significant difference {alpha=. 10) in 2002 versus
1999 regarding the propensity to use barter to obtain a better exchange price on a sale
(2002 M=3.99; 1999 M=4.12), which is inconsistent with working Hypothesis 2a. Upon
fijrther reflection, this result should not be too surprising, since one would expect that a
firm would always try to get the best price possible even if barter were necessitated for
purposes of profit maximization. Conversely, businesses are significantly (p<.00l) less
likely to use barter in 2002 to compensate for a lack of cash as compared with 3 years
earlier (2002 M=5.02; 1999 M=6.39), which provides strong support for working
Hypothesis 2b. Neither Hypothesis 2c nor 2d were supported, however, since Russian
businesses are not significantly less likely in 2002 to use barter to either hide profits or
avoid taxes as compared with 1999. It should be noted that the negative connotation of
Hypotheses 2c and 2d, hiding profits and evading taxes, may have affected the
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Table 5
Hypotheses Id- If paired /-tests/repeated measures ANOVA
Hypothesis pair/year M SD N t F Partial eta squared
H„ld: The percent ofpayments for equipment settled by barter decreased during the periodfrom
1996 to 2002.
2002 1.76 A.ll 78 5.395*** 29.104*** .274
1999 10.27 15.31 78
2002 2.07 5.39 54 6.539*** 42.757*** .447
1996 29.00 31.18 54
1999 13.65 17.45 57 6.481*** 42.022*** .429
1996 29.23 30.82 57
Hale: The percent ofpayments of employee salaries using in-kind non-cash methods decreased during
the periodfrom 1996 to 2002.
2002 4.22 11.10 87 6.951*** 48.314*** .360
1999
2002 4.55 11.66 78 9.178*** 84.231*** .52:
1996
1999 16.65 21.35 78 6.756*** 45.645*** .372
1996
15.79 20.88 87
29.85 26.80 78
30.29 27.34 78
ments for taxes settled by bat ter decreased during the pe
2.32 5.68 81 5.265*** 27.716***
9.15 14.19 81
2.03 4.83 61 5.695*** 32.429***
20.70 27.31 61
9.93 14.78 60 5.453*** 29.732***
19.72 26.42 60
2002 .257
1999
2002 .351
1996
1999 .335
1996
For Ha Id through H^ If above, respondents were specifically asked to estimate the barter percentage associated
with firms similar to theirs.
Due to surveys with some unanswered questions, matched-pairs statistics result in slightly different averages for
the same years.
*** P<.QQ\.
responses received from subjects. The following section discusses implications of these
findings.
5. Implications and conclusions
The results strongly support all six parts of Hypothesis 1 (overall barter decrease during
1996 to 2002) and one of the four parts pertaining to Hypothesis 2 (the purpose and use of
barter changed during 1996 to 2002). Furthermore, the interviews that the authors
conducted of Russian businesspersons also strongly support the decrease in barter
incidence during 1996 to 2002 espoused by Hypothesis 1.
Generally, the analyses in Tables 4 and 5 indicate that there has been a dramatic
downturn in the use of barter in the Russian Federation between 1996 and 2002. For
example, the study's subjects indicate that the percent of business receipts and payments
settled by barter in firms similar to theirs has fallen from about 62% in 1996 to 14% in
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Table 6
Hypotheses 2a-2d paired ?-tests/repeated measures ANOVA
Hypothesis pairAfear M SD N t F Partial eta squared
Ha2a: Russian businesses were less likely in 2002 to use barter to obtain a better exchange price on
a sale or purchase as they were in 1999.
2002 3.99 1.92 89 0.888 0.789 .009
1999 4.12 2.13 89
Ha2b: Russian businesses were less likely to use barter in 2002 to compensate for a lack of cash as
compared to 1999.
2002 5.02 2.06 96 7.215*** 52.055*** .354
1999 6.39 0.93 96
H„2c: Russian businesses were less likely to use barter in 2002 to hide profits as compared to 1999.
2002 2.89 1.70 89 0.096 0.009 .000
1999 2.88 1.72 89
H„2d: Russian businesses were less likely to use barter in 2002 to avoid taxes as compared to 1999.
2002 2.77 1.73 90 0.127 0.016 .000
1999 2.76 1.79 90
A 7-point Likert scale was employed to measure respondent attitudes, where:
l=strongly disagree that barter is used today {3 years ago) to .
4=ambivalent that barter is used today (3 years ago) to .
7=strongly agree that barter is used today (3 years ago) to .
*** P<.001.
2002; while barter payments from customers have declined from about 46% to only 9%
during this same time period. Similar trends during these years are found regarding barter
payments to suppliers, which have fallen from about 46% to 8%), as well as barter
payments for equipment and employee salaries, which have fallen from about 29% to less
than 5% in both cases.
Specifically, if the businesspersons interviewed by the authors are correct (see Table 1
)
and considering Commander et al. (2000), barter probably peaked somewhere around the
ruble crisis of 1998, and then started to decrease thereafter. These conclusions are
noteworthy, given that they are not consistent with the preponderance of literature
addressing Russian barter that suggests Russian barter is not only as widespread as ever,
but is still likely on the rise (Commander, 1999; Coyle & Platonov, 1998; Enthoven, 1999;
Lindberg, 2002; Makarov & Kleiner, 2000; Van Schaik, 1998; Woodruff, 1999; Yakovlev,
2000). Indeed, these findings have implications for the economic future of the Russian
Federation, as discussed subsequently.
Table 6 provides some surprising empirical evidence, which is not consistent with the
majority of recent literature pertaining to Russian barter. For example, a number of
researchers suggest that barter is associated with tax evasion, and some authors suggest
this may also involve purposely hiding and/or camouflaging accounting profits (Black et
al., 2000; Goldman, 1998; lakovlev, 2000; Lindberg, 2002; Moberg, 1998; Van Schaik,
1998; Yakovlev, 2001). The subjects in our study, however, indicated that there were no
differences between the ways the Russian businesses used barter in 1 999 as compared with
2002 with respect to hiding profits (2002 M=2.89, vs. 1999 M=2.88) or avoiding taxes
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(2002 M=2.77, vs. 1999 M=2.76). Although these results may reflect a phenomenon of
only the previous few years, a minority group of scholars (Commander, 1999; Linz &
Krueger, 1998; Yakovlev, 2000) have also argued that barter is not a significant component
of evasion and/or hiding profits.
A review of the 2002 mean barter percentages contained in Tables 4 and 5 suggest that
barter is more likely associated with business receipts and payments (2002 M=14%) and is
least likely associated with payments for equipment (2002 M=2%), taxes (2002 M=2%),
and employee salaries (2002 M=4 1/2%). It appears that the days of the late 1990s, when
employers paid their employees with vodka, cars, tea sets and tampons, are essentially
over. These mean percentages based in Tables 4 and 5 are very consistent with the Table 1
2003 interview data, including the percentages that Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov
enumerated in his 2002 speech, that suggested that barter percentages in general are now
well below 20%.'"^ In addition, if barter in Russia is below 20%, this level is consistent with
the approximate 20% barter intemational norm for commerce espoused by Mardak (2002).
As highlighted in the hypotheses development earlier, reform of the Tax, Civil, and
Labor Codes of the Russian Federation might offer some explanations for the decline in
barter. First, cash, liens, and orderly liquidation of business assets are clearly defined as the
means of tax settlement, replacing the possibility of in-kind barter exchanges. Second,
although barter and offset exchanges are viewed as a legal means of transactions between
businesses, tax bodies are given the authority to question barter transactions that deviate
too far from fair market exchanges, discouraging businesses from indulging in barter to
distort taxable income or gain unfair profit advantages. Finally, new laws limiting the
rights of employers to utilize barter in lieu of cash salary appear to have been effective in
curbing these practices (Lobacheva, 2003).
The apparent decrease in barter has significant implications regarding the direction of
the Russian economy as a whole. For example, free market price equilibrium should start
to emerge in Russia, freeing the forces of supply and demand and the concept of value.
Transaction costs should decrease and managerial time should be freed from barter
negotiation to focus on the efficiency and productivity of the enterprise. Additionally,
Russian company financial statements should become more transparent, allowing for
investor and creditor monitoring of corporate governance. Investment risk should
generally decrease, increasing the possibility that overseas investment might flow into
the country and further energize the Russian economy.
Widespread decreases in barter incidence should sever interfirm relationships that
undermine competition and innovation and mitigate artificial demand for goods that may
not otherwise be competitive (Commander et al, 2000). Finally, inefficient enterprises
formerly artificially buoyed by barter will be allowed to fail, increasing "allocative and
dynamic efficiency" in the Russian economy (Commander et al., 2000, p. 23).
It is noteworthy that this trend of decreasing barter proclivity is accompanied by the
Russian government's significant reform of its tax structure during the past 2 years.
Morozova and Amett (2001, p. 10) argue that the former Russian tax structure contributed
to Russia's economic lack of transparency because of the "large number of taxes, high
This percentage is now consistent with the approximate 20% barter international norm for commerce
espoused by Mardaic (2002).
60 G. Fleischman, P. Herz / The International Journal ofAccounting 40 (2005) 39-63
effective rates of tax, bureaucratic inefficiency and inadequate or non-existent judicial
controls over the tax authorities." The Russian government has radically reformed the tax
structure by reducing effective tax rates, substantially minimizing the number of different
business taxes, and creating a tax monitoring system that is more equitable and less
draconian (Fleischman & Herz, 2002). We expect that a more fair and streamlined tax
system will enhance economic and financial transparency and reduce remaining incentives
to use barter to hide profits from the tax authorities. These changes should also assist
foreign investors in calculating the true cost of investing in Russia (see, e.g., Fleischman &
Herz, 2002; Khanna, Palepu, & Srinivasan, 2004; Young & Guenther, 2003) and will
likely assist the metamorphosis of the Russian financial statement towards intemational
accounting standards (IAS), which should reduce information asymmetry (see, e.g., Leuz,
2003; Lindberg, 2002). Indeed, it appears that Russia may be at the threshold of a 21st
century economic renaissance.
This manuscript adds to the empirical Russian barter literature in a number of
significant ways. In addition to a comprehensive review and synthesis of the literature and
related economic theory, the study uses a survey to query Russian businesspersons
regarding significant barter issues that are not addressed in any other publication that we
are aware of For example, this research investigates trends in Russian barter during 1 996
though 2002 pertaining to business receipts, as well as payments for equipment, employee
salaries, taxes, and payments to suppliers. The study also empirically investigates
contemporary trends in Russian barter pertaining to its use to obtain a better purchase
price, to compensate for a lack of cash, to hide profits, and to avoid taxes, which furthers
our understanding of Russian business operations.
While the results of this study are intriguing and noteworthy for the future of the
Russian Federation's economic development, we must note the limitations of the study.
The study's sample is relatively small, and hails primarily from a uniform geographical
location that lacks ethnic diversity, so generalizing the results to other Russian regions,
non-business professions and ethnic groups is difficult. The authors did attempt to
minimize same source data bias by utilizing a written survey as well as personal
interviews, but most of the data was obtained from the written survey source. Further, the
mean barter percentages presented may not solely represent direct or commodity barter
activity since they may also include other fonns of non-monetary exchange such as offsets
and veksels, which are discussed in footnote 2.
Future research should explore the relationship between barter incidence and recent tax
reform. Further, researchers should investigate recent barter trends in Russia using
information obtained from other professions and non-professional citizenry, and by using
different data-collection methodologies. It would also be helpful to explore changes in
Russian monetary policy, banking and credit, productivity, gross domestic output, and
foreign investment over time in relation to barter incidence.
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1. Introduction
Ownership structure—the relative amounts of ownership claims held by management
and investors has traditionally dominated research in accounting, particularly research
using the agency approach. Under conventional views of agency costs, an increase in
management's stake in the firm should lead to an alignment of managers' and other
shareholders' interests and, therefore, lead to shareholder-wealth creation. Studies have
found, however, that concentrated ownership, especially when the controlling shareholder
is either an individual or a family member, will have a negative impact on a company's
performance (Gilles, 1999; Mahaffy, 1998).
The purpose of this study is to investigate the influence of contingent-fit on the
relationship between ownership structure and business-unit performance. Using a
contingency approach, we define fit as the proper match between the firm's strategic
orientation and its structure (Bruns & Waterhouse, 1975; Gordon & Miller, 1976; Otley,
1980; Ouchi, 1977) and measure this construct based on the weighted sum of the fit
contribution of each contextual variable as proposed by the fitness landscape theory.
Furthermore, we measure business-unit performance by the relative importance of the
following variables: return on investment, profit, cash flow fi^om operations, cost control,
development of new products, sales volume, market share, market development, and
personnel development (Chenhall & Langfield-Smith, 1988; Govindarajan, 1988).
Previous studies have found a positive association between fit and performance
(Chenhall & Langfield-Smith, 1988; Moores & Yuen, 2001). The existing studies,
however, have focused their investigation on widely-held companies. We are not aware of
studies that have looked at this phenomenon in closely-held companies to determine
whether the pattern found in widely-held companies also exists in closely-held companies,
despite their different characteristics.
Five main characteristics distinguish closely-held companies from their widely-held
counterparts. First, closely-held companies are owned by a limited number of shareholders
who often are family members or a group of entrepreneurs who started the venture.
Second, their stocks are not actively traded on an established market or held widely
enough to be subject to the disclosure requirements and oversight of securities regulators.
Consequently, closely-held companies tend to face fewer regulatory and disclosure
requirements. Third, closely-held companies tend to develop systems and procedures that
are heavily influenced by their entrepreneurial owners. Fourth, owners of closely-held
companies often have a larger stake in the firm than owners of widely-held companies,
which suggests that shareholders of closely-held companies tend to be less risk-neutral
than shareholders of a widely traded company. Studies have shown that the less risk-
neutral the principal, the more likely risk will be shared with the agent through outcome-
contingent compensation such as a bonus plan to align the interests of the owner and the
manager (Ang, Cole, & Lin, 2000). Finally, managers of closely-held companies
encounter greater internal monitoring than managers of widely traded firms (Gilles,
1999). This discussion suggests that closely-held companies have different characteristics
fi-om their widely traded counterparts which might influence their strategic orientation and
their choice of organizational design, types of control, and types of management
accounting systems.
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Following a recent development in organizational and management sciences that
investigates the role of contingency fit for an evolving system and its environment on the
survival of organizations, this study adopts a fitness landscape-theory approach to define
contingent-fit between strategic orientation and firm structure. Building on fitness
landscape theory (Kaufftnan, 1993), we define contingent-fit as the weighted sum of the
independent contribution of each contextual variable to the chosen strategy (see also
Jermias & Gani, 2002; Levinthal, 1997). Fitness landscape theory is derived from the
biological view that organisms evolve over time to survive and that this evolution can be
viewed as a journey to find a better fit to increase the chance of survival. This theory has
been used to investigate organizational development and strategy (Maguire, 1997) and
how to manage technological change and innovation (Aldrich, 1999; McCarthy, 2002).
Data were collected fi-om business-unit managers of both widely-held and closely-held
Indonesian companies which manufacture and sell food and beverages, tobacco,
pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, households, textile, and foot ware. As predicted, contin-
gent-fit has a positive relationship with business-unit performance. The higher the fit level,
the better the performance. The results of the study also indicate that widely-held
companies perform better than their closely-held counterparts. However, this advantage
decreases with increasing level of contingent-fit.
This study contributes to the literature in two ways. First, it extends prior research on
the contingency relationship between contingent-fit and effectiveness in widely-held
companies to include closely-held companies that presumably have different environ-
ments. Second, it adds to the limited body of knowledge in integrating business-unit
strategy, organizational design, types of control, and types of management accounting
systems with business-unit performance. This study introduces a method to develop and
measure the fit between strategic orientation and the firm's structure using fitness
landscape theory. This theory has been considered as one of the most appropriate approach
to investigate the relationship between evolving systems and performance (e.g., Dooley &
Van de Ven, 1999; Jermias & Gani, 2002; Levinthal, 1997).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the
underlying theory used to develop and measure the contingent-fit construct, followed by
the related literature review. The research model and hypotheses are presented in section
four. The fifth and sixth sections present the research method, data analysis, and results.
The paper concludes with a discussion of the major findings, limitations, and directions for
fijture research.
2. Theoretical background
Management and organizational science literature reflect a growing interest in
investigating the ability of organizations to survive. Some recent studies have proposed
that contingent-fit between strategic orientation and its contextual variables tends to have a
positive association with performance (Beinhocker, 1999; Levinthal, 1997).
The concept of fit has long been used in management accounting literature to
investigate the contingent relationship between management accounting systems, its
contextual variables, and organizational performance (Ferris, 1988; Otley, 1980). A
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number of major attempts have been made recently to construct the fit between strategic
orientation and its contextual variables. Each attempt is motivated by a conviction that the
latter is inadequate to explain the former.
We adopt a fitness landscape approach to develop and measure the contingent-fit
between strategic choice and its contextual variables and use regression analysis to
evaluate the moderating effects of contingent-fit on the relationship between ownership
structure and performance. Fitness landscape approach is considered by many as an
appropriate approach to investigate the ability of organizations to survive (see for example
Beinhocker, 1999; Dooley & Van de Ven, 1999; Jermias & Gam, 2002).
Jermias and Gani (2002) propose that there are five steps to test the relationship
between contingent-fit and performance. First, an ideal model should be developed based
on the hypothesized relationship between strategic priorities, degree of centralization,
types of control, and types of management accounting systems. Second, the range of
possible scores for each contextual variable should be determined. Third, the ideal
(perfect) contingent-fit score can be generated based on the proper match between business
strategy and its contextual variables using the following formula':
1
'
Fit;=T7E^'^=l---^'
A^
;=1
Where, Fit,: the total contingent-fit value of entity j; Xif. fit contribution of contextual
variable / for entity y; .V: the number of contextual variable in the model; J: the number of
entities.
Fourth, the scores of the contextual variables obtained fi-om sampled business-units can
be compared with their respective ideal to determine the contingent-fit-index for each
business-unit. Finally, the relationship between contingent-fit and performance can be
examined.
The contingent-fit value represents the ability of the business-unit to survive
(represented by business-unit performance). It is expected that the contingent-fit value
will have a positive association with business-unit performance.
3. Related previous literature and hypothesis
The research model used in this study is based on the following set of arguments: first,
the strategy chosen by an organization determines to a large extent the uncertainty with
which the organization must cope (Chandler, 1962; Gupta & Govindarajan, 1984; Miles &
Snow, 1978). Second, different organizational designs and management accounting
systems are available to help organizations cope with uncertainty (Galbraith, 1973; Lorsch
& Allen, 1973; Lorsch & Morse, 1974; Tushman & Nadler, 1978). The key organizational
designs that firms can use to cope with uncertainty are design of organizational structure
' This model assumes that deviations from ideal pattems for any contextual variables have an equal effect on
business-unit performance. For example, the performance effect of a one unit deviation from the ideal pattern of
degree of centralization is equal to a one imit deviation from the ideal pattern of types of control.
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(Chandler, 1962; Galbraith, 1973; Tushman & Nadler, 1978) and design of control
systems (Hayes, 1977; Hirst, 1983; Lorsch & Allen, 1973). Certain management
accounting systems might also enhance the companies' ability to deal more effectively
with uncertainties of their customers, competitors, technology, suppliers, and economic
circumstances. Galbraith (1993), for example, reports that companies particularly those
pursuing a strategy of differentiation try to reduce uncertainties by developing integrated
reporting systems that link customers' requirements to product design and production
scheduling to ensure timely and reliable delivery. Similar linkage with suppliers can also
help companies achieving quality and delivery targets (Kaplan & Norton, 1996). Some
companies use benchmarking to reduce uncertainties related to their competitors.
Benchmarking often help companies improve their performance by reducing uncertainties
surrounding their competitive advantage through learning the best practices used by
international firms and establishing valid expectations based on other companies'
experience (McNair & Leibfried, 1992). And third, matching organizational design and
management accounting systems with strategy is likely to be associated with superior
performance (Chenhall & Langfield-Smith, 1988; Moores & Yuen, 2001; Fig. 1).
This study used Porter's (1980) strategy framework, since this approach is academically
well accepted and internally consistent (Dess & Davis, 1984; Hambrick, 1983). Porter
identifies two generic ways in which a business-unit can gain a sustainable competitive
advantage: low-cost and product differentiation. A low-cost strategy emphasizes the need
to incur the lowest cost in an industry. This strategy requires aggressive construction of
efficient scale facilities, vigorous pursuit of cost reductions from experience, tight cost
control, avoidance of marginal customer accounts, and cost minimization in areas such as
research and development, service, sales force, and advertising.
A product-differentiation strategy, by contrast, focuses on satisfying the customers'
needs in terms of product features, product quality, and customer services. Product
differentiation business-units tend to select one or more attributes that their customers
perceive as important and uniquely position themselves to meet those needs. Porter (1985)
argues that product differentiation business-units are rewarded for their uniqueness with
premium prices. It should be noted, however, that a business-unit pursuing a low-cost
Strategic Organizational Design Management Acct. Performance
Choice
Degree of Types of
Centralization Control
Systems
Low-cost
->
Centra-
lized 7>
Output
Control 7>
MAS
Type I
' < / < '' <
Product
Differentia-
tion
->
Decen-
tralized
->
Beha-
vioural
Control
-
MAS
Type II
Fig. 1
.
The model (adopted from Jermias and Gani,2002) for testing the impact of contingent-fit between strategic
choice, organizational design, and management accounting systems on business-unit performance.
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Strategy does not imply that it can ignore quality, service, features, or other bases for
differentiation. Similarly, a business-unit pursuing a differentiation strategy cannot ignore
costs. As Porter (1985) correctly asserted, a strategy of differentiation does not allow a
business-unit to ignore costs and a strategy of low-cost cannot ignore quality and services,
but rather they are not the primary strategic target.
Researchers such as Chenhall and Langfield-Smith (1988) and Shank and Govindarajan
(1993) argue that to affect performance positively, competitive strategy should be
supported by an appropriate control system, organizational structure, and management-
accounting systems. Previous studies have reported that a proper match between
competitive strategy and its contextual variables enhanced a company's performance
(Chenhall & Langfield-Smith, 1988; Miller, 1981; Moores & Yuen, 2001).
3.1. Linking competitive strategy and degree of centralization
Organizations need to adapt quickly to their market environment to achieve and
maintain competitive advantages (Day 1991; DeGeuss, 1988; Senge, 1990). Govindarajan
(1986) and Gupta (1987) argue that the choice of a product differentiation rather than a
low-cost strategy would increase uncertainty in a business-units' task environment for the
following reasons. First, product innovation is likely to be more critical for business-units
employing a differentiation strategy than for those employing a low-cost strategy. With
strong emphasis on new product developments, product differentiation business-units will
face high uncertainty since they are betting on products that have not yet crystallized.
Second, business-units employing a product-differentiation strategy tend to have a
broad set of products in order to create uniqueness. Previous researchers (e.g.. Chandler,
1962; Gupta, 1987) have argued that product breath is associated with high environmental
complexity and, consequently, with uncertainty. In contrast, business-units employing a
low-cost strategy tend to have narrow product lines to minimize inventory carrying costs
and to benefit ft"om scale economies."
Finally, creating and sustaining differentiation require incurring discretionary expendi-
tures in several areas such as improvement of quality and speed of delivery, advertising to
build product image, and research and development. In contrast, a low-cost strategy
implies economies in all forms of discretionary expenditures. Accordingly, implementing a
differentiation strategy is likely to require decision making by intuitive judgment to a
greater extent than will implementing a low-cost strategy.
Because creativity and innovativeness are crucial to differentiate themselves in the
market characterized by dynamic environments, business-units that adopt a product-
differentiation strategy will benefit more fi"om decentralization than those that adopt a low-
cost strategy.
" Although a business-unit is pursuing a low-cost strategy, it cannot ignore quality, ser\ ice, features or other
bases for differentiation. Similarly, a business-unit pursuing a strategy of differentiation does not allow the unit to
ignore cost. As Porter (1980) asserts, "... a strategy of low-cost implies that low-cost relative to competitors
becomes the running theme through their entire strategy, though quality, service and other areas cannot be
ignored, (p. 35) and . . .a strategy of differentiation does not allow the firm to ignore costs, but rather they are not
the primary strategic target, (p. 37).
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3.2. Linking competitive strategy and control system
Porter (1980) states that low-cost business-units can be characterized by their vigorous
pursuit of cost reduction, employing people with high levels of experience, practicing all
possible economies of scale, acquiring process-engineering skills or the skills needed to
design an efficient plant, employing a routine task environment, and producing standard,
undifferentiated products. These characteristics imply that the knowledge of ends and
means is relatively high. Since costs are typically easily determined and outputs are more
observable, low-cost business-units tend to use output control for maximum effectiveness.
Product differentiation business-units tend to have difficulty implementing compre-
hensive control systems due to changing demands of their environment (Miles & Snow,
1978). Business-units pursuing a differentiation strategy tend to rely on strong basic
research to produce unique products in which the knowledge of means and ends is low and
outcome observability is also low. Govindarajan and Fisher (1990) argue that since control
should be based on degree of observability, it is desirable for product differentiation
business-units to use socialization, or behaviour control. In a similar vein, Ouchi (1979)
argues that since the output of basic research tends to be long term in nature, short term
output measurement on monthly, quarterly, or annual intervals is usually not available.
Therefore, output control is considered inappropriate for this type of strategy.
3.3. Linking competitive strategy^ and management accounting systems
Information provided by management accounting systems (MAS) helps organizations
adopt and implement plans in response to their competitive environments. Traditional
approaches to management accounting do not provide the type of information that
managers require to develop and support an organization's strategic choices (Johnson &
Kaplan, 1987; Shank & Govindarajan, 1993). Recent management-accounting practices
have emerged that focus on developing more accurate product costs, provide more
information for evaluating organizational effectiveness, and relate activities and processes
to strategic outcomes. Many of these management-accounting practices have the potential
to provide benefits to organizations that emphasize either product differentiation or low-
cost strategies. However, different managerial mindsets underlying product differentiation
and low-cost strategies may influence preferences for particular management accounting
practices (Shank, 1989).
Companies that emphasize product-differentiation strategy focus their efforts on
satisfying customer needs for high-quality products, specialized design features, fast and
reliable delivery, and effective post-sales support (Porter, 1985). To ensure that customer-
focused activities are emphasized, companies need to develop closer linkages among all
stages of their operational processes, their suppliers, and their customers (Hayes,
Wheelwright, & Clark, 1988). Traditional management-accounting approaches are
unlikely to be sufficient for assessing customer-focused activities. Therefore, we propose
that product differentiation business-units will benefit more by using management
accounting systems that provide measures of customer satisfaction, timely and reliable
delivery, and measures of key production activities, quality, benchmarking, employee-
based measures, and strategic planning (MAS type II).
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High-performing companies emphasizing low-cost strategies, by contrast, will focus
primarily on ensuring that production processes are highly cost efficient (Porter, 1985). To
achieve cost efficiencies, companies may focus on improving existing processes. This may
entail down-sizing operations to reduce costs quickly (Hamel & Prahalad, 1994) and
reducing non-value-added activities (Hayes et al, 1988). In some companies, further
improvements in cost effectiveness require implementing innovation in manufacturing
systems such as new manufacturing processes or investing in a new plant (Hamel &
Prahalad. 1994) or outsourcing manufacturing operations when external companies can
supply at a lower cost while maintaining required quality and delivery standards. The type
of formal performance measures appropriate for companies emphasizing a low-cost
strategy will focus mainly on controlling costs. Thus, traditional management-accounting
systems such as budgetary performance measures, variance analyses, and activity-based
costing (MAS type I) are suitable for these companies (Chenhall & Langfield-Smith,
1988).
3.4. Hypothesis
This study employs a contingency approach to investigate the influence of a proper
match between strategic choice and its contextual variables on the relationship between
ownership structure and business-unit performance. The contingency approach is based on
the assumption that there is no one universal system of accounting that is optimal for every
environment and context in which these systems operate. Rather, this theory asserts that
there is a contingent relationship between competitive strategy, organizational design, and
types of management accounting systems. Achieving a proper match between strategic
choice, organizational design, and management accounting systems enhance organiza-
tional perfonnance. Therefore, we predict that there will be a positive relationship between
contingent-fit and business-unit performance.
Previous discussions also suggest that closely-held companies tend to have limited
access to financial resources and professional executives, and use more family oriented
management style as compared to their widely-held counterparts. Therefore, we expect
that widely-held business-units will perform better than closely-held business-units. The
performance differential, however, will decrease with increasing fit level. Although we
expect a positive correlation between contingent-fit and performance for both widely-held
and closely-held business-units, the benefits of improved fit will be higher for poor
performing firms (i.e.. closely-held business-units) than for high performing firms (i.e.,
widely-held business-units). Due to their superior access to financial and human resources,
managers of widely-held business-units are quite well equipped to develop their marketing
acumen, embrace changes in technology and explore every available opportunity to
optimize their performance. In contrast, many managers in closely-held business-units are
family members who lack of these crucial skills and they tend to develop a level of
comfortable inefficiency (Foster, 1992) and would continue to behave like a monopoly and
management creativity would not grow strong (Grosse & Yanes, 1998). This implies that
there is relatively more opportunity for improvement for closely-held business-units as
compared to widely-held business-units. Therefore, the impact of aligning business
strategy with its contextual variables is expected to be greater for closely-held business-
J. Jerviias. L. Gani Tfie Inienmtional Journal ofAccounting 40 (2005) 65-85 Ti
units as compared to their wideK-held counterparts. Specifically, we examine the
following h\"potheses:
HI. Contingent-tit between competiti\"e strategy- and its contextual \ariables is positi\ely
related to business-unit performance.
H2. \\'idel\'-held business-units perform better than their closeh-held counterparts.
H3. The magnitude of the performance differential ben\een wideK-held business-units
and closely-held business-units decreases with an increasing le\'el of contingent-fit.
We use the following regression model to test the h\"potheses:
PERPOFLM; = Vo + V, FIT, - v. OWNER - , FIT *OWNER - z, (1)
Where. PERFORM : performance of business-unit / is determined b>- return on
in\'estment. protlt. cash Viow from operations, cost control. de\elopment of new products,
sales \olume. market share, market de\'elopment. and personnel de\elopment and their
relatixe importance to the company ; FIT.: contingent-fit betA\een competiti\'e strategy and
its contexnaal \anables for business-unit /; OWNER : an indicator equal one for wideh-
held compan\' and zero for closely-held company.
Eq. ( 1 ) allows us to estimate the effects of FIT. 0\\"N'ER and FIT*OWNER on
business-unit performance. The coefficient on FIT represents the Imear relationship
bepvveen FIT and performance. The estimated coefficient for OWNER represents the
a\-erage difference in performance bet\veen wideh'-held business-units and closely-held
business-units, while the coefficient on FIT*0\\N'ER represents the effect of an increasing
fit le\'el on the ONcrall relationship ber^^een 0\\'NER and performance. \\ e expect positi\"e
coefficients on FIT and OWNER but a nesatne coefficient on FIT^OWNER.
4. Research method
A questionnaire suney and personal inter. lews were conducted to collect data from
business-unit managers' m the target companies. After high level approval was obtained
indicating the companies' willingness to participate in this study, we requested that the top
management nommate business-units and contact persons to \\hom the questionnaires
should be sent.
4.1. Variable measurement
The questionnaire used in this stud%' was developed and refmed based on prior studies
(See Table 1 for the questionnaire). Each questionnaire consists of sLx sections. The first
For the purpose of this study, a business-unit is defined as either an organization, or a segment of an
organization that function as a profit centre.
The questionnaire was re\iewed by three colleagues and a strategic management e.xecuti\ e for clarit%- and
understandabilm prior to administration. A pilot smd\' uin ohing four business unit managers was also conducted
to obtain preliminary results related to the hypotheses de\"eloped in this study and to investigate any changes
necessan before the final sun e\ and inieniew. See Table 2 for the suney questiotmaires.
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Table 1
Survey questionnaire (each statement was evaluated based on the scale of 1 to 7, where l=significantly lower and
7=significantly higher)
A. Competitive strategy (please position your products relative to leading competitors on 7-point Likert scale in
the following areas):
1
.
Product selling price
2. Percent of sales spent on research and development
3. Percent of sales spent on marketing expenses
4. Product quality
5. Product features
6. Brand image
7. Introduction of new product
8. Make changes in design
9. Fast and reliable delivery
10. Post-sales support
B. Degree of centralization (please indicate the typical influence you had in affecting the outcome of each
operating decisions that could effect SBU performance, where each number is represented by the following
statements):
1 Increasing (beyond budget) the level of expenditure for advertising and promotion
2. Changing the selling price on a major product or product line
3. Increasing (beyond budget) the level of expenditure or research and development
4. Increasing (beyond budget) the number of employees in a business-unit.
C. Type of control (please indicate whether the following statements reflect your superior actual approach to
managing his business-units):
1 The attainment of the sales targets set for your business-unit
2. The attainment of the expenses targets set for your business-unit
3. The attainment of market share targets set for your business-unit
4. The decision of the way of achieving these targets
5. The monitoring of decisions taken to achieve these targets on an ongoing basis
6. The monitoring of actions taken to achieve these targets on an ongoing basis
D. Management accounting system (MAS; please indicate whether you apply these measures):
1. Budgetary performance measures
2. Variance analysis
3. Manufacturing system innovations (improving existing process)
4. Activity-based costing
5. Outsourcing
6. Cost advantages of specific linkages with suppliers
7. Cost-volume-profit analysis
8. Measures of customer satisfaction
9. Timely and reliable delivery
10. Measures of key production activities (cycle time and throughput time)
1 1
.
Measures of quality
12. Benchmarking
13. Employee-based measures
14. Strategic planning
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Table 1 {continued)
E. SBU performance (please indicate your SBU's performance relative to corporate standard and the degree of
importance superior attached to SBU performance):
1. Return on investment
2. Profit
3. Cash flow from operations
4. Cost control
5. Development of new products
6. Sales volume
7. Market share
8. Market development
9. Personnel development
section requests demographic information about the respondent. The second to the sixth
questions ask respondents to provide information about their business-units in terms of
strategic priorities, degree of decentrahzation, types of control, management-accounting
systems, and performance.
We adapted the questionnaires used in prior studies (Chenhall & Langfield-Smith,
1988; Govindarajan & Fisher, 1990; Innes & Mitchell, 1995; Jermias & Armitage, 2000)
to measure strategic priorities, type of control, and type of management accounting
systems. Strategic priorities were measured by asking respondents to indicate their
product relative to their leading competitors on a seven-point Likert scale (Insignifi-
cantly lower; and 7=significantly higher). Ten questions measure the tendency of
respondents' business-unit toward certain strategic priorities. These include the product's
selling price, percent of sales spent on research and development, product quality,
product features, brand image, introduction of a new product, frequency of change in
product design, delivery system, and post-sales support. A higher score is associated
with a product-differentiation strategy while lower score is associated with a low-cost
strategy. All questions are on the seven-point Likert-type scale. The strategy
classification was derived as follows. If the total score is higher than the mean, the
business-unit is classified as adopting a product-differentiation strategy. On the other
hand, if the total score is below the mean, the business-unit is classified as adopting a
low-cost strategy. If the total score equals the mean (i.e., the average total score=4), the
business-units do not have a clear strategic priority and therefore were excluded from
ftirther analysis. We also use an alternative approach for strategy classification suggested
by Cohen and Cohen (1983). A one-half standard deviation above (below) the mean of
the competitive strategy scores was taken to represent product-differentiation (low-cost)
strategy. This alternative approach was applied only to business-units with a clear
strategic orientation [i.e., scores that are above (below) one-half standard deviation from
the middle point].
The degree of decentralization was measured by responses to four questions about the
level of autonomy given to business-unit managers. We asked respondents on a seven-
point Likert-type scale (l=no influence; and 7=total autonomy) to indicate the typical
influence on their operating decisions. Higher scores indicate more autonomous business-
units.
76 J. Jermias. L. Gani / The International Journal ofAccounting 40 (2005J 65-85
Types of control were assessed by asking respondents to indicate the intensity-level
used by their superiors to manage their business-units. There are six questions to
measure this construct. The first three questions are designed to measure output controls
and the last three questions are intended to measure behavioural controls. The intensity
level is indicated by the degree of supervision exercised by their superiors (l=does not
concern; 7=focus very significantly). Higher scores indicate a more intensive control
system.
Types of management accounting systems used by the business-units are measured by
asking respondents whether they use a particular management accounting system and the
level of intensity of the usage of the system. There are 14 items to measure this
construct. The first seven items are intended to measure management accounting systems
that support low-cost strategy and the last seven questions are intended to measure
management accounting systems that support product-differentiation strategy. Responses
to these items indicate the intensity level of usage of a particular management
accounting system (l=negligible; 7=very intensive).
To measure business-unit performance, we adapt questionnaires used by Govindar-
ajan and Fisher (1990). Respondents were asked to position their product with respect to
their companies' standard and also relative to their leading competitors' in terms of
return on investment, profit, cash flow from operations, cost control, development of
new products, sales volume, market share, market development, and personnel
development. Respondents were also asked to indicate the relative importance of each
item for their business-units. A single effectiveness score for each business-unit was
obtained by a multiplication of nine performance dimensions with their respective
relative importance for the business-units. Therefore, the highest possible score is seven
and the lowest possible score is one.
The fit construct was developed and measured based on the fitness landscape theory
outlined in the previous section. This construct represents the level of appropriate match
between the chosen strategy and its contextual variables. For product-differentiation
units, the appropriate match is defined as units that adopt a decentralized structure, use
behavioural control, and use management accounting systems that support the units'
ability to differentiate their product and to serve their customers. For low-cost units, the
appropriate match is defined as units that adopt a centralized structure, use output
control, and use management accounting systems that promote efficiency. To determine
the level of contingent-fit, first we classify the sample into product differentiation and
low-cost business-units as describe before. The contingent-fit score for each business-
unit is determined by calculating the weighted sum of the responses to the questions
about degree of centralization, type of control and type of management accounting
systems. Since all respondents use both output and behaviour controls and both
management accounting systems type I and type II, we use reverse coded for variables
that are inconsistent with the chosen strategy. Therefore, to calculate the contingent-fit
value for business-units that adopt a product-differentiation strategy, a reverse coded of
output control and MAS type I was performed. For business-units that adopt a low-cost
strategy, a reverse coded of degree of centralization, behaviour control, and MAS type II
was conducted. These procedures are necessary to ensure that a higher score represents a
better match between the chosen strategy and its contextual variables.
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The contingent-fit value for each business-unit can be calculated as follows:
riXj=\ ^^,V/=1...253,
;=1
where. Fit,: total contingent-fit value for entity j\ Xij: contingent-fit contribution fi-om
contextual variable / for entity / (i.e., /=3: degree of centralization, types of control, and
types of management accounting systems).
The highest possible score (the ideal pattern) is seven and the lowest possible score is
one.
5. Data analysis and results
We begin our analysis by assessing the construct validity of the variables used to
test the hypotheses. The assessment is based on raw scores except for the contingent-fit
construct in which some reverse coded were performed. All constructs are considered
usable with Cronbach alpha coefficients greater than 0.75 (Nunnally, 1967).
A total of 281 business-units fi^om 123 firms were received (115 business-units fi^om
26 widely-held firms and 166 business-units fi^om 97 closely-held firms). Twenty
respondents (7 and 13 business-units fi'om widely-held and closely-held companies
respectively) were removed fi^om the original sample based on Box Plot analysis which
categorizes those twenty responses as extreme data resulting in 261 respondents. Eight
respondents were also excluded fi-om fiarther analysis since they do not have a clear
strategic orientation (their average total score equals to four). This results in 253 usable
responses. When the strategic classification was based on one-half standard deviation
above (below) the mean, the total usable responses were reduced to 185.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics of contextual variables by ownership structure
Variables All sample Widely-held business-units Closely-held business-units
(;7=253) (« = 106) (« = 147)
Observed Mean (standard Observed Mean (standard Observed Mean (standard
range deviation) range deviation) range deviation)
Degree of 1.00-7.00 3.87(1.31) 1.25-7.00 3.97(1.39) 1.00-7.00 3.80(1.26)
centralization
Types of conti'ol:
Output 1.33-7.00 4.98(1.26) 2.00-6.67 5.35(1.13) 1.33-7.00 4.70(1.27)
Behavior 2.00-7.00 4.59(1.31) 2.33-7.00 4.67(1.44) 2.00-7.00 4.53(1.21)
Types ofMAS:
Type I 3.14-7.00 4.87(0.74) 3.14-6.71 4.94(0.73) 3.29-7.00 4.82(0.74)
Type 11 3.29-7.00 5.46(0.93) 3.71-7.00 5.87(0.82) 3.29-7.00 5.16(088)
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Table 3
Descriptive statistics of contingent-fit and performance by ownership structure
Unit of analysis Significant
difference"
Contingent-fit
Observed
range
Mean (standard
deviation)
Performance
Observed
range
Mean (standard
deviation)
Panel A:
All sample (;2=253)
Panel B: partition by
Widely-held (H=i06)
Closely-held (h=147)
ownership stiitcture
WH>CH
2.78-5.54
2.78-5.29
3.11-5.54
4.05(0.45)
4.02(0.41)
4.07(0.48)
1.46-7.00
1.46-7.00
1.62-5.95
3.60(1.08)
3.83(1.22)
3.43(0.94)
" The significant difference between widely-held and closely-held sub-samples are based on the /-test of the
performance mean (p<0.01).
We use Eq. ( 1 ) to investigate the relationship between contingent-fit and business-unit
performance and the moderating effects of contingent-fit on the relationship between
ownership structure and business-unit performance.
5. 1. Descriptive statistics
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for the contextual variables and Table 3
provides the descriptive statistics for contingent-fit and business-unit performance for
all companies partitioned by ownership structure. As predicted, widely-held business-
units perform better than their closely-held counterparts. A univariate comparison in
Table 3 indicates that the mean performance of 3.83 for widely-held business-units
is significantly higher than the mean performance of 3.43 for closely-held business-
units (/=2.91, p<0.0\). Although there could be other explanations for differences in
performance levels, this finding is consistent with previous literature which reports
that widely-held business-units have a performance advantage over their closely-held
counterparts due to a better access to fmancial and human resources (Gilles, 1999).
5.2. Hypothesis testing
Table 4 reports the regression results using both the average total score (column 3) and
a one-half standard deviation above/below the mean (column 4) of the strategic priority
scores as methods to classify business-units into their strategic priority.^ Since the results
are consistent across both specifications (there are stronger results based on the one-half
standard deviation above/below the mean, but at the expense of losing 68 observations),
we use and discuss only the results based on the average total score to classify business-
units into product differentiation or low-cost strategy.
By using the one-half standard deviation above/below the mean of strategy priority scores to classify business-
units into product differentiation or low-cost strategies, sixty-eight business units were excluded fi^om the analysis
due to lack of clear strategy.
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Table 4
Regression of business-unit performance on contingent-fit and ownership structure test of hypotheses HI, H2 and
H3 (/7-values in parenthesis)
Variables (1) Prediction (2) Results (3) Results (4)
Mean of strategic score
coefficient (p-values)
One-half standard deviation above/below
the mean coefficient (p-values)
Intercept 9
Owner +
Fit +
Fit*owner -
Adjusted R~
Sample size
1.429(0.344)
0.275 (0.02)**
0.422 (0.05)**
-0.835 (0.08)*
0.21
253
3.237 (0.227)
0.302 (0.01)***
0.448 (0.04)**
-0.657 (0.01)***
0.23
185
* Denotes significance level of 0.10.
** Denotes significance level of 0.05.
*** Denotes significance level of 0.01.
The F-statistics for the regression are statistically significant (/»<0.01) and the overall
explanatory power of the estimated regression is quite strong (adjusted i?^=0.21). The first
hypothesis (HI) predicts that contingent-fit between competitive strategy and its
contextual variables will be positively related to business-unit performance. The
significant positive coefficient on FIT (/?=0.05) supports this hypothesis, thus indicating
that business-units benefit from aligning their strategy with its contextual variables.
The second hypothesis (H2) predicts that widely-held business-units will perform better
than their closely-held counterparts. The positive and significant coefficient on OWNER
(/7=0.02) support this hypothesis. The result supports the view that due to their superior
access to financial and human resources, widely-held business-units tend to perfomi better
than their closely-held counterparts.
The third hypothesis (H3) predicts that the magnitude of the performance differential
between widely-held business-units and closely-held business-units will decrease with an
increasing level of contingent-fit. The negative and significant coefficient on
FIT*OWNER confirms this hypothesis. The result indicates that the higher the fit level,
the lower the performance differential between widely-held business-units and closely-
held business-units. The result is consistent with the argument that there is relatively more
opportunity for improvement for closely-held business-units as compared to widely-held
business-units and, therefore, the impact of contingent-fit on performance is greater for
closely-held business-units as compared to their widely-held counterparts.
It is interesting to note, however, that while we expect that the sum of the coefficients
for FIT and FIT*OWNER to be positive, the results show the opposite (0.422 FIT-0.835
FIT*OWNER=—0.413). One possible explanation for this result is that for widely-held
companies there are bound to be more inefficiencies which are being picked up in this
estimation.
5.3. Robustness checks
In this section we discuss the results of additional robustness checks pertaining to the
determination of fit construct and the development of the fit scores. We repeat our analysis
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Table 5
Results of factor analysis by strategic choice
Factor Eigenvalue Percent of variance explained
Product differentiation:
Strategic choice
Degree of centralization
Type of control 1
Type of control 2
Type of MAS 1
Type of MAS 2
Performance 1
Performance 2
Fit 1
Fit 2
5.87
2.69
2.63
2.03
6.26
2.66
5.15
1.07
1.65
1.37
43.85
33.81
44.73
19.02
57.22
11.85
33.00
27.38
58.73
67.26
77.65
63.75
69.07
60.38
Low-cost:
Strategic choice
Degree of centralization
Type of control 1
Type of control 2
Type of MAS 1
Type of MAS 2
Type of MAS 3
Performance 1
Performance 2
Fit 1
Fit 2
Fit 3
5.87
3.17
2.92
2.22
8.26
1.48
1.25
5.88
1.27
1.92
1.29
1.03
48.70
37.02
58.99
10.55
8.91
65.38
14.07
32.07
21.56
17.22
58.73
79.35
85.72
78.45
79.45
70.85
in Table 4 using factor analyses. To classify our sample into product differentiation and
low-cost strategies, we create a dummy variable of strategic choice based on mean raw
score of four for every item in the strategic choice questionnaires. Based on this procedure,
we obtain a total of 258 business-units (108 widely-held and 150 closely-held business-
units respectively).^ We perform two separate analyses for product differentiation and low-
cost business-units and we analyze the research questions related to strategic choice,
degree of centralization, types of control, types of management accounting systems,
performance, and contingent-fit.^
As shown in Table 5, for product differentiation business-units, strategic choice has one
factor (59% of the variance explained), degree of centralization has one factor (67% of the
variance explained), type of control has two factors (77% of the variance explained), types
of management accounting systems has two factors (64% of the variance explained),
There are three respondents that have factor scores equal to the cutting point and thus are excluded for further
analyses.
^ This variable was generated based on the results from factor analysis of the contextual variables using
principal components factor analysis with varimax rotation. In applying this procedure, factor with eigenvalues
greater than 1 .00 were retained.
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performance has two factors (69% of the variance explained), and contingent-fit has two
factors (60% of the variance explained). For low-cost business-units, strategic choice has
one factor (59% of the variance explained), degree of centralization has one factor (79% of
the variance explained), types of control has three factors (86% of the variance explained),
types of management accounting systems has three factors (78% of the variance
explained), performance has two factors (79%) of the variance explained) and
contingent-fit has three factors (71% of the variance explained).
We then correlate the fit factor with performance factor scores obtained from the
previous analysis. The results are presented in Table 6. Overall, the results are generally
consistent with those reported in Table 4 using raw data.
In addition, we also conducted a regression analysis using a fixed effects model to
investigate the possibility that the observations may not be completely independent. As
shown in Table 7, the results indicate that the relationship between fit and performance is
positive and significant, F=1.73, p<0.01. The interaction effect, however, is not
significant. Overall, the results of these two additional procedures are consistent with
Table 6
Correlation between contingent-fit and business-unit performance using factor analyses (p-values in parenthesis)
Unit of analysis Prediction Results
A. Total sample In= 258)
Contingent-fit 1
Contingent-fit 2
0.12(0.03)**
0.31(0.01)**''
B. Partition by ownership structure
Widely-held Business-units (/7=108)
Contingent-fit 1
Contingent-fit 2
Closely-held Business-units (/! = 150)
Contingent-fit 1
Contingent-fit 2
0.06(0.26)
0.37(0.01)***
0.21(0.01)***
0.26(0.01)***
C. Partition by strategic choice and ownership structure
Widely-held-Low-cost (n=7>\)
Contingent-fit 1 +
Contingent-fit 2 +
Contingent-fit 3 +
Widely-held-Product Differentiation (n=ll)
Contingent-fit 1 +
Contingent-fit 2 +
Closely-held-Low-cost («=66)
Contingent-fit 1 -l-
Contingent-fit 2 +
Contingent-fit 3 +
Closely-held-Product Differentiation (h=84)
Contingent-fit 1 +
Contingent-fit 2 +
0.04(0.42)
0.01(0.49)
-0.14(0.23)
0.11(0.18)
0.66(0.01)***
0.27(0.01)***
0.08(0.26)
-0.28(0.01)***
0.19(0.04)**
0.33(0.01)***
** Denotes significance level of 0.05.
*** Denotes significance level of 0.01.
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Table 7
Regression of business-unit performance on contingent-fit using a fixed effects model
Source Numerator DP Denominator DP F-value Significance
Intercept 1 82 2352.38
Fit 103 82 1.73
Fit*owner 17 82 0.90
0.000***
0.005***
0.576
Denotes significance level of 0.01.
those reported on Table 4 suggesting that contingent-fit contributes positively to
performance.
6. Discussion, limitation, and direction for future research
This study reports a positive relationship between fit and business-unit performance.
The results indicate that widely-held companies perform better than their closely-held
counterparts. The magnitude of performance differential between widely-held business-
units and closely-held business-units, however, decreases with an increasing level of
contingent-fit. With limited access to financial resources and professional executives,
and more family-oriented management style, closely-held companies might find it
difficult to compete against widely-held companies. Improving the degree of
contingent-fit between strategic orientation and its contextual variables might decrease
the performance gap between widely-held business-units and their closely-held
counterparts.
The results of this study should be interpreted in light of five limitations. First, the
findings are based on data fi^om Indonesian companies in industries that manufacture and
sell products to end customers. Therefore, the findings might not necessarily reflect the
general pattern of all companies across industries or across countries. Future research
might use cross-industry data as well as data fi^om other countries to investigate the
impact of contingent-fit on business-unit effectiveness as well as organizational-level
performance.
Second, while data collected from a survey and personal interviews might enable
researchers to explore the richness of reality by obtaining information that is not widely
available, possible bias due to subjective responses to the questionnaires should be taken
into consideration. Future research might use publicly available data to measure
companies' performance in areas such as return on investment, net income, or cash flow
fi^om operations, as well as to measure the contextual variables like research and
development expenses and market share to enhance the reliability of the constructs.
Third, the model to measure contingent-fit assumes deviations from the ideal patterns
of any contextual variables have equal effect on performance. This assumption can be
relaxed by assigning different weight for the same unit of deviations of different
contextual variables to represent the relative importance of the contextual variables on
performance. However, since the relative importance of the contextual variables on
performance is not known yet, this is left for future research.
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Fourth, performance in widely-held companies might be affected by agency cost due
to conflict of interest between management (agent) and shareholders (principal). Future
studies might investigate whether managerial incentives affect performance differently
for widely-held companies as compared to their closely-held counterparts.
Finally, other variables such as size, technology, and leadership style might also have
a significant effect on business-unit performance. The use of a single industry sample
coupled with the relative performance measures, however, minimizes the influence of
these control variables on the results of this study.
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Discussion
Discussion of ownership structure, contingent fit, and
business unit performance: A research model
and empirical evidence
Dariusz Zarzecki
University of Szczecin. Poland
1. Purpose of the study and definition of fit
The puqjose of the study is to investigate the influence of contingent fit on the
relationship between ownership structure and business unit performance. Therefore, the
definition adopted for "contingent fif is central to the development of theory, the
collection of data, and the statistical analysis.
Van de Ven and Drazin (1985) indicated at least three different conceptual approaches
to "contingent fit"—selection, interaction, and total systems approach. Each approach
significantly influences the essential meaning of contingency theory and the expected
empirical results.
The "selection" and "interaction" approaches are criticized for their inability to
measure the fit of a total system, whereas the system's approach is called into
question because of lack of rigorous approach and of the relatively high level of
subjectivity.
Jermias and Gani define "fif as the proper match between the firm's strategic
orientation and its structure. They measure this construct based on the normalized sum of
the "fit" contribution of each contextual variable as proposed by the fitness landscape
theory. They adopted a fitness landscape theory approach to define "fitness" between
strategic orientation and firm structure.
Fitness landscape theory is derived from biological sciences (Kauffman, 1993) in that
organisms evolve over time for survival, and that such an evolution can be viewed as a
journey to find a better "fit" to increase the chance of survival.
0020-7063/530.00 €> 2005 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
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2. Hypotheses
1. The authors expect a positive relationship between "contingent fit" and business unit
performance;
2. assume that widely held business units would perform better than closely held business
units; and
3. predict that performance differential would decrease with increasing "fif level.
They formulate these expectations in three hypothesis:
HI. Widely held business units will perform better than their closely held counterparts.
H2. "Contingent fif between competitive strategy and its contextual variables will be
positively related to business unit performance.
H3. The magnitude of the performance-advantage differential between widely held
business units and closely held business units will decrease with increasing level of
"contingent fit".
3. The regression analysis
Jermias and Gani use regression analysis to evaluate influence of ownership structure
on the relationship between "contingent fif and business unit performance. The regression
model takes the following form:
PERFORM, = 7o + 7iFIT, + -/.OWNER, + 73FIT,*OWNER, + 8,
where:
PERFORM,: Performance of business unit z determined by return on investment, profit,
cash flow from operations, cost control, development of new products, sales volume,
market share, market development, and personnel development and their relative
importance to the company,
FIT,: Contingent fit between competitive strategy and its contextual variables for
business unit /,
OWNER,: An indicator equal 1 for widely held company and for closely held
company.
4. Results
A univariate comparison of results indicates that mean performance of 3.83 for widely
held business units is significantly higher than the mean performance of 3.43 for closely
held business units; this finding is consistent with previous literature reporting that widely
held business units has performance advantage over their closely held counterparts due to
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a better access to financial and human resources; the F-statistics of the regression are
statistically significant (p<0.01; Adj. R~=0.2\);
The coefficient on "OWNER" is positively significant.
1. It means that widely held business units perform better than their closely held
counterparts.
2. This result is consistent with hypothesis HI;
The results are also consistent with hypotheses H2 and H3.
5. Variable measurement
Based entirely on a questionnaire survey instrument developed and refined based on
prior studies. The questionnaire was reviewed by three colleagues and a strategic
management executive for clarity and understandability prior to administration. A pilot
study was conducted to obtain preliminary results related to the hypotheses examined in
the paper.
6. Comments
The participants' opinions in response to a questionnaire are often excessively
subjective. The results may therefore be not as reliable as the regression results imply.
The authors use several variables that are easily measurable, e.g. percent of sales
spent on research and development, ROI, profit, cash flow from operations, sales
volume, market share which increases the quality and reliability of data and of the
study.
One of the potential explanations for the difference between mean performance of
3.83 for widely held business units and mean performance of 3.43 for closely held
business units is likely to be the dissimilarity of the perceived meaning and
measurement of business performance. Evaluating business performance of small
businesses is often more challenging and complex than evaluating performance of
larger firms.
Jermias and Gani specify five main characteristics distinguishing closely held
companies from their widely held counterparts:
1
.
limited number of shareholders (often family members),
2. stocks are not actively traded on an established market or held widely enough
to be subject to the disclosure requirements and oversight of securities
regulators,
3. systems and procedures are heavily influenced by entrepreneurial owners,
4. owners often have a larger stake in the firm than owners of widely held
companies,
5. managers encounter greater monitoring than managers of widely traded firms.
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Viewed from a different perspective, however, there are three principal categories of
differences between large firms and small companies that affect the business performance
analysis:
1
.
Operational differences—meaning the way businesses are organized,
2. Transactional differences—meaning the way that such firms are traded in their
respective transactional markets,
3. Market dynamics differences—in the data (in ternis of both quantity and quality),
methodology, and analytical factors that are involved directly in the business
perfonnance analysis.
From the business performance analysis perspective, the key operational differences
between large companies and small companies are noted in Pratt, Reilly and Schweihs
(1998) as follows.
Item Factor Large firms Small firms
Separate accounting
Owners' personal
expenses
Operational transactions
with the equity owners
Separate commercial
transactions
Usually, there are relatively few
transactions between the company
and the individual equity owners;
therefore, it is easy to keep the
accounting affairs separate from
the accounting for the equity
owners' affairs.
Nomially, the owners' personal
expenses are not paid by the
business.
Generally, there are very few
contractual or other transactions
with the equity owners.
The company has business
transactions that are totally
separate from those of the
equity owners.
Often, there are frequent transactions
between company and the individual
equity owners (e.g. shareholder
receivables, shareholder payables,
discretionary or personal expenses
paid by the company on behalf of the
owners, discretionary bonuses paid to
the employee-owners, etc.); therefore
it is sometimes difficult to keep a
separate accounting between the
company's affairs and the equity
owners affairs.
Often, the equity owners' discretionary
expenses are paid by the business.
The equity owners often own the real
estate and other assets used by the
subject small firm; the equity owners
lease these assets to the company.
The company business transactions are
often not easily separable from those
of the equity owners.
Managers of small firms are usually the owners of the business. Therefore, performance
of such businesses should be measured by both return on labor (the owner's remuneration)
and return on capital. Absent any need for third-party review, financial reporting is likely
to emphasize minimizing taxable income. Accordingly, eamings may be understated.
Thus, in small firms, return ratios that are based on eamings may be biased downward as
compared to similar ratios for larger firms (assuming other factors unchanged).
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There is also at least one key transactional difference between large companies and
small companies: business buyer motivations. In large companies, the buyer's primary
economic motivation is the expected return on equity-excluding personal salary
considerations. In small firms the buyer is often "buying a job", so that the salary of the
equity holder is considered part of the total return on investment analysis made by the
business buyer (Pratt et al., 1998). This difference may affect the ratios used to measure
business performance.
In other words, the same ratios may have completely different scope and meaning,
depending on the size and type of the business. It is also generally true that smaller
businesses are usually riskier than larger ones, which results in a higher cost of debt and a
higher cost of equity when compared to larger companies in the same industry.
A practical demonstration of a higher cost of capital in small companies is the size
premium, i.e. the excess retum of the traditional CAPM (Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and
Inflation. Valuation Edition 2003 Yearbook, Ibbotson Associates). Studies conducted by
Ibbotson show that size premium increases as companies get smaller. Despite higher
mortality rate in the population of small companies, many of them have substantially
higher returns than larger ones. Therefore, one might expect that closely held
companies (usually small businesses) would, on average, outperform widely held
firms. This is contrary to the results of the study by Jermias and Gani
—
probably due,
in part, to the authors' use of much broader definitions and measures of business
performance.
Jermias and Gani distinguish between two competitive strategies that are derived from
Porter (1985): (1) Low cost, and (2) Product differentiation. This classification raises a
question as to whether it describes the differences in competitive strategies. What about
branded products? Additionally, diversification itself has many dimensions, e.g. related
diversified, unrelated diversified. The strategy classification was derived as follows. If the
total score is higher than the mean, the business unit is classified as adopting a product
differentiation strategy. On the other hand, if the total score is below the mean, the
business unit is classified as adopting a low cost strategy. If the total score equals the mean
(i.e. the average total score=4), the business units do not have a clear strategic priority and
therefore were excluded from further analysis. Because of lack of clear strategy, the
authors excluded only 8 out of 281 responses received.
This simplistic cut-off point is inadequate. To mitigate this problem, the authors applied
an alternative approach for strategy classification based on one-half standard deviation
above/below the mean of the competitive strategy scores. This partitioning would
represent product differentiation (low cost) strategy as suggested by Cohen and Cohen
(1983).
The latter approach includes only business units with clear strategic orientation (i.e.
scores that are above/below one-half from the middle point).
7. Independence of variables
This study assumes that each contextual variable is independent of all the other
variables. However, some researchers argue for exploring the relationships among the
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contingency variables. Fisher (1998), for example, maintains that contingency research
should move beyond simple correlation and attempt to determine causality.
8. Other questions
It would have been helpfiil if the authors have explored the following questions:
1
.
Are there any country-specific factors that might influence results of the study?
2. What will happen when we use cross-industry data rather than data from companies
operating in end-users industries?
3. What will happen when we use other contextual variables? Which ones should be used
and why? What weights should be attached to those variables? How should the weights
be objectively established?
9. Conclusion
Despite the questions and issues raised above, this study is an interesting attempt
towards investigating the influence of "contingent fit" on the relationship between
ownership structure and business unit performance. Application of the model and its
upgraded versions can be extended to other countries and industries.
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1. Introduction
Our paper investigates the moderating effects of contingent fit on the relationship
between ownership structure and business-unit performance. We argue that closely-held
companies tend to have limited access to financial resources, professional executives, and
use more family-oriented management style as compared to their widely-held counterparts.
Consequently, widely-held companies will outperform their closely-held counterpart but
contingent fit will mitigate the performance advantage. Zarzecki (2005) raises several
legitimate concerns about the paper. His comments and suggestions can be summarized
into six issues. First, the conceptual ground for the performance advantage of widely-held
companies over closely-held companies. Second, the reliability of the results given that the
study relies solely on responses to questionnaires sent to respondents. Third, the use of
performance index which consists of more than one variable to represent business-unit
performance. Fourth, the method used to classify our sample firms into product
differentiation and cost leadership strategy. Fifth, the assumption that each contextual
variable contributes independently toward the contingent fit construct. Finally, the results
of our study that might be affected by factors other than those identified in our paper. The
following are our responses to each issue raised by the discussant.
* Corresponding author Tel.: +1 604 291 4257; fax: +1 604 291 4920.
E-mail addresses: jjermias@sfti.ca (J. Jermias), saQak@bit.net. id (L. Gani).
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2. Performance advantage of widely-held companies over closely-lield companies
Zarzecki (2005) argues that despite higher mortaHty rates in the population of small
companies, many of them have substantially higher returns than larger ones. He concludes
that closely held companies (usually small businesses) would outperform widely held firms
(usually larger businesses). This argument is consistent with Jensen (1993) who proposes
that managerial share ownership helps align the interest of shareholders and managers
resulting in superior performance (also known as the convergence of interest hypothesis). It
follows that since owners of privately-held companies are usually those who manage the
business, the conflict of interest between shareholders and managers in privately-held
companies tends to be lower than those in widely-held companies. Consequently, privately-
held companies will perform better than their widely-held counterpart.
Recent empirical studies, however, found that increasing level of managerial ownership
has negative effects on firm performance (Kole, 1995; McConnell & Sevaes, 1990; Morck,
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988; Short & Keasey, 1999). Short and Keasey (1999), for example,
argue that the increasing level of managerial ownership can transfer additional risk to
managers (i.e., owner-manager) beyond their non-diversifiable human capital which might
lead to risk-avoiding behavior on the part of management that is not in the best interest of
shareholders. In a similar vein, Zahra (1996) argues that managers' unwillingness to
engage in risky but strategically important projects might jeopardize a firm's sustainable
competitive advantage. Therefore, excessive risk carried by managers in closely-held
companies tends to have a negative affect on the performance of the companies.
The empirical findings are consistent with the arguments mentioned in the paper that
widely-held companies tend to perform better than their closely-held counterpart due to
factors such as superior access to financial and human resources, better equipped to develop
their marketing acumen and embrace changes in technology, and more willing to engage in
risky but profitable projects due to limited risk beyond their non-diversifiable human capital.
Zarzecki (2005) also suggests comparing the performance of widely-held and closely-
held companies in terms of return ratios. Following this suggestion, we perform a
univariate comparison between widely-held and closely-held companies in terms of return
on investment' (the only return ratio that we have in our performance variables). Table 1
shows the results of this procedure.
Table 1 indicates that the mean ROI of 3.49 of widely-held companies is significantly
higher than the mean ROI of 3.08 (/=2.512,/>=0.006). This result is consistent with those
using all nine performance indicators reported in the paper. That is, widely-held companies
outperform their closely-held counterparts.
3. Reliability of results that are based solely on responses to questionnaires
We acknowledge the limitation of the study due to its exclusive reliance on self-report
measures. As in any studies using questionnaires to gather data, possible bias due to
' The return on investment in our study is measured based on managers' assessment of the difference between
actual and budgeted ROI multiplied by the relative important of ROI to the business unit.
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Table 1
A univariate comparison between widely-held and closely-held companies in terms of return on investment
Companies N Mean (ROD Standard deviation /-value /j-value
Widely-held
Closely-held
106
147
3.49
3.08
1.52
1.12
2.512 0.006*
* Denotes significance level of 0.01.
subjective responses to questionnaires may occur. Despite this limitation, the method
enables us to explore the richness of reality by obtaining information that is not publicly
available. Furthermore, given that our study investigates the impact of contingent fit on
business-unit performance, the information that we need is not publicly available. Public
information regarding performance measures of companies is usually available only in
aggregate forms and does not contain detail information about performance of each
business unit in the companies. Govindarajan and Gupta (1985) argue that since many
performance variables critical to the success of a product differentiation strategy such as
new product development, personnel development, and market development, are not
available publicly, the use of publicly available measures to evaluate performance of every
business unit regardless of its strategic choice violates one of the fundamental axioms
underlying contingency research that include strategy as a contextual variable. We also
believe that the resuhs of the reliability test and procedures performed prior to
administering the questionnaires as discussed in the "research method" section in the
paper give us sufficient confidence in the appropriateness of the method used in our study.
4. The use of performance index which consists of more than one variables to
represent business-unit performance
Our study assesses business unit performance based on a multiplication of nine
performance dimensions with their respective relative importance perceived by the
business unit. Govindarajan and Gupta (1985) argue that the use of a multivariate
approach with criterion weights is particularly appropriate in a context where, by
definition, different strategic missions imply quite different sets of priorities. Therefore, we
believe that the measure of business-unit performance in the form of a comparison
between actual and budgeted performance, and multiply the result with the degree of
importance perceived by the business unit is suitable for our study because managers' a-
priori expectations of business-unit performance are likely to consider the anticipated
impact of the strategy adopted by the business unit.
5. The method to classify our sample firms into product-differentiation and cost-
leadership strategy
We use a mean-split approach to classify our sample firms into their strategic
orientation. As suggested by the reviewers of this journal, we also perfonned two
alternative approaches for this purpose. First, we use a one-half standard deviation above
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(below) the mean of the competitive strategy scores to represent product-differentiation
(low-cost) strategy. Second, we use factor analyses by creating a dummy variable of
strategic choice to group the strategic variable into product-differentiation and low-cost
strategy. Given the results of the two alternative approaches are consistent with those of
the mean-split approach, we believe that the results reported in the paper are robust to
different approaches used to classify firms into their strategic orientation.
6. The assumption that each contextual variable contributes independently toward
the contingent fit construct
We agree with Zarzecki's (2005) concern that the assumption of independent
contribution of each contextual variable toward the overall fit value is an idealization.
In a system with A'' contextual variables, the fit contribution of one variable may often
depend upon the other A^— 1 remaining variables. One method to deal with the dependency
among variables is by multiplying their fit contributions. Kauffman (1993) argues,
however, that, in general, we almost have no idea what might be the mutual influences of
the contextual variables on the overall fit of the system, and if the mutual contributions are
affected by a large number of variables, the interacting variables are mostly unknown.
Since the inter-relationship among contextual variables and their effects on fit are not
known yet, we leave this for future research.
7. The results of our study might be affected by factors other than those identified in
the paper
We thank Professor Zarzecki for his many useful suggestions regarding factors that
might be considered to extend our study such as using publicly available information to
minimize subjectivity, using data fi^om other industry and/or other countries, and using
other key operational variables that distinguish closely-held from their widely-held
counterparts. We will take advantage of these comments and suggestions in our ftiture
work and also hope that readers of the paper might utilize those advices when analyzing
the paper. We do believe, however, that the method used and results reported in our paper
can be applied to other settings.
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Gary Giroux, Detecting Earnings Management, Wiley, United States, 2004 (x+326 pp).
1. Introduction
This book tackles an interesting topic that has become quite timely in the wake of
recent financial-reporting scandals in the United States. It is primarily intended for
intermediate and advanced financial accounting students and for any practitioner with a
basic understanding of financial accounting (e.g., equity analysts, investors, financial
executives). Accounting scholars who are interested in the topic will also find this book
useful. Despite its relatively "hea\'y" content, the book is quite easy to read, largely due to
the author's effective writing style, his occasional use of humor, and extensive use of real-
life examples. In particular, examples are drawn fi^om the Apple Corp's annual report
throughout the book, and, where appropriate, additional references from other firms are
employed. Although the technical parts of this book are best suited for US users, many of
the technical and most of the non-technical parts could be used by international users to
draw parallels with other reporting environments. The book has 1 1 chapters that naturally
fall into three parts: chapters 1-3 (part one) describing the financial reporting environment,
chapters 4-8 (part two) addressing earnings management in the financial statements, and
chapters 9-11 (part three) presenting various other topics that are related to earnings
management. A detailed chapter-by-chapter discussion is provided below.
2. Part one
Part one of the book, comprising chapters 1-3, describes the financial reporting
environment. Chapter 1 introduces the topic by defining earnings management as the use
of operating and discretionary accounting methods to adjust earnings to a desired outcome.
(Alternative definitions of earnings management from the professional literature are
provided in Appendix 1.1.) Giroux presents several reasons why managerial opportunism
leads to eamings management pressures, to maximize short-term results, to meet market
and analyst expectations, to convey an impression the finn is financially healthy, and to
maximize managerial compensation. Next, the chapter outlines and briefly discusses the
institutional factors that are related to the eamings management environment: corporate
governance, auditing, accounting regulation and standard setting, eamings restatements,
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SEC enforcement actions, attorneys, investment bankers, and whistle blowers. Appendix
1.2 provides a brief overview of the academic literature on the topic.
Chapter 2 traces the history of financial-reporting scandals in the United States. Its main
theme is that recent scandals are, in part, similar to scandals from prior periods, both in
nature and relative import. This overview of financial scandals through time allows the
interested reader to gain insight into their common characteristics, such as corporate greed,
earnings management, and a tolerant institutional environment. The chapter provides
numerous examples of financial scandals that took place in the United States, starting from
the most recent, such as Enron, WorldCom, and AOL-Time Warner, and going back to the
crash of 1929 and the Robber Barrons of the 19th century. Appendix 2.1 provides a useful
overview of the major financial regulations implemented by government and the private
sector over the past 200+ years, which has often come in response to financial scandals.
Chapter 3 initially discusses the financial disclosures firms are required to make,
explaining in sufficient detail the basic format of the 10-K, and more briefly the 10-Q, and
the proxy statement. The author states that in evaluating a corporation's financial-reporting
quality, the first step is a qualitative assessment of the firm's financial-reporting
characteristics: the clarity of its business strategy, the reasonableness of its corporate-
governance structure, the report completeness and timeliness, transparency, the extent of
accounting conservatism, and any evidence of earnings manipulation. Potential areas of
concern are highlighted for each of these characteristics. The second step is a detailed
quantitative earnings management detection (EMD) strategy.
3. Part two
Part two, comprising of chapters 4-8, delves into the technical side of earnings
management, focusing on each of the three major financial statements. Chapter 4 describes
an EMD strategy for the balance sheet. The author proposes a two-step process, starting
with a restatement of all balance sheet accounts as a percentage of total assets (common
size analysis), and a comparison to direct competitors and prior years. Working capital and
leverage ratios provide useful heuristics in level 1 analysis. Essentially, in level 1 analysis
the investigator is looking for red flags. In level 2 analysis, the author highlights in detail
several potential problem areas, in separate tables, for current assets and liabilities, long-
term assets, long-term habilities, and stockholders' equity. Each table outlines each of the
major accounts, associated major earnings management concerns, and an EMD strategy
for that account.
Chapter 5 provides an EMD strategy for the revenue side of the income statement. The
investigator should be sensitive to managerial incentives to avoid reporting earnings below
zero, below analyst forecasts, or negative earnings; also, earnings that violate debt
covenants, compromise compensation expense, or raise political costs. In assessing
income-statement quality, as it pertains to both revenues and expenses, level 1 analysis
could involve comparisons to competitors, trends through time, and common size analysis.
As with all financial statements, important information could be hidden in the management
discussion and analysis or in the footnotes. Moving to level 2 analysis, the author
discusses a series of potential problems in revenue recognition, the specific concern in
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each case, and the suggested EMD strategy. Some of the important topics addressed are
sales-recognition policies, bill-and-hold sales practices, reporting leases as sales,
recognizing revenues before service is performed, and back-pocket sales. Several practical
examples are employed to help illuminate each of these topics. Last, evidence is provided
that earnings restatements are followed, on balance, by share-price declines. Chapter 6
considers expenses and non-recurring items. As with revenues, the key is the timing of
recognition and the application of the matching principle in general. Level 2 concems
relate to the cost of sales, the capitalization of R&D, software development, goodwill
costs, the treatment of reserves, depreciation methods, tax provisions, and expenses that
are hidden in a generic "other expenses" category. Also, the reasonableness of amounts
related to extraordinary items, discontinued operations, and accounting changes should be
considered. In addition to individual accounts, an assessment of earnings per share, market
value, and credit risk is suggested.
Chapter 7 studies the cash-flow statement. Unlike the income statement that is the
prime ground for earnings management, relatively little can be done to manage cash flows.
Nevertheless, a red flag would be any severe difference between the trend in net income
and the trend in cash flows. Additional specific concems relate to the composition of cash
flows from operations, investment, and financing activities; also, marketable securities,
taxes paid, stock options, negative working capital, and near zero cash balances. This
chapter also discusses alternative bottom-line (earnings) numbers and their relative
advantages and weaknesses, as well as pro forma earnings and S&P's core earnings.
Chapter 8 studies trends, norms, and quarterly analysis, essentially revisiting the issues
from chapters 4 to 7 using multi-period techniques. The main insight in studying trends is
that most eamings management activity is reversed in time. Studying the financial
statements through time helps uncover such activity, and can be performed using common
size analysis, growth analysis (studying percentage changes in the figures), and base-year
analysis (studying percentage changes using a base year to create an index). Shortcomings
of this approach are presented. One can similarly study temporal patterns in quarterly
statements. Although quarterly infomiation is seasonal, less complete, and unaudited, it is
more timely, and is often more likely to contain irregularities. The author proceeds to
outline various issues to look for when comparing financial statements through time,
highlighting potential balance sheet, income statement, and cash flow problem areas
separately. Detailed examples from the computer industry are used to highlight the main
points.
4. Part three
Part three of the book is an amalgam of various topics pertinent to eamings
management. Chapter 9 reviews business combinations as they pertain to eamings
management. The author provides a brief overview of the reasons for takeover activity and
the accounting freatment of business combinations, including the latest SFAS (141 and
142). Potential signals include the frequency and magnitude of acquisitions, prices paid,
and how new acquisitions fit into a firm's long-term strategy. Also, more specific areas of
potential concern following the acquisition are the accounting freatment of R&D,
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goodwill, and the allocation of asset values. Next, the author provides examples of
acquisition failures, a brief assessment of the related market reaction, and regulatorv' issues
related to acquisition activity. Further, the author describes the accounting implications of
ONMiership for equity investments, the equity method, and joint ventures, and how these
environments can give rise to various off-balance-sheet techniques that affect the financial
statements. The chapter closes by discussing the special earnings management
implications related to divestitures and segment reporting.
Chapter 10 discusses corporate governance, compensation, and other employee issues.
Initially, the role of the CEO and the board of directors are discussed, highlighting the
importance of a board that is independent of the CEO, delegating work to board
committees, and performance-related pay for outside directors. Next, the author discusses
the importance of well designed, performance-based pay packages for corporate
executives, the role of independent and competent audit-committee members, the
compromising role of transactions by related parties, such as investment bankers, on
independence, problems arising from insider-trading practices, and any evidence of past
abuse and ongoing problems. Last, the author reviews accounting for pension and other
post-employment benefits (OPEB). Potential areas for earnings management include, for
example, the actuarial assumptions made about the discount rate, the retum on plan assets,
and compensation increases, their trends and comparison to actual data, any reported plan
underfunding. negative pension (OPEB) expense, and the extent of pension (OPEB) plan
investment in company stock.
Chapter 11 covers risk management. deri\ati\es. and special purpose entities. After a
brief re\'iew of the types of risk and common deri\"ati\es, the author highlights related
earnings management concerns including the effectiveness of risk management and
hedging practices, fluctuations in derivative acti\it\'. speculation activity', and the gain and
loss recognition resulting from opting between fair-\alue and cash-flow hedges. Largely
motivated by the Enron scandal, in the second part of the chapter the author discusses
special purpose entities (SPEs). "separate legal entities established by asset transfer to
cany out some specific purpose" (p. 290). Cause for concern arises, for example, when
there is no apparent reason, based on the finn's expressed business strategy, for using
SPEs. the relative magnitude of off-balance-sheet SPEs. ambiguous related disclosures,
and their impact on financial ratios.
5. Discussion and conclusion
This book is best seen as tackling financial reporting qualit\' in general, more than
eamings management in particular. In several places in the book the discussion extends
beyond the confines of eamings management to describe, for example, the general
reporting environment, and the management of other t\pes of financial data. A major
challenge when dealing with financial-reporting qualit\' in general or eamings manage-
ment in particular is that these are elusive concepts. In many cases, current disclosure
requirements cannot ensure the definitive identification of areas where eamings qualit>' is
compromised, or of items that are being manipulated. An additional challenge is that
eamings management is more likely where judgment is in\ olved. The author makes very
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good suggestions on how to circumvent these problems with his two-step approach: first,
look for red flags through quahtative analysis, as he provides numerous suggestions for
potential areas of concern for each of the financial statements or specific settings; second,
once potential areas of concern are identified, delve into each potentially problematic
account in depth, studying trends, comparisons, statement notes, and management
discussion and analysis.
Although the academic literature has not been very successful in developing definitive
eamings management detection techniques, much work of value has been done that would
deserve some attention, 1 think, in any book on detecting eamings management. For
example, a section on the discretionary-accruals models that are common place in the
academic literature might have been useful. In a related vein, a discussion on the motives
for eamings management around corporate events such as equity offerings, litigation,
share repurchases, initial public offerings and the related empirical findings would enhance
the reader's understanding of the eamings management environment. On the other hand,
the material in this book is likely to stir some interesting research questions in its academic
readers. Further, ahemative data sources that could be used in academic research are
illuminated in the book.
In closing, given the breadth of the topic, it would be difficult for one book to tackle all
issues involved in sufficient depth. The author has made a commendable effort to tackle a
wide range of issues that are pertinent to eamings management. Most importantly, the
book's greatest contribution is in positing an approach for detecting eamings management
that is both easy to understand and fairly realistic to put in use. I would highly recommend
this book to anyone who is interested in understanding how to detect eamings
management.
Nikos Vafeas
University of Cyprus, Nicosia, Cyprus
doi:10.1016/j.mtacc.2005.01.006
David A. Guenther, Financial reporting and analysis. International Edition, New
York, New York, McGraw-Hill, 2005 (xx+521 pp).
This International Edition of Financial Reporting and Analysis by David
Guenther of the University of Colorado, has three goals in mind. "'First, the book is
highly conceptual in nature, examining financial reporting practice through the lens of
economics.
. .The second goal of the book is to give students a good sense of how
financial accounting information is used. . .The third goal is to be rigorous in terms of
topical coverage, while at the same time avoiding much of the detail that seems to
overwhelm students" (page vii). The text is only partially successful at achieving these
goals, as will be discussed in the following paragraphs of this review. But to begin, a
brief list of the contents of the textbook is as follows: (1) The Economics of
Accounting Information; (2) Accrual Accounting and the Income Statement; (3) The
Balance Sheet: Market Value versus Historical Cost; (4) The Cash Flows Statement
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and the Importance of Cash Flows; (5) Notes Receivable, Notes Payable, and the Time
Value of Money; (6) Timely Reporting: Recognizing Future Band News Early; (7)
Product Costs: Inventories and Cost of Goods Sold; (8) Allocating the Cost of Property
and Equipment; (9) Accounting for Income Taxes; (10) Investments in Intangible
Assets; (11) Investments in Other Companies; (12) Investments in Leased Assets (13)
Financial Instruments and Derivative Securities; (14) Pension and Other Postemploy-
ment Benefits; (15) Shareholders" Equity; (16) Earnings Management; (Appendixes A)
Who Makes Accounting Standards and Why Do They Do It?; (Appendix B) Recording
Accounting Transactions.
What can be readily seen in this list of contents is that apart from several chapters, the
material is similar in many respects to the material covered in most intermediate financial
accounting textbooks. This raises the question of whether there is something unique or
novel about this text. In answering this question it is perhaps useful to note that the
author's goal of being different and conceptual is most frilly realized only in Chapter 1,
dealing with the Economics ofAccounting Information, Chapter 6, dealing with Timely
Reporting, and Chapter 16, dealing with Earnings Management . The other chapters are
essentially reduced versions of what would ordinarily be found in an intermediate financial
accounting text, along with some rearrangement of material, for example, moving the
treatment of Cash Flows to Chapter 4. That being said, there is a rather effective treatment
of some recent difficult topics, such as Derivatives in Chapter 13.
The Preface to the text states that each of the chapters will be organized in the following
way: (1) each chapter includes a discussion of how the financial accounting information
discussed in the chapter is used to make decisions; (2) each chapter explains the
relationship between the accrual accounting concepts discussed m the chapter and cash
flows; (3) each chapter notes the differences between U.S. GAAP rules and the financial
reporting practices in other countries. In pursuit of this organizing principle, different
chapters focus the discussion on different companies (for example, DaimlerChrysler in
Chapter 1). As far as I can tell the only purpose ser\ed by focusing on a particular
company is to conform to the organizing principle set out in the Preface (see above).
While the text hews scrupulously to the organizing principle, it is only with regard to
the second aspect of the principle that the objective is achieved. For example, in Chapter
2, dealing with Accrual Accounting and the Income Statement, the focal company is
Microsoft. Income statements and extracts from footnotes for the fmancial statements of
Microsoft are used to illustrate certain accounting concepts like accrual accounting;
periodicity; revenue recognition; the matching principle; income statement display;
materiality; discontinued operations; extraordinary items; and changes in accounting
principle. There is a reasonably clear explanation of the relationship between these
accrual accounting concepts and cash flows, but the discussion of how accounting
information is used to make decisions is virtually absent. In addition, the discussion of
the differences between U.S. GAAP rules and financial reporting practices in other
countries is somewhat superficial, concentrating primarily on an illustration of what
Microsoft's income statement would look like if it was prepared according to British
GAAP. This lesser emphasis on the use of accounting for making decisions and on the
comparisons between U.S. GAAP and financial reporting in other countries is replicated
in most of the other chapters.
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The author states that Chapter 6, Timely Reporting: Recognizing Future Bad News
Early, is a distinctive aspect of the text. In this regard, the topics covered in Chapter 6
include the concept of economic income; accounting for bad debts; lower of cost or
market asset impairments; restructuring charges; contingent liabilities; warranties; and
discontinued operations. The author asserts that such accounting practices are evidence
of conservatism. While this assertion may be accepted as accurate in a general sense, the
question arises whether the concept of conservatism is as important or significant a
concept, either in U.S. GAAP or in the financial reporting practices of other countries,
as Chapter 6 would imply. In recent years, both the SEC and the FASB have de-
emphasized conservatism as a fundamental principle, replacing it instead with fair-value
measurements, which are deemed to be more relevant for decision makers. There is, of
course, a certain correspondence between accounting practices which are said to be
conservative and fair-value measurements. For example, reducing tangible fixed assets to
their impaired values is congruent with a fair-value measurement approach. Even though
there is no comparable ability to remeasure upwards in U.S. GAAP, one could
nevertheless argue that revaluation downward due to a perceived asset impairment is a
form of fair-value measurement and not necessarily a hallmark of conservatism in
accounting practice.
This text has many good aspects. The writing is clear and the graphics are good. The
chapter-end questions and exercises are well conceived and the support materials appear to
be abundant. The primary question in the mind of this reviewer is whether this text offers
much that is new or different to instructors of accounting in countries outside North
America. The forthcoming requirement that all member states of the European Union
adopt standards promulgated by the International Accounting Standards Board as of
January 2005 makes this question even more pertinent. The text does not discuss or
integrate lASB standards, thus presenting a lacuna which would caution against adoption
of this text by most European and Austral-Asian instructors, other than in a course
focusing primarily on U.S. GAAP financing reporting. Given the increasingly rapid
evolution and convergence of financial accounting standards setting, one wonders whether
a focus on U.S. GAAP will in the future be considered appropriate even in textbooks
intended primarily for the domestic American market.
C. Richard Baker
Adelphi University^ Garden City,
NY, United States
doi:10.1016/j.intacc.2005.01.007
Colin Drury, Management and cost accounting, 6th edition, Thomson Learning,
London, 2004 (xxxii+1280 pp.).
Colin Drury's Management and Cost Accounting, now in its sixth edition, is one
of many in the overcrowded field of management accounting textbooks. The topics
that comprise management accounting are more or less standard throughout the world,
which makes the choice for a specific textbook one of didactic considerations (as it
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should with textbooks) and a matter of personal taste—where one student is
enlightened by a term like "peanut butter costing," others will feel more at ease with
"plant-wide rate." Next to the quality of exposition, there are several other issues
which determine the quality of a textbook, such as the structure (ordering of
chapters), the number and quality of the exercises, and the availability of (web)
support.
1. Outline of the book
The book has six parts which are divided into 26 chapters. As the author indicates in
his preface, the book's structure is based on the premise that there are three main
applications of management accounting information: profit measurement and inventory
valuation using full costs, decision making using relevant costs, and management
control.
Part 1 , the introduction, consists of two chapters—one on the nature of management
accounting and one on basic cost categorizations (fixed vs. variable, direct vs. indirect).
Part 2 discusses "Cost accumulation for inventory valuation and profit measuremenf in
five chapters. Chapter 3, titled "Cost assignment," discusses traditional and activity-
based costing systems. Both approaches are presented as variants on the same principle
of "two-stage allocations": in the first stage, costs are grouped into pools, or centers. In
the second stage, the costs of the pools or centers are allocated to the cost objects.
Thus, rather than pitching activity-based costing as something completely different, it is
presented as an extension of the traditional methods that use main (production)
departments and support (service) departments: "ABC systems tend to establish
separate cost driver rates for support centers, and assign the cost of support activities
directly to cost objects without any reallocation to production centers" (p. 72). Also, it
is recognized that the "traditional vs. ABC" dichotomy is partly a question of
terminology: "To emphasize the point that ABC systems use cause-and-effect second
stage allocations the term cost driver tends to be used instead of allocation base" (p.
74). In our experience, teaching ABC as "simply" another variant of cost assignment
helps students understand it better than presenting it as a completely novel costing
method. Chapter 4, which focuses on accounting entries for a job-costing system, can
be skipped in management accounting courses. Chapters 5, on process costing, and 6,
on joint costing, show that it is problematic to distinguish between the use of
management accounting information for full-costing purposes and for other purposes:
process costing is difficult (and interesting) when deviations of normal operations occur
(e.g. treatment of abnormal losses), and in discussing joint costing the notion of
relevant costs is essential. Finally, Chapter 7 deals with absorption versus variable
costing.
Part 3, 'Information for decision-making', starts with a separate chapter (8) on break
even analysis (which is a lot of attention for such a simple concept). Chapter 9
discusses relevant cost decisions in five settings: special orders, bottleneck calculations,
replacement decisions, make-or-buy decisions, and discontinuation decisions. This
chapter thus provides for a concise discussion of the nature of relevant costing issues:
Book reviews 109
simply look for those costs that change. Chapter 10, on ABC, seems a bit out of place:
there is an overlap with Chapter 3 that may be confiising for students and while
activity-based costing is discussed in the Part 3, "Information for decision-making," its
relation to decision making is limited to a discussion on activity hierarchies (unit-level,
batch-level, product-sustaining, and facility-sustaining activities). The chapter further
discusses more advanced issues related to ABC, such as resource consumption versus
resource supply. Pricing policies and customer-profitability analysis are discussed in
Chapter 11, which is—like the chapter on break-even analysis—a bit low in content.
After Chapter 12, on decision making under uncertainty. Chapters 13 and 14 deal with
capital-investment decisions. The techniques are adequately discussed, although
students will not understand annuities after reading Chapter 14, since this requires
more attention than simply referring to an annuity table. Later in this review we will
discuss Part 3 a little more.
In Part 4, "Information for planning, control and performance measurement," the first
three chapters (15 to 17) provide a largely qualitative discussion of management-control
issues. Topics such as control types (action vs. personnel vs. results controls),
responsibility centers, the motivational quality of budgets, and the budgeting process
are discussed adequately at an introductory level. The discussion on "contingency theory
and organizational and social aspects of management accounting" is perhaps too in-
depth; it falls out of pace with the rest of the book. Chapters 1 8 and 1 9 discuss variance
analysis. The notation in these chapters does not help one understand the similarities
between materials and labor variances. Also, the level of detail in the analysis is
sometimes too much. We have yet to encounter an example of the useftilness of
calculating variable overhead expenditure variance, or of the volume- efficiency variance
of fixed overheads. Chapter 19 has some good qualitative discussions on different types
of variances, and on the pros and cons of standard costing. Chapter 20, on divisional
performance measures, deals with return on investment and residual income. Finally,
Chapter 21 is about transfer pricing. The exposition of transfer-pricing issues uses
economic reasoning (i.e. declining sales with increasing price), which is not the most
optimal approach in a management accounting course. In our experience, the essence of
transfer-pricing problems is better explained using relevant-cost decisions such as special
orders.
Having presented the three main applications of management accounting in
Parts 2 to 4, attention is directed at "new" techniques in management accounting
in Part 5, "Cost management and strategic management accounting." Chapter 22
briefly discusses a variety of cost-management techniques such as life-cycle cost-
ing and target costing. It is difficult to get across the possibilities and difficulties
of target costing in two pages or less, and the chapter does not succeed in this.
' Chapter 23 mainly deals with the balanced scorecard, its advantages and
limitations. It lacks a discussion of what makes measures suitable (are they
specific, measurable, accurate, etc.) and why non-financial measures are popular in
the first place.
Finally, Part 6, "The application of quantitative methods to management accounting,"
discusses techniques such as regression analysis, economic order quantity, and linear
programming in three chapters.
I
I
I
j
I
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2. Discussion
The back cover plugs the book as "Europe's market leading management accounting
textbook." We have to take the book's word for it, but if this is really the case, where
would this come from? What makes it stand out relative to its competitors? In this field,
there is no escaping Cost accounting, a managerial emphasis (2003) by Homgren, Datar,
and Foster (hereafter HDF), so let us take this book as a typical textbook. The one thing
that immediately stands out is the logical structure of Drury's book. By taking the main
applications of management-accounting information as the basis for structuring, a logical
grouping of topics results. For example, the basics of cost allocation are discussed in one
chapter (3), instead of the four chapters scattered throughout HDF. Overall, the individual
chapters cover topics that are logically grouped together. Since each instructor has his or
her own preference in presenting the topics throughout a course, reference can be made to
complete chapters rather than having to take bits and pieces out of different chapters.
Compared with the previous (fifth) edition, the number and order of the chapters have
not changed; in fact, textual differences are rather limited. This brings us to the second
strong point of the book compared to HDF: it chooses to present all concepts by using
simple settings, with simple numbers presented separately in boxes, and not in rurming
examples throughout the main text. Thus, the book explains each concept directly rather
than in a complicated setting with many realistic embellishments. This presentation
allows instructors to refer to the book while still using their own favorite examples and
settings in class.
The major changes in the sixth edition are to be found in new material to support the
main text. First, a number of "real-world view" boxes are introduced, to illustrate the use
of accounting techniques in practice. In general, these are somewhat detached from the
text itself, and do not always provide interesting examples. Second, each chapter
concludes with a two-page summary that follows the learning objectives of the chapter.
The summaries are very good in their length and depth. Third, the book provides frilly
worked answers to some 20 large exercises per chapter. Also, some 15 review questions
per chapter are asked about the concepts and definitions discussed in the chapter,
indicating the pages where the answers can be found. This is an excellent way of
helping students study the theory as well as the techniques of management and cost
accounting. Finally, all case studies have been moved to the web site accompanying the
book, which allows the author to provide a greater number of case studies. The web
support of the sixth edition offers teaching notes to all cases, as well as an abundance of
exfra questions and answers. These are not very helpfiil, however, given the large
number already available in the book. Somewhat more interesting are the interactive
multiple-choice questions with direct feedback. Powerpoint slides were not available yet
at the time of writing this review.
There are two detailed issues that we would like to discuss, related to Chapter 3 and to
Part 3. As we discussed above, in Chapter 3 Drury presents activity-based costing as an
extension and improvement compared to traditional costing systems, rather than as a
separate category of costing systems. We would suggest that this idea could be taken
frirther by Drury and that accurate costing systems could be presented as a continuum.
Chapter 3 could then talk first about general guidelines for improving cost-accounting
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systems (such as more direct cost tracing, more homogeneous cost pools, cause-and-effect
cost-allocation bases, going from averages to metered costs, and maybe even reciprocal
cost allocations). In fact, HDF discuss such guidelines in a brief section (on page 140, 141)
that is, however, not used as a main theme in their text. After that. Chapter 3 could position
activity-based costing as being the kind of costing systems that incorporate "many" of such
guidelines. Drury seems to implicitly consider activity-based costing as a gradual
development, and we suggest making this an explicit and central leitmotif for treating
costing systems.
A second detailed point is the connection between the Chapters in Part 3
"Information for decision-making." This connection is explained very clearly at the
beginning of Chapter 9, where it is emphasized that "a decision relevant approach
adopts whichever planning time horizon the decision maker considers appropriate for a
given situation" (page 314). The chapter on capital-investment decisions (13) is
introduced as being about the time value of cash flows. For any decision (not just
for capital-investment decisions), the analysis should be about "fiature cash flows, which
will differ between the various alternatives being considered" (page 314). We would
suggest taking this approach one step further in terms of consistently discussing all
decisions as applications of the differential cash-flow concept, whereby timing
differences are covered through discounting. We would suggest discussing the examples
in Chapter 9 such that the cash flows at different points in time are described with an
explicit time horizon. For example, on page 322 and fiarther, the decision on the
replacement of equipment could be described in terms of the cash flows (for each
alternative) in years 1, 2, and 3, and the three alternatives could be compared based on
the net present value or other criteria discussed in Chapter 13. The examples in Chapter
9 do not explicitly talk about the timing of cash flows and the project horizon, and such
differences hide the basic similarities between all decisions (as emphasized in the
introduction to Part 3). In the same way, we would like to see a more explicit connection
between the chapter on activity based costing (10) and the differential cash flow
concept.
Some weak points of the book remain. Next to the content issues discussed in the
outline and above, a major issue is the quality of the exercises. Many of the exercises
require a good deal of number crunching before the actual concepts can be applied. Also,
complex descriptions in the exercise aim to introduce real life complexity, but often lead to
ambiguous problems, again deterring students from trying to understand the real issues. At
over 1300 pages, it is quite voluminous (the fifth edition was called "the telephone book"
by our students, and that had 100 fewer pages).
Ultimately, Drury's book is about the techniques of management accounting. As
such, it is limited in its attention to new concepts (you won't find "key performance
indicator'' or "non financial measures" in the index, although the concepts are
discussed) or specific types of organizations. If the student understands a concept such
as cost allocation, he/she can apply it anywhere, whether it is a manufacturing, service,
intemet, or government organization. Since the explanation of the concepts is done very
well, in a logical structure, the book is very well suited for introductory management
accounting courses at the both the undergraduate and the graduate level. We expect to keep
using it for a considerable time.
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The relevance of financial statement infonnation
for executive perfonnance evaluation:
Evidence from choice of bonus plan
accounting performance measures
Debra L. Krolick*
Cornerstone Research. 360 Mewhiay Street. Fifth Floor. Boston. AfA 02115. United States
Abstract
I explore whether the t>pe of accounting performance measure used in the CEO bonus plan
provides an indication of the informativeness of the firm's financial statements for purposes of
performance evaluation. Using contingency table analysis and LOGIT regressions, I find firms with
high levels of unrecorded intangible assets rely significantly less often on accounting rate-of-retum
measures (vs. earnings alone) in executive bontis plans.
© 2005 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Intangible assets; Bonus plan; Accounting rate of return
1. Introduction
I explore whether the Compensation Committee's choice of accounting performance
measures in the bonus plan for corporate officers provides an indication of the relevance of
the finn's financial statements. I examine the relevance of accounting infonnation for the
evaluation and compensation of top corporate executives.
I investigate whether the Compensation Committee's choice of bonus plan accounting
performance measure reflects the expected infonnativeness of the balance sheet for
* Tel.: +1 617 927 1518.
E-mail address: dkrolick@comerstone.com.
0022-7063/$30.00 C 2005 University of Illinois. All rights reserved,
doi: 10. 1016/j.intacc.2004.1 1.002
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purposes of perfonnance evaluation. I hypothesize that firms with significant investments
in intangible assets not reflected on their balance sheets avoid accounting rate-of-retum
measures (in favor of measures based on only income statement infonnation) in executive
bonus plans. Using proprietary data from Hewitt Associates, I document that firms
expected to have high levels of unrecorded intangible assets rely significantly less often on
accounting rate-of-retum measures in executive bonus plans.
While an extensive body of capital market research examines the infonnation content of
financial statement information for valuing corporate equity, relatively little prior empirical
research explores a firm's choice among specific accounting measures for evaluating the
performance of executives. I document systematic differences among the firms' choices of
accounting performance measures in executive bonus plans and examine whether these
choices vary with the intensity of the firms' investments in intangible assets.
The study proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents background information and develops
the hypotheses. Section 3 reviews related literature, and Section 4 discusses the sample
and data. Section 5 explains my proxy for investment in intangible assets, and Section 6
analyzes the relation between accounting performance measure choice and expected level
of unrecorded investments in intangible assets. Section 7 concludes the study.
2. Background information and hypothesis development
The bonus plan is only one component of total executive compensation. Besides a
salary and bonus, a CEO might receive stock options, stock appreciation rights, phantom
shares, performance units, performance shares, or other types of incentive pay.' The
Compensation Committee can choose different perfonnance measures, including stock
return, accounting return, and nonfinancial measures, to determine how much of each form
of compensation the executive will earn. Results from theoretical literature support the use
of multiple performance measures to induce the desired allocation of effort among the
agent's multiple tasks and to reduce the noisiness of perfonnance measures resulting fi-om
events beyond the manager's control." While many types of compensation are based on
stock return measures, virtually all bonus plan contracts rely on accounting measures:
earnings-based, accounting rate-of-retum, or both. I interpret the choice of bonus plan
performance measure as providing information about the Compensation Committee's
belief in the relative informativeness of financial statement summary measures.
1 divide firms into two categories: those with only income statement infonnation as
bonus plan performance measures, and those with rate-of-retum performance measures, or
' A stock appreciation right permits the executive to receive in cash the difference between the stock price and
the exercise price. Executives earning phantom shares receive the cash value of the shares rather than the stock
itself A performance unit permits executives to earn an amount of cash that depends on the attainment of long-
term performance goals based on accounting numbers (such as earnings per share or return on assets).
Performance shares are similar to performance units except that the executive earns shares of stock instead of
cash. The annual bonus is only one component of the executive's total compensation package which may include
these long-term accounting-based plans.
" See, for example, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) and Feltham and Xie (1994).
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a combination of income-statement-based and rate-of-retum measures/ I define income
statement information to be a measure of earnings or some component of earnings, such as
sales. Accounting rate-of-retum measures combine income statement and balance sheet
infonnation by dividing income by a measure of assets (return on assets), equity (return on
equity), or total capital (return on capital).
The examination of the choice of accounting performance measures in bonus plans
presents an opportunity to discern the Compensation Committee's beliefs about the
infonnativeness of performance measures based, in part, on the finn's balance sheet. I
assume the Compensation Committee chooses the accounting performance measure(s) that
best reflect executives' contribution to firni value. Holmstrom (1979) shows that any
costless performance measure that is marginally infonnative about an agent's actions will
improve the efficiency of the contract with the agent. Under Holmstrom's definition, a
measure is infonnative if no second measure (or set of measures) is a sufficient statistic for
the first measure with respect to the agent's actions. Given that firms are required to report
the balance sheet and income statement to shareholders, it is reasonable to view
performance measures based upon these financial statements as costlessly available for
contracting purposes. Consequently, 1 interpret the selection of a rate-of-retum performance
measure, which incorporates both balance sheet and income statement infonnation, to be an
indication of the relevance of the balance sheet for purposes of perfomiance evaluation."*
Results from the theoretical literature suggest reasons why a Compensation Committee
might choose particular bonus plan performance measures. Banker and Datar (1989) show
that the relative weight on each of two linearly aggregated performance measures depends
only on the sensitivity of the measure to the agent's actions and the precision with which
the measure captures the agent's actions. Feltham and Xie (1994) characterize the value of
including an additional performance measure in a contract as a function of the precision of
the measure and the congmence between the impact of the agent's actions on the measure
and on firm value. Paul (1992) shows analytically that stock price need not provide
efficient incentives in a multi-task setting because price captures the value of the finn
rather than the value-added by the manager. Bushman and Indjejikian (1993) model how
the relative weights on eamings and stock price in a compensation contract vary with the
information content of eamings.
For firms with significant investments in intemally generated intangible assets, rate-of-
retum measures will not capture completely the relation between net income and the
investments that generate net income. While the income statement reflects revenues earned
from total assets in place, both tangible and intangible, the balance sheet reflects the
icquisition cost, less depreciation, of only tangible and acquired intangible assets, omitting
nvestments in intemally developed intangible assets. As a result. Compensation
I'ommittees of firms with significant investments in these assets may be more likely to
I'ely only on income statement information to determine executive bonuses. This problem
Firms do not usually disclose the weights applied to bonus plan pertbmiance measures. Therefore, the
T'artition based on reliance on or avoidance of accounting ratc-of-retiim measures is used only as an indicator of
le relative infonnativeness of financial statement information between the two groups.
None of my sample finns uses a bonus plan performance measure based on only balance-sheet information
g., capital expenditures or debt reduction) without also reporting an accounting rate-of-retum measure.
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is not one of bias; if accounting rate-of-retum were simply biased upward because the
denominator was too low, then the Compensation Committee could just raise the target
level. Adjusting the target level will not alleviate the problems caused by a measure that
does not reflect accurately the relation between earnings and the underlying (net) assets,
and thus may not capture how managers' actions contribute to firni value.
I hypothesize that firms with high levels of internally developed intangible assets will
avoid accounting rate-of-retum measures because the balance sheet does not reflect fully
the assets of the firm.^ Under U.S. generally accepted accounting principles, all costs
related to intemally developed intangible assets, such as brand names and patents, are
charged to earnings as incurred. Although many argue that investing in advertising, R&D,
and human capital helps create assets (probable future benefits), the AICPA Special
Committee on Financial Reporting (1994) states that users generally oppose recognition of
these assets, in part because no objectively reliable method determines their values. As a
result, intemally generated intangible assets that create significant weahh for the firm are
not recognized on the balance sheet. Users of financial statements may consider the
balance sheets of firms with high levels of unrecorded intangible assets to be less
informative about the firm's prior investments than the balance sheets of other firms. The
concem about the relevance of financial statements has increased as the economy has
become more reliant on knowledge-based assets. Steven M.H. Wallman, a Commissioner
of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, stated:
Traditional financial statements are now significantly less reflective of the assets that
create wealth than in times past. Intangible assets such as brand names, intellectual
capital, patents, copyrights, expenditures for research and development, human
resources, etc. are generating an increasing amount of our overall wealth.^
Compensafion Committees may choose to incorporate nonaccounting performance
measures in incentive plans. However, virtually all of my sample firms rely at least in part
on accounting performance measures to determine annual bonuses for top executives. In
this paper, my focus is on the choice between types of accounting measures; I do not
address a possible shift from accounting measures to nonaccounting measures.
Because expenditures related to internally developed intangible assets are expensed as
incurred, the revenues from intangible assets are often reported in different accounting
periods from the costs incurred to generate those assets. My tests focus on the reliance on
or avoidance of accounting retum measures; however, the earnings of firms with
significant investments in intangible assets can also be a relatively poor measure of a
manager's contribution to firm value during the year. The effect on earnings from
investing in an intangible asset changes through the life cycle of the asset. During the early
^ Investments in intangible assets are only one reason why firms might choose to avoid rate-of-retum measures.
Other potential influences on accounting-performance-measure choice include regulator}' restrictions on utilities
which earn higher-than-expected rates of retum.
"" Wallman (1996).
^ Research that explores the use of nonaccounting measures includes Bushman, Indjejikian, and Smith. (1996),
who investigate firm and CEO characteristics associated with the weight placed on individual performance
evaluation in CEO's annual incentive plans. Also, Itmer, Larcker, and Rajan (1997) examine how the relative use
of nonfinancial and fmancial measures in executive bonus contracts varies with firm characteristics and strategies.
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Stages of an intangible asset's life, expenditures are large but revenues are small or zero;
thus, earnings do not reflect the benefits of current expenditures to develop intangible
assets. In contrast, a mature intangible asset produces revenues with little or no additional
investment, causing earnings to reflect the benefits realized fi^om investment decisions
made in prior periods. If a firm is in a "steady state," earnings will be less affected by
reporting in different periods the expenses associated with investments in intangibles and
the revenues fi^om those investments. My sample consists of large, established firms which
I expect have both mature assets and assets in development. For these firms, I expect the
value of reported earnings to be less affected than the value of reported assets by the
immediate expensing of investments in intangibles. Consequently, for sample firms with
high prior investments in intangible assets, I expect income-statement-based measures,
such as sales and earnings, to be more reflective of executive performance than accounting
rate-of-retum measures, which rely on both the income statement and the balance sheet.
3. Related literature
My research question is related to several areas of literature. The first is research
examining the relation between accounting perfonnance measures and manager
compensation. Several papers (including Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Lambert & Larcker,
1987; Sloan, 1993) investigate the sensitivity of executive compensation to stock retums
and accounting performance measures. These studies find both types of measures are
positively associated with executive compensation. However, the empirical tests of these
studies use one accounting performance measure for all firms (usually return on equity
[ROE], which incorporates both income statement and balance sheet information). My
results might affect the interpretation of these studies if the relative sensitivity of executive
compensation to stock return and accounting return measures is affected by the finn's
choice of accounting performance measure.
Lambert and Larcker (1987) suggest that cross-sectional differences in the correlation
between stock return and ROE affect the relative influence of stock return and accounting
retum measures on executive cash compensation. Lambert and Larcker find a lower
correlation between ROE and stock retum is associated with a higher relative weight on
ROE and a lower relative weight on stock return.^ However, my results indicate the
\
correlation between ROE and stock-return is lower for firnis that do not rely on accounting
!
rate-of-retum performance measures.
\
Additional studies examine cross-sectional differences in the relation between
compensation and firm performance. Ely (1991) uses a sample of firnis from four diverse
' industries (banking, electric utility, oil and gas, and retail grocery) to document differences
in the relation between CEO compensation and firm perfonnance. She observes little
i evidence of differences across industries in four targets explicitly disclosed by finns: stock
1 retum, retum on assets, net interest income, and revenues. Most of her sample firms with
bonus plans use some form of retum on assets (again, a measure incorporating both
' See also Ittner, Larcker, and Rajan (1997), who find higher correlations between accounting retum measures
and annual market retums are associated with lower use of nonfinancial measures in executive bonus contracts.
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income statement and balance sheet information). However, her only sample industry in
which R&D or advertising would appear to be significant is oil and gas, where
capitalization of exploration costs is permitted. In her analysis of the implicit relation
between compensation and performance, she finds significantly different coefficients
across her four industries when she regresses CEO salary and bonus amounts on stock
return, ROA, and two industry-specific accounting measures used by analysts.
Clinch ( 1991 ) explores the relation between compensation contracts and levels ofR&D
expenditures, examining both cash compensation (salary plus bonus) and a measure of
total compensation. He finds a stronger association between total compensation and both
stock and accounting performance measures for high-R&D versus low-R&D firms, a
result which appears to be driven by small finns. Again, Clinch uses a rate-of-retum
measure, ROE, as the accounting performance measure for all firms.
Bushman, Engel, Milliron, and Smith, (1998a) conclude that the importance of earnings
relative to stock return in determining executive's cash compensation has declined over
time. Bushman, Engel, Milliron, and Smith, (1998b) find the value-relevance of earnings
and the presence of growth opportunities relative to assets in place are cross-sectional
detemiinants of differences in the ratio of the sensitivities of earnings and stock market
returns to cash compensation.
This paper also contributes to research investigating the value-relevance of financial
statements of firnis in technology-based industries. Lev and Zarowin (1999) find an increase
(decrease) in R&D intensity (R&D/Sales) over time is associated with a decrease (increase)
in earnings infomiativeness. Amir and Lev (1996) conclude financial statement information
alone, without adjusting for the expensing of intangible assets or incorporating nonfinancial
information, is largely irrelevant for the valuation of cellular companies. Aboody and Lev
(1998) find the capitalization of software development costs is value-relevant to investors.
Lev and Sougiannis (1996) provide evidence which suggests the capitalized value of
investments in R&D (a measure not disclosed on financial statements) provides information
to shareholders. They estimate the value ofR&D capital for their sample firms and adjust the
reported earnings and book value for the capitalization and amortization of R&D. They
regress firni return on earnings before the adjustment for R&D capitalization and on the
adjustment and find evidence the adjustment is value-relevant to investors.
4. Sample and data
The sample consists of 376 firms that have financial statement data on Compustat and
compensation data on a Hewitt Associates LLC proprietary database representing the results
from Hewitt Associates' 1987-1993 compensation surveys of public domestic companies.
The surveys are mailed annually to participating firms, who divulge confidential infonnation
about the compensation of their executives and pay a fee to obtain results summarizing the
information from all contributing firms. The data used in these tests are the finns' answers to
the following question: "What financial measures are used to determine annual bonus plan
awards to top corporate officers?" The firms provide a list or description of the performance
measures used. Since many firms participate repeatedly in the survey, I use only one year's
data from each finn to prevent unequal weighting. The sample comprises the first
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observation for each firm,'^ which was examined and assigned to one of two groups. The
first group, which I call rate-of-retum reliers, consists of firms that report the use of
accounting rate-of-retum measures, such as return on equity, or rate-of-retum measures in
combination with income statement or other measures (such as individual performance
evaluation, customer satisfaction, or other nonfinancial measures). The second group,
called rate-of-retum avoiders, report the use of income statement measures alone or in
combination with other performance measures, but no accounting rate-of-retum
measures.'*^ I exclude firms listing solely discretionary performance measures or those
whose perfomiance measures could not be classified.
Table 1 presents the distribution of performance measures across firms. Half the sample
relies on only income-statement-based information to compute executive bonuses, while an
additional 13% combine income-statement-based information with nonaccounting meas-
ures, such as individual performance evaluation or market share. Consistent with the
findings of prior literature (Ely, 1991; Ittner, Larcker, & Rajan, 1997), I find stock retum is
not commonly used as a bonus plan performance measure. Only one finn in my sample
reported using stock-market-based performance measures in conjunction with accounting
performance measures.
Analysis (not reported) of the distribution of performance measures across the 48 two-
digit SIC codes represented in the sample reveals that for firms with two-digit SIC codes
above 50, including service firms and wholesale and retail merchandisers, rate-of-retum
avoiders outnumber rate-of-retum reliers by over three to one. Rate-of-retum avoiders also
predominate in the chemicals (28) and machinery and computer equipment (35) industries.
Companies in the food (20), transportation equipment (37), and electric and gas service
(49) industries are roughly equally divided between the two groups.
Analysis of descriptive statistics (not reported) suggests the two subsamples have
similar financial and compensation contract profiles. Rate-of-retum avoiders and reliers do
not differ significantly in median or mean levels of eamings, book value of equity, after-
tax profit margin,'^ market value of equity, retum on equity, or retum on assets. The mean
level of market /book'" is significantly higher for the rate-of-retum avoiders, but the two
subsamples do not differ significantly in median level of market/book. Because of these
results, I do not expect size or profitability to be a confounding factor in my tests.
Further analysis (not reported) indicates the subsamples have similar executive
compensation policies; rate-of-retum avoiders do not appear to fonnulate the remainder
of the contract to counterbalance the lack of a retum metric in the bonus plan. The
subsamples do not differ significantly in the percentage of total compensation fi^om the
annualized value of grants of stock-based compensation, the percentage of total
Each year, the survey respondents are provided with the firm's prior year's response and may neglect to
update the response to reflect changes in the perfonnance measures used. Therefore, I believe using each finn's
earliest response to the survey reduces measurement error.
The power of my tests may be reduced if firms fail to report the implicit use of rate-of-retum performance
measures in determining executive bonuses. For example, a firm might report that the CEO bonus is based on
eamings per share, but neglect to mention that no executive will receive a bonus unless retum on equity exceeds a
certain level. Alternatively, the firm could report the bonus is based only on eamings, but neglect to mention that
the target level of eamings is set according to the fimi's accounting rate of retum.
After-tax Profit Margin = Income before Extraordinary Items /Sales(Net).
Market/ Book = Shares of Common Stock Outstanding, * Market Price Per Share, /Shareholders' Equity,.
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Table 1
Distribution of bonus plan pertbmiance measure types (n=376)
Performance measures No accounting Accounting
rate-of-retum rate-of-retum
performance perfonnance
measures (%) measures (%)
50.0 _
- 13.3
- 16.8
12.8 -
_ 3.7
- 3.5
Income statement only, e.g. EPS, Pre-tax profits. Earnings
Accounting rate of return only, e.g. ROA, ROE, ROIC
Both income statement and accounting rate of return
Income statement plus other measures, e.g. discretion,
market share, individual performance
Accounting rate of return plus other measures
Both income statement and accounting rate of return,
plus other measures
Total 62.8 37.3
The sample comprises one observation per firm from 376 public domestic companies that have financial data on
Compustat and that reported bonus plan performance measures to Hewitt Associates LLC at least once during
1987-1993.
compensation due to the annualized value of option grants, the percentage of total cash
compensation due to the bonus, and the percentage of total compensation due to the bonus.
5. Identifying firms with significant investments in intangible assets
To test my hypotheses, I need to identify fums whose primary businesses involve
creating and employing brand equity, patents and copyrights, or human capital. Because
intemally generated intangible assets are not presented on financial statements, I must use
a proxy to distinguish firms with significant investments in these assets. Two possibilities
are a measure of the level of a firm's intangible assets and a measure of the investments
that create those intangible assets. For my tests, I first use market /book as a measure of the
level of the firm's intangible assets, and examine whether the level of a firm's market/
book ratio is associated with its choice of accounting performance measure in the
executive bonus plan. I define market/book as (Shares of Common Stock Out-
standing, * Market Price Per Share,)/ Shareholders' Equityt. I then developed a proxy
based on the firm's investments in three types of intangible assets: brand value, human
capital, and R&D-related assets. By basing my proxy on the firm's investments in
intangible assets, I can investigate whether the presence of specific types of intangible
assets is related to the choice of bonus plan performance measure.
Firms develop copyrights, patents, and other R&D-related intangible assets through
research and development expenditures, which are expensed as incurred in accordance
with SFAS 2. To identify firms with significant unrecorded R&D-related assets, I sort the
sample observations on the current year's R&D expense deflated by total assets.'" Firms
are not required to disclose R&D if the expenditure is less than 1% of sales; therefore.
The results of my tests do not change when 3- or 5-year-average ratios are used to determine the HIINTAN ,.
proxy.
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unreported R&D expense is treated as equal to zero. The reporting ofR&D expense at low
levels may be noisy because some firms may report voluntarily R&D expense when it is
below the 1% threshold. However, I wish to identify only those firms for which investing
in R&D is a substantial activity. I therefore designate observations in the highest two
deciles of R&D Expense /Total Assets as HI_RD= 1. The remaining firms are designated
HI_RD = 0.'"^ Panel A of Fig. 1 illustrates that most of the observations have a zero or low
ratio of R&D/Total Assets.
Similarly, firms with significant investments in brand value support their brands with
advertising. I resort the sample firms by the ratio of advertising expense to total assets, and
designate the firms in the highest two deciles of the current year's advertising expense
deflated by total assets'^ as firms likely to have unrecorded brand value (HI_ADV=1).
Again, unreported advertising expense is treated as equal to zero. The graph is similar to
Panel A of Fig. 1 and is not presented.
One characteristic of finns with significant human capital is the ability to generate
revenues with lower physical assets than other finns. The sample contains only ten firms
with a primary SIC code in service industries (defined as SIC code 7000 or greater) but may
contain other firms that are similarly able to generate revenues fi'om low levels of physical
assets. Ratios such as return on invested capital are less meaningfiil for firms with little
invested capital; accordingly, these firms may choose to avoid rate-of-retum performance
measures. To identify finns which are or behave like service firms, I designate companies in
the lowest two deciles of (Gross Property, Plant and Equipment + Inventory) /(Total
Assets + Accumulated Depreciation) of my sample as L0_PPE=1. Panel B of Fig. 1
contains the graph of (Gross Property, Plant and Equipment + Inventory) /(Total Assets +
Accumulated Depreciation) for the sample observations. ^'^
Firms with probable R&D-related unrecorded assets (HI_RD = 1 ) or brand value
(HLADV= 1 ), or firms with low physical assets employed (LO_PPE= 1) are designated as
HIINTAN=1 firms, with the remaining finns designated HIINTAN = 0. Examination (not
reported) of the distribution of HIINTAN across two-digit SIC codes reveals that, as might
be expected, the HIINTAN = 1 firms are concentrated in industries such as 20 (foods), 28
(chemicals, including phannaceuticals), 35 (machinery and computer equipment), and 38
(measuring instruments and photographic equipment).
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the subsamples of HIINTAN = or 1. Not
surprisingly, both mean and median market /book are significantly higher for HIINTAN = 1
firms. The subsamples have similar mean and median levels of earnings and after-tax profit
margin, book value of equity, and market value of equity.'^
Because Compustat Research and Development expense excludes exploration and development expenses for
extractive industries, I may be misclassifying some HIRD= 1 firms as HIRD = O.This biases my tests against my
hypotheses.
Advertising is deflated by total assets rather than sales because firms often budget advertising expenditures
based on the desired ratio of advertising /sales.
I also performed all tests using (Net PP&E + Inventory) /Total Assets to determine LOPPE; results are
quantitatively similar.
After-tax Profit Margin = Income before Extraordinary Items/Sales (Net); Market /Book = [{Share Common
Stock Outstanding, * Market Price Per Share,) + Book Value of Debt,] /{Shareholders' Equity, + Book Value of
Debt, + Accumulated Depreciation, — Purchased Goodwill,.
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Panel A:
Ratio of 0.15
R&D
Expense to
Total Assets 0.
1
Panel B:
Ratio of Gross
PP&E to
Total Assets
/
____^
^^
R&D Expense
Total Assets
100 150 200 250 300 350
Sample Observations
for Sample Observations. Sorted from Lowest to Highest
150 200 250
Sample Observations
Gross Property, Plant and Equipment + Inventory
Total Assets + Accumulated Depreciation
for Sample Observations. Sorted from Lowest to Highest
Fig. I
.
Distribution of measures of R&D and human capital intensity across sample observations. Panel (A)
Distribution of R&D intensity across sample observations. Panel (B) Distribution of human capital intensity
across sample observations.
I also find the HIINTAN = 1 firms have a significantly higher percentage of total
compensation ft-om the annualized value of option grants (0PT10N%), and a
significantly higher percentage of cash compensation in the form of a bonus
(BONUS%). Further tests (not reported) reveal the results for 0PT10N% are driven
by HI_RD firms, while the results for BONUS% are from the HLADV and LO_PPE
firms. There is no difference across subsamples in the percentage of cash bonus to total
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compensation. These results support prior work by Gaver and Gaver (1993) and Smith
and Watts (1992) who investigate, at the finn and industry levels, respectively, whether
growth firms are more likely to rely on market-based incentive plans because
managerial actions are less observable in these firms. Gaver and Gaver construct a
growth measure based in part on R&D expense, and find growth firms pay higher
levels of cash compensation and have a higher incidence of option plans than
nongrowth firms. Clinch (1991) finds high R&D firms use more option-based
compensation plans than low R&D firms do.
6. Accounting performance measure choice and tlie firm's expected level of
investments in intangible assets
In this section, I investigate whether the Compensation Committees of firms with
high levels of investments in intangible assets, such as internally developed patents or
copyrights, brand names, or human capital, avoid accounting rate-of-retum measures
in executive bonus plans. First, I analyze whether a firm's level of market/book is
related to its choice of bonus plan perfonnance measure. Second, using the HIINTAN
proxy developed in Section 5, I identify sample firms with large levels of
investments in internally generated intangible assets related to advertising, to
R&D, and to human capital. I then compare, using contingency tables and LOGIT
regressions, the type of bonus plan perfonnance measures used by firms identified
by the proxy as having significant investments in unrecorded intangible assets with
the type of bonus plan perfonnance measures used by the remainder of the sample
firms.
To analyze whether finns with high levels of intangible assets, as proxied by market/
book ratio, avoid rate-of-retum measures in the bonus plans of corporate executives, I
perform LOGIT regressions of performance measure type on market/book, before and
after controlling for firm growth and amount of purchased intangible assets. I then focus
on firms with high investments in internally generated intangible assets with a
contingency table analysis of HIINTAN versus performance measure type. To examine
the individual effects of each type of intangible asset in the presence of the others, I
perform LOGIT regressions of performance measure type on the intangible asset dummy
variables, both alone and after controlling for firm growth and amount of purchased
intangible assets.
I hypothesize high market /book and HIINTAN firms choose income-statement-
based perfonnance measures over accounting rate-of-retum measures because the
balance sheet does not reflect the investments in intemally developed intangible
assets. However, some companies may select performance measures based only on
income statement information in order to encourage firm growth. Firm value is
created by establishing a rate of return on investments above the firm's cost of
capital, and by taking advantage of growth opportunities. Firms wishing to encourage
management to pursue high growth may emphasize income statement perfonnance
measures, which capture growth, over rate-of-retum measures. Accordingly, I
designate GROWTH = I firms as those firms which experience positive real growth
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in sales from year / — 1 to year / + 1 . I hypothesize firms experiencing positive real
growth (GR0WTH=1) will be more likely to avoid accounting rate-of-retum
measures in executive bonus plans.
Table 2
Sample firm descriptive statistics
HirNTAN = HIINTAN= 1 /) -value
Book value of equity iSMi
Median 974
Mean 2075
Standard deviation 3734
Earnings ($M)
Median 84.00
Mean 186.47
Standard deviation 666.92
Market value of equity (SM)
Median 1534
Mean 3587
Standard deviation 7490
Market 'Book
Median 1.618
Mean 1.958
Standard deviation 2.316
After-tax profit margin
Median 0.043
Mean 0.045
Standard deviation 0.067
STOCK%
Median .300
Mean .298
Standard deviation .206
BONUS/CASH%
Median .316
Mean .284
Standard deviation .260
BONUS/TOTAL%
Median .192
Mean .189
Standard deviation .119
OPTIONVo
Median .170
Mean .187
Standard deviation .168
730
2161
4799
89.05
256.38
505.03
1603
4014
6540
1.978
2.474
1.879
0.051
0.055
0.062
.306
.319
.213
.380
.325
.181
.205
.209
.143
.221
.246
.193
.24
.86
.47
.30
.52
.59
.000
.031
.28
.15
.58
.38
.004
.034
.153
.247
.011
.006
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Table 3
Results of LOGIT regressions of performance measure type on market book
Panel A: ROR, = a+(i|MB,+f, (« = 347)
Coefficient -.087 -.185
S.E. .207 .088
Prob>/- .673 .036
Panel B; ROR, = a+(i MB + ti2RECGW + (i3GR0WTH,+fc| (n = 337)
y. /^i /^2 P:^
Coefficient -.031 -.159 -.253 -.078
S.E. .236 .085 .299 .237
Prob>/- .896 .059 .397 .743
Variable definitions:
ROR=l if the firm reports the use of accounting rate-of-retum perfomiance measures in executive bonus
plans, and otherwise
MB = [(Shares Common Stock Outstanding, * Market Price Per Share,)+Book Value of Debt,] /[Shareholders'
Equity, + Book Value of Debt, + Accumulated Depreciation, — Purchased Goodwill,]
RECGW=1 if observation is in the top 2 deciles of [Unamortized Intangible Assets, + Deferred Charges,]/
Total Assets, for the sample firms
SALESGR = 3-year real growth (years t— 1 to t+ ! ) in sales.
Some companies may have low ratios of (Gross Property. Plant and Equipment +
Inventory) /(Total Assets + Accumulated Depreciation) because of high levels of
purchased goodwill. Ceteris paribus, I expect a larger portion of the investment in
intangible assets to be reflected accurately on the balance sheet of a firm with
purchased, as opposed to internally developed, intangible assets. To examine whether
the presence of purchased intangible assets affects the relation betv^'een HirNTAN=l
and choice of bonus plan perfonnance ineasure, I sort the sample firms by the ratio
Notes to Table 2:
P-\alues are fi^om parametric /-test (mean) and nonparametric Mann-Whitney L'-test (median).
\'ariable definitions:
HirNTAN=l if observation is in the highest two deciles of R&D E.xpenses Total Assets or Advertising
Expense/Total Assets or the lowest two deciles of (Gross PP and E + Inventory) (Total Assets + Accumulated
Depreciation) for the sample firms, and otherwise
After-Tax Profit Margin = Income before Extraordinary Items Sales (Net)
Market Book = [( Shares of Common Stock Outstanding, * Market Price Per Share,) + Book Value of Debt,]/
[Shareholders' Equity, + Book Value of Debt, + Accumulated Depreciation, — Purchased Goodwill,]
Stock%= annualized value of grants of stock-based compensation as a percentage of total compensation
BONUS%= Bonus/ (Bonus ^- Salary)
OPTION%= annualized value of option grants as a percentage of total compensation.
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Table 4
Contingency tables of performance measure type by firm type
Firm type HirNTAN = HirNTAN=l Total
No rate-of-return performance measures
Frequency 1 1
6
Expected fi"equency XTiLAA
Cell X- 2.04
Rate-of-return performance measures
Frequency 95
Expected frequency 78.56
Cell x' 3.44
Total 211
120
103.56
2.61
45
61.44
4.40
165
236
140
376
Total /-: 12.48.
P-value: .001.
Variable Definitions:
HirNTAN= 1 if observation is in the highest two deciles of R&D Expense/Total Assets or Advertising Expense/
Total Assets or the lowest two deciles of (Gross PP and E + Inventory) /(Total Assets+ Accumulated Depreciation)
for the sample firms, and otherwise.
of unamortized intangible assets and deferred charges to total assets,' and designate
firms in the top two deciles as RECGW= 1. 1 expect firms with purchased intangible assets
(RECGW=1) will be more likely to rely on accounting rate-of-retum performance
measures in executive bonus plans.
Panels A and B of Table 3 present the results from the LOGIT regression of accounting
performance measure choice on market/book. The dependent variable of the regression,
ROR, is set equal to one for finns that report the use of accounting rate-of-retum
performance measures in executive bonus plans, and set equal to zero otherwise. The
regression in Panel A is run using 347 observations because 29 observations do not have
the Compustat data necessary to compute the firm's market /book ratio, or have negative
market /book ratios. An additional ten observations have insufficient data to compute
GROWTH, so the regression in Panel B is run on 337 observations. The coefficient on
market /book is negative and significant before and after controlling for GROWTH and
RECGW, suggesting firms with intangible assets are less likely to rely on accounting rate-
of-retum performance measures in the bonus plans of corporate executives.
Table 4 presents contingency tables of HIINTAN versus performance measure type.
Firms identified as likely to have high unrecorded intangible assets (HIINTAN = 1 ) rely
significantly less often on rate-of-retum performance measures and significantly more
often on only income-statement-based measures in their bonus plans than would be
expected if these choices were independent. HIINTAN = finns are significantly more
likely to choose rate-of-retum performance measures and significantly less likely to
select measures based on only income statement infonnation than would be expected if
these choices were independent. The chi-squared statistic for the table is significant at
the .001 level.
Compustat data items (33+ 152)/ 6.
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Panel A of Table 5 presents the results from the LOGIT regression of accounting
performance measure choice on HIINTAN. Nineteen observations do not have the four
consecutive years of sales data on Compustat required to compute GROWTH; therefore,
the regressions are based on the remaining 358 observations. The coefficient on HIINTAN
is negative and highly significant, suggesting firms with high levels of unrecorded
intangible assets are less likely to rely on accounting rate-of-retum as a CEO bonus plan
performance measure, before and after controlling for GROWTH and RECGW. As shown
in Panel B of Table 5, when ROR is regressed on the individual types of expected
unrecorded intangible assets, both HI_RD and LO_PPE have negative and highly
significant coefficients while HI_ADV is insignificant. The coefficients on HI_RD and
LO_PPE retain their significance after controlling for firm growth and unamortized
purchased intangible assets (Table 5 Panel C). The coefficient on GROWTH is positive but
insignificant; the coefficient on RECGW is negative but insignificant.
Table 5
Results of LOGIT regressions of performance measure type on firm type (/) = 358)
Panel A: ROR, =a + ti| HIINTAN, + (i2RECGW, + P3GROWTH,+fc,
-.759 -.306 .140
.236 .301 .237
.001 .309 .556
Panel B: ROR, = a + ;i,HL_RD, + ^^.HLADV, + (i,LO_PPE,+eJ
^
Ij^ Ih P,
Coefficient -.189 -.761 -.178 -.876
S.E. .136 .307 .294 .329
Prob>/- .166 .013 .545 .008
Panel C: ROR, = a + (i , HI_RD, + ('..HLADV, + (i^LOJ'PE, + ^^jRECGW, + ^\^GROWTH, +e,
Coefficient -.221
S.E. .190
Prob>x- .247
2 Ih P2 P^ Pa fh
Coefficient -.223 -.803 -.194 -.822 -.280 .138
S.E. .189 .311 .302 .334 .308 .240
Prob>/- .237 .010 .520 .014 .363 .567
Variable definitions:
ROR= 1 if the firm reports the use of accounting rate-of-retum perfonnance measures in executive bonus
plans, and otherwise
HIINTAN =1 ifHI_RD=l orHLJ^DV=l orLO_PPE=l
RECGW= 1 if observation is in the top 2 deciles of [Unamortized Intangible Assets + Deferred Charges]/Total
Assets of the sample firms
GROWTH=l if firni has positive 3-year real growth (years t- 1 to t+1) in sales
HI_RD=1 if observation is in the top 2 deciles of R&D Expense/Total Assets of the sample firnis
HLADV=1 if observation is in the top 2 deciles of Advertising Expense/Total Assets of the sample firms
LO_PPE=l if observation is in the lowest 2 deciles of (Gross Property, Plant and Equipment + Inventory)/
(Total Assets +Accumulated Depreciation) of the sample firms.
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I also performed the contingency analyses and LOGIT regressions defining HIINTAN
with alternative measures for advertising and R&D expense. If, as I hypothesize in
Section 2, my sample firms are in a steady state with respect to advertising and R&D
expenditures, then current expenditures should approximate the amount of intangible
capital consumed during the year. I adjusted both the expenses and the total assets of
each finn to reflect the capitalization of advertising and R&D expenditures. I
amortized advertising over 3 years and R&D over 7 years, following Hirschey and
Weygandt (1985), who conclude that the "life" of advertising is 1-5 years, while the
"life" of R&D is 5-10 years. Because of the time-series of data required, the sample is
reduced to 316 observations. Results (not reported) for contingency tables and for the
LOGIT regression from Panel A of Table 5 are quantitatively similar. Results from the
LOGIT regressions from Panels B and C of Table 5 are less statistically significant
than from regressions using current advertising and R&D expense to determine
HIINTAN.
The results suggest investments in R&D create intangible assets that make rate-of-
retum measures less useftil for purposes of performance evaluation. Investments in other
intangible assets, such as human capital, as measured by the LO_PPE proxy, also relate to
avoidance of rate-of-retum performance measures. The insignificant coefficient on
HI_ADV may be due in part to the nature of the relation between advertising expense
and brand value. While R&D expenditures associated with a particular technology or
product usually decline dramatically once the new technology or product is created,
advertising expenditures on established brands is often significant (e.g. Coca-Cola and
McDonald's). As a result, advertising expense is an imperfect measure of investment in
brands, because a portion of reported advertising expenditures is used to "maintain"
established brands rather than to invest in new-brand value.
7. Conclusions
The evidence I provide suggests that firms' choices of CEO bonus plan accounting
performance measures vary in a predictable manner. I find that the presence of high levels
of investments in intangible assets is associated with a firm's choice to avoid accounting
rate-of-retum performance measures in executive bonus plans. The results hold for my
proxies for both R&D-related assets and service firms, but not for advertising-related
assets, and my results are insensitive to controlling for firm growth and for the presence of
purchased goodwill.
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Abstract
Using the creation and collapse of the Cyprus stock market bubble as a backdrop, we document
substantial positive abnonnal returns around the announcement and execution of stock splits in
Cyprus. Split-induced returns cannot be explained by variables proxying for conventional liquidity
and signalling hypotheses for stock-split activity. Positive split-induced returns are largely reversed
in the post-split months. Post-split stock undeiperfomiance is inversely related to, and thus appears
to be a correction for, the significant market oveireaction at split execution. We suggest an investor
irrationality explanation for these results, arguing that stock splits were associated with the creation
of the bubble due to the inability of investors to understand splits coixectly. We conclude that
educating investors in emerging markets to process information coirectly will improve the efficiency
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1. Introduction
In this paper, we attempt to shed hght on investor irrationahty by studying investor
behavior in the emerging Cyprus Stock Exchange (CSE). The CSE has been extensively
discussed in the international financial press for its erratic behavior in recent years.
Notably, the CSE Index rose fi-om 97 points on January 1, 1999, to 852 points on
December 1, 1999, gradually descending back to 103 points by September 30, 2001. The
CSE, classified in the broad category of emerging markets, provides an interesfing setting
for studying investor irrationality because its youth and the relative inexperience of its
market participants makes irrational investor behavior more likely.' Further, its recent
astonishing roller-coaster type movement provides a fertile ground for such an
investigation.
Specifically, in this paper, we focus on stock splits as one mechanism that may have
contributed to irrational investor behavior and the unprecedented boom and bust. Using
event-study methods, we initially document considerable abnormal returns around the
announcement and execution of stock splits in Cyprus. We also find that one year after
the execution of splits, splitting firms severely underperfomi the already declining
market. Importantly, the highly positive returns on the split execution day are not
correlated with factors proxying for conventional explanations for stock-split activity.
Instead, they are negatively related to post-split underperformance, suggesting that
splitting firms clearly beat the market on the way to the top, but are severely beaten by
the market on the way down."
We believe that the contribution of this paper is twofold: first, we provide empirical
evidence about the market assessment of stock splits in an emerging market. It is not clear
ex ante how traditional explanations for stock-split activity coming from developed
markets, based on infonnation signaling and liquidity arguments, apply to developing
markets that are less liquid and exhibit greater information asymmetry between managers
and shareholders.
Second, our empirical results are sufficiently distinct in that our results are consistent
with the notion that stock splits have contributed to the creation of a stock market
bubble, because stock price performance of splitting firnis was both statistically and
economically distinct from the overall market performance. The magnitude of the market
reaction is much stronger than the split-induced market reaction documented in
developed markets. Further, the long-term market underperformance of splitting firms
that we document in the present study is unprecedented. Thus, our study illuminates an
interesting set of empirical regularities that are very different from findings observed in
developed markets.
The study proceeds as follows: Secfion 2 provides some background on the CSE,
Section 3 briefly reviews the literature and presents our expectations. Section 4 discusses
I
More sophisticated foreign investors could not counterbalance such overvaluation because of regulation
prohibiting short-selling. Cyprus Stock Exchange statistics show that the trading volume by foreign investors at
the time was less than 10% of the total stock market trading volume.
" For an illustration of the rise and fall of the CSE and the occurrence of splits see Fig. 1.
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The General Index of the CSE from January 1999 to September 2001
900
Date
Fig. 1 . Movement of the Cyprus stock exchange general index. This figure shows graphically the movement of
the general index of the Cyprus Stock Exchange from January 1999 to September 2001. The barriers indicate the
area where all the stock-split announcements took place.
the data and methods. Section 5 presents the resuhs, and Section 6 provides concluding
remarks.
2. Background
A form of stock exchange has been in operation in Cyprus since the early 1980s in an
over-the-counter setting through dealers and brokers, but without a proper institutional
framework (Vafeas, Trigeorgis, & Georgiou, 1998). Some monitoring of this process was
provided by the Cyprus Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCCI), and no specialists or
official market makers were employed during this period (Travlos, Trigeorgis, & Vafeas,
2001). Because of the small number of informed market participants who were involved
during this period, prices appeared to be set "rationally" with no apparent evidence of
anomalies. Starting on March of 1996, the official Cyprus Stock Exchange (CSE) was
launched by the Cypriot government. Since then, regular auction-type meetings are held
daily, five times a week for 90 minutes per day, making a significant step toward
improving the efficiency of the market. During the first 3 years of its operations, the CSE
attracted little interest, with average daily trading volumes around half a million U.S.
dollars and the index ranging from 74 to 105 points. During this period, political concems
over the divided island's future reinforced investor cautiousness.
By April 1999, the first stock split ever was recorded by a CSE firm. By late August,
the number of firms announcing stock splits had reached 14. As shown in Fig. 1, at about
On March 16th, 2004, one Cyprus pound equaled about 2.10 U.S. dollars.
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this time, the index started rising steadily; the index rose eightfold in less than one year as
more people converted their life savings into securities. More than 1 50 firms applied for
listing at the CSE within a year, twice the number that was traded at the CSE up to that
time. IPOs were routinely oversubscribed dozens of times over. Nevertheless, following
initial excitement, the index gradually, but unmistakably and inevitably, descended to its
prior level, losing nearly 90% from its peak value.
In an attempt to mitigate the problems created by the huge drop in the CSE index,
several actions were taken by the CSE and the Government of Cyprus. An expert team was
called in from Greece to examine the problems and suggest corrective actions, an
investigative committee was appointed by the President of the Republic of Cyprus to
determine who was to blame, and parliamentary committees routinely made suggestions
on various aspects of the problem. Suggested measures included approving legislation for
the creation of open-end mutual funds, setting up an administrative agency to mitigate
differences between banks and investor-debtors, setting up a "guarantee" fund managed by
a foreign organization to ensure stability in the CSE, investing money from public pension
fiinds in the CSE, improving the quality of financial reports provided in the prospectuses
of start-ups, and lastly, approving a corporate governance code for finns that are listed in
the CSE.
3. Literature review and expectations
In this section, we review the academic literature on stock splits and discuss investor
irrationality as an explanation for the market response to stock splits.
3.]. Review of the literature
The positive stock market reaction to stock-split announcements in the United States
has been well established by numerous studies starting with the seminal work of Fama,
Fischer, Jensen, and Roll (1969).'^ Much of the later work focused on understanding the
reasons for the positive market reaction to split announcements. The predominant
explanation is that splits serve as a credible signal about finn value that is conveyed by
management to less informed investors. The split announcement bridges the gap in
informational asymmetry leading investors to revise their estimate of firm value upward
(e.g., Asquith, Healy, & Palepu, 1989; McNichols & Dravid, 1990). A second explanation
is that stock splits move the firm's trading price to a more attractive range, thus increasing
its liquidity (Lakonishok & Lev, 1987; Lamoureaux & Poon, 1987). Greater liquidity
lowers the finn's cost of capital. Therefore, splits that induce higher liquidity and may
potentially lower the firm's cost of capital are favorably assessed by market participants.
Evidence from the U.S. also suggests that the split execution day is associated with
positive abnormal returns (e.g., Grinblatt, Masulis, & Titman, 1984; Maloney & Mulherin,
1992). Maloney and Mulherin (1992) attempt to link the ex-day returns to market
"* Also see, for example, Grinblatt et al. (1984). Fama et al. (1969), Lakonishok and Lev (1987), and Maloney
and Mulherin (1992) also find that stock splits follow a period of abnormal equity appreciation.
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microstructure phenomena. In a similar vein, Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1996) explore
splits of ADRs that are not associated with splits in their home country. They are, thus,
able to separate information from liquidity effects. They conclude that splits increase
liquidity both in the number of trades and total volume of shares traded. In contrast,
Copeland (1979) and Conroy, Harris, and Benet (1990) document liquidity declines
following stock splits. In sum, U.S. evidence suggests that both the announcement and
execution of splits elicit a favorable market response. For split announcements that
response has been partly explained by information, and to a lesser extent, by liquidity
considerations. Ex-day returns are partly explained by liquidity considerations.
Studies in other settings generally document similar results. For example, Wulff
(1999) focuses on splits in Germany and documents small, positive returns around split
announcement and execution. He argues that his results are unlikely to be explained by
information signaling or liquidity effects. Instead, they are more consistent with a
neglected-firm explanation according to which firms split their stock to elicit public
attention. Wu and Chan (2000) study stock splits and reverse stock splits in Hong Kong.
They find positive abnormal returns at the announcement of stock splits that can be
explained well by an "optimal price range" or liquidity variable. Studying stock dividends
in Cyprus between 1985 and 1994, Travlos et al. (2001) document small, positive returns
that cannot be explained by liquidity or signaling variables.
3.2. Investor irrationalit}' as an explanation for the market response to stock splits
In our paper, we initially examine the market reaction to stock-split announcements
focusing on the Cyprus setting. Following prior work, and guided by casual observation,
we examine whether the market reaction to split announcements is positive. Second, we
study the market reaction to the execution of stock splits. As discussed earlier, prior
research has suggested that signaling and liquidity considerations are expected to result in
positive split-induced returns. Third, we proceed to explain the cross-sectional variation in
announcement - and execution - day returns. We construct variables proxying for the
information and liquidity effects of splits and attempt to identify the effects contributing to
the way Cypriot investors respond to stock splits. In particular, the split factor, trading
volume, share price, and pre-split stock performance are used to capture the cross-sectional
variation in split-induced returns."
Fourth, we suggest and test an additional, previously unidentified explanation for split-
induced returns based on investor irrationality. Specifically, unsophisticated investors fail
to understand the fundamental mechanics of a split, behaving as if a split results in a
multiplication of firm value. Substantial positive returns are expected at the announcement
of the split by investors "looking forward to receiving many shares in exchange for one,"
and on the execution day, when this "gift" finally materializes. During 1999, there was an
overwhelming infiision of funds into the CSE by ignorant and unsophisticated investors.
Volume ratio is the trading volume in number of shares for firm i divided by the number of shares outstanding
over the 50-day pre-announcement trading period (—110, —61). Split factor is the number of common shares
outstanding after the stock split divided by the number of common shares outstanding before the spht.
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raising the daily volume of trade from one million Cyprus pounds at the end of 1998 to
over 100 million at the peak of this phenomenon in late 1999. Thus, there was tremendous
demand for the stocks of splitting finns, bidding their share prices to great heights.
Importantly, no short-selling is allowed by the Cyprus Stock Exchange. Therefore, a
rational investor could not profit from this behavior by selling the inflated shares around
the split to deliver at a future date. This irrationality in investor behavior is partly offset by
the few rational shareholders selling the splitting firms' stock either directly or indirectly
(e.g., by cashing in on their grossly overpriced pension funds that happened to include a
few firms that were splitting their stocks over this period). Importantly, even if short sales
were allowed, it was unclear at the time how long this bubble would last, and shorting a
stock would not have guaranteed any gains. Indeed, it took nearly three years for the index
to come full circle (see Fig. 1).
Thus, consistent with investor iirationality described above,
Hypothesis 1. Splitting firms are expected to experience significantly positive market- and
risk-adjusted returns around split announcement and execution.
Further, as the market became wiser in processing information and the market index
was deflated, we expect that splitting firms would have suffered the consequences of this
run-down more severely than non-splitting finns. ^ Thus,
Hypothesis 2. There is a long-run market underperformance by the splitting firms in the
post-split period.
Given that most investment decisions in the CSE at the time were not driven by
fiindamentals, the value of traditional explanations for stock-split activity is an open
empirical question. We explore this notion empirically.
Hypothesis 3. Liquidity and infomiation-signaling proxies are associated with the stock
market reaction to the announcement and execution of stock splits.
Our fourth and last expectation is that the degree of underperformance following the
split is inversely related to the market reaction to splits; i.e., the greater investor
irrationality had been at the split announcement and execution (as measured by the market
reaction), the greater the price decline would be in the following months. Thus,
Hypothesis 4. There exists an inverse relation between the stock market response to split
announcement and execution and the post-split underperformance of splitting firms.
4. Data and methodology
Next, we describe the data sources and data collection procedures, and briefly outline
the event-study methods used to analyze that data.
Notably, the post-split underperformance that we hypothesize in Cyprus is in direct contrast to evidence on
post-split overperformance from the U.S. stock market (e.g., Desai & Jain, 1997).
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4.1. The data
Stock-splitting firnis were identified and selected from two Cypriot financial newspapers:
Financial Minor and Neos Typos. The split announcement and execution days were
identified from the official database of the Cyprus Stock Exchange and were confirmed by
the Stockwatch financial web page, the main provider of news on the Cyprus Stock
Exchange over the Internet. Infonnation on the split factors is also collected from the same
sources. The announcement day (/ = 0) is the first day the information becomes publicly
available. Even though firms in the CSE use the terms stock split and stock dividend
iiTcspective of the split factor (depending on the accounting treatment of the paper
transaction), we define stock splits as all transactions with a split factor of at least 1 .25, given
that smaller splits are effectively stock dividends. Our final sample comprises 45 splits that
took place in 1 999 and 2000 (all ofwhich took place between April 1 999 and October 2000).
Importantly, splits were practically an unknown instrument to Cypriot investors until that
time, given that no stock splits had ever occurred in Cyprus before April 1 999. Further, only
one split occurred within 36 months from the end of our sample period, suggesting that, in
this study, we essentially use the population of stock splits by Cypriot fimis to date.
Information on daily stock prices, daily trading volumes, and the stock market index are
also collected from the CSE official web page. For the post-split period, stock prices and
trading volumes are adjusted by the split factor. Stock prices and volumes are also adjusted
for other corporate issues such as stock bonuses and rights issues that occurred throughout
the period under examination.
4.2. Methodology
To measure stock performance around the announcement and execution of splits, we
use standard event-study methods. Given the highly erratic behavior of the market over
this period, the stationarity of finn betas is questionable. Thus, we initially measure
abnormal return as the difference between actual return and market return (market-adjusted
return). Results from tests on market-adjusted returns are reported throughout the paper.
We alternatively estimate daily abnormal return as the difference between actual and
expected return, where expected return is estimated using the one factor market model.
The parameters a and (i of that model are estimated over the 1 00-day trading period from
— 160 to —61 days before the stock-split announcement. Returns are then accumulated
and their statistical significance is tested using the standard method described in Travlos et
al. (2001). Results from this method (not tabulated) are qualitatively similar to results on
market-adjusted returns reported here. '^
5. Results
Fig. 2 presents graphically the pattem of market-adjusted returns around the stock-split
announcement (panel A) and the stock-split execution (panel B). Focusing first on panel
Additional tests focusing on raw returns provided (untabulalcd) results similar to those reported in this paper.
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Fig. 2. Cumulative maricet-adjusted returns (CMAR) around the announcement and execution of stock splits.
Panel (A) shows graphically the average cumulative market-adjusted returns across the 45 splitting firms from
trading day — 60 to trading day + 1 0, where the benchmark trading day is the stock-split announcement date.
Panel (B) shows graphically the average cumulative market-adjusted returns across the 45 splitting firms during
and after the execution day. The selected area refers to trading days — 10 to +210 (the benchmark trading day is
the execution day).
(A), cumulative returns before the announcement date are near zero up to day — 20, and
start increasing significantly and steadily thereafter, reaching a peak on the announcement
day. Returns remain fairly stable in the post-announcement days. This suggests that some
information leakage about the decision to split the stock occurred, while insider trading
cannot be ruled out as an explanation for the pre-split run-up. Interestingly, all news about
the split is absorbed by the announcement date.
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Unlike evidence from developed stock markets, results in panel (B) suggest a sharp
increase in share price following the execution day. However, almost the entire gains from
the split execution gradually disappear in the subsequent 200 trading days. This graphic
evidence is in line with an irrational investor reaction to the split execution and a delayed
correction to this anomaly. In summary, comparing the pre- and post-split evidence shown
in Fig. 2, we observe that 200 days after the ex-day, splitting finns lose some but not all of
the collective gains they have earned from the split. These losses roughly offset the ex-day
gains, reducing total split-related gains to their announcement day levels (the extreme ex-
day retums forbid us from measuring post-announcement returns for an extended time
period because splits are executed within a few weeks from their announcement).
To explore the possibility that the splitting firms contributed to the creation of the
Cyprus Stock Exchange bubble, we estimated a separate index for stock-splitting firms
over the sample period and compared that to the non-splitting firms' index. As shown in
Fig. 3, the splitting fimis were indeed associated with the creation of the CSE bubble.
Since April 1999, when the first stock split occuned, up to the peak of the bubble in
November of 1999, the splitting fiiTns' index rose from 100 to around 1400 points,
whereas the index of the non-splitting firms rose to around 800 points. Thus, results show
that the splitting firms' index increased by almost twice as much compared to the non-
splitting firms' index during the pre-peak period. Results also show that the splitting finns'
index appears to decline at a much greater rate than the non-splitting firms' index in the
post-peak period.
DATE
• split-firms non-split firms
Fig. 3. Stock performance of separate indices of splitting and non-splitting finns around the stock bubble period.
This figure shows the stock performance of separate indices of splitting and non-splitting firms around the stock
bubble period 1999 2001.
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To further explore the possibility that the splitting firms led the non-splitting firms into
the bubble, we attempted to explain the daily returns of the index of non-splitting firms
using the lagged daily retums of the splitting finns' index for the period between April
1999 and December 2001. Various models were estimated using anywhere from 1- to 10-
day lags to this end. The results, presented in Table 1, suggest that there is a strong,
statistically significant relation between the daily retums of the non-splitting firms' index
and the retums of the splitting firms' index on the prior day. These results suggest that the
stock performance of non-splitting firms during that period was partly guided by the stock
performance of the splitting firms. As a further check, to control for autocorrelation in
retums, as that is evidenced by the rise and fall of the overall market index, in our
regressions, we also controlled for the lagged retums of the non-splitting firms. That
variable was also positive and significant, confirming that retums exhibit significant
autocorrelation. Importantly, the splitting firms' index continued to be positive and
significant, suggesting that splitting firms led, on average, non-splitting firms, even after
controlling for autocorrelation. Thus, we conclude that splitting firms exhibited a much
greater boom and bust during the bubble (see Fig. 3), and more tentatively argue that they
led non-splitting firms by one trading day in doing so. This evidence notwithstanding, we
Table 1
The association between the retums of non-splitting firms with lagged splitting finn retums from April 1999 to
December 2001
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept 0.001 0.001 0.0001 -0.110*** -0.081*** -0.050***
(0.703) (0.628) (0.527) (-7.065) (-7.749) (-8.360)
R,x 0.292***
(8.876)
0.289***
(8.295)
0.269***
(7.617)
R.^1 -0.0874
(-0.510)
-0.022
(-0.601)
R.-2 0.0784***
(2.249)
0.051
(1.390)
R,^ 0.072*
(1.955)
R,-5 0.057
(1.605)
R(- 1. -:<) 0.110***
(7.148)
^(-1, -5) 0.0813***
(7.885)
R(-}.
-10) 0.050***
(8.650)
Sample size 653 653 653 653 653 653
F-statistic 78.792*** 28.090*** 18.877*** 51.089*** 62.166*** 74.831***
R- adj. 0.106 0.111 0.120 0.071 0.086 0.102
The dependent variable is the daily return for the non-splitting firms' inde.x. The independent variables are the
retums of the splitting firms" index, both daily and cumulated for 3. 5. and 10 days prior to day t. t is the day the
retum is measured for the dependent variable. *, **, ***Statistically significant at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels,
respectively.
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Table 2
Cumulative abnormal returns around stock split announcements and executions in the Cyprus stock exchange
Period AVG (CMARnv r,,) t-Test Z-value N
Panel (A) Announcement of split
CMAR,_,,„| 0.0445
CMAR<^2. +2) 0.0647
CMAR(^5, +5) 0.0961
CMAR<_,o.
.,0) 0.1514
2.60**
2.62**
3 f,4***
7 '^y***
3 J')***
45
45
45
45
Panel (B) Split ex-day
CMAR,„,,,„ 0.0097
CMAR,_2. +2) 0.1005
CMAR<_5, +5) 0.0915
CMAR,_,o,
.10, 0.2009
0.36
1.94*
3.00***
0.44
2 54***
1.66*
2 j^:^***
43
43
43
43
***, **, *Statistically significant at the 0.01. 0.05, 0.10 levels, respectively.
Average cumulative market-adjusted returns (CMAR) for the 45 splitting fimis. The analysis refers both to the
announcement (panel A) and execution day (panel B) of the stock splits. The third and the fourth columns show a
parametric /-test and a non-parametric Wilcoxon test across firms, respectively. The last column shows the
number of events that are used in each case.
cannot definitively preclude the possibility that splitting finns were just an example of the
overall market boom and bust phenomenon.
Next, Table 2 presents statistical evidence on the market reaction to split
announcements (panel A) and split execution (panel B) for various event windows.'
Tests on market-adjusted retums are presented. In line with the graphic evidence and
with Hypothesis 1, windows of 2, 5, 11, and 21 days consistently capture a significantly
positive announcement period effect of varying magnitudes. The largest market-adjusted
return is observed for the period (- 10, +10) to be 15.14%; / = 3.14; Wilcoxon r = 3.12;
both p< 0.01. Similarly, with the exception of the 2-day window, tests on the market
reaction around the execution day reveal highly positive returns. Again, these retums are
the highest for the 21-day window at 20.09%; / = 3.00; Wilcoxon r = 2.83; both/?<0.01.
In Table 3, we address the time that elapses between split announcement and split
execution, breaking that gap down to 15-day intervals. The market reaction per sub-sample
on the announcement and execution periods (5- and 21 -day windows) is also provided. On
average, splits are executed 67 days after they are publicly announced. In general, there is
no discernible relation between the announcement-to-execution time interval and the
market reaction to splits, neither for the announcement nor for the execution periods.'
To address whether there is learning in the market reaction to splits through time, in
Table 4, we partitioned the sample into five 4-month intervals. We then examined the
market reaction per sub-sample on the announcement and execution periods (5- and 21-
day windows). The descriptive results do not reveal any notable trend in the market's
assessment of stock splits through time, although the second and third 4-month periods.
Two firms announced but did not can^ out their stock splits. Forty-three firms are included in these tests.
We further estimated this relation in two cross-sectional regressions of split-induced announcement and
execution retums on a continuous announcement-to-execution time variable. The (non) results hold.
1-15 - - -
16-30 4 0.0544 0.0651 0.2119
31-45 5 -0.0604 0.1252 0.0668
46-60 8 0.0558 0.0315 0.2533
61-75 6 0.1862 0.3028 0.0461
76-90 5 0.1763 0.0092 0.2936
91-105 9 0.0427 0.1925 0.1422
106-120 - - -
121-135 3 0.0812 0.0810 0.3945
136-150 - - -
151-175 2 0.2473 -0.0151 0.4880
Total 42
144 A. Chariton et al. / The International Journal ofAccounting 40 (2005) 133-149
Table 3
Split announcement and execution returns for sub-samples of finns partitioned by the number of days from split
armouncement to split execution
Time gap A' CMAR,^..
-:» ANN CMAR,_:, ^2, EX CIVL^R,^ ,,i, lo, ANN CMAR, ^ ,,). - km EX
0.1710
-0.0938
0.1065
0.8675
0.0581
0.2130
-0.0101
0.1603
This table presents cumulative market-adjusted returns (CMAR) for both armouncement and execution dates for
each time gap. Time gap is the number of days that elapsed between the announcement and the execution date. N
stands for the number of finns in each time gap. ANN stands for the announcement date, EX stands for the
execution date. CMAR, _ 2, ^21 ANN: Cumulative market-adjusted remms for the period 2 days before until 2 days
after the announcement date.
representing the market's peak, generally exhibit higher split-induced returns. Indeed, by
the end of the period, such returns become more modest. In sum, it appears that the
strength of the market reaction to splits follows in import the price behavior of the market.
A learning effect is not discernible.
Table 5 presents tests of the significance of market-adjusted returns for longer intervals
around the event days. First, the 50-day period leading up to the announcement (—60,
— 11) is positive and significant, in line with the pre-announcement run-up that was
described by panel (A) of Fig. 2. Beginning 60 days after the split execution, returns are
negative, in line with a reversal in the positive split-induced returns. Near-zero returns are
observ ed for the first 50-day window. Negative returns are observ ed for the second, third,
and fourth 50-day window after day +10 (-3.24%, -5.64%, and -8.91% respectively).
Table 4
Split announcement and execution returns for sub-samples of tinns partitioned by the time of the split
announcement
Period A' CMAR, 2. :, CMAR, _ 2 ; CMAR,_„,. -u), CMAR,_„ 1. - ID)
ANN EX ANN EX
May 99-Aug 99 8 0.0257 0.0926 0.0808 0.0470
Sep 99 Dec 99 11 0.0947 0.2357 0.1966 0.5520
Jan 00-Apr 00 12 0.1683 0.0109 0.4276 0.0399
May 00-Aug 00 5 0.0321 0.1377 -0.1522 0.2220
Sep 00-Dec 00 7 -0.0344 0.0512 0.1138 0.1222
Total 43
This table presents cumulative market-adjusted returns (CMAR) for both split announcement and execution dates
for each sub-period that the stock split took place. Total of five sub-periods. A' stands for the number of firms in
each sub-period. ANN stands for the announcement date, EX stands for the execution date. CM.AR,_ 2.
-;i ANN:
Cumulative market-adjusted returns for the period 2 days before until 2 days after the announcement date.
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Table 5
Long-window market-adjusted returns (LW'MAR) around split announcements and executions
Peiiod of cumulation Benchmark trad, day .A.\ erage LWMAR r-Test r-\alue A'
( - 60. - ! 1
)
.Announcement 0.1329 T 15** 2.15** 39
(+11. +60) Ex-day 0.0054 0.081 0.991 41
(+61. -110) Ex-day -0.0324 -0.7 -1.457 38
(+111, +160) Ex-day -0.0564 -1.623 -1.313 37
(+161, +210) Ex-day -0.0891 -2.37** -1.98** 35
(+11. +110) Ex-day -0.0462 -0.611 -1.211 38
(+11. +160) Ex-day -0.1022 -1.331 -1.76* 37
(+11. +210) Ex-day -0.1925 -1.93* -2.18** 35
(+61. +210) Ex-day -0.1813 — 2.91*** -2.85*** 35
***. **. *Statistically significant at the 0.01. 0.05. 0.10 levels, respectively.
Long window market-adjusted remms (third column) for different event windows. For the period referring to the
trading days. -60 to - 1 1 day zero is the announcement da\ and for the rest of the periods. da\ is the ex-day. A
parametric /-test and a non-parametric \\'ilcoxon test are constmcted to show whether stock returns are
statistically different from zero during these periods. The last column shows the number of firms that are used in
each case.
At a total of — 18.13%. these market-adjusted returns are the lowest for the (+61. +210)
window, and are statistically significant at p<0.0\. These results are consistent with
Hypothesis 2. and the notion that splitting finns se\ erely underperfomi the market in the
year following the split execution.
Panel (A) of Table 6 presents descriptive statistics for the variables measuring the return
windows around the split announcement and execution, as well as variables approximating
potential explanations for these returns. Panel (B) of Table 6 presents pair-wise Pearson
correlations among these variables. From panel (A), the average splitting firm traded at
4.54 Cyprus pounds at the time of the split and had a ti"ading volume ratio of 3.71%. The
average split factor was 3.24. Consistent with earlier results, significant positive retiuTJS
( 1 5%) are observed before the split announcement, at the split announcement ( 1 7%). and
at the split execution (21%). while negative returns (—20%) are obser\ed in the post-split
period. The conelation matrix in panel (B) suggests that the variables are generally
uncorrelated with two exceptions: first, there is weak e\idence that the announcement
period return reinforces the pre-split return pattern (/• = 0.28; /?<0.09). and. most
importantly, that the execution day return is largely reversed in the 200 post-split trading
days (/• = 0.60;p<0.01).
In Table 7. we attempt to explain the market reaction to split announcements (panel A).
split executions (panel B). and the post-execution returns anomaly (panel C) using OLS
regressions. In all regressions, the variables are winsorized to the 5th and 95th percentile to
! reduce the effect of extreme observations. Our inteipretation of the results was similar in
i spirit when we used ordinal rather than raw variable \alues.
We approximate the liquidity explanation for stock splits using the pre-split trading
{
volume and share price \ariables. We expect that splits will be most beneficial in
]
enhancing liquidity, and should thus elicit a more favorable market response, when pre-
split share prices are high (presumably outside an optimal range), and trading xolumes are
i
low. Second, we approximate an infomiation explanation by the split factor and the pre-
1 split increase in share price. Following McNichols and Dravid (1990), we expect that
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Table 7
Regression results of the association of iiquidit\ and information variables with cumulati\e market-adjusted
returns (CMAR
)
Panel (A) Dependent variable: C.\L4R,^j 1 _ ii„ announcement
Raw \ariables
y. ii .\d]-R- F-statistic A"
Price_„ 0.1901(2.743***) -0.0047 (-0.404) 0.00 0.16 44
CMAR<_6o.
-11) 0.1407(2.752***) 0.2505(1.761*) 0.08 3.10 38
Volume ratio,_, 10.
-60) 0.2820(3.136***) -0.0192 (- 1.086) 0.05 1.18 26
Split factor 0.0-60(0.913) 0.0284(1.351) 0.04 1.83 44
Panel (B) Dependent variable: C.\IAR,_
,o, ^ lo, ex day
Price_|, 0.2885(3.268***) -0.0176 (- 1.252) 0.04 1.57 44
CMAR<_6o.
-II) 0.2484(3.131***1 -0.1239 (-0.562) 0.01 0.32 38
Volume ratio,
_,,o. -60, 0.2383(1.721*) -0.0026 (- 0.097) 0.00 0.01 26
Split factor 0.1432(1.295) 0.0191(0.695) 0.01 0.48 44
CMAR,
_,o. -10) ANN 0.2420(3.266***) -0.1650 (-0.798) 0.02 0.64 41
Pane] IC) Dependent variable: CMAR,^ u ^2i0)
CMAR,_,o.
-10, ANN -0.2292 (-2.202**) 0.3067(1.089) 0.04 1.19 44
CMAR,_,o. +,o)EX -0.0266 (-0.310) -0.8028 (-4.304***) 0.36 18.52 38
CMAR ,^60. -11, -0.0953 (-0.818) -0.1866 (-0.618) 0.01 0.38 26
**. **. *Statistically significant at the 0.01. 0.05. 0.10 levels, respectively.
Panel (A) shows the regressions where the dependent variable is the announcement window cumulati\e market-
adjusted returns and the independent \ariables are (1) the price prior the announcement window. (2) the
cumulati\e market-adjusted returns for the trading period -60 to -11 before the announcement. (3) the volume
ratio (the trading \olume in number of shares for firm / di\ided by the number of shares outstanding o\er the 50-
day pre-announcement trading period (—110, —61). and (4) the split factor (the number of common shares
outstanding after the stock split divided by the number of common shares outstanding before the split). Panel (B)
shows the regressions where the dependent \ ariable is the ex-day window cimiulati\ e market-adjusted returns and
the independent variables are the same as in panel (A), plus the 21 -day announcement related market-adjusted
return. Panel (C) shows the regressions where the dependent variable is the long windov\^ cumulati\e market-
adjusted return from -^11 to -^210 after the execution, and the independent \'ariables are the cumulative market-
adjusted returns for both the announcement and the ex-da\ windows and the pre-announcement return from —60
to — 1 1 (f-statistics are in parentheses). Independent \ariables are winsorized to the 5th and 95th percentile.
greater split factors send a more fa\orahle signal to market participants, and should thus be
associated with more positi\"e announcement period returns."' Last, the pre-split run-up is
j
a measure of ad\'erse selection and should reinforce announcement-induced returns. That
\
is, a stock split is a costly-to-replicate signal. Therefore, only managers belie\ ing that the
run-up truly reflects fLmdamental \ alue \\ ould announce a split.
In panel (A), we examine these expectations through a series of simple regressions. The
I
limited sample size does not allow us to use multiple regressions. In sum. we find no
evidence that split announcements in C\prus are related to liquidity.- considerations. We
find, however, limited e\idence that infonnation considerations mav contribute to the
In this setting, the split factor may altemati\el\ help to address the conjecture that irrational in\estors
erroneously belie\e the split reflects a multiplication in firm \ alue. Alternatively, using a log transformation for
the split factor does not. in any way. change our interpretation of the results.
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positive market reaction. Specifically, the pre-event run-up is weakly positive and
significant (t=l.l6; /7<0.08). Additional tests in panel (B) fail to identify any relation
between information and liquidity considerations to the positive market reaction to split
execution. This result leaves unsolved the puzzle of the ex-day returns.
Results in panel (C) of Table 7 provide some revealing evidence. Specifically, the
negative post-split performance that was documented in Fig. 2 and Table 5 can be
explained well by the market reaction to the split execution (but not the split
announcement); i.e., the greater the market reaction to the split execution, the greater
the post-split drop in share price (r = 4.30 and adjusted /?" = 36.0%). It seems that the
irrational and unexplained increase in share price that is associated with splitting a stock is
corrected in the post-split months. That correction is proportionate to the initial market
reaction to the split execution.
Put in a broader context, our results present an empirical puzzle. Although some
\ariation exists in the market reaction to stock splits across markets, the erratic return
behaviour exhibited in the Cyprus market appears unprecedented. Unlike our evidence, in
larger and more developed markets such as the United States (e.g.. Lamoureaux & Poon.
1987), Germany (Wulff 1999), Hong Kong (Wu & Chan, 2000), and Denmark
(Bechmann & Raabale, 2004), the market reaction to splits is positive but quite modest,
and is often attributed to liquidity' or signaling factors: in Switzerland it was recorded to be
near zero (Kunz & Majhensek. 2004). Thus, in developed markets, the empirical evidence
does not provide support for an irrationality view of the market reaction to splits.
Evidence on stock splits coming from emerging markets has been sparser. Batchelor
and Orakcioglu (2004) report a zero price effect and an increase in volatility
accompanying the execution of bonus issues in Turkey, while Barnes and Ma (2002)
find a positi\e market response to the proposal and approxal of bonus issues in the Chinese
stock exchanges. Nevertheless, prior evidence from these emerging markets does not
resemble the extreme price effects that were observed in the Cyprus Stock Exchange
during the bubble period. Further study of alternative emerging markets might prove
enlightening for this purpose.
6. Conclusion
We find substantial gains to shareholders around the announcement and execution of
splits. These gains do not seem to be explained by liquidity' or signaling variables. They are.
however, partly reversed in the post-split months, and this reversal is significantly related to
the initial market reaction on the split execution date. We interpret this as evidence that
Cypriot investors acted irrationally, misunderstanding the mechanics of stock splits.
Our results cannot be explained by insufficient controls for risk, given that splitting firms
are likely to be much less risky than non-splitting firms; on average, they are much larger as
measured by equity capitalization, and have lower betas. Further, the inclusion of splitting
firms in the market index tones down the true effect of splits because these returns are partly
offset by the expectations benchmark; raw returns are in excess of 30% around both the
announcement and the execution date. One potential implication of our results is that
splitting firms have contributed to the creation of the stock market bubble. Yet,
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notwithstanding our empirical evidence, we cannot definitively preclude the possibility that
splitting fimis were just an example of the overall market boom and bust phenomenon.
This apparent elementary eiTor that has been associated with the discovery of the CSE by
Cypriot investors suggests the following: while much is made ofdisclosure ofinformation in
emerging markets, little attention has been paid to the ability of investors to process such
infonnation conectly. We believe that in\ estor education should be a \ ital component for the
development of emerging markets. In general, policy makers seem to ad\ ocate that more
rules and regulations will protect investors by forcing other market participants to ""do the
right thing." The evidence from this study casts doubt on this contention. While a
comprehensive institutional framework should rely on the philosophy of improxed
disclosure that triggers market forces, for such disclosure to have the desired effect,
emphasis should be placed on making investors more knowledgeable, and therefore wiser.
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Abstract
This study explores the association between ISO 9000 certification and financial performance
at the organizational level in a mature quality initiative market. It extends the limited literature on
quality initiatives and objective measures of financial performance. The study hypothesizes that
ISO 9000 certification is associated with improvements across three dimensions of financial
perfonnance. These dimensions are operating efficiency, growth in sales, and overall financial
perfonnance. These dimensions of perfonnance are measured using profit margin, growth in sales,
and earnings per share, respectively. Based on data for a sample of 70 companies listed on the
Singapore Stock Exchange over a 6-year period, the results of the study are consistent with the
hypothesized effects. In particular, the results show that the extent of improvement is driven
largely by operating efficiencies and suggests that firms can benefit fi'om ISO 9000 certification if
they are genuinely interested in the quality philosophy by improving their internal business
processes.
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1. Introduction
Quality management initiatives such as total quality management (TQM) and just-in-
time systems (JIT) are receiving growing attention in management accounting textbooks.
However, the effect of such initiatives on financial performance has received little
attention in academic research. This is probably because much of the research on quality
and self-reported non-financial firm performance measures are located in the quality
management paradigm. Noting the lack of studies on quality initiatives generally, Maher
(1995) urged accounting researchers to undertake a time-series exploration of the effects of
quality initiatives on organizational performance. However, such research remains scarce
in the accounting discipline. Ittner and Larcker (1995) were among the first management
accounting researchers to study the effect of quality management practices on organiza-
tional performance. Balakrishnan, Linsmeir, and Venkatachalam (1996) and Kinney and
Wempe (2002) investigated the financial impact of JTT systems. Most recently, Nagar and
Rajan (2001) studied the relationship between fmancial and non-financial indicators of
quality and future sales.
However, it is not easy to establish an empirical relationship between the adoption of
quality initiatives such as TQM and JIT and firm performance that are measured by
accounting variables. The difficulty of establishing an empirical relationship between
TQM and JIT initiatives on firm performance stems from determining the objectivity of
the extent of adoption, the validity of the adoption claims by the firm, and identifying an
adoption date. Easton and Jarrell (1998, p. 256) describe the problem in the context of
TQM as follows;
First, whether or not a firm has seriously pursued TQM cannot be determined by
relying on the finn's public announcements. Many firms claim to be implementing
TQM when, in fact, they have made essentially no changes (other than in their
public rhetoric). . . . Second, firms seldom publicly announce the beginning of the
deployment of their TQM systems. In fact, there is often no completely
unambiguous start date.
The purpose of this research is to investigate the association between International
Organization for Standardization 9000 (ISO 9000) certification and financial performance
at the organizational level. A study of the effect of ISO 9000 certification on financial
performance alleviates the limitafions of prior studies because the certification process
requires compliance with the elements of the ISO 9000 standards. The certification process
is conducted by an approved independent ISO 9000 registrar. If a firm meets the ISO 9000
standards following an audit by a registrar, the firm is issued an ISO 9000 certificate that
includes the scope of certification and the effective date. While certificates are typically
issued for 3-year periods, compliance review is performed every 6 months.
Although ISO 9000 certification has been globally pursued and implemented, very few
studies have explored its impact on objective measures of financial performance. The
literature abounds with studies examining the effect of ISO 9000 certification on self-rated
performance measures such as product quality, defects, employee satisfaction, employee
turnover, customer satisfaction, supplier quality, and productivity, to name a few. While
such studies add to our knowledge about the effects of ISO 9000 certification and quality
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systems on performance, the use of self-rated performance measures is not independent,
suffers from self-reporting bias, and, thus, presents limitations. The implications of self-
rated measures are well recognized in the management accounting literature.
Moreover, the phenomenal growth in the number of companies attaining ISO 9000
certification worldwide suggests certification will yield benefits to the firm.' The benefits
appear to have been realized because, as noted previously, the literature is replete with self-
rated benefits of ISO 9000 certification. However, whether ISO 9000 certification is
associated with more objective measures of performance remains an empirical issue. If
ISO 9000 certification is not positively associated with financial perfomiance, it may
possibly lose credibility and be regarded as another management fad. It is conceivable that
the self-rated benefits are a self-fulfilling prophecy. Juran (1999), one of the pioneers of
quality concepts, is quite pessimistic about ISO 9000 and has called for research de-
monstrating the financial benefits of the costly ISO 9000 certification process. This study
fills the current void in the literature and addresses an important policy and strategic issue.
Specifically, I investigate the extent to which ISO 9000 certification improves financial
perfomiance at the organizational level and make the following contributions. First, I use
financial performance measures derived from audited financial statements. Prior literature
investigating ISO 9000 effects has focused on self-rated measures of performance that
suffer from inherent bias. Second, prior studies have largely investigated differences in
performance between firms with ISO certification and those without in the post-ISO
period. I extend this literature by providing evidence on ISO 9000 certification and the
extent of improvement in financial perfoiTnance. I investigate the financial performance of
firms based on data 3 years prior to and 3 years after ISO 9000 certification. I also employ
a benchmark of matched-control firms that never pursued ISO 9000 certification either in
the period of study or 3 years thereafter. This is the most important contribution of the
study as it provides an objective assessment of the impact of ISO 9000 certification on
performance.
Third, I study a range of industries. I do not restrict my sample to manufacturing firms for
the simple reason that ISO 9000 certification is a non-industry specific standard. The ISO
Sui-vey ofISO 9000 lists 39 industries from which companies have attained certification, yet
studies confine their analysis to the manufacturing industry." However, I test the sensitivity
ofmy results to industry membership and find that the results relating to the effects of ISO
9000 certification on performance is not affected by industiy membership.
Fourth, I study the certification effect on perfonnance in an emerging market
(Singapore) where the quest for gaining global competitive advantage both within the
region and against firms from developed nations such as Japan, the United Kingdom and
the United States is intense. An emerging market is also studied because there is very little
evidence on quality initiatives outside the major markets such as Japan, the United
Kingdom and the United States (Low, Tan, & Ang, 1999). As multinational corporations
Since 1983, the number of ISO 9000 certificates issued has grown from just under 28,000 to over 400,000,
spanning 158 countries in December 2000. As of December 2000, Europe comprised 53.87" o of total
j
certifications with Asia in second place with 20.()5"o.
I
' For details refer to "The ISO Survey of ISO 9000 and ISO 14000 Certificates - Tenth Cycle" publislied by the
i
International Organization for Standardization.
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shift their manufacturing processes to developing nations, such as those in Asia, studying
emerging markets becomes even more critical. In concert, suppliers in emerging markets
are facing increasing pressure from their global customers in the major markets to provide
the highest quality goods and services (Chan, 2000; Quazi, Chang, & Chan, 2002). ISO
9000 certification is a global recognition of achieving high and consistent quality
standards.
Finally, Singapore, as a mature ISO certified nation, provides a suitable context for
investigating whether ISO certification is associated with higher financial performance."^ In
non-mature ISO contexts, the "first movef to attain certification might experience gains
due to visibility rather than to improvements in its internal business processes. In a mature
ISO context, where most firms are ISO certified and competition is intense, superior
performance would demand genuine improvements to internal processes visible to
customers through higher quality products and value-for-money prices.
The analysis, based on 384 firm-years of data derived from 70 companies listed on the
Singapore Stock Exchange over a 6-year period revealed that the financial performance of
firms achieving certification was significantly greater than non-certified finns. More
importantly, the results indicated that ISO 9000 certification was associated with
significant improvements in financial perfonnance; the control-firm adjusted performance
in the post-ISO 9000 certification period was significantly greater than that in the pre-ISO
9000 certification period. The results are robust to sensitivity and selection-bias tests.
These results imply that ISO 9000 certification possesses economic significance and firms
can enhance performance through certification.
However, the analysis shows that the increase in performance is attributable largely to
improvements in operating efficiency and, to a lesser extent, growth in revenue. Gains in
performance arise, therefore, if firms are genuine in their ISO 9000 implementation
process. The results and more critically the design of the study assist in explaining
inconsistencies in the literature. As with studies of this nature, the results and inferences
drawn ought to be considered in context and with regard to the limitations of the study as
discussed in the concluding section of the paper. The next section provides the background
on ISO 9000 certification and discusses the relevant literature. The research hypotheses are
articulated next followed by the research method. The final two sections present the results
and conclude the study.
2. Background and literature review
2.1. ISO 9000 certification
The strategic management agenda of firms increasingly emphasize quality management
systems. Since the promotion of quality concepts by Crosby, Deming, Ishikawa, and Juran,
The rate of ISO certification in Singapore has stabihzed at approximately 4,000 companies with most
registrants being small and medium enterprises that are not publicly listed. The number of listed companies in
Singapore was approximately 500 as at November 2001 and many of them are now certified to ISO 9000.
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firms around the globe have gradually embraced quality management practices. One of the
milestones in quality management was the establishment of international standards for
quality. In 1987, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) issued standards
to establish and foster voluntary adoption of global industrial and manufacturing
standards. ISO 9000 is "a series of international standards dealing with quality systems
that can be used for external quality assurances purposes" (ISO, 1987). Unlike quality
standards relating to products and services, the ISO 9000 standards apply to the quality
management system. The purpose of the ISO 9000 standards is to ensure that a certified
company maintains a quality management system that will enable it to meet its published
quality standards relating to the processes and activities for delivering goods and services.
The Standards provide guidelines for the development, implementation, and management
of a quality management system. Organizations must document practices that affect the
quality of their products and deliver the procedures consistently to gain and maintain ISO
9000 certification.
In short, ISO 9000 could be viewed as a system for managing internal business
processes irom the beginning to the end of a value chain. Certification can only be
confirmed after an independent ISO audit. Regular independent audits are performed to
maintain certification. An unsatisfactory audit will lead to de-registration with subsequent
registration contingent upon meeting the requirements of certification. Therefore,
obtaining and maintaining ISO 9000 certification is a continuous and costly process.
Despite the apparent expense and bother, ISO certification has increased exponentially
in Singapore. Since 1989 at least 3900 organizations have attained certification for ISO
9000. As part of its economic development strategy, the Singapore government continues
to encourage local industries to achieve certification by providing ISO implementation
subsidies (Quazi et al., 2002). In Asia, Singapore is second only to South Korea in quality
initiatives. According to Chan (2000), Singapore has almost reached the highest echelon of
quality management practices by implementing world-class benchmarking systems in the
quest for attaining Global Quality Management status. While these initiatives are
encouraging, the research evidence to date has yet to show that such practices have led
to significant improvements in financial performance not only in Singapore but elsewhere.
The next section reviews this evidence.
2.2. Literature review
The following review of the prior literature is categorized into studies investigating the
effects of ISO 9000 certification on non-financial perfomiance measures and those
investigating the impact on financial perfonnance.
2.2.1. Non-financial performance studies
There is an extensive literature on the effects of ISO 9000 certification on non-financial
performance measures. The review presented here is not exhaustive but representative for
illustrative purposes. Evidence in the literature is mixed. Contextual differences and
management's motivation for seeking certification explain the inconsistent results observed.
Rao, Ragu-Nathan, and Solis (1997) surveyed companies in China, India, Mexico and
the United States to determine the effects of ISO 9000 certification on quality management
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practices and self-rated measures of non-financial perfonnance. Most (77%) of their
respondents were manufacturers. They concluded that ISO 9000 certification had a
significant impact on quality management practices such as leadership, strategic quality
planning, good supplier relationships and customer satisfaction. They also reported that
ISO certification was significantly related to rework, throughput time, productivity, and
market share.
Elmuti and Kathawala's (1997) study of two manufacturing plants in a large U.S.
organization showed that the plant with ISO 9000 certification had better and improved
quality of work life compared to the non-certified plant. They also found that ISO 9000
certification increased employee productivity, morale, and goal congruence while it
decreased absenteeism, rework, and defects. Export sales of the plant were also enhanced.
Chittenden, Poutziouris, and Muhktar (1998) found that U.K. finns attaining ISO 9000
certification reported benefits similar to those reported by Elmuti and Kathawala (1997).
Consistent effects have been observed in Northem Ireland (McAdam & McKeown, 1999),
Norway (Sun, 1999) and North America (Simmons & White, 1999).
However, results to the contrary have been reported by Beattie and Sohal (1999), Hua,
Chin, Sun, and Xu (2000), Quazi et al. (2002), Shams-ur (2001), Yamada (2001). Beattie
and Sohal's (1999) survey of 50 Australian companies showed that 25% of the companies
could not identify any strategic benefits and a mere 4% reported improving their
profitability following certification. Similarly, Shams-ur (2001) noted insignificant
differences in self-rated organizational perfomiance between small- and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) with and without ISO 9000 certification in Australia. Hua et al.'s
(2000) survey of 100 companies in Shanghai found no significant differences in quality-
related performance measures between companies with ISO 9000 certification and those
without. Yamada's (2001) survey of certified Japanese companies could not identify the
effects of ISO 9000 certification on estimated expenses and profits of large companies
listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. More recently, Quazi et al.'s (2002) replication of
Rao et al. (1997) revealed that ISO 9000 certification did not affect quality management
practices and quality related measures of companies in Singapore. The lack of expected
relationships was attributed to the nature of the sample as 62% of the respondents were
SMEs. In contrast, the respondents in Rao et al. (1997) were mainly large organizations. A
further explanation for the difference is that SMEs are usually "pushed" into certification
by their customers and consequently, the real drive towards quality improvement is lacking
(Wide & Brown. 1997-98).
Low et al. (1999) explain that the motive for attaining certification explains the lack of
observed positive association between ISO 9000 and firm performance. They investigated
whether ISO 9000 certification increased Singaporean contractors' CONQUAS score. The
CONQUAS score is a system for assessing a contractor's quality of work. The assessments
were made on site by assessors from the Construction Industry Development Board. They
found that most companies experienced either a fall or an immaterial increase in their
CONQUAS scores. Since the Singapore government gave rebates to ISO 9000 certified
contractors for public tenders, the primary motive for certification was to secure
government projects and rebates in the short term rather than committing to improve
quality in the real sense. The decline in the CONQUAS scores following ISO 9000
certification is consistent with this view.
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2.3. Financial performance studies
To date four studies have investigated the effect of ISO 9000 certification on non-self-
rated financial perfonnance measures derived from financial statements. Simmons and
White (1999) studied 126 U.S. companies in the electronics industry and investigated
whether three financial perfonnance measures (ROA for profitability, sales/equity for
operational performance, and foreign sales) were significantly different between the 63
ISO certified and the 63 non-ISO certified companies. The non-ISO companies were
matched for industiy and were not ISO certified in 1995. The perfonnance measures were
derived from the 1995 financial infonnation available from COMPUSTAT. They found
that ISO certified companies were more profitable than non-ISO certified companies but
not with respect to operational perfonnance and level of foreign sales. Simmons and White
(1999) reported that most of the financial gains were attached to larger finns. However,
they did not control for the potential presence of non-ISO firms seeking certification; that
is, firms in the process of attaining certification. The study ofjust one year data also does
not pennit assessing the longer tenn effects of ISO 9000 certification nor does it allow
them to isolate the effects of perfonnance prior to ISO 9000 certification on post-ISO
certification perfonnance.
Haversjo (2000) argued that quality systems such as ISO 9000 certification would
improve internal and external quality and consequently improve profitability. He
investigated differences in the rate of return of ISO 9000 certified and non-ISO
certified Danish companies. His results based on 664 companies showed significantly
higher rate of return for ISO 9000 certified companies than their size-matched
counterparts. The difference in perfonnance between ISO companies and non-ISO
companies was 20% in the year prior to certification and approximately 35% 2 years after
certification. However, similar to Simmons and White (1999), his tests did not isolate the
effects of pre-ISO perfonnance on post-ISO perfonnance; that is, to what extent was the
perfonnance in the post-ISO period due to a continuation of perfonnance prior to attaining
certification? An examination of his tabulated trend analysis shows that the difference in
the 5 year average rate of return between the ISO and control firms was 29.8% prior to ISO
9000 certification and 12% following certification. It therefore appears from Haversjo's
(2000) data that ISO 9000 certification is not associated with significant financial gains in
the longer tenn.
More recently, Heras, Casadesus, and Dick (2002) provided evidence of certified
Spanish firms outperforming non-certified firms. Using return on assets (ROA), their
univariate tests show that the ISO 9000 certified finns achieved 24% to 45% higher ROA
tlian non-certified finns over a 4-year period. However, like the preceding studies, Heras et
al. (2002) did not control for factors (e.g., size, industry, prior perfonnance) likely to
influence performance and do not conduct selection-bias tests. They also do not test
perfonnance before and after ISO 9000 certification. In a subsequent study, Heras, Dick,
and Casadesus (2002) control pre-certification performance in their univariate test and
report that ISO certification does not increase profitability. With the exception of this
Haversjo (2000) does not define rate of return.
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control, their study suffers from the preceding Hmitations that raise questions about the
vaHdity of their findings.
The four studies reviewed above appear to show some short-term differences in
profitabihty following ISO 9000 certification. However, the studies are unable to
demonstrate that the effects of ISO 9000 certification on financial performance were not
a result of continuation of the pre-lSO 9000 certification perfonnance. That is, they did not
control for pre-ISO 9000 performance when determining post-ISO 9000 performance.
None of the studies perfonned a selection bias test to detennine whether the firms'
underlying characteristics prompted them to seek ISO 9000 certification. If there are
differences in profitability, then it is possible that the effects reported in prior studies have
been overstated. The suney studies on self-reported financial and non-financial measures
have similarly not been able to ascertain that post-ISO 9000 perfonnance had improved
following certification. In this study, I adopt a research design that allows me to test the
extent of improvement in financial performance following ISO 9000 certification and
control for extraneous effects. 1 also perfonn sensitivity and selection-bias tests that I
discuss following the main results.
3. Hypotheses development
The literature identifies two ftindamental theories that explain possible sources of gains
following ISO 9000 certification. The two theories can be described as Internal
Improvement Theory and External Improvement Theory. Both theories rationalize that
perfonnance in the post-ISO 9000 certification period should exceed perfonnance in the
pre-ISO 9000 certification period.
5.1. Internal improvement theory
The internal improvement theory is based on the rationale that ISO 9000 certification
brings benefits through greater quality awareness among employees (e.g.. Brooks, 1995;
Brown & Van der Wiele, 1995; BSI, 2000; Dale, 1994; Peach, 1997), and increased
productivity and efficiency (e.g., Arnold, 1994; Brooks, 1995; BSI, 2000; Buttle, 1997;
RAB, 2000; Reed, Lemak, & Montgomery, 1996). In other words, ISO 9000 certification
seems helpful for companies seeking to improve the quality of their internal business
processes. ISO 9000 certification is frequently regarded as the stepping stone to achieving
total quality in the entire organization (Quazi et al., 2002). The following sub-sections
briefly articulate drivers of quality-related improvements in a firm's internal business
processes.
3.1.1. Quality awareness
Quality-conscious employees understand the importance of producing high-quality
output and are capable of executing the operations with that objective in mind. ISO 9000
facilitates this objective by providing "guidelines for developing a quality system and the
process of acquiring certification impose a certain level of discipline on an organization"
(Carr, Mak, & Needham, 1997, p. 387). Consequently, a company accredited with ISO
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9000 is dedicated to maintaining a high-quality environment. Hence, workers would
experience fewer problems on the job and consequently increase their motivation and job
satisfaction that ultimately manifests in better financial performance.
3.1.2. Prodiictivit}' and efficiency
Productivity and efficiency relate to the rate at which goods and services above
minimum satisfactory levels can be delivered to customers. Throughput rate and similar
measures of productivity and efficiency increase when employees are aware of quality
objectives, and when they are motivated and share common strategic visions. Marquardt
(1992) provides evidence consistent with this view. Given the improvements in
productivity and efficiency following certification, it is inferred that ISO 9000 certification
reaps cost savings by eliminating non-value-added activities, reducing scrap, rework, and
warranty claims. In summary, the internal improvement theory suggests ISO 9000
certification would improve internal business processes such that production becomes lean
and costs decline.
3.2. External improvement theory
Although internal quality improvements are imperative, companies cannot ignore the
needs and responses from the market (Lisiecka, 1999). After all, the purpose of a company
is to maintain and increase profits and its survival is contingent on its ability to satisfy
customers and sustain competitive advantage (Carr et al., 1997). In other words, a
company's improvement must not be observable only from inside the organization; its
external business partners should also be able to recognize the change and its quality.
While the pursuit for ISO 9000 accreditation may reflect an organization's strategic
intent to be quality-focused, research indicates that the driving force could essenfially be
customers' expectations and contractual requirements (e.g.. Brown & Van der Wiele,
1995; Rayner & Porter, 1991). Companies "stamped" with the quality logo increase
customer confidence and help speed up the supplier-selecfion process (Dale, 1994;
Yamada, 2001). Consequently, ISO 9000 certified firms are likely to increase their
customer base and market share and, therefore, sales. These coupled with internal-process
improvements could lead to improvements in overall financial performance.
The preceding discussion and the literature review suggest that gains in financial
performance are available through ISO 9000 certification. In the current competitive
environment many firms are seeking ISO 9000 certification to improve their internal
business processes for competitive advantage. Conceptually, the balanced-scorecard
framework would suggest that improvements to internal processes could lead to enhanced
financial perfonnance. Given that certification to ISO 9000 is evidence of improvements
to the quality management system driving a firm's internal processes, it follows that ISO
9000 certification is associated with increased financial performance.
The balanced-scorecard framework also suggests that customer satisfaction is
associated with sales revenue. This is the drive that comes from the tlnn's external
environment. Finally, the balanced-scorecard framework relates improvements to the
I
internal business processes to greater customer satisfaction and consequently better
I financial peifonnance. The theories underpinning ISO 9000 certification and the balanced-
h
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scorecard framework suggest the motivation for ISO 9000 certification could be either
internal or external or both. Therefore, I specify three hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1 relates ISO 9000 certification to internal efficiencies and Hypothesis 2
refers to external effects. Hypothesis 3 reflects the belief that the benefits of ISO 9000
certification exceed its cost such that overall financial performance increases as a result. I
use return on sales (earnings before interest, tax, and extraordinary items divided by net
sales) as the financial measure for efficiency. I use growth in sales to capture the effect of
the external improvement theory. Finally, I use earnings per share (operating income after
tax divided by number of ordinary shares issued) to capture the overall improvement in
financial performance related to ISO 9000 certification. Hence, I formulate the following
three hypotheses:
HI. The financial efficiency (profit margin) of finns improves with ISO 9000 certification
and is greater than firms without ISO 9000 certification.
H2. The growth (sales growth) of firms improves with ISO 9000 certification and is
greater than firms without ISO 9000 certification.
H3. The overall financial performance (earnings per share) of firms improves with ISO
9000 certification and is greater than firms without ISO 9000 certification.
4. Research design
4.]. The sample
All Singapore incorporated companies listed on the main and secondary boards (SGX
and SESDAQ) were identified for ISO 9000 certification from information held by the
Productivity and Standards Board. Companies that were ISO 9000 certified after 1998
were eliminated because the study requires at least 3 years of post-certification data. I
required 3 years of post-certification data to capture the benefits following a sufficient
"gestation" period. Prior studies have not allowed a sufficient time for the effects of ISO
9000 certification to be realized. The primary data set included financial data through
fiscal years ending December 31, 2000. Thus, companies listed after 1994 could not be
included. Furthermore, companies incorporated overseas were eliminated from the sample
due to an inability to establish their ISO 9000 certification status. Industries without any
ISO 9000 certified companies were also omitted. Because I matched the ISO 9000
certified companies with a non-certified company (discussed below), companies that were
in the process of attaining certification were excluded from the non-ISO matched sample. I
determined this by referring to company webshes, print media, and phone calls. Finally,
ISO 9000 certified companies in industries without any non-ISO 9000 certified companies
were eliminated. Forty companies did not have the required infonnation and were thus
eliminated. These procedures yielded a sample size of 52. To increase the sample size, 18
companies with at least 2 years pre- and 2 years post-certification data were added. Thus,
the final sample size was 70 comprising 35 ISO 9000 certified and 35 matched non-ISO
certified companies. Table 1 summarizes the sample-selection process.
I
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Table 1
Sample selection process
Reason for elimination from the sample No. of firms
Total listed companies on SGX and SESDAQ as at 28 November 2001 493
Company was listed after 1994 (222)
Company was ISO 9000 certified after 1998 (6)
Company was partially ISO 9000 certified (16)
Company was incorporated overseas (56)
Industry without ISO 9000 certified companies (e.g., diversified industry, (57)
investment, finance)
Excess unmatched non-ISO 9000 certified companies (39)
ISO 9000 certified companies without matched non-ISO 9000 certified (5)
companies
Full set of financial data not available (3 years prior to and 3 years (40)
following the year of ISO 9000 certification)
Remaining in the sample 52
Companies added with most complete set of financial data (minimum 18
2 years prior to and 2 years following the year of ISO 9000 certification)
Total sample size 70
The distribution of ISO 9000 certification over the 8-year period was quite even, with
the exception of 1994 which recorded the highest number of certifications. This is
mostly due to the Singapore government "demanding" certification for construction
firms' eligibility to undertake large government projects. There was one certification in
1991, two in 1992, three in 1993, 11 in 1994, four in 1995, five in 1996 and 1997, and
four in 1998. The sample was represented by the following industries; services 28%,
engineering and machinery 26%, construction 20%, electronic and electrical 14%,
packaging 6%, food producers 3% and household goods 3%. I conducted sensitivity
tests for industry and year effects and found the results relating to the effects of ISO
9000 certification on financial performance were robust. The relevant results are reported
in the Results section of the paper.
4.2. Research design and test variables
4.2.1. Matched control sample
As the study is concerned with the effects of ISO 9000 certification on financial
performance, I employ a sample ofISO certified firms and matched non-ISO certified finns.
j
The matched control firm also assists control for economy-wide and industry factors.
! Consistent with Simmons and White (1999), matched firms were selected based on industry
1 classification and asset size. Matching on size also controls for the capability of firnis to
! embark on the ISO 9000 certification process. Larger firms with greater resources and access
jj
to capital markets are capable ofand committed to investing in long-run quality processes. A
j!
paired /-test ofdifferences in size (total assets in year 0) between ISO 9000 certified and non-
Ij ISO 9000 certified firms was not significant (/ = 0.756, /? > 0. 1 0). This suggests that the firms
ii were appropriately matched. While I did not match the firms on their perfomiance over the 3
I
years prior to certification, the data in Panel A of Table 2 shows the perfomiance of the ISO
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9000 certified and non-ISO 9000 certified firms do not significantly differ in the 3-year
period prior to the certification year. Recognizing that more profitable and growth firms have
incentives and the financial capacity to attain certification, I conducted self-selection bias
tests and found that the results relating to the effects ofISO 9000 on performance are robust.
Results of this test are reported in the Results section of the paper.
4.2.2. Test design
In recognition that the pre-ISO 9000 certification and post-ISO 9000 certification
perfoiTnance could be due to economy-wide and industry factors, or a continuation of firm-
specific performance prior to ISO 9000 certification, I employed an adjusted performance
measure when evaluating the effects of ISO 9000 certification on performance. The
control-adjusted performance measure is computed as illustrated in Fig. 1 . First, I derived
a pre-ISO adjusted value (X) by comparing the financial performance for each ISO 9000
certified firm with its matched non-ISO 9000 certified firni for the 3 years prior to the
certification year. Similarly, I derived a post-ISO adjusted value ( Y) by comparing the
financial perfonnance for each ISO 9000 certified firm with its matched non-ISO 9000
certified firm for the 3 years following the certification year.
Second, I evaluate the difference between the pre-ISO adjusted value {X) and the post-
ISO adjusted value ( Y) as shown in Fig. 1 to determine the extent of improvement due to
ISO 9000 certification. The test design attempts to control for the effect of economy-wide
and industry factors and pre-ISO 9000 certification performance on post-ISO 9000
certification performance. This design ensures, ceterus paribus, that the difference in
financial perfonnance between the pre- and post-ISO 9000 certification periods relates to
ISO 9000.-'
4.3. Test variables
I use financial ratios to measure company performance. The approach is to use pre- and
post-certification accounting data to test for changes in company performance. The ratios
are computed for every company up to 3 years prior and 3 years subsequent to the
certification year. Since this study is investigating whether ISO 9000 certification is
associated with economic gains, the financial ratios selected reflect whether the source of
the effect is internal or extemal. The three ratios used in this study focus on efficiency
^ A more complete and rigorous design would include ISO registered finns not continuing registration. The
inclusion of such firms for comparative purposes would assist in ascertaining whether ISO certification was
optimal, particularly for firms without ISO. However, the resuhs of this study show that firms without ISO
certification are significantly outperformed by their ISO certified counterparts following certification.
Nevertheless, 1 discussed deregistration by ISO firms with the CEO and Vice President of the largest ISO
authority in Singapore. The discussions revealed that firms very rarely deregister or not continue registration. The
most common reasons for deregistration included relocation outside Singapore, terminating activities or winding
up. Deregistration for publicly listed companies was the most rare; in fact the CEO and Vice President could not
recall the deregistration of any company over the last few years. They explained that given their visibility, public
companies do not deregister because of potential economic consequences both from trading partners and internal
efficiencies. In short, the benefits of ISO 9000 certification are seen as valuable in Singapore and the lack of
deregistration data does not allow me to study firms discontinuing ISO 9000 registration.
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Fig. 1. Design for computation of test variables.
(profit margin/return on sales) as an internal source of gains, revenue (sales growth) as an
external source, and profitability (earnings per share) as overall financial perfonnance
giving returns to shareholders. All three measures of performance indicate whether ISO
9000 certification is a value-increasing event that is associated with real economic gains.
The focus on efficiency, revenue and profitability is consistent with prior studies and the
theoretical relationships between ISO 9000 certification and financial perfonnance
advanced earlier. Since the hypotheses are directional, all tests of improvements in
performance are based on a one-tailed test. Following Fig. 1, Eqs. (1), (2) and (3) test the
extent of improvement in perfonnance where AGSALES, AEPS, and APM reflect
differences captured by X and Y in Fig. 1
:
AGSALES = (GSALESisoposT - GSALESnisopost)
— (GSALESisopRE — GSALESnisopre) T
AEPS — (EPSisoposT — EPSnisopost) — (EPSjsopre — EPSnisopre) (2)
APM = (PMisoposT - PMnisopost) - (PMisopre - PMnisopre) (3)
where: ISOPOST = performance measure for ISO 9000 certified firm in the post-ISO
9000 certificafion period; ISOPRE= performance measure for ISO 9000 certified firm in
the pre-ISO 9000 certification period; NISOPOST = perfonnance measure for control
finn (non-ISO 9000 certified) in the post-ISO 9000 certification penod; NISOPRE =
performance measure for control finn (non-ISO 9000 certified) in the pre-ISO 9000
certification period; GSALES = growth in net sales measured over the 3-year period
either in the pre-ISO or post-ISO certification period; EPS = eamings per share defined
as operating income after tax divided by number of ordinary shares issued; and
PM = profit margin defined as earnings before interest, tax, and extraordinary items
divided by net sales.
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Table 2
Mean differences between ISO 9000 certified and non-ISO 9000 certified firms (n for mean value
calculation = 3 84 finn-years)
Panel A: Three year mean differences between ISO 9000 certified and non-ISO 9000 certified firms prior to
certification
Variable ISO Non-ISO ?-vaIue P (two-tailed) P (one-tailed)
GSALES' 0.575 0.452 0.653 0.518
EPS 0.202 0.305 -0.641 0.526
PM 0.076 0.081 -0.167 0.869
Panel B: Three-year mean differences between ISO 9000 certified and non-ISO 9000 certified finns following
certification
Variable ISO Non-ISO /-value p (two-tailed) ;; (one-tailed)
GSALES" 0.221 0.036 1.057 0.298 ns
EPS 0.208 0.048 2.366 0.024 <0.01
PM 0.036 -0.048 2.082 0.045 <0.025
Panel C: Control-firm adjusted mean differences between the 3-year pre-lSO 9000 certification period and 3-year
post-ISO 9000 certification period
Variable Pre ISO X Post ISO Y /-value p (two-tailed) p (one-tailed)
GSALES" 0.134 0.187 -0.209 0.836 ns
EPS -0.103 0.161 -1.770 0.086 <0.05
PM -0.005 0.085 -2.078 0.045 <0.025
GSALES = 3-year net sales growth; EPS = operating income after tax divided by number of ordinary shares
issued; PM = earnings before interest, tax and extraordinary items divided by net sales, ns = not significant,
#=after removal of outlier effects, X and }'=refer to Fig. 1.
4.4. The data
The financial reports of the 35 ISO 9000 certified companies and 35 non-ISO 9000
certified companies were obtained for up to 3 years prior and 3 years after the ISO 9000
certification year. Fifty-two companies had data for the complete 6-year period and 18
companies had data for four continuous years (see Table 1). Therefore, a total of 384 firm-
year data were used. All data were hand collected.
5. Results
Panel A in Table 2 presents mean-difference statistics for the three performance
measures for the period prior to certification. The data shows that none of the 3 -year
average performance measures are significantly different.''
''
I removed two outliers (greater than two standard deviations from the mean) from GSALES. These related to
the non-ISO group. The matched ISO firms were also removed. Including the outliers resulted in a significant
(/7<0.10) difference in GSALES with higher growth for the non-ISO group (mean = 7.216) than the ISO group
(mean 0.568). Subsequent analysis excludes the outliers.
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Fig. 2. Total revenue mean value plots for ISO 9000 certified vs. non-ISO 9000 certified firms.
Panel B of Table 2 presents the results for differences in performance in the post-ISO
certification period. The data suggests that the ISO 9000 certified companies had
significantly better performance for GSALES, EPS, and PM. The differences were
significant for EPS (p<0.01) and PM (/?<0.05). In order to identify the extent of
improvement in performance and control for differences due to economic factors, tests
were conducted on the control-adjusted perfonnance measures {X and Y shown in Fig. 1).
The results for these tests are shown in Panel C.
year
-ISO —•—NON-ISO
Fig. 3. EPS mean value plots for ISO 9000 certified vs. non-ISO 9000 certified firms.
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Fig. 4. Profit margin mean value plots for ISO 9000 certified vs. non-ISO 9000 certified firms.
When differences of the pre-mean {X) and post-mean ( Y) for the three performance
measures are considered, GSALES is not significantly different. EPS and PM however
show significant (/?<0.05) differences. The difference in the control-adjusted performance
measures for EPS and PM show that ISO 9000 certified companies significantly improved
their performance over the pre-ISO period and perform better than their matched non-ISO
9000 certified company.
The tabulated financial performance results are supported by trajectories reported in
Figs. 2, 3 and 4. Fig. 2 shows ISO 9000 certified firms report increasingly greater total
j
revenues than non-ISO 9000 certified firms in the years following certification. Similarly,]
trajectories for EPS and PM in Figs. 3 and 4, respectively, show differences between the!
ISO 9000 certified firms and non-ISO 9000 certified finns in the years following]
certification.
5.1. Multivariate analysis
There are two limitations of the univariate tests reported above. First, it does not]
control for other factors that affect firni perfomiance. Second, the mean difference test]
assumes that the rate of change in the pre-ISO 9000 certification measures is equivalent]
to the post-ISO 9000 certification measures. I address these limitations through al
multivariate analysis by regressing post-ISO certification performance on pre-ISO
certification performance, company size (SIZE: log of total assets), major source of sales
revenue (SOURCE: foreign=l or local/regional = 0), age of the company (AGE: number]
of years listed on SGX or SESDAQ), and ISO status (ISOStatus: ISO 9000 certified=ll
and non-ISO 9000 certified = 0). I include AGE because Finley and Buntzman (1994)]
argued that the age of a company influences its performance. Company SIZE is includec
to control for size effects on performance. SOURCE of sales was included because
Singapore companies have domestic and international markets and these can influence
their performance and motivation for seeking ISO 9000 certification. Three OLS
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regressions were estimated for each performance measure. The models took the
following general fomi:
Post-ISOperf/ = a + /?, SOURCE + ft.^lZE + /?3AGE + p^VxQ - ISOperf,
+ j^jISOStatus + £ (4)
Where Perf/ represents each of the three perfonnance measures; GSALES, EPS, and
PM. Since Hypotheses 1 to 3 posited greater financial perfonnance of ISO 9000 certified
firms relative to non-ISO 9000 certified firms, the coefficient of interest is ft^ and the
test criteria is /^5>0. The coefficient of interest, /?5, measures the change in the mean
value of the relevant performance value (Post-ISOpe,f,) if a finn is ISO 9000 certified
relative to a firm not certified, after controlling for the influence of other factors likely to
affect perfonnance. Table 3 presents the regressions results.
For each financial performance measure, the pre-ISO 9000 certification performance
measure is statistically significantly associated with the post-ISO 9000 certification
performance. These observations confirm the belief that past performance is related to
future performance and that such effects need to be controlled. They also confirm that
prior studies are limited to the extent that they have not isolated the effects of prior
performance on post-ISO 9000 certification performance and have overstated certification
effects.
The coefficient, ft^, on the variable of interest, ISOStatus, is positive and statistically
significantly associated with GSALES (/^fg-O.nO, /=2.249, p<0.05), EPS {(U = Q>219,
/ = 2.577, ;?<0.05), and PM (/i5 = 0.282, / = 2.393, p<0.05). The results for ISOStatus
suggests that after controlling for prior perfonnance and other factors, ISO 9000
certification is significantly associated with perfonnance. These results are consistent with
the three research hypotheses that collectively posit post-ISO 9000 certification perform-
ance is greater than the pre-ISO 9000 certification perfonnance.
Table 3
OLS results for effect of ISO 9000 certification on financial performance
Variable Expected GSALES EPS PM
Beta (t value) Beta (/ value) Beta [t value)
Constant ? 37.500 (0.609) 34.615 (1.290) 22.869(1.613)
SOURCE 7 -0.016 (-0.270) 0.068 (0.619) -0.019 (-0.157)
SIZE + 0.180(2.281)** 0.256 (2.230)** 0.062 (0.497)
AGE 7 -0.036 (-0.606) -0.147 (-1.309) -0.198 (-1.623)
Pre-ISOpert + 0.751 (10.178)*** 0.360 (3.364)*** 0.183 (1.577)*
ISOStatus + 0.130(2.249)** 0.279 (2.577)** 0.282 (2.393)**
Adj. R- 0.790 0.231 0.084
Model F 51.445*** 5.152*** 2.257*
Post-ISOpe,.r, = a + /^iSOURCE + /^SIZE+/J3AGE+/?4Pre-ISOiv,r, + /^5lSOStatus+f;.
SOURCE = 1 for majority foreign sales and for regional/local sales; SIZE = log of total assets; AGE = number of
years listed on SGX/SESDAQ, Pre-ISOp,.,i,= Pre-ISO GSALES: 3-year mean net sales growth for the Pre-ISO
certification period, Pre-ISO EPS: 3-year mean earnings per share for the Pre-ISO certification period, and Pre-
ISO PM = 3-year mean profit margin for the Pre-ISO certification period; and ISOStatus= 1 for ISO 9000 certified
and for non-ISO certified firnis. ***/7<0.01, **/?<0.05, *p<0.10. All tests one-tailed except as indicated.
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Furthennore, /?5 suggests that ISO 9000 certification increases the mean value of
GSALES by 13%, EPS by 28% and PM by 28%. These effects suggest that the benefits of
ISO certification come largely from internal efficiencies rather than from external sources
such as growth in sales. In a highly competitive market and mature ISO context such as
Singapore, benefits of ISO are more likely to flow from internal sources. The ISO
companies appear to have significantly improved their performance relative to their non-
ISO counterparts through a genuine commitment to and implementation of quality-
improvement processes. These results also suggest that improvements to performance in
mature ISO contexts are likely to result from continuous enhancements to internal business
processes.
5.2. Sensitivity analysis
I explored the effects of industry membership and year of ISO 9000 certification on the
results reported in Table 3. Since the Singapore government provided incentives to
companies in the building and construction industry that attained ISO 9000 certification, it
is possible that the motive for such companies differs from the motives for companies in
other industries seeking ISO 9000 certification. In addition, companies in the
manufacturing industry may seek certification in response to customer demands. I classiiy
companies into three broad industry groups; construction, manufacturing, and service and
test for industry effects using two dummy variables in the OLS (Eq. (4)). For the three
performance measures I found that the results (not tabulated) pertaining to the effects of
ISO 9000 certification are consistent with those reported in Table 3. That is, ISO 9000
certification continues to have a positive and significant (at least at p< 0.025) effect on
post-ISO 9000 certification performance after controlling for industry effects.^
Similarly, for year effects I used a dummy variable that was coded 1 for firms that
attained ISO 9000 certification in 1994 and otherwise. In 1994, 11 (31%) of the
companies in my sample attained ISO 9000 certification, whereas other years had similar
occurtences of certification. Inclusion of year effects in the OLS (Eq. (4)) did not affect the
results relating to the effects of ISO 9000 certification on post-ISO 9000 certification. The
year effect was also not significant (/?>0.10) for any of the three perfomiance measures.
Inclusion of industry and year effects together in the OLS (Eq. (4)) produced results
consistent with their effects when isolated.
5.3. Self-selection bias test
The results reported above ignore self-selection inherent in the ISO 9000 certification
decision. If finn characteristics that motivate ISO certification are associated with better
financial performance, then it is likely that the results observed overstate the effects of ISO
9000 certification on perfonnance. Following Kinney and Wempe (2002) and Maddala
(1977), I investigated effects of endogeneity using a two-stage self-selection procedure. In
I
The construction industry variable had a negative and significant {/7<0.05) effect on post-ISO 9000
performance for PM and EPS, while the manufacturing industry variable had a negative and significant
(p<0.052) effect on post-ISO 9000 performance for GSALES.
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the first stage, I employed the following PROBIT analysis of ISO 9000 certification choice
where the variables are as previously defined:
ISO^ = a + /?, SOURCE/ + /J.SIZE, + p^AGEj + /i4GSALESpRE/
+ /^sEPSpREy + /^ePMpRE/ + uj (5)
I included SOURCE, SIZE, and AGE for reasons explained earlier. I included the three
pre-ISO 9000 certification measures of financial performance because firms with superior
performance are likely to seek certification to maintain their performance and, due to their
superior performance, they would be able to afford such initiatives. It is also possible that
firms with lower performance seeking superior perfonnance may attain certification. For
example, firms expanding their market may seek ISO certification for strategic purposes
while those seeking to improve efficiency may also go for certification. ISO 9000
certification and improvements to intemal business processes are likely to benefit such
firms. ISO was coded 1 for firms that attained certification and otherwise. The
unreported results indicated no significant effect for any of the variables at/7<0.10. This
suggests that the sample finns were relatively homogenous. The second stage test
comprised of separate analysis for the two sub-samples of ISO 9000 certified and non-
certified finns. The following model was estimated for each of the three financial
perfoiTnance measures:
Post-ISOperf, = 5; + /?, SOURCE + ftj'^lZE + /^jAGE + f^^Vrt - ISOperf,
+ i55Miso(NTSO) + £ (6)
In Eq. (6), Mjso and A/niso are selectivity variables. For the ISO certified sub-sample
equation, Miso is —f{(i'Z)^F{fi'Z) and for the non-certified sub-sample Mniso is
fiP'Z)^i\~F{P'Z)). P'Z is the prediction from the first-stage PROBIT model and/( ) and
F() are the density and distribution functions of the standard normal distribution.^ The
test condition for selectivity bias is a negative and significant ft^. The unreported results
indicated that for each of the three performance measures for both sub-samples fi^ was not
significant at /^< 0.10. Thus, there is no evidence to suggest that self-selection bias affects
the results.
6. Conclusion
This study sought to investigate whether ISO 9000 certification is associated with
financial perfonnance measures at the organizational level. The study makes several
contributions to the literature. First, using a sample of 35 ISO 9000 certified firms
across a range of industries and 35 non-ISO certified companies matched on size and
industry, 1 investigated whether ISO certification was associated with improvements
For a comprehensive discussion of the self-selection bias tests, refer to Maddala (1977, pp. 351-366, 1983,
pp. 257-290).
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(as opposed to differences between ISO and non-ISO firms at a point in time) in
objective measures of financial performance such as EPS, Profit Margin, and Growth
in Sales. I employed an appropriate design that permitted investigating the extent of
improvement in performance following ISO certification. Second, the relationship
between ISO 9000 certification and performance was investigated in an emerging
market that had a mature ISO outlook. A mature ISO context enabled me to study the
real benefits of ISO 9000 certification arising fi"om improvements to the internal
business processes rather than due to a "first mover" effect. In doing so, this study
provides the first reliable evidence of the impact of ISO 9000 certification on financial
perfomiance at the organizational level.
The results of this study provide evidence that ISO 9000 certification is associated
with improvements in financial performance. They suggest that ISO 9000 certification
does bring benefits to the firm and its stakeholders. Specifically, the multivariate tests
showed that ISO 9000 certification is associated with significant improvements in profit
margin, growth in sales, and earnings per share. However, the effect of ISO 9000
certification was greater on profit margin than on growth in sales. This suggests that the
improvement in overall performance is attributed largely to improvements in internal
business processes. Thus, in a mature ISO context such as Singapore, ISO 9000
certification appears to affect firm performance through internal sources focused on
improving quality-related processes. It appears from the data analyzed in this study that
ISO 9000 could be an important strategic initiative because it does impact the bottom
line through enhancements to internal business processes. Firms not certified but
considering ISO 9000 certification are likely to benefit financially from attaining ISO
status. Finally, the evidence here also suggests that ISO 9000 has credibility and
supports the literature on the self-rated benefits of ISO 9000.
There are a few limitations in this study. First, the results of this study are not
generalizable to non-listed companies and SMEs. Future research could consider such
companies because they play major roles in world economies. However, data
availability is likely to limit such investigations. Second, I cannot rule out the
possibility that other variations in firm characteristics and endogenous factors
influenced the observed perfonnance differences. More complex and intricate models
are required to explore such effects and are left to future research. Third, due to the lack of
objective and sufficient information, the study did not examine other financial measures
such as inventory turnover, cost of goods manufactured/serv ices provided, and intemal
and external failure costs that could more directly capture the effects of ISO 9000
certification. Other financial performance measures such as EVA could be considered.
Future research could investigate the causal effects of ISO certification on non-financial
measures and consequently on financial measures. Fourth, the period of the study was
one where Singapore companies implemented other quality initiatives such as JIT,
total quality management, and cellular manufacturing technology. The extent to
which these practices varied between the ISO and non-ISO certified companies and
This is a common, inherent hmitation of studies examining the association between quality initiatives and
performance (see also Balakrishnan et al., 1996; Ittner & Larcker, 1995; Kinney & Wempe, 2002; Simmons &
White, 1999).
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within the ISO certified firms could not be determined. Therefore, the resuhs of the study
must be interpreted cautiously. Future research could explore the effect of quality
initiati\es and ISO certification on financial perfonnance. Finally, no attempt was made to
investigate the effect of types of ISO 9000 certification on performance due to limited
information and the small sample size. This is another issue that could be explored in
fiiture research.
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Abstract
This paper examines the origins, growth, and the development of accounting practices and
disclosures in Pakistan and the factors that influenced them. We trace the early days of accounting in
the Indian subcontinent and discuss the British colonial influence. We examine the development of
accounting in Pakistan through three eras: Independence through 1971, Post 1971-1984, and 1984 to
present. We describe how the colonial past and later the international financial institutions such as the
Asian Development Bank and the International Monetary Fund played key roles in shaping
accounting and reportmg practices of the country. Pakistan's adoption of International Financial
Reporting Standards as national standards has not led to improvement in the quality of financial
reporting. We argue that Pakistan, even though classified as a common law country in literature,
exhibits most of the properties of code law countries. We conclude that lack of investor protection
(e.g., minority rights protection, insider-trading protection), judicial inefficiencies, and weak
enforcement mechanisms are more critical to explaining the state of financial reporting m Pakistan
than are cultural factors. This insight has policy implications for developing countries that are
making efforts to improve the quality of the financial reporting of their business entities.
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1. Introduction
Recent advances in information and financial technology have focused attention on the
ideas of global business strategy and alliances. How well the outside world understands
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the business practices of a particular countn could determine the difference between a
successfiil or a failed outcome—especially if the countn." is an emergmg economy such as
Pakistan. An integral part of this understanding is to determine how a countr\'"s business
entities measure, summarize, and fmalh repon their economic transactions to their
stakeholders. This is the primar>' focus of this paper: the origins and the development of
accounting in Pakistan with emphasis on the factors that have influenced accountmg
disclosures and practices.
Earher research focused on the de\elopment. di\ ersit>. and classification of accounting
practices of different groups of countries (DaCosta. Bourgeois. & Larson. 1978: Doupnik.
1987; Frank. 19~9: Xair & Frank. 1980). A recent rcMew of accounting literamre
(Doupnik & Salter. 1995; Gemon & Meek. 2001: Meek & Saudagaran. 1990; Mueller.
196") reveals that important en\ ironmental factors that influence accounting practices are
the level of economic de\'elopment. the namre of business enterprises and their
relationships with providers of capital, political and economic ties, legal system (common
vs. code law), tax laws, inflation levels, and level of education.
Our study contributes to the literamre on the development of accounting because
Pakistan pro\'ides a unique research setting. Pakistan is an Islamic Republic located in a
region that has great economic potential. Since 1985. Pakistan has been following
Intemational Accounting Standards (now known as International Financial Reporting
Standards). Meek and Thomas (2004). note that Islamic nations ha\e been mostly left out
of the accounting development research and. this paper contributes to filling this vacuum.
Intemational financial institutions (such as the Intemational Monetars' Fund, the Asian
Development Bank, the USAID. the World Bank, and the Paris Club) have been involved
in the economic development of Pakistan and ha\ e \ ested interests in knowing how their
funds (loans, grants, etc.) are allocated to benefit Pakistan's econom\-. Pakistan offers a
promising in\"esting oppormnit\' to foreign in\estors who wish to di\ersif>' their risks by
investing in capital markets of other countries.^
2. Islamic Republic of Pakistan— a profile"
Pakistan, a nation ofmore than 140 million people is situated in South Asia. Pakistan was
previously a part of the British colonial Raj. In 194". the Indian Sub-Continent was
partitioned into uvo so\'ereign States—India and Pakistan. .An unresohed dispute o\er
Kashmir (a Muslim-majorit}." state of the undivided India) led to several wars between
Pakistan and India. Until 1971. Pakistan was comprised ofuvo parts (West Pakistan and East
Pakistan) separated by ahnost 1000 miles of India's territor>. In 1971. following a war with
India, the countrs's eastem wing declared itselfas an independent countrs' called Bangladesh.
Geographically. Pakistan (as it stands now ) stretches out 1000 miles north from the
Arabian Sea; its breadth varies between 150-400 miles. For the last four decades
' http://editioiLcnn.coin/2002BUSINESS/asia/12'31/asia.stox2002 . In fact Pakistans stock market in Karachi
was tenned by American nevis network. CNN as Asia's best performing market in 2002 {up more than 1 12%).
" Some information about Pakistan has been drawn from " -1 note on Pakistan' by Professor WasifM Khan of
Lahore University of Management Sciences.
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Pakistan's population has been growing at an alarming rate, averaging close to 3%
annualh'. As shown in Exhibit I. the population has increased fourfold since independence
(population data is for West Pakistan, now called Pakistan) and the growih rate has
averaaed around 2.8% (see Exhibit I. Panel B) since 1981. According to the latest census
140.000
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'132352
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Source: Federal Bureau of Statistics. Statistics Division. Government of Pakistan
P.AXEL B
Year Population
( million)
Growih Rate
1981 85.09 3.06
1982 87.67 3.03
1983 90.30 2.99
1984 92.96 2.95
1985 95.67 2.90
1986 C)y.l! 2 So
1987 1-1. i^ :>:
1988 103.99 2.~"
1989 106.S4 2.73
1990 109.71 2.69
1991 112.61 2.63
1992 115.54 2.60
1993 118.50 2.56
1994 121.48 2.51
1995 124.49 2.4~
1996 127.51 2.43
1997 130.56 2.38
1998 13.V.V 2.20
1999 136.24 2.19
2000 1.39.14 2.13
2001 142.01 2.06
2002 144.85 2.00
2003 14^.66 1.94
Source: Federal Bureau of Statistics. Statistics Division. Government of Pakistan
Exhibit I. Panel (.A) Population and population growth rate in Pakistan (in thousands). Panel (B) Pakistan's
population growth rates (in millions).
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conducted in 1998, rural population has declined from 71.7% in 1981 to 67.5% in 1998.
This shift in population is exerting tremendous pressure on the urban infrastructure leading
to wide spread problems typical of urban slums. Pakistan's gross domestic product has
grown an average of5% over the last five decades (see Exhibit II, Panel A and Panel B). In
some years, such as in 1970-71, 1992-93, 1996-1997, the GDP growth rate was
significantly less than the population growth rate.
Majority of the population lives in the rural areas, and relies on an agriculture-based
economy. Wheat (a staple food), cotton, and rice are the main agricultural products.
PANEL A
Year Growth rate Year Growth rate
1951-52 -1.80 1977-78 7.73
1952-53 1.72 1978-79 5.53
1953-54 10.22 1979-80 7.33
1954-55 2.03 1980-81 6.40
1955-56 3.53 1981-82 7.56
1956-57 2.98 1982-83 6.79
1957-58 2.54 1983-84 3.97
1958-59 5.47 1984-85 8.71
1959-60 0.88 1985-86 6.36
1960-61 4.89 1986-87 5.81
1961-62 6.01 1987-88 6.44
1962-63 7.19 1988-89 4.67
1963-64 6.48 1989-90 4.44
1964-65 9.38 1990-91 5.42
1965-66 7.56 1991-92 7.57
1966-67 3.08 1992-93 2.10
1967-68 6.79 1993-94 4.37
1968-69 6.49 1994-95 5.06
1969-70 9.79 1995-96 6.60
1970-71 1.23 1996-97 1.70
1971-72 2.32 1997-98 3.49
1972-73 6.80 1998-99 4.18
1973-74 7.45 1999-00 3.91
1974-75 3.88 2000-01 2.22
1975-76 3.25 2001-02 3.36
1976-77 2.84 2002-03 5.08
Source: Federal Bureau of Statistics. Statistics Division, Government of Pakistan
PANEL B
1950-51
to
1959-60
1960-61
to
1969-70
1970-71
to
1979-80
1980-81
to
1989-90
1990-91
to
1999-2000
GDP (fc) Global Average 4.5 5.4 3.9 3.2 2.3
GDP (fc) Pakistan 3.14 6.77 4.84 6.11 4.44
Agriculture 1.73 5.07 2.37 4.37 4.49
Industrial Sector 7.72 9.92 5.50 8.05 4.00
Services Sector 3.53 6.74 8.26 5.92 4.56
GDP (mp) at constant prices - 6.69 5.59 3.41 7.75
GDP (mp) at current prices 3.76 10.25 17.39 13.80 14.01
Source: Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistics Division. Government of Pakistan
Exhibit II. Panel (A) Annual real growth rate of gross domestic product. Panel (B) Ten-year average real growth
rates (%) in GDP decades of 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s.
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Agriculture still contributes slightly over 25% to GDP, employs around 44% of the
work force, and is the main source of foreign exchange eamings. In fact, the rate of
agricultural growth dominates other components of overall economic growth.
Manufacturing is the second largest sector of the economy accounting for 17%) of
the gross domestic product. Major industrial products include textile and apparel,
leather, cement, food and allied, paper and board and chemical, mbber and plastic.
Cotton and the cotton textile industiy are the backbone of Pakistan's industrial
economy. It continues to enjoy the status of the largest industry and commands
comparative advantages in resource utilization. It employs the largest number of the
PANEL A
2000-2001 2001-2002 2002-2003
(Million Rupees) |
Total 539,070 560,947 652,294
Cotton Fabrics 60,486 69,297 78,665
Cotton Yam and Threads 62.975 57,165 54,342
Synthetic Textiles 31.911 25,232 33,534
Rice 30,849 27,509 32,433
Sports Goods 1,5.919 18,623 19,579
Petroleum & Petroleum Products 10,833 11,764 14.507
Leather 13,723 14,740 13.733
Woolen Carpets & Rugs 16,877 15,122 12,690
Medical Instruments 7.293 8,896 8,767
Fish 7,994 7,746 7,867
Fruits & Vegetables (including juices) 6.072 6.492 6,696
Raw Cotton 8,072 1,502 2,873
Source: Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistics Division, Government of Pakistan
PANEL B
2000-2001
1
2001-2002
|
2002-2003
(million rupees)
Total 627,000 634,630 714,372
Mineral Fuels, Lubricants & related materials 198,414 176,233 184,204
Machinery & Transport Equipment 121,164 135,254 171,904
Chemicals 111,259 114,930 126.404
Manufactured Goods classified chiefly by material 51,632 60.999 71.772
Crude Materials except fuel 37,162 52,079 53,964
Animal or Vegetable Oil and Fats 25,265 29,121 40,654
Food and Live Animals 52,669 32,262 29,000
Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles 15,208 17,605 21,380
Commodities & Transaction not classified 14,049 15,974 14,720
Beverages and Tobacco 178 172 368
Source: Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistics Division, Government of Pakistan
Exhibit III. Panel (A) Pakistan's recent exports-principal commodities (in million Rupees; 1 USS=60 Rupees;
2002 average rate). Panel (B) Pakistan's imports-commodity/major groups (in million Rupees; 1 US$ = 60
Rupees; 2002 average rate).
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Foreign Trade
Export
1 Imports
(thousand rupees)
1951-52 921,925 1.473.886
1956-57 698,217 1.516,034
1961-62 542.869 2,236.256
1966-67 1,297,323 3,625,658
1971-72 3,371,393 3.495,366
1976-77 11,293,875 23.012.175
1981-82 26.269,865 59.481.537
1986-87 63,354,879 92.430.787
1991-92 171,727,714 229.889.408
1996-97 325,313,469 465.001.242
2001-02 560.947.000 634,630,000
Source: Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistics Division, Government of Pakistan
Exhibit IV. Pakistan's foreign trade (thousand Rupees) (1 USS = 60 Rupees; 2002 average rate).
industrial labor force (38%), is the major source of foreign-exchange earnings (60%),
and accounts for 27% of the value-added in the manufacturing sector. Panel A of
Exhibit III shows the recent (2000-2003) exports of principal commodities. The major
finished-products exports include cotton-yam, cotton-fabrics, knitwear, bed-wear,
readymade garments, synthetic textiles, carpets, sports goods, leather manufactures
and surgical instruments. Panel B of Exhibit III show the most recent (2000-2003)
primary imports, which include petroleum products, agricultural and other chemicals,
machinery and transport equipment, and food items. Exhibit IV provides an overall
summary of foreign trade since 1951. The country has experienced large trade deficit
since 1951, which is typical of underdeveloped countries.
3. Historical perspective
History of accounting in the subcontinent is ancient. Gladwin (1796) suggested that in
India in 1583 there was a Hindu method of accounting before the adoption of the Persian
mode. In Hamilton's (1798) opinion the Hindu method of accounting used by Bengali
traders was a double-entry system. Lall Nigam (1986), drawing support from Hamilton
(1798), contends that the system used by Indian traders was a predecessor to the Italian
method and was transported to Italy by Indian exporters. Although Nigam could not
present any physical evidence to support his claim (see Nobes, 1987), Indians, even back
in 1191, were using a bilateral form of accounting, which may not be a double-entry
system (Michael & Nandy, 1992).
3.1. The corporate laws
Formal accounting, as we understand it today, came to the Indian subcontinent
(accompanied by the concept of limited liability and statutory audit), in the middle
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of the 19th century during the British rule, when the Companies Acts of 1850
and 1857 were initially enacted. The Acts required that the companies should
submit their accounts including half-yearly audits and auditors' reports. These Acts
were followed by the Companies Act 1883 which required detailed audit
guidelines in term of appointment, remuneration and duties of auditors (Saeed,
1993).
3.2. Companies Act 1913
The Companies Act 1913, next in a series of corporate laws enacted in the
subcontinent, mandated that every company maintain books of accounts with respect
to: (1) sales and purchases, (2) receipts and payments of money, and (3) assets and
liabilities of a company. Under the requirements of this law, no person should act as an
auditor of the company unless he/she held an auditor's certificate granted by the
provincial government. The central government, however, held the right to issue this
certificate to members of certain professional bodies, namely; the Institute of Chartered
Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW), Institute of Chartered Accountants of
Scotland (ICAS), and Institute of Chartered Accountants of Ireland (ICAI), who were
immediately recognized as qualified auditors. There were no examinations required for
obtaining the practitioner's certificate until 1918, when the Government of Bombay
instituted a Government Diploma in Accounting and constituted detailed rules
regarding the examination and training of those who wanted to obtain the diploma
and the license to audit. All provinces in British India soon adopted these rules. It was
not until 1932 that the Government of British India framed auditors certificates rules
to control and regulate the auditing profession. After gaining independence in 1947,
Pakistan adopted as is the Companies Act of 1913 and the auditors certificate rules,
1932 (Saeed, 1993).
In 1952, as a first step toward the institutional development of the profession,
the practicing accountants (back then called Registered Accountants) formed a
private body known as the Pakistan Institute of Accountants (PIA) to look after
their own interests and to take up the accounting professional matters with the
government. With the formation of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Pakistan
(ICAP) in 1961 the accounting profession marked a major post-independence
development. This step was the result of persistent pressure from the Pakistan
Institute of Accountants, and the government's realization that the profession has
grown in stature and importance. Another major development in the institutional
structure was the creation of the Institute of Cost and Management Accountants of
Pakistan (ICMAP) in 1966 (as a follow up to the formation of Pakistan Institute of
Industrial Accountants) to regulate the profession of cost and management accountants
(Saeed, 1993).
3.3. From independence until 1971
The financial reporting requirements of Companies Act of 1913 remained in force
after the nation gained independence in 1947 until 1 97 1. The disclosure requirements
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of the Third Schedule to the Companies Act were rudimentary and incomplete in
nature."
In evaluating the financial reporting practices in Pakistan during that period, Qureshi
(1975) describes the weaknesses in the specimen balance sheet given in the Third
Schedule of the Companies Act:
".
. .It does not suggest a classification of assets according to their nature, such as
current assets, fixed assets, intangibles, long term investments and so forth;
intangibles like good will, trade marks, patents, etc. are described as fixed assets;
and preliminary expenses and underwriters commission lack proper classification.
There is no suggestion to classify the capital and liabihties side of the balance sheet
into current liabilities, long-term liabilities, and shareholder's equity. Profit or deficit
is not shown as part of or deduction from stockholders equity, instead, the deficit
appears separately on the asset side ofthe balance sheet. Similarly, the un-appropriated
balance of profit is listed as an item of liability and not as part of equity. The provision
for bad and doubtful debts is shown as a reserve and not as deduction from
receivables."
Additionally, Qureshi (1975) identifies other weaknesses in financial reporting
practices that included absence of disclosure of accounting policies, failure to maintain
distinction between reserves and provisions, and the valuation of assets in the balance
sheet at gross value.
".
. .various sources of revenue were distinguished, but the gross revenue was not
broken down by product line, major business activities or by different segments in
case of a conglomerate. Valuation of year end inventory was described such as lower
of cost or market value but the method applied for relating different cost of products
acquired to periodic revenues such as LIFO, FIFO, AVERAGE was not disclosed.
Similarly in twenty out of thirty reports that were examined, auditors had relied on
certificate given by the management regarding the valuation of year end inventories
For profit and loss accounts, the requirements included disclosure of the following:
1. The amount of gross income (by sources),
2. The amount of gross expenditure (distinguishing the expenses of establishment, salaries, and other like
matters),
3. The portion of deferred expenditure that is to be written off.
4. The amount written oif for depreciation, and
5. The amount paid to directors and managing agents of the company as remuneration for their ser\'ices.
For balance sheet, disclosure requirements included:
1. A summary of property and assets of the company disclosing their general nature and how the value of
fixed assets has been arrived at,
2. A summary of capital and liabilities of the company disclosing their general nature, and
3. Disclosure in the above two categories should conform to the contents of Form F (specimen balance sheet)
as given in the Third Schedule of the Companies Act.
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and no audit report had mentioned the fact that inventories were not covered by their
opinion."
3.4. Post J 971-1984
In 1970. the Securities and Exchange Authority, a semi-autonomous body created
by the government, developed certain rules (that became effective in 1972) to improve
financial reporting practices in the country primarily through disclosures. For the first
time, the publication of semi-annual accounts for listed companies was made
mandatory. Equally important was the requirement to disclose transactions between
the associated companies describing the aggregate sales, purchases, and balance
transfers.
Pakistan became a member of The International Accounting Standard Committee
(lASC) shortly after its fomiation in 1974. Since Pakistan have not had any national
accounting standard of its own, the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Pakistan (ICAP)
encouraged its members to recommend to their corporate clients to prepare their financial
statements in conformity with international accounting standards. Use of international
accounting standards was not mandated for listed companies, until the enactment of the
Companies Ordinance 1984, Section 234 for listed companies only. Unlisted companies
are still not required to comply with the requirements of the IAS (now known as
Intemational Financial Reporting Standards. IFRS). Aimexed to the Companies Ordinance
1984 were the Fourth and Fifth Schedule, providing disclosure requirements for listed and
unlisted companies, respectively. Listed companies were hence required to comply with
requirements of the Fourth Schedule as well as IFRS.
3.5. Companies Ordinance 1984
Companies Ordinance 1984 included some critical requirements, given the corporate
context of the country. The three critical requirements were: (1) disclosures of the
remuneration of directors, chief executives, and auditors (where auditors' compensation
segregated between audit fees and other services), and (2) regulating related party
transactions. This section also required companies to ensure that the total amount of
advances/commissions to associated company should not exceed 20% of the paid in
capital plus free reserves of the lender company. In order to monitor organizations in this
regard, a clause was inserted in the Fourth Schedule of the Companies Ordinance 1984
that required companies to disclose maximum balances due to and due from associated
companies at the end of any month during the year, and (3) finally, in reports
accompanying their accounts, company directors were now required to disclose the
following:
(a) Any material changes and commitments affecting the financial position of the
company that have occurred between the end of the financial year of the company to
which the balance-sheet relates and the date of the report;
(b) Any changes that have occurred during the financial year concerning the nature of
the business of the company or of its subsidiaries, or in the classes of business in
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which the company has interest, whether as a member of another company or
otherwise, unless Corporate Law Authority (now known as Securities and Exchange
Commission of Pakistan) exempts the company from making such disclosures on
the ground that such disclosures would be prejudicial to the business of the
company;
(c) The fullest information and explanation in regard to any reservation, observation,
qualification or adverse remarks contained in the auditor's report;
(d) Information about the pattern of holding of the shares in the form prescribed;
(e) The name and country of incorporation of its holding company, if any, where such
holding company is established outside Pakistan;
(f) The eaming per share; and
(g) Reasons for incurring loss and a reasonable indication of future prospects of profit, if
any.
In addition, through an amendment made in 1999 in the Companies Ordinance,
directors were also required to disclose information about default on payments of debt, if
any, and reasons, thereof
3.6. J 984 to present-developments
Financial statements of listed companies continued to improve into 1990s with a
number of new international accounting standards issued by the lASC (now known as
the International Accounting Standards Board lASB). These standards were issued as
part of a core standards project specified by International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO) to lASC before it would consider endorsing IAS for cross-border
listing of companies on the intemational stock exchanges of the world. Most of these
standards were adopted by SECP (Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan) on
the recommendation of ICAP along with many old standards that were not adopted
earlier.
3. 7. Issuance of the Code of Corporate Governance
Another major development in the financial reporting system is the Code of Corporate
Governance issued on March 28, 2002. Several features of the Code have specific
reference to financial reporting and auditing issues.
The contents of Directors Report to members, in addition to the requirements of
Section 236 of Companies Ordinance 1984 must include:
• A statement with regard to the compliance with IFRS as applicable in Pakistan for the
preparation of financial statements and disclosures of any departures from the same;
• Information regarding the system of internal control being adequately designed,
implemented and monitored;
• The director's view regarding the going-concern ability of the entity;
• A statement to the effect that there have been no material depaiture from best practices
of corporate govemance, as detailed in listing regulations;
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• A summary of key operating and financing activities data for the last six years;
• An explanation if dividends have not been declared;
• Pattern of shareholders-disclosing the name-wise details of i) institutional shareholders,
ii) holdings of directors and their spouses, iii) details of associated companies, and iv)
shareholders holding more than 10% of the total holdings.
The Code requires listed companies to publish quarterly, un-audited financial state-
ments. These have to be accompanied by a director's review of the affairs of the company
during the quarter. This is the first time that listed companies in the country are required to
report quarterly results. Prior to this, listed companies were required to publish half-yearly
accounts that could be un-audited as well.
Listed companies are required to ensure that annual audited accounts are circulated not
later than four months from the end of financial year of the company. The earlier
requirement as per the Companies Ordinance 1984 for both listed and non-listed
companies was 6 months.
Companies are required to include in the annual report a statement of compliance with
the Code of Corporate Governance. The company auditors are required to review and give
an opinion about the compliance. Given the nature of the work, auditors give a moderate
assurance on statement of compliance with the Code of Corporate Governance.
In summary, we provided a brief account of evolution of the institutional structure of
accounting and financial reporting in the country. In the next sections we shall explore
the effects of different environmental factors that shaped the accounting system of the
country.
4. Economy, politics and the legal system
Since gaining independence, Pakistan had to accede to forces of secession and
independence and in that process lost East Pakistan, which is now Bangladesh. The
country has had successive military governments, which assumed powers after the
dismissal or overthrow of civilian governments; in the last 25 years, six elected
governments have been dismissed or overthrown. The ensuing uncertainty has
significantly and negatively affected the economy, corporate governance structure, and
the nature of business and industry.
The 1960s were noted for the government's attempt to foster import substitution
industries through direct control by supporting industrial projects. Several industrial
family-owned companies emerged in a wave of capital intensive and mostly low value-
I
added businesses, mainly in textiles. Much of the industrial growth achieved by these
1 family-owned enterprises was greatly helped by the government in the fonn of industrial
licensing procedures, overvalued exchange rates, tariff protection against imports, input
i subsidies, and preferential access to capital (White, 1974). Foreign assistance played a
j
major role in the development of the economy. As shown in Exhibit V, the amount of
foreign loans and grants doubled during the 1960s increasing from 842 million dollars in
the 1950s to around 2.4 billion dollars in the decade of the 1960s. During the decade of
development (1958-68), GNP rose from Rupees 31.439 million to Rupees 48.280 million,
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Disbursements of Foreign Economic Assistance
Year Loans Grants Total
(Million US Dollars)
1951-1960 192 650 842
1960-1965 1,232 1.162 2,394
1965-1970 2.324 719 3,043
1970-1978 5,096 634 5,730
1978-1983 4.418 1,375 5,793
1983-1988 5,158 2,025 7,183
1988-1993 9,540 2.541 12,081
1993-1997 9,214 1,008 10,222
1997-2001 4.555 2,918 7,473
Source: Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistics Division. Government of Pakistan
Exhibit V. Foreign economic assistance to Pakistan (million US dollars) (Years 1951-2001).
a rate of growth of 6% during the years 1965-68, flieled by the industrial output in all the
sectors especially in textile, jute and sugar.'* The number of joint stock companies
increased from 3853 in 1957-58 to 8654 in 1967-68." Pakistan's efforts to survive and
develop were so successful that it was described as the most remarkable example of state
and nation building in the post-World War II era.^ But according to some critics, there was
a downside to this economic development.
"Pakistan attained economic development but at the cost of social justice. GNP grew
rapidly, but so did skew-ness in the distribution of income and wealth, rendering the
rich richer and the poor poorer. Industrial expansion was remarkable but economic
power became concentrated in the hands of a small elite class. Gross domestic
savings as a proportion of GNP rose markedly, but it consisted mostly of
undistributed corporate profits plus depreciation allowances, and came about in
response to such fiscal incentives as the tax holidays. Even dividends in majority of
cases were payments within controlling group or group of companies, which were
reinvested."^
The de\'elopment of stock market was made possible with the development of Karachi
and Dhaka (now the capital of Bangladesh) Stock Exchanges. The closely held
corporations discouraged small investors to become owners for fear of difflision of
ownership. Trading on the stock exchange therefore represented transactions between
select groups of people.
^ Investment in Pakistan—background andperspective (Karachi: The Department ot In\estment Promotion and
supplies. Government of Pakistan, 1968), p. 23.
*^ 25 years ofPakistan in Statistics 1947-72 (Central Statistical Office. Economic Affairs Division. Mmistry of
Finance. Planning and Development. Government of Pakistan. 1972). p. 155.
The Times. London, February 6, 1966.
Role ofprivate sector in Pakistan's development, pp. 52-53.
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During the 1 970s, we observe a significant reaction to much of the perceived or real
inequities created by the market friendly economic policies of the 1960s. The popularly
elected government of Mr. Z.A. Bhutto, led a wave of nationalization, sending the
industrial groups from the 1960s into virtual hibernation and even into exile.
Nationalization of commercial banks in 1974 opened a new chapter in political patronage;
industrial loans were sanctioned to political or ethnic cronies, often in wanton disregard of
prudent economic sense and sound decision-making (Shahid-ur-Rehman, 1998). To
finance large industrial projects, the government launched development finance
institutions such as the National Development Finance Corporation (NDFC). After the
civilian government was overthrown in a militaiy coup in 1977, the previously
nationalized financial institutions continued to be run by the government. In a White
Paper issued by the military government in 1979 on misuse of banks by political
government, it was stated,
".
. . the aggregate amount of advances of half million rupees and above which were
classified as doubtful or irregular in the State Bank Inspection Report of December
31, 1975 is over Rs 1340 million. Advances of half million mpees or above given by
the banks after nationalization which have been found to be bad, doubtfiil or
irregular abinitio amounted to Rs 510 million. It also found that nationalized
commercial banks sanctioned loans worth Rs 562 million under irresistible political
and administrative pressure or influence between 1974-77."
The lingering Afghan civil war of the 1980s brought almost four to five million
Afghans to Pakistan seeking refuge which resulted in a unique set of problems such as the
proliferation of weaponry and a rampant spread of drugs. At the same time, Pakistan
reaped economic dividends in the fonn of increased foreign assistance
—
grants and loans.
Some of this aid was used to revive the private sector, further concentrating wealth in a
few hands, particularly in the textile sector. Although Pakistan has been receiving foreign
loans from international donor agencies since the 1950s, during the 1980s the total
external debt rose to approximately 15 billion US dollars.
The 1990s were most notable for the country's multiple experiments in democracy, and
rapid expansion in the capital markets resulting in an increased number of listed
companies on the three major stock exchanges of the country. As shown in Exhibit VI, the
number of listed companies increased from a total of 314 to 487. Some important
developments of the 1990s were the huge loan defaults by politically connected and
influential industrialists, the continued public financial assistance of the resource-draining
failed industries, and massive corporate failures. According to Shahid-ur-Rehman (1998),
"Three lists of bad loans have been published since 1993, showing an increase in bad loans
from Rs 1340 million to Rs 130 billion in January 1997."
4.1. Formation of securities and exchange commission of Pakistan (SECP)
Increased external debt and the diminished ability of Pakistan to repay it resulted in
increased involvement of international donor agencies (such as the Asian Development
Agencies and the International Monetaiy Fund) in the fiscal and monetary policy making
of the country. As part of the capital market regulation reforms of the Asian Development
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YEAR No. of listed
companies
Listed capital
(Rupees in million)
Market Capitalization
(Rupees in million)
1950 15 117.3 -
1960 81 1,007.7 1,871.4
1970 291 3,864.6 5.658.1
1980 314 7,630.2 9,767.3
1990 487 28,056.0 61,750.0
2000 762 236.458.5 382,730.4
Source: http://www.kse.net.pk
Exhibit VI. Number of listed companies (Rupees in millions) (Years 1950-2000) Karachi Stock Exchange,
Pakistan.
Bank (ADB), the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) was formed in
1999 (under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1997) to monitor the activities of
corporate and capital markets and all related players.
SECP succeeded the Corporate Law authority (CLA), which had been administering
Corporate Laws in the country since 1981. As a government department to the Ministry of
Finance, the CLA lacked autonomy and was a bureaucratic structure that made it difficult
to effectively pursue transparency, disclosure and authenticity of operations in the financial
sector. The rapid expansion of stock markets during the early 1990s further highlighted the
need for an independent regulatory body with full operational and administrative
autonomy.^
4.2. The emergence of a nuclear state and its aftermath
Pakistan's tests of nuclear devices in 1998 resulted in the imposition of various
international sanctions. Foreign economic assistance dropped from 10.2 billion US dollars
dunng 1993-1997 to 7.4 billion US dollars during 1997-2002 (see Exhibit V) and the
foreign direct investments (already limited) dried up. Consequently, the country's
economic indicators worsened. During this period the government made significant
attempts to focus on stabilizing rather than growing the economy. This, in turn, led to
collapse in investments and an increase in poverty and unemployment. The heavy expense
The responsibilities include:
1
.
The issue of securities;
2. Regulating the business of stock exchanges and other security markets;
3. Supervising depository and clearing houses;
4. Registering stock brokers and sub-brokers;
5. Regulating investment schemes and funds;
6. Preventing frauds in securities markets; and
7. Regulating share acquisition and mergers/takeovers of companies.
Chairman of SECP in the Chainnan's Statement accompanying the annual accounts for the Commission for
the year ended June 30, 2000.
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of debt servicing and defense had a fiirther depressing affect on dismally performing social
indicators such as the literacy rate (down to 38%), high population growth rate (averaging
around 2.1%) and poor public health.
4.3. Code of Corporate Governance
As mentioned in the earlier section of this paper, the SECP introduced a set of proposals
in the form of a Code of Corporate Governance (CCG), whereby listed companies would
be managed in compliance with international best practices. Pakistan faces the same
corporate governance challenges typical of emerging economies: loan-defaults, large-scale
tax evasions, non-payment of dividends to shareholders for longer periods of time, and
government's ongoing financial and managerial assistance of a large number of distressed
industrial units. The purpose of the Code of Corporate Governance (issued in 2002) was
not only to address such problems, but also to boost investor's confidence in the
fiinctioning of corporate entities, and to induce mobilization of savings through equity and
debt markets. The Code was enforced through listing regulations of all three stock
exchanges of the country.
4.4. Economic development periods
Mueller (1968) suggests that the stage of economic development, type of the economy,
and the growth pattern of the economy, can exert an impact a country's accounting
practices. Doupnik and Salter (1995) argue that the stage of development affects the type
of business transactions that are conducted in a country and the type of economy
determines which transactions are more prevalent. On similar conceptual lines, we can
relate evolution of Pakistan's accounting practices to three economic development
periods
—
private sector driven economic development, nationalization, and de-regulation/
privatization, discussed next.
4.4.1. Private sector development
The fairly primitive reporting requirements of the Companies Act of 1913 continued to
remain in force throughout 1960s. The emergence of family-based business groups on the
corporate scene (a recuning institutional story in the non-USA business setting) and the
heightened concern for wealth concentration became dominant political issues during this
period. These concerns were augmented by possible involvement in unethical acts such as,
; evasion of taxes, lack of distribution of dividends and transfer of fijnds/profits from one
^
company to another within the group (in the form of advances and loans), and inter-
' company sales and purchases of goods and services.
It was not until 1972 when the Securities and Exchange Authorit}' Rules of 1971 issued
new rules regulating transactions between associated companies. Listing regulations of
j
Karachi stock exchange added a provision to suspend from trading companies that do not
declare dividends for five consecutive years. This provision was in response to minority
shareholders' persistent complaint in the 1960s that highly profitable family businesses did
,not distribute dividends for long periods. Little changed in reality for the minority
I shareholders for the next two decades. Eventually, through the fiscal budget 1998, an
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amendment was made to the Income Tax Ordinance 1979, whereby, if a company's
retained earnings exceed 50% of the paid up capital, the excess amount will be deemed to
be the earnings of the company for the fiscal year and will be taxed accordingly. The Code
of Corporate Governance mandated in 2001 that directors disclose the reasons for
nondeclaration of dividends in a particular year and give the reasons for incurring losses.
This chain of events that initially affected listing regulations and later the tax laws, ended
up affecting the accounting system.
4.4.2. Nationalization era
During the 1970s there was a major shift in the policy of the popularly elected
government of Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto. A number of large industrial units, banks,
and insurance companies were nationalized in order to soothe popular anger against the
"twenty-two families" (see White, 1974) that are claimed to control the economy. This
radical change in economic and political system could be expected to cause major
changes in the accounting practices of the country. But unlike financial reporting in
China (Lynford & Li, 1997), there were no changes in the financial reporting framework
of Pakistan.
4. 4. 3. Deregulation/privatization
The issue of huge nonperforming loans granted to political cronies by successive
governments since 1970 became a major issue in the late 1980s and particularly, in the
early 1990s (Shahid-Ur-Reliman, 1998). An amendment to Section 236 of the Companies
Ordinance on July 27, 1999, required directors to disclose in their report accompanying
the annual accounts, information about loan default, and the reasons. However, it still took
many years before this particular disclosure item was made mandatory for incorporated
businesses in the country.
5. Systems interactions
5.7. Common vs. code law classification
International accounting literature has long recognized the prevalence of a particular
legal system (common law or code law) to be an important variable affecting the accounting
system of a country (Berry, 1987; Fantl, 1971; Nobes, 1983). The literature recognizes that
common-law countries are oriented towards fair presentation, transparency, and ftill
disclosure (known as the Anglo-Saxon model). Standard setting is carried out in these
countries by bodies in the private sector, and the stock market is the dominant source of
financing for corporate entities. By contrast, in code law countries, banks or governments
are the main sources of financing and financial accounting is geared towards creditor
protection (known as the Continental model). Financial reporting, in these countries, is
characterized by low disclosures and an alignment of financial accounting with the tax laws.
In addition, governments have a strong influence in setting accounting standards.
Recently researchers have shown a renewed interest in empirically examining the
relationship between accounting systems and legal system in xarious countries. La Porta.
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Lopez-de-Salines, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997, 1998, 2000), suggest that the type of legal
system a country has predisposes it towards a principal system of finance. That is, a
common-law legal framework emphasizes shareholders' rights and offers a stronger
investor protection system as compared to that of a code-law legal system. This linkage
leads to the development of strong equity markets in common-law countries and weak
ones in code-law countries. Consequently, in code-law countries, debt rather than equity is
the dominant source of financing.
The case of Pakistan is indeed a puzzle. In the models for accounting practices of
different nations, it is placed as a common law country, most likely because of its British
colonial past and its adoption of the International Accounting Standards very early on
(see Hope, 2003b). In addifion, it exhibits some of the properties of a common-law
country: two separate sets of reporting requirements (tax reporting and financial
reporting); minimal influence of labor (as stakeholder) on corporate governance; and no
direct involvement of government in standard setting. On the other hand, if we examine
a little deeper, we find that Pakistan exhibits even more of the characteristics of a code
law country. It has a weak equity market, a prevalence of family-owned big businesses
(business-groups), strong preference and use of debt as a source of financing (as against
use of outsiders' equity), and a general perception of low quality of financial reporting
(Baig, 1997). Thus, we can argue equally strongly that Pakistan should be grouped with
code-law countries.
5.2. Enforcement predicament
The literature has shown that incentives to produce quality financial statements are
low in the absence of effective enforcement mechanisms. The extent to which standards
are enforced is as important as the standards themselves (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998;
Sunder, 1997, p. 1 67). Hope (2003a) describes enforcement mechanisms as consisting of
rule of law, shareholders' protection, insider trading laws, judicial efficiency, and audit
spending. Historically, enforcement mechanisms in Pakistan have been rather weak;
Company Law was considered to be the least administered law. In addition, minority
shareholders' protection regulations have traditionally been inadequate. Efforts were
made in the 1 960s and later to improve the situation, which include enactment of the
Securities and Exchange Ordinance 1969, Monopolies and Restrictive Trade practices
Ordinance 1970, Securities and Exchange rides 1972, and fonnation of Corporate Law
Authorit}' in 1981 . Other measures include an amendment in Chartered Accountancy
Ordinance 1961, and in 1983, the ICAP got its first independently elected president.
Some serious measures, to improve the enforcement climate were adopted in late 1990s
with the formation of an effective regulatory body called the Securities and Exchange
Commission of Pakistan (SECP).
\3. Enforcement-role of the accounting profession
The Influence and independence of the accounting profession is an indication of the
effective enforcement of accounting standards (Ball, Robin, & Wu, 2003). Corporate
mvironment of family-owned and -managed firms in Pakistan pose serious threats to
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independence of auditors. In the words of a senior partner of a top-four finn, "It is very
difficult to stand against the aspirations of management, if they own more than seventy
percent of voting rights." While litigation against auditors in the West is the most important
deterrents against any potential collusion of auditors with management of the audited firm
(Coffee, 2001). To the best of our knowledge, there has never been a litigation case against
the auditors in Pakistan. Regulatory action by ICAP against its practicing members has
been minimal, but the enforcement environment has improved somewhat after the
formation of SECP according to the annual report of the SECP.
"The enforcement and monitoring division (EMD) of the SECP during the year under
review identified several cases of negligence of statutory auditors where they had
failed to act in conformity with the statutory requirements. The audit reports issued
by such auditors failed to report material facts about the affairs of companies or
otherwise contained untrue statements. Previously, the Commission used to refer
such cases to Institute of Chartered Accountants of Pakistan for taking necessary
disciplinary action against the concerned auditors. In view of delays noted in disposal
of these cases, the Commission decided to invoke the provisions of the Companies
Ordinance, 1984 to proceed against auditors for negligence and professional
misconduct in conducting statutory audit of listed companies. Accordingly, the
EMD initiated proceedings in 25 cases against 20 firms of chartered accountants
during the financial year 2002. Penalties were imposed in 21 cases while four cases
were pending as of June 30, 2002 (2002 Annual report of SECP)."
ICAP has also become more active in pursuing cases against its practicing members
and publicly reprimanding the guilty and publicly disclosing that information. The cases
and the actions taken by ICAP and SECP against these audit firms is publicly available
information and can cause serious damage to the reputation of firms. There is a wide
spread belief in the profession that these measures have definitely improved the quality of
financial reporting practices in the country (Ashraf & Khalid, 2005).
Another step in improving the regulatory environment is the Quality Control Review
Program (QCR) started in 1987 by Institute of Chartered Accountants of Pakistan with
significant impact after the implementation of the Code of Corporate Governance, which
required auditors of listed firms to achieve a satisfactory rating in the Quality Control
Review Program. Every audit firm has to submit a complete list of the audit clients as of
June 30th of a particular year to ICAP, and to undergo a Quality Control Review at least
once in 2 years. The Professional Standards Compliance Department (PSC) selects five
(maximum) audit engagements, which are preferably listed companies and/or high-risk
audit engagements, from the list of clients of each audit firm under review. One of the five
selected clients is chosen for QCR on the day of the review. Audit working papers and
correspondence files are reviewed and a report is issued stating whether the quality of
work performed is or is not in accordance with International Standards on Auditing. If a
report is not satisfactory, a revisit is performed after 6 months. During the year 2003, of
370 registered audit firm, 85 practicing firms were given satisfactory ratings under the
program. As of June 30, 2003, the total number of ICAP members is 3026 of which 270
are sole proprietors and the remaining are in partnerships (composed of two or more
partners) for a total of 100 firms (Ashraf & Khalid, 2005).
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5.4. Audit fees
Low spending on audit services has always been a concern for accounting
profession in Pakistan. According to the partner of one of the top four auditing firms,
"this factor severely hampers the quality of audit because at the end of the day we are
in the business of selling audit services and low revenue will mean low cost and
resultantly poor quality staff and review." The situation got so worse that ICAP had to
issue a circular in 1999 describing minimum audit fee to be paid to auditors. In
summary, in Pakistan, in the absence of strong incentives for the main constituents of
the accounting system, regulation has had the most pronounced effect on accounting
practices.
6. Effects of taxation laws on accounting
More than half of the listed firms on the Karachi Stock Exchange are family-owned
and operated (widely known to be business group firms). Companies listed on the stock
exchanges pay substantially low rates of tax as compared to companies that are not
listed (see more on this in first schedule of the Income tax Ordinance, 2001). Arguably,
reduced tax burden is an incentive for listing, but in exchange companies have to
accept more stringent disclosure requirements. Tax evasion by the family-owned and-
managed companies has been a widespread concern since the 1960s and it is claimed
that the economy and tax evasion have risen to 10.6% and 11.4% of the Gross
Domestic Product (GDP), respectively, in the past 7 years. "^ On this issue Ashraf (1979)
notes that
"It is obvious that exaggerating costs, manipulating production records and under-
invoicing sales are far more profitable techniques than any cost control technique or
cost analysis."
To a larger extent this has been a problem with a number of under-developed countries.
According to Nashui (1984), Turkish companies are accused of preparing three sets of
financial statements, one set for external reporting, the second set for tax authorities that
shows very depressed income (to avoid a large tax liability), and the third set for banks and
other lending organizations that provides a very rosy picture of the financial position of the
company (to persuade lenders to extend the required credit). It is widely believed in the
business circles that the notion of triple financial statements is also practiced in Pakistan.
In order to tackle the problem, the government of Pakistan made an amendment in 1 990
whereby business organizations are now required to pay a minimum tax of 0.5% of total
turnover irrespective of the level of profit or loss."
In addition to understating revenues and overstating expenses, companies also
manipulate other areas of financial disclosures in Pakistan. For example, companies
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp? page=story_2-2-2003_pg7_32.
Section 80 D of Income Tax Ordinance 7979/Section 113 of Income Tax Ordinance 2001
.
194 J. Ashraf. W.I. Ghani / The Intenuitiomil Jniinial ofAccounting 40 (2005) 1 75-201
aggregate any "miscellaneous or other income" with other expenses to avoid the taxes
levied by income tax laws. A recent case of tax considerations affecting corporate
disclosures became apparent when mutual fiands and Modaraba'" companies asked SECP
to relax the application of certain provisions of IAS 39. Under these provisions, they were
required to value financial instruments held for trading at market value and to treat the
increase in market value of these instruments as income of the period. Modaraba
companies and mutual funds are given tax exemption only in cases when they distribute
90% of their income as dividends which goes to show the impact of tax avoidance on the
accounting practices over the last five decades.
7. Political and economic ties
Gemon and Meek (2001) argue that many accounting professions patterned after the
U.K. model. As noted by Briston (1978), almost all of colonial territories that experienced
substantial degree of industrial development under the British mle were subject to the
British Companies Act with the usual reporting and auditing requirements. The British
Companies Act of 1913 remained in use in Pakistan until 1970.
7.1. British colonial influence on the accounting profession
The United Kingdom's trained accountants have been a major source of influence on
accounting practices in its former colonies. In fact, Britain is the only major colonial
power to transfer both its accounting ideas and accountants (Gemon & Meek, 2001).
Although central government in the Indian subcontinent held the right to issue the
certificate to practice, the members of British professional accounting bodies such as
ICAEW, ICAS, and ICAI were immediately recognized as qualified auditors in the
Indian subcontinent (Saeed, 1993). An inflow of the members of professional accounting
bodies from the United Kingdom continued even after partition. In fact, even today in
Pakistan, members of the professional accounting bodies from the United Kingdom, the
Institutes of Chartered Accountants of Canada, Australia and New Zealand continue to
enjoy certain privileges.
7.2. Role of international financial reporting standards
Immediately after the formation of the lASC in 1973, Pakistan was among the first
group of countries admitted for associate membership to the LASC 1974.''' ICAP members
were encouraged to recommend to their clients to apply International Accounting
Standards (IAS) while preparing their financial statements. To comply with the
' ~ It is an Islamic mode of finance where one person contributes capital and the other his sicills to run a business.
The profit or loss of the business is shared on agreed upon basis and in accordance with Islamic injunctions.
Currently, there are 32 Modaraba companies in Pakistan.
' ^ http://www.iasb.org/about/liistory.asp.
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requirements of IAS, Companies Ordinance 1984 added Section 234 stipulating that the
hsted companies should comply with the requirements of those IAS that are notified by the
Corporate Law Authority (now SECP). Through a notification in 1986, 19 International
IAS 1 Presentation of Financial Statements - (August 6, 1986)
IAS 2 Inventories - (August 6, 1986)
IAS 7 Cash Flow Statements - (August 6, 1986)
IAS 8 Net Profit or Loss for the Period, Fundamental Errors and Changes in Accounting
Policies. - (August 6, 1986)
IAS 10 Contingencies and Events Occurring After the Balance Sheet Date - (August 6,
1986)
IAS 1 1 Construction Contracts - (August 6. 1986)
IAS 12 Income Taxes - (August 6, 1986)
IAS 14 Segment Reporting - (August 6. 1986)
IAS 16 Property, Plant and Equipment - (August 6, 1986)
IAS 17 Leases - (August 6. 1986)
IAS 18 Revenue - (August 6, 1986)
IAS 19 Employee Benefits - (August 6, 1986)
IAS 20 Accounting for Govenunent Grants and Disclosure of Government Assistance -
(August 6, 1986)
IAS 21 The Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates - (August 6, 1986)
IAS-22 Business Combinations - (July 18, 2001)
IAS 23 Borrowing Costs - (November 20, 1996)
IAS 24 Related Party Disclosures - (November 20, 1996)
IAS 25 Accounting for Investments - (November 20, 1996)
IAS 26 Accounting and Reporting by Retirement Benefit Plans - (June 18, 1998)
Exhibit VII. Status of adoption of international accounting standards in Pakistan.
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IAS 27 Consolidated Financial Statements and Accounting for Investments in
Subsidiaries - (May 12, 1998)
IAS 28 Accounting for Investments in Associates - (May 12, 1998)
IAS 30 Disclosures in the Financial Statements of Banks and Similar Financial
Institutions - (January 27. 2000)
• IAS 31 Financial Reporting of Interests in Joint Ventures - (August 15, 1997)
IAS 32 Financial Instruments: Disclosure and Presentation - (August 15, 1997)
IAS 33 Earnings Per Share - (May 12, 1998)
IAS 34 Interim Financial Reporting - (January 27, 2000)
IAS 35 Discontinuing Operations - (September 14, 2000)
IAS 36 Impaimient of Assets - (July 18, 2001
)
IAS 37 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets - (September 14. 2000)
IAS 38 Intangible Assets - (September 14, 2000)
IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement - (July 18, 2001)
IAS-40 Investment Property - (January 23, 2002)
The following standards have not yet been adopted:
IAS 15 Information Reflecting the Effects of Chang
non-mandatory by IAS Committee and has not been adopted by Pakistan.
IAS 29 Financial Reporting in Hyperinflationary Economies - Not relevant in the
Pakistan context and has not been considered for adoption.
IAS 41 Accounting for Agricultural property.
Exhibit VII {continued).
Accounting Standards were adopted (see Exhibit VII). These included IAS 1, 2, 4-14, and
16-21. As shown in Exhibit VII, Pakistan, eventually adopted almost all International
Accounting Standards (or IFRS) that were issued by the lASC (or lASB). These IFRS
were based on the fair presentation/full disclosure model, which assumes outside
shareholders as primary users of financial statements. This practice of adoption of IAS
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Most lAS's have been adopted in full, however, after some minor deviations as follows:
1
)
IAS 1 - Not mandatory for banks and insurance companies. The accounting requirements
for banks are covered in the Banking Companies Ordinance 1962 and insurance
companies are required to have separate classes of insurance accounts under the
Insurance Ordinance 2000; only minor deviations from lASs.
2) IAS 1 6 - Allows for a revaluation of an asset to be offset against the devaluation of
another asset, i.e., the offset is not restricted for the same asset, in accordance with IAS.
3) SECP has decided to grant relaxation to the NBFCs (that provide investment finance
services, discounting services and housing finance services) from the application of IAS
39 and IAS 40 until further orders.
Source: Institute of Chartered Accountants of Pakistan
Exhibit VII {continued).
without any modification or without any attention towards the local needs is fairly
common among less developed countries (Hove, 1986).
8. Effect of international financial institutions
International financial institutions have been involved in the development of the
Pakistan economy and its institutions since the 1950s, mainly because of close
political and defense ties Pakistan developed with the United States and the western
world during this era. The involvement of international donor agencies and financial
institutions in the financial policy-making process in Pakistan, therefore, has been
there since independence (see more in Islam, 1972). Foreign assistance to Pakistan
increased significantly in the late 1970s and early 1980s when the Soviet Union
invaded Afghanistan and Pakistan was given the status of a front-line state in this war
(see Exhibit V, showing foreign economic assistance to Pakistan since 1951).
' Similarly, after the terrorists attack of September 11, 2001 Pakistan became a front-
i line state and reaped the benefits of significant foreign assistance in the form of
\
grants, donations, relaxation in the repayment tenns of old loans, and some write-offs
I
of existing loans.
One of the major interests of the international agencies naturally has been to ensure
effective management of the industrial entities in the country. The Institute of Cost and
I Management Accountants of Pakistan was the first professional accounting body to
receive financial as well as technical assistance from the Government of Canada for its
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expansion in 1958, but without substantial impact on the financial reporting system.
The more important influence may be attributed to the Asian Development Bank,
which launched in 1977 a capital market development program. The focus of the
program was on mobilization and efficient allocation of long-term financing through a
diversified and competitive capital market. Of the important initiatives are the
automated trading system and settlement mechanisms, development of the corporate
debt market, development of new financial instruments, and most importantly,
restructuring and transforming of ineffective Corporate Law Authority into the
Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan whose role in accounting develop-
ment has been discussed earlier.
9. Level of education
Radebaugh (1975) and Mueller (1968) suggested that the general level of education
and/or the accounting profession of a country affect accounting practices. According to
Doupnik and Salter (1995) a simple educational environment prevents development of
sophisticated accounting practices. An examination of the level of education of
accountants in the early years of ICAP's history shows that all members of Pakistan
Institute of Accountants became ICAP members immediately after its formation. Thus,
the early members of ICAP were educated and trained at British professional
accounting institutes. Later on, the majority of members were trained at local
accounting firms and passed locally administered examinations. Members knowledge of
developments in the international sphere may not have been well developed; there was
no research conducted in the local universities regarding emerging accounting
information needs and current practices and resources are rarely available to stimulate
these activities. Even nowadays, there are hardly any books written by Pakistani
authors on accounting subjects. As noted by Saudagaran and Diga (1997) these factors
are the primary reasons that developing economies readily adopt IFRS. In addition, it
is much cheaper and quicker to acquire overnight credibility for a country's financial
reporting among international users (Ball et al., 2003). Adopting International
Accounting Standards linked the Pakistani accounting profession to a source from
where they could update their financial reporting system, and enhance their knowledge
of the latest accounting approaches and concepts on measurement and reporting of
financial events.
10. Culture and accounting development
Recent research postulates that culture plays a role in developing and changing an
accounting system (Gray, 1988; Hofstede, 1980). We argue that the major changes in the
financial reporting system of companies in Pakistan came only when there were changes in
either the underlying legal rules and regulations and/or better enforcement of these rules
through active monitoring of corporate players by the regulatory authorities. We feel that
the colonial background of a country is a key explanatory variable that has to be explicitly
I
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incorporated in to any model that tests the relationship between culture and financial
reporting systems. For the puipose of our study, we conclude that the effect of culture on
the accounting system in Pakistan cannot be explained unambiguously because of her
colonial past. In this respect, our observation is more in line with the finding of Jaggi and
Low (2000) who conclude that cultural values do not predict disclosure levels once legal
origin is considered.
11. Summary and conclusion
The primary purpose of our paper is to explore the factors that have influenced the
evolution, the origins, growth and development of accounting in Pakistan. We traced
the early days of accounting in the Indian subcontinent and described the British
colonial influence over the accounting of the newly independent state of Pakistan. It is
worth noting that the Companies Act of 1913 remained in force in Pakistan for more
than three decades beyond independence and it was not until 1984 that major revisions
to the Act were made to the Companies Ordinance 1984. We traced the development
of accounting through three eras: (1) Independence through 1971, (2) Post 1971-1984,
and (3) 1984 to the present. We describe how the colonial past and later the
international financial institutions such as Asian Development Bank and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund played a key role in shaping accounting and reporting practices
of the country. Pakistan readily adopted International Financial Reporting Standards as
national standards in 1985; however, the quality of financial reporting did not improve
with the mere adoption of these standards. For an emerging economy like Pakistan, we
argue that it is the enforcement mechanisms (interaction between legal system,
accounting system and sub-system within the accounting system) that are keys to
improving the quality of financial reporting.
We argue that models to describe reporting practices of different countries based on
legal systems, i.e., common vs. code law (Beny, 1987; Fantl, 1971; Hope, 2003b;
Jaggi & Low, 2000; Nobes, 1983) are not suitable for the financial reporting systems
of a developing country such as Pakistan. Pakistan, even though is classified as a
common law country in (Hope, 2003b), exhibits more of the properties of code-law
countries. We conclude that lack of investor protection (minority rights protection,
insider-trading protection), judicial inefficiencies and weak enforcement mechanisms are
more critical to explaining the financial reporting practices in Pakistan than are cultural
factors. These legal factors are linked to the enforcement environment and affect the
"preparers' incentives." This insight has policy implication for developing countries that
are trying to improve the quality of the financial reporting of their corporate entities.
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Graham W. Cosserat, Modern auditing. Second ed., John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.,
Chichester, UK, 2004 (ix+681 pp)
Modern Auditing, the book under review, is unique. It is an English publication based
on the Australian text by Gudarshan Gill and Graham Cosserat. Gill and Cosserat based
their text on an American Auditing text by Water G. Kell and Richard E. Ziegler (now
authored by William C. Boynton and Walter G. Kell). Therefore, we have an English text
based on an Australian text, adopted from an American text, and reviewed by an American
college professor. The book and this review are truly an international effort.
The objective of Modern Auditing is to bring to the reader a comprehensive and
integrated approach to auditing using an international frame of reference. The author uses
International Auditing Standards throughout the text to equip students with the
background necessary to participate in auditing anywhere in the world. The anticipated
audience for the text is undergraduate and graduate students or practitioners.
1. The structure of the text
The text consists of 17 chapters, with an average length of 34 pages per chapter.
Covering the entire book in a 15-week semester would be tight, but it could be done with
carefial planning. If I were to adopt the book, I would probably only cover 14 or 15
chapters, particularly the first time through, and, at this point, I am not sure which chapters
I would leave out, because they are all relevant.
The first four chapters provide an introduction to auditing. They cover the role of the
auditing profession in today's environment, the puipose of financial statement auditing,
the ethical expectations of the auditing profession, and the legal responsibility auditors
have to the users of their work. Chapters 5 to 9 deal with the basic techniques used in
planning and performing an audit. Coverage in these five chapters consists of discussions
on audit risk and evidence, client and engagement acceptance, the nature of internal
control and control risk, audit sampling, and the design of substantive tests. Chapters 10
through 13 present substantive tests for the basic transaction cycles such as sales and
receivables, purchasing, payables and payroll, inventory (stocks), tangible fixed assets,
and cash and investments. Chapters 14 and 15 discuss the wrap-up of the audit and
preparing audit reports. The last two chapters look at the future of auditing. Chapter 16
deals with auditing issues concerning e-commerce. Chapter 17 covers topics such as the
role of the auditor in corporate governance, information technology topics including
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advanced financial software and XBRL, and emerging issues such as the auditor's role in
discovering fraud and forensic auditing.
The stmcture of each chapter is similar. Each begins with a brief chapter overview and
presents a list of learning objectives followed by a list of the international professional
auditing standards applicable to the chapter's subject area. A list of learning-checks
follows each of the chapter's sub-sections, which summarize the key concepts presented in
that particular section. End-of-chapter material consists of multiple-choice, discussion, and
professional-application questions.
The multiple-choice questions appear to be the product of the author. While they are
adequate, in my opinion adopting multiple-choice questions from professional exams
would add to the text's appeal. The professional-application questions mainly come from
professional exams in the United Kingdom and other countries. The answers to the
multiple-choice and the professional-application questions are at the end of the book,
which in my opinion can be helpful to students.
2. Presentation style and coverage
The writing style is easy to follow and appropriate for the intended audience of the
book. The author explains concepts in a conversational manner, very similar to what you
would expect to observe in a classroom setting. The coverage of topics is complete and
contains well thought out examples to illustrate the concept presented.
The learning-checks that follow each sub-section are a good feature. Each sub-section
ends with five to eight individually numbered sentences that present the reader with a key
point from the preceding discussion. These key points help reinforce the concepts the
author wants the student to retain and could help streamline the student's review process
when preparing for an exam.
The concepts of audit risk and internal control are at the very center of the audit
process. In addition, with the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, internal control has
become a critical area of study in both undergraduate and graduate auditing courses. Given
the current environment, I was particularly interested in how this text approached these
two areas. Chapter 5 presents the auditor's evaluation of audit risk, and Chapter 7 deals
with internal control.
Chapter 5, titled "Audit Risk and Audit Evidence," introduces the concepts of audit
risk, materiality, evidence, and audit objectives and procedures. The discussion on the
audit-risk model is comprehensive and does an excellent job of explaining how inherent,
control, and detection risk interrelate. Figure 5-2 (p. 137) is a nice illustration showing
how these risks relate to audit risk. The discussion on materiality is comprehensive,
covering (a) materiality at both the financial statement and the account balance class of
transaction level, (b) the quantitative and qualitative considerations of materiality, (c)
different approaches to allocating financial statement materiality to various accounts, (d)
the relationship between materiality and audit evidence, and (e) the difference between
setting materiality levels at the planning and the final review stages of an audit. The sub-
section on audit objectives explains the relationship between audit objectives and
management assertions. Table 5-4 (p. 1 50) does an excellent job of showing how specific
Book reviews 207
audit objectives relate to specific management assertions. The discussion on audit
evidence covers the attributes of evidence, as well as presenting the various types of
evidence auditor's use. In my opinion the last section of the chapter, which relates auditing
procedures to types of evidence and management assertions, provides students with a
sound understanding of how these critical concepts fit together in the audit process.
Chapter 7 covers internal control. The discussion first establishes the importance of
internal control within an entity and then identifies and discusses the components that
form an integral part of an internal control system. The concepts of reasonable assurance
as well as the reasons why the concept is important are covered. The chapter presents a
short discussion of internal controls in a computer information system, which includes a
comparison of internal controls in a computerized information system to a manual
system. Because of the importance and pervasiveness of computerized information
systems today, the coverage seems a bit light. In my opinion, there is probably enough
interest in this area to warrant a separate chapter covering this topic. However, I realize
that there are often tradeoffs in deciding on the level of coverage of different subjects in
textbooks. The chapter does include examples of questionnaires and a discussion of how
flowcharts are useful in documenting the auditor's understanding of the internal control
system. The discussion about making the preliminaiy assessment of control risk is well
organized: it contains two tables showing how to use different types of controls to
mitigate potential misstatement. The chapter also includes examples of ways to test the
effectiveness of those controls. Overall, I found the coverage on audit risk and intemal
control comprehensive and well organized, and the tables and other illustrations
informative and useful.
Chapter 9 covers designing substantive tests and includes a thorough discussion on how
the auditor uses the audit-risk model to determine an acceptable level of detection risk and
the relationship between detection risk and the level of substantive testing performed by
the auditor. Chapters 10 through 13, on substantive tests, begin by presenting management
assertions and relating audit objectives to each assertion at the transaction class and
account-balance level. Each chapter includes a discussion of the intemal controls
associated with the cycle and relates the control to the relevant audit objective.
The final two chapters cover auditing e-commerce and contemporary topics in auditing.
The e-commerce chapter does not go into much detail but does provide an adequate
overview of the nature of auditing e-commerce. Chapter 17, on contemporary topics in
auditing, covers corporate governance, fraud and forensic auditing, current developments
in financial software, the Internet, and environmental auditing.
Overall, in my opinion. Modern Auditing meets its objective of bringing the reader a
comprehensive and integrated approach to auditing using an international frame of
reference, and it does so in a style that students and instructors will find comfortable to
use.
Stephen C. Del Vecchio
Department ofAccounting, Centred Missouri State University, USA
doi:10.1016/j.intacc.2004.09.002
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Eisuke Sakakibara, Structural Reform in Japan: Breaking the Iron Triangle,
Brookings Institution Press: Washington, DC, 2003, ISBN: 0-8157-7676-4, xix+167 pp.
This book is the prescription for revitaUzing the economy in Japan. The author is
Japan's former Vice Minister of Finance and known as "Mr. Yen" for his strong influence
over global currency markets. Japan has suffered through a decade-long recession in the
1990s—the so-called "lost 10 years". Sakakibara's message is that effective reforms need
to be implemented simultaneously and comprehensively across various sectors.
1. Objective
The objective or goal of this book is "to present a rough sketch ofthe areas where genuine
structural or institutional refonn should be simultaneously implemented in order to achieve
overall success for the Japanese economy" (p. xvi). It should be noted that his primary
intention is to present a broad outline of the areas needing structural reform. This work does
not attempt to develop sophisticated economic policy nor demonstrate the empirical data to
support his view. The focus is specifically on the economic aspect.
2. Environmental factors
Sakakibara contends that "the major cause of the decade-long stagnation of the Japanese
economy was the lack of profitable investment opportunities due to a high cost structure" (p.
viii). Why did the Japanese economy ha\'e such a high cost structure? It was the resuh oftwo
major environmental changes: the technological revolution and globalization. These two
events proved the ancien regime of the "Iron Triangle" to be out-dated and dysfunctional.
The only way of curing Japan's languishing economy is to break the Iron Triangle of the
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the bureaucracy and vested interest groups.
3. Approach
The author emphasizes an "all-encompassing approach" to structural reform in Japan. In
this book, the concept of"structure" is used interchangeably with that of"institution" (p. xi). As
the Iron Triangle suggests, such institutions or structures are complementary in nature. That is,
institutional or structural reform can only be achieved when both economic and political
institutions change together. This might be a significant difference from conventional partial
reforms such as the financial "Big Bang" and deregulation in \ arious sectors.
4. Structure of the book
This book consists of 12 chapters. The first five chapters provide helpful background
information and analysis. The following six chapters present more specific analysis of
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such diverse areas as banking, diplomacy, education, government, agriculture and health
care. The final chapter provides a future perspective of institutional reforms.
The first two chapters give fruitful insights into the urgent need for structural reform in
Japan. Chapter 1 works from the globalization context and deals with why Japan needs
structural reform in the age of network globalization: "Network globalization's effect on
interpersonal relationships as well as on social structure has led to the destruction of the
old order" (p. 7). A new direction needs to be found. A "third path", combining global
markets with welfare, is not a clear solution. Asian regional cooperation is also too early in
its developmental stages. However, one thing is certain, "Japan still should pursue
structural reform in order to maintain its prominent position in Asia, and as the third major
power in the world, after the United States and Europe" (p. 10). In other words, "the
intention of structural reform is to maintain, and develop in the context of the world's new
environment of internationalism, the pluralism of Japan and the rest of Asia, including
each country's cultural identity" (p. 1 1 ).
Chapter 2 uses a historical perspective, and supports the author's view of Japan's
modernization and industrialization from the Meiji Era through the postwar period of high
growth. The point is that Japan has established its unique Japanese-style capitalism with a
strong cultural flavor throughout its history. One feature of this Japanese capitalist system
is vividly reflected in Chapter 3.
Chapter 3 is devoted to the development and decay of the construction state. Heavy
investments in public works and construction of highways have certainly played a
significant role in developing Japanese-style capitalism. However, the productivity of
public works was very low. In addition, the system created a breeding ground for vested
interests. Consequently, it "became a hindrance not only to politics but also to economics"
(p. 36). This led to internally motivated structural reform. Readers will benefit from the
extensive public-works-related data.
Chapter 4 deals with in-depth analysis of the dual structure of Japanese economics
and politics. The purpose of the chapter is to understand why breaking the bureaucracy
is necessary to implement Japan's structural reform. Sakakibara notes two dual
structures. One is the dual structure of the economic system, which is characterized by
the coexistence of market mechanisms (the highly productive sector) and socialist
policies (low productive sector). Another is the dual stmcture of the political system,
which includes politicians with and without legal authority to draft government
legislation (such as party committee members). Unfortunately, these two dual structures
interact with each other in the policymaking process. Representatives with vested
interests, politicians of various party committees, so-called "zoku" (or "tribe
parliamentarians"), and the bureaucracy has a close alliance and plays a significant
role in making policy. This decision-making mechanism tends to lack transparency as
well as efficiency. Therefore, it is this author's conclusion that, "Japan needs to
immediately address structural reforni vis-a-vis the dismantling of the two dual
structures" (p. 56). Sakakibara's logic is clear and sharp. His conclusion is also
persuasive. However, resolving the question of how to break the Iron Triangle is not so
easy.
Chapter 5 goes on to deal with the Japanese corporate system. According to the author,
the Japanese company is now seeking a new transfonuation in the age of globalization and
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information. The Nissan, Toyota and Mitsubishi Corporations are among these companies.
Nissan, for example, has implemented revolutionary and fundamental reforms under CEO
Carlos Ghosn's strong leadership. The important point is: "this new transformation is
neither Americanization nor the surrender to a global standard; rather, it is the process of
creating a new kind of Japanese company" (p. 69). The author fumly focuses on the new
Japanese corporate system, its unique identity and culture.
The following chapters mainly deal with the specific problems that Japan is now
facing. Chapter 6 highlights one of the most crucial issues, the banking system and the
problem of nonperforming loans (NPLs). It is Sakakibara's view that "only after the
government makes progress in dissolving the system of protection for vested interests,
and in resolving the problem of NPLs, can the framework for a new Japanese corporate
governance system be created" (p. 85). In this respect, the new governance system will
include a combination of main bank governance and governance through the market by
institutional investors.
Chapter 7 deals with Japan's postwar foreign policy strategy. Sakakibara criticizes the
"number two strategy" and suggests the shift from its U.S.-dependent foreign policy to one
more balanced between the East and West. Chapter 8 raises some issues underlying the
Japanese meritocracy system, such as the "socialistic" education policy and centralization
versus decentralization with respect to regulation and direction. Using the most updated
data, the government debate over centralization versus local government is successftilly
provided with the most up-dated data in Chapter 9. Chapter 10 deals with the new
direction of agricultural policy. Excessive income subsidies and pork-barrel policies are
strongly criticized. In Chapter 11, the present socialistic health-care system is analyzed and
a proposal is made to dismantle the old Iron Triangle of politicians, government and vested
interests. Finally, Chapter 12 presents a future perspective of uniquely Japanese
institutional refonns.
5. Impressions
This book is devoted to the most up-to-date topics of structural refonn in Japan. It is
well written and organized. Readers will benefit from numerous examples using real-world
data associated with Japanese business and the economy. However, the readers will also be
confronted with two difficulties.
One is concemed with the real purpose or intention of implementing structural reform
in Japan. In the Preface of the book, as I have already mentioned, Sakakibara seems to
support structural reform "in order to achieve overall success for the Japanese economy"
(p. xvi). On the other hand, he also declares that "the intention of structural reform is to
maintain, and develop...the pluralism of Japan and the rest of Asia" (p. 1 1 ). Apparently, the
former focuses on economic needs, while the latter puts emphasis on a wider and more
profound purpose. Which one is his real intention?
In my judgment, the author's final purpose must be the latter one. In fact, in his
previous book, written in Japanese, Shinseiki heno koiizoukaikaku (Structural Reform
toward a New Century) (1997), Sakakibara concludes that the real problem in attempting
structural reform in Japan will be "how to respond to the post-Cold War increase in
I
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globalization after post-Cold War and the advent of the infonnation revolution" (p. 241).
His intention is not simply an economic focus, but highlighting "the balance between
economic competitiveness and coexistence" (p. 230).
Another issue is how to break the Iron Triangle. It seems easy "on papei^', but taking it
apart in practice is quite hard to do. When Japan's Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi came
onto the political stage with his reform agenda, the Japanese public expected drastic
change in the deep-rooted system. It is said, however, that Koizumi's reform is far from
successftil. If Koizumi has been unsuccessftil so far, the question is, who will be able to
make these changes?
6. Audience
This book provides an excellent introduction to understanding some of the unique
aspects of Japan's political, economic and business structure. Anyone concerned with the
Japanese business system will find the book to be thought provoking and insightful. I
strongly recommend it as a worthwhile reading.
Chitoshi Koga
School of Business Administration, Kobe University', Kobe, Japan
doi:10.1016/j.intacc.2004.06.013
Malcolm, Smith, Research Methods in AccountingSage Publications, London, 2003,
xiv+241 pp.
This book provides an overview of how to conduct research in accounting. The author
adopts a practical approach which takes the reader from the initiation of the research idea
through to the publication of the research findings. The overall aim is to facilitate the
conduct of what the author calls "applied research studies in accounting". Since only
empirical accounting research is considered and no attention is given to analytical studies
in accounting, a more representative title for the book would be "empirical research
methods in accounting". A large segment of the book is devoted to the discussion of
research "methods". In particular, technical issues are discussed that are associated with the
conduct of empirical accounting research, including the most frequently used statistical
techniques. The intended readership is wide, including instructors, doctoral students and
academics starting their research careers.
The book contains 1 1 chapters. In the introductory chapter Smith starts from the
premise that accounting has little theoiy of its own, no methods of its own, and only a few
instruments of its own, and that, hence, it heavily relies on prior research in natural and
st)cial sciences to explain what can be observed. Smith borrows from natural sciences to
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introduce a theoretical foundation for empirical accounting research, but does not address
a rich body of extant accounting theory.
Chapter 2 focuses on the development of the research idea. Useful information
described in this chapter includes: (a) what constitutes a typical research sequence; (b) the
characteristics of a sound research idea; (c) the elements a typical research proposal should
include; and (d) the need to develop a conceptual representation of the research project.
The remaining pages of the chapter are dedicated to examples of how research ideas
originated in the minds of role-model researchers, but again-disappointingly-the examples
are taken only from natural sciences, and not from accounting.
In Chapter 3, Smith elaborates on the hypotheses development and theory stage of
the research project. First, he lists the typical sources of theory in accounting research,
namely: economics, finance, and organizational behavior. A more profound description
of major insights from these theories that are relevant to accounting would be of
tremendous value to the intended readership of the book. On top of that, analytical
research findings in accounting also deserve more attention as they are undoubtedly a
source of theory for the empirical accounting researcher. A second theme in this chapter
is practicalities of the literature search process. Next, a discussion is provided of how the
relationship between two variables of interest can be modeled. Subsequently, hypothesis
development is described and finally an interesting discussion of some validity issues is
provided.
Chapter 4 provides a nice overview of basic issues that relate to data collection and
analysis. This includes the following topics: sample selection, measurement issues, data
management, descriptive statistics, differences in sample means, measures of association
and analysis of variance, and multivariate model building. This overview is mainly
technical. It would have been more useful to a novice accounting researcher to explain the
techniques in this chapter from real accounting research examples, rather than
theoretically.
Chapter 5 constitutes a relevant and nice intemiezzo as it addresses the increasingly
important ethical considerations which underpin the conduct of accounting research. In
this chapter the reader is invited to execute a quiz about potential ethical dilemmas in
accounting research settings, and then gets a discussion of ethical guidelines related to
accounting research.
The next four chapters are dedicated, respectively, to different empirical approaches to
accounting: experimental, survey-based, fieldwork, and archival. In Chapter 6, four
guidelines (Gibbins and Salterio 1996) for good experimental research in accounting are
discussed in detail: clear problem statement; clear statement of the theory that underlies the
process; sound experimental design; recognition of the importance of extemal validity.
Chapter 7 deals with various aspects oi sun'ey research: design and planning issues; pilot
testing; data collection; problems of measurement error and interview techniques. Next,
Chapter 8 addresses //eWwoz-A' research. In particular: case study methods; qualitative
protocol analysis; grounded theory; and verbal protocol analysis are discussed. Chapter 9,
then, addresses some aspects that are related to archival research. These include: cross-
sectional data; time-series data; validity issues; content analysis; and critical approaches to
accounting research. All four chapters provide an overview of main issues and thus give a
broad, extensive perspective. The intended readership would definitely benefit more fi^om
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additional detail. In addition, per empirical approach, one or more prototype studies could
have been included and used to illustrate the problems and challenges discussed in the
respective chapters.
As an important audience for this book is doctoral candidates, a chapter is devoted to
the siipenisor candidate relationship. Chapter 10 focuses hereon and describes the
mutual responsibilities of both parties. This may be very useful reading to reflect upon for
both candidates and supervisors, as typically both parties' expectations do not always
coincide. The final chapter is devoted to various aspects of the publication process and
addresses questions such as: why publish, where to publish, what to publish, and how to
publish.
Overall, this book is very accessible due to its broad perspective and practical approach.
The reader gets a clear overview of the sequence of steps that need to be taken in order to
have their research published. Throughout the book, she/he is made aware of potential
pitfalls that she/he may encounter, and to some extent how to solve them. The book's main
contribution is its broad overview of the research process, including guidelines on how to
review existing research and offer critiques to articles. This, however, is simultaneously
the book's major drawback. This broad, extensive perspective is at the price of a detailed,
intensive perspective that novice researchers need to acquire. The author discusses, for
example, the most frequently used statistical techniques, without really discussing
solutions to statistical problems that may occur. To my taste, also, too few examples
from the accounting literature are used. Hence, the book may serve as a guideline to
(starting) researchers, claritying the several steps that need to be undertaken. Other, more
specific literature-both from accounting and statistics-will however be needed to solve
concrete problems.
Marleen Willekens
Katholieke Universiteit Leiiven, Leiiven, Belgium
doi:10.1016/j.intacc.2004.03.001
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Abstract
This study evaluates disclosures on pollution and greenhouse gases by firms domiciled in
countries that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol compared to others. The study is based on disclosures
made in the annual reports, environmental reports, and websites of 1 20 of the largest (in terms of
revenues) public firms from the chemical, oil and gas, energy, and motor vehicles and casualty
insurance industries. The study uses content analysis to construct weighted and unweighted
disclosure indices.
The results show that fimis from countries that ratified the Protocol have higher disclosure
indexes as compared to firms in other countries. Additionally, larger firms disclose more detailed
pollution information. Multinational firms that operate in countries that ratified the Protocol but have
their home offices in countries that did not are associated with lower disclosures. This lack of
consistency in disclosure is not likely to be helpfiil in informing shareholders about the social
responsibility of their investments.
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1. Introduction
With Russia's ratification ofthe Kyoto Protocol (hereafter, referred to as the Protocol) in
2004, the Protocol went into effect in February 2005. There are still nine nations (including
the United States, Switzerland, and Australia) that are resisting ratification of the Protocol.
Countries that ratify the Protocol are obligated to enact regulations incorporating the
Protocol's provisions on disclosures related to greenhouse gases, i.e., carbon dioxide,
methane, and nitrous oxides. A key aspect of this Protocol is that greenhouse gases emitted
by vehicles, power plants, and certain types of industrial operations need to be brought to
acceptable levels in order to control their global warming effect.
In this paper, we evaluate whether firms from industries that are severely impacted by the
Protocol are disclosing information related to the emission of greenhouse gases and how
these firms plan to reduce these emissions to the desired levels. We conduct a comparative
analysis of the greenhouse gas disclosures made by large firms, generally multinationals,
from countries that have ratified the Protocol against disclosures by firms from countries that
did not ratify the Protocol but are operating in the ratifying countries.
Multinational firms from countries ratifying the Protocol are expected to be more
forthcoming in making detailed disclosures on their greenhouse gas emissions and on their
plans to meet the Protocol requirements because they would be evaluated on how well
they meet their country's disclosure requirements. Thus, they would have an incentive to
keep their investors better informed on their pollution performance. On the other hand,
non-ratifying foreign multinationals operating in countries ratifying the Protocol would be
likely to take advantage of the unsettled political situation and meet only the minimum
disclosure requirements. We conjecture that disclosure policies of these firms are more
influenced by the regulations of their home country rather than by the country in which
they operate. Our expectation is that firms from countries ratifying the Protocol make
significantly more disclosures about their plans to deal with the problem of greenhouse gas
emissions compared to firms from countries that have not ratified the Protocol but are
operating in the Protocol ratifying countries.
In addition to comparing the Protocol-related total pollution disclosures of firms from the
Protocol ratifying and non-ratifying countries, we also evaluate the disclosures on carbon
dioxide emissions (COt) that are especially emphasized by the Protocol. In particular, we
examine whether the association between CO2 emissions and pollution disclosures is
stronger for multinationals from the Protocol ratifying countries compared to other
multinationals. Furthermore, we evaluate the impact of firm-specific factors (e.g., return
on assets, firm size, and debt-equity structure) on pollution disclosures because these factors
may have significant influence on disclosure-related managerial decisions.
The analyses are based on the greenhouse gas disclosures included in the annual reports
from 2000 through 2002, environmental reports, and websites of the 120 largest (in terms
of revenues) public companies in the world belonging to the chemical, oil and gas, energy,
and motor vehicle and casualty insurance industries. We use content analysis to develop
the disclosure index and conduct regression analyses to evaluate the association between
the disclosure index and an indicator variable for the firms from Protocol ratifying and
non-ratifying countries. The analyses are conducted by controlling for the impact of the
legal system and the regulatory enforcement level of a country as well as for industry and
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country effects on the association between the disclosure index and the independent test
variables.
The results indicate that there is a significantly positive association between the
disclosure index and firnis from counfries ratifying the Protocol. This finding confirms the
expectation that the finns from Protocol ratifying countries are more forthcoming in
making disclosures on greenhouse gas pollution emissions and their detailed plans to deal
with the global warming problem. The CO2 emission disclosures are especially higher for
firms from the Protocol ratifying countries. These firms are motivated to keep their
shareholders infonned about their efforts to meet the Protocol's guidelines and to provide
higher disclosures. On the other hand, firms from countries that have not ratified the
Protocol do not disclose detailed information on global warming even though they operate
in the Protocol ratifying countries.
The results with regard to the firm-specific characteristics show that the greenhouse
pollution disclosures are positively associated with firm size; larger firms are making more
extensive disclosures compared to smaller firms. The coefficients on ROA (retum on assets)
and debt /equity show no significant impact of these characteristics on the greenhouse
pollution disclosures. We also detect no significant difference in the disclosures among the
finns belonging to the different industry groups covered in the study.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In part two, we provide background
and the theoretical rationale for the study. The research design, including sample selection,
data collection, hypotheses, and research methodology, is discussed in part three. The
results are presented in part four, and the conclusion is contained in part five.
2. Background and rationale for pollution disclosures
2.1. Background
As of June 2003, the completion date of this study, 84 nafions had ratified the Kyoto
Protocol including the European Union (EU), Japan, and Canada. The United States and
Russia, the first and third largest pollution emitters, respectively, of carbon dioxide (a
key greenhouse gas) had not ratified the treaty (French, 2002). The countries ratifying
the Protocol are committing to reduce greenhouse gases by 5% by the year 2012 from
their 1990 level (Revkin, 2001). Because the United States has so far decided not to
ratify the Protocol and has not made any commitment to reduce greenhouse gases, it is
not clear how U.S. multinationals will react to the Protocol's requirements.
We expect the Protocol's requirements to have a significant impact on fossil-burning
electric utilities (the major industrial producer of carbon dioxide), chemicals, and oil and
gas companies, which are required to reduce emissions by 5% before the year 2012. We
also expect an effect on firms from industries that create the products that cause greenhouse
gas emissions; these include the manufacturers of motor vehicles, farm equipment,
airplanes, and the parts for these products. In order to modify the products so as to reduce
emissions, these firms will require creative thinking, planning, retooling and redesigning of
their manufacturing processes. Therefore, reducing emissions caused by these products will
involve substantial costs and may take longer to achieve. In addition, insurance companies
are also likely to be affected by the Protocol because global warming is expected to result in
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a number of ecological disasters. Insurance companies that write policies for casualty or
business liability insurance will have to pay off claims for many of these disasters. Munich
Re, a German insurer, estimates that global warming could cost $300 billion annually by the
year 2050 (Cortese, 2002a). Disclosure of cost information will require the insurance
companies to estimate losses from agricultural damage, flooding, drought, and other
environmental impacts.
Earlier studies conceming environmental disclosures show that disclosures vary among
firms from different countries. Bulir and Freedman (2001) report that Canadian firms
provide more extensive environmental disclosure than U.S. firms, whereas Guthrie and
Parker (1990) find that U.S. firms are associated with greater environmental disclosures
compared to Australian or U.K. firms. Gamble, Hsu, Jackson, and Tollerson (1996) also find
that U.S. firms provide more extensive environmental disclosures compared to firms from
27 other nations. They also report that firms using the Anglo-American model (U.S., UK,
Canada, and Australia) tend to provide more environmental disclosures compared to fums
from other countries. Fekrat, Carla Inclan, and Petroni (1996), who examined firms from 18
nations, find that Canadian firms tend to provide the most environmental disclosures and
Japanese firms the least, and they attribute this difference to the strength of capital markets.
Williams (1999), examined disclosures by firms from seven Pacific nations, and finds that
the key variables in determining environmental disclosures relate to cultural variables of
uncertainty avoidance and masculinity, as defined by Hofstede (1980)." He finds, however,
that the equity market is not a significant determining factor.
Most of these studies are based on the environmental information disclosed in the annual
reports from 1980s to the mid-1990s. Environmental information is now also available from
special environmental reports and company websites and these sources have not been
utilized many earlier studies. According to corporateregister.com, an on-line website
tracking social reporting, 339 separate environmental reports were issued in the U.S.A. in
1999 (Cortese, 2002b). Furthermore, the existing studies are based on data that were
disclosed before the Protocol was signed. A number of major initiafives have recently been
undertaken to encourage firms to provide environmental disclosures and environmental
reports. These initiatives include the Global Reporting Initiative, SustainAbility, and
CERES. This study utilizes environmental data disclosed in the financial statements, as well
as in the enviromnental reports, and on websites.
2.2. Rationale for pollution disclosures
A number of theories have been developed to explain differential environmental
disclosures by firms. Two of these theories—stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory
—
provide a more convincing rationale for environmental pollution disclosures (for example,
see Gray, Kouhy, & Lavers, 1995). The stakeholder theory (Clarkson, 1995; Roberts, 1992;
" Masculinity vs. femininity and strong vs. weak uncertainty avoidance are tvvo of the four original societal
values that Hofstede (1980) described in his pioneering work on global culture. Masculinity refers to a society
where male characteristics like assertiveness and heroism are valued more than female characteristics like caring
and relationships. Uncertainty avoidance basically concerns the ability to deal with risk.
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Ullmann, 1985) posits that environmental disclosures are made in response to the
stakeholders' demand for environmental (and social) information. Management responds
to public pressure by stakeholders by voluntarily disclosing the types of environmental (or
social) information they demand. A major problem with this theory, however, is that it fails to
explain why firms from similar industries operating in the same geographic areas provide
differential disclosures.
According to legitimacy theory (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975), social disclosure is a means
to deal with the firm's exposure to political and social pressures (Lindblom, 1994; Patten,
2000). Finns behave in a way that is considered to be congruent with the society's perceived
goals. By disclosing environmental information, firms attempt to convey to their
stakeholders that they are meeting the society's environmental and social goals (even if
they are not doing it), and thereby alleviate public pressures. Thus, the firms "legitimize"
their performance by providing environmental (and social) disclosures (Lindblom, 1994).
Legitimacy theory has been examined in numerous empirical studies and the results of
these studies have been fairly consistent in confirming the theory. Most of the studies utilize
samples based on U.S. firms (see Patten, 1991, 1992; Walden & Schwartz, 1997). However,
one study examined firms from Western European countries (Adams, Hill, & Roberts,
1998), and two other studies focused on Australian firms (Deegan & Gordon, 1996; Deegan
& Rankin, 1996). Results of all these studies are consistent with legitimacy theory. Based on
the findings of studies on legitimacy theory, we argue that disclosure of information on
greenhouse gases fits the legitimacy model because managers of firms from the Protocol
ratifying countries appear to perceive that detailed disclosures would be important for their
public image. On the other hand, there is not likely to be strong pressure on firms from
countries that have not signed the Protocol to make detailed pollution disclosures.
3. Hypotheses
3.1. Disclosure index andfirms from countries ratifying protocol
The largest firms in the world, in general, are multinationals and most of them have
manufacturing facilities and offices in several countries, including countries that have ratified
the Protocol. Therefore, it can be argued that irrespective ofwhether or not the country oftheir
home office has ratified the Protocol, these firms need to seriously consider the Protocol's
implications for their future performance, especially with regard to their operations in the
countries ratifying the Protocol. Because large expenditures may be required to meet the
Protocol's requirements, it is important that these firms provide detailed disclosures on their
efforts and achievements in reducing greenhouse gas emissions to assist investors in assessing
the trade off between risk and retum. For example, if a U.S. -based firm has manufacturing
facilities in an E.U. country, it will need to make sure that the E.U.-based facility follows the
E.U. requirements developed under the Protocol. It would, therefore, be important forthis firm
to disclose information on its efforts and success in meeting the regulatory requirement,
including information on its future plans and projected costs ofcomplying with regulations.
On the other hand, it can be argued that foreign multinationals operating in Protocol
ratifying countries may not have strong motivation to make detailed disclosures because
such disclosures are not required by the country of their home office. In this study, we
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empirically test whether disclosures about greenhouse gases made by firms from Protocol
ratifying countries differ from those made by firms that have their home offices in countries
not ratifying the Protocol. We expect finns from countries that have ratified Kyoto to be
associated with higher degrees of disclosures because they are likely to disclose more than
the minimum requirement. We develop the following hypothesis to test this assumption.
HI. Firms from countries that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol make more detailed
pollution disclosures pertaining to global warming compared to firms from countries that
have not ratified the Kyoto Protocol.
3.2. Firm size and disclosure index
Environmental accounting literature argues that firm size plays an important role in a
firni's pollution-abatement perfomiance and pollution-emission disclosures (see, Spicer,
1978; and Roberts, 1992). This argument is based on the premise that larger firms could
more easily afford the expenditures needed to abate pollution. Moreover, according to the
political hypothesis (Watts & Zimmennan, 1986) larger finns attract greater attention from
the media, policy makers, and regulators. They would be, therefore, under greater pressure to
act in a manner consistent with the Protocol than smaller firnis.
However, Patten (2000) shows that fimi size may not be a critical factor in pollution
performance and pollution disclosures. Despite Patten's study, we argue that this fear for
incurring a high political cost provides the motivation for large firms to make detailed
disclosures so that their pollution performance would not be underestimated or ignored by
policy makers and regulators. The following hypothesis asserts the existence of a positive
association between pollution disclosures and finn size.
H2. There is a positive association between finn size and global warming related poUufion
disclosures.
3. 3. Deht/equit}' structure effect on pollution disclosures
According to the debt-covenant hypothesis in (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986), managers of
firms with a high debt-equity ratio are expected to choose accounting policies and methods
that would help them avoid debt-covenants' violations. The findings ofseveral studies support
this expectation (e.g., DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994; Jaggi & Lee, 2002; Sweeney, 1994).
Consistent with this hypothesis, it is argued that firms with high debt-equity ratios are likely to
opt for an accounting policy of detailed disclosures in order to keep their investors and
creditors fiilly informed about their operating perfonnance, including pollution perfonnance.
In the absence of detailed pollution disclosures, investors and creditors would not be able to
properly evaluate the firm's risk ofdefault, and thus theymay avoid investing in the firm. Thus,
we expect firms with a high debt-equity ratio to be more forthcoming and maintain a
comparatively higher level of disclosures, including disclosures on global wanning-related
pollution emissions. We test this expectation using the following hypothesis:
H3. Firms with a higher debt-equity ratio have more extensive pollution disclosures
concerning global warming than firms with a low debt-equity ratio.
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3.4. Return on assets and pollution disclosures
It has been argued in the hterature that firms with a better operating performance,
proxied by the return on assets, are hkely to have a higher incentive to make more detailed
environmental disclosures (Roberts, 1992) because they can afford to spend more on
environmental abatement. Similarly, Porter and van der Linde (1995) posit that firms that
do a good job environmentally can be expected to perform better economically. While
these studies posit different causality, it is our interest to test the association, and not make
a causal inference. We test this expectation with the following hypothesis:
H4. There is a positive association between pollution disclosures and return on assets.
4. Research design
4.1. Sample and study period
We are focusing our study on large firnis for the following reasons. We expect larger firms
that are required to report to regulatory agencies to be more concerned with disclosures,
including pollution disclosures. Larger finns are more likely to have a website that provides
corporate financial and environmental information and these sites are a source ofdata for this
study. Therefore, our study focuses on the largest firms in the industries affected by the
Protocol in the Protocol ratifying countries compared with firms from non-ratifying countries.
The selection of large global finns starts with their identification from publicly available
data bases, i.e.. Fortune's list of 500 global companies and Hoover's directory. The 2002
edition oiFortune's list of 500 includes firms with revenues of at least U.S. $10 billion. We
select the firms that are classified in the chemical, oil and gas, energy, motor vehicles, and
casualty insurers industries. To expand this sample, we include firms from the same
industries found in Hoover's directory, which have revenues greater than $6 billion.
The selected firms are screened on the basis of the following criteria. First, the finns must
have a website in English to facilitate obtaining all necessary available data. Second, the
firms must have operations in a country that has ratified the Kyoto Protocol. Third, a
complete set of financial statements must be available. Firms not meeting any of these three
criteria are excluded from the sample." The final sample consists of 120 firms from 20
countries. The number of firms at different steps of the selection process is provided in
Table 1 and the names of finns from different countries are provided in Appendix A.
We examined the websites in May/June 2003 and obtained the latest information they
contained on pollution disclosures related to global warming."* Although the websites
might not have been updated for some time, we assume that they were up to date, at
least as far as early 2003. Any information on global warming available on the website
was considered public information, and, we included it, if it is relevant to this study. In
The one exception is with Hyundai, which has no production facihties in countries that ratified Kyoto, but
does sell cars that produce greenhouse gases in these countries.
We used a May-June 2003 window for the website to keep changes in the websites to a minimum and still be
able to capture data through 2002.
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Table 1
Sample selection
Motor vehicles Oil and gas Eners\ Chemicals Insurance Total
Panel A: no. affirms operating in countries that ratified Kyoto Protocol'^
From Fortune 500 21 38 30 14 17 120
From Hoover's database 3 7 15 6 4 35
Total 24 45 45 20 21 155
Less:
Website under construction -2 -2
Website not in English -1 -1 -2
Website unavailable -1 -5 _2 _2 -1 -11
No operation in country- that -2 -11 -1 -1 -15
ratified Kyoto Protocol
Incomplete financial data -1 -2 -1 -1 -5
Final Sample 22 33 31 16 18 120
Panel B: no. offirms disclosing infonnation of carbon dioxide emissions
Country
US 12 8
Japan 4 5
EU 4 6 7
Non-EU Europe
Canada 1 1
Australia 1
Total 9 10 21
3 14
2 1 12
4 3 24
1 1
2
1
9 5 54
^ These firms are fi^om countries that ratified the Kyoto Protocol and they also include muhinational firms
belonging to countries which have not ratified the Protocol but hav e production facilities in countries ratifying the
Protocol, with the exception of one firm fi"om South Korea.
addition to the websites, we also collected relevant information from environmental
reports, environmental statements, and annual reports. The annual reports made
available to shareholders and the 10 K forms filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission and available on the SEC website were especially used for U.S. firms.
We used the latest available information, although some of these reports contained
information pertaining to earlier years. Because emission information after 2000 was not
available for several firms, we decided to use the emission disclosures for the year 2000 in
order to increase number of firms in the analyses."
4.2. Measurement of dependent variables: disclosure index
We develop a disclosure index using the content-analysis technique that focuses on the
substance ofwhat is disclosed rather than counting the lines of disclosure. This approach has
been utilized in numerous earlier environmental-accounting studies (e.g., Freedman &
Wasley, 1990; Wiseman. 1982). The disclosure indices, based on the categorical technique
used in earlier environmental studies, either relate to en\ironmental disclosures in general
Carbon dioxide emission data usually was presented for a number of years. In order to maximize the sample
size, provide the most current data, and still be consistent in comparing companies we used emissions for the year
2000.
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(Wiseman, 1982) or to disclosures concerned with a specific regulation (Patten, 2000) as is
the case with this study.
Based on the requirements and expected consequences of the Protocol as well as on the
existing literature dealing with perceived shareholders' environmental needs (e.g., Freedman,
Jaggi, & Stagliano, 2004) and on the availability of information in 10 websites, we identified
relevant categories for constructing a Protocol-related disclosure index for this study. Since
our focus is on specific regulations, the number of disclosure categories is limited. We
decided to use the following five categories that are expected to capture the Protocol-related
disclosures:
1. Mention of global warming or of the Kyoto Protocol.
2. Firm's plans to deal with global warming and the objective to control global warming.
3. Potential costs to achieve the global-warming objectives.
4. Current costs to reduce the greenhouse-gas emissions.
5. Infonnation on the extent of greenhouse-gas emissions.
Two disclosure indexes are developed based on two weighting schemes: equal weights
and differential weights (unequal weights). The Equal Weight Index assigns a one to each
item with a maximum score of five.^ This method is simple and avoids controversies.
Justification for using the Unequal Weighted Index is the assumption that the information
conveyed by different items differ in importance. For example, a mere mention of global
warming in the reports is not likely to provide adequate information to investors in
evaluating the firm's performance and is not likely to be as informative as the cost
information. Thus, there is a compelling argument for using differential weights for
individual items, depending on the perceived importance of each item. There are, however,
no guidelines on the weighting scheme to be used and we use the weights based on our
perception of their contribution to the evaluation ofthe firm's global-warming perfonnance.
We give higher weight to quantitative information compared to descriptive information.
Thus, the following weight scheme is developed:
Item Weight
Mention global warming 1
Firm's plans 2
Potential costs 3
Current costs 3
Amount of emissions 3
The maximum score of the Unequal Weight Disclosure Index for a firm is 12. In order
to overcome the weaknesses of the choice of weights in the Unequal Weight Disclosure
Index, we use both Equal and Unequal Weight indices. Consistent results for both of these
indices is an indication of the robustness of the evidence.
'' The weighting scheme utilized in this study just recognizes that the last three items provide more specific
information than the first two. Although an argument can be made that each of the last three items should be
weighed differentially, we fmd it hard to defend specific differences in those weights.
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4.3. Selection of independent and control variables
We use four-test variables to test the hypotheses developed in the study. The first test
variable is an indicator variable of KYOTO_X)UM. It differentiates between the firms
that belong to the groups of Protocol ratifying and non-ratifying countries. The variable
is coded as one if the firm belongs to the Protocol ratifying country, otherwise zero. The
second test variable is firm size (SIZE). We use the log of total assets for 2002 for this
size variable. The third test variable is return on assets (ROA), and the fourth test
variable is the debt-to-equity (DE) ratio. (Although long-term debt is sometimes used in
the numerator, we use an overall measure of debt burden because it is considered to be
more pertinent to pollution disclosures.)
In addition to these noted, independent variables, we use control variables for the
different industry groups (IND_DUM), the Legal System of the country (LS_DUM), and
an index of the regulatory enforcement level in the country (REL). These control
variables should capture the impact of factors other than the test variables discussed
above on pollution disclosures. The following industries are captured by the rND_DUM
variables: auto, oil, energy, and chemicals. We use the legal system of the country as a
variable because disclosures are significantly influenced by the country's legal system
(e.g.. Ball, Kothari, & Ashoket, 2000). Consistent with the literature, we classify
countries into common and code law countries (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, &
Vishny, 1997). The LSJDUM is coded as one for common law countries, otherwise
zero. In addition, we use the index of regulatory enforcement, as developed by La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (unpublished working paper). This variable
controls for the effectiveness of regulatory requirements.
4.4. Statistical tests and model
We use the following regression model to test the above hypotheses:
POL_DISjjj = a + /3i(KY0T0_DUM)+ ,^2 (SIZE) +/33 (ROA) + /34(DE)
5
+ Psi^S^UM) + ;36(REL) + /37_io ^ IND^DUMj + e (1)
y=i
where:
POL_DISdi = Disclosure Index, where subscript DI= 1 and 2, (1 represents Unweighted
Disclosure Index and 2 represents Weighted Disclosure Index),
KYOTO_DUM = 1 when the firni belongs to a country that ratified the Kyoto Protocol,
otherwise
SIZE = Log of Total Assets
ROA= Return of Assets, proxy for operating performance
DE= Debt-Equity Ratio
LS_DUM=1 when from common-law country, otherwise
REL= Regulatory enforcement level
IND_DUM = Auto, oil, energy, chemical industry and insurance
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a = Constant
j? 1 1 = Coefficients
£ = Residual
5. Results
5.7. Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics for disclosure indices and other variables are provided in Table 2.
Out of 120 firms, 68 tlnns belong to countries that ratified the Protocol (Kyoto firnis)
and 52 to countries that have not (non-Kyoto firms).
The mean of the equally weighted disclosure index for Kyoto firms is 2.35 against
1.21 for non-Kyoto firnis. The mean for weighted index for Kyoto finns is 4.69
against 2.21 for non-Kyoto firms (Table 2, Panel A). We conduct a /-test to evaluate
the significance of differences between the disclosure scores of Kyoto firms and non-
Protocol firms. The /-test results indicate that the differences are statistically
significant both for the equally weight index and the unequally weighted index at
the level of 0.001%. These results clearly indicate that firms from countries that
Table 2
Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Median Maximum Minimum Standard deviation
Panel A : firms from countries which ratified Kyoto Protocol (N= 6S)
Disclosure index (equal weights) 2.35 3.00 4.00 1.23
Disclosure index (unequal weights) 4.69 6.00 9.00 2.67
Assets (in Sbillions) 75.76 32.25 988.4 1.00 16.89
Return of assets 0.03 0.02 .18 -0.06 0.04
Debt /equity ratio 6.78 0.73 255.9 .73 32.06
Pane! B: firms from countries which have not ratified Kyoto Protocol (N= 52)
Disclosure index (equal weights) 1.21 1.00 3.00 1.30
Disclosure index (unequal weights) 2.21 1.00 6.00 2.49
Assets 58.71 21,00 561.00 1.20 103.41
Return of assets -0.13 0.01 .21 -6.70
Debt /equity ratio .87 .85 -49.00 29.02 8.19
Panel C: correlation among variables for the total sample
EW UEW ROA DE Assets
Kyoto 0.415*** 0.431*** 0.133 0.118 0.059
EW 0.981*** 0.008 -0.095 0.009
UEW 0.036 -0.081 -0.028
ROA 0.010 0.034
DE
-0.044
Where Kyoto=l when the firm belongs to the country ratifying the Protocol, EW=equal weighted disclosure
index, UEW = unequal weighted disclosure index, ROA= return on assets, DE = debt/equity ratio. Assets = total
assets.
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ratified the Kyoto Protocol pro\'ide more disclosures compared to firms from non-
ratifying countries.
In Panel B of Table 2, we provide a correlation matrix for the total sample. The
results show that the disclosure indices (equally weighted as well as unequally) are
significantly correlated with the Kyoto variable, which is equal to one for the Kyoto
firms and zero for non-Kyoto firm. There is no significant correlation among other
variables.
5.2. Regression results
The regression results are provided in Table 3.
The regression results show a significant positive association (at the 0.01 level)
between disclosure indices and the indicator variable for Kyoto and non-Kyoto firms.
There is no difference in the results for the equally weighted and unequally weighted
disclosures indices, suggesting that irrespecti\ e of the disclosure index used, the Kyoto
firms provide more disclosure. These regression results are consistent with the /-test and
correlation results. These results support HI, that firms from countries that ratified the
Protocol provide greater pollution disclosures.
The regression results also show that the coefficient for firm size is positive and
significant at the 0.01 level. This is interesting because the sample is already made up of
Table 3
Regression results on pollution disclosures for the total sample
Variables Equal weig It index model Unequal we ght index model
Coefficient r-value Coefficient f-\alue
Intercept -1.79 -3.89* - 1 .43 -3.54*
KYOTOJ3UM 0.22 3.52* 0.21 3.94*
SIZE 0.07 3.97* 0.06 3.51*
ROA -0.02 -0.68 -0.01 -0.33
DE -0.002 -1.77 -0.001 -1.67
LS_DUM 0.02 0.31 0.04 0.68
REL 0.006 0.36 0.005 0.36
AUTO 0.31 3.94* 0.25 3.67*
OIL 0.25 3.41* 0.20 3.09*
POW-ER 0.35 4.93* 0.30 4.84*
CHEM 0.26 3.01* 0.22 2.88**
N 120 120
F-Value 6.50* 6.43*
Adj. /?-Square 0.32 0.31
KYOTO_DUM= 1 when the firm belongs to a country that ratified Kyoto Protocol, Otherwise 0. SIZE = log of
total assets. ROA= return of assets, proxy for operating performance, DE = debt equity ratio, LS_DUM= 1 if the
country is a common law country, otherwise 0, REL = regulatory enforcement level, AUTO=l when the firm
belongs to the auto industry, otherwise 0, 01L=1 when the firm belongs to the oil industry, otherwise 0,
POWT:R= 1 when the firm belongs to the energy industry, otherwise 0, CHEM= I when the firm belongs to the
chemical industry, otherwise 0.
* Significant at 0.01 level.
** Significant at 0.05 level.
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the largest companies in the world, yet firm size plays a significant role in determining
the extent of pollution information disclosed. This finding supports H2 that the larger the
firm, the higher the extent of pollution disclosures.
The coefficients on ROA and DE are statistically insignificant, suggesting that the
operating performance, proxied by ROA, and the debt-equity ratio do not play a significant
role in pollution disclosures; that is, H3 and H4 are not supported.
The coefficients for all industry groups included in the regression model (four industry
dummies) are positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. This result suggests
that all industry groups that are potentially severely impacted by the Kyoto Protocol
provide relatively greater pollution disclosures.
5.3. Results on the impact of carbon dioxide emissions on disclosures
The Protocol especially focuses on carbon dioxide emissions. We, therefore,
conduct additional analyses on firms that are associated with disclosure of
information on carbon dioxide emissions. Only 54 sample firms provided that
information. The breakdown of this sub-sample by industry and region is provided in
Panel B of Table 1.
We conducted a regression analysis to determine whether carbon dioxide emissions
(CO2) would have an impact on the pollution disclosures made by Kyoto firms. In order
to examine this, we include an interaction variable between CO? and KYOTO, where
Kyoto is coded as one for Kyoto firms and zero for non-Kyoto firms. The coefficient of
the interaction term will jointly test the association of pollution disclosures with CO2 and
whether the firms belong to Protocol ratifying or non-ratifying countries. The following
regression model is used to evaluate this association:
POL - DIS = y + (3,(KYOTO*C02) + (52 (SIZE) + ^3 (ROA) + ^4(DE)
5
+ ^5-9 ^ IND_DUM/- + C (2)
7=1
where:
CO2 * Kyoto = interaction of the log of carbon dioxide emissions with the Kyoto
dummy variable (Kyoto is coded as 1 for countries ratifying the Protocol),
(5 ]-^9 = coefficients,
u= residual
Other variables have been defined earlier.
The regression results are presented in Table 4.
The results indicate that the coefficients on the interaction variable, is positive and
statistically significant. This finding thus suggests that the firms from countries ratifying
the Protocol provide more pollution disclosures when carbon dioxide emissions are high.
The results with regard to the firm size, ROA, and debt/equity are insignificant. In terms
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Table 4
Regression results on disclosures for firms that disclosed carbon dioxide emissions data
Variables Equal weight index Unequal weight index
Coefficient /-value Coefficient /-value
Intercept 0.79 1.26 0.82 1.60
KYOTO *C02 0.01 2.07* 0.01 2.55**
SIZE -0.02 -0.71 -0.02 -1.02
ROA -0.88 -1.54 -0.76 -1.62
DE 0.0
1
0.48 0.002 0.17
LS DUM
REL
AUTO 0.19 2.42** 0.17 2.57**
OIL 0.24 2.83** 0.18 2.56**
POWER 0.19 2.68** 0.16 2.68**
CHEM 0.13 1.53 0.11 1.65
A' 54 54
F-Value Prob 0.05 0.03
Adj. /?-Square 0.15 0.17
KYOTO *C02 = Interaction between Kyoto and CO2. where Kyoto = 1 when the firm belongs to a country that
ratified the Kyoto Protocol, otherwise O; and C02 = log of carbon dioxide emissions. SlZE=log of total assets,
ROA= return of assets, proxy for operating performance. DE = debt-equity ratio, LS_DUM= 1 if the country is a
common-law country, otherwise 0. REL = regulatory enforcement level, AUTO= 1 when the firm belongs to the
auto industry, otherwise 0, OIL= 1 when the firm belongs to the oil industry, otherwise 0, POWER = 1 when the
firm belongs to the energy industry, otherwise 0, CHEM=1 when the firm belongs to the chemical industry,
otherwise 0.
* Significant at the 0.05 level.
** Significant at the 0.001 level.
of disclosure by industry, the results indicate that three out of four industry groups have
statistically significant coefficients at the 0.05 level, and the coefficient for the chemical
industry is insignificant at the conventional level. It would appear that in the case of the
chemical industry, disclosure of carbon dioxide emissions is independent of Kyoto
adoption. We also conducted a test without the variables of firm size, ROA, and debt/
equity and the results do not change.
6. Conclusion
The findings show that firms from countries that have ratified the Protocol provide greater
pollution disclosures as compared to firms whose home countries have not ratified the
Protocol even though they are firms operating in Protocol countries. Similarly, we find that
firms from Protocol countries are more forthcoming about the firm's pollution performance,
especially related to the Kyoto requirements. Even though firms from non-ratifying
countries are required to meet the Protocol's requirements if they operate in Protocol
ratifying countries, we find that they do not disclose equally detailed information on their
pollution performance voluntarily.
An analysis of disclosures also indicates that only some Japanese firms disclosed
current costs of reducing greenhouse gases, but no Japanese firm disclosed infonnation on
estimated future costs. In the absence of cost information, even the most sophisticated
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users of financial statements are not likely to have a proper understanding of the impact of
global warming on the firm's performance. In order to improve pollution disclosures for
investment decisions, lack of voluntarism may lead regulators to consider mandatory
disclosure requirements.
Appendix A. Names of firms from different countries by industry
Country not Countries that ratified Country that either ratified(R)
ratifying Kyoto Protocol or did not ratify (N) Kyoto Protocol
Kyoto
Protocol
U.S. Japan EU Europe Asia, North and
Countries (other (other than South
than EU Japan) and America,
Countries) Australia other than
USA
Panel A—motor vehicles
GM Toyota Daimler
Chrysler
Hyundai (N)
Ford Honda Volkswagen
Dana Mitsubishi Renault
Navistar Int'l Fuji Hvy
Eqpt
BMW
Paccar Denso
Mazda
Nissan
Isuzu
Yamaha
Man
Volvo
Robert Bosch
Panel B—oil and gas
Amerada Showa Shell ENl Lukoil (N) India Oil (R) Imperial (R)
Hess
Chevron Tex. Cosmo Oil Statoil Yukos (N) SK(N) Petrobas (N)
Conoco Japan Engy Anglo-Amer
E G Res. Nippon-Mits BHP
Billiton(N)-
Australian
ExxonMobil Idemitsu Royal Dutch
Shell
Marathon BP
Occidental Total Fina
Phillips Pet. EON
Valero Pet.
El Paso Engy
Andarko Pet.
Plains All
AMCC
Unocal
(continued on next page)
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Appendix A (continued)
Countrv not Countries that ratified
ratifying Kvoto Protocol
Kvoto
Protocol
Counir. that either ratified(Ri
or did not ratify (N) Kvoto Protocol
U.S. Japan EU
Countries
Europe
(other
than EU
Countries)
Asia.
(other than
Japan) and
Austraha
North and
South
.\merica.
other than
USA
Panel C—energy
AEP Tokyo Elec Enel
Ehike Eng\ Kansai Elec Endesa
Rehant Eng> Chubu Elec Gaz de
France
Aquila Tohuku Elec Scottish
Power
Mirant Kytishu Elec Iberdola
Xcel Engy Tomen National
Grid Gp.
CMS Eng>- RWE
Cinergy Suez
Edison Int"l
AES
Con Ed.
Public Ser\
EnL
Sempra Engj
FirstEnergy
KeySpan
Dynergy
Panel D—chemicals
Dow Marubeni A\entis
DuPont Mitsubishi
Ch
BASF
Pharmacia Sumitomo Bayer
.AkzoCh
Imperial Ch
Norsk
Hydro
Henkel
MG Tech
DSM
Sohay
Panel E—Insurance
AIG Tokyo Mne Allianz AG Zurich Ins
and Fire fN)
State Farm Mitui Munich RE Swiss Reins
Sumitomo (N)
Korean El.
m
TransCanada
(R)
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Appendix A {continued)
Country that either ratified! R)
or did not ratify (N) Kyoto Protocol
Conntrv not Countries that ratified
ratifying Kyoto Protocol
Kvoto
Protocol
U.S. Japan EU Europe Asia. North and
Countries (other (other than South
than EU Japan) and America,
Countries) Australia other than
USA
Panel E—Insurance
All State Yasut a Fire Roval
and Mne and Sun
Libem CGN
Mutual
Berkshire Skandia
Ht\\7
CAN
St Paul
Chubb
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Abstract
In Korea, regulators could assign auditors to firms. We investigate the relationship among audit
fees, mandatory auditor assignment, and the joint provision of non-audit and auditor services in
Korea. We find that assigned auditors charge significantly higher audit fees than fi^eely selected
auditors. We also find that the joint provision of non-audit and audit services does intensify the
relation between auditor assignment and audit fees. Combined with the results of other studies that
have shown that firms audited by assigned auditors report smaller amounts of discretionary accruals
than firms audited by freely selected auditors, our results suggest the possibility that mandatory
auditor assignment may improve auditor independence.
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1. Introduction
This study investigates the relationship among audit fees, mandator} auditor
assignment, and the joint pro\ision of non-audit and audit ser\ices m Korea.
Specifically, we examine how audit fees are affected by mandator, auditor assignment
and the joint provision of non-audit and audit services. In 1989. regulator)' bodies in
Korea partially adopted an auditor assignment system to improve auditor indepen-
dence. Under a mandators' auditor assignment system, companies are not allowed to
select auditors for themselves. Instead, regulators mandatorily assign auditors to a
company. Once an auditor is assigned, regulators expect the company and the audit
firm to complete the audit engagement, unless there are legitimate reasons for not
doing so. This assignment process gives auditors more power and could lead to higher
audit fees than when companies select their own auditors on a competitive basis.'
Beck, Frecka. and Solomon (1988) and Deberg. Kaplan, and Pany (1991) argue that
there may be a conflict of interest for auditors when the\' provide non-audit services as
well as audit services. Investors and regulators' bodies have also raised concerns that
the joint provision of non-audit and audit serv ice may impair audit independence since
auditors may be less likely to point out their own errors in the audit process if thev'
also provide non-audit service in the design of the internal control system. During the
1990s in the USA. fees from non-audit services grew explosively, overtaking audit
fees late in the 1990s (Ashbaugh. LaFond. & Mayhevv. 2003). Levin (2000) argues
that the substantial growth in consulting services audit firms provided to their audit
clients potentially compromised their independence. He also argues that auditors whose
firms provide both audit and consulting services to the client tend to allow such clients
to adopt borderline revenue enhancing accounting treatments more readily than when
the auditor provides only audit services. Further, a series of accounting scandals
including Enron. WorldCom, and others has prompted concerns about the joint
provision of audit and non-audit serv ices across the world. In a series of actions to
address the concerns, the United States Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, which prohibits auditors from also providing most non-audit services to their
audit clients.
Non-audit fees for Korean accounting firms have also grown rapidlv' and manv- Big
Five accounting firms earn more from non-audit services than from audit services.
Because of the profitabilit\' of non-audit services, audit firms may be prone to
discount (lowball) the audit fees in the hope of securing additional, more profitable,
non-audit service agreements. This suggests that the anticipated increase in audit fees
from mandator}.' auditor assignment may be partlv' negated due to the joint provision
of audit and non-audit services. In response, the Korean government began in 2001
requiring firms to disclose audit fees and non-audit fees in the footnote to financial
statements and has prohibited auditors from providing certain non-audit services to
" Before 1998. the fees that an audit firm could charge to its clients were hea\ily regulated by audit fee
guidelines imposed by the Korean government (Taylor. Simon. & Burton. 1999). Ho\ve\er. the audit fee
guidelines were repealed in 1 998. From that time on, audit fees are determined by negotiation bet%veen an auditor
and its clients. Our sample period covers from 1999 to 2002.
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audit clients consistent with action in the United States of America. This regulatory
change in Korea creates a unique opportunity for examining the effect of auditor
assignment and the joint provision of audit and non-audit services on audit fees.
Using the 2025 firm-year observations listed on the Korean Stock Exchange, we find
that mandatory auditor assignment is associated with higher audit fees. We also document
that this relation is not affected by the joint provision of audit and non-audit services.
Rather, the joint provision of audit and non-audit services intensifies the auditor-
assignment effect on audit fees.
This paper provides new evidence to two areas in auditing: First, it provides evidence
on the effect of auditor assignment on audit fees. Most previous studies that examine the
effect of auditor assignment on audit fees use discretionary accmals. This study documents
that audit fees are higher when the auditor/client relationship is assigned by regulators,
which may imply that in this setting clients have less bargaining power. Combined with
the results of previous studies on the effect of mandatory auditor assignment on
discretionary accruals, the results of this study suggest the possibility that mandatory
auditor assignment may improve auditor independence. Second it adds additional evidence
to the effect of the joint provision of non-audit services on audit fees. We also find that the
joint provision of audit and non-audit services in Korea does not affect the auditor-
assignment effect. These results may have implications for other countries that are
interested in increasing auditor independence.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. The next section presents the auditor-
assignment system in Korea, a review of previous research on the effect of the joint
provision of audit and non-audit services, and our hypotheses. The research design and
sample selection are discussed in Section 3. Descriptive statistics and the results of the
empirical analysis are presented in Section 4. The conclusion of the paper is provided in
Section 5.
2. Mandatory auditor assignment, provision of non-audit services, and hypothesis
2.1. Mandatory auditor assignment in Korea
During the late 1970s and early 1980s the rapid growth of the Korean economy
spurred expansion of the Korean stock market. To meet the demand for credible financial
reporting and external auditing required by this expansion, regulatory authorities in Korea
enacted the Act on External Audits (hereafter "AEA") in 1980. The AEA required that
financial statements of companies with total assets larger than a certain amount be audited
by external auditors. This requirement has substantially increased the number of
companies subject to statutory external audits. At the same time, the AEA changed the
auditor-selection mechanism from assignment to competition. Before the enactment of
the AEA, auditors were assigned to finns by regulatory bodies. Under the new auditor-
selection method, companies were fi"ee to select their own auditors and negotiate audit
fees. This change in auditor selection by the AEA intensified competition among auditors
and provided managers with the means to influence the auditor's opinion through the
threat of a potential change in auditor. Han (1998) reported that the proportion of firms
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with other than unquahfied opinion decreased to less than 5% in 1995 from 35% in 1981
among the listed firms in the Korean Stock Exchange, while the explanatory power of
earnings for yearly returns decreased to 13.4% in 1995 from 38.4%) in 1981. Taylor et al.
(1999) provide evidence that the large audit firm fee premium does not exist in Korea.
This may be due to the high level of competition among auditors and price-cap regulation
in Korea.
However, investors' concerns over the lack of auditor independence increased
significantly during the 1980s. As a result, the Financial Super\'isory Service (the
Korean counterpart of the SEC in the United States, "FSS" hereafter) recommended the
revision of the AEA to increase auditor independence and address the investors'
concerns about the quality of financial statements. AEA was amended in 1989 to
introduce the mandatory auditor-assignment system for some firms, while maintaining
competition, in general, among auditors. Under the new amended rule, the FSS assigns
external auditors to firnis that are likely to manipulate earnings or shop for opinions.
The goal of this assignment is to increase auditor independence. The AEA specifically
stipulates the conditions under which the FSS assigns auditors to firms: (1) when firms
do not select auditors within the statutory auditor-selection period, (2) when firms
change their auditor for inappropriate reasons, (3) when the FSS finds a violation of
GAAP in the previous year's financial statements, (4) when a firnis' owner-manager
has more than 50% ownership, (5) when finns have a high debt-equity ratio, or (6)
when the company's stock becomes an administrative issue in the Korean Stock
Exchange or KOSDAQ due to bankruptcy, lack of liquidity, or bad governance
structure, etc. In practice, the primary reasons cited for auditor assignment include an
excessive debt-equity ratio, high owner-manager ownership, and administrative issues.
In Korea, listed companies are obliged to engage a given auditor for three consecutive
years. Therefore, once auditors are assigned by the FSS. they will audit the company for
three years without the burden of renegotiating a contract. If a company continues to
require auditor assignment after three years the regulations specify that a new auditor is to
be assigned. Therefore, under the mandatory-assignment system, there is a mandatory
audit rotation and auditors would be interested in maximizing their revenues by charging
higher audit fees, because clients could not change them.
When the FSS assigns auditors to companies, they generally choose auditors with a
high assigrmient score. High scores are given to those auditors who are less often
"detected" by the FSS review process of their external audits; auditors who audit their
cUents' fmancial statements in complete compliance with generally accepted auditing
standards (GAAS), will not be "detected" for any wrong doings during the FSS review
process. Therefore, the auditor-assignment process may encourage auditors to perform
audits in strict compliance with GAAS. Compliance with GAAS during audits may imply
higher quality audits and, therefore, higher costs.
Earlier studies suggest the possibility of attaining higher audit quality by mandatorily
assigning auditors. Park (1996) and Kim, Min, and Yi (2002) provide evidence that
companies with assigned auditors report smaller amounts of discretionary accruals than
companies with competitively selected auditors. This result is interpreted to mean that
assigned auditors more stringently restrict managers from adopting aggressive accounting
methods compared to competitively selected auditors.
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Also, assigned auditors have more bargaining power than competitively selected audit
firms when negotiating audit fees, because assigned audit finns have a quasi-monopoly on
the company's audit services. Accordingly, we expect fees for assigned auditors to be
higher than the fees of competitively selected auditors, as stated formally in H 1
:
HI. Mandatorily assigned auditors charge higher audit fees than freely selected auditors.
2.2. Provision of non-audit seti'ice, auditor independence, and audit fee
Since the SEC in the USA first expressed concerns about the effect of the scope of
auditor services on auditor independence in 1957, the provision of non-audit services has
been a source of controversy because of the potential influence of non-audit services on
auditor independence. DeAngelo (1981b) suggests that the auditor's dependence on a
given client increases as the economic bond between the audit firm and the client
increases. Simunic (1984) and Beck et al. (1988) argue that non-audit fees further increase
the client-auditor bond by increasing the portion of the audit firm's wealth derived from
serving a client. This bond could lead investors to perceive that auditor independence is
impaired because (1) the audit team is unwilling to criticize the work performed by its
consulting division, and (2) the audit firm does not want to lose profitable consulting
services provided to the audit client and is, therefore, more reluctant to disagree with
management's interpretations of accounting matters (Beck et al., 1988; Deberg et al., 1991;
Pany & Reckers, 1983). That is, the economic bond between auditor and client, created by
the provision of non-audit services may provide auditors with incentives to allow a
manager's aggressive accounting treatment.
The 2001 Public Oversight Board annual report indicates that the level of non-audit
services have grown so large that the size of the fees from these services raises investors'
concerns about the auditor's independence or appearance thereof Ashbaugh et al. (2003)
show that average non-audit fees for Big 5 auditors is larger than the average audit fees
($1,332,408 vs. $546,420). More conservatively, Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson (2002)
report that non-audit fees are, on average 49% of the total fees that auditors earn (including
non-Big 5 auditors). This shift in audit firm revenue sources induced the U.S. SEC to issue
a ruling on auditor independence in November 2000. The new mle requires companies to
disclose, in their proxy statements, information about audit and non-audit fees billed by the
audit finn. The disclosures are intended to provide information useful to investors in
evaluating whether non-audit fees have impaired the auditor's independence.
Previous studies on the effect of the joint provision of audit and non-audit ser\'ices on
auditor independence have been inconclusive. While some researchers such as Simunic
(1984), Palmrose (1986), and Ashbaugh et al. (2003) provide evidence that non-audit
services have no effect on auditor independence, other studies such as Parkash and
Venable (1993), Firth (1997), and Frankel et al. (2002) document that the joint provision of
non-audit services by auditors may impair auditor independence or the appearance of
auditor independence.
Parkash and Venable (1993) examine the relationship between non-audit ser\'ices
provided by auditors and various measures or predictors of agency costs, using U.S. data
from 1978 to 1980. They find that the relative level of consulting fees to audit fees is
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positively related to management shareholdings and the largest institutional shareholdings,
and negatively related to debt-to-asset ratios. Firth (1997) also shows that firms with high
agency costs are less likely to purchase non-audit services from their auditors. Frankel et
al. (2002) find a positive association between abnormal accruals and the ratio of non-audit
fees to the sum of audit fees and non-audit fees. This evidence is consistent with the idea
that perceptions of auditor independence are even more important when agency costs are
potentially high and that consulting services provided by the auditor may impair the
appearance of independence. Therefore, it would be infonnative to examine whether the
joint provision of audit and non-audit services are affected by mandatory auditor
assignment; the joint provision of audit and non-audit services may have the opposite
effect on the relationship between auditors and clients than intended by mandatory auditor
assignment. For example, if mandatory assigned auditors are allowed to provide non-audit
services, they may not charge higher audit fees. Thus, the joint provision of non-audit
services may reduce auditor independence, which is opposite of the implied impact of
auditor assignment. Whether mandatory assigned auditors charge higher audit fees will be
an empirical question as tested in H2:
H2. Mandatory assigned auditors do not charge high audit fees when they provide audit
and nonaudit services.
3. Research design and sample selection
3. 1. Sample and data
To test our hypotheses we gathered data on firms listed on the Korean Stock Exchange
over the period 1999 to 2002 from publicly available sources. Korean firms have reported
audit fee and non-audit fee data for the most recent three years in the footnotes of financial
statements since 2001. We extracted other financial statement items from the Korea
Investors Service-Financial Analysis System (KIS-FAS) database, which provides the
financial statements of Korean listed firms beginning with 1980. We use only December
year-end firms for convenience (more than 80% of Korean firms use December year-end).
We exclude fi^om the sample, financial institutions that might have different determinants
of audit fees (Stein, Simmons, & OKeefe, 1994). We collected both the audit opinion and
auditor type (Big 5, non-Big 5) from the auditor's reports.
As shown in Table 1 , the sample is spread over several industries. Approximately 42%
of the sample companies are from chemical, rubber, plastic, and non-metallic
manufacturing and 24% are from machinery and equipment manufacturing.
3.2. Research design
Simunic (1984) suggests that audit fees are affected by client size, audit complexity,
and auditor-client risk sharing. Numerous empirical studies have adopted this model with
the use of slightly different variables. These studies generally show that the model has
good explanatory power and is robust across different samples, different time periods, and
15 4 4 3 4
284 68 70 68 78
851 204 207 205 235
480 118 119 118 124
222 53 53 51 65
145 33 36 34 42
30 7 7 7 9
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Table 1
Distribution of sample used in this study by year and industry
Industry All 1999 2000 2001 2002
Agriculture and fishing
Mining
Chemical, rubber, plastic, and non-metallic products
Machinery and equipment, electric machine manufacturing
Construction, electric, gas and sanitary services
Wholesale and retail trade, hotel and restaurants
Services
Total 2025 487 496 486 557
different countries. The variables we use are client size, debt ratio, audit opinion, auditor
type, and the proportion of inventories and receivables among total assets.'*
DeAngelo (1981a) argues that the existence of client-specific quasi-rents to incumbent
auditors lead to low-balling in the initial audit period. Consistent with her argument,
Simon and Francis (1988) and Ettredge and Greenberg (1990) provide empirical evidence
that substantial price-cutting actually occurs in the first year of the audit. Therefore, we
include an indicator variable for the initial audit in the regression. We expect a negative
coefficient on this variable.
Previous studies indicate that the large international accounting firnis systematically
charge higher audit fees. For example, Simon and Francis (1988) estimate a Big 8 premium
of approximately 18% across a number of studies and Craswell, Fancis, and Taylor (1995)
estimate 28- 39% brand name premium in their study. While Taylor et al. (1999) find no
audit-fee premium for the large accounting firnis in Korea during 1995-1996; we include
the size variable in this study. This leads to the following regression model.
The following regression:
Audit Fecjt = a + Z)ilnifial,t + />2 Design;, + /730pinion„ + ^4Auditori,
+ /jsInvReCjt + b(,Size^t + ^7Leverage|, + ^sNon-auditjt + e^ (1)
here:
• Audit FeCi, is the log transformed audit fee for finn i at year t.
• Inifialit indicates a new auditor during year t, otherwise zero.
• DesigUit indicates an assigned auditor during year t, otherwise zero.
• Opinionj, indicates other than unqualified opinion in year t, otherwise zero.
• Auditor,, indicates an auditor in year t is Big 5, otherwise zero.
• InvReCit is the sum of inventory and receivables divided by total assets for firm i at year t.
• Sizeit is the log transformed total assets for finn i at year t.
• LeveragCj, is total liabilities divided by total assets for firm i at year t.
• Non-auditj, is the log transformed non-audit fee for finn i during year t and e^ is the
eiTor tenn.
We do not use the number of consolidated subsidiaries and the proportion of subsidiaries that represent foreign
perations because this information was unavailable for our sample firms.
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4. Descriptive statistics and empirical results
4. 1. Descriptive statistics
Panel A of Table 2 provides descriptive statistics regarding the fee variables used in the
audit-fee model. The data show that mean audit fee and non-audit fees paid by clients in
our sample are 70 MM Korean won and 26 MM Korean won, respectively. We recalculate
the mean of non-audit fees paid by clients, because 495 firnis purchased non-audit services
from incumbent auditors. The mean of non-audit fees paid by firms that purchase both
audit and non-audit services from the incumbent auditors is 1 06 MM Korean won, which
is close to the mean audit fees paid by those firms, 112 MM Korean won. The mean audit-
fee ratio calculated by dividing non-audit fees by the sum of audit and non-audit fees is
6.5%, which is relafively small. But the standard deviation of the audit-fee ratio is large
(16%), which implies large variation among tlnns.
Panel B of Table 2 shows differences in the model variables across different
engagements in which the auditor provided or did not provide non-audit services in
conjunction with audit services. As shown in the panel B of Table 2, firms that purchase
Table 2
Descriptive statistics (A'^=2025) (unit: MM in Korean Won)
Panel A.
Mean Std dev Median Min Max
Audit fee 69.9 77.6 46 4 1212
Non-audit 25.9 172.1 4007
Ratio 6.5% 15.7% 0% 0% 96.7%
Audit fee to size 0.04% 0.04% 0.02% 0.0% 0.9%
Panel B. Differences between firms with audit fees and firms with audit fee and non-audit fees (yV=2025)
Firms without non-audit service Firms with non-audit services /-value
111.9 -9.51*'
(65.0)
0.02% 5.48*'
(0.02%)
0.265 2.28*-
(0.250)
2,106,215 -12.1*'
(320,730)
0.63 0.56
(0.59)
83 (16.8%)
36 (7.2%)
17 (3.4%)
381 (76.7%)
*Ratio is calculated by dividing non-audit fees by the sum of audit and non-audit fees.
*' Significant at 1% level; * is significant at 5%.
The number in parenthesis is the median.
Audit fee 56.2
(43.0)
Audit fee to size 0.04%
(0.03%)
InvRec 0.282
(0.266)
Size 542,146
(156,882)
Leverage 0.64
(0.53)
Initial 313 (20.5%)
Designated 184(12.0%)
Opinion 74 (4.8%)
Auditor type 1005 (65.7%)
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Table 3
Correlation matrix among variables using the whole sample
Initial Design Opinion Auditor InvRec Size Leverage Non-audit fee
Fee -0.098*' -0.030 0.004 0.284*' -0.247*' 0.833*' -0.011 0.479*'
Initial 0.284*' 0.067*' -0.082*' -0.016 -0.049*- 0.060*' -0.041*'
Design 0.169*' -0.121*' -0.008 -0.085*' 0.174*' -0.065*'
Opinion -0.001 -0.061*' -0.038*' 0.279*' -0.013
Auditor -0.074*' 0.251*' -0.047*- 0.147*'
InvRec -0.307*' -0.051*- -0.120*'
Size -0.071*' 0.445*'
Leverage -0.002
1. Variable definition: Audit Fee,, is the log transformed audit fee for finn i at year t; Initial,, is 1 when firm i is
audited by a new auditor during year t, otherwise 0; Design,, is 1 when firm i has an assigned auditor during year
t, otherwise 0; Opinion,, is 1 when audit opinion for firm i at year t is not unqualified, otherwise 0; Auditor,, is 1
when an auditor for firm i at year t is Big 5, otherwise 0; InvRec,, is calculated by dividing the sum of inventory
and accounts receivable by total assets for firm i at year t; Size,, is log transfonned total assets for firm i at year t;
Leverage,, is calculated by dividing total liabilities by total assets for firm i at year t; Non-audit fee,, is the log
transformed non-audit fee firm i at year t.
2. *' is significant at 1%; *- is significant at 5%; *' is significant at 10%.
audit and non-audit services from the same vendor pay higher audit fees and are larger
than firms that purchase only audit services. Also, finns that purchase both audit and non-
audit services are more likely to be audited by Big 5 auditors. However, firms that
purchase only audit services pay relatively high audit fees relative to size and have more
initial and designated auditors than finns that purchase audit and nonaudit services.
Table 3 reports the correlation matrix among variables used in the analysis. Audit fees
are significantly and positively correlated with auditor type, client size, and non-audit fees,
while they are significantly and negatively correlated with initial audit, the portion of
inventory, and receivables out of total assets. Although the auditor-assignment variable is
negatively correlated with audit fees, the coefficient is not significant. However, before we
draw any conclusion, we should estimate multivariate regressions.
4.2. The effect of mandatory auditor assignment on audit fees
Table 4 reports the results of the audit-fee model described in Section 3
excluding the non-audit-fee variables. The model is significant at/) < 0.01 with an adjusted
/^-squared of 71.0% which is comparable to the results of other studies using U.S. and
Australian data (Felix et al., 2001; Craswell et al., 1995; Francis & Siinon 1987, among
others). The coefficients on several control variables such as the initial audit dummy,
auditor type, size of clients, and leverage are significant and have the expected signs.
Consistent with the argument of DeAngelo (1981a) and the results of many empirical
studies, such as Francis and Simon (1987) and Ettredge and Greenberg (1990), the initial
audit-indicator variable is negative and significant. This implies that auditors in Korea also
We also estimated the regressions with industry and year dummy variables and using only Big 5 clients. The
results are qualitatively similar to the results of the regressions without these variables.
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Table 4
Regression coefiScients of the following equation:
Audit Fee,,=a+b, Initial,! "*" ^ ;Design,t
+
b jOpinion.i + 64Auditor„ + 6 sInvRec,,
+
b(,Size,i+ b yLeveragej,+6^
Variables (1) 1999 2000 2001 2002
Initial -0.122 -0.064 -0.109 -0.081 -0.173
(-6.27)*' (-2.06)*- (-2.44)*- (-1.79)*^ (-4.80)*'
Design 0.130 0.047 0.069 0.270 0.142
(4.85)*' (1.09) (1.22) (4.92)*' (2.60)*'
Opinion 0.034 -0.036 0.066 -0.010 0.182
(0.85) (-0.52)- (1.02) (-0.13) (1.80)*-'
Auditor 0.116 0.086 0.131 0.140 0.126
(6.58)*' (2.68)*' (4.00)*' (4.31)*' (3.67)*'
InvRec 0.068 -0.045 0.072 0.114 0.117
(1.14) (-0.40) (0.67) (1.03) (1.10)
Size 0.378 0.378 0.393 0.388 0.363
(63.2)*' (34.26)*' (35.32)*' (34.96)*' (30.78)*'
Leverage 0.029 0.033 0.016 0.050 0.162
(3.36)*' (1.63) (1.20) (4.01)*' (3.70)*'
N 2025 487 496 486 556
R- 71.0% 75.5% 75.7% 75.6% 69.1%
1. Variable definition: Audit Fee,, is the log transformed audit fee for firm i at year t; Initial,, is 1 when firm i is
audited by a new auditor during year t, otherwise 0; Design,, is 1 when firm i has an assigned auditor during year
t, otherwise 0: Opinion,, is 1 when the audit opinion for firm i at year t is not unqualified, otherwise 0; Auditor,, is
1 when an auditor for firm i at year t is Big 5, otherwise 0; InvRec,, is calculated by dividing the sum of inventory
and accounts receivable by total assets for firm i at year t: Size,, is the log transformed total assets for firm i at year
t; Leverage,, is calculated by dividing total liabilities by total assets for firm i at year t.
2. *' is significant at 1%; *" is significant at 5%; *' is significant at 10%.
3. Numbers in parentheses are r-values.
discount audit fees during the first year of the relationship as m other countries. In contrast
to the Taylor et al. (1999) study, the coefficient on the auditor-type variable is positive and
significant atp<0.0\. The coefficients on the size and leverage variables are also positive
and significant atp<0.0\.
We are interested in the auditor-assignment \anable (Design). Consistent with
HI. the coefficient on this \ariable is significant and positive. This implies that
mandatorily assigned auditors charge higher audit fees, conditional on other \ariables
including firm size.^
We re-estimate regression (1) by year to determine whether the resuhs differ over the
sample period. The last four columns of Table 4 show the coefficients of the regression for
each year. The model remains significant at/? < 0.0 1 for each year and the adjusted ^-squared
values are 75.5%. 75.7%. 75.6%. and 69.1% for 1999. 2000. 2001. and 2002. respectively.
While the results are shghtly weaker across years than in the pooled regression, overall
results are qualitatively similar to those in the pooled regression. The initial audit, auditor
type, client size variables show significant coefficients, consistent with those in the pooled
Because several independent variables are significantly correlated, as shoun in Table 3. we calculate the
variance inflation factor for each independent variable to investigate the severity of multicoUinearity among
independent variables. None of the \ariance inflation factor is greater than two implying that multicoUinearity
among independent variables is not severe enough to change the results.
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Table 5
Regression coefficients of the following equation:
Audit Fee,, = a + /> , Initial,, + /jiDesign,, + /) ^Opinion,, + ft4Auditoi„ + b sInvRec,, + /5,,Size,i
+ A 7Leverage,| + b sNon-Audit,, + e
,,
Pooled 1999 2000 2001 2002
Initial -0.120 -0.055 -0.106 -0.094 -0.183
(-6.35)*' (-1.79)*' (-2.41)*- (-2.10)*- (-5.24)*'
Design 0.138 0.045 0.075 0.272 0.179
(5.25)*' (1.06) (1.34) (5.01)*' (3.37)*'
Opinion 0.034 -0.035 0.075 -0.010 0.158
(0.87) (-0.51) (1.18) (-0.13) (1.61)
Auditor 0.109 0.084 0.127 0.133 0.118
(6.36)*' (2.63)*' (3.96)*' (4.14)*' (3.54)*'
InvRec 0.055 -0.061 0.036 0.120 0.132
(0.95) (-0.55) (0.34) (1.10) (1-19)
Size 0.352 0.363 0.368 0.369 0.334
(54.8)*' (30.5)*' (29.0)*' (30.5)*' (26.9)*'
Leverage 0.026 0.031 0.013 0.047 0.149
(3.04)*' (1.54) (0.98) (3.82)*' (3.53)*'
Non-audit 0.056 0.038 0,045 0.037 0.063
(9.99)*' (3.20)*' (4.14)*' (3.63)*' (6.23)*'
N 2025 487 496 486 556
R~ 72.3% 76.0% 76.4% 76.2% 71.1%
1
.
Variable definition: Audit Fee,, is log transfonned audit fee for firm i at year t; Initial;, is 1 when firm i is
audited by a new auditor during year t, otherwise 0; Design,, is 1 when fimi i has an assigned auditor during year
t, otherwise 0; Opinion,, is 1 when audit opinion for fimi i at year t is not unqualified, otherwise 0; Auditor,, is 1
when an auditor for firm i at year t is Big 5, otheiAvise 0; InvRec,, is calculated by dividing the sum of inventory
and accounts receivable by total assets for firm i at year t; Size,, is log transformed total assets for fimi i at year t;
Leverage,, is calculated by dividing total liabilities by total assets for tlrm i at year t; Non-audit,, is the log
transformed non-audit service fee for firm i during year t.
2. *' is significant at 1%; *- is significant at 5%; *"' is significant at 10%.
3. Numbers in parentheses are lvalues.
regression for all four years. Also, the auditor-assignment and leverage variables show the
same significant coefficients as those in the pooled regression for two years. None of the
yearly regressions reverses the signs of the coefficients on the auditor-assignment variable.
These results imply that either the mandatorily assigned auditors charge higher audit fees, or
the freely selected auditors discount audit fees during the first year of a relation.
4.3. The effect of non-audit sen'ices on audit fees and mandatoiy the auditor-assignment
effect
To investigate how the joint provision of audit and non-audit services influences the
effect of mandatory auditor assignment on audit fees, we estimate Eq. (1) in Section 3,
which includes non-audit-fee as an independent variable. Table 5 presents the regression
estimation results. The overall model is significant at/7<0.01 with an adjusted 7?-squared
of 72.3%, which is close to that of the audit-fee model without the non-audit-fee variable.
Consistent with previous studies and the results in the previous section, the coefficient on
the non-audit-fee variable is significant and positive, suggesting that non-audit services are
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related to audit serv'ices. However, the inclusion of non-audit fees does not appear to add
significantly to the explanatory power of the model.
In this regression, we are interested in the coefficient on the auditor-assignment variable
that shows a significantly positive coefficient in regression ( 1 ) without non-audit fees. As
shown in Table 5, the coefficient on the assigned-auditor variable is positive and
significant at/)<0.01. The results for control variables are similar to those shown in the
tests of HI. That is, the initial audit variable is significantly negative and auditor type,
client size, and leverage variables are significantly positive. The results of yearly
regressions are also qualitatively similar to those of the pooled regression. These results
are consistent with the results reported in the previous section, indicating that the effect of
mandatory auditor assignment on audit fees documented in the previous section does not
change by including non-audit fees as an independent variable in the regression.
However, to investigate the statistical significance of the joint provision of audit and
non-audit services on the mandatory auditor assignment and other control variables, we
add interaction variables between non-audit services and auditor assignment, initial audit
indicator, auditor type, client size, and leverage to the audit-fee model ( 1 ) after deleting
non-audit fee variable. Specifically we run the following regression:
Audit FeCit = c/ + /^ilnitiali, + /)2lnitialj,*Dummy|, + Z53Designn
+ Z?4Designit*Dummy„ + /^sOpinioUj, + ^gAuditorit
+ Z)7Auditorjt*Dummy|, + /?sInvReCit + Z^gSizCn
+ ^ioSizeit*Dummy|, + />]i Leverage j,
-I- /)i2Leveragei(*Dummyn + e^ (2)
where:
• Dummy,! is one when finn i purchases audit and non-audit seiTices from incumbent
auditor at year t, and
• Other variables are defined as in Eq. ( 1 ).
The coefficients bi, /?4, b-j, bio, and bij represent the effects of non-audit services on
other determinants of audit fees: initial-audit, mandatory auditor-assignment, auditor-type,
client-size and leverage variables, respectively. If the joint provision of audit and non-audit
services affects the effect of auditor assignment on audit fees, the coefficient on b4 will not
be significant.
Table 6 presents the results of regression Eq. (2). The overall model is significant at
p<0.0\ with an adjusted i?-squared of 72.0%. The coefficient on the initial-auditor-
indicator variable is significant and negative, and the coefficients on the assigned-auditor,
auditor-type, client-size, and leverage variables are significant and positive as in two
previous regressions. Also, the assigned auditor, auditor type, and size interaction
variables show the significant positive coefficients. That is, mandatorily assigned Big 5
auditors charge significantly higher audit fees than other auditors when they jointly
provide audit and non-audit services. This implies that the joint provision of audit and non-
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audit services does not weaken but rather intensifies the effect of mandatory auditor
assignment on audit fees.
The coefficients on the initial audit indicator and the interaction variable between initial
audit indicator and non-audit services are significantly negative. This suggests that both
mandatorily assigned auditors and freely selected auditors discount audit fees for the first
year of the contract when firms offer both audit and non-audit services. The coefficient on
the leverage variable is significant and positive, suggesting that auditors charge higher
audit fees for fmns with high leverage due to the high audit risk. In contrast, the leverage
dummy interaction variable shows a negatively significant coefficient. This suggests that
auditors who also provide non-audit serves may discount audit fees for clients with high
leverage if there is a chance to provide non-audit services to these clients.
We also re-estimate regression Eq. (2) year-by-year and the last four columns of Table 6
report the results of the yearly estimation. As shown in Table 6, the results are qualitatively
the same as in the pooled regression. However, the results become slightly weaker by
showing that the coefficients on the auditor-assignment variable are significantly positive
only for two years. ^ The coefficients on the interaction variable between auditor assignment
and the provision of non-audit services are also positive for all four years, but only two are
significant. Although the results become generally weaker, the results of yearly regressions
confirm the pooled-regression results that the joint provision of audit and non-audit services
does not weaken but rather intensifies the effect of mandatory auditor assignment on audit
fees. The results related to the initial audit in the yearly regression are also similar to those in
the pooled regression. That is, the coefficients on the initial-audit indicator are always
negative for four years, although significant for two years, only while the coefficients on the
interaction variable between initial audit and the joint provision of audit and non-audit
services are unstable, showing only one significant year. The coefficients on auditor type and
the interaction variable are significant and positive for three years. The coefficients on the
interaction variable between client size and the joint provision of audit and non-audit
services are significant for only one year, suggesting that client size may not have a
consistent effect on audit fees when the auditor also provides non-audit services. The results
on leverage and the interaction variable between leverage and the provision of non-audit
services in yearly regressions are also the same as those in the pooled regression.
Also, we re-estimate the regressions Eqs. (1) and (2) after coding the design variable to
indicate if firm-year is the first, second, or third year of the mandatory assigned auditor to
investigate whether start-up costs for assigned firms are driving the results. While the
results generally become weaker, the results are qualitatively similar to the results in the
previous section.^
Taken together, empirical test results show that mandatory auditor assignment is
positively related to audit fees and this relation is not affected but rather intensified by the
joint provision of audit and non-audit services.
I
We would have liked to perform other statistical tests to determine whether this result is a period-specific
phenomenon by performing the Fama and MacBeth (1973) test or the bi-nomial test using yearly coefficients as
observations. However, there are not sufficient data to perform such tests.
We are thankful to the reviewer who pointed out this issue. The results are not included in the paper, but
available from authors on request.
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5. Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to examine (1) whether mandatory auditor assignment
allows auditors to charge higher audit fees, and (2) whether the joint provision of audit and
non-audit services affects the impact of auditor assignment on audit fees. Under a
mandatory auditor-assignment system, auditors may charge higher audit fees due to their
increased bargaining power. Our empirical results, based on a sample of 2025 fimi/years
over a period from 1999 to 2002, are consistent with the idea that assigned auditors charge
higher fees than competitively selected auditors and that the joint pro\ision of audit and
non-audit ser\'ices does not alleviate the effect of auditor assignment on audit fees, even
though the results are relatively weak. Further, we find that the joint provision of audit and
non-audit services intensifies the effect of auditor assignment on audit fees. Our result
raises the possibility that the auditor-assigimient system may improve auditor indepen-
dence and audit quality.
We do, however, find that non-audit fees are positively associated with audit fees. This
could be the result of knowledge spillover or production efficiency for the joint provision
of audit and non-audit services. This result may not be consistent with the notion that
auditor independence is impaired by the provision of non-audit services. The generalized
ability of whether the inference we make in this paper will require further studies,
especially since the companies that have mandatoiy assigned auditors and purchase both
audit and non-audit services make up a very small portion of the sample firms used in the
study. Additionally, we do not control the amount of audit hours in our test. If assigned
auditors simply spend more hours due to the audit risk of the assigned clients, we may not
be able to infer that the higher audit fees charged by assigned auditors unply high quality
audit. In addition, we cannot conclude based on the results of this paper whether assigning
auditors to all fimis would impro\e the o\erall quality of audit, because the very existence
of the assignment system may hinder the development of audit skills unless there is an
appropriate controlling (monitoring) mechanism for the quality of audit.
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Abstract
Continuous disclosure is the immediate release of material information by issuers within a
regulatory and information dissemination framework. Under such a regime, the market is informed at
all times and no investor is disadvantaged by lack of access to information. We attempt to identify
the firm-specific detenninants of these disclosures.
We examine the frequency and regularity of online announcements on the stock exchange
websites of companies included in the Morgan Stanley Capital Index for small-cap firms in eight
developed markets in Asia and Europe. We find that firms with higher infonnation asymmetry have a
higher frequency and regularity of continuous online reporting. Our results also show that the
frequency and regularity of online disclosure is positively associated with agency costs, earnings,
and analyst following and is inversely related to the length of the product cycle of a firm. Our results
are more robust for discretionary disclosures. We also find variations in the frequency of disclosures
by countries, some of which are explainable by the online disclosure settings of the countries.
© 2005 Published by University of Illinois.
Keywords: Continuous corporate disclosure; Internet disclosure; Firm-specific determinant; On-line reporting
1. Introduction
In a continuous disclosure regime, corporations are required either by law or by the
listing regulations of securities markets to inform the securities regulators or markets of
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material events whenever those material events occur. By contrast, in a periodic disclosure
reporting regime, corporations are required to make more in-depth, periodic disclosures of
firm performance. Continuous disclosure is central to the smooth functioning of securities
markets (ASX, 2002; FSA, 2001, 2002; The Treasury, 2002). The proposal by the
Securities and Exchange Commission to widen the scope of events that would trigger the
filing of a fonn 8-K (SEC, 2002a,b) would move the United States closer to a continuous
disclosure model.
Developments in information and communication technologies (ICT), notably the
Internet, have been important for both the continuous and periodic disclosure models. The
publication of periodic disclosures on the Internet in databases such as EDGAR (USA) or
on corporate Websites have allowed low-cost and ubiquitous access to filings and
disclosures (Benston, Bromwich, Litan, & Wagenhofer, 2003; Debreceny, Gray, &
Rahman, 2002; FASB, 2000; lASC, 1999). Developments in ICT significantly facilitate
the continuous disclosure model. When material disclosures are made available at low cost
in a timely fashion to all stakeholders, continuous disclosure is enhanced. Securities
exchanges and securities regulators are rapidly adopting the Internet as a means of
information dissemination (e.g., SEC, 2002a,b, 2003).
Continuous disclosure changes the pattern and ft^equency of disclosure. There is a
burgeoning literature that studies the frequency of disclosure by corporations. Recent
studies research quarterly reporting (Butler, Kraft, & Weiss, 2002; Chen, DeFord, & Park,
2002; Landsman & Maydew, 2002), conference calls (Brown, Hillegeist, & Lo, 2002;
Bushee, Matsumoto, & Miller, 2002; Frankel, Johnson, & Skinner, 1999) and reporting of
specific items of expanded disclosure such as segment reports (Botosan & Harris, 2000).
This literature attempts to identify firm-specific reasons and effects of specific forms of
fi-equent disclosures. However, it treats each disclosure as an independent event and stops
short of recognizing the frequency of such disclosures.
We note two typical features of continuous disclosure. These are fi'equency and spread.
Frequency accounts for the number of specific instances of disclosure and spread is the
distribution of disclosure across time. Similar to other fornis of disclosure (Healy &
Palepu, 2001; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), online disclosures have both causes and effects.
Causes are variables that detennine the level or nature of voluntary disclosure (e.g., firm-
specific reasons identified in Hossain, Perera, & Rahman, 1995). Effects are investor and
market reactions to voluntary disclosure or changes to market parameters arising from
voluntary disclosure (e.g., cost of capital identified in Botosan, 1997). In this paper, we
focus on the causes of continuous disclosure and attempt to identify fimi-specific
determinants of frequency of continuous corporate disclosure. To achieve greater depth in
our understanding, we further investigate the detemiinants by types of disclosure and by
stock exchanges. An investigation by stock exchanges gives us insight into whether these
disclosures are simply artifacts of regulatory arrangements or are indeed driven by firm
and market variables.
Our source for continuous disclosure data is the Internet's continuous disclosure
arrangements on stock exchange websites. Disclosures on this source are widely
accessible by investors. We study the corporate announcements on stock exchange
websites over a 15-month period for 334 corporations in eight countries. The companies
chosen are those from the Morgan Stanley Capital Index (MSCI) for "small cap"
I
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companies in developed markets. The companies are indicative of entities that are
monitored by a range of market participants inchiding mutual ftinds, insurance companies,
and individual stockholders, but they are not so large as to warrant intensive analyst
following that may make continuous disclosure regimes of less value (also see Botosan,
1997). The eight countries we have chosen (United Kingdom, France, Germany, Denmark,
NoiAvay, Finland, Singapore and Hong Kong) each has a continuous disclosure reporting
regime that is available on its stock exchange website to all firms listed on the exchange
and is also publicly accessible.
We conduct both long window (15 months) and short window (1 month) tests. The long
window tests generally cover the frequency and type of disclosures in a full reporting cycle
starting from last year's closing date to the current year's earnings announcement. We take
a 15-month period to include all disclosures made for the year and made prior to the
annual earnings announcement. The short window allows us to capture the spread or
regularity of disclosure within the annual reporting cycle.
We find that fi-equency and regularity of online disclosure is positively associated with
agency costs, earnings and analyst following and is inversely related to the length of a
firm's product cycle. Our resuhs are more applicable to discretionary forms of disclosure
such as prospective information disclosure. We also find variations in the frequency of
disclosures by countries, some of which are explainable by the online disclosure settings
of the countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The second section introduces the
currently evolving concept of continuous disclosure and relates this form of disclosure to
the literature on frequency of disclosure. The third section provides an evaluation of the
nature of continuous disclosures on the stock exchange websites. The fourth section
identifies the key drivers of continuous disclosure. The fifth section discusses the findings.
The final section provides conclusions for this study and raises questions for future
research.
2. Background and literature review
2.1. Continuous disclosure
The primary idea behind continuous disclosure is to provide price-sensitive information
to the market as soon as it is known to the issuer of securities (AIMR, 2000; SGX, 2003;
The Treasury, 2002). The purpose of such disclosures is to create adequately informed
markets. Frequent and timely disclosures are considered important parameters of the
quality of disclosure (AIMR, 2000). Internet-linked venues provide low-cost means of
disseminating market-relevant corporate information. They are also valuable for
stakeholders as they provide for ease of access and low transaction cost of infonnation
search. Other benefits include near-instantaneous availability of information and fair
disclosure to all interested parties, as all stakeholders can equally acquire the information,
given the effectively ubiquitous reach of the Internet. Therefore, in theory, "continuous
disclosure means that the market is infomied at all times and that no investor is
disadvantaged by lack of access to material information" (ASX, 2002, 3).
252 R. Dehreceny. A. Rahman / The Inlernational Journal of Accounting 40 (2005) 249-278
However, continuous disclosure brings a number of challenges. Without regulatory
monitoring systems, it may be prone to premature release of information. A higher
frequency of disclosure may unduly prejudice the proprietary interests of the disclosing
firms — it is often difficult to balance the requirement to ensure that the market is made
aware of market-relevant information with the need to maintain corporate competitive
adxantage. While corporate disclosure regimes are predicated on the need for corporations
to disclose information that is material to the market, there is no clear definition at present
of what constitutes materiality. Although material information is presumed to be price-
sensitive information, a clear formulation to predict the price effect of information is yet to
be discovered.
At a technical level, distribution of information on individual corporate websites may
make effective institution of rules difficult as it may be challenging for regulators to
monitor corporate disclosures on a host of individual websites, each with its own design
nuances.' Further, while information is typically made available to stakeholders effectively
in real-time, it may be difficult for market participants to monitor disclosures and to
evaluate the relative importance of a host of disclosures.
A freely available source of continuous corporate disclosure in many countries is the
stock exchange website. Online disclosures on stock exchange websites differ from
periodic disclosure in that they are driven by events rather than periods of disclosure
stipulated in disclosure regulations or company policies. In this respect, we consider the
antecedents of periodic disclosures, i.e.. end of a quarter, half-year or a year period, as an
event. Periodic disclosures relating to and emanating from the end of a period would be
part of the overall continuous disclosure process.
Although events may be regarded as the primary motivator for continuous disclosure, it
is at the discretion of the managers to detemiine the materiality of such events and.
thereby, make the necessary announcements. Therefore, similar to voluntary disclosures
made in annual reports, the frequency with which continuous disclosures are made will
depend on characteristics similar to those of voluntary disclosures in annual reports.
2.2. The key firm-specific drivers of continuous disclosures
Botosan and Harris (2000) argue that dis.cXo's.nxQ frequency is as important as disclosure
level. Frequency of disclosure was the subject of early studies comparing the effectiveness
of quarterly reporting and annual reporting (e.g.. May, 1971). Botosan and Harris (2000)
studied the determinants and effects of managers' decisions to increase segment-disclosure
frequency. Butler et al. (2002) examined the determinants and effectiveness of quarterly
earnings disclosure in comparison to seminal annual reporting. Landsman and Maydew
(2002) used price and volume tests to examine the effects of quarterly earnings.
Lundholm and Myers (2002) demonstrate that higher levels of disclosure reduce
information asymmetry and allow investors to predict future earnings better. Likewise,
earlier studies, such as Botosan (1997), suggest that higher levels of disclosure reduce
information asymmetry and thereby reduce cost of capital of firnis. Botosan (1997)
See CLERP 9, Chapter 8. for discussion of these issues.
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demonstrates that firms would, therefore, increase disclosure to reduce information
asymmetry. Specific to frequency of reporting, Butler et al. (2002) show that quarterly
reporting, i.e., frequency of periodic reporting, is associated with infomiation asymmetry.
Brown et al. (2002) also find association between information asymmetry and conference-
call disclosures. Because continuous disclosure is a near instantaneous method of informing
the market, finns with high information asymmetry would disclose more frequently to avoid
the consequences of such asymmetry. Therefore, we hypothesize that:
HI. Frequency of continuous disclosure is positively associated with a firm's level of
information asymmetry.
Financial reporting is a means of mitigating agency problems (Healy & Palepu, 2001;
Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Leftwich, Watts, and Zimmerman (1981) find that the debt
ratios of semiannual reporters in the United States are significantly higher than the
corresponding ratios for the other reporting frequencies and assets-in-place, a proxy for
information asymmetry of semiannual reporters, was lower than that for other reporters.
Butler et al. (2002) expected reporting frequency to vary with assets-in-place and capital
structure. They argued that firms with a higher percentage of tangible assets have lower
agency costs because it is more difficult for managers to misappropriate well-defined
assets-in-place than to extract value from uncertain growth opportunities. Therefore,
since these finns have lower agency costs, they can reduce their reliance on disclosures.
They also consider that firms with more debt financing have higher agency costs and
therefore exhibit a greater demand for monitoring. Similar to Leftwich et al. (1981),
Butler et al. (2002) expect finns with more financial leverage to report more frequently.
Likewise, we expect the frequency of on-line corporate disclosure to be higher for firms
with variables that generate agency costs, e.g., assets-in-place and leverage. However,
Williamson (1988) has argued that assets-in-place detennines the capital structure. He
explained that asset-in-place would lead to debt financing as it would lead to lower
agency costs associated with debt. Furthermore, prior studies (see Hossain et al., 1995)"
have found inconsistent results for leverage due to the varying compositions of debt and
equity. We, therefore, use assets-in-place as our measure of agency costs. Accordingly, we
hypothesize that:
H2. Frequency of continuous disclosure is negatively associated with a finn's extent of
assets-in-place.
One cost of disclosure, and particularly disclosure of firm prospects, is the competitive
damage that results when firms provide proprietary information to current and potential
competitors (Butler et al., 2002). Competitive damage can arise more immediately if a finn
' Hossain et al. (1995) reviewed both U.S. and non-U. S. firms. In many non-U. S. markets, debts are mainly
private in nature. Since private debts would nomially have private disclosure arrangements and would not involve
I market transactions, fimis having such debts would require less public disclosure. Therefore, debt equity is a logical
detenninant of public disclosure only if debt has a large public component. On the other hand, AIP is a broader
determinant of public disclosure arising out of debt financing. Most private and public debt would require higher
I
asset specificity (Williamson, 1988). We also ran tests with debt /equity ratio as a determinant. As expected for non-
U.S. firms, we found weak support for this determinant.
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discloses more frequently. According to Butler et al. (2002), proprietary costs vary by
industry and are higher for firms in concentrated industries, which are generally less
competitive and therefore more likely to protect economic rents by less frequent reporting.
To measure proprietary costs, Butler et al. (2002) use the four-firm concentration ratio
(CR4) defined as the sum of the market shares of the four largest firms in the industry.
They expect a negative relation between the four-firm concentration ratio and reporting
frequency. Likewise, we hypothesize that:
H3. Frequency of continuous disclosure is negatively associated with a firm's level of
market concentration.
Dechow and Dichev (2001) argue that as a firm's production cycle lengthens, errors
in accrual estimation grow. Shortening the reporting interval exacerbates these
estimation errors and results in noisier financial reports. Based on this reasoning, firms
with longer production cycles, measured as a function of days in inventory, will issue
interim reports less frequently. However, Butler et al. (2002) argue that the demand for
more frequent accounting disclosures is greater for firms with longer product cycles
because such firms are less transparent. In addition, product cycle is an important
measure of a firm's activity. Since it could be argued that a firm's continuous disclosure
is driven by the occurrence of material events and not by the market and contracting
motivations, we include product cycle in our model to control for occurrence of material
events. Once again, product cycle can have two connotations. The first connotation is
that firms with shorter product cycles would have more disclosures relating to the
completion and sales of their products. The second connotation, running contrary to the
first and similar to Butler et al.'s lack of transparency argument, would be that firms
with longer product cycles would have to disclose more about their unfinished
production activities to keep the market informed. Since we cannot infer a clear
direction for the relation between frequency of disclosure and product cycle, we
hypothesize that:
H4. Frequency of continuous disclosure is not associated with a firm's product cycle.
As discussed in Lang and Lundholm (1993), theory and empirical evidence on
voluntary disclosure offer no clear-cut predictions on the relation between firm
performance and levels of voluntary disclosure. Further, the relation between disclosure
and performance may not be linear. For example. Skinner (1994) demonstrates that the
level of disclosure increases with an increase in losses because in such situations firms try
to reduce litigations from investors. Chen et al. (2002) also demonstrate that additional
balance-sheet disclosures are more likely among firms reporting losses with larger forecast
errors. Conversely, Miller (2002) shows that firms with increasing profits would increase
discretionary disclosures. Most researchers agree that performance and disclosure are
related. Butler et al. (2002) include four lagged measures of firm performance: (i) return on
assets; (ii) retum on equity; (iii) 12-month stock returns and (iv) 12-month market-adjusted
stock returns. We also include performance measures to ascertain the influence of
performance on frequency of online disclosure. However, since disclosure is related to
both high profit and loss, and as this phenomenon is measurable by the absolute value of a
firm's earnings, we posit a positive relation between frequency of continuous disclosure
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and an absolute measure of performance. We select return on equity because it better
reflects the relation between performance and stockholder equity. Therefore, we
hypothesize that:
H5. Frequency of continuous disclosure is positively associated with a firm's absolute
value of return on equity.
To ascertain whether or not the direction of earnings influence disclosure we include a
dichotomous variable which is equal to one if the firni has made a profit and zero if it
made a loss during the year. Because of the earlier expression of inconclusiveness in the
relation between disclosure and performance, we do not posit a definite direction in the
relation between the sign of performance and frequency of continuous disclosure.
Therefore, we hypothesize that:
H6. Frequency of continuous disclosure is not associated with a firm's direction of
performance.
Healy and Palepu (2001) argue that apart from corporations disclosing through
regulated financial reports and voluntary communications, there are disclosures about
firms by information intermediaries, such as financial analysts. Lang and Lundholm
(1993) demonstrate that analyst following is positively influenced by the level of
disclosure of a firni. However, Foster (1986), Nagar, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) and
Skinner (2003) argue that analysts are an important part of the demand mechanism of
corporate disclosure. Yet another argument is that analyst reports and earnings
announcements are competing forms of disclosure mechanisms and the market values
both these forms of disclosure (Francis, Schipper, & Vincent, 2002). Recent studies such
as Lang, Lins, and Miller (2002) seem not to make a distinction with respect to causality
between disclosure and analyst recommendations; instead they simply regard analysts as
information intermediaries who use corporate disclosures along with information from
other sources to further inform the markets about corporate activities. Lang et al. (2002)
demonstrate that analysts can mitigate the effects of poor corporate governance by
fiinctioning as additional monitoring devices. Since our study is about determinants of
frequency of disclosure, we recognize the demand aspect of analysts and posit that
analysts as a consumer and distributor of corporate information would call for greater
corporate disclosure. Therefore, we hypothesize that:
H7. Frequency of continuous disclosure is positively associated with a firni's analyst
following.
According to Lang et al. (2002) and Nagar et al. (2003), ownership structure also affects
investor demand for disclosure. The higher the ownership spread the greater would be the
agency problem. Furthennore, ownership of equity capital by large shareholder blocks, e.g.,
large family and institutional shareholdings, may have control rights through board
membership (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Such ownership requires low public disclosure
because they have direct private monitoring rights. Therefore, we posit that:
H8. Frequency of continuous disclosure is positively associated with a firm's ownership
spread.
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High growth prospects represent intangibles such as technology, corporate strategy, and
human resources (Lev & Sougiannis, 1999). Firms with high growth prospects will have
specific knowledge that is not effectively and efficiently transferable to investors through
traditional accounting disclosures. Firms attempt to mitigate the information asymmetry of
high-growth-prospect finns by making disclosures through additional means such as
conference calls (Frankel et al, 1999). With the availability of online modes of disclosure,
we expect finns to provide infonnation about growth through the continuous disclosure
format. Since high-growth finns are more risky (Lev & Sougiannis, 1999), they are likely
to make disclosures more frequently. Therefore, we hypothesize that:
H9. Frequency of continuous disclosure is positively associated with a firm's growth
prospect.
2.3. IndusUy and countiy control variables
Both Botosan (1997) and Nagar et al. (2003) contend that different disclosure levels
could prevail in different industries due to their varying disclosure needs. These
disclosures arise from differences in technologies, the nature of activities and the varying
levels of risks and returns. Likewise, we posit that there will be variation in frequency of
continuous disclosure between industry sectors. Therefore, we included relevant industry
dummies to control for industry effects. However, initial tests suggested weak association
between industry and frequency of disclosure. In our final test we include a dummy for
financial services because financial service firms have separate disclosure rules specific to
their industry.
According to Debreceny et al. (2002), the U.S. has capital markets with higher levels of
liquidity than the markets of other countries. At the same time, the U.S. has extensive
disclosure regulations and enforcement arrangements that provide investors with a strong
sense of security and certainty. Therefore, we expect the disclosure frequencies of U.S.-
listed firms to be more than that of the firms that are not hsted in the U.S. exchanges.
Continuous disclosure levels could also be affected by national and cultural factors.
Although choice of identifying material and the manner in which it will be made available
to the market is largely voluntary, the rules of securities agencies, stock exchanges listing
requirements, and accounting standards of respective countries can influence the
frequency of continuous disclosures. Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2003) provide
evidence of the interplay of firm-level transparency and various national disclosure and
governance features. A recent study by Standard and Poors on Transparency and
Disclosure of finns fi^om 23 countries suggests that disclosure levels in countries such as
the United States is higher than that of emerging and less developed markets in Asia and
Latin America (Standard & Poors, 2002). Likewise, we also expect to observe variations
in the irequencies of disclosures by countries. In our examination of requirements for
disclosure of material information we have found greater specificity in the requirements of
Finland, Norway and Singapore to disclose and in the manner to disclose on stock
exchange websites. In addition, the United Kingdom is considered to have higher levels of
transparency (Bushman et al., 2003) which could also be observable in the levels of
fi'equencies of UK firms' continuous disclosures. All countries covered in our study also
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have explicit insider-transaction-disclosure requirements. Therefore, we expect to see
higher proportions of share-transaction disclosures in the total disclosures of the firms in
all our eight countries. Given that a mix of country-level regulatory and transparency
influences can affect disclosures, we control for such influences by adding dichotomous
(one, zero) country indicators in our multivariate analyses.
2.4. Model
Based on the above discussion, we model the relation between the frequency of online
reporting and its determinants in the following manner:
FREQf = Q + 5, (ASYMMETRYf) + /^.(AGENCYf
)
-t- /?3(PROPRIETARYf) + d^{VKOT)\}CT CYCLEf)
+ /35(PERFORMANCEf) + ^^(EARNFLAGf)
+ /^y (ANALYST,-) + ,38(OWNERSHIPf) -f /39(GROWTHf)
+ /?io(FINSERVf ) +
.3,
,
(USLIST) + /3i2(COUNTRY, ) + . .
.
+ /3,9(COUNTRY8)+^ (1)
where,
FREQf=number of online disclosures.
ASYMMETRYf= information asymmetry of a finn.
AGENCYf= agency cost of a firm.
PROPRIETARYf= proprietary cost within an industry.
PRODUCT CYCLEf=the time taken for a product to be turned around from an input to
its final sale.
PERFORMANCEf=firm performance.
EARNFLAGf: = dichotomous dummy for firm profit (loss).
ANALYSTf= number of analyst forecasts of EPS.
OWNERSHIPf= ownership spread or free float.
GROWTHf= ratio of market value to average equity.
FINSERVj^ dichotomous dummy for industry class. '^
USLIST,- listing on NYSE or NASDAQ.
COUNTRY] 9 = dichotomous dummy for country.
Since frequency of continuous disclosure has no specified period, we test the above
model for both a long window (in this case, disclosure over all 15 months) and a short
Our tests have shown that there is no systematic variation in disclosure between the firms within the non-
financial SIC categories (i.e., a series of dummy variables for industry membership at the one digit SIC level were
[introduced into the long-window regressions and were not significant). We found that only financial firms have
j
different levels of disclosure. Therefore, unlike previous disclosure studies we use a dummy identifying only two
classes of industries, i.e., financial and non-financial.
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window (in this case, disclosure in each of the 15 months). The long-window tests
generally cover the frequency and type of disclosures in a full reporting cycle starting from
last year's closing date to the current year's earnings announcement. We take a 15-month
period to include all disclosures made for the year under examination and made prior to the
annual-earnings announcement, i.e., until three months after the close of the year."^ The
short-window tests allow us to capture the spread or regularity of disclosure within the
annual-reporting cycle because they examine the data by very short durations. Since firms
tend to disclose more around earnings announcements and other major events, the long
window tests may be biased by these events. Short-window tests, based on monthly data,
will be less biased by periodic or one-off events' disclosures than the annual tests.
3. Data
Announcements on the stock exchange websites are the primary sources of data of
disclosure for the purposes of this study. We select our sample from the 59 stock
exchanges that were members of the World Federation of Exchanges as at 1 January 2003.
Twenty-one of these stock exchanges provided free and open access to announcements
and had announcements in English.'^ Eight of these 21 were chosen for this study. At the
time of data collection for this study, all of the eight stock exchanges required prompt
disclosure of material information after careflil scrutiny. Material information in all cases
was price-sensitive information. In all cases such information had to be disclosed to the
stock exchange in the form of announcements. Regardless of varying electronic filing
systems, all of the eight stock exchanges had websites for company announcements that
were readily accessible by investors. Since all announcements were provided in English,
the announcements could be regarded as understandable to a wide range of investors
around the world.
The sample for this study comprised of 334 listed companies from Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Hong Kong, Norway, Singapore, and United Kingdom included in the
Morgan Stanley Capital Index (MSCI) Developed Markets Small Cap Index (US$0.2-I.5b
market capitalization). (See Table 2 for the breakdown by countries). The reasons for
choosing this sample were as follows: (i) the sample is drawn from a selection of major
stock exchanges in Europe and Asia that have arrangements for online posting of company
''
Initially, we took 15 months because the stock exchanges of our sample have preliminary announcement
deadlines within three months or less after the close of the year. We also considered that firms have different year-
ends. However, this was not a matter of serious concern as we examined associations, not causality. In spite of all
these considerations, we finally kept the same time period for all firms to control for the impact of environmental
variables such as major political and economic crises. Firms tend to make more disclosures in the period after major
crises such as that which occurred on September 1 1 , 200 1
.
" The three stock exchanges in the U.S., (NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX) have no arrangements for online
disclosure of corporate announcements. This is perhaps because of the extensive corporate disclosure infrastructure
existing outside the exchanges, via the SEC's EDGAR system and by voluntary disclosure mechanisms such as
PRNewswire. Another major stock exchange, the Tokyo Stock Exchange, did not have online disclosure
arrangements for corporate announcements.
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announcements in English; (ii) the exchanges chosen are all from developed markets,
ensuring that there is less market-based differences between the countries; (iii) the
companies indexed by MSCI are listed companies that have, at least in part as a result of
their inclusion on an established capital market index, ^ an international following, and (iv)
MSCI Small Cap companies are relatively small and are therefore expected to have low
analyst coverage, obviating bias that would come from including larger companies that
typically have more analyst coverage (Botosan, 1997).
Research assistants visited the websites of each of the exchanges and collected each
announcement for the companies on the index. Each announcement was carefully coded
against a detailed classification matrix. Data-collection procedures were instituted to
ensure high levels of quality control and procedures put in place to ensure and then verify
inter-rater reliability. Inter-rater reliability was primarily established through direct
consultation by the data collectors with the researchers. Such consultations were extensive
at the start of the project, which meant substantial time was invested in training the data
collectors. The data collected were 12,673 separate announcements made over a period of
15 months between 1 January 2001 and 31 March 2002.
3.1. Variable measurement
FREQf Frequency of online disclosure in the reporting period is measured as the number
of online disclosures made on the designated stock exchange website. Data were
hand collected directly from the websites of the stock exchanges where the
announcements are disclosed.
ASYMMETRYf Landsman and Maydew (2002) and Cready and Hurtt (2002) narrow
down the measures of information asymmetry to a measure of variation in
abnormal retums and a measure of variation in trading volume during the study
period. Following their two studies, information asymmetry was measured using
two types of liquidity measures. One measure was price-based and the other was
volume-based. For price-based measures we used the standard deviation of the
monthly abnormal retums during the 15-month period of the long window (STD-
AR-LW) and the standard deviation of abnormal retums of the immediate past
four months for the monthly data of the short window (STD-AR-SW). The
volume-based measures were the standard deviation of the ratio of monthly share
tumover by total shares outstanding for the 15 months of the long window (STD-
VOL-LW) and the standard deviation of the ratio of monthly share tumover by
total shares outstanding for the immediate past four months for the monthly data
of the short window (STD-VOL-SW). Past months were used in the monthly data
tests to provide the variability needed to compute the standard deviation and also
to take into account the immediate past asymmetry which may affect current
disclosure decisions (Botosan & Harris, 2000; Butler et al., 2002).
The MSCI Developed Markets Small Cap Index was created in 1998 to provide a global performance index for
all classes ofsmall capitalization firms. It covers equities ranging in market capitalization from $0.2b to $ 1 .5b. There
is a total of 1 722 securities from 22 countries in the Index, from Asia (448); Europe (494); North America (726) and
Oceania (54). Our sample (334) covers 20% of the firms included in the index.
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AGENCYf Tangible assets to total assets (assets-in-place (AIP) or asset specificity).
PROPRIETARY; Recent studies have measured proprietary cost within an industry using
the industry-concentration ratio CR4, which is the percentage of total revenues of
the four largest firms within an industry. These prior studies were mostly U.S.-
based. In the U.S., there are generally many finns within an industry. Given that
most of our stock exchanges were comparatively smaller than the US stock
exchanges, some industries in some stock exchanges were found to have very few
firms. Therefore, we compute industry concentration by dividing the total
revenues in the industry, measured by the two-digit SIC, by the number of firms
in that industry (PROPRTY).
PRODUCT CYCLEf Days of inventory (PRODUCT CYCLE).
PERFORMANCEf Absolute value of return on equity (ROE).
EARNFLAGf Dichotomous dummy for firm profitability. One = profit firm and Zero =
loss firm (EARNFLAG).
ANALYSTf Analyst coverage measured by the number of forecasts of EPS(ANALYST).
OWNERSHIPf Spread of ownership as determined by MSCI free float (FLOAT). MSCI
defines the free float of a security as the proportion of shares outstanding that are
deemed to be available for purchase in the public-equity markets by international
investors. Limitations on free float available to international investors include:
strategic and other shareholdings not considered part of publicly available shares
and limits on share ownership for foreigners (MSCI 2001, 12).
GROWTHf Growth prospects (GROWTH), represented by market-to-book value
(Myers, 1977; Ohlson, 1995).
FINSERVf Dichotomous dummy for industry class. 1= financial firm and O = non-
financial firm (FINSERV).
USLIST, Dichotomous dummy for listing on NYSE or NASDAQ. l=hsting and = no
hsting (USLIST).
COUNTRY 18 Dichotomous dummy for country (FR, DE, DK, NO, FI, UK, SG and
HK). Data for the independent variables were collected fi^om the Global
Vantage database.
The variable PRODUCT CYCLE is not applicable to financial services firms. For
financial services firms, data for PRODUCT CYCLE were standardized using the sample
mean. We use multiple measures for some of the independent tests to provide for
robusmess in our results. We chose from the literature both firm based variables and
proxies. Where possible market-based variables and proxies were used because the firm-
based variables and proxies could suffer from endogeneity as the dependent variable itself
is firm-based.
4. The nature of continuous disclosures on stock exchange websites
The nature of information disclosed varies widely. Information ranged from straightfor-
ward announcements of changes in shareholding of significant shareholders and
announcements of the filing of financial statements with regulators to in-depth analyses
offirm prospects. Following an analysis ofthe content ofthe announcements, we classify the
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Table 1
Frequency of disclosures by MSCI small cap firms in Paris, London, Helsinki, Oslo, German, Copenhagen,
Singapore and Hong Kong stock exchanges between Jan 2001 and Mar 2002
Singapore Finland France ^Jorway Denmark Germany UK Hong Kong Total
Panel A: number of announcements by disclosure types and countries
Shares 1010 538 418 720 9 112 3273 218 6285
Accounting and finance 187 180 207 457 27 423 1121 270 2896
Accounting 133 101 118 124 17 180 718 237 1636
Rpt-qtr 28 46 70 205 6 207 62 16 645
Dividend 9 3 2 35 6 228 5 298
Profit warning 6 15 7 46 18 86 3 182
Finance 11 15 10 47 4 12 27 9 135
Prospective: 193 223 126 301 13 227 854 145 2075
Products 104 136 82 172 11 160 456 29 1148
Mergers 83 76 36 108 2 58 320 114 794
Future prospects 6 11 8 21 9 78 2 133
Personnel: 110 116 8 195 8 66 440 138 1082
Board change 66 70 1 147 7 29 162 92 577
Coy meeting 35 27 4 25 1 27 255 46 419
Other personnel 9 19 3 23 10 23 86
Other 14 10 5 131 3 12 66 46 335
Total 1514 1067 764 1804 60 840 5754 817 12673
Number of companies 22 20 54 16 13 46 120 42 334
Disclosures per company 68.82 53.35 14 15 112.75 4.62 18.26 47.95 19.45 37.94
Panel B: proportion (%) of disclosure by types of disclosures
Shares 66.11> 50.41 54.68 39.91 15.00 13.33 56.88 26.66 49.60
Accounting and finance 12.63 16.90 27.15 25.32 45.50 50.28 19.49 33.07 22.86
Accounting 9.05 9.50 15.41 6.90 28.83 21.40 12.49 29.02 12.91
Rpt-qtr 1.84 4.27 9.18 11.35 10.00 24.64 1.08 1.96 5.09
Dividend 0.61 0.28 0.26 1.95 0.00 0.71 3.95 0.62 2.35
Profit warning 0.40 1.43 0.94 2.53 0.00 2.10 1.50 0.37 1.44
Finance 0.73 1.42 1.36 2.59 6.67 1.43 0.47 1.10 1.07
Prospective: 12.74 20.87 16.49 16.66 22.00 26.98 14.86 17.72 16.37
Products 6.87 12.74 10.73 9.51 18.67 19.00 7.93 3.53 9.05
Mergers 5.47 7.08 4.71 5.99 3.33 6.90 5.57 13.95 6.27
Future prospects 0.40 1.05 1.05 1.16 0.00 1.08 1.36 0.24 1.05
Personnel: 7.28 10.82 1.04 10.86 13.34 7.81 7.64 16.89 8.53
Board change 2.33 2.49 0.52 1.40 1.67 3.21 4.43 5.65 3.30
Coy mtg 4.36 6.56 0.13 8.16 11.67 3.43 2.81 11.24 4.55
Other personnel 0.59 1.77 0.39 1.30 0.00 1.17 0.40 0.00 0.68
Other 0.62 1.00 0.64 7.25 4.16 1.60 1.13 5.66 2.64
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
information disclosed into four main groupings, shown in Table 1. Unlike periodic
disclosures that often contain both financial and non-financial infonnation disclosures,
online continuous disclosures are mostly non-financial infonnation disclosures.
Table 1 provides an overview of the frequency of disclosures by types of disclosures of
the sample countries. Overall, for all eight countries summed together, disclosure for share
transactions (49.6%) is the most frequent type of disclosure followed by disclosure for
accounting infonnation (22.86%). These are followed by disclosures relating to future
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Table 2
Frequency of online disclosure^;ountr%' statistics
Country Class of disclosure Companies Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Overall Accounting 320 10.000 8.310 76
Prospective 320 7.401 8.308 168
Personnel 320 1.522 2.015 19
Shares 320 19.209 25.986 257
Total 320 38.204 37.233 1 342
France (FR) Accounting 54 3.685 3.923 13
Prospective 54 2.741 3.712 14
Personnel 54 0.130 0.391 2
Shares 54 7.630 8.457 47
Total 54 14.185 11.223 1 70
Germany (DE) Accounting 46 9.565 6.313 2 37
Prospective 46 5.326 5.309 24
Personnel 46 0.804 1.204 5
Shares 46 2.457 5.592 34
Total 46 18.152 14.849 3 96
Denmark (DK) Accounting 13 2.308 1.702 6
Prospective 13 1.462 1.127 3
Personnel 13 0.077 0.277 1
Shares 13 0.692 0.947 3
Total 13 4.538 1.854 1 7
Norway (NO) Accounting 16 34.875 15.126 10 76
Prospective 16 30.000 37.884 10 168
Personnel 16 3.000 4.719 19
Shares 16 45.000 60.425 8 257
Total 16 112.875 86.822 39 342
Finland (FI) Accounting 20 11.800 3.105 4 18
Prospective 20 12.100 6.95 1 26
Persormel 20 2.250 2.099 7
Shares 20 26.850 40.297 2 145
Total 20 53.000 42.712 15 166
UK CUK) Accounting 120 10.508 3.42 23
Prospective 120 7.500 6.713 37
Personnel 120 2.300 1.836 12
Shares 120 27.308 15.11 84
Total 120 47.617 18.457 12 112
Singapore (SG) Accounting 22 11.136 4.979 3 24
Prospective 22 9.500 7.236 26
Personnel 22 2.000 1.604 5
Shares 22 45.909 39.081 155
Total 22 68.545 40.926 3 194
Hong Kong (HK) Accounting 42 8.381 5.17 19
Prospective 42 4.833 6.176 33
Personnel 42 1.119 1.517 6
Shares 42 5.167 5.392 21
Total 42 19.500 11.221 1 43
prospects (16.37%) and personnel (8.53%). Observing the sub-categories, it could be said
that the disclosures could also be classified into those that are driven partly by specific
requirements and those that are driven more for a firm's own disclosure needs. For example.
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disclosure for share transactions are driven by stock exchange and securities law
requirements and disclosures of accounting information are generally specified by
corporate laws and accounting standards. With the prospective type, infomiation about
mergers is often required by securities laws. Similarly, board changes have to be filed as per
the corporate laws of a jurisdiction. On the whole, even if a stock exchange may not specify
that these items be disclosed online, the regulatory requirements would be influencing the
online disclosures as they could be regarded as material infonnation. All stock exchanges
examined in this study had requirements for disclosure of material infonnation.
Table 2 shows that the continental European countries of France and Germany, together
with Denmark and Hong Kong had significantly lower levels of disclosure. Conversely, the
United Kingdom, Norway, Finland, and Singapore had significantly higher levels of
disclosure. Nevertheless, further examination of the data (see Tables 1 and 2) leads to the
finding that in spite of regulatory requirements, the frequency of disclosure by companies
varies considerably in all the eight stock exchanges (see the standard deviation and the
minimum and maximum scores of each disclosure item for each country).
Therefore, the variations in the disclosure levels are due not only to the disclosure
environment of the country, but also to firm-specific reasons. The remainder of the paper
deals with identifying the firm-specific, industry-specific and country-specific determi-
nants of continuous disclosure. Some of the additional tests for specific classes of
disclosures and disclosures by countries are also briefly reported.
5. The determinants of online continuous disclosure
We use the aforementioned model (Eq. (1)) to identify the key determinants of online
continuous disclosure on stock exchange websites. The results of both long (15 months)
and short windows (monthly) are presented in this section. We also conduct tests by major
categories of infonnation and by countries. We exclude the smallest of the major
categories, personnel disclosures, from our multivariate tests as its frequencies by months
were not sufficient for such tests.
5.7. Descriptives
Tables 2 and 3 provide the descriptive statistics on frequency of disclosure (dependent
variables) and pattern of independent variables, respectively. The mean for all disclosures
was 37.37. Share-transaction disclosures dominated the disclosure statistics. The mean for
share transaction was 19.21, whereas the mean for the next highest category, disclosure of
accounting, was 10.00. The mean for disclosure of prospective information was 7.40 and
the mean for personnel disclosure trailed at a distant 1.52. Several of the independent
variables that had skewed data were subjected to a natural log, zero-skew transfonnation.
Table 4 shows the Spearman Conelation for the dependent and independent variables.
The table shows that the four classes ofdisclosure are strongly correlated with each other and
the total measure (DSUM). This indicates that the variations in DSUM are representative of
the variations in its components. Standard deviation of share volume (STD-VOL-LW) is
strongly correlated with all the measures of frequency of disclosure. This measure of
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Table 3
Descriptive statistics — long window
Variable Mean Median Std. dev. Skewness Min. Max.
STD-AR-LW 18.10 15.84 12.74 6.15 5.27 168.83
STD-AR-LW^ 2.50 2.54 0.63 0.01 0.72 5.11
STD-VOL-LW 37.19 25.36 62.50 8.37 0.00 822.74
STD-VOL-LW^ 3.21 3.28 0.89 0.01 0.10 6.71
AIP 0.25 0.18 0.23 1.08 0.00 0.95
PROPRTY 0.76 0.83 0.22 -0.60 0.31 1.00
PRODUCT CYCLE 38.58 32.91 35.17 0.53 0.00 101.00
ROE 0.19 0.11 0.32 6.30 0.00 3.83
ROE^ -2.21 -2.16 1.08 0.00 -5.18 1.34
EARNFLAG 0.19 0.00 0.39 1.56 0.00 1.00
ANALYST 7.46 7.00 5.63 1.73 0.00 51.00
FLOAT 0.70 0.70 0.25 -0.23 0.20 1.00
GROWTH 2.84 1.48 8.01 12.56 -20.03 128.46
GROWTH^ 3.27 3.24 0.18 -0.00 1.38 5.03
FINSERV 0.15 0.00 0.35 2.01 0.00 1.00
USLIST 0.06 0.00 0.24 3.68 0.00 1.00
Market capitalization (US $ million) 503 405 389 1.44 5 2652
Total assets (non-financial services) 923 547 1397 5.71 5 15,448
(US $ million)
7V=334
ASYMMETRY, :
STD-AR-LW: standard deviation of the monthly abnormal returns for 15 months.
STD-VOL-LW: standard deviation of the ratio of monthly share turnover by total shares outstanding for 15
months.
AGENCY,- : tangible assets to total assets (assets-in-place (AIP) or asset specificity).
PROPRIETARY,: industry concentration computed by dividing the total revenues in the industry, measured by
the two-digit SIC, by the number of firms in that industr\' (PROPRTRY).
PRODUCT CYCLE,- : days in inventory of products (PRODUCT CYCLE).
PERFORMANCE, : absolute value of reUim on equity (ROE).
EARNFLAG,: l=profit firm and 0=loss firm (EARNFLAG).
ANALYST, : analyst coverage measured by the number of forecasts of EPS (ANALYST).
OWTMERSHIP, : spread of ownership as determined by MSCl (free float) (OWNERSHIP).
GROWTH, : growth prospects (GROWTH) measured by market to book value.
FINSERV,: l = fmancial firm and = non-financial firm.
USLIST, : hsting on NYSE or NASDAQ. l=listing and = no listing (USLIST).
asymmetry is, in turn, strongly correlated with the alternative measure, standard deviation of
market retums (STD-AR-LW). Interestingly, this latter measure is not significantly
correlated with any of the disclosures. The other firm-level variables that are most strongly
correlated with disclosure are assets-in-place (AIP) (+ve) product cycle (PRODUCT-
CYCLE) (-ve), return on equity (ROE) (+ve), earnings flag (EARNINGSFLAG) (+ve)
and ownership spread (FLOAT) (+ve) and financial services indicator (FINSERV). Among
countries that were significantly associated, the United Kingdom (UK), Singapore (SG) and
Norway (NO) had +ve signs and Germany (DE), Denmark (DK), France (FR) and Hong
Kong (HK) had — ve signs.
Correlation among the independent variables was generally low (less than 50%). The
only high bivariate correlations among independent variables were those between UK and
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FLOAT (0.5879), which suggests that UK fimis had the highest a\ erage shareholder spread
among all eight countries.
5.2. Miiliiyariaie (regressioni analyses — long window
Gi\'en that the dependent \ anables were ti'equencies of disclosure, coupled \Mth the
clear evidence of over-dispersion shown in Table 3. we use appropriate regression
techniques for count data. For anahsis of the total le^ el of disclosures \\'e use negative
binomial regression analysis. For anah'sis of the components of disclosure, we emplo\'
zero-inflated negative binomial regression analysis (Gardner. Muhe>. c^ Shaw. 1995:
Long. 199^; Long & Freese. 2001; Winkelmann. 2001).'
We conducted anahsis on all possible combinations of the \ anables with total
disclosure: asymmetr\". agenc\'. perfoniiance. proprietaiy cost competition, and product
cycle. This procedure, wixh multiple proxies for some of the \ariables. pro\ided evidence
of a strong association beu\een the disclosure \ anables and the independent \ anables.
\Miere more than one proxy existed, we repon results for onh' one of the proxies of a
N'ariable. with the exception of as>'mmetiy
.
Table 5 shows the determinants of total disclosure under both measures of as\mmeny.
STD-AR-L\V and STD-\'OL-LW. Columns (!) and (2) provide results for the total
disclosures (TOTAL) sample, and columns (3) to (S) pro\'ide resuhs for tlu-ee major
categories of disclosure, accounting mfomiation (ACCOLTS'TING). prospective infomia-
tion (PROSPECTI\'E). and shares-trading infomtation (SPLARES). We found that tlie
strongest factor in detennimng the total le\"el of disclosure was the extent of as>'mmetiy.
meastu'cd b>' the standard de\iation of market-adjusted returns and miding \olumes.
Between the two proxies (as found b\" Cread\' & Hum. 2002). the ^•olume measure had tlie
stronger association. Results for ACCOLTS'TING and SHARES were similar to that of
TOTAL, but results for PROSPECTI\'E were \er\- strong. This is understandable, since
prospecti\e-disclosure items could be regarded as the most \oluntaiy among the three
t>pes of disclosures. ACCOUNTING. PROSPECTIVE, and SH.ARES. As for countries.
the United Kingdom (UK).^'' Singapore (SG). Norway (NO), and Finland (Fl) had
generalK' positi\"e signs with significance (/i-^0.05). Gemtan)' (DE). Denmark (DK).
France (FR). and Hong Kong (HK) had generalK' negati\e signs with significance
(p<0.05). Both the I'nited Kingdom and Singapore, which comprised 4.'^'\> of our sample,
are common-law countries. Gemian\- and France, which comprised 30'\i of our sample, ai'e
code-law countries. This Finding coincides with the findings of existing coiporate
Negative binomial regression is a GLM technique tliat is appropriately applied to ;m;i]N sis of count data subject
to o%er-dispersion and excess zeroes. The cxicnt of o\ er-dispersion in our dependent variable, evident in Table 3,
\\ as continued when we conducted graphical and fomial likelihood ratio tests for over-dispersion when testing
whether a Poisson or negati\ e binomial model best fitted the data ^Long & Freese, 2001. 246'). Wlien anahzing tlie
components of disclosure, the \uong test was emplo\ ed to test whether the zero-intlaled negative binomial
regression analysis should be emplo\ ed (Vuong, I'^S'^)!. \Miilst all corporations made some type of disclosure, not
all companies made a disclosure in each of the classes of disclosure. .A zero-intlated negaii\ e binomial regression is
appropriate in most cases (Lambert. l'-^^2"l.
IK IS not incUklcd in T.iblc .'^ duo to the Uniiiations of the multivariate procedure used. One of the countn'
dummies has to be dropped tor the piocediu'e. Additional tests, including our bi\ mate tests (Table 4). show a
significant association between IK and tlie disclosure frequencies.
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Table 5
Determinants of continuous disclosure — lon!i-\vindo\\ results
Total .Accounting Prospecti\e Shares
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
STD-AR-LW (^ve) 0.130*
2.287
0.097*
2.180
0.158+
1.763
0.131
1.415
STD-\OL-LW (+ve 0.138**
2.836
0.071+
1.937
0.238**
3.436
0.208*
2.394
AIP (+ve) -0.205 -0.172 -0.079 -0.057 -0.546* -0.430+ -0.013 0.015
1.243 1.039 0.615 0.439 2.105 1.664 0.050 0.059
PROPRTY(-ve) 0.298 0.240 0.129 0.081 -0.037 -0.180 0.511+ 0.469
1.576 1.279 0.843 0.533 0.125 0.615 1.698 1.580
PRODUCT -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.003+ -0.003+ 0.001 0.001
CYCLE (?) 0.436 0.319 0.180 0.202 1.782 1.671 0.505 0.609
ROE^ (+ve) -0.030 -0.026 -0.008 -0.006 -0.163** -0.159** 0.002 0.009
0.872 0.778 0.288 0.230 2.983 2.989 0.034 0.159
E.-\RNFL.\G (?) 0.150 0.075 0.044 0.012 0.648** 0.509** -0.110 -0.196
1.463 0.715 0.572 0.155 4.159 3.268 0.671 1.194
ANALYST (+ve) 0.009 0.010 0.008 0.009 0.034** 0.035** -0.018 -0.017
1.197 1.362 1.344 1.520 2.751 2.888 1.447 1.371
FLO.\T (-ve) 0.042 -0.060 -0.003 -0.059 -0.171 -0.323 0.081 -0.063
0.208 0.299 0.017 0.375 0.544 1.046 0.230 0.184
GRO\\TH' (+ve) -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.004 -0.006 -0.006
0.495 0.517 0.294 0.273 0.315 0.386 0.984 1.069
F1NSER\- -0.072 -0.074 0.052 0.049 0.162 0.167 -0.212 -0.176
0.622 0.653 0.568 0.539 0.913 0.968 1.094 0.919
USLIST 0.052 0.027 0.052 0.028 0.371 0.395+ 0.034 -0.028
0.343 0.180 0.447 0.242 1.594 1.723 0.133 0.109
DE -1.055** -0.969** -0.127 -0.078 -0.467* -0.272 -2.066** -1.977**
7.608 6.804 1.230 0.727 2.232 1.262 7.406 7.083
DK -2.395** -2.372** -1.533** -1.514** -1.364** -1.291** -3.947** -3.912**
9.851 9.771 6.288 6.203 3.615 3.457 7.811 7.758
SG 0.373* 0.412** 0.034 0.040 0.236 0.290 0.513* 0.603*
2.434 2.674 0.286 0.337 1.027 1.277 2.120 2.469
NO 0.761** 0.669** 1.161** 1.116** 1.291** 1.119** 0.359 0.208
4.405 3.838 10.165 9.745 5.231 4.574 1.330 0.759
FR -1.301** -1.247** -0.812** -0.782** -1.233** -1.125** -1.080** -0.986**
9.222 8.709 5.918 5.614 5.191 4.770 4.727 4.254
HK -0.985** -0.942** -0.082 -0.047 -0.596* -0.497* -1.879** -1.863**
6.083 5.815 0.645 0.365 2.339 1.971 6.849 6.834
FI -0.009 0.078 0.037 0.093 0.496* 0.694** -0.085 0.033
0.058 0.471 0.309 0.759 2.113 2.882 0.331 0.124
Constant 3.235** 3.202** 1.972** 2.044** 1.233* 0.987* 2.723** 2.483**
10.175 10.611 8.122 8.790 2.474 2.186 5.028 4.781
Obser\ations'^ 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300
Likelihood ratio /" 275.166 278.016 216.359 215.405 156.776 166.405 199.464 203.092
Prob>x" 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
governance and international accounting literature, which suggest that companies in
common-law countries disclose more than the companies in code-law countries (Shleifer
& Vishny. 1997; Standard & Poors. 2002). Also. Finnish. Norwegian, and Singaporean
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fimis could ha\e had higher frequencies because these countries ha\e greater specitlcit\ in
the requirements for disclosure of material infomiation.
As for PROSPECTIVE, the significant variables (at significance le\el /?<0.05). apart
from as\inmetr>'. were AIP (- ve). ROE (-\e). EARNFLAG (+\e). and ANALYST (^ve).
The results for AIP and ANAL'^'ST were as hypothesized. The resuhs for performance
\ariables, ROE and EARNFLAG. w ere contrary to the hypotheses. The results suggest that
profitable firnis ha\e higher frequencies of disclosure.
5.3. Short window data tests
To test the robustness of the result, especially with regard to spread or regularity; we
conducted additional tests with short-window (monthh ) data. Monthly data for income-
statement and balance-sheet items are not a\ailable because financial statements are at best
produced quarterly. Quailerh' and semi-annual infonnation could be used, but such
infonnation is not readily available for all firms in Global Vantage.
The as\'mmetr\' proxies were computed for the immediate past four months. Tliis was
done such that we could see the effects of the immediate past as\mmetiA and peifomiance
situation on the cuirent month's disclosure frequency. Four months data were taken to
allow sufficient \ariability in the computation of the standard de\iation. For returns, the
current month's returns were used. To reduce serial correlation, benveen panels cross-
sectional time series negati\"e binomial regression models were used for multi\ariate
analyses. The same oxerall pattern of disclosure as obsen ed for the long w indow. w ere
found for the short window, as shown in Table 6.
The following observations were made for asymmetn proxies. Disclosure was
significantly associated with STD-AR-SW (/;<0.001). Although the abnomial-residual
variation (STD-\'OL-SW) is not strongly and consistently significant, its positive
association with all the disclosure proxies lends support to the Inpothesis that higher
Notes to Table 5;
r statistics significant at 10" o; *significant at 5° o: **signit'icant at fo.
'Subject to log transformation "34 obser\ations dropped due to data a\ailabilit\.
.\SYMMETRY, :
STD-AR-LW: standard de\ iation of the monthly abnormal returns for 1 5 months.
STD-VOL-LW: standard de\ iation of the ratio of monthh' share turnover by total shares outstanding for
15 months.
.AGENCY, : tangible assets to total assets (assets-in-place (.-MP) or asset specificity).
PROPRlETARYj: industry concentration computed by di\iding the total revenues in the mdusin. measured b\
the t\\ o-digit SIC. by the number of firms in that industry (PROPRTRY).
PRODUCT CYCLE, : days of inventory (PRODUCT CYCLE).
PERFORMANCE, : absolute value of return on equit\- (ROE).
E.A.RNFLAG,: l=profit firm and O=loss firm (EARNFLAG).
ANALYST, : analyst co\erage measured by the number of forecasts of EPS (.AN.A.LYST).
FLOAT, : spread of ownership as determined by MSCl (free float) (0\\'NERSH1P).
GROWTH, : growth prospects (GROWTH) measured b\- market to book \alue.
FINSERV,: 1= financial firm and = non-financial firm.
USLIST, : listing on NYSE or N.A.SDAQ. 1 = listing and = no listing (USLIST).
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asymmetry firms will have higher disclosures. It is also important to note that, in this respect,
firms with more price volatility tend to disclose more fi-equently as well as regularly.
Also significant in the TOTAL disclosure regression (columns (1) and (2)) was
(EARNFLAG) (+ve), which indicates that highly profitable companies tend to make
disclosure more regularly than less profitable ones. Results for most other variables were
similar to those of the long-window tests.
Similar to long-window tests, PROSPECTIVE disclosure had the strongest set of results.
The variables strongly associated with PROSPECTIVE were assets-in-place (AIP) (— ve),
product cycle (PRODUCTCYCLE) (— ve), return on equity (ROE) (+ve), earnings flag
(EARNFLAG) (+ve), and ownership (FLOAT) (— ve) with disclosure. Unlike the long-
window tests, analyst following (ANALYST) had only a weak associafion.
We also found there was no positive association between country membership and total
disclosure or the other three types of disclosure. Most coefficients, in this regard, were
negative, which suggests that a country's environment in this area has little positive
influence on the regularity of disclosures.
5.4. Additional analyses
Given the national differences in disclosure, we conducted additional analyses with the
total and various classes of disclosure, country by country (Table 7). Since there were
insufficient observations for short-window tests, we conducted long-window tests. We
found that, similar to the earlier long-window and short-window results, with the
exception of Hong Kong, the firm-level determinants of disclosure are more strongly
associated with prospective information than they are with disclosures of an accounting
nature or for market relevant share transactions. Again, with some exceptions, the results
were mostly similar to those of the earlier long-window and short-window tests.
There are a few interesting exceptions at the national level. In the United Kingdom,
which accounts for most of the overall sample listed on U.S. markets, USLIST is
positively associated with such disclosures. The level of dispersion in ownership (FLOAT)
is positively associated with prospective disclosures in France and Singapore. More
interestingly, information asymmetry is not a strong or posifively associated variable for all
countries. It is only strong and posifive for Germany (DE), Singapore (SG), and Hong
Kong (HK). Also, previous weak variable proprietary cost (PROPRTY) is significant for
these countries (<0.001). Financial services (FINSERV) is significant in many instances,
suggesting some additional motivations in the financial services industry by country.
We also conducted a series of additional analyses, not reported here, including testing the
effect offirm size on disclosure. As expected, given the design ofthe study, firm size was not a
statistically significant influence on either total disclosure or on the components of disclosure.
5.5. Discussion
Barring some variations by country, on the whole, the analyses using both long and
short windows suggest that infonnation asymmetry is a strong driver of online
The relationships for Denmark, Norway, and Finland are not disclosed as there are insufficient observations.
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disclosures followed by agency, production cycle, profitability, ownership, and country
influences.
There are some striking differences in the pattern of disclosure by types. While the
country-level determinants are still in the same direction as the overall level of disclosure,
there are clear distinctions between share and accounting disclosures, on the one hand, and
prospective disclosures, on the other. The former classes of disclosure seem to be more
strongly associated with national factors, whereas the level of prospective disclosures has a
stronger association with firm-level characteristics. As can be predicted from theory, the
level of prospective disclosures seems associated not only with the level of asymmetry
observed for the total level of disclosure but also with assets-in-place ( — ve, as predicted),
return on equity (— ve, not as predicted), whether the finn was profit-making (+ve, not as
predicted), and ownership spread (+ve, as predicted).
As demonstrated by Cready and Hurtt (2002), our price and volume measures of
symmetry are associated with the same sign, signifying that they are robust measures of
information asymmetry.
When we conducted additional analyses based on the various classes of disclosure we
found that the asymmetry associations seem to be strongest for prospective information and
weakest for disclosure of share information, with the other categories ranging in between.
The reason for the strength in the case of prospective information could be that most such
disclosures are not driven by regulatory needs. They are driven by finns' own needs to
provide information to investors, such that the investors' transaction cost to acquire such
information is reduced, which in turn minimizes the cost of capital of the firm. Conversely,
disclosure of share transactions is heavily influenced by securities and stock market
regulations that require disclosure of significant movements in shares and insiders trading
their shares. Although the rules vary, all the eight exchanges in this study had significant
requirements for disclosing share transactions. Similar disclosure rules exist for accounting,
such as rules for the issue of annual and interim reports and preliminary announcements or
profit warnings.
The country-by-country tests raise more questions than answers. While the overall
results are robust, because they are representative of the eight-country sample as a whole,
they are not exact representations of the country results. Rather, they provide a composite
view of the various effects within countries. For example, asymmetry is not positively
associated with total disclosure in all countries. In one of the countries it is negatively
associated and in three it is not significantly associated with total frequency. This suggests
that the influence of infonnation asymmetry in the full-sample tests comes from the three
countries where it is significantly positively associated with frequency of disclosure.
To account for variations in total disclosures by country, we looked closely at Finland,
Norway, and Singapore, where a more explicit disclosure mechanism led us to expect a
higher frequency ofcontinuous disclosure. In our TOTAL disclosure tests and disclosure by
type of information tests we do find that these countries have higher frequencies of
disclosure.
Putting the full-sample test with all disclosures, the tests by types of disclosure and the
country-disclosure tests together, we observe that the results by prospective-information
disclosures is by far the strongest set of results. Therefore, the discretionary types of
continuous disclosure are determined by certain firm-level variables.
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6. Conclusions
Continuous online disclosure is becoming a common form of disclosure. Extant
research in accounting and accounting practices still regards periodic disclosure as the
dominant form of disclosure. A recent study. Landsman and Maydew (2002), finds
quarterly reporting (a more trequent form of disclosure) to be more informative than or just
as good as the annual form of reporting. Butler et al. (2002) find that quarterly reporting is
a more timely fonn of reporting. Given the advent of online disclosure, it is pertinent to
assume that the continuous forms of disclosure would take a share in the market for
corporate information. Our study attempts to explain the nature of online disclosure and
identify the determinants of such disclosures. We focus on readily accessible online
disclosures. Since such disclosures are available globally we cover the announcements
made in eight Asian and European stock exchanges.
Similar to the findings of Botosan and Harris (2000) and Butler et al. (2002), we find
that firms with higher information asymmetry are more likely to report frequently. Our
results show some support, especially for more discretionary types of disclosure like
prospective-infomiation disclosure, for the evidence of prior studies in the area of
voluntary disclosure and frequency of disclosure. Akin to the findings of Leftwich et al.
(1981) and Butler et al. (2002) in the area of quarterly reporting, we find that firms with
agency costs have a tendency to report more frequently. Analogous to the argument
raised by Miller (2002), we also find that profit-making firms disclose more. Our
evidence also shows strong support for the hypothesis that the firms with lower shorter
operating cycles (Butler et al., 2002) and more analyst following report more frequently
(Nagar et al., 2003; Skinner, 2003).
Since our short-window (monthly) results are as strong or stronger for most variables
with strong results in the long window (15 month), we conslme that our findings apply
to both the level of fi^equency and the spread or regularity of disclosures. With respect to
continuous disclosure and its two features, frequency and spread/regularity, our study
has dealt with a growing phenomenon in the area of disclosure. Our study found several
interesting variations in results when tests were conducted between types of disclosure
and for tests by country. On the one hand, we did find some generalizable results; on the
other hand, we have raised issues for further research.
This study has some limitations. Information asymmetry in markets is difficult to
measure (Botosan & Harris, 2000; Butler et al., 2002). The proxies used in this study are
based on the most recently used measures of asymmetry. However, these measures may
suggest an alternate hypothesis, that of a reverse causality between disclosure and the
proxies. Based on market reacfion studies (e.g., see Cready & Hurtt, 2002), this alternate
hypothesis would be that the more frequent the disclosure the more frequent the variations of
stock price and volume, (i.e., fi^equency of online disclosure would drive variations in stock
price and volume). We have disregarded this view. Since we are studying the frequency of
continuous disclosure (not periodic disclosure) we feel that the more often the firm makes its
disclosures, the more aligned the information set for outsiders would be with that of insiders.
This would reduce the surprise element when infonnation is released to the market. One way
to remove doubts about our view would be to examine the after disclosure effects of online
disclosures (Botosan & Harris, 2000; Butler et al., 2002). However, such a test is difficuh to
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conduct because as frequency increases it is difficult to isolate the effects of one disclosure
from that of another. Nevertheless, this issue could be a subject of future research.
With improvements in technology, the Internet is rapidly becoming the most important
information source for investors. Firms are rapidly recognizing this change. The internet is
also much more powerful than the paper form ofreporting (Debreceny et al.. 2002). It allows
many forms of providing information (e.g., HTML and Adobe Acrobat formats),
hyperlinking to other databases, and immediate dissemination and accessibility of
information. These advantages have led to increased demand for Information and the way
information is provided. Continuous disclosure, or the expectation that firms should
continuously inform the investors, has become a common issue in the capital markets. To
provide for good quality information dissemination under the concept of continuous
disclosure, it is essential that policy makers and corporate managers understand the forms
available and the reasons behind online disclosures.
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In this paper Debreceny and Rahman (2005) in\estigate whether continuous disclosure
is associated with the same variables as voluntary- disclosure and disclosure frequency in
particular. To that end nine hypotheses of continuous disclosure are formulated and tested.
Frequency and regularity of online disclosures on stock exchange websites in eight
developed markets in Asia and Europe are examined. Sample firms included in the
analysis are 334 Morgan Stanley small-cap firms fi-om eight different countries. A
continuous disclosure model is proposed and the dependent variable is a self-constructed
disclosure variable aggregated from manually collected Internet disclosures on stock
exchange websites. The types of information disclosures included vary widely and some
disclosures are mandatory whilst others are not. The explanaton,- variables of the proposed
continuous disclosure model include measures of information asymmetry', agency costs,
proprietary cost, operating cycle, performance, analyst following, free float, industry, US
listing and countn.'. The inclusion of these variables in the model is motivated by referring
to the literature on \oluntary disclosure. For the full sample (eight countries together),
significant positive associations are found of the various continuous disclosure sub-
measures with information asymmetry measures and country' \ ariables. Depending on the
t\pe of disclosure sub-measure being used as dependent \ ariable. different results are
found for the other test variables, but in most cases the results on these \ariables are not
statistically significant.
As only limited research has been done on the factors dri\ ing continuous disclosure and
most other disclosure studies do not focus on small-cap firms, this study is potentially
interesting and definitelv challensins. The authors' manual data collection efforts of
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various t\"pes of continuous disclosure items are quite impressi\ e: 12.6~3 announcements
for 334 films over a period of 15 months are identified. Tlie results are ho\\e\er less
impressive, as all but one test variable (information as\"mmeti^ ) are statistically
insignificant in the models presented in Table 5. In the remainder of this discussion I
elaborate on possible reasons why the results in this stud>' are so weak.
1. Questioning the research question
My first set of comments relates to the definifion of continuous disclosure as
provided by the authors in the paper's abstract and the implications of this particular
definition for the research design of the paper. Continuous disclosure is defined as "the
immediate release of material information by issuers within a regulatory- and
information dissemination fiamework" (italics added). This definition suggests that the
stock exchanges included in the analysis (and or other regulators) require that material
information items be disclosed. Therefore I am not convinced that the literature on
voluntar\" disclostire is appropriate to moti\ ate the h\potheses and the choice of the
explanaton.- variables in this study. WTiat is being investigated ma\ well be (at least
partially) mandatorv' disclosure. For example, disclosure about future acquisitions is
often mandatorv. Hence if the continuous disclosure measure includes acquisition
disclosures, what is actually tested is not disclosure of acquisitions but the incidence of
acquisitions. Unless there is no enforcement of disclosure rules, a model inspired by the
voluntary disclosure hterature will not work, .^d this is exactly what we see: lack of
significance of many test variables in Tables 5. 6 and 7 of the paper. I believ e that vv hat
is measured as continuous disclosure is the incidence of material e\ ents and not so much
the decision to disclose these ev ents.
Next comment relates to the concept of materiality. What makes information
'material' such that disclosure is required is often vague and may differ across
instimtional environments. Given prior analviical work about the impact of vague
standards on behavior (see. for example. Willekens. Steele. Miltz. 1996). it is reasonable
to expect that exchanges that prov ide clear guidance about what is considered to be
material information will generate more compliance with the disclosure standard (as
compared to exchanges that remain vague). In such environments (with clear materialitv
standards), continuous disclosure can be expected to be equivalent to mandatorv
disclosure. Given this reasoning and the argument put forward in the prev ious paragraph.
tfie variation across disclosure rates between firms in the sample can be expected to be
driven mainly by the characteristics of the securities exchange w atchdog of a panicular
countr>; from which the data are drawn, and other factors that driv e the incidence of a
material event
Related to the issue of vagueness and the qualitv" of the securities exchange watchdog
are the instimtional differences between countries in general. Consideration of prior
studies on the institutional differences between countries (see. for example. LaPona.
Lopez de-Silanes, Shleifer. Mshny. 1998) are particularlv relevant to the design and
context of any study that includes observations from countries from different legal
origins. No reference is made to that literamre. Institutional differences, for example.
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relate to the legal system, the quaht\' of the enforcement mechanisms, investor protection
and accounting systems (principles-based versus rules-based (. These elements have a
direct impact on disclosure behavior of firms and may explain the findings in this stud\
better than the variables borrowed fi^m the \ oltmtan disclosure Uterature.
The authors do include country -specific \ ariables in their disclosure model, but these
variables almost tautologically absorb most of the variation in the disclosure measures, as
can be seen fi-om Tables 5 and 6. A vast majorit\' of coimtn" parameters is statisticaih^
significant and the size of the countr\ coefficients is substantial. In additioiL inspection
fi-om Table 7. in which results are presented for fi\ e coimtries separately, reveals tiiat the
dri\ ing forces of continuous disclosure differ across all countries. This suggests that
different disclosure models (as opposed to one general model as proposed) are describing
continuous disclosure m diftereni institutional en\Tronments.
2. More questions about the research design and the h\potheses
As mentioned abo^ e. the in\ estigation of continuous disclosure is mainh motivated by
the literature on fi:equenc> of ( \ oluntar\ ) disclosures. This also imphes that ver\ Utde is
said about \\ hat is t\pical for continuotis disclosures. Further, the audiors do not explain
why a model that is topically used for large cap firms is tested on a sample of small-cap
firms. It is reasonable to expect that some forces that drive disclosure in general will also
apply in the small-cap context, but there must also be forces that are t\pical for disclosure
in a small-cap context and there ma> be forces that work in a large cap conte.xt that do not
\\ ork in a small-cap context—another possible reason why some test \ ariables turn out to
be insignificant.
Nine h>potheses are formulated and tested, some of which are expresvsed as no-effect
h>"potheses. No distinction is made beuveen different t>pes of information disclosures in
formulating these h>potheses: that is. all h>potheses are \"ei> generally formulated not
only for all coimtries but also for aU t\-pes of continuous disclosures that are investigated in
this paper. This suggests that all t>pes of disclosures are expected to be driven by the same
\ ariables. .\nother reasonable approach may be to distinguish between various tvpes of
disclosures and build h>potheses per t>pe of disclosure, for example, distinguish bet\^'een
mandated and \ olimtarv disclosures, or between disclostires about past or fimire events. In
addition, no h>potheses are included to capture factors that would be t\pical for
conhnuoiis disclosure in a small-cap context.
3. Some questions about \ariable measurement and data collection
The dependent \anable m ilie conimuous disclosure model thai is proposed in the
paper is the trequency of disclosure of online information items on the stock e.xchange
N\ ebsiies. Manual collection of information items was done by various research assisrants
b) coding "a detailed classification matrix." .Additional information about inter-rater
consistenc) would be welcome. Lack of inter-rater consistency may generate noise in die
data and may (at least parrialh ) explain the insignificance of the test variables. Also, no
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information is provided on how the dimensions of the dependent variable are identified
and aggregated.
Measurement issues relating to the explanatory variables may also be a reason for
the observed insignificance. First, in this study proprietary costs are measured through
market concentration, in particular through the CR4 ratio. No motivation is provided
why exactly the CR4 and not the CR6 ratio or Herfindahl index has been used to
capture market concentration. In addition, although this measure is used in prior
studies, it does not really indicate whether markets are significantly concentrated. An
alternative measure for market concentration could be an indicator variable that equals
one if a market is significantly concentrated and zero if not. Significance of market
concentration can be easily assessed through tests developed in the Industrial
Organization literature (see, for example, Parker, 1991^). Second, some control variables
seem to be missing from the model specification. I believe that a company size measure
should also be included as the size range may still be considerable even in this small-cap
sample". Prior evidence is generally consistent with a positive association between finn
size and (the level of) voluntary disclosure (see, for example, Lang & Lundholm, 1993).
Also, the issuance of new securities may be associated with disclosure behavior of firms in
general. Prior studies report a positive association between securities issues and disclosure
(see Lang & Lundholm, 1993).
4. Summary
This study is one of the first to construct and test a continuous disclosure model. The
authors' manual data collection efforts of various types of continuous disclosure items
are quite impressive: 12,673 announcements for 334 firms over a period of 15 months
are identified. The results are however less impressive, as all but one test variable
(information asymmetry) are statistically insignificant. Most of the variance in the
disclosure data is explained by country variables. A challenge for future research on
continuous disclosure is to build a model that is adapted to the institutional and
regulatory environment in which it is tested, as well as to the different types of
continuous disclosures that exist.
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The points raised by the discussant with regards to our study are pertinent for the nature
of research we have conducted. We addressed most of the discussants comments during
the review process. We seem to have satisfied the discussant on several of the issues.
However, some issues are contentious. Our discussion below addresses some of these
concerns. The frequency and nature of the continuous forms of disclosure are new issues
in the accounting and finance literature. Some of the concerns that the discussant raises
will require future research to flilly appreciate this phenomenon. We are confident that
continuous disclosure will continue to be an important form of disclosure and the need for
research on this class of disclosure will continue to grow.
The discussant refers to Tables 5, 6 and 7 of the paper. She questions the robustness of
our research model. In particular, she draws attention to the statistics in Table 5 and states
that all but one test variable (information asymmetry) are not statistically significant in the
models presented. We have carefully reexamined this concern. When these three tables are
seen together, the short window models (Table 6) show up as more robust than the long
window models. Intuitively this is an appropriate outcome as the phenomenon we are
examining is continuous in nature, i.e., short term in nature. The long window fi-equency
measures seem to capture only the information asymmetry aspects of the financial
environment, as the discussant has noted. We suggest that future research take note of the
short term aspect of continuous forms of disclosure. Also, this indicates that, as
hypothesized, the motivations for level of voluntary disclosure of the periodic form (tested
in earlier studies) are also true for frequency of voluntary disclosure. In this respect, we did
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attempt to replicate the countn" b>" countrv" tests of Table " on a short window basis. The
results were weak due to tlie low frequency count for se\ eral countries when broken down
into counti},' by countn.- analysis, .\ccordiiigh. \% e did not report these statistics.
The discussant is not convinced tliat the literature on % oluntan" disclosure is appropnate
to motivate the hypotheses and the choice of the explanaton. \ariables. She feels that what
is being investigated may well be (at least partially) mandatoiy- disclosure. This point of
the discussant is fiindamental to \oluntar\" disclosure research. Man\ researchers in the
past have claimed or impUed that the disclosures they w ere stud\"ing \\ ere \ oluntan. in
nature. None of tfie studies that claimed lo be of \"oluniar>' disclosure studies that we came
across are completely free from mandator." biases. A measure of \ oluntan. disclosure used
in some of the smdies. ALNIR scores, are based on analysts" perceptions of total
disclosures, not siiiq)ly voluntary disclosures. A 2000 AIMR survey states that the sur\ ey
is about "its members' attimdes toward and perceptions of corporate and financial
disclosure among publicly traded companies" (AIMR. 2000. S). Tlie repon does not
mention the term volimtan.- disclosure. Yet many well cited studies used AIMR data as
volimtar>- disclosure data and used \oluntap.- disclosure theones to explain the le\ el of
AIMR scores of firms or their effects on market parameters. CIF.\R scores (also used in
prior voluntarv' disclosure studies) are based on both mandators and \ oluntan. disclosures.
The well-known Botosan (IQQ'') scoring system for voluntar\ disclosure was den\ ed from
the -AIMR and CEF-AR systems of measuring disclosure le\ els.
Since the issue ofmeasurement of voluntary? disclosure is important we ha\ e attempted
to address it in the paper It is difficult if not impossible to proN ide a precise and
universally accepted definition of voluntar." disclosure. \\"e ha\e addressed the problem in
tfiree w^ys. First, we have highlighted the point that disclosures of the r>pe that we are
studying are only volimtar. to a certain extent. Note that stock exchanges and or regulators
only provide a general requirement that "material" infomtation be disclosed. Except for
some insider trading requirements and financial disclosures. the\ lea\e the final
determination of what is material to the firms. Since items like insider trading disclosures
and financial disclosures ha\e specific or more stringent securities law requirements, we
note that the fiTequencies for these t\pes of disclosures are high. So. we rerun our tests by
segmenting total disclosure into its main sub-categories. Initialh' we had considered using
scoring systems such as that of Botosan (1997) to categorize the items, .-\fter matching the
items on the volimtaiy disclosure indices found in the hterature w ith those of actual online
disclosures we realized that the two did not match ven. well.
The voluntar>" disclosure indices of past studies were constructed for annual repons and
not for corporate atmoimcements. This latter class of information tends to deal with
information that may have an immediate price impact. Consequent!} the\ are often
parsimonious. Conversely, aimual reports are issued with more detail on indi\ idual items of
disclosure. This comparison led us to beUeve that there were mainh four kinds of
disclosures: Shares. Accounting. Prospective and Personnel, the first x\\o being affected
more by mandator}' requirements and the second two being more \oluntar\ in nature.
Initially we had many smaller categories, but because of the small frequencies of many of
these categories, they were merged into these four broad main categories. Our test results do
show that the use of voluntar\' disclosure theories of the prior literamre better explain
Prospective and Personnel disclosures than Shares and .Accounting disclosures.
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Second, the international accounting literature suggests that there are numerous other
variables, such as legal systems, culture, business financing. t\pe of ownership and level
of de\elopment. that affect continuous disclosure. We. therefore, deal with reporting
en\ ironment influences, and this is done by using country dummies to control for country
based institutional influences.
Third, there are industr\- regulations and other industry related influences on voluntary
disclosure. For this we use industr\' control variables. Since only financial firms were of
the t> pe that had different le\ els of disclosure fi-om the rest, vs e reduced the number of
industn dummies to a single dichotomous dummy to distinguish between financial and
non-financial firms. This was sufficient for controlling industn' effects.
The discussant also questions the measurement of continuous disclosure from another
angle. She points out that the frequency of corporate aimoimcements is the incidence of
material e\ ents and not so much the decision to disclose about these e\"ents. The nature of
compan% announcement is such that it has to be event dri\en. Companies tend to or are
required to re\eal material events and. if it can be estimated disclose the consequences of
such e\ents. Howe\ er. we ha\ e clarified in the paper and in the above discussion that in
most circumstances it is up to the firms to decide the materiality- of the e\ enL Therefore.
\s e do attempt to capmre the incidence of the decision to disclose in oiu" disclosure
measure. Ne%enheless. we also make additional arrangements to control the issue of
frequenc)- of matenal e\"ents. Firsth-. since firm size could be a determinant of frequency
of e\ ents. we control for size b> selecting onh' small cap firms. We also ran tests for size
effects and found no association between frequenc\ of disclosure and size. We also use
product c> cle in our model to control for occurrence of material events. Product cycles can
ha\ e mo connotations. The first connotation is tiiat firms with shorter product cycles
would ha\ e more disclosures relating to the completion and sale of their products. The
second connotation, running contrary to the first and similar to Butler. Kraft, and ^^'eiss
( 2002 ) lack of transparenc\ argument would be that firms with longer product cycles
would ha\ e to disclose more about their unfinished production acti\ iries to keep the
market informed. Since we cannot infer a clear direction for the relation between
frequency of disclosure and product cycle, we hypothesize a non-directional hypothesis for
product cycle.
The discussant raises concerns about disclosures being dri\en by institutional variables
and noi b\ the \ oluntarv' disclosure detenninants as we attempt to show. She points out
that no reference is made to the literature that deals with the influence of instimtional
differences on reporting. She explains instimtional diflferences relate to the legal s\'sterru
the qualit) of the enforcement mechanisms, investor protection and accoimting s\ steins
ipnnciples-based versus rules-based). She argues that these elements have a direct impact
on disclosure beha\ ior of firms and may explain the findings in this smd\' better than the
variables borrow ed from the \ olimtar\' disclosure hterature. We do accept that there can be
differences in institutional en\ ironments. In terms of online reporting requirements per se.
there w as limited \ ariation ber*.\ een our selected exchanges. We decided to use all of these
eight countries to ha% e results that could be generalizable across coimlries that do have
continuous disclosure arrangements. To control for what could be considered a m\riad of
securities law requirements we used country dummies. We do regard instimtional
differences as imponani reasons for disclosure levels, but we feel that it is too eariy to
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conduct research using these notions for examining continuous disclosure activities as
there are only a small number of countries that have adequately adopted continuous
disclosure arrangements. Furthermore, the difficulty of hand collection of data may make a
project including many countries cumbersome and costly.
Once again, with respect to the institutional differences, the discussant notes that a
majority of country parameters are statistically significant and the size of the country
coefficients is substantial. This, she indicates, suggests that different disclosure models (as
opposed to one general model as proposed) are describing continuous disclosure in
different institutional environments. We do disagree with this comment. Like most
research issues there can be more than one research question to be asked and to answer
each research question one may need a different research model. The country parameter
issue is closely associated with the institutional issue dealt with above and it is not a simple
issue. At the present time, with the information that we have, we believe that country
variations are not because of different levels of requirements of online disclosure. We have
noted through the process of data collection that the online disclosure requirements of our
eight countries are very similar. The differences mainly occur because of the details of the
various general disclosure requirements for disclosure of both financial and non-financial
information. Some influence may also come from the general level of transparency in a
country. These other country idiosyncrasies can have an indirect impact on the frequency
of online disclosures. It is not the purpose of this study to examine these indirect impacts
and therefore we used country dummies to control for country institutional and
environment effects.
The discussant is concerned about inter-rater consistency. She feels that lack of inter-
rater consistency may generate noise in the data and may (at least partially) explain the
insignificance of the test variables. This research, being the first of its kind, required us to
monitor the data collection process with great care. The scoring system was primarily a
count of the frequency of announcements made on the stock exchange websites. Initially
some thought was given to whether or not we should give weight to larger announcements.
After observing the density and wide variation we decided to use a simple count and
restrict our paper's focus on frequency of announcements rather than the size and quality
of the announcements. The research assistants downloaded all the announcements in fiill.
We decided to restrict our discussion to only the categorisation of the disclosures in terms
of simple categories. These announcements were meticulously classified into the
categories jointly by the researchers themselves. Therefore no concern for inter-rater
reliability exists. For the frequency component, inter-rater reliability was primarily
established through direct consultation between the researchers and research assistants.
Also, substantial time was invested in training the data collectors at the start of the project.
The discussant points out that no motivation is provided for why the CR4 and not the
CR6 ratio or Herfindahl index has been used to capture market concentration. Having read
the literature on market concentration, we felt that CR4 is a commonly used measure of
industry concentration. In the interest of parsimony, we decided not to describe CR4 and
other competing forms in detail. In this regard, we cite a fairly recent and easily accessible
paper, Butler et al. (2002), where this measure has been discussed in detail. We had
considered the Herfindahl index in the early stages of this study, but we decided not to use
it because a precise computation of this index would require the proportion of the market
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share of all the finns within an industry. We used COMPUSTAT for procuring revenue and
market share data. Since there were some firms with missing data, we resorted to the use of
a broad measure such as CR4. CR4 requires a simple addition of proportions of the market
share of each firni in an industry. Conversely the Herfmdahl Index requires raising a firm's
proportionate share to the power of two and then adding it to the squares of other firms'
proportions. A missing data point in constructing the Herfindahl index can have a much
larger impact on that index than it would have on CR4.
We do appreciate the suggestion for the use of alternative variables and measures. For
some of the variables we did use alternative measures, however, for others we could not
adopt alternatives because of missing data problem. In the case of availability of multiple
measures, we decided to report the results of only those measures that we felt were more
appropriate for the respective tests or that had more complete data sets. Because of the
multiple measures for the dependent variable and to keep our tables readable, we decided
to keep the number of alternative measures for the independent variables to generally one
per variable.
We conclude by adding that we appreciate the discussants penetrating and inquiring
discussion. Although it will be very challenging to address all her concerns in a single
piece of research, the points raised will alert future researchers attempting to conduct
continuous disclosure studies of the essential issues pertaining to this area of research.
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International accounting: A user perspective
Shahrokh M. Saudagaran, International accounting: a user perspective. Second ed.,
,
Thomson South-Western, Ohio, 2004
International accounting is an increasingly important area of accounting. Business and
capital markets are more widely dispersed around the globe than ever before.
Consequently, the demand for cross-border financial information has correspondingly
increased. Saudagaran's textbook, International Accounting: A User Perspective,
describes international accounting issues for current and future business managers. Since
the majority of business executives will be users of multinational financial infomiation,
not preparers of it, the book takes a user perspective to international financial reporting.
In response to recent concerns about the quality of financial reporting in many countries
international financial reporting is receiving growing attention. The recent financial
debacles at major multinational companies such as U.S.-based Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco
drew global attention. Fraud and/or financial scandals have also occurred in companies
elsewhere in the world, such as Canada's Bre-X Minerals, Netherlands' Ahold, and Japan's
Daiwa Bank. Current and ftiture business managers need to understand the related issues.
New in this second edition of the book is information about recent developments in the
global-standard setting arena. Of particular note is information on the format and structure
of the new International Accounting Standards Board. The book also covers the recent
introduction of the new single currency, the Euro, in most European Union member
countries.
The book presents the material completely, and succinctly in a writing style that is easy
to read. As a result, the book fits between advanced accounting texts that have very little
coverage of international accounting issues and very long traditional international
accounting texts. The book has seven chapters: multinational financial reporting (Chapter
1 : Interaction between accounting and its environment, diverse roles of accounting in
countries, effects of diversity on capital markets, classification of financial accounting and
reporting systems, and major challenges facing accounting globally); harmonization of
international accounting standards (Chapter 2); currency exchange rate changes (Chapter
3: Foreign exchange exposure, exchange rate fluctuations, and foreign currency
translation); selected financial reporting and disclosure issues (Chapter 4: Accounting
for changing prices, accounting for goodwill and intangible assets, geographic segment
reporting, and environmental and social disclosures); using corporate financial reports
across borders (Chapter 5: Corporate responses to foreign users of financial statements.
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coping with transnational financial reporting, international financial statement analysis);
financial reporting in emerging capital markets (Chapter 6); and managerial issues
(Chapter 7: Budgeting and performance evaluation, global risk management, transfer
pricing and information technology).
Regarding end-of-chapter materials, each chapter ends with discussion questions,
exercises, and sometimes cases. Web assignments are also provided. Discussion questions
correspond to chapter materials. Many of the exercises involve practical evaluation of
domestic and foreign annual reports. For the instructor's use, PowerPoint lecture outlines
are provided for each chapter.
The strengths of International Accounting: A User Perspective are twofold. First, in a
concise way, the book effectively covers the essential subjects of an international
accounting class. Second, different fi-om the average textbook, this book cites a great deal
of scholarly research, which makes it a helpful reference book for the international
accounting researcher. The weaknesses of the book stem from its strengths. First, the book
may be too concise for some instructors
—
just seven chapters, and not all traditional topics
are included. For example, given today's business environment, the book would have
benefited from materials on business ethics and corporate social responsibility. Second,
some students will not appreciate the way the author connects the book's topics to
scholarly research. In many ways the book reads more like a research paper than a
textbook. Thus, the strengths of the book are also its weaknesses.
L. Murphy Smith
Texas A&M University; College Station, TX 77845- USA
doi: 1 0. 1 1 6 j.intacc.2005.06.009
Christopher Humphrey, Bill Lee, (Eds.), The Real Life Guide to Accounting Research
— A Behind-the-Scenes View of Using Qualitative Research Methods, Elsevier,
Oxford, UK, 2004, 539 pp., (539 pages, USD 100, EUR 100, 0-08-043972-1)
1. General
This book is an unusual collection and I imagine it was a major project to
coordinate. The editors, in fact, allude to what seems to me to have likely been a
difficult process which clearly extended over a much longer time than appears to have
been the original expectation. A number of features of the book are exceptional and
perhaps extraordinary.
This is a very considerable tome, extending to 30 chapters and involving in all 46
authors. Other points to note are the variety of the contributions. The individual chapters
vary greatly in interest, style, readability and authority. The book contains a number of
chapters, which I consider to be gems, providing great insights on research for both
experienced and novice researchers, alike. Some chapters will likely be of more help to
new researchers, others to more experienced researchers, but some of the contributions are
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a must read for both experienced and inexperienced researchers. This is not easy to achieve
in unison.
The book consists of five sections:
1
.
the meaning of research
2. managing the research process
3. collecting and analyzing data
4. publishing and dissemination
5. interdisciplinary perspectives
Producing a worthwhile review of such an extensive and expansive text is difficult. By
design the book is highly diverse. Qualitative research approaches cover a vast array of
alternatives and when combined with the editors' aim to go behind the scenes to get
personal stories of research experiences even more diversity is produced. In part, the result
is an academic text which is far too diverse for me to recommend as the basis of a research
methods course, but it certainly contains some must read material for budding researchers.
The text is just too much and too big to face postgraduate students with. Although, 1 would
also not feel comfortable recommending this entire book to postgraduates, there are
notable contributions in each of the main sections that offer keys to understanding and
applying qualitative approaches in accounting. I will pick out those that struck me as
particularly valuable.
The book contains some remarkable contrasts which ought to help convince research
students that the research journey is indeed a very personal experience. There are examples
of these personal journeys in section one. I found myself completely enthralled reading
Loft's chapter ("Nice Work: Wrifing a Ph.D. Thesis in Accounting"). For me the draw was
not merely Loft's journey to Foucauldian enlightenment, though this is certainly
extraordinary, but the folk tales of an array of researchers I have come to regard as
legends of qualitative and critical research. Some begin to sound quite human in Loft's
account. Loft somehow makes mundane her research experiences in an environment that
seems to switch casually between the extreme loneliness of research and writing and
interruptions occasioned by encounters with a veritable who's who of the authors who
firamed the 'critical' accounting project.
The theme of the research act as a personal journey, can be found in other sections. In
section two Bums provides a highly anecdotal perspective on his early research path
("Confessions of a Research Assistant'). Bums describes the anxiety of differentiating his
doctoral research from his work within a larger research project. He talks ofthe difficulties of
finding an identity while acting as research assistant, doctoral student and lecturer. The
context is so specific that it may not apply to many others, but readers might still draw
interesting parallels with their own experiences.
At times it is not easy to see clearly the reason for one chapter being in one section rather
than another. In many ways trying to impose sections goes against much of what some
elements of qualitative research is about. Examples include chapter 17, in section three,
where Ahrens delivers a carefijlly crafted and thoughtful piece on the nature of access and
the alternative imperative of engaging with organizations (and presumably individuals) in
more or less fornial ways. Ahrens appears to argue that in some cases it is in the researcher's
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interests and the interests of the research to avoid committing too early to highly detailed
agreements as to what the researcher will do and what access he/she will be restricted to.
In section two Bedard and Gendron writing about their experiences of case research
into the modus operandi of audit committees ("Qualitative Research on Accounting: Some
Thoughts on What Occurs"), recount experience that adds to the advice we might take
from Ahrens. Bedard and Gendron warn us against becoming too tied up with negotiations
of access at the organizational level. They extol the virtues of informal access, of being
able to approach individuals and develop access and their research questions gradually as
they come to understand the research questions better. Bedard and Gendron argue, in
opposition to conventional wisdom, that approaching individuals may produce better
quality research access. They suggest that trying to arrange access at the level of the
organization can often prove ineffective. There are shades of Ahrens in the experiences
these authors recount.
Bedard and Gendron also give a good deal of emphasis to the requirements for ethical
research practices in relation to both the research objects and the research funding bodies. I
think it is clear that some research questions would be more amenable to the type of
individual-research-object approach which these authors describe and in other instances an
organization based approach may be necessary.
Lapsley also expresses concerns about access ("Making Sense of Interactions in an
Investigation of Organizational Practices and Processes"), but has a rather different and
perhaps controversial solution. In chapter 1 1 , Lapsley takes concerns about the ethics of
research and access to an extreme. He appears to argue in favor of covert studies of
organizational environments by relating such an approach to that used in some types of
clinical research. Lapsley 's approach stands in marked contrast to the approach to ethics
discussed by Bedard and Gendron, and seems to me to be a dangerous path to take qualitative
research down.
A number of authors address issues of access and allude implicitly to the difficulty of
balancing the expectations of both research participants and ftinding agencies. McSweeney,
in chapter thirteen ("Critical Independence"), describes problems he experienced in
balancing research and ethics while retained as a trade union advisor. He talks of the
pressures on the individual of being in a 'fiduciary' relationship with a key player in the
research environment.
In chapter 9 ("Management of a Research Team"), Broadbent and Laughlin give us as
transparent an account of what middle range thinking means to the researcher and the
research process as I have read previously. Their description of a very long association in a
research team environment and with a particular methodology is infomiative and intriguing.
Section 3 tided "collecting and analyzing data," is the largest section of the book (ten
chapters). I found the chapters in the section ofmixed interest and, I think, quality. There are,
however, some exceptional discussions in this section. For example, the Ahrens chapter I
referred to earlier together with very different and distinctive pieces by Anderson-Gough
("Using Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software: Respecting Voices within
Data Management and Analysis") and O'Dwyer ("Qualitative Data Analysis: Illuminating a
Process for Transforming a 'Messy' but 'Attractive' 'Nuisance'"). These authors provide
excellent and detailed descriptions on aspects of data collection, manipulation, and the way
in which they try to link to theory and identify themes. These are valuable contributions for
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both new researchers and those more experienced writers and researchers who may wish to
consider different quahtative techniques. O'Dwyer provides a brilhantly careful outhne of
his doctoral research project, giving a detailed account of the steps taken in data coding and
interpretation. Anderson-Gough has produced an insightful and thoughtfijl contribution on
"using computer assisted qualitative data analysis software."
My favorite chapter in this section is by Scapens ("Doing Case Study Research"). There is
some commonality between Scapens and O'Dwyer in that one of the aspects which is
particularly well illustrated by the former is the use ofmind maps as a conceptual tool. Both
authors refer to the use of such a tool as part of their ways of making sense of the vast
amounts of research material produced in qualitative case studies. Scapens makes this
technique come alive with some useftil illustrative examples of mind maps he has used. He
provides a wide-ranging treatise on case research, which is probably no surprise given his
experience. Rather like the Ahrens contribution, Scapens produces an insightful contribution
which seems to me to contain much common sense about carrying out qualitative research
and working toward a case story. There is an interesting discussion of the pros and cons of
taping research interviews that provides valuable reminders of some of the difficuh choices
faced by qualitative researchers. Scapens devotes a very convincing section to the use of the
charts, diagrams, and the mind map approach. He uses the section in part to help emphasize
the complexities of typical case research. This is one of the most practical sections in the
book and well worth careful consideration. But the use of visual methods in the
interpretation process is not without dangers. One of the cautions I would raise is that
diagrams can be dangerous simplifications of the research context, potentially giving
impetus to overly simple interpretations of complex settings. Diagrams can reveal but can
also conceal, impacting on our thinking and ideas too heavily. Scapens suggest that charts
and diagrams can be ofimmense value in the act oftranslating the research data into research
story. He also provides a brief but instructive discussion of issues of writing up results,
including those common difficulties encountered regularly in the review process of the
authenticity and plausibility of the research story. This section of the chapter concludes with
some interesting comments about the publication process in terms ofwhat it means to have a
theoretically informed case study.
This brings us to part four of the book which considers "publishing and dissemination."
Here there are two very interesting contributions, chapters 24 and 25, from the editors of
two well respected international journals, both of which publish a significant number of
qualitative papers. The authors (Guthrie, Parker and Gray, "Requirements and Under-
standings for Publishing Academic Research: An Insider View" for AAAJ; Kari Lukka
("How Do Accounting Research Journals Function? Reflections from the Inside") for
EAR) present good descriptions of the behind-the-scenes aspects of the academic journal
submission and review process. Along the way they provide useful insights and advice for
authors. Some of this advice might seem rather prosaic to experienced authors, but I
certainly wish I'd not had to learn some of it by the trial and enor route. This is again great
value for new researchers and authors.
Part five of the text brings in "interdisciplinary perspectives." Here I found interesting
insights into organizational psychology in chapter 29 ("Raising the Profile of Qualitative
Methods in Organizational Research" by Cassell and Symon), but from my perspective the
jewel in crown of the whole book is chapter 28 written by Harry Collins ("Qualitative
298 Book revievis
Methodology in Practice: My Experience"). I have to admit that this might again simply
reflect personal biases as Collins is a founding father of the sociology of science studies,
an area I have found of great interest. Collins provides a great escape from the depths of
despair that many doctoral researchers often experience (see Loft in chapter six for a
wonderfully happy ending but with some clearly excruciating moments). In contrast,
Collins describes the, at times, fortuitous nature of the research environment. He argues
how important it is "to stay light on your feef and that "nearly every piece of fieldwork I
have ever undertaken has turned to. . . disappointment. . . but when 1 decided that I must
have been looking for something else all along, that something else, turned out to be much
more interesting" (p. 488).
2. Conclusion
Given the seminal articles produced by Collins, this is a nice way to sum up some of the
most interesting insights in this book for me. They are twofold: the excitement and
unpredictability of the research process and the constant need to consider your options in
relation to the research site and the questions you think you will be able to answer.
Research must be planned and the researcher must be committed to the research process (if
you like the quest for knowledge and understanding), but it is best not to fit oneself for a
straightjacket too early.
Alan Lowe
Tlie University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand
doi:10.1016/j.intacc.2005.06.011
Christian Leuz, Dieter Pfaff, Anthony Hopwood (Eds.), The Economics and Politics of
Accounting — International Perspectives on Research Trends, Policy, and Practice,
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004 (404 pages, £58.00, ISBN: 0-19-926062-1)
The volume gathers together fifteen authoritative contributions, thanks to which it is
possible to trace the trends in Accounting, assuming an international perspective and an
original point of view, that of the economic and political dimensions.
The choice of referring to an international perspective allows for the delineation of the
evolution of Accounting, concentrating on the great phenomena that have characterised
the past few years and that promise to affect the very way of understanding the scientific
area during the next few years. In this sense we can interpret some of the issues and
proposals developed by the authors in the individual chapters, as in the case of fair value
evaluations, or Goodwill's evaluation, or the transition to lAS/IFRS, or moreover the
relationship between financial reporting and models of corporate governance. The
topicality of the themes that are dealt with and the potentiality connected to their
development are such to render them evident and to include how much future exists in
{
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Accounting. The volume thus estabhshes a type of condensation of the potential areas of
research for the next few years.
At the same time, the originality of the perspective that was taken in the selection and
orientation of the different contributions in the volume must be noted. From the reflections
proposed in each contribution, a clear and strong awareness emerges: accounting is much
more than a scientific discipline characterised by technicality. It interacts deeply with the
forces of economics and politics. An economic and political level of accounting exists
which guides the strategic choices carried out both in the national sphere and more and
more frequently in the international sphere. The comprehension of the technical solutions
adopted for accounting, representation and evaluation within financial reports requires
accounting scholars to descend into the examination of the forces that have guided the
definition of accounting rules. In this sense, there is a need to develop knowledge and
competence of the different and correlated fields (information economics, regulatory
economics, sociology, and political science).
During the past few years, the concreteness and the actuality ofthe preceding affirmations
has found wide confirmation. The need to supply credible, reliable and complete accounting
(and not only accounting) information to the international capital markets has become more
and more evident and the recent scandals have dramatically confirmed this. In this sense, the
need for scientific contributions relative to the impact between economic and Accounting
forces has become more and more important. At the same time, events such as the lASB
reform, the agreement with IOSCO and the strategy developed by European Union con-
stitute a clear proof of the interaction that exists between political and Accounting
dimensions.
With reference to the importance evoked by the themes in examination, we must note the
choice made by the Editors to dedicate the volume to the memory ofthe late Professor Dieter
Ordelheide, who authored two of the contributions. The dedication of the volume to Dieter
Ordelheide is a coherent testimonial because the perspective assumed in the volume and the
originality ofthe themes confronted in the different contributions fully respond to the human
and scientific depth of the illustrious Master. As is recalled in the preface of the volume,
Dieter Ordelheide lived his university experience actively participating in the construction of
a more European identity of the studies of Accounting, always assuming an international
point ofview with an elevated cultural depth. His involvement in the activities ofthe EIASM
and EAA, and with the European Doctoral Colloquium, and his participation in numerous
research networks on the European level have left a deep impression. As it is possible to read
in one of the contributions in this volume. Dieter Ordelheide considered Accounting to be a
scienfific discipline characterized by solid conceptualisations, strongly structured by the
interaction with the socio-economic context, and necessarily rooted in history. The different
contributions offered in this volume, which includes a series of scholars that have shared
academic activities, research projects and scientific collaborations with Ordelheide, adhere
to this formulation.
In the case of volumes that gather different contributions linked to a theme of reference,
there is always the risk of a certain disharmony or dissonance among the many formulations
proposed in each contribution. The emergence of this situation could be connected to the
construction of a volume which follows the realisation of the individual contributions. In the
specific case of this volume, the sensation that it is possible to perceive in the pages of the
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presentation of the study, in the organisation ofthe same, and in the development of specific
contributions is that of a unity of the project. In the book, the different authors seem to share
the same pressure to consider Accounting as an area that is inevitably influenced by factors
and forces of an economic and political nature.
Beginning with this conviction, the volume was structured in three parts, within which
specific sections are identified. In the first part of the volume, the theme of the interactions
between economics and Accounting, or rather the role that Accounting plays in the
economic processes, are developed. In particular, they have tried to illustrate the impact of
economic research in financial accounting with particular reference to the problems of
information asymmetry or conflicts of interest (Alfred Wagenhofer). In the section relative to
the problems of Equity evaluation they point out, moreover, the contributions developed
regarding the utilisation of evaluations at fair values in the preparation of Financial
Statements (Michael Bromwich), as well as the informative limitations that these evaluations
can manifest (Wolfgang Ballwieser). In the first part, further contributions were offered with
reference to the problems that Accounting encounters with respect to the theme ofmeasuring
performance (Dieter Pfaff), and with respect to the relationship between Accounting and
corporate governance (Ray Ball).
The focus of the second part was, however, placed on the examination of themes that
regard accounting regulation and the problems of enforcement, with particular reference to
the recommendations that the literature and empirical research conducted can allow us to
deduce in order to steer strategic and operative choices of the standards setters, on both an
international and a national level. Relative to the themes ofaccounting regulation, problems
connected to evaluation in terms of costs and benefits of regulations that provide a major or
minor disclosure of information in annual accounts were examined (Robert E. Verrecchia).
The theme of disclosure was, ftirthemiore. addressed in empirical terms with reference to
voluntary disclosure in Germany (Christian Leuz). An area of study that is strictly correlated
to that ofthe definition ofaccounting regulations is that ofthe instruments and the forms that
allow them to be put into practice, or rather, enforcement. From this point of view, the
contiibutions made reference to the problems of the application of US GAAP on Goodwill
(these deal with SFAS 142 and FASB) within the German accounting scene (Walther Busse
von Colbe), or the problems connected with the application (again in the German scenario)
of international accounting standards relative to the drafting of the Cash Flow Statement
(GiJnther Gebhardt and Aaron Heilmann), or the problems connected to the correct
utilisation of accounting regulations from the point of view of auditors within the scenario
following the Enron disaster (Ralf Ewert).
In the third and last part of the volume, themes that manifest the political character
inherent in Accounting, or rather the political forces and choices that intervene in the
definition of the regulations that technically determine or influence the process of the
preparation of annual accounts, were confronted. In this perspective, the role of Accounting
in society and in the formation of the phenomenon of lobbying was investigated. Within this
sphere, a posthumous contribution by Dieter Ordelheide was published, in which the
recently deceased scholar had defined the Framework of the Politics of Accounting. The
contributions regarding the study of the phenomena of lobbying and their impact on the
development of accounting regulations for the annual accounts in the particular German
scenario (Stuart McLeay, Dieter Ordelheide and Steven Young), or rather that regarded the
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issuance process of a regulation of law examined, making reference to the case of Austria
(Stuart McLeay and Doris Merkl) are tied to this framework. A further area of investigation
within the sphere ofthe Politics ofAccounting considered the vast and very current theme of
the processes of the issuance of the International Accounting Standards. This theme was, in
the case of the volume in examination, obsei'ved from the point of view of the difficult
relationship between the European Directives in accounting matters and International
Accounting Standards (Karel van Hulle), as well as the role that academics have, or could
have, in the definition of the politics of development of Accounting, moving, in this case,
from an analysis comparing England and Germany (Michael Power).
A reading of the different contributions offered in the volume allows us to reconstmct an
original and complete vision of Accounting. Original, in the sense that from it, it is possible
to appreciate a focus on a series of themes that are still less noted in literature and certainly
projected toward the near future. Complete, in the sense that the volume was defined as a
structure that covers the different currents that tie Accounting to the economic and political
dimensions.
On the whole, the themes were addressed by following a formulation in which
contributions of the institutional and regulatory type, as well as those of an analytical and
empirical type, were given space. All was developed with a methodological rigor and
originality of contents that clearly emerge from all of the contributions. It could have been
nothing less, considering the authoritativeness of the majority of the academics that
participated in the elaboration of the scientific project and in the preparation of the volume.
The perspective of the international context and regarding the specific national scenarios
examined was broad, although the reference to the international scenario and that of the
different Countries which compose the European context could have been broader.
Roberto Di Pietra
Department of Business and Social Studies, University of Siena, Italy
doi:10.1016/j.intacc.2005.()6.010
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Abstract
Using proprietary audit hour and fee data from the internal records of four Big Six finns in
Finland, this study examines the influence of audit client ownership type on audit effort and fees.
The primary argument is that there are differential effects of ownership concentration depending on
the particular nature of concentrated ownership (i.e., firms in which the majority of shares are
manager-owned versus foreign-owned versus state-owned). Consistent with this, the paper
documents that audit hours and fees are lower for companies majority-owned by their management
and higher for subsidiaries of foreign companies than for other firms. However, no difference
between companies owned by the state or municipalities and companies with a more diverse
ownership structure can be found. This suggests that governmental ownnership is actually closer to a
dispersed than a concentrated ownership strticture in terms of audit quality.
The results show that replacing the variable indicating majority-ownership with the variables
capturing the type of a controlling owner increases the explanatory power of the models significantly,
which demonstrates the importance of ownership type in the production and pricing of an audit. The
findings have important implications for those examining audit markets with client firms owned by
different types of controlling shareholders.
© 2005 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Audit fees; Audit costs; Audit effort; Audit production; Ownership structure; Managerial ownership
The earlier draft of this paper, entitled as "Client's ownership type as a determinant of audit effort and audit
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Various client risks include the degree of the financial statement user's reliance on the
statements, the new client-auditor relationship (Helliar, Monroe, & Woodliff, 1996), and the
probability of financial distress (Pratt & Stice, 1994; Stice, 1991). To capture these client
risks, following prior research, indicator variables for listed companies (LISTED), new
client relationships (NEW CLIENT), and loss-making (LOSS) are employed, respectively.
For audit hours, the expected signs for these three variables are assumed to be positive.
However, for audit fees, competition over new clients and poor profitability may create
downward pressure (Buttenvorth & Houghton. 1995; Simon & Francis. 1988; Taylor &
Baker, 1981). Due to the possible opposite effects of new client relationships and loss
making on audit fees, no prediction for fees is presented for NEW CLIENT and LOSS.
Finally, systematic differences in audit fees may exist among the different audit firms.
For example, Price Waterhouse has been found to charge higher fees in many countries
(e.g. Moizer, 1997). To control for the possible pricing or effort differences between Price
Waterhouse and the other audit firms, an indicator variable (PW) was added to the model.
6. Sample selection and descriptive statistics
(5.7. Sample selection
This study focuses on the audits of large cHents of (then) Big Six audit fums in Finland,
excluding financial and insurance companies. Limiting the analysis to Big Six audits
should reduce the possible impact of national idiosyncrasies as the very idea of being a
global brand name supplier is to provide the same goods or services in every country.
Consequently, focusing on Big Six audits should further improve the comparability of the
results to other countries.
The client companies were identified by comparing Statistics Finland's database of the
large Finnish firms with data on the auditors of large and medium-sized Finnish companies
produced by Balance Consulting Ltd. After deleting observations for companies with joint
auditors, there were 502 potential companies. A sample of 200 client companies was
randomly drawn from the list. I then contacted the audit firms for these 200 companies to
collect the data on audit fees and audit hours from fiscal year 1996. Four of the Big Six
firms provided access to their internal billing records.*"
The proprietary data describing the ownership type of an audit client were hand
collected from Suomen Asiakastieto Oy-Finska (a major credit-analyst firm in Finland)
files. The database lists the names of members of the board of directors and of major
owners of firms for almost all unlisted Finnish firms, which allowed the identification of
the indirect owners.^ The companies are classified as (1) companies owned and controlled
^ In addition, one audit firm provided audit fees and hours, but not the identities of their cUents. These data
could not be used in this study.
The audit of a single firm as a unit of analysis causes the measurement problem of the ownership stmcture.
For example, seemingly similar cases in the sense of direct ownership, a fully owned subsidiary of a multinational
firm and a fiiiiy owned subsidiary of the group controlled and owned by its management are clearly ver\' different
ownership types. Thus, in addition to direct ownership, indirect ownership also has to be taken into account.
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Table 2
Sample finns by industry
Industry Frequency Percent
Manufacturing
Trade
Mining
Construction
Post and telecommunications
Services
Transport
Computer and computer-related activities
Holding companies
Other
Total sample
28
33
2
2
2
4
2
2
4
2
81
34.57
40.74
2.47
2.47
2.47
4.94
2.47
2.47
4.94
2.47
100.00
by their managers (e.g., family businesses), (2) companies owned by the state or
municipahties, (3) companies owned by foreign companies, or (4) companies with no
majority owners (comparison group). In cases of missing or unclear data, the information
needed was gathered from the firm's web pages or directly from the company's
management by phone or email. Combining all these sources of data resulted in the sample
of 103 observations.
Financial statement data were obtained from the Voitto+ database. Missing data on the
length of the auditor-client relationship (NEW CLIENT) reduced further the final sample
size to 81 observations. Table 2 provides a breakdown of the sample firms by industry.
Table 3
Descriptive statistics
Continuous variables Mean S.D.
FEE (1000 FlMs)
LNFEE
AUDIT HOURS
LNHOURS
TOTAL ASSETS (million FIMs)
LN ASSETS
INVREC
134.55
4.42
319.77
5.27
748.22
12.52
0.35
154.79
1.14
384.59
1.21
1536.14
1.36
0.22
Binary variables Percentage' Number''
PARENT
LISTED
NEW CLIENT
LOSS
PW
MAJORO
STATEO
MANO
FORO
33.33
9.88
7.41
24.69
18.50
74.10
7.41
24.69
41.98
27
8
6
20
15
60
6
20
34
Variable descriptions are found in Table I.
Sample size, ;2 = 81.
^ Where value of variable = 1.
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concentration and fees. The same relationship, however, could not be found with
Norwegian data (Firth, 1997).
In sum, our understanding about the relationship between the ownership structure of the
audit client and audit production and fees is limited. Moreover, there is a lack of research
on the influence or the existence of non-managerial majority shareholders on audit
production and fees, despite the calls for research on this particular issue (Hay et al., 2003,
p.24).
3. Auditing in Finland
Finland provides a good setting for a Continental European study as the Finnish
institutional setting resembles those in other Continental European countries in three
important ways: concentrated corporate ownership (Faccio & Lang, 2002), legal systems
based on code law (LaPorta et al., 1998; Wymeersch, 1998), and relatively low auditors'
exposure to litigation risk (Vander Bauwhede, Willekens, & Gaeremynck, 2003).
In Finland, the principles of financial reporting are stipulated in the Accounting Act and
the Company Law, and the Auditing Act specifies the rules and regulations in auditing.'
As a member state of the European Union, Finland has the obligation to ensure that the
Finnish audit regulations comply with the Directives of the European Commission
(Finland joined the EU in 1995). In Finland, these directives are implemented through the
Auditing Act (936/1994), which defines the purpose and scope of a statutory audit and,
requires "full" fmancial statement audits (i.e. reviews or other assurance services providing
limited assurance are not an option). In addition to opining on the fairness of the financial
statements, auditors must also give an opinion regarding the profit distribution suggestions
made by the board of directors, and an opinion as to whether a client's management has
complied with all applicable laws and company by-laws (Auditing Act 936/94, Chapter 4,
Subsection 19).
Although the Auditing Act specifies the principles of auditing and regulates the
profession, it provides limited practical guidance on financial statement audits. Since the
Finnish certified auditors' professional organizations are members of the International
Federation of Accountants (IFAC), certified auditors in Finland must also follow the
International Standards on Auditing (ISA). Together, these standards provide a lower
bound of audit quality attributable to the profession.
Similar to many Continental European countries, such as some Nordic countries,
Germany, and Italy, the certification of public accountants in Finland is characterized
by a two-tier system. Auditors approved by the Central Chamber of Commerce (KHT)
are regarded as "first tiei^' auditors whereas the "second tier" certified accountants
(HTM) are approved by regional Chambers of Commerce. In general, both the
prerequisites and the KHT certification exam itself are regarded as more demanding
than the qualifications needed to become an HTM auditor. The largest companies and
J
For a description of Finnish accounting and auditing laws, see Sundgren and Johansson (2004: 126-127).
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all the listed companies operating in Finland are required by law to hire a KHT
auditor whereas the clients of the HTM auditors are mainly small and medium-sized
companies (Niemi, 2004)."
In Finland, three features in the legal system mitigate against auditor litigation
(Niemi, 2002). First, legal awards are limited to the actual loss of the plaintiff (i.e.,
they have no punitive aspect). Second, the professional body of attorneys prohibits
contingent-fee-based billing. Third, class-action lawsuits are not possible. Consequent-
ly, the auditor's litigation exposure should be lower in Finland than in countries that
allow class actions and higher awards. To support the assertion that Finland is a
country with relatively low litigation pressures, I turned to a leading insurance
brokerage firm that maintains a proprietary litigation index for puiposes of pricing
insurance premiums for large international accounting firms. The index ranges from
to 10 in order of increasing litigation pressure and is maintained and updated annually for
110 countries. For the audit period in question, the index shows Finland in the upper
quartile of the lower half of the range."*
4. Hypothesis development
4.1. The scope of an audit and the demand for assurance
The scope of an audit and the demand for assurance that accounting numbers are fairly
presented are the two general determinants of audit effort. The scope of the audit is
detennined by the number of different infonnation and reporting systems used by the audit
client, the number of fransactions in those systems, and the amount and nature of financial
information disclosed by the client management. The level of assurance delivered by the
audit is understood in the audit literature as the probability that the financial statements are
free from material error after they have been audited. The demand for this assurance
emerges from information asymmetries between client management and stakeholders of
the client firm and also from the legal environment in which the client firm operates. The
main argument of the paper is that there are differential effects of ownership concentration
depending on the particular nature of concentrated ownership (i.e., firnis in which the
majority of shares are manager-owned versus foreign-owned versus state-owned) on audit
production and pricing through the two dimensions of an audit, the scope of the audit, and
the demand for assurance.
In addition to the two tiers of certified public accountants, there is also a "third tier" of supphers of audit
services, persons holding no certificate. Non-certified persons are allowed to audit companies and partnerships
that are so small that according to the EU Directives they could be exempt from having a statutory audit but are
required to be audited according the Auditing Act. Nevertheless, the requirements of audit quality stipulated in the
Auditing Act are the same for all. Anyone providing a statutory audit is required to have a sufficient level of skills
and knowledge in accounting and legislation to conduct the audit given its level of complexity.
I wish to thank Prof Mark Taylor and Aon Insurance Ser\'ices for providing the infonnation.
The firm disallowed reporting of the actual index for any of the countries.
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4.2. Three types of controlling owners
Studies on corporate ownership show that the most common type of a controlhng
owner is a manager-owner or a "founding family," that participates in daily operations of
the corporation (e.g., LaPorta et al., 1999). This is also the case in Continental European
countries including Finland (Faccio & Lang, 2002). Another typical controlling owner is
the state or municipalities. According to LaPorta et al. (1999: 496), 70% of the largest
traded firms in Austria, 45% in Singapore, and 40% in Israel and Italy are state controlled.
A third common type is corporate ownership (Wymeersch, 1998). Subsidiaries of MNCs
with overseas headquarters are major players in many industries, especially in smaller
economies. These three types of ownership structures have unique characteristics. The
differences arise from the relationship between management and the controlling owner.
Consequently, these differences are expected to have differential effects on auditing as
discussed below.
4.2.1. Managerial ownership
Information asymmetry between the owners and managers in manager-owned firms
should be lower than in other forms of ownership, which should lead to a lower demand
for assurance. Empirical support for this argument is provided by the auditor choice
literature, which links the higher probability of choosing a higher quality auditor to
situations characterized by higher information asymmetry between owners and managers
(e.g. Beatty, 1989; DeFond, 1992; Francis & Wilson, 1988). This finding is consistent
with the view that the higher the managerial ownership, the lower the demand for
assurance because owners are more actively engaged in day-to-day operations. Also,
manager-owners might be more efficient in controlling corporate assets than hired
managers, resulting in a less hierarchical organizational structure. This lower
organizational complexity should also reduce the demand for assurance (Abdel-Khalik,
1993) and the scope of the audit. Third, a manager that has a large share of his wealth
invested in the company is likely more risk averse in making investment decisions than
the manager who has a more diversified portfolio (Jensen, 1986). The management's
risk-taking behavior should have an impact on audit effort through the auditor's risk
assessment.
In sum, manager-owned firms are expected to be characterized by lower information
asymmetry, lower organizational complexity, and lower auditor risk, which should result
in lower audit effort and fees. These expectations are fonnalized as HI:
HI. Audit hours and fees are lower for companies where a majority of shares is owned by
its management than for other companies.
4.2.2. Foreign-owned subsidiaries
Prior empirical evidence suggests that multinationals report their results in more
detail than companies operating in only one country (Jaggi & Low, 2000). Since more
detail requires more effort to audit, such audits reflect higher fees (Karim & Moizer,
1996; Rose, 1999). Similarly, audit fees should be higher for the subsidiaries of
foreign companies than their domestically owned counterparts because of added
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financial reporting complexity and the greater need for corporate governance in foreign
owned subsidiaries. Producing financial statements is likely to be more complex when
a parent company is located in another country because the accounting rules differ
across countries. As each subsidiary is obviously responsible for producing its own
financial statements for consolidated accounts at the group level, a subsidiary
operating in a different country than its parent company must produce at least one
additional set of financial statements. Moreover, these additional sets of financial
statements may be prepared in multiple languages requiring additional effort. Lastly,
financial reporting of overseas affiliates requires foreign currency transformations and
transfer pricing.
Foreign affiliates may also require additional controls over management because the
conflict of interest between the management of the subsidiary and the foreign corporate
owner may be magnified by geographical distance and national objectives (Buckley, 1997:
204). As in all related companies, the owners are concerned with suboptimization (i.e., a
subsidiary taking action that is beneficial to its own objectives but not optimal for the
organization as a whole), but in multinational corporations this monitoring problem is
likely exacerbated by the geographical separation. The managers may favor the perceived
interests of their national subsidiary rather than the overall interests of the firm.
Consequently, the need for management control may be higher in foreign-owned
subsidiaries than in domestically owned subsidiaries. Thus, the additional complexities
in financial statement reporting and the problems of management control in foreign-owned
subsidiaries likely increases the need for more extensive auditing procedures. These
expectations are formalized in H2:
H2. Audit hours and fees for companies that are foreign affiliates are higher than for other
companies.
4.2.3. Governmental ownership
Governmental ownership differs from the other forms of ownership. Denis and
McConnell (2003: 4) describe such ownership as a hybrid of dispersed and concentrated
ownership. On the one hand, state-owned corporations are ultimately financed with money
that belongs to the people of the state, and in this regard the ultimate ownership is
extremely dispersed. This creates a more pronounced free-rider problem than in large
listed companies with a diffuse ownership structure, where the shareholders have no strong
incentive to directly monitor the management themselves because each shareholder has
only a small investment in the firm (Berle & Means, 1932). On the other hand, the de facto
control rights, in practice, are in the hands of the individuals within the government
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).
But unlike other types of controlling owners, the government representatives have no
cash flow rights. Even so, they have an incentive to monitor the management as they may
suffer reputation costs if they fail to monitor management effectively. More important, the
fact that the individuals within the government do not bear the controlling (auditing) costs
themselves should have an impact on their own cost-benefit analysis, which should, from
the individual's point of view, shift the optimum amount of external auditing upwards.
This should result in a larger investment in auditing in state-owned companies compared
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to those companies with insiders bearing the cost of auditing.^ These expectations are
formahzed in H3:
H3. Audit hours and fees are higher for state-owned companies than for other companies.
5. Research design
5.7. Combined ownership concentration (preliminary test)
Chan et al. (1993) hypothesized and documented an inverse association between
ownership concentration and audit fees with the sample of large listed U.K. companies.
They combined managerial ownership and any holdings exceeding 5%. Firth (1997) used
the same measure in his fee study focusing on Norwegian listed companies but found no
association between concentrated ownership structure and fees. For comparison, the
associations between ownership concentration (having a majority-owner) and audit effort
and fees are examined two versions of the following:
LN(r) = ao + aiLNASSETS + a2lNVREC + X3PARENT + a4LISTED
+ ajNEW CLIENT + agLOSS + xtPW + asMAJORO + d ( 1
)
where 7 is the total audit fees (LNFEE) for Model 1, and the total audit hours (LNHOURS)
for Model 2. The explanatory variables are as defined in Table 1 . The variable of main
interest, MAJORO is an indicator variable for a company that is majority-owned.
5.2. Different types of controlling owners (the main test)
As a main test, the association between the levels of audit fees and hours and the
hypothesized fee determinants are examined by estimating two versions of the following
regression:
LN(r) = Po + AiLNASSETS + /?2lNVREC + A3PARENT + /?4LISTED
+ iSgNEW CLIENT + ^gLOSS + ^yPW + ^gSTATEO
+ /?9MAN0 + /?ioFORO + v (2)
where Y is the total audit fees (LNFEE) for Model 3, and the total audit hours
(LNHOURS) for Model 4. The explanatory variables are as defined in Table 1. To test the
hypotheses of the study, the three ownership variables (MANO, FORO, STATEO) are
included in both regression models. These three variables of interest are dummies
indicating if the client is a company in which the majority of shares are owned by the
company's management (MANO), a foreign (parent) company (FORO), or the state or
^ For discussion about the incentives of different parties influencing the demand for auditmg in a more general
context, see Hay and Knechel (2003).
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Table 1
Description of variables
Variable name Expected sign
fees/hours
Description
Dependent
LNFEE (Models I and 3)
LNHOURS (Models 2 and 4)
LNASSETS +/+
INVREC +/+
PARENT +/+
LISTED +/+
NEW CLIENT ?/+
LOSS
PW
?/+
+/+
MAJORO (Models 1 and 2) ?/?
STATEO (Models 3 and 4) +/+
MANO (Models 3 and 4) -/-
FORO (Models 3 and 4) +/+
Natural logarithm of total audit fee
Natural logarithm of total audit hours charged to
the audit engagement
Natural logarithm of the client's total assets
Proportion of the client's assets in inventories
and receivables
Binary, 1 =the client is a parent company, otherwise
Binary, l=the client's shares were publicly held
in 1996, otherwise
Binary, l=the auditor client relationship is 2 years
or less, otherwise
Binary, 1 =the client incurred a loss in the any of the
last 3 fiscal years, otherwise
Binary, 1 =the client of Price Waterhouse, otherwise
Binary, 1 =the majority of the client company's shares is
owned by the State or municipalities, its management,
or a foreign company, otherwise
Binary, l=the majority of the client company's shares
is owned by the State or municipalities, otherwise
Binary, l=the majority of the client company's shares
is owned by its management, otherwise
Binary, I = the client is a subsidiary of a foreign
company, otherwise
municipalities (STATEO), respectively. The negative coefficient for MANO supports HI
and the positive coefficients for FORO and STATEO support H2 and H3, respectively.
5.3. Control variables
The prior audit fee modeling work shows that major fee determinants include client size,
complexity of cUent operations, various chent risks, and the supplier of the audit (Chan et al.,
1993;Cobbin, 2002; Hay et al., 2003; Walker & Johnson, 1996). The typical measure of
client size in the previous models, the natural logarithm of total assets (LNASSETS) is
adopted in this study. Following prior works, the ratio of inventories and receivables to total
assets (INVREC) is employed to capture one aspect of the complexity of the audit client.
Another aspect of complexity, the number of accounting systems, should increase with the
number of subsidiaries ifthe audit effort were measured at the group level. In this study, since
the effort and fees are measured at the individual company level, the similar relationship
cannot be assumed. Even so, audits of parent companies can be assumed to be more laborious
than subsidiaries or "independenf companies because the auditor of the parent company also
has to audit the consolidated financial statements (the Accounting Act). Consequently, a
\ ariable indicating when the client is a parent company (PARENT) is employed.
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Various client risks include the degree of the financial statement user's reliance on the
statements, the new client-auditor relationship (Helliar, Monroe, & Woodliff, 1 996), and the
probability of financial distress (Pratt & Stice, 1994; Stice, 1991). To capture these client
risks, following prior research, indicator variables for listed companies (LISTED), new
client relationships (NEW CLIENT), and loss-making (LOSS) are employed, respectively.
For audit hours, the expected signs for these three variables are assumed to be positive.
However, for audit fees, competition over new clients and poor profitability may create
downward pressure (Butterworth & Houghton, 1995; Simon & Francis, 1988; Taylor &
Baker, 1981). Due to the possible opposite effects of new client relationships and loss
making on audit fees, no predicfion for fees is presented for NEW CLIENT and LOSS.
Finally, systematic differences in audit fees may exist among the different audit firms.
For example. Price Waterhouse has been found to charge higher fees in many countries
(e.g. Moizer, 1997). To control for the possible pricing or effort differences between Price
Waterhouse and the other audit finns, an indicator variable (PW) was added to the model.
6. Sample selection and descriptive statistics
6.]. Sample selection
This study focuses on the audits of large clients of (then) Big Six audit firms in Finland,
excluding financial and insurance companies. Limiting the analysis to Big Six audits
should reduce the possible impact of national idiosyncrasies as the very idea of being a
global brand name supplier is to provide the same goods or services in every country.
Consequently, focusing on Big Six audits should fijrther improve the comparability of the
results to other countries.
The client companies were identified by comparing Statistics Finland's database of the
large Finnish firms with data on the auditors of large and medium-sized Finnish companies
produced by Balance Consulting Ltd. After deleting observations for companies with joint
auditors, there were 502 potential companies. A sample of 200 client companies was
randomly drawn from the list. I then contacted the audit firms for these 200 companies to
collect the data on audit fees and audit hours from fiscal year 1996. Four of the Big Six
firms provided access to their internal billing records.^
The proprietary data describing the ownership type of an audit client were hand
collected from Suomen Asiakastieto Oy-Finska (a major credit-analyst firm in Finland)
files. The database lists the names of members of the board of directors and of major
owners of firms for almost all unlisted Finnish firms, which allowed the identification of
the indirect owners.^ The companies are classified as (1) companies owned and controlled
^ In addition, one audit firm provided audit fees and hours, but not the identities of their clients. These data
could not be used in this study.
The audit of a single firm as a unit of analysis causes the measurement problem of the ownership structure.
For example, seemingly similar cases in the sense of direct ownership, a fUlly owned subsidiary of a multinational
firm and a ftilly owned subsidiary of the group controlled and owned by its management are clearly very different
ownership types. Thus, in addition to direct ownership, indirect ownership also has to be taken into account.
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Table 2
Sample firms by industr\'
Industry Frequency Percent
Manufacturing 28 34.5"
Trade 33 40.74
Mining 2 2.47
Construction 2 2.47
Post and telecommunications 2 2.47
Services 4 4.94
Transport 2 2.47
Computer and computer-related acti\ ities 2 2.4"'
Holding companies 4 4.94
Other 2 2.47
Total sample 81 100.00
by their managers (e.g.. famih' businesses). (2) companies o\\ned b\' the state or
municipalities. (3) companies owned by foreign companies, or (4) companies with no
majority owners (comparison group). In cases of missing or unclear data, the information
needed was gathered from the firm's web pages or directh' from the company's
management by phone or email. Combining all these sources of data resulted in the sample
of 103 obserxations.
Financial statement data were obtained from the \bitto- database. Missing data on the
length of the auditor-client relationship (NEW CLIENT) reduced funher the tlnal sample
size to 81 obser\ations. Table 2 pro\ides a breakdown of the sample finns by industr\-.
Table 3
Descripti\ e statistics
Continuous variables Mean S.D.
FEE (1000 FlMs) 134.55 154."9
LNFEE 4.42 1.14
.\UD1T HOURS 319.77 384.59
LNHOURS 5.27 1.21
TOTAL ASSETS (million FlMs) 748.22 1536.14
LN ASSETS 12.52 1.36
nsrV'REC 0.35 0.22
Binan.' variables Percentage* Number^
R\RENT 33.33 2"
LISTED 9.S8 8
NEW CLIENT 7.41 6
LOSS 24.69 20
P\V IS. 50 15
M.AJORO "4.10 60
ST.ATEO ".41 6
MANO 24.69 20
FORO 41.98 34
\ariable descriptions are found in Table 1.
Sample size. ;7=81.
Where value of variable = 1.
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6.2. Descriptive statistics
Table 3, which presents the descriptive statistics of the 81 sample companies, shows
that the average fee is 134,000 Finnish Markkas (27,000 USD) and an engagement takes
an average of about 320 h. When comparing the average fees and hours to previous studies
it should be noted that the empirical tests performed in this paper are based on audits of
single companies, not on groups of companies. This level of analysis is chosen as it allows
the examination of the subsidiaries of foreign companies. Sixty (74%) companies out of 81
are majority-owned; 34 (42%) are subsidiaries of foreign companies, 20 (25%) are owner-
managed companies, and six (IVo) are state-owned companies. Eight (10%)) sample firms
are listed companies, leaving 13 privately held companies with no majority owners.
6.3. Correlations between the independent variables
Table 4 presents the correlations between independent variables. The highest
correlations (—0.560) are between listing status (LISTED) and the ownership concentra-
tion dummy (MAJORO), and between client size (LNASSETS) and the ratio of
inventories and receivables to total assets (INVREC), a proxy for complexity of client
operations (—0.549). The values of correlation coefficients exceeding 0.8 are interpreted
as indicating significant multicollinearity problems (Judge, Hill, Griffiths, Liitkepohl, &
Lee, 1988: 868). As all the values of correlation coefficients are well below 0.8, they do
not suggest that multicollinearity is a serious problem.
7. Results
7.1. Combined managerial and non-managerial concentration (the preliminary test)
As a preliminary test, motivated by Chan et al. (1993), the differences in audit fees and
hours between companies with majority owners and companies with a more diverse
ownership structure were examined. The results of this preliminary test are reported in
Table 5 (Models 1 and 2). As the measure of the combined managerial and non-managerial
ownership concentration (MAJORO) is insignificant in both Models 1 and 2, the results do
not support the idea that ownership concentration per se impacts audit effort or fees. The
finding is not surprising if managerial and non-managerial ownership concentration have
opposite effects on auditing as hypothesized.
The positive PW indicator variable in both Models 1 and 2 (/?< 0.005 and p< 0.0 10,
respectively) suggests that the audits of Price Waterhouse are larger, resulting in higher
fees. The negative NEW CLIENT variables indicate that not only fees, but also audit hours
are lower for the initial audits.
7.2. Effects of the different ty^pes of the majority' owners (the main test)
As a main test, the regression models above were re-estimated after replacing
MAJORO with the three separate indicator variables MANO, FORO, and STATEO.
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Table 5
Test of differences in audit fees and audit hours between majority-owned companies (MAJORO) and companies
with no majority owners
Dependent Model 1 (audit fees) Model 2 (audit hours)
variable LNFEE LNHOURS
Independent Expected sign Coefficient / statistic p value* VIF Coefficient t statistic p value* VIF
variable' (Model 1'
Model 2)
Constant -2.591 -1.842 0.070 -1.115 -0.719 0.475
LNASSETS +/+ 0.524 5.241 0.000 1.738 0.475 4.308 0.000 1.738
INVREC +/+ 0.802 1.349 0.091 1.561 0.773 1.180 0.121 1.561
PARENT +/+ 0.095 0.357 0.356 1.489 0.108 0.372 0.356 1.489
LISTED +/+ -0.024 -0.053 0.479 1.739 -0.106 -0.212 0.416 1.739
NEW CLIENT ?/+ -0.843 -2.010 0.048 1.154 -1.137 -2.459 0.008 1.154
LOSS ?/+ 0.433 1.759 0.083 1.077 0.593 2.185 0.016 1.077
PW +/+ 0.666 2.383 0.005 1.129 0.736 2.388 0.010 1.129
MAJORO 7/7 -0.027 -0.088 0.930 1.708 -0.072 -0.216 0.830 1.708
Sample size.
H=81
Adj. ^- 0.351 0.302
F statistic 6.404 5.320
Significance of 0.000 0.000
F statistic
Variable descriptions are found in Table 1
.
Significance of p value based on one- (two-) tail /-test when (no) a priori prediction is made.
Table 6 shows that consistent with HI stating that audit hours and fees are lower
for management owned companies, the coefficient on MANO is negative and
significant for both audit fees and hours (/?< 0.020 and p<0.010, respectively). The
results are also consistent with H2, as audit fees and hours of companies that are
foreign affiliates are higher than other companies as shown by the positive
coefficient on FORO (/7<0.043 and p<0.039). The results are not consistent with
H3. Audit hours and fees are not higher for the state-owned companies than for
other companies. On the contrary, the results on STATEO suggest that companies
owned by the state or municipalities do not differ from those with non-majority
owners.
The regression coefficient estimates of the test variables MANO and FORO reported in
Table 6 translate to the relative differences in audit fee and hour levels as follows. Owner
managed firms (MANO) have around 47% lower fees and 55% lower hours, on average,
than the comparison group (i.e., companies that are not majority owned). Correspondingly,
foreign-owned subsidiaries have 70% higher fees and 84% higher hours on average than the
comparison group.
^
However, due to relatively wide confidence intervals (not reported) for true coefficients the estimated
multitudes of differences in fees and hours should be interpreted with caution.
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Table 6
Test of differences in audit fees and audit hours beuveen companies owned by the management, a foreign
corporation, the state or municipalities, and other companies
Dependent
variable
Model 3 (audit fees) Model 4 (audit hours)
LNFEE LNHOURS
Independent Expected sign Coefficient t statistic p value*
variable^ (Model 3/
Model 4)
VLF Coefficient / statistic p value* VIF
Constant -2.183 -1.722 0.089 -0.668 -0.488 0.627
LNASSETS +/+ 0.470 5.145 0.000 1.815 0.415 4.205 0.000 1.815
INVREC +/+ 1.063 1.924 0.029 1.690 1.046 1.752 0.042 1.690
PARENT +/+ 0.605 2.297 0.013 1.852 0.716 2.517 0.007 1.852
LISTED +/+ -0.190 -0.463 0.323 1.804 -0.319 -0.718 0.238 1.804
NEW CLIENT ?/+ -0.811 -2.165 0.034 1.155 -1.100 -2.718 0.004 1.155
LOSS ?/+ 0.315 1.406 0.164 1.119 0.446 1.842 0.035 1.119
PW +/+ 0.339 1.261 0.106 1.306 0.334 1.151 0.127 1.306
MANO -/- -0.644 -2.101 0.020 2.098 -0.791 -2.389 0.010 2.098
FORO +/+ 0.531 1.688 0.043 2.889 0.608 1.792 0.039 2.889
STATED +/+ 0.432 0.997 0.161 1.546 0.387 0.828 0.205 1.546
Sample size.
« = 81
Adj. R- 0.482 0.466
F statistic 8.441 7.969
Significance of 0.000 0.000
F statistic
Variable descriptions are found in Table 1.
Significance ofp value based on one- (two-) tail /-test when (no) a priori prediction is made.
The results on the NEW CLIENT variable remained qualitatively the same as those in
the preliminary test: the negative coefficient on NEW CLIENT suggests that fees and,
unexpectedly, also audit hours are lower for initial audits (/?<0.034 and /7<0.004,
respectively). The comparison of the results for the PW indicator variable between the
preliminary test and the main test (Tables 5 and 6), however, warrants further
examination. The PW indicator variable, which was found positive and significant for
both audit fees and hours in the preliminary test (/?<0.005 and p<0.010, respectively),
lacks statistical significance in the main test. To exclude the possibility that the PW
clients drive the results supporting the hypotheses, the PW clients (15) were removed
from the sample and the models were re-estimated. As Table 7 shows, the results
remained qualitatively the same, which increases the confidence for the documented
support for the hypotheses.
7.3. Diagnostics and sensitivity checks
Based on standard diagnostics for the appropriateness of the ordinary least squares
(OLS) method perfonned, any problems in applying the OLS method in tests of the
hypotheses could not be found.^ MulticoUinearity does not seem to be a serious problem
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Table 7
Test of differences in audit fees and audit hours between companies owned by the management, a foreign
corporation, the state or municipalities, and other companies when the clients of price waterhouse are removed
from the sample
Dependent Model 5 (audit fees) Model 6 (audit hours)
variable LNFEE LNHOURS
Independent Expected sign Coefficient t statistic p value* VIE Coefficient t statistic p value* VIE
variable"* (Model 5/
Model 6)
Constant -2.541 -1.599 0.115 -1.339 -0.768 0.446
LNASSETS +/+ 0.480 4.153 0.000 2.232 0.451 3.557 0.000 2.232
INVREC +/+ 1.529 2.105 0.020 2.006 1.566 1.965 0.027 2.006
PARENT +/+ 0.754 2.299 0.013 2.053 0.799 2.218 0.015 2.053
LISTED +/+ -0.197 -0.444 0.329 1.790 -0.324 -0.667 0.254 1.790
NEW CLIENT ?/+ -1.059 -2.410 0.019 1.161 -1.367 -2.833 0.003 1.161
LOSS ?/+ 0.301 1.126 0,265 1.169 0.390 1.330 0.094 1.169
MANO -/- -0.667 -1.974 0.027 1.873 -0.810 -2.185 0.017 1.873
FORO +/+ 0.652 1.904 0.031 2.234 0.724 1.927 0.030 2.234
STATEO +/+ 0.560 1.185 0.120 1.585 0.495 0.954 0.172 1.585
Sample size.
H=66
Adj. R- 0.492 0.467
F statistic 7.984 7.329
Significance of 0.000 0.000
F statistic
* Variable descriptions are found in Table 1.
* Significance of/? value based on one- (tvvo-) tail /-test when (no) a priori prediction is made.
either: the correlation coefficients between independent variables (Table 4) are moderate,
most independent variables have statistically significant regression coefficients, and the
Variance Inflator Factor scores reported with the regression results (Tables 5 and 6) are
well below the threshold of ten that is perceived to indicate serious multicollinearity
(Neter. Wasserman, & Kutner, 1983).'*^
The sensitivity checks on the results to alternative model specifications, however, are
warranted, as only a limited amount of work is done in European countries and the choice
of variables has been based more on experimenting and prior empirical findings than
formal theory. First, total assets were replaced by other proxies for client size, total net
sales and number of personnel. While these size variables were somewhat less correlated
' The distributions of the residuals from the models were examined using the Kolmogorov-Smimov test. The
assumption of normality could not be rejected. To examine the possible heteroskedasticity problems the
Goldfeld-Quandt test was performed. The Goldfeld-Quandt test should be more efficient than for example.
White's general test of heteroskedasticity in cases in which one can identify the source of potential
heteroskedasticity problems (Greene, 1997: 551). Often the source of potential problems is related to the firm
size: if error terms are not constant they are likely to increase with the firm size. The Goldfeld-Quandt test based
on this assumption revealed no heteroskedasticity' problems.
'" In the context of audit fee models, a fairly thorough analysis of multicollinearity is found in Taylor & Simon
(1999: 385).
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with some other control variables, such as the ratio of inventories and receivables to total
assets (INVREC), the overall model fit was lower. Otherwise, the results remained
qualitatively the same.
Second, various alternative measures of complexity of client's operations and the audit
risk related to the client's financial distress were considered. Complexity was measured by
the number of industries the client operates in and the number of locations the client has.
Financial distress measure, the indicator variable for loss making, was replaced with
alternative continuous measures of leverage and profitability.
Third, to reduce the risk that correlated, omitted variables drive the results, some
variables were added to the model. Following Chan et al. (1993), the location of the client
was considered using a dummy that indicates if the client is located in the Helsinki area,
where living costs are higher than in the other parts of Finland. Also, using an indicator
variable approach, the effects of the "busy season" (Chan et al., 1993), and of having an
intemal audit department (Felix, Gramling, & Maletta, 2001; Jensen & Payne, 2003;
Simunic, 1980) on audit hours and fees were examined. Possible differences in audit
production, reflecting differences in the clients' industries, were examined using two
industry indicator variables (manufacturing and trade). Also, to control for the possible
differences between audit firms more carefiilly, two firm dummies were added. Although
controlling for individual audit firms reduced somewhat the significance levels for FORO
in both Models, FORO remained significant at the 10% level (one-tail test). As none of
these dummy variables were statistically significant, and, more importantly, the results
remained qualitatively the same in these alternative model specifications, the variables
were removed for parsimony fi-om the reported models.
Finally, an alternative sample was used to address the problems that might arise from
the potential classification error of ownership types. This classification error is more
likely to occur for publicly held finns than for privately held companies, as the
ownership type of listed companies in some cases might be less clear that that of private
companies. Namely, it may be that in some public companies the largest blockholders are
quite influential even if they are not majority owners. This is possible, for example, when
the blockholders are the managers of the company. In those cases, the actual ownership
type might resemble a management-owned company rather than a company with a more
diverse ownership structure. On the contrary, privately held firms typically have either a
very concentrated ownership structure or a very diffuse owner base (for example, mutual
fiind companies that are owned by their customers or members). Consequently, all listed
finns (8) were removed from the sample and the regressions were re-estimated. As the
results remained qualitatively the same using this altemative sample, the potential
misclassification error of ownership type of the listed companies does not seem to be a
serious problem.
8. Conclusion
The paper argues that the effect of the ownership concentration on audit effort and
pricing depends on the owner type. Consistent with this, the results show that, compared to
other firms, audit effort and fees are lower for the companies majority-owned by their
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management and higher for the subsidiaries of foreign companies. However, no difference
between companies owned b\- the state or municipalities and companies with more diverse
ownership structure was found, suggesting that go%emmental ownership, a hybrid of
dispersed and concentrated ownership (Denis & McConnell. 2003. 4). is closer to
dispersed than concentrated ownership in terms of audit qualit}
.
The finding that the impact of ha\ ing a controlling owner depends on the type w arrants
extra care for controlling for differences in ownership t\pes. This is especially important
when examining markets charactenzed with a broad \anet\' of different ownership t>pes
such as those in Continental European countries.
The findings also demonstrate that the failure to control for ownership t\pe may lead to
incorrect conclusions. To illustrate, the results from the prelirmnar\- tests based on the
models including only the measure of combined managerial and non-managerial
ownership concentration indicated clear differences in audit hours and fees between Price
W'aterhouse and the other three Big Six audit firms used in this study. However, after
controlling for different t\pes of majorit\^-owners. statistically significant differences
between audit firms could not be found.
A relatively small sample size can be regarded as a limitation of this study. .\lso. the
study is limited to the audits of the four Big SLx (then) firms that allowed access to their
internal billing records. It may be possible that the other audit firms behave differently.
On the other hand, limiting the analysis to Big Six audits should reduce the possible
impact of national idiosyncrasies, since the ver\' idea of being a global brand name
supplier is to pro\ ide the same goods or ser\'ices in e\ er> countn,'. Consequently, focusing
on Big SLx audits should further improve the comparabilit\' of the results to other
countries.
Future research is needed to evaluate the generalit\' of the results. For example, cross-
countp. smdies could examine the influence of instimtional differences on the relationship
between client's ownership structures and audit production, .\udit production and
functioning of the markets for audit ser\ices in countries \\ ith concentrated ownership
strucmre is still largely unexplored terrain.
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Abstract
In this paper, we in\estigate the role of culture as an explanatory' factor underlying differences
bet^\een national GAAP and International Accounting Standards (IAS). National G.AAP can differ
from IAS in two ways: ( 1 ) di\ ergence: both national GAAP and LAS cover a specific accounting
topic but prescribe different methods; or (2) absence: national GAAP do not cover an accounting
issue regulated by IAS. Based on Nobes" [Nobes, C. (Ed.) (2001). Gaap 2001—A Sun^ey of
National Accounting Rules Benchmarked Against International Accoimting Standards. EFAD.] data,
we construct a measure for the level of di\ ergence of national GAAP benchmarked on IAS. W'e
also create a measure (labeled absence) to assess the scope of national accounting rules compared to
IAS. Our sample is made up of 52 countries. We show that culture matters more than legal origin
(common law civil-law) in explaining divergences from IAS. This result is robust to two pro.xies for
culture: Hofstede [Hofstede. G. (2001). Culture's Consequences: Comparing Values. Behaviors,
Institutions and Organizations Across A'ations. Second. Sage Publications (London).] and Schwartz
[Schwartz. S. H. (1994). Beyond individualism collectivism: New cultural dimensions of values. In
U. Kim. H. C. Triandis. C. Kagitcibasi. S. C. Choi. & G. Yoon (Eds.). Individualism and
collectivism: Theory: method and applications (85119). Sage.]. Our findings contribute to the
ongoing debate on accoimting harmonization. More specificalh. they suggest that the technical and'
or political dimensions of the debate, although essential, are not the only ones involved. Opposition
to IAS is not exclusively driven by contractual motives, a claimed technical superiority, or legal
origin, but also b> diversits' in cultural factors. Another contribution of this paper is the
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development of a two-dimensional score to measure the differences between national GAAP and
IAS.
© 2005 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The importance of international accounting harmonization is now widely accepted for
several reasons. First, the rapid development of international capital markets is
strengthening their dominant role as an economic resource distributor. How information
is disclosed to the market is a central issue in ensuring market efficiency. Second, the
increasingly frequent cross-listing of multinationals generates an urgent need for a single
universal set of accounting standards for these firms in order to reduce information
production costs and send out a unified, reliable message to the market. Third, the
activities of institutional investors are becoming increasingly internationalized. Their
presence in foreign markets is forcing domestic listed firms to play the accounting game
by global rules.
As a legitimate pretender to the role of global GAAP, International Accounting
Standards (IAS in the rest of the paper) (renamed International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRS) from 2001) have been growing in fame since the endorsement in 2000 of
the Comparability Project by the IOSCO and the reform in 2001 that saw the lASC
become the lASB. In June 2002, the European Union decided to make IAS compulsory for
the consolidated accounts of all its listed companies from 2005 (European Union, 2002).
This decision was followed by the introduction of similar policies in Russia, Australia, and
New Zealand. In October 2002, the FASB and lASB issued a memorandum of
understanding, marking a significant step towards formalizing their commitment to the
convergence of U.S. and international accounting standards. However, not all countries are
traveling down the road of convergence towards IAS at the same speed. The domestic
accounting standards of the "slower" countries often cover fewer issues than the IAS.
There are two ways that a national GAAP system can differ from IAS: (1) divergence:
both national GAAP and IAS cover a specific accounting topic but prescribe different
methods; or (2) absence: national GAAP does not cover an accounting issue regulated by
IAS. Conformity is easily understood in this context, but how can we explain the remaining
differences (i.e. divergence or absence), especially in 2001, after several decades of
development of IAS? In this paper, we investigate the role of a country's cultural values and
legal origin in explaining the differences between national GAAP and IAS as of 2001.
Based on the study of "GAAP 2001" (Nobes, 2001) conducted by several international
accounting firms, 62 countries are assigned scores according to their divergence from IAS
and the absence of national accounting standards on issues covered by IAS. Note that our
measures are created on the basis of 2001 data. This allows us to analyze the "true"
divergence and absence indexes, as these differences are observed before the date of
mandatory application of IAS in certain regions (e.g. 2005 for the European Union and
Australia).
Y. Ding et al. / The International Journal oj Accounting 40 (2005) 325-350 327
We then analyze the relationship between these accounting harmonization scores and
cultural values, as assessed with reference to the work of Hofstede (1980, 1991, 2001) and
Schwartz (1994). Another possible approach would have been to investigate the influence
of institutional/economic factors on our measures. However, since recent literature in
economics and finance (Greif, 1994; Landes, 2000; Stulz & Williamson, 2003)
demonstrates that culture is a determinant of institutions, this article stresses the
importance of cultural rather than institutional factors.
For more comprehensive coverage of the issue, we also integrate institutional factors
into our model, in the form of legal origin, which proxies for various economic/institutional
factors (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleiffer, & Vishny, 1998). In particular, as past
research identified significant links between accounting disclosures and legal systems
(Jaggi & Low, 2000; Hope, 2003), we hypothesize significant differences of approach to
the IAS between two sub-samples: code-law countries and common-law countries.
We find that cultural values matter more than legal origin in explaining divergence
ft-om L\S. However, with regard to the absence index, we find no significant relationship,
and legal origin does not appear to have any influence on divergence from IAS or absence
of local standards. These results contribute to the existing literature in two ways: the
relationship between culture and intemational accounting harmonization has not been
studied previously, and although legal origin is usually considered as an explanatory
variable for accounting information (Ball, Kothari, & Robin, 2000), this does not seem to
be the case for accounting regulation in the context of intemational accounting
harmonization.
This research will be valuable not only for understanding the current differences
between IAS and national GAAP, but also for predicting the potential difficulties facing
various countries in the move towards future intemational accounting harmonization. The
rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the literature on
intemational accounting differences and describes the measurement tool we used. Section
3 analyzes the relationship between culture and accounting, and lays out our hypotheses.
Section 4 explains our research design and measurement of independent variables. Section
5 analyzes the empirical findings, Section 6 presents the limitations of this study, and
Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. International accounting differences
2.1. Past research on measurement of intemational accounting differences
In the literature, various data sources have been used to measure intemational
accounting differences. During the 1970s, Price Waterhouse Intemational (1973, 1975,
1979) published a series of studies on accounting principles and reporting practices
worldwide. In 1973, the sur\-ey covered 233 principles and practices in 38 countries. The
1975 survey constitutes a better data source, with eight additional countries and 264
principles and practices covered. The sample in both studies is biased toward Westem
countries, and leaving certain areas of the world under-represented. The 1979 survey
extended further to cover 64 countries. These surveys were used in several intemational
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accounting studies (e.g. Doupnik & Taylor, 1985; Frank, 1979; McKinnon & Janell, 1984;
Nair & Frank, 1980, 1981), all of which focus on accounting requirements and standards.
Other studies (Emenyonu & Gray, 1996; Evans & Taylor, 1982; Murphy, 2000; Nobes,
1987; van der Tas, 1988) are more interested in company reporting practices. Tay and
Parker (1990) review several of these studies (see also van der Tas, 1992).
In their study on the accounting disclosure requirements of 35 stock exchanges
throughout the world, Adhikari and Tondkar (1992) developed another tool to measure
international accounting differences. They developed a composite disclosure index to
measure the overall quantity and intensity of compulsory disclosures (44 information
items, financial and non-financial) in the listing and filing requirements of different stock
exchanges. The main limitation of their index for measuring international differences is
that it covers disclosures only in annual reports.
After summarizing the information on accounting practices in 15 countries (various
European countries, the U.S., Canada, Australia, and Japan) plus IAS, Ordelheide and
Semler (1995) proposed the TRANSACC Reference Matrix. Each country's complete
accounting rules are presented in tabular form and the rules on any particular accounting
issue are shown for all the countries covered by TRANSACC. Accordingly, the matrix
covers those rules that determine the content of the balance sheet and income statement,
including recognition and valuation as well as the consolidation methods applied in the
respective countries. It provides information on each accounting method under review in the
following form: R (required), A (allowed), F (forbidden). Ordelheide and Semler's study
provides a comprehensive examination of different accounting methods, but is restricted to
the most developed countries in the world. In subsequent literature, several studies have used
this matrix to classify countries according to their accounting differences (e.g. d'Arcy,
2001).
More recently, Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001 ) sought to determine whether the variation
in accounting standards across national boundaries relative to IAS had an impact on
financial analysts' ability to forecast the earnings of non-U.S. firms' accurately. They
analyzed accounting practices in 13 countries to identify differences in countries'
accounting standards relative to IAS, covering both differences in disclosure requirements
and measurement methods for IAS versus sample firms' domestic GAAP in 1993.
To conclude, there is room for improvement in the existing measurements for
international accounting differences. Some of them are out of date (Price Waterhouse
International, 1973, 1975, 1979); others concern only a limited number of countries
(Ashbaugh & Pincus, 2001; Ordelheide & Semler, 1995), cover only a selection of
accounting issues (Adhikari & Tondkar, 1992), or deal with measurement of accounting
differences on a corporate reporting basis (Emenyonu & Gray, 1996; Evans & Taylor,
1982; van der Tas, 1988).
2.2. Measuring a countiy's accounting harmonization
We obtain our data on differences and similarities between national GAAP and IAS from
"GAAP 2001: A Survey of National Accounting Rules Benchmarked against International
Accounting Standards" published by Andersen, BDO, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst and
Young, Grant Thornton, KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers (Nobes, 2001).
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In this study, "partners in the large accountancy firms in more than 60 countries" [62
countries, to be precise] were asked to "benclimark their local written requirements against
some 80 accounting measures, focusing on standards (both LA.S and national) in force for
the fmancial reportmg period ending 31 December 2001. The resulting high level
summaries were prepared b\' identif\ing. for the selected accounting measures, those
instances in which a countn." would not allow (because of inconsistent requirements) or
would not require (because of missing or permissi%e requirements) the IAS treatment." By
using 2001 data to create our measures, we can anahze the "true"' divergence and absence
indexes, since these differences occur before the date of mandatory application IAS in
certain regions (e.g. the required adoption in 2005 for the European Union and Australia).
For each countr\\ the accounting differences with L\S are listed in four categories:
(1
)
"accounting may differ from that required by IAS because of the absence of specific
rules on recognition and measurement."
(2) "no specific rules requiring disclosures."
(3) "inconsistencies between" national "and IAS rules that could lead to differences for
many enterpnses in certain areas."
(4) "in certain enterprises, these other issues could lead to differences from IAS."
Appendix A shows the results of the sur\ey concemmg one sample-countr>': Australia.
We found ourselves confronted by several methodological issues. The result of the stirvey
is "negati\ely" organized in the sense that it only includes "absent" or "inconsistent" items.
Items that are "in conformit},'" or "present" or "consistent" are not disclosed (see Appendix
-A ). Because it was crucial to identify these items for the purposes of this paper, we referred
to the sur\ey questionnaire, presented in G.\AP 2001 (p. 149-161). .-\ppendix B presents
the first uvo questions as an illustration. Tliis questionnaire has 79 questions. The only
w a\ to identify "in conformity" items was to take all the questions from the questionnaire
and search for the related item and or I.-\S paragraph in the sur\ey"s results (see Appendix
A). We then assumed that an item related to a question not co\ered in the results was an
"in conformity" item. This brought us to realize that the order of questions in the
questionnaire and the order of items mentioned in the results \\ ere not always consistent.
Additionally, some topics hsted in the results did not correspond exactly to a question: for
instance, some questions were split into nvo items.
We therefore matched the questions and results countr\' by countrv'. It was then decided
to create a comprehensi\ e list of items, comprising all items found in both the results and
the questions. We identified 1 1 1 items (starting from the initial 79 questions in the
questionnaire).
W ith this list of items, for each country we were able to prepare the following
codification, concentrating on differences:
Code Meaning
-A Absence of specific rules on recognition and measurement
B No specific rules requiring disclosures
C Inconsistencies that could lead to differences for many enterprises
D Differences in some enterprises
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As we found that the distinction was not always clear-cut between categories C
(differences for many enterprises) and D (differences in certain enterprises), we merged
them. As categories A and B refer to the absence of rules (recognition/measurement or
disclosures), we also merged these two categories.
Our final classifications were thus as follows:
Code Meaning
1 Divergence: inconsistencies that could lead to differences for many or some enterprises
2 Absence: of specific rules on recognition/measurement or disclosure
The score per country for each category is determined by the number of accounting
items included in the categories. In all, 62 countries' national GAAP were studied, but
only a maximum of 52 are presented in this study due to the availability of data concerning
our independent variables: Hofstede's cultural dimensions. Using Schwartz's (1994) value
types (see below) leads to a restricted sample of 32 countries.
Table 1 presents the divergence/absence/conformity scores for the 52 countries
studied (both present in our IAS database and in Hofstede's sample). Of the 111 items
identified in IAS, on average, 21 are divergent from national rules, 24 are absent from
national principles, and 66 are in conformity.
We then conducted an analysis by IAS. For each item we compute the number of
countries where local rules were divergent (divergence), less comprehensive (absence),
different (absence or divergence) or equivalent to lASB rules. Since we have 52
countries in our sample, the total score for all three dimensions (divergence, absence,
and conformity) equals 52. We then aggregate items for each IAS. For example, three
items relate to IAS 1. The sum of the scores is thus 156 (=52*3). Since the number
of items per LAS is not constant (three items for LAS 1 , as mentioned, 5 items for IAS
Table 1
Divergence, absence, difference and conformity scores for the 52 countries studied
Divergence Absence Difference Conformity Total
(1) (2) (^ = 1+2) (B, as a check) {A+B)
Mean 21 24 45 66 111
SD 9 15 18 18
Minimum 31 111
Percentile 25% 14 13 34 52 111
Median 21 23 43 68 111
Percentile 75% 28 33 59 77 111
Maximum 38 56 80 111 111
Our two indexes of differences {divergence and absence) are based on the study of 1 11 IAS items for 52
countries. For a given country, divergence is the number of items (out of 111) for which national GAAP and
LAS diverge (prescription of different solutions to the same problem). Absence is the number of items absent
in national GAAP compared to IAS (items covered in IAS but not in national GAAP). Difference is the sum
of divergence and absence. Conformity is the addition of 1 1 1 dummy variables coded 1 if local rules and
LAS are identical (111 items studied). Total is the sum of conformit}' and difference.
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2, etc.), we present the percentage of items divergent, absent, different or in con-
formity compared to IAS. Going back to the example of IAS 1, we found no
countries with diverging standards, 29 with absent items and 127 with items in
conformity (total: 156). The corresponding percentages are 0%, 19% (=29/156) and
81% (=127/156). We interpret this percentage as an aggregate measure of divergence/
absence/difference/conformity of local standards with regard to a given IAS. For
instance, national standards are 81% in conformity with IAS 1. Table 2 presents the
resuhs by IAS.
Table 2 shows that the four most harmonized accounting standards are "inflation
adjustment," "associates," "joint ventures," and "tangible assets," while the four least
harmonized accounting standards are "discontinuing operations," "financial instruments:
recognition and measurement," "employee benefits," and "financial instruments."
Interestingly, these intemational accounting differences exist for various reasons. For
"discontinuing operations" and "employee benefits," the difference mainly arises from
the lack of relevant accounting standards in many countries; financial instruments, on
the other hand, are a major area of intemational divergence because many nations take
different approaches from IAS.
Table 2
Level of divergence/absence/difference/conformity of national GAAP relative to LAS
IAS Related theme Divergence
(1) [%]
Absence
(2) [%]
Difference
(=1+2) [%]
Conformity
(3) [%]
1 Presentation of financial statements
2 Inventories
7 Cash flow statements
8 Extraordinary items
10 Post-balance-sheet events
1
1
Construction contracts
12 Deferred tax
14 Segment information
1
6
Tangible fixed assets
1
7
Leases
19 Employee benefits
20 Government grants
21 Foreign currency translations
22 Business combinations
24 Related parties
27 Consolidated subsidiaries
28 Associates
29 Inflation adjustment
3
1
Joint ventures
32 Financial instruments
33 Earnings per share
35 Discontinuing operations
36 Impairment of assets
37 Provisions and contingencies
38 Intangible assets and goodwill
39 Financial instruments: recognition and measurement
i 40 Investment property
19 19 81
25 8 33 67
14 25 39 61
31 15 46 54
20 4 24 76
37 10 46 54
31 22 53 47
9 43 52 48
15 2 17 83
20 23 43 57
18 52 70 30
12 8 19 81
17 10 27 73
18 14 32 68
27 27 73
17 4 21 79
10 4 13 87
6 7 13 88
4 12 15 85
30 39 69 31
10 35 44 56
17 65 83 17
14 34 48 52
21 18 38 62
20 12 31 69
45 27 72 28
16 26 42 58
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3. How does culture influence accounting?
In this section, we briefly describe how cultural issues have been introduced into
international accounting research, with reference first to Hofstede's cultural dimensions
model (Hofstede, 1980, 1991, 2001), then the conception of accounting values by Gray
(1988). We also discuss the cultural dimensions of values, introduced more recently by
Schwartz (1994). Finally, we present our hypotheses.
3.1. Hofstede's cultural dimensions model
"Culture is defined as collective programming of the mind; it manifests itself not only
in values, but in more superficial ways: in symbols, heroes, and rituals" (Hofstede, 2001, p.
1). Based on an attitude survey of IBM employees in 66 countries during the 1970s,
Hofstede developed country-based indices corresponding to four dimensions of national
culture for each country surveyed. With the help of this model, cultural differences and
their consequences between nations, societies, and regions can be described in detail. Here
are the definitions of these key dimensions.
Power distance: The extent to which the less powerfiil members of society accept that
power is unequally distributed.
Individualism: In individualistic societies there are few ties beyond those of the nuclear
family, whereas in coUectivist societies people belong to strong, cohesive in-groups.
Masculinity: In "masculine" societies men are assertive, tough, and concemed with
material success, whereas women are more modest, tender, and interested in the quality of
life. In 'feminine' societies, both are equally concemed with quality of life.
Uncertainty avoidance: The extent to which people feel threatened by uncertain or
unknown situations. This is expressed in a need for formality, predictability, and clear
rules.
This cultural dimensions model has been challenged by several researchers (Bond,
1988; Smith, Dugan, & Trompenaars, 1996). For example. Smith et al. (1996) examined
the replicability of Hofstede's methodologies. They raised the following question: did
Hofstede's measures reflect the Western values of those who designed them? Hofstede had
addressed this issue by undertaking a Chinese Value Survey (Hofstede & Bond, 1988),
subsequent to which a further dimension, "Long-Term Orientation" (also named
"Confiician Dynamism"), was introduced.
Long-term orientation: The extent to which people favor a pragmatic, fiiture-oriented
perspective-fostering virtues like perseverance and thrift-over short-term thinking.
Appendix C shows the scores for the first four dimensions for the 52 countries
surveyed, the "long-term orientation" dimension being disregarded in this study because
data are only available for a limited number of countries (23). For example, the United
States scores 91 on Individualism and Guatemala six, reflecting the fact that the United
States is highly individualistic and Guatemala very coUectivist.
Although Hofstede's cultural dimensions model has been criticized in the literature
(Baskerville, 2003; Gemon & Wallace, 1995; Hofstede, 2002, 2003; McSweeney.
2002a,b), it is extensively used in business-related (including accounting) research and
psychological research (Sondergaard, 1994). Gemon and Wallace (1995) reviewed issues
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and problems in the application of Hofstede's cultural dimensions. They described cultural
studies in international accounting research as "trapped by a paradigm myopia by its
reliance on the framework suggested by Hofstede" (p. 85), partly because Hofstede's
survey was limited to one organization and may not be applicable to other contexts.
Baskerville (2003) argued that "the embeddedness of the four dimensions in the social,
political or economic measures indicates that the dimensions identified by Hofstede
describe characteristics of different nations, most of which could be identified as socio-
economic in origin."
Another possible criticism of Hofstede's approach is that the IBM data are now old and
therefore obsolete. However, in his new edition of "Culture's consequences," Hofstede
(2001, p. 73) argued that the dimensions found were assumed to have centuries-old roots.
Furthermore, only data that remained stable across his two subsequent surveys were
retained. Since 1980, Hofstede's cultural dimensions have been validated against other
external measurements and recent replications show no loss of validity (Barkema &
Venneulen, 1997; Hoppe, 1990; Sondergaard, 1994; van Oudenhoven, 2001).
3.2. Gray's accounting values
It was Gray (1988) who made the major contribution of introducing Hofstede's cultural
dimensions into accounting. Based on Hofstede's model, he developed four accounting
values:
Professionalism versus statutory control: A preference for the exercise of individual
professional judgment and the maintenance of professional self-regulation as opposed to
compliance with prescriptive legal requirements and statutory control.
Uniformity versus flexibility: A preference for the enforcement of unifoiTn accounting
practices between companies and for the consistent use of such practices over time as
opposed to flexibility in accordance with the perceived circumstances of individual
companies.
Consen'atism versus optimism: A preference for a cautious approach to measurement
so as to cope with the uncertainty of future events as opposed to a more optimistic, laissez-
faire, risk-taking approach.
Secrecy versus transparency: A preference for confidentiality and the restriction of
disclosure of information about the business only to those who are closely involved with
its management and financing as opposed to a more transparent, open, and publicly
accountable approach.
Gray (1988) sets out to link his accounting values to Hofstede's cultural dimensions.
Following this proposition, a number of empirical research papers attempted to find
empirical evidence on this topic, and the Hofstede-Gray framework was strengthened and
enhanced by other studies (Belkaoui, 1989; Chow, Chau, & Gray, 1995; Hussein, 1996;
Perera, 1989; Perera & Mathews, 1990; MacArthur, 1996; Roberts &. Salter, 1999). A
number of hypotheses relating societal values to accounting sub-cultural values have been
proposed. In particular, Perera (1989) developed a useful explanation of cultural factors
specifically for the context of developing countries' accounting systems. He argues that a
combination of accounting sub-cultural dimensions have considerable influence on
accounting practices.
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3.3. ScJnvartz's cultural dimensions of values
On the basis of data gathered during the 1988-1992 period from 86 samples drawn
from 41 cultural groups in 38 nations, Schwartz (1994, p. 102) and Schwartz and Bardi
(1997, p. 396) divided national cultures into seven value types:
Conservatism: Emphasis on the status quo, propriety, and restraint of actions or
inclinations that might disrupt the solidary group or the traditional order.
Autonomy: Emphasis on the person viewed as an autonomous entity entitled to pursue
his or her individual interests and desires. It can be split into two sub-dimensions:
- Intellectual autonomy: Emphasis on self-direction and flexibility of thoughts.
- Affective autonomy: Emphasis on stimulation and hedonism.
Hierarchy: Emphasis on the legitimacy of the hierarchical role and resource
allocation.
Mastery: Emphasis on active mastery of the social environment through self-assertion.
Promotion of active efforts to modify one's surroundings and get ahead of other people.
Egalitarian commitment: Emphasis on transcendence of selfish interests, voluntary
commitment to promoting the welfare of other people.
Harmony: Emphasis on fitting harmoniously into the environment
—
protecting the
environment, unity with nature, world of beauty.
Appendix D shows the scores for these seven dimensions for the countries surveyed
(based on Schwartz, 1994, p. 112-115; Schwartz & Bardi, 1997, p. 397, 399). Thirty-two
countries are common to Schwartz's sample and our sample of IAS indexes.
These seven culture-level value types are condensed by Schwartz into two broad
dimensions: (1) autonomy versus conservatism and (2) egalitarian commitment and
harmony versus hierarchy and mastery. Schwartz's (1994) cultural dimensions of values
have recently been used in international accounting (Hope, 2003) or finance (Chui, Lloyd,
& Kwok, 2002) research as a usefiil complement to Hofstede's model.
3.4. Hypotheses
3.4.1. Culture
The theory behind our hypotheses is that culture plays an important role in shaping the
accounting standards and practices of a particular country (Perera, 1994). We expect that
the level of harmonization with the IAS will vary between countries, especially between
those with different cultural dimensions.
As said earlier, this study concentrates on differences between IAS and national GAAP
(see previous section for a description of the two categories below):
Divergence: The national GAAP cover the specific accounting field also regulated by
LAS, however the two sets of accounting standards propose different solutions;
Absence: the national GAAP do not cover the specific accounting field regulated by
IAS.
Our first hypothesis is formulated on the basis of the two models of culture described
above: Hofstede (1980, 1991, 2001) and Schwartz (1994).
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HI. Culture matters in explaining divergence with IAS and the absence of local standards
on topics covered by IAS.
3.4.2. Legal origin
This paper concentrates primarily on culture as an explanatory variable for two reasons:
first, recent literature in economics and finance (Greif, 1994; Landes, 2000; Stulz &
Williamson, 2003) demonstrates that culture is a determinant of economic institutions;
second, culture has not yet been taken into consideration in explaining international
accounting harmonization. But we also introduce the legal origin factor into our models.
Several authors have examined the link between disclosure levels and culture and legal
origin (Jaggi & Low, 2000; Hope, 2003), and legal origin emerged as a variable that could
explain disclosure level. Moreover, La Porta et al. (1998, 2000) show that legal origin
proxies for various institutional factors such as investor protection and ownership
concentration.
If it is accepted that IAS represent a more uniform, less conservative, and less secretive
set of standards than most national GAAP in the world, and that common-law countries
are traditionally favorable to full disclosure (Ball et al., 2000), then common-law countries
can be expected to show less divergence fi^om IAS. They are also likely to have more
highly developed regulation systems than code-law countries.
H2. Common-law countries are likely to have accounting standards that diverge less from
IAS than those of code-law countries.
H3. Common-law countries are likely to have accounting standards that are more
extensive than those of code-law countries with regard to IAS.
4. Measurement of the independent variables
We apply first Hofstede's cultural dimensions, then Schwartz's value types.
4.1. Research design no. 1: Hofstede's cultural dimensions
Hofstede (1980, 1991, 2001) proposed a definition and scoring system for five cultural
dimensions as summarized in Section 3: power distance index (pdi), masculinity (mas),
individualism {ind), uncertaint)' avoidance (ua), and long-term orientation. As mentioned
above, this last dimension is disregarded in this study because data are only available for a
limited number of countries. Hofstede's initial sample included 66 countries, 52 of which
are in our sample of IAS difference/absence/conformity indexes (Appendix E lists the 52
countries included in our sample).
A brief examination of the correlation matrix (not tabulated) reveals a potential
multicollinearity problem, since power distance and individualism are both negatively and
significantly correlated (0.63 at the 0.01 level).
To avoid the effects of multicollinearity, which threatens to affect the interpretation of
the regression results, we will run several variations of the same model, excluding some
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Table 3
Pearson's correlation matrix of Schwartz's value types for the 32-country sample
Conservatism Affective
autonomy
IntellecUial
autonomy
Hierarchy Mastery Egalitarian
commitment
Harmony
Conservatism
Affective
1.000
-0.780*** 1.000
autonomy
Intellectual -0.744*** 0.703*** 1,000
autonomy
Hierarchy
Mastery
Egalitarian
0.407
-0.152
-0.711
-0.246
0.113
0.400
-0.394
-0.095
0.328
1.000
0.321
-0.579***
1.000
-0.005 1.000
commitment
Harmony -0.262 0.098 0.323 -0.536*** -0.299 0.372 1.000
***Correlation significant at the 0.01 level.
variables. CoUinearity can also be diagnosed by evaluating the VIF (variance inflation
factor) for each variable."
4.2. Research design no. 2: Schwartz's value types
Schwartz (1994) proposed a definition and sourcing system for seven value types as
summarized in Section 3: conservatism, intellectual autonomy, affective autonomy,
hierarchy, mastery, egalitarian commitment, and hannony. 32 countries are common to
Schwartz's and our sample of IAS indexes (Appendix F lists the 32 countries included in
this sub-sample). We examine the correlation matrix between these seven variables (Table
3). Multicollinearity can be diagnosed because conservatism is negatively and
significantly correlated with affective autonomy, intellectual autonomy, and egalitarian
commitment, whereas hierarchy is negatively and significantly correlated with egalitarian
commitment and harmony.
To avoid this multicollinearity problem, which seems to be more serious than in the
case of Hofstede's variables, we conduct a factor analysis of the seven Schwartz value type
variables using a principal component extraction method with a varimax rotation.
The eigen values associated with each factor are reported in Table 4. Consistent with
Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black (1998), we select factors only if their eigen value is
greater than one. A two-factor solution clearly appears, explaining more than 70% of the
variance.
Using the rotated factor matrix, shown in Table 4, taking into account the sign and
magnitude of factor loading, factor 1 and factor 2 can be interpreted as follows:
- A high score on factor 1 means that the inhabitants of the country accept harmony
but not hierarchy and masteiy. To simplify, we will call this the ";?o hierarchy^' factor.
" The VIF measures the degree to which each explanatory variable is explained by the other explanatory
variables. Traditionally, collinearity is not considered to be a problem when the VIF does not exceed 10 (Neter,
Wasserman, & Kutner, 1983).
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Table 4
Varimax principal components factor analysis (Schwartz's value types)
Eigen values Percentage of Cumulative
variance explained percentage explained
Conservatism 3.365 0.481 0,481
Affective autonomy 1.562 0.223 0,704
Intellectual autonomy 0.847 0.121 0,825
Hierarchy 0.560 0.080 0,905
Mastery 0.359 0.051 0,956
Egalitarian commitment 0.235 0.034 0,990
Harmony 0.072 0.010
Factor 1
1,000
Factor 2
Conservatism -0.121 -0.956
Affective autonomy -0.056 0.883
Intellectual autonomy 0.231 0.787
Hierarchy -0,770 -0.369
Mastery -0,722 0.271
Egalitarian commitment 0,415 0.642
Harmony 0.776 0,186
- Factor 2 is mainly driven by autonomy (either affective or intellectual) as opposed to
conservatism . To simplify, we will call this the "autonomy' factor.
Our results are similar to those of Schwartz (1994) and Schwartz and Bardi (1997). To
measure culture, we will use the scores corresponding to the two factors which, by
construction, are not correlated.
4.3. Legal origin
Legal origin is defined by the common-law/code-law distinction as used by La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleiffer, and Vishny (1997). As certain countries (mainly former
Eastem-bloc countries) are not included in these authors' sample, we use the classification
devised by the University of Ottawa to extend our sample.
5. Statisrical results
For each cultural model, we start with a brief presentation of univariate statistics. A
multivariate analysis is then conducted and results are discussed.
5.1. Univariate results
Table 5 reports correlations between divergence/absence and our cultural (panels A and
B) and institutional factor (panel C) proxies.
^ This list can be downloaded at the following address: http://www,droitcivil,uottawa,ca/world-legal-systems/
eng-tableau,html.
Panel A: Hofstede's cultural dimensions
Power distance index -0.366***
(P) (0.008)
Individualism 0.485***
(P) (0.000)
Masculinity 0.137
(P) (0.331)
Uncertainty avoidance 0.161
(P) (0.255)
Panel B: Schwartz s value types
Factor 1 (No hierarchy) 0.413**
(P) (0.019)
Factor 2 (Autonomy) 0.507***
(P) (0.003)
Panel C: Legal origin
Common law -0.143
(P) (0.294)
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Table 5
Univariate tests: Pearson's correlation between IAS indexes and (1) cultural dimensions and (2) legal origin
Variables Divergence Absence
0.130
(0.357)
-0.101
(0.476)
0.164
(0.245)
0.338**
(0.014)
0.315
(0.079)
-0.015
(0.936)
-0.396***
(0.003)
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Definition of variables: Divergence is the number of items (out of 111) for which national GAAP and IAS
diverge (prescription of different solutions to the same problem). Absence is the number of items absent in
national GAAP compared to LAS (items covered in IAS but not in national GAAP). Power distance index: The
extent to which the less powerflil members of society accept that power is unequally distributed. Individualism :
In individualistic societies there are few ties beyond those of the nuclear family, whereas in collectivist
societies people belong to strong, cohesive in-groups. Masculinity: In "masculine" societies men are assertive,
tough, and concerned with material success, whereas women are more modest, tender, and interested in the
quality of life. In "feminine" societies, both are equally concerned with quality of life. Uncertainty avoidance:
The extent to which people feel threatened by uncertain or unknown situations. This is expressed in a need for
formality, predictability and clear niles. Factor 1 measures the level of acceptance of harmony but not of
hierarchy and mastery. To simplify, we call factor 1 the "/20 hierarchy" factor Factor 2 measures autonomy
^either affective or intellectual) as opposed to conser-vatism . To simplify, we call factor 2 the "autonomy"
factor. Common law is a dummy variable coded 1 if the country has a common law tradition. AH variables are
country-specific measures.
Panel A reports the Pearson's correlation between the four cultural dimensions identified
by Hofstede (1980, 1991, 2001) and our divergence/absence scores.
- The divergence index is significantly negatively correlated with the power distance
index and positively with individualism . This gives support to our first hypothesis (HI).
- The absence index is significantly positively correlated with uncertainty avoidance, in
accordance with the same hypothesis.
Overall, univariate results give support to our first hypothesis.
Panel B reports the Pearson's correlation between the two main cultural dimensions
identified on the basis of Schwartz (1994) and our divergence/absence scores.
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- The divergence index is significantly positively correlated with no hierarchy (factor 1)
and autonomy (factor 2). This also gives support to our first hypothesis (HI).
- The absence index is not correlated with either of the two factors, which is not in
accordance with HI.
Panel C exhibits no correlation between the level of divergence and legal origin.
However, there is a negative correlation between the level of absence and legal origin,
which seems to provide support for H3: code-law countries have a less extensive set of
standards, compared to IAS, than their common law counterparts.
5.2. Regression results: Hofstede's cultural dimensions
Multivariate analysis results are presented in Table 6. Panel A presents the results for
the divergence index, and panel B for the absence index. For each, we estimate alternative
specifications for two basic models:
Divergence = ao + "J-xPower distance index + ajindividualism + (XT,Masculinity
+ CL^Uncertainty avoidance + oisCommon law + e (1)
Absence = Pq + P^Power distance index + fiilndividualism + P^^asculinity
+ P^Uncertainty avoidance + fi^Common law + e. (2)
We tabulate two specifications for each equation:
- Model (1) and model (3): with four cultural variables only {power distance index,
individualism, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance);
- Model (2) and model (4): full models including cultural variables and legal origin
{common law).
We computed the VIFs, which are all lower than 2.08. Multicollinearity does not thus
appear to be a real problem.
In model (1), divergence with IAS is apparently explained by differences in culture,
particularly as adjusted R" is almost 27%. Divergence is significantly related to indi-
vidualism and uncertainty' avoidance
.
Concerning uncertainty avoidance, our results demonstrate that countries with a higher
level oi uncertainty avoidance will not prefer unifonnity and will thus be less inclined to
conform with IAS. The IAS are known to require a high level of disclosure, to favor a
"transparenf (less secretive) approach to financial reporting, and to be less conservative
(Ball et al., 2000). Our result is consistent with Salter and Niswander (1995) who carried
out one of the most comprehensive studies on the relationship between culture and
international accounting differences. They find a negative relationship between uniformity
and uncertainty avoidance, in contrast to Gray (1988)'s prediction. They even mention
"other principles for which a market in information exists and for which Gray's
proposition may not hold" (p. 389). Finally, Doupnik and Salter (1995) associate a set of
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Table 6
Regression results: Hofstede's cultural dimensions and legal origin
Panel A: divergence
(i: (2)
Panel B: absence
(3) (4)
0.029 -0.021
0.810 0.857
-0.012
-0.034
0.918 0.757
0.100 0.133
0.341 0.186
0.202 0.126
0.026** 0.195
-8.167
0.114
4.403 12.814
0.728 0.326
52 50
0.138 0.198
0.064 0.107
1.879 2.170
0.130 0.075
Power distance index -0.064
Sig. 0.331
Individualism 0.164
Sig. 0.011 =
Masculinity 0.054
Sig. 0.342
Uncertainty avoidance 0.102
Sig. 0.037^
Common law (dummy variable)
Sig.
Constant 7.185
Sig. 0.298
Observations 52
R'- 0.325
Adj R' 0.267
F 5.656
Sig. (F) 0.001
-0.063
0.350
0.162
0.013**
0.055
0.339
0.085
0.129
-1.666
0.572
8.935
0.237
50
0.329
0.253
4.320
0.003
** Coefficient significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Definition of variables: Divergence is the number of items (out of 1 1 1 ) for which national GAAP and IAS diverge
(prescription of different solutions to the same problem). Absence is the number of items absent in national GAAP
compared to IAS (items covered in IAS but not in national GAAP). Divergence and Absence are country-specific
measures. Power distance: The extent to which the less powerful members of society accept that power is
unequally distributed. Individualism: In individualistic societies there are few ties beyond those of the nuclear
family, whereas in coUectivist societies people belong to strong, cohesive in-groups. Masculinity: In "masculine"
societies men are assertive, tough, and concerned with material success, whereas women are more modest, tender,
and interested in the quality of life. In "feminine" societies, both are equally concerned with quality of life.
Uncertainty avoidance: The extent to which people feel threatened by uncertain or unknown situations. This is
expressed in a need for formality, predictability and clear rules. Common law is a dummy variable coded 1 if the
country has a common law tradition.
environmental factors and cultural dimensions with intemational differences in accounting
practices. They propose a general model of intemational accounting development and
empirically test its explanatory power. They find that a higher level of disclosure is
consistent with a lower level of uncertainty avoidance and that low uncertainty avoidance
groups tend to be less conservative. Countries experiencing a higher level of uncertainty
avoidance would thus be expected to try to diverge from IAS in order to avoid the high
level of disclosure required.
In model (2), we added legal origin {common law) to cultural variables. This variable
tums out to be unrelated to the level of divergence, which goes against H2. This is an
interesting result, showing that legal origin, which has appeared to be a valuable explanatory
factor in several studies (Hope, 2003), does not, in fact, play a significant role, probably
because the common-law/code-law dichotomy covers a wide diversity of national systems.
We also note that the coefficient on uncertainty avoidance becomes non-significant, which
suggests that strong links exists between institutional and cultural factors.
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As robustness checks, we also ran the regressions with other specifications (excluding
masculinit}' and legal origin, excluding power distance index, masculinity and legal origin
and excluding power distance index). In one of the specifications, we excluded
masculinity, following the example of Hope (2003, p. 222, 238), who mentions that some
authors consider the link between this dimension and disclosures (the topic studied by
Hope) to be more questionable or less important (Gray, 1988; Haskins, Ferris, & Selling,
2000). Our results (not tabulated) are similar.
The absence index (absence of national accounting rules on an issue covered
by IAS) is not explained by cultural variables, since the F statistic is not
significant at 5% in model (3). This result can be explained as follows. An analysis of
the most frequent items covered by an IAS but not by national rules shows that they
relate to IAS 14 (segment information), 19 (employee benefits), 22 (business
combinations), 33 (earnings per share computation), 35 (discontinuing operations), 32
and 39 (financial instruments), and 40 (specifically, the fair value of property
investments). These standards depend more on the level of economic development
and the size of the capital market than national culture. To proxy for these two variables,
we also added legal origin to the research design for the measurement of absence (see
Table 5, panel B, model (4). La Porta et al. (1997) show that in common law countries,
capital market development is higher than in code-law countries. Nevertheless, legal
origin does no better than cultural values in explaining the absence index, since the F
statistic is still not significant at 5%.
Overall, our results suggest that a "divergence" status with regard to IAS can be
explained by variations in national culture. Such is not the case for the absence
index.
5.3. Regression results: Schwartz's value types
Multivariate analysis results are presented in Table 7. Panel A presents the results for
the divergence index, and Panel B for the absence index. For each, we estimate alternative
specifications for two basic models:
Divergence = ao + (X\Factor 1 {No hierarchy) + ccjFactor 2 (Autonomy)
+ c(.T,Common law + e (3)
Absence = ao + a\Factor 1 {No hierarchy) + ociFactor 2 {Autonomy)
+ a^Common law -\- e (4)
As we did with Hofstede's cultural values, we tabulate two specifications for each
equation:
- Model (1) and model (3): with cultural factors only (factor I — no hierarchy and factor
2—autonomy);
- Model (2) and model (4): full model including cultural factors and legal origin
(cotnmon-law).
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The divergence from IAS is apparently explained by differences in culture,
particularly as adjusted R" is almost 39%. Our first hypothesis is backed by the
multivariate analysis concerning divergence (model (1)), since both variables, which
correspond to factors 1 and 2 defined in Section 4 above, are significant at conventional
levels. Schwartz's first sub-dimension corresponds to our factor 1, i.e. autonomy versus
conservatism. This shows that countries with a high autonomy score are more inclined to
diverge from IAS.
The second sub-dimension corresponds to the values of egalitarian commitment and
harmony versus hierarchy and mastery. Hierarchy can be linked to international
accounting harmonization: the greater a country's acceptance of hierarchy, the more
likely it is to accept extemal influence from a supra-national source, and consequently the
LAS. The same applies to mastery: taking action to control the environment appears to be
quite compatible with acceptance of an extemal influence. The same reasoning works
conversely. Our results show that a country with a lower hierarchy/mastery score is likely
to have accounting standards that diverge from IAS.
There is no association between divergence and legal origin (panel A, model (2)), if this
variable is added to factors 1 and 2, previously identified as summarizing Schwartz's value
types.
The absence index (absence of national accounting rules conceming an issue covered
by LAS) is not explained by cultural variables, since the F statistic is not significant at 5%
whatever the specifications (models (3) and (4)).
Table 7
Regression results: Schwartz's cultural dimensions and legal origin
Panel A: divergence Panel B: absence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Factor 1 (No hierarchy) 3.092 2.087 3.802 1.765
Sig. 0.006*** 0.089* 0.084* 0.468
Factor 2 (Autonomy) 3.791 3.443 -0.179 -0.884
Sig. 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.933 0.678
Common law -4.563 -9.258
Sig. 0.106 0.105
Constant 22.594 23.734 26.063 28.377
Sig. 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
Observations 32 32 32 32
R- 0.427 0.479 0.099 0.181
Adj/?- 0.388 0.423 0.037 0.094
F 10.821 8.586 1.600 2.066
Sig. (F) 0.000 0.000 0.219 0.181
* Coefficient significant at the 0. 1 level (2-tailed).
*** Coefficient significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Divergence is the number of items (out of 111) for which national GAAP and IAS diverge (prescription of
different solutions to the same problem). Absence is the number of items absent in national GAAP compared to
IAS (items covered in IAS but not in national GAAP). Factor I measures the level of acceptance oi harmony but
not of hierarchy and masteiy. To simplify, we call factor I the ""no hierarchy' factor. Factor 2 measures
autonomy (either affective or intellectual) as opposed to consen'atism . To simplify, we call factor 2 the
'"autonomy'" factor. Common law is a dummy variable coded 1 if the country has a common-law tradition.
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Overall, our results suggest that a "diverging" status with regard to IAS can be
explained by variations in national culture.
6. Limitations
One of the contributions of this paper is the creation of new measures of international
accounting differences. However, it should be noted that our measures are based on Nobe's
(2001) study, which relies upon subjective responses. Moreover, in computing our
divergence/absence indexes, we considered that each of the 111 items studied was of equal
weight: we then counted the number of divergence/absence responses for each country in
our sample. Divergence and absence were thus treated as continuous variables. For
instance, a country with 50% divergence is deemed to be twice as divergent as a country
that is 25% divergent. This "equal-weight" assumption may be debatable, but the same
could be said of the contrary solution (attributing a specific weight to each item over a total
of 1 1 1). The definition of a specific weight would imply that IAS are not equally important,
and the concept of the importance of one IAS is not easily evaluated.
Another possible limitation lies in the fact that our vision of national culture is
partly derived from Hofstede (1980). Hofstede's model has been strongly criticized
(Baskerville, 2003) but is still widely used because of its extensive international
coverage, and has generated robust results. When using Schwartz's value types, our
results still hold, which strengthens evidence for the influence of culture on international
accounting harmonization.
7. Conclusion
This study is designed to examine whether differences between national accounting
standards and IAS are explained by cultural dimensions and legal origin. We measure
differences between national GAAP and IAS using two innovative measures: divergence
and absence. Divergence measures the degree to which national GAAP and IAS cover a
specific accounting topic but prescribe different methods. Absence measures the degree to
which national GAAP do not cover an accounting issue regulated by IAS. We use two
different sets of measures to proxy culture: the first from Hofstede (1980, 1991, 2001) and
the second firom Schwartz (1994). We find that cultural values are associated with our
divergence index and matter even more than legal origin in explaining divergences from
IAS. With regard to the absence index, we find no significant relationship with either
cultural values or legal origin. These results contribute to the existing literature in two
ways: ( 1 ) the relationship between culture and international accounting harmonization has
not been studied previously, and (2) although legal origin is usually considered as an
explanatory variable for accounting information (Ball et al., 2000), this does not seem to
be the case at the level of accounting regulation in the context of international accounting
harmonization.
This paper contributes to the ongoing debate on accounting harmonization. More
specifically, our findings suggest that the technical and/or political dimensions of the
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debate, although essential, are not the only issues involved. Opposition to IAS is not
driven exclusively by contractual motives or a claimed technical superiority but also by
diversity in cultural factors. Another contribution of this paper is the development of a
two-dimensional score to benchmark the differences between national GAAP and IAS.
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Appendix A. Australia (Source: Nobes, 2001, p. 14)
Australian requirements are based mainly on the Corporations Act 2001 and the
standards of the Australian Accounting Standards Board and Abstracts of the Urgent
Issues Group.
Australian accounting may differ from that required by L\S because of the absence of specific AustraUan rules
on recognition and measurement in the following areas;
Intangible assets
The derecognition of financial assets
Provisions, except for certain specific cases such as redundancy and cyclical maintenance
Defined benefit employee obligations
The treatment of dividends proposed after the balance sheet date, particularly as practice
is generally to accrue for them
Detailed requirements for calculating impairment; it is not necessary to discount the cash
flows when calculating recoverable amount for impairment losses.
There are no specific rules requiring disclosures of
The fair values of investment properties
Discontinuing operations
Segment liabilities.
There are inconsistencies between Australian and L-\S rules that could lead to differences
for many enterprises in certain areas. Under Australian rules:
Trading, available-for-sale and derivative financial assets are not recognized at fair \ alue
Trading and derivative liabilities are not recognized at fair value
Gains and losses on the change in value of trading financial instruments are not required
to be taken to income
Hedge accounting is permitted more widely
Deferred tax is accounted for on the basis of timing differences rather than temporary
differences
IAS 38
IAS 39.35
IAS 37
IAS 19
L^S 10
IAS 36.5
IAS 40.69
IAS 35
IAS 14.56
L-\S 39.69
LAS 39.93
IAS 39.103
IAS 39.142
IAS 12.15
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On disposal of a foreign entity, the cumulative amount of deferred exchange differences
in equity is not recognized in income
Investment properties can be held at cost without depreciation
The changes in value of investment properties held at a current value are taken as reserves
Revaluations of intangible assets are permitted without an active market
Poolings/unitings of interests are prohibited
In the context of a business combination accounted for as an acquisition, provisions
may be created more extensively than under the IAS
A primary/secondary basis is not used for segment reporting
Earnings per share is calculated before extraordinary items, and there are other differences.
In certain enterprises, these other issues could lead to differences from IAS:
There are no specific rules concerning the translation of the financial statements
of hyperinflationary subsidiaries
An event after the balance sheet date indicating that the enterprise is not a going concern
is not treated as an adjusting event
Research costs could be capitalized if they meet a recoverability test
Negative goodwill is eliminated by proportionately writing down the carrying value of
non-monetary assets
Government grants are recognized in frill when an enterprise has a right to receive them
and no obligation to repay
There is no specific prohibition of discounting of deferred tax balances
IAS 21.37
IAS 40.50
IAS 40.28
IAS 38.64
IAS 22.77
IAS 22.31
IAS 14.26
IAS 33
IAS 21.36
IAS 10.13
IAS 38.42
IAS 22.59
IAS 20.12/24
IAS 12.53
Appendix B. Survey questionnaire (beginning) (Source: Nobes, 2001, p. 149)
IAS reference
Para Extract from IAS text
National GAAP for 31 December 2001
Question
27.11
27.6
A parent which issues consolidated financial statements
should consolidate all subsidiaries, foreign and domestic,
other than those referred to in paragraph 13.
A subsidiary is an enterprise that is controlled by another
enterprise (known as the parent). Control (for the purpose
of this Standard) is the power to govern the financial and
operating policies of an enterprise so as to obtain benefits
from its activities.
When there are subsidiaries must
consolidated accounts be prepared?
Is a subsidiary defined on the basis
of de facto control (which can exist
without majority ownership)?
Appendix C. Hofstede's indexes for 52 countries (2001, p. 500, 502)
PDI IND MAS UA
Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score
Argentina 35/36 49 22/23 46 20/21 56 10/15 86
Australia 41 36 2 90 16 61 37 51
Austria 53 11 18 55 2 79 24/25 70
Belgium 20 65 8 75 22 54 5/6 94
Brazil 14 69 26/27 38 27 49 21/22 76
Bulgaria 70 30 40 85
(continued on next page)
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Appendix C (continued)
PDI IND MAS UA
Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score
Canada 39 39 4/5 80 24 52 41/42 48
Chile 24/25 63 38 23 46 28 10/15 86
China 80 20 66 30
Czech Repubhc 57 58 57 74
Denmark 51 18 9 74 50 16 51 23
Estonia 40 60 30 60
Finland 46 33 17 63 47 26 31/32 59
France 15/16 68 10/11 71 35/36 43 10/15 86
Germany FR 42/44 35 15 67 9/10 66 29 65
Great Britain 42/44 35 3 89 9/10 66 47/48 35
Greece 27/28 60 30 35 18/19 57 1 112
Hong Kong 15/16 68 37 25 18/19 57 49/50 29
Hungary 46 80 88 82
India 10/11 77 21 48 20/21 56 45 40
Indonesia 8/9 78 47/48 14 30/31 46 41/42 48
Iran 29/30 58 24 41 35/36 43 31/32 59
Ireland (Rep of) 49 28 12 70 7/8 68 47/48 35
Israel 52 13 19 54 29 47 19 81
Italy 34 50 7 76 4/5 70 23 75
Japan 33 54 22/23 46 1 95 7 92
Luxembourg 40 60 50 70
Malaysia 1 104 36 26 25/26 50 46 36
Mexico 5/6 81 32 30 6 69 18 82
Morocco 70 46 53 68
Netherlands 40 38 4/5 80 51 14 35 53
New Zealand 50 22 6 79 17 58 39/40 49
Norway 47/48 31 13 69 52 8 38 50
Pakistan 32 55 47/48 14 25/26 50 24/25 70
Peru 21/23 64 45 16 37/38 42 9 87
Philippines 4 94 31 32 11/12 64 44 44
Poland 68 60 64 93
Portugal 24/25 63 33/35 27 45 31 2 104
Romania 90 30 42 90
Russia 93 39 36 95
Singapore 13 74 39/41 20 28 48 53 8
Slovakia 104 52 110 51
South Africa 35/36 49 16 65 13/14 63 39/40 49
South Korea 27/28 60 43 18 41 39 16/17 85
Spain 31 57 20 51 37/38 42 10/15 86
Sweden 47/48 31 10/11 71 53 5 49/50 29
Switzerland 45 34 14 68 4/5 70 33 58
Taiwan 29/30 58 44 17 32/33 45 26 69
Thailand 21/23 64 39/41 20 44 34 30 64
Turkey 18/19 66 28 37 32/33 45 16/17 85
USA 38 40 1 91 15 62 43 46
Venezuela 5/6 81 50 12 3 73 21/22 76
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PDI = Power distance index; IND = Individualism index; MAS = Masculinity index;
UA = Uncertainty avoidance; LTO = Long-term orientation index. Countries with no
indication of rank have been added more recently in Hofstede (2001).
Appendix D. Schwartz's indexes (1994, p. 112-115, Schwartz and Bardi, 1997,
p. 397, 399)
Country Conservatism Affective
autonomy
Intellectual
autonomy
Hierarchy Mastery Egalitarian
commitment
Harmony
Australia 4.06 3.50 4.12 2.36 4.09 4.98 4.05
Brazil 3.97 3.30 4.13 2.64 4.16 4.92 4.02
Bulgaria 4.43 3.13 3.78 3.07 4.04 4.83 4.32
China 3.97 3.32 4.27 3.70 4.73 4.49 3.71
Czech Republic 3.95 3.12 4.30 2.07 3.76 4.89 4.39
Denmark 3.64 4.01 4.58 1.86 3.97 5.52 4.16
Estonia 4.26 3.08 3.63 2.00 3.73 4.96 4.65
Finland 3.84 3.51 4.62 2.03 3.63 5.26 4.54
France 3.35 4.41 5.15 2.16 3.89 5.45 4.31
Germany 3.42 4.03 4.75 2.27 4.07 5.37 4.42
Greece 3.68 3.96 4.09 2.01 4.53 5.35 4.39
Hong Kong 4.04 3.11 4.08 2.83 4.18 4.85 3.34
Hungary 3.97 3.34 4.44 2.42 3.96 4.87 4.51
Israel 4.08 3.62 4.31 2.69 4.06 4.78 3.01
Italy 3.82 2.95 4.60 1.69 4.08 5.57 4.80
Japan 3.87 3.54 4.68 2.86 4.27 4.69 4.07
Malaysia 4.46 3.16 4.07 2.43 4.34 4.66 3.50
Mexico 4.03 3.23 4.20 2.35 4.34 4.99 4.67
Netherlands 3.68 3.51 4.44 2.26 3.98 5.39 3.98
New Zealand 3.73 3.98 4.36 2.38 4.23 5.15 3.99
Poland 4.31 3.13 4.09 2.53 4.00 4.82 4.10
Portugal 3.76 3.54 4.12 2.08 4.25 5.62 4.29
Russia 4.17 3.04 4.27 2.47 3.74 4.68 3.74
Singapore 4.38 3.04 3.68 2.75 3.93 4.79 3.72
Slovakia 4.28 2.76 4.03 2.11 4.09 4.98 4.40
Slovenia 4.27 3.76 5.03 1.76 3.76 4.36 4.72
Spain 3.42 3.97 4.90 2.03 4.11 5.55 4.53
Switzerland 3.25 4.24 5.33 2.20 4.18 5.19 4.50
Taiwan 4.31 3.21 3.93 2.85 4.11 4.68 4.17
Thailand 4.22 3.62 4.08 3.32 3.99 4.34 3.93
Turkey 4.27 3.25 4.12 3.30 3.90 5.12 4.26
USA 3.90 3.65 4.20 2.39 4.34 5.03 3.70
Appendix E. 52 countries included in the sample
Argentina France Luxembourg Russian Federation
Australia Germany Malaysiia Singapore
Austria Greece Mexico Slovakia1
Belgium Hong Kong Morocco South Africa
Brazil Hungary Netherlands Spain
Bulgaria India New Zealand Sweden
Canada Indonesia Norway Switzerland
Chile Iran Pakistan1 Taiwan
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China (People's Republic) Ireland Peru Thailand
Czech Republic Israel Philippines Turkey
Denmark Italv Poland United Kingdom
Estonia Japan Portugal United States
Finland Korea (South) Romania Venezuela
Appendix F. 32 countries common to the Schwartz/IAS sample
Australia France Mexico Slovenia
Brazil Greece Malaysia Slovakia
Bulgaria Hong Kong Netherlands Spain
China (People's Republic) Germany New Zealand Switzerland
Czech Republic Hungary Poland Taiwan
Denmark Israel Portugal Thailand
Estonia Italy Russia Turkey
Finland Japan Singapore United States
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Discussion
Discussion of "Why do national GAAP differ from
IAS? The role of culture"
Afroditi Papadaki
Department ofAccounting and Finance. Athens University' of Economics and Business. Greece
1. Introduction
The purpose of the study by Ding, Jeanjean, and Stolowy (DJS) (2005) is to investigate
whether culture explains differences between national GAAP and International Account-
ing Standards (IAS).
First, the authors define differences between national GAAP and International Accounting
Standards (IAS). Using Nobes' (2001) data and redefining his results, they construct two
measures of accounting differences (divergence and absence) between national GAAP and
IAS. Divergence measures the level of divergence of national GAAP, benchmarked on IAS
and absence, assesses the scope of national accounting rules compared to IAS.
DJS also present Hofstede's (1980, 1991, 2001) cultural dimensions model (for 52
countries) and Gray's (1988) work that introduced Hofstede's cultural dimensions into
accounting. Subsequently, DJS present cultural dimensions of values, which have been
introduced recently by Schwartz (1994) (for 32 countries). Finally, DJS present hypotheses
relating accounting differences to both culture and legal origin.
2. Hypotheses
DJS develop three hypotheses, one about the role of culture and two about legal origin.
These hypotheses state that:
HI. Culture matters in explaining divergence with IAS and the absence of local standards
on topics covered by IAS.
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H2. Common-law countries are likely to have accounting standards that diverge less from
IAS than those of code law countries.
H3. Common-law countries are likely to have accounting standards that are more extensive.
3. Methodology
I. Based on Hofstede's (1980. 1991. 2001). cultural dimensions DJS propose the
following critical variables:
Divergence: the number of items for which national GAAP and IAS diverge (prescription
of different solutions to the same problem).
Absence: the number of items absent in national GAAP compared to IAS (items covered in
LAS but not in national GAAP).
Power distance index: the extent to which the less powerful members of a society accept
that power is unequally distributed.
Individualism: an index for individualistic societies, in which there are few ties beyond
those in a nuclear family, whereas in collectivistic societies people belong to strong and
cohesive in-groups.
Mascidinit}-: an index for masculine societies, in which men are assertive, tough, and
concerned with material success, whereas women are modest, tender, and interested in the
quality of life. In "feminine" societies, both men and women are equally concerned with
the quality of Hfe.
Uncertainty- avoidance: an index that denotes the extent to which people feel threatened by
uncertain or unknown situations. This is expressed by the need for formality, predictability,
and clear rules.
Common law: is a dummy variable coded 1 if the country' has a common law tradition.
DJS use regression analysis to assess whether culture and legal origin play an
important role in shaping accounting standards and examine two specifications for each
model:
A) One model with four cultural variables (Power distance index. Individualism,
Masculinity, and Uncertainty avoidance) as explanatory variables.
B) Another model with four cultural variables and legal origin (Common law) as
explanatory variables.
The two models take the following form:
Divergence = ao + a i Power distance index + X2lndi\'idualism + 5:3 Masculinity
+ a4Uncertainty avoidance + /^^Common law + e
Absence = ao + xi Power distance index + a^IndividuaUsm + 3(3Masculinity
+ ^4Uncertainty avoidance + j^jCommon law + £
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II. Based on Schwartz's (1994) value types, the following variables are defined:
Divergence: the number of items on which national GAAP and IAS diverge
(prescription of different solutions to the same problem).
Absence: the number of items absent in national GAAP compared to IAS (items
covered in IAS but not in national GAAP).
Factor J: measures the level of acceptance of harmony but not of hierarchy and
mastery. DJS call Factor 1 the "no hierarchy" factor
Factor 2: measures autonomy (either affective or intellectual) as opposed to
conservatism. DJS call Factor 2 the "autonomy" factor
Common law: is a dummy variable coded 1 if the country has a common law tradition.
Legal origin is defined by the common law/code law distinction as used by La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleiffer, and Vishny (1997).
They conduct a factor analysis of the seven Schwartz (1994) value type variables
(Conservatism, Intellectual autonomy, Affective autonomy, Hierarchy, Mastery,
Egalitarian commitment and Harmony) using a principal components extraction
method with a Varimax rotation to avoid the multicollinearity problem. They select
two factors which explain more than 70% of the variance. To measure culture, they
use the scores corresponding to the two factors. They examine the following two
models:
Divergence = ao + ai Factor) (No Hierarchy) + a2Factor2(Autonomy)
+ a3Common law + s
Absence = ao + ai Factor 1 (No hierarchy) + a2Factor2(Autonomy)
+ asCommon law + s.
4. Results
Their statistical results-based on factor analysis and regression analysis-show that the
level of divergence between National Accounting Standards and International Accounting
Standards is related to cultural dimensions.
When they use Hofstede's cultural dimensions, "Individualism" and "Uncertainty
avoidance" are found to explain divergence from IAS in multivariate models. When DJS
use Schwartz's dimensions, both factors (no hierarchy and autonomy) were statistically
significant in explaining the divergence from IAS.
However, the cultural dimensions of a nation do not explain the level of absence,
as the model was not statistically significant. An analysis by DJS of the most
frequent items covered by IAS but not by national rules shows that national
standards depend more on the level of economic development and the size of the
capital market than on national culture. Legal origin has no explanatory power in
the multivariate regression models no matter which cultural dimensions model were
used.
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5. General comments
Several studies have examined differences in international financial reporting based on
two broad explanations. The first group of studies claims that differences result from
culture (Doupnik & Salter, 1995; Gray, 1988; Jaggi, 1975; Perera, 1989; Salter &
Niswander, 1995; Zarzeski, 1996), while the second, that differences result from
differences in corporate governance systems (Nobes, 1983; Nobes & Parker, 1998).
Most studies of the first group have used Hofstede's cultural dimensions model to
explain the differences in accounting practices (Archambault & Archambault, 2003;
Arnold, Bemardib, & Neidermeyer, 2001; Gray, 1988; Hussein, 1996; Perera, 1989;
Williams, 2004). Hofstede is the most often cited author in cross-cultural research (Dahl,
2004; Sondergaard, 1994) and has become the most cited author next to John Dunning and
Michael Porter (Sivakuma & Nakata, 2001). Today, Hofstede's cultural indices have
become a permanent feature in the textbooks for cross-culture education (Tang, 2005). A
search of the Social Science Citation Index reveals that, from 1987 to 2004, Hofstede's
concepts of culture's consequences (1980, 2001) were cited nearly as frequently (2858
citations) as Karl Marx's work Capital (2873 citations) (Bearden, Money, & Nevins, in
press).
Hofstede's indices of culture have been received controversially in many disciplines.
Although many critiques of Hofstede's work have appeared in the literature, they have not
diminished the attractiveness of his model which is still used by researchers in managerial
studies. Criticisms of Hofstede's model include a variety of methodological problems such
as the exclusive use of IBM employees for his sample, the lack of cultural dimensions
dynamics, the coincidence of culture with nation, the limited replication of his method in
others samples, difficulties in quantifying culture, etc. An extensive list of problems
related to accounting research is presented by Baskerville (2003) and Baskerville-Morley
(2005), Bhimani (1999), Ahrens (1996), and Gemon and Wallace (1995).
One critique focuses on the fact that cultural values are based on matched samples
of IBM employees. The data were collected using a self-completed questionnaire
between 1967 and 1973 in 66 countries. The four culture indices (Power distance.
Individualism, Uncertainty avoidance, and Masculinity) are calculated based on the
average opinion as calculated from the answers in the questionnaire. One weakness of
this methodology is that the sample is not representative because the data are derived
from a single company and therefore do not provide information on the cultural values
of the entire nation. Respondents came from 15 countries and numbered fewer than
200. A second criticism is that 30 years later, the IBM data are obsolete (McSweeney,
2002). Furthermore, the four cultural dimensions used are not enough to describe
culture. Hofstede's four dimensions also may not fially describe all the issues societies
must confront in order to regulate human activity (Bergeron & Schneider, 2005;
Hofstede, 1980; Schwartz, 1994).
The main theoretical argument against the adoption of Hofstede's cultural dimensions
model for the analysis of policy issues is its lack of nonnative perspective. If we accept
both the theoretical and statistical results of the paper, then what is the suggested policy?
No adoption, partial adoption, or complete adoption of International Accounting
Standards? Does one have to wait until there is a decrease in Uncertainty Avoidance,
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and if so, how can this be attained if the values of cultural dimensions are stable over time
(as both the authors and Hofstede assert)? If the values of cultural dimensions are stable or
change slowly, this implies that differences in culture are a significant obstacle to
international harmonization.
Unfortunately, the strongest opponent against the adoption of Hofstede 's cultural
dimensions model for policy issues is Hofstede himself As Hofstede wrote (2002, p.
1359) "... I never claimed that culture is the only thing we should pay attention to. In
many practical cases it is redundant, and economic, political or institutional factors provide
better explanations." Besides that, Hofstede has already (p. 1356-1357) warned the
applied researcher for potential misuse of his model "In fact, this extensive use [of his
model] has its disadvantages. Some people have tried to imitate my approach cheaply for
commercial purposes. Some carry the concepts further than I consider wise. At times my
supporters worry me more than my critics."
Besides the inefficiencies of Hofstede 's model in analyzing policy issues (confirmed
by Hofstede himself), "there may be other dimensions related to equally ftindamental
problems of mankind which were not found. . . because the relevant questions simply
were not asked" (Hofstede 1980, p. 313-314). DJS, in their study, do not consider any
economic factors as explanatory variables of the accounting differences across countries,
although they mention three pure economic factors (rapid development of international
capital markets, increasingly frequent cross-listing of multinationals, and the internation-
alized activities of institutional investors) as the driving forces behind international
accounting harmonization. DJS use Hofstede's model to explain why the national GAAP
differs from IAS, but why should masculinity explain these differences. Other authors
consider the link between masculinity and disclosures to be very questionable (Gray,
1988; Hope, 2003).
Baskerville (2003) has also mentioned this problem in many studies that have used
Hofstede's model, suggesting that research in international accounting "...requires
systematic modeling of characteristics of nations based on well-established economic
indices, as well as indices to take account of the nexus of historical and political
tensions in each nation." From this perspective, it is questionable to consider the
cultural factors listed in the paper separately from economic and social ones. A strong
preference for uncertainty avoidance, to take just one example, can be linked to the
absence of a well-functioning legal environment that provides swift and unbiased
resolution to conflicts. Hence, agents compensate by following practices that are more
predictable and conservative since they want to avoid the cost and uncertainty of
htigation.
DJS blame socio-economic factors for the failure of the model when there is an absence
of standards and at the same time omit them altogether when there is a divergence of
standards. In fact, their absence results in a potential omitted-variable bias for the estimates
of the culture variables coefficients. The results would be more robust if the cultural
variables retained their significance and expected sign when socio-economic variables
were included in the regression. As the situation stands now, cultural variables might be
just a proxy for the socio-economic ones.
The measures of divergence and absence in DJS appear to be flawed since they put
equal weight on all items of the International Accounting Standards. The considerable
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differences in compliance for various items suggest that firms and regulatory agencies treat
indnidual items \ery differently and this might be an indication of their varying
importance.
A different approach to define cultural \alues has been taken by Schwartz (1994).
His database is based on the response of schoolteachers and college students in 38
nations in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Schwartz used smallest space analysis, a
statistical procedure that shows which items cluster together, and identified se\en
cultural values. Schwartz (1994) also found a high degree of association between the
cultural values deri\ed from his data and Hofstede's dimensions. However, his items
are broader than those of Hofstede. Examining the commonalities between
Hofstede's and Schwartz's cultural \alues. one realizes that certain facets appear
to be missing, such as the time perspective of a culture or the temporal stability of
the culture.
Recent research has focused more on the effects of other factors to explain the
difference in accounting practices, e.g., the legal system (Hope, 2003; Jaggi & Low, 2000;
Stulz & Williamson, 2003; Williams, 2004), the level of economic development (Adhikari
& Tondkar. 1992; Ahmed, 1995; Cooke & Wallace. 1990; Doupnik & Salter. 1995;
Williams. 2004), and the size of the equity market (Adhikari & Tondkar. 1992: Ahmed,
1995; Doupnik & Salter. 1995; Williams. 2004).
DJS also investigate the role of legal origin in explaining the differences between
national GAAP and IAS. The inclusion of legal origin as an explanatory variable weakens
the empirical findings because only one cultural dimension remained significant
(indi\idualism). It is very important that DJS conduct robustness tests as their results
are highly susceptible to omitted-\'ariable bias. In addition, the findings of the regression
in table 6 panel b indicate that there is a multicollinearity problem. These findings show
that when an additional variable (legal origin) is included in the model, there is a
significant F statistic but no significant r-statistics.
Fechner and Kilgore (1994) report that there are significant correlations between
uncertainty avoidance and the other three independent cultural \ariables (Power distance
index. Indixidualism, and Masculinity). Saundagaran and Meek (1997) state that "one
explanation for the finding that uncertainty avoidance dominates the other three cultural
dimensions is that uncertainty avoidance is a summary index for the other three cultural
dimensions." Others have attempted to add institutional variables (legal origin), however,
as Saundagaran and Meek (1997) mention, "these environmental and cultural factors are
clearly correlated."
The national accounting standards are the result of a complex interaction of cultural,
historical, economic, and mstitutional factors. Factors that can influence accounting
development are (1) the legal system, (2) the nature of the relationship between business
enterprises and providers of capital, (3) the tax laws. (4) inflation levels, (5) political and
economic ties. (6) the level of economic de\elopment. and (7) education le\els
Saudagaran & Meek (1990, 1997).
Finally, one cannot easily explain why DJS clearly ignore economic factors, differences
in the development of national capital markets, and differences in national fmancial
systems, since it is e\ ident that their cultural dimensions explain nothing in the case of
absence, and why they do not include these variables in the case of divergence.
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6. Overall conclusion
Despite the limitations raised above, this study is an interesting attempt to understand
differences between IAS and national GAAP. The authors could have expanded their study
by investigating the influence of economic factors in understanding difference in
accounting policies.
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1. The absence of economic factors as determinants
In the discussion. Papadaki questions why our paper only included cultural dimensions
as the c\plicati\e \ariables of international accounting differences. We ha\e one
theoretical reason and one methodological reason.
As the reviewer quoted. Hofstede wrote (2001. p. 135*)) ". . I ne\er claimed that
culture is the only thing we should pay attention to. In man\ practical cases it is
redundant, and economic, political or institutional factors provide better explanations".
In our paper, we are conscious of the other approach of explaining international
accounting differences by institutional economic factors. Our study focuses on cultural
values, because (1) the majority of existing literature is dominated by studies using
institutional/ economic factors, we propose an alternative explanation based on cultural
values, as assessed with reference to the work of Hofstede (1^80. 1991. 2001) and
Schwartz (1994). and (2) recent literature in economics and finance (Greif 1994;
l.andes. 2000; Stulz & Williamson. 2003) demonstrates that culture is a detemiinant of
institutions. Concentrating on culture rather than on institution.s rcllects that culture
precedes institutions.
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Another reason of excluding institutional 'economic factors from our study is a
methodological one. The discussant mentioned the works of Meek and Saudagaran
(1990) and Saudagaran and Meek (1997): "The national accounting standards are the
result of a complex interaction of cultural, historical, economic and institutional factors.
Factors that can influence accounting development are: (1) the legal system, (2) the
nature of the relationship between business enterprises and providers of capital. (3) the
tax laws, (4) inflation levels, (5) political and economic ties, (6) the level of economic
de\elopment. and (7) the level of education levels". However, our study is country-based
with only 50 observations. The inclusion of such an important number of determinants
will pose a problem for the degrees of freedom in the regression. Besides, these factors
are highly correlated between each other which creates a potential multi-collinearity
issue.
2. The controversy of Hofstede's cultural dimensions
The discussant noted that ""Hofstede's indices of culture ha\e been a very controversial
topic in many disciplines", because of the non-generalisability of the results, because of the
obsolescence of the study and because of its lack of comprehensiveness. We totally
understand these criticisms.
However, again as the discussant mentioned, "although many critiques of Hofstede's
work have appeared in the literature, they did not diminish the attractiveness of his model
which is still used by researchers in managerial studies".
Because of these concerns on the possible measurement bias by using only Hofstede's
cultural dimensions as proxies in our study, we added in the revised version of our paper
another set of cultural value measures from Schwartz (1994). This fiirther investigation
confirms that our results are quite robust, i.e. culture does play a role in explaining
international accounting differences.
3. The measures of divergence and absence
The reviewer mentioned: 'The measures of divergence and absence in DJS appear to be
flawed since they put equal weight to all items of the International Accounting Standards.
The considerable differences in compliance for different items suggest that firms and
regulatory agencies treat these items very differently, and this might be an indication of
their varying importance."
In disclosure studies, the weighting of each disclosure item is potentially important.
Cooke (1989, 1991. 1992, 1993), and many other authors (e.g. Ahmed & Nicholls, 1994;
Archambault & Archambault, 2003; Chen & Jaggi, 2000; Hossain, Perera, & Rahman,
1995; Hossain, Tan, & Adams, 1994; Tai, Au-Yeng, Kwok, & Lau, 1990; Wallace, Naser,
& Mora. 1994), are in favor of unweighted items, implying that each item is of equal
importance. The major argument is that "one class of user will attach different weights to
an item . .
.
than another class" and that "the subjective weights of user groups will average
each other out" (Cooke. 1989. p. 115).
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In our study, the indexes have been determined assuming that each of the 1 1 1 items has
an equal weight. This assumption is standard in the hterature and is also based on the
difficulty involved in defining a specific weight for each item. Howe\er. we have re-run all
tests with an alternative weighting scheme. We first group all items within a given L\S and
determine "absence" and "divergence" indexes per IAS. For example, if a given IAS
includes 10 items among the 111 studied, we compute for each country the number of
"absenf and "divergent" items over 10. This determines a percentage of "absence" and
"divergence" per IAS. We then compute a non-weighted average of these indexes on all the
IAS, resulting in disclosure indexes where all the IAS have the same weight. Untabulated
results show that inferences are not affected bv this alternative weiahtina scheme.
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Abstract
This paper uses a valuation fi-amework on a sample of firms from four European countries
(France, Germany, Netherlands, and United Kingdom) to examine how income, accruals, and book
value of equity are perceived by the respective capital markets. Our model includes adjustments for
industry effects and taking into account the linear information dynamics of the accounting variables
posited in the Ohlson model. Consistent with previous researchers, we find that both earnings and
book value of equity have valuation implications and that there is significant dispersion in the
country-specific and industry-specific valuation multiples. However, when using accounting
variables to forecast market values we find that industry-specific valuafion multiples reduce
forecasting error more than country-specific ones.
© 2005 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In 1980, F. Black issued a provocative statement: accounting policies must be chosen so
that earnings are usefiil in the valuation of a firm and, more specifically, that the earnings-
price multiple should be constant across firms. It is well known however, that there is
substantial variation in the average earnings-price multiple across countries although Land
and Lang (2002) found that earnings multiples across countries became more similar over
the years. In the present study, we investigate whether the systematic differences in the
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value relevance of the book value of equity and earnings found among European countries
and reported in King and Langli (1998) and Arce and Mora (2002) may also be explained
by economic factors such as industry effects. We go even further and ask whether one
should regulate accounting at the national level (or, even the supra-national one, e.g.,
I.F.R.S.) or at the industry level by adopting industry-specific standards as the FASB or
even European country regulators have done on a number of occasions in the past. We
focus on four European Union (EU) countries. The EU offers an interesting context for
such studies because a series of Directives were enacted in the 1980s to ensure that
member states would harmonize their accounting policies. Still, generally accepted
accounting principles vary substantially across countries. Consequently, a number of
recent publications (inter alia, Arce & Mora, 2002; King & Langli, 1998) have examined
the valuation implications of these differences.
The modeling approach used in this paper is based on Ohlson (1995) and Feltham and
Ohlson (1995, 1996). This class of models "can best be understood as an attempt to restate
economic theories of income measurement in the light of advances in the economics of
asset pricing under uncertainty" (Walker, 1997, p. 341). The fundamental characteristics of
Ohlson type models are characterized by the clean surplus assumption and linear
information dynamics (Walker, 1997). Indeed, estimating variants of the Ohlson model
imposes three types of constraints on the estimated equation:
"The first constraint is that all components of earnings have the same earnings
forecasting coefficient and valuation multiple. The second constraint adds the additional
restriction that earnings valuation multiples are identical across industries. The third
constraint is that the theoretical structural relation underlying the valuation model is
appropriate." (Barth, Beaver, Hand, & Lansdman, 2002, p. 1).
The purpose of this study is to provide evidence on the influence of these constraints in
a cross-national context.
Several studies provide evidence that the first constraint is binding with regard to the
cash flow and accrual components of income (e.g., Barth, Beaver, Hand, & Landsman,
1999; Dechow, 1994; Sloan, 1996). In particular, with relevance to the current study, Barth
et al. (1999, 2002) show that total accruals and cash flow earnings components have
different implications for forecasting abnormal earnings and for estimating equity market
value in the context of Ohlson (1999). That is, disaggregating earnings into its accrual and
cash flow components aids in forecasting abnormal earnings and explaining equity market
value. We argue that different institutional environments for accounting regulation are
likely to influence the accruals component only. Therefore, any systematic differences in
accounting policies will be reflected in the valuation of accruals and not cash flows
because cash flows should be valued at approximately the same rate based on economic
conditions.
Barth et al. (1999, 2002) also provide evidence that the valuation of the accrual and
cash flow components of eamings vary across industries. In the case where the researcher
aims to identify differences in the valuation of eamings and book value across countries,
constraining the valuation coefficients of eamings components (and book value) to be the
same is even more important because economic conditions facing European countries are
more likely to be reflected at the industry level rather than the macro level.
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Finally, the third constraint regarding the structure of the model implies that the linear
information model (LIM) describing the time-series evolution of earnings and other
variables is descriptively valid. As Myers (1999, p. 26) obser\'es. "linear models of the
link between current and future information ensure consistency and are an integral
component of accounting based valuation." Therefore, ignoring the LIM in the
estimation of the valuation equation is likely to lead to biased estimates. In addition,
time-series properties of earnings are likely to differ between countries. For example, in
countries with higher conservatism of accounting measures, accounting earnings will
exhibit higher persistence.
Accordingly, we use data for a sample of firms from four European countries (France.
Germany, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) for the 9-year period from 1995 to 2003
to examine how their accounting income and book value of equity are perceived by the
respective capital markets. This paper extends prexious studies of the effect of different
regulatory regimes on the valuation implications of accounting income and book value of
equity by taking into account the time-series properties of the key accounting variables
posited in the Ohlson model, industry effects, and by distinguishing between the accruals
and cash flows components of eamings.
To evaluate the influence of these two variables we investigate their explanatory power
for obser\ed market \ alues and also the forecasting power of the estimated models for out-
of-sample companies. Our focus on the predicti\e ability of alternative definitions of the
model is consistent with the expectation that accounting data should help predict future
cash flows and consecutively market prices. At the same time, using predicti\e ability' as a
criterion is consistent with the requirement that valuation parameters be constant cross-
sectionally. Finally, scale induced bias in the estimated coefficients causes heteroscedas-
ticity and this suggests that R" cannot be used as the primary criterion for evaluating
differences in the value relevance of accounting data.
Consistent with previous studies, we find that eamings and book \alue of equit}- in
both models studied, as well as accruals in the second one. have valuation implications,
that there are significant country-specific differences in the \aluation of these variables,
but that industry effects are a more important source of variation in the capitalization
rates.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section. \\e describe the
clean surplus valuation models used in our study and dexelop the testable hypotheses.
Subsequently we describe the sample and data used in our tests, and present our findings.
The final section summarizes and concludes the study and presents ideas for further
research.
2. Clean surplus valuation models
Previous research implicitly accepted the prediction of market value as the criterion for
judging alternative models. In this paper, we investigate whether alternative specifications
of the estimated equation that are more consistent with the theoretical model or
specifications that use more information lead to different conclusions regarding differences
in the valuation parameters among EU member states.
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As stated in the Introduction, a major constraint in the estimated valuation models is the
theoretical structure of the Ohlson model. For this reason, consistent with Barth et al.
(1999, 2002) we use a generalized version of the Ohlson (1999) model to develop
predictions of the way in which book value of equity and earnings and then a
decomposition of earnings into cash flow and accruals relate to stock market prices. In
doing so, we examine two linear information models (LIMs). The first model, LIMl. is
based on Feltham and Ohlson (1996) and has been frequently used in accounting research.
It comprises three equations, where Eqs. (1) and (2) are forecasting equations, and Eq. (3)
is the implied-valuation equation based on the linear information dynamics of the
forecasting equations.
Pooling observations cross-sectionally requires the assumption that "the security price-
earnings relation is both positive and homogeneous over the entire range of earnings
realizations" (Collins, Pincus, & Xie. 1995, p. 30). Hayn (1995) and Collins et al. (1995)
document a non-homogeneous price-earnings relationship across profit-and-loss firms.
These effects are mitigated by the inclusion of the book value of equity as an independent
variable in the valuation equation. However, estimates of the earnings coefficient in the
valuation equation may sfill be biased. For this reason, we also report results for the
positive earnings sub-sample.
Accordingly, LIMl is defined as follows:
NI,^ = oj,o + wnNI,^_i + oj,2BOOK,,_, + 8^, (1)
BOOK,, = OJ20 + oj22BOOK„_i + £2,7 (2)
MV,v = V + aiNI,^ + a2BOOK„ + es/r (3)
where MV is market value of equity, NI" is abnormal income defined as earnings less
the normal return on equity book value, BOOK is the book value of common equity, v
can be interpreted as including the effects of "other information" in Ohlson (1995), the
g's are error terms and the /, / subscripts denote firm-year observations. This model
implicitly assumes all components of earnings carry equal weight in forecasting
abnormal earnings and hence equal weight in the valuation equation as well. Previous
research on the cross-national differences in the \ aluation of earnings and book value
esfimated Eq. (3) assuming no influence from the time-series properties of the accounting
variables.
The second model, LIM2, which once again is based on the model in Barth et al.
(1999). relaxes the constraint that total accruals and cash flow components of earnings
have the same valuation implications. This model is particularly important in the context
of our research, since, if differences in valuation parameters identified in previous research
simply reflect differences in GAAP among the national settings examined, these should be
reflected in the accruals component only. L1M2 comprises four equations, where Eqs. (4>-
(6) are forecasting equations, and Eq. (7) is the valuation equation implied by the linear
information dynamics of the forecasfing equafions. Relative to LIMl, LIM2 imposes an
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additional restriction upon the valuation parameters by adding an additional forecasting
equation.
NI,^ = C040 + W4iNI,^_, + f/j42ACC„_i + 0J43B00K„_i + £4,, (4)
ACC„ = C/J50 + 0J5iACC,7-i + oj53BOOK„-i + ssit (5)
BOOK,, = 0J60 + co6iBOOK„-i + £6,7 (6)
MV,v = V + aiNI,^ + 0C2ACC + asBOOK,, + £7// (7)
where ACC is the total accrual component of eamings. Although we use the same notation
for coefficients and error terms in both LIMs to facilitate exposition, most likely the
estimated coefficients will differ.
In estimating the two models we assume that there is contemporaneous correlation in
the error terms of the equations in each model and use the maximum likelihood estimator
of Zelner's Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR). Consistent with Barth and Kallapur
(1996) and Barth et al. (2002) we estimate all equations without scaling the data. We report
robust standard errors estimated using the consistent covariance matrix estimator to
address heteroscedasticity problems.
2.7. Valuation relevance research and its implications for international accounting
harmonization
Previous research investigating cross-national differences in the valuation implication
of financial statement items is rather limited despite recent calls for more international
accounting research (Meek & Thomas, 2003). Furthennore, the issue of differences in the
valuation of accounting data has important public policy ramifications. When research
studies provide evidence about differences in the "information content of accounting data
under different GAAP, this helps to justify the process of harmonization" (Pope, 1993).
The European Union, in many respects, offers a unique setting to study the effects of
information-content differences. EU member states have agreed to a minimum set of
rules that harmonize financial statements including the "true and fair" principle. In fact,
there are many differences which remain that can be attributed to cultural factors such
as corporate-governance mechanisms as well as institutional ones that refer to the
influence of tax authorities on financial-reporting. It should also be noted that EU
member states try to coordinate their economic policies and are each others" most
important trading partners. They have already taken a number of steps to integrate their
financial markets. This implies that there are many common fundamentals driving their
financial markets.
The first study to examine the capital markets of accounting-policy differences in the
context of the European Union was Joos and Lang ( 1 994), who used returns and price
models to examine the effects of accounting diversity in the European Union. They found
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evidence of significant differences in the stock market valuation of accounting data which
are consistent with the cross-country differences in reporting philosophies.
More recently. King and Langli (1998) and Arce and Mora (2002) used ad hoc variants
of the Ohlson (1995) model and both concluded that there are significant differences in the
value relevance of accounting data among the European countries studied. Both papers
used Theil's decomposition of the coefficient of determination (R^) to examine whether
earnings and book value of equity explained market capitalization.
King and Langli (1998) used data for three countries while Arce and Mora (2002) used
data from eight countries. Both papers include one country in the sample that is not an EU
member (Norway and Switzerland, respectively) and, therefore, is subject to a very
different regulatory regime. Furthermore, both these countries, for their own reasons, stand
aloof from EU developments and are therefore subject to different economic fundamentals
as well. Thus, their presence in the two samples may be confounding the results.
Both papers concluded that "earnings seem to be more value relevant than book value
in market-oriented countries, and vice versa in creditor-oriented countries" and that
"results show that both earnings and book value convey additional information having
incremental explanatory to explain market prices" (Arce & Mora, 2002, p. 595). In
particular. King and Langli (1998) concluded that German accounting data, which are not
prepared with the needs of capital markets participants in mind, are less value relevant than
that in the United Kingdom and Norway, the two other countries in their sample, and that
book value of equity explains more of the variance in market prices than earnings in
Germany but less in the other two countries.
Cross-country value relevance results are being used to justify further harmonization of
accounting policies internationally. This usage can be criticized on many grounds— from
the purely technical to the more fundamental relating to the use of accounting information
in various institutional contexts.
At the technical level, it can be argued that previous studies have used a limited version
of the Ohlson model since they did not take into account the information dynamics
assumptions of the model. In the present paper, we attempt to address this problem.
Furthermore, data from different national contexts violate both the clean surplus
relationship and the unbiased accounting assumptions of the Ohlson model although the
results of Hand and Landsman (1999) suggest that the violation of the clean surplus
assumption should have limited effects on the results.
Furthennore, focusing on which variable, earnings, or book value is more value
relevant violates, at least partly, the spirit of the Ohlson model which is, according to
Walker (1997, p. 352), that "a two dimensional model of the firm (i.e., in terms of earnings
and book value) is demonstrably superior to a single dimensional representation (i.e., in
terms of earnings only)."
A more fundamental criticism is that value relevance studies, including the present one,
take an impoverished and decontextualized view of accounting. Clearly, there is more
information in the financial statements than earnings and book value and it is being used
by investors. Furthermore, companies disseminate information using channels other than
financial statements. This information clearly influences how data in financial statements
are evaluated. Nevertheless, these two key figures are frequently treated as a benchmark of
company performance and investment-selection criteria by most investors.
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Finally, accounting harmonization is about applying the same or at least similar
recognition and measurement rules for the preparation of financial statements. Information
provided therein is used for resource allocation and distribution decisions and therefore
financial statements must serve multiple purposes including, inter alia, control, corporate
governance, taxation, regulatory requirements, evaluation of the stewardship of a
company's resources, and investment analysis. Since national economic and social
systems (which drive demand for accounting information) differ, properties of accounting
information by necessity will differ. Thus, value relevance research, which by definition
focuses on the use of accounting information for investment selection, can provide only a
partial picture.
2.2. National differences
Two basic properties of accounting income are conservatism and timeliness. Timeliness
of accounting income refers to the extent to which current-period income incorporates
contemporaneous economic income while conservatism is defined as the extent to which
there is an asymmetric requirement for the recognition of good news versus bad news
(Basu, 1997). These two properties capture most of what is commonly referred to as
"transparency" of the financial statements. Ball, Kothari, and Robin (2000) argue that
differences in the demand for accounting income in different institutional contexts cause
its basic properties to vary internationally.
In our study, we focus on four European countries, France, Germany, the Netherlands,
and the United Kingdom, all European Union members. We chose these countries because
they represent distinct national accounting systems (Choi, Frost, & Meek, 2002) whose
influence extends beyond their borders. Two of these countries (France and Germany) are
fundamentally code-law countries, the United Kingdom is mainly a common-law one,
while the Netherlands is technically a code-law country but its accounting framework is
strongly influenced by the relationship of the Dutch profession with the academia and the
research conducted therein.
In the Appendix we present financial regulations of the countries in the sample as
described by Choi et al. (2002). However, national accounting standards do not give a
complete picture of accounting practice in each country. As Ball et al. (2000, p. 4) argue,
much accounting practice is not determined by accounting standards because practice is
more detailed than standards, standards lag innovations in practice, and because
companies do not invariably follow standards. It is therefore likely that companies that
belong to the same economic sector follow more similar accounting policies in ternis of
timeliness and conservatism and therefore the variation in the valuation multiples of
earnings and book value may be better captured if we focus on economic sector groups
rather than country ones.
With regard to the basic properties of accounting income. Ball et al. (2000) fmd that
accounting income is substantially less timely and less conservative in code-law countries
than in common-law countries. In their sample, however, they find that among common-law
countries accounting income is least conservative in the United Kingdom, possibly because
ofthe influence ofEU regulations. Thus, overall, all countries in our sample have accounting
income that is characterized by lower asymmetrical conservatism than common-law
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countries such as the United States. Consequently, book \ alue ofequin \\ ill be characterized
by lower conseT\'atism as well. These results suggest that we can rel> on the conservatism
properties of accountmg data to formulate e.x ante hypotheses about the relati\ e \aluation
relevance of earnings and book value in the countries of our sample. These results also
suggest that timeliness in the recognition of current economic income is the distinguishing
characteristic of the accounting systems of the four countries in our sample.
2.3. Testable hypotheses
Previous research has documented that book \alue and income ha\e differential
valuation implications and thus both contain \'aluable mformation for the \aluation of
equity securities. In this paper, we examine the persistence of differences among countries
in the value relevance of book value of equit\' versus earnings after adjusting for industry
effects. In a time-series context. Collins. Maydew. and Weiss (1997) suggest that changes
in investment in intangibles, nonrecurring items, losses, and firm size may explain the
observed differences. In addition, companies may be operating under the same regulaton.'
regime but follow different accounting policies as influenced b\' the markets the\- operate
in and'Or the reporting practices of their competitors. v\hich are not necessanh their next-
door neighbors. Some of these influences may be captured by examining the \alue
relevance of eamings and book value in an industr>'-specific context as opposed to a
country-specific one. Indeed, Barth et al. (2002) have documented m a U.S. context that
partitioning the firms into industry-specific groupings leads to supenor forecasts of the
market \alue of equit>' as opposed to constraining all firms to have the same model
parameters. We also investigate whether the differences across countries in the \ aluation
coefficients of eamings identified in pre\'ious studies affect onK' the accruals-adjustment
component of eamings.
Heterogeneitv' across countries for a gi\ en LI.\I can arise for two reasons. The first is
the difference in the economic conditions in each country- studied uhile the second is the
regulatory regime that influences how a company's cash fiows are mapped into accounting
variables. To the extent that firms within the ^ame countn. face similar economic
conditions, including cost of capital, and ha\e similar accounting practices, including le\el
of conservatism and timeliness, valuation parameters for firms within a country' will be the
same, but coefficients may vary across countries as a result of differences m the economic
environment and accounting regulations.
This leads to the following hypotheses (m altematr.e form):
Ha]. There are country-specific differences in the valuation of earnings and book \alue of
equity.
Operationally, this hypothesis mean^ that the estimated parameters for eamings and
book value in Eqs. (3) and (1) will differ between countries after pooling across industries
and adjusting for the linear information dynamics of the accounting variables. For results
to be consistent with prior research, the value fjf the R" of the valuation equation should
vary systematically in accordance to the regulatory regime in each country studied; i.e. it
should be higher in countries where the accounting system has an investor orientation (the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom).
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Baitfa et aL (2002) found that including the accruals component separately in their
valuation equation improved its forecasting performance. Accordingly, we use LIM2 to
in\estigate the followmg two h\-potheses about the accruals adjustment
Ho- ^^'- accruals ad^ustmeiit is valued at a different rate from earnings after adjusting for
country effects.
We evaluate this hypothesis by estimating LIM2 separately for each country in the
sample and testing whethw the estimated coefficients for residual earnings and accruals in
Eq. (7) differ across countries in a statisticaDy significant sense.
Heterogeneity- across mdHStries for either of the tvv o models can also arise for tW'O
reasons. The first is the result of actual differences across industries in the nature of
their business. For example. SCT\ice firms do not have substantial inventories. The
second source of heterogeneit>' arises from industry-specific differences in the
persistence of earnings, which may be due to seasonahty of demand, credit terms
\^Tth customers and supphers. and so on. To the extent that firms \\ithin the same
industrv' fece similar economic conditions, including cost of capital, and ha\ e adopted
similar accounting practices that are not influenced by their domicile, valuation
parameters for firms 'within a si>ecific industrv' \^ill be the same. Ob\iously. coefficients
can differ b^ween industries as a result of differences in the economic en\Tronment and
accounting practices.
This leads to the followTng two hypotheses (in altCTnative form):
Ha3. There are industry-specific diffCTcnces in the valuation of earnings and book value of
equit>'.
This hv'pothesis imphes that the estimated parameters for earnings and book value in
Eqs. (3 1 and (7) will differ betv^'een mdustries after pooling across countries and adjusting
for the linear information dynamics of the accounting variables.
Corresponding to our country analysis, we e\ aluate the following hypothesis on an
industrv'-specific analysis.
Ha4. The accruals adjustment is valued at a different rate from eamings after adjusting for
industry effects.
This h\-pothesis imphes that the estimated coefficients for residual eamings and
accruals in Eq. (7) are different in a statistically significant sense when estimating LrM2
for e\ery industry- in the sample.
Finally, we address the fundamental question of this paper, namely, whether there is less
error in the estimates of a company's market \alue when using \aluation multiples
estimated in a countrv -specific context versus an industrial-sector one. Initially, we test for
the forecasting power of LIMl.
Ha5. LIMl leads to superior forecasts of the market value of equity after adjusting for
mdustr>' effects than after adjusting for country effects.
This hypothesis implies tliat the errors in the forecast of the market \ alue of each
company generated using industrv -specific estimates of LIMl will be smaller than if LIMl
was estimated by coimtry.
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The second valuation model, LIM2, has a finer set of accounting variables including an
adjustment for accmals. Consequently, we investigate whether forecast errors generated using
industry-specific estimates of LIM2 are smaller that when LIM2 is estimated by country:
Ha6. LIM2 leads to superior forecasts of the market value of equity after adjusting for
industry effects than after adjusting for country effects.
To test HAS and HA6, we generate test statistics from the forecast errors. First, we
estimate LIMl and LIM2 on a sample pooled across countries and industries. The
estimated valuation equation includes dummy variables for year, industry, and country
effects. Implicitly, these equations require the estimated coefficients (valuation multiples)
to be constant across both countries and industries as well as over time. We then estimate
each of the two LIMs separately, for each economic sector, allowing for country fixed-
effects captured by dummy variables in the valuation equation. Finally, we pool finns
within the same countiy allowing for industry fixed-effects in the valuation equation
modeled by dummy variables.
Both LIMs are estimated cross-sectionally. Barth and Kallapur (1996) have argued that
when estimating such models, there are cross-sectional scale differences "that can result in
biased coefficient estimates and heteroscedastic regression errors" (p. 528). Barth and
Clinch (2004) suggest that the causes of scale differences are additive and/or multiplicative
correlated omitted variables, scale-varying valuation parameters, and scale-related
heterogeneity. Consistent with Barth and Kallapur (1996), to investigate scale problems
in the estimated valuation equation we included size proxies and more specifically per
value of equity and sales. We found that this had limited effect on the estimated
coefficients and negligible on forecasting performance. This suggests that scale effects are
unlikely to be affecting our conclusions.
For each model or specification we study, we generate a distiibution of the absolute
percentage forecast errors (absolute value of the difference of the predicted value less than
the actual one over the actual one). We then use the nonparametric Wilcoxon matched
pairs signed-rank test to assess the statistical significance of differences in the following
three pairs of error distributions:
1. fixed-effects model pooled across industries and countries versus country-specific
estimates
2. fixed-effects model pooled across industries and countries versus industiy-specific
estimates
3. country-specific estimation versus industry-specific estimation.
These comparisons allow us to detennine for a given level of earnings decomposition
(i.e. LIMl and LIM2) whether industry or country effects are more influential in
forecasting equity market values.
2.4. Sample and variables' definitions
We use data extracted from Standard and Poor's Global Vantage database for all non-
financial companies domiciled in France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United
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Kingdom, quoted in the iespecti\'e national stock exchange and with December accounting
year-end for the 9-ycar period 1995-2003. hi accordance with pre\ious studies in the area
(Arce & Mora, 2002; King & Langli. 1998), to mitigate the effects of outliers, we treat as
missing obser\ations those that are in tlie extreme top and bottom one percentile, by year and
within each country and industiy group, for market and book value of equity and earnings.
Funhemiore, we require sample fmn-years to ha\e full data to estimate each information
dynamics and market-\ aluation equation, which results in a sample common to both LIM.
Consequently our sample consists of 5957 fimi-year obserxations. In the cases of France.
Gemiany. and the Netherlands, all \aiiables are expressed in millions of euros (by default).
Data for U.K. companies were con\ erted to euros using contemporaneous exchange rates.
More specifically the \ariables used in this study are:
Market \alue: the total market \aluc of all classes of common equity at accounting year-
end. Although Bailh and Clinch (2001) recommend estimating \ariants of the Ohlson
model on a per-share basis, this is impractical for European companies which issue
more than one class of ordinaiy shares.
Residual income (.V//): defined as income available to ordinary shareholders, i.e., after ad-
justing for minority interests and preferred dividends less a normal return on book value
of equit> w hich was assumed to be 12% as in previous studies. The use of a common cost
of capital for all the countries in our sample may be a source of bias but can be justified
because. o\ er the period studied, the average yield-to-maturity of 10-year bonds was ap-
proximately the same in all four countries. Consistent with pre\ious research (e.g.. Baith
et al.. 2002; Dechow, Hutton, &. Sloan, 1999), we exclude extraordinaiy items. Disclo-
sure and measurement rules for extraordinary items differ substantially among the coun-
tries in our sample and. therefore, ifone looked at earnings before extraordinaiy items one
would focus on ex ante non-comparable items. Funhermore, this limits the risk that esti-
mation results are influenced by large one-off items. Nevertheless, it must be noted that
exclusion of extraordinary items is inconsistent with the clean suiplus assumption of
Ohlson (1995).
Book value of equity (BOOK): defined as share capital and reser\'es but excluding prefe-
rence capital.
Accruals (ACC): measured as the difference between net income less operating cash flow
as reported in the cash flow statement. A problem with identifying the accrual adjust-
ment in a European context is that most non-UK companies did not publish a cash flow
statement until recently. Nevertheless, we chose to use data from the cash flow state-
ment because, as Hribar and Collins (2002) report, studies that use changes in balance-
sheet accounts to estimate accruals are possibly contaminated by measurement error.
Although the definition of countiy is not problematic, industiy classification clearly is
(Bjojraj, Lee. & Oler, 2003). We classify companies in economic sectors (Consumer
discretionary. Consumer staples. Health care. Industrials, Infonnation technology,
Materials, and Other, which includes: Telecommunication sen ices. Utilities, and Energy')
' The number of company years in these three sectors is small (especially Telecoinmunications and Energy),
which made estimation of the models for each of these sectors difficult because of the limited number of degrees
of freedom.
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Table 1
Frequency table of indusm by counir\ classification of number of finn-year obsen ations
Sector Counny Total
France German) Netherlands United Kingdom
Consiimer discretionarv 299 335 138 565 1337
Consumer staples 165 127 101 130 523
Heahh caie 72 121 10 116 319
Industrials 376 550 283 793 2002
Infonnation technologv' 239 343 92 230 904
Materials 146 1" "4 191 588
Otber 76 65 14 129 284
Total 1373 1718 712 2154 5957
as reported in Global \'antage. ^^e focus on these sectors to balance the obiecti\e of
enhancing homogeneir\" of firms within each industn grouping so that we can plausibh'
argue that valuation parameters may differ because of industry-specific economic
conditions, and asset and liabilitA" structures, as wdl as accounting practices, with the
constraint of having a minimum number of sample firms within each mdustn."
classification. It should be noted that previous research (Bjorajraj et al.. 2003) has
identified the S and P classification as superior to other schemes for research purposes.
Table 1 presents the industn.' and country.' composition of our sample. As can be seen.
most of the obsen'ations are from companies domiciled in German}' and the United
Kingdom, the two coimtries which represent the two 'extreme" applications of code-law
and common-law to financial-reporting, respectiveh
.
Table 2 shows summarv' statistics of the core variables b> countn. and industry. As can
be observed, there is substantial \"ariabilir>' in the size of the companies smdied depending
on the origin of the companies in the sample, hi particular, the median market \alue of
Ehitch and British companies is larger than that of French and German ones, although the
biggest companies by market \alue are French. Furthermore. Table 2 re\eals that, on
average, the market value of equit\" exceeds book \alue. This result indicates that the book
vahie of equity is insufficient to explain market value of equir> alone and therefore market
value also reflects capitalized earnings.
Finally. Table 3 contains Pearson and Spearman correlations of the \ anables. We note
that the book vahie and residual income \anables are not correlated (Pearson's statistic) at
a statistically significant level. This result confirms that the v.vo \anables pro\'ide
complementary information for e.xplaining market pnces.
3. Results
In Tables 4 and 5 we present estimation results for the LIMl and L1M2 models.
respectively. More specifically, the first panel in each table reports results for the \ aluation
equation, while in die second panel results for the information d>namici equations are
presented.
\SiTthin each paneL, the first line reports results obtamed from estimation of a countr\.
industry, and year fixed-effects regression in which all available obsen. ations are pooled.
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Table 2
Sununary statistics b\ countn and b\ sector
Mean S.D. Median Mm Max
Panel A: country statistics
France MV 1725.63 4992.69 150.31 2.01 53.848.18
BOOK 697.91 1675.37 83.16 -18.74 13.134.10
NI" -6.17 118.48 -1.02 -1525.73 1426.56
ACC -110.38 361.61 -9.61 -4203.30 515.00
Germany MV 837.40 2574.77 99.40 1.23 31.670.23
BOOK 362.35 994.38 63.26 -6.63 13.815.90
NI' -0.64 80.88 -2.96 -796.48 843.17
ACC -87.02 375.46 -9.38 -4883.00 1203.00
Netherlands M\' 1342.40 3345.28 227.66 3.81 +4.282.64
BOOK 404.14 751.59 129.19 1.06 5142.00
NI' 7.82 104.94 3.23 -692.41 767.68
ACC -70.43 180.08 -11.22 -1910.00 258.72
United Kingdom MV 967.44 2630.89 186.60 2.96 35.581.94
BOOK 394.60 936.74 83.77 -167.04 8906.93
NT -3.53 103.96 -0.27 -1023.86 783.43
ACC -71.73 205.73 -12.10 -3521.60 396.78
Panel B: sector statistics
Consumer discretionary M\^ 1227.22 2921.58 149.17 1.69 31.123.77
BOOK 551.22 1290.89 84.49 -16^.04 11.729.00
NI^ -0.74 110.30 -0.61 -960.24 906.15
ACC -110.82 380.01 -11.82 -4637.00 1203.00
Consumer staples M\^ 2223.50 5343.92 252.00 2.70 53.848.18
BOOK 638.03 1211.14 108.43 0.00 7609.50
NI" 19.24 96.93 1.13 -730.68 569.36
ACC -124.37 342.15 -15.46 -3521.60 1039.00
Health care \n- ri5.17 5619.56 167.17 2.81 51.932.38
BOOK 442.60 996.07 72.91 0.17 9753.00
NI^ 13.11 125.67 -4.11 -263.44 1426.56
ACC -41.34 110.92 -5.73 -748.97 515.00
Industnals MV 650.77 1480.27 170.43 1.50 16.997.90
BOOK 297.11 609.78 87.15 -20.91 7843.68
m' -4.27 73.34 0.00 -1023.86 717.98
ACC -52.75 144.50 -11.21 - 1424.80 759.01
hiformation technology MV 554.96 2318.52 54.55 1.23 44.282.64
BOOK 126.80 420.95 31.05 -36.01 4553.46
Nr -14.67 66.73 -3.51 -1030.36 187.69
ACC -17.65 73.08 -4.31 -1157.00 251.00
Matenals M\^ 1512.78 3862.74 168.87 3.30 31.670.23
BOOK 858.01 1900.85 141.87 3.46 13.815.90
Nr -4.57 128.24 -0.81 -915.15 783.43
ACC -141.74 316.06 -20.71 -2634.25 555.41
Other M\' 2826.48 6620.75 276.97 3.95 53399.84
BOOK 1030.46 2098.13 185.04 -40.70 13134.1
NI^ -1.26 193.59 -2.37 - 1525.73 843.17
ACC -262.01 739.05 -34.13 -4883 313.4
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Table 3
Speannan's (Pearson) correlations, above (below) the diagonal
Variable MV BOOK NI' ACC
MV 1.000 0.870* 0.292* -0.509*
BOOK 0.767* 1.000 0.135* -0.568*
NI'' 0.254* -0.006* 1.000 0.099*
ACC -0.594* -0.711* 0.0-'4* 1.000
* Significant at the 1% level.
The following six lines report statistics (average, standard deviation, maximum,
minimum, number of significant positive, and negative) about the coefficients obtained
in country-specific estimations with industry and year fixed-effects. The last six lines in
each panel report the same statistics about the coefficients obtained in industry-specific
estimations with country and year fixed-effects. These statistics are presented to provide
descriptive evidence on the magnitudes, signs, and significance of the estimated
parameters which are used in subsequent tests as well as to facilitate comparison with
previous research.
3.]. Valuation equation results
Findings relating to the valuation equation of both LIMs are consistent with prior
research (Barth et al., 1999, 2002) and expectations. More specifically, in the case of
LIMl (Table 4. panel A) the coefficient of residual earnings, y.i, is positive and
significant in the pooled sample, for three out of four countries (except Germany) and for
six out of seven industry groups (excluding the information technology category). The
valuation coefficient on book value of equity, ^2, is significantly positive in the pooled
sample and all country and industry settings. The large range in coefficient estimates
across countries (for example, ai ranges from 5.864 to 19.396) and across industries (ai
ranges from 8.226 to 22.704) is prima facia evidence that prediction of the market value
of equity based on separate country or industry estimation may contain smaller errors
than those based on the pooled estimates.
Results relating to LIM2 as evidenced in panel A of Table 5 are also consistent with
previous research. It is noteworthy that separating accruals has the effect that the valuation
coefficient on eamings is significant and positive in all country and industry settings in
LIM2, although accruals is a significant variable in the case of Germany and the United
Kingdom and the industrials and materials sectors. This suggests that accruals in these two
countries provide additional information that is valuable to investors incremental to
residual eamings." The low significance of accruals in most sectors does not confirm in a
European context the results of Barth et al. (1999, 2002) who found that accruals is a
highly significant variable. The result, that accruals is a significant variable in the case of
the two countries where accounting differs most, cannot be reconciled with differences in
^ When estimating LIM2 separately by country and by industry we also tested whether a restriction that the
coefficients on eamings and accruals are equal (but of opposite signs) is statistically significant. Results show that
these two variables have different valuation multiples, and add to the resuh that accruals have incremental
information content relative to abnormal eamings.
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Table 4
Summary results for LIM
1
Panel A: Summary statistics from regressions of market value of equity on earnings and book value of equity:
MV„ = i' + 3(|NI,:; + a2BOOK„ + £3„
7, IXi R-
Coefficient r-statistics Coefficient z-statistics
Pooled fixed effects 13.109 7.60* 2.361 22.96* 0.65
Across countries
Mean 12.113 2.543 0.66
S.D. 5.574 0.420
Maximum 19.396 3.160
Minimum 5.864 2.2238
No. significantly positive
No. significantly negafive
Across industries
3 4
Mean 12.882 2.932 0.70
S.D. 4.782 1.123
Maximum 22.704 4.730
Minimum 8.226 1.813
No. significantly positive
No. significantly negative
6 7
Panel B: Summary statistics from regressions of earnings on lagged earnings and book value of equity:
NI,y =oJio + W||Nl,^.i+oJi2BOOK„
I
+ei„ and regressions of book value of equity on lagged book value of equity:
BOOK,, = 0^20+ W22BOOK„_
I
+ £2,,
OJu CO,; R- R-
Coefficient z-statistics Coefficient z-statistics Coefficient z-statistics
Pooled fixed effects
Across countries
Mean
S.D.
Maximum
Minimum
No. significantly
positive
No. significantly
negative
Across industries
Mean
S.D.
Maximum
Minimum
No. significantly
posidve
No. significantly
negative
0.283
0.310
0.155
0.519
0.146
3
0.318
0.174
0.683
0.152
6
5.43" -0.008
-0.008
0.012
0.001
-0.025
1
•0.014
0.037
0.035
0.086
1
1.97** 0.18 1.009
0.23 1.008
0.089
1.069
0.875
4
0.28 1.008
0.049
1.070
0.910
7
45.39* 0.93
0.92
0.91
Significant at the 1% level.
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the demand for earnings' properties among code-law versus common-law countries
identified in Ball et al. (2000).
3.2. Cross-coimUy differences
To test HAl and HA2 we estimated LIMl and LIM2 separately by country. For both
models, accounting variables have the highest explanatory power (as measured hy R~) for
German market equity values (0.82 and 0.83, respectively). Thus, our results differ from
previous studies in the sense that the models perfomi best in Gemiany, a code-law country.
This can perhaps be explained because, in contrast to previous research, our research
design takes into account infonnation dynamics and jointly estimates the information
dynamics equations with the valuation one. When the accruals variable enters the
valuation model in LIM2, there is almost no change in the value of the R~ of the valuation
equation for France, Germany, and the Netherlands but there is a substantial increase in the
case of the United Kingdom.
To formally evaluate our first two hypotheses (HAl and HA2) for the equality of the
valuation multiples across countries we used the Wald test assuming that country
populations are independent. Results reject the hypothesis that the coefficient on earnings
is the same across countries both in the case of LIMl at the 10% level and LIM2 at the 5%
level and that the coefficient on accruals is the same across in LIM2 at the 0.1% level.
However, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the valuation coefficient on book value of
equity is the same across countries in the case of LIMl at any conventional level of
significance, while in the case of LIM2, this is true only at the 5% level.
3.3. Cross-industry differences
To formally test HA3 and HA4 we estimated LIMl and LIM2 separately by industry.
Again we observe wide variation in the value of the R~ of the valuation equation, but the
average R^ for both models are marginally higher than when the model is estimated on a
country basis. The sector where our models have the lowest explanatory power for market
equity values is the consumer discretionary sector for both specifications and the highest is
the health care sector.
To formally evaluate HAS and HA4 we used the Wald test for the equality of the
estimated coefficients across industries, assuming that industry populations are indepen-
dent. Our results reject both hypotheses for the linear information dynamics models. More
specifically, our results indicate that the valuation multiple on earnings and equity differs
across industries for both models and on accruals for LIM2 at least at the 1% level of
significance.
3.4. Information dynamics results
Findings relating to the information dynamics equations in both LIM 1 and LIM2 show
that there are substantial differences in the explanatory power of these equations.
Book equity in both LIMs exhibits strong autoregressive behavior and it should be
noted that, given the nature of the estimation procedure used, estimated coefficients are
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almost identical. The estimated coefficient of the lagged value of book equity is
significantly positive in all country and industry contexts.
In the case of abnormal earnings, the explanatory power of the estimated equation for
both LIMs is low. In the case of LIMl. the average R~ of the estimated equation is 28%
when the model is estimated by country and 34% when it is estimated by industry.
Interestingly, the explanatory power of this equation increases in LIM2 (i.e., when we
include accruals as an independent variable). This suggests that accruals provide valuable
infonnation about future realizations of earnings. Findings for LIMl (panel B of Table 4)
are that when the model is estimated by country the lagged-eamings coefficient in the
infonnation dynamics equation is significantly positive for three out of four countries and
when it is estimated by industry it is significantly positive in all but one sector. Results for
LIM2, which provides for separate persistence parameters for earnings and total accruals,
show that in the case of the earnings information dynamics equation, the coefficient on
lagged earnings (panel B of Table 5) is significantly positive for all countries as well as for
all industrial sectors for which the model is estimated.
Finally, in the case of the accruals information dynamics equation (panel B of Table 5)
the coefficient on the lagged value of accruals is significantly positive in all countries and
all industries.
3.5. Forecasting market values
The second of the two main research questions addressed in this paper is whether
partitioning the sample of firms by country or by industry leads to lower errors in
predicting equity market values.
Table 6 presents descriptive statistics (mean, median, minimum, maximum, and
standard deviation) for the absolute percentage error for equity market value predictions
obtained from estimations in model parameters using the jack-knifing procedure
described earlier. Results presented in Table 6 refer to the prediction error from pooled
and separate industry and country estimations. Comparisons are based on aggregating
all errors from separate country and industry estimations. It is noteworthy that the
median forecasting error as a percentage of actual market value is in excess of 150%
for most contexts (country, sector) and models (LIMl, LIM2) studied, although this is
partly caused by our estimation procedure which keeps parameters constant across
years. ^ This indicates that market values reflect more information than simply earnings and
book value of equity and/or interpret them in a more complex way than the simple models
used here."*
Consistent with previous results, that the relation between equity market value and
accounting variables differs across countries and industries, we observe that the median
and the mean absolute percentage error (APE) is smaller when estimating both LIMs
^ This is necessary because our forecasting tests are based on out-of-sample data and therefore parameters for
each year are, by definition, unobservable.
"* Our regression models do not tatce into account that market value of equity is always a positi\e number. If our
predictions were computed as the maximum of zero and the value predicted by the model, predictions errors
decrease substantially but our results do not change.
194.6 833.3 32.303.4 2029.4
176.6 794.4 27.201.1 1889.4
149.5 687.8 45.204.7 1770.2
187.8 827.0 31.353.9 2029.1
165.2 786.8 28.492.2 1900.6
147.6 692.4 51.835.6 1820.0
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Table 6
Distribution statistics of absolute percentage error of out of sample market value forecasts
Minimum Median Mean Maximum S.D.
(°o) (%) (%) (%) (%)
LIMl Forecast using year, country and industry dummies 0.1
Forecast by country using year and industry dummies 0.
1
Forecast by industry using year and country dummies 0.
LIM2 Forecast using year, country and industry dummies 0.
Forecast by country using year and industry dummies 0.
Forecast by industry using year and country dummies 0.
by country or by industry rather than using the pooled model which includes industry
and country fixed-effects. Furthermore, for both LIMs we observe that the median and
the mean APE is smaller when estimating the models by industry rather than by
country.
To test whether differences in the forecasting errors are statistically significant
when each LIM is estimated by industry and by country in the pooled sample,
we used the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. Test results reject both HAS and HA6
and thus confirm that both LIMs lead to superior forecasts of the market value of equity
after adjusting for industry effects rather than after adjusting for country effects, which
suggests that there is greater homogeneity of firms within the industry classifications
than in the country ones. This result ftarther supports our contention that cross-sectional
differences in the valuation multiples of earnings and book value are not simply caused
by differences in national accounting rules.
When estimating both LIMs in country-specific contexts, the United Kingdom is
the country with the smallest median forecasting error, followed by the Netherlands,
Germany and France. The United Kingdom is also the country with the mean average
APE followed by Germany, Netherlands, and France. Previous studies suggest that
the European country where financial statements are most investor-oriented is the
United Kingdom (Arce & Mora, 2002; King & Langli, 1998) and Germany the
country where they are least investor-oriented (Arce & Mora, 2002). The above
mentioned rankings contrast, at least partly, with previous studies which found that
German financial statements are the least value-relevant and they also differ fi^om
those based on R~.
When predicting market values by industry, the sector with the biggest median
APE for both LIMs was information technology, while the sector with the smallest
median error was industrials. Intuitively, this ranking reflects sectors which closely
fit the traditional accruals accounting model (mamre sectors) and those where market
prices reflect growth expectations rather than past profitability.
Comparison of mean APE based on LlMl and LIM2 in Table 6 reveals that
disaggregation of eamings into cash flow and total accruals aids in predicting
equity market values when the models are estimated by country but not when
estimating the pooled models or the models by industry. This result is partly
confirmed if we also look at the median APE, although the median APE based on
the pooled LIMl is also smaller than the median model based on the pooled
LIM2. Thus, comparison of APE across LIMs supports disaggregation of eamings
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Table 7
Summary results for LlMl (sub-sample of positive income firm-year)
Panel A: Summary statistics from regressions ^of market value of equity on earnings and book value of equity:
MV„ = v + a,+NI,^ + a2BOOK„ + (; }ii
'^1 ^2 R'
Coefficient c-statistics Coefficient z-statistics
Pooled fixed effects 17.557 7.33* 2.319 21.60 0.68
Across countries
Mean 15.189 2.494 0.71
S.D. 6.717 0.382
Maximum 22.023 3.021
Minimum 5.931 2.123
No. significantly positive 3 4
No. significantly negative
Across industries
Mean 17.062 2.917 0.72
S.D. 6.948 1.177
Maximum 31.817 4.927
Minimum 10.330 1.823
No. significantly positive 6 7
No. significantly negative
Panel B; Suitutiary statistics from regressions of earnings on lagged earnings and book value of equity:
NI,y =oj|() + ('>»i|NI,v_| + £|„ and book value of equity on lagged book value of equity: BOOK,, =0^20 + ^22
BOOK„_|+f:2„
COii 0J12 7?' 0J22 R-
Coefficient z-statistics Coefficient r -statistics Coefficient z-statistics
Pooled fixed effects 0.256
Across countries
Mean 0.359
S.D. 0.273
Maximum 0.754
Minimum 0.126
No. significantly 3
positive
No. significantly
negative
Across industries
Mean 0.313
S.D. 0.210
Maximum 0.753
Minimum 0.128
No. significantly 6
positive
No. significantly
4.35* -0.003 -0.69 0.18 1.007 42.93* 0.93
-0.006 0.27 1.004 0.92
0.012 0.093
0.006 1.068
-0.020 0.867
4
1
-0.004 0.27 1.017 0.92
0.019 0.077
0.028 1.160
-0.030 0.900
1 7
1
negative
Significant at the 1% level.
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Table 9
Distribution statistics of absolute percentage error of out of sample market value forecasts
Minimum Median Mean Maximum S.D.
(°o) (%) (%) (%) (%)
LIMl Forecast using year, country and industry dummies
Forecast by country using year and industry dummies
Forecast by industry using year and country dummies
LIM2 Forecast using year, country and industry dummies
Forecast by country using year and industry dummies
Forecast by industry using year and country duinmies
into accruals and cash flows for by-country estimation but not in the case of by
industry estimation.
3.6. Positive earnings results
Previous research (inter alia, Barth, Beaver, & Landsman, 1998) has documented a
positive relation between earnings persistence and value relevance. Losses are less
persistent than profits (Collins et al, 1997; Hayn. 1995) and therefore valuation
parameters are likely to differ for firms with positi\e and negative income. The
results presented in Tables 4 and 5 are based on a sample of tlmis that includes both
profit- and loss-making firnis.
Thus, we re-estimated both LIMl and LIM2 limiting the sample to positive
accounting income firm-years. Estimated coefficients are presented in Tables 7 and
8 while in Table 9 we present results on the forecasting perfonnance of the
models.
While the profitable firm-years sub-sample consists of 4415 observations, or about
74% of the full sample, results in Tables 7 and 8 are consistent with those for the
full sample. In contrast to expectations, the estimated parameter for the persistence
of abnormal eamings is not substantially different for the positive earnings sub-
sample versus the full one in the case of LIMl and actually smaller in the case of
LIM2. This is compensated, however, by the substantially higher persistence of
accruals.
Turning to the valuation equations, signs and significance of a^ in LIMl and
0(2 and Xy in LIM2 are generally the same as those estimated using the full
sample.
Finally, the forecasting performance of our models reported in Table 9 is
substantially better if the jack-knifing procedure outlined earlier is applied only to
profitable firm-years. On a\'erage, the median forecasting error is at least 25%
smaller. However, results about the relative perfonnance of country-based versus
industry-based estimation and cross-LIM comparisons are not affected by the
partitioning of the sample.
Overall, results presented in Tables 7-9 suggest that inferences based on the full
sample are robust to the inclusion of loss-making firms in the sample.
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4. Conclusions
This study extends previous work on cross-national differences in the valuation
of earnings and book value of equity. Using a sample of companies from four
European countries, we jointly estimate Ohlson's valuation equation with linear
information dynamics equations and we evaluate the influence of industry sectors
in the forecasting performance of the model. We estimate two linear information
valuation models (LIM) employing two levels of earnings disaggregation. The first
LIM is based on aggregate residual earnings while the second includes total
accruals as a separate variable. We initially estimated pooled versions of both
LIMs and found earnings and book value of equity to be significant explanatory
variables of the cross-sectional variation in market values while accruals in the
second is not.
Our first set of testable hypotheses was about cross-sectional variation in the
valuation multiples of earnings and book value of equity in the two LIMs and
accruals in LIM2 when these are estimated by country and by industry. Our
findings were that earnings and book value are significant and with the expected
sign in almost all country and industry contexts in both LIMs. Earnings valuation
multiples differ significantly across both countries and industries while the
valuation multiples on book value of equity vary significantly only when the
models are estimated by industry. Accruals which is used as a separate variable in
LIM2 is a significant variable only in a limited number of country and industry
contexts but, nevertheless, there are statistically significant differences in the
valuation multiples across both countries and industries.
To test whether basing predictions on separate country and industry estimations
of valuation model parameters affects equity market value predictions, we compare
prediction errors from pooled and separate country and industry estimations for
each LIM. Our results indicate that when estimating each LIM separately by
industry, prediction errors are substantially smaller than when estimating a pooled
model or when estimating the models by country.
Finally, our results support disaggregation of earnings into accruals and cash flows
if the LIM equity valuation models are estimated by country but not in the case of
sector-specific estimation and prediction. In the latter case, prediction eiTors are larger
on average than if we did not include accruals.
Overall, our results indicate that there is convergence in financial-reporting
practices within sectors. The size of the errors, however, suggests the need for
consistency, which implies that there is a need for more sector-specific standards.
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In general the authors find, both in-sample and out-of-sample, that the model
improvements achieved by allowing industry variation in the parameter values is greater
than that achieved by allowing cross-country variation. This suggests that fundamental
industry effects are more important than the cross-country differences that, the authors
argue, are mainly due to differences in accounting rules and practices.
I believe the results of the authors are interesting, and worthy of further development.
However, I also do have one major policy concern about the paper, and a number of
suggestions for further development of the work.
1. The ir/relevance of value relevance
The paper adopts a value relevance perspective. However, financial reporting also
serves a contracting and stewardship role that is arguably more important than value
relevance.
I doubt if the unfortunate external shareholders of Parmalat and Enron would thank you
for knowing that the association with share price and earnings was high. This is a major
problem for any attempt to draw policy conclusions from linear information models. Such
models take the cash flows as exogenously given. In the LID context, accounting serves no
economic role. The accounting numbers simply reflect information that is already known
to all economic agents. Accounting numbers do not affect investor or managerial
behaviour in such models.
In order to draw policy conclusions we need to be able to model accounting in a context
where managerial and investor behaviour and cash flows are "caused" by accounting; i.e.,
we need to be able to model how behaviour changes when accounting changes. LID
models are irrelevant for this task.
Consider, for example, what we would conclude if we found that the LID estimates
were identical across all countries and all industries. Would this imply that accounting was
perfect? Clearly not; for if accounting was universally poor across all EU states, then the
LID models could still yield identical fitted values.
In thinking about policy relevance we should really be thinking about the regulation of
the financial-communication and corporate-governance system as a whole. The formal
accounting numbers are just a cog in a much bigger machine. In designing a car it is
important to have a good gear box, but one would not design an entire car around the gear
box. So long as there are major differences in disclosure, other market regulations, and
legal/governance regimes, it is far from obvious why one would want to pursue equality of
the value relevance of accounting numbers as a desirable policy objective.
2. Suggestions for further work
The model adopted in the paper assumes unbiased accounting. There are better models
around that allow for ex ante conservative accounting.
The model does not allow for Basu-type earnings conservatism. Basu-type models are
inherently non-linear and do not mix well with LID models. Given the now massive
I
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empirical support for the existence of Basu conservatism this is a major weakness of the
LID approach to value relevance.
The paper makes no attempt to control for disclosure differences. More general versions
of the LID model allow for other information, and this might be a way to capture
differences in disclosure. For example one might use analysts' forecasts to back out
estimates of other information, to the extent that such forecasts reflect other disclosures.
The model makes no attempt to distinguish between normal and discretionary accruals.
The results could change if total accruals were further partitioned in this way. I suspect for
example, that the null accruals effects for Germany and France might change if this is
done.

Available online at www.scienceciirect.com
^ TheSCIENCE ^DIRECT. Intcmational
Journal of
The International Journal of Accounting Accounting
ELSEVIER 40(2005)395-397
Discussion
Response to commentary on "Differences in the
valuation of earnings and book value: Regulation
effects or industry effects?"
Apostolos Dallas*, Dimosthenis L. Hevas
Athens University ofEconomics and Business, 76 Patission Street, 10454, Athens, Greece
1. Introduction
Our paper uses data for four EU countries (France, Germany, Netherlands and the
United Kingdom) to investigate differences in the explanatory power of earnings and book
value of equity for the market value of equity obtained when partitioning our sample
according to industry and according to country. We find that partitioning by industry
generally improves the explanatory power of accounting variables compared to results
obtained when partitioning the sample by country which indicates that there is
convergence in the financial reporting practices within economic sectors. The size of
the errors however, implies that there is a need for more sector specific standards to
improve consistency.
Walker (2005) raises a number of legitimate concerns about our paper which can be
summarized into three issues. First, that financial reporting also serves a contracting and
stewardship role that is arguably more important than value relevance in terms of policy
relevance. Second, that the use of linear information dynamics models limits our ability to
draw policy implications and finally he suggests possible extensions to our work. The
following are our response to the issues raised by the discussant.
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2. The role of accounting information
Walker (2005) suggests that 'Tinancial reporting also serves a contracting and
stewardship role that is arguably more important than value relevance" and therefore "in
thinking about policy relevance we should really be thinking about the regulation of the
financial communication and corporate governance system as a whole." We could not
agree more. Consistent with Ball (2001) we believe that the requirements for an
economically efficient financial reporting system cover a substantial part of what is usually
thought of as the economic, legal and political infrastructure of a country.
However, arguments regarding the harmonization of accounting regulation in the
academic literature (for example, Joos & Lang, 1994) are primarily based in differences in
the valuation implications of accounting data across regulatory regimes. Furthermore, it is
clear that the European Commission had stock market investors in mind when adopting
the regulation requiring listed companies in accordance to IAS fi^om 2005 onwards. Last,
but certainly not least, our results lend support to the discussant's comment since they
indicate that value relevance differences are not primarily due to jurisdictional differences
in regulatory regimes.
3. The use of lineal information dynamics models
A fundamental assumption of the Ohlson-type model used in our study is that cash
flows are exogenously defined. An alternative formulation of this criticism is that Ohlson-
type models assume a Modiglianni-Miller world where financing decisions do not affect
the value of the firm. In such a context, accounting numbers do not affect investor or
managerial behaviour and therefore, strictly speaking, the results of our tests cannot be
used for policy recommendations. We recognize the validity of this criticism but we must
point out that these same models have been used before for this very purpose in a large
number of previous studies. These include those cited in our paper for cross-country
comparisons of the valuation implications of earnings and book value of equity.
4. Suggestions for further work
The discussant makes three suggestions for possible improvements in our research
design and fiarther work. More specifically, he suggests that we should control for
disclosure differences in different contexts (countries and/or industries), that we should
investigate models that allow for ex ante conservative accounting and Basu-type earnings
conservatism and finally that we should distinguish between normal and discretionary
accruals. We agree that these suggestions, ifwe could implement them, would improve our
paper. However, there are problems with the dataset we use.
In order to control for disclosure differences. Walker (2005) recommends that we use
analysts' forecasts of earnings. In practice, there is significantly smaller analyst coverage
of non-UK firms in standardized databases (such as I/B/E/S), i.e. only a very small number
of such forecasts are available, and this would significantly bias our results.
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The second issue raised by Walker (2005) refers to a fundamental assumption of the
model used in the paper, namely unbiased accounting. One example of model that assumes
earnings conservatism is Begley and Feltham (2002) which again requires data that are not
as readily available for firnis from some countries in our sample as for others.
Finally, evidence in Hribar and Collins (2002) suggests that accruals should be
measured directly from the statement of cash-flows as opposed to measuring accruals in
successive balance sheet accounts. This would allow a proper partitioning of accruals in
normal and discretionary components using a model outlined in their study. Nevertheless,
publication of cash-flow data by French and German companies does not cover the full
period of our sample. Additionally, both the Hribar-Collins model and our methodology
require estimates of lagged values of some variables and therefore separating accruals as
suggested by the discussant would lead to a much smaller population of firms. Given our
modelling approach (modified jackknife) relies on the availability of data for a substantial
number of firms, we are hesitant to draw inferences based on a small sample.
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Abstract
This study reports the resuhs of an empirical investigation of the extent of mandatory disclosure
by 94 listed companies in Bangladesh. It also reports the results of the association between company-
specific characteristics and mandatory disclosure of the sample companies. The results indicate that
companies in general have not responded adequately to the mandatory disclosure requirements of the
regulatory bodies. It has been found that companies, on average, disclose 44% of the items of
information, which leads to the conclusion that prevailing regulations are ineffective monitors of
disclosure compliance by companies. Company age appears to be an insignificant factor for
mandatory disclosure. And there is little support for industry size as a predictor of mandatory
disclosure except where size is measured by sales. Then it is marginally significant. Profitability was
also found to have no effect on disclosure. And status, i.e., whether a company is modem or
traditional also has no effect on mandatory disclosure.
© 2005 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Bangladesh; Mandatory disclosure; Annual report; Disclosure index; Regulatory framework;
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1. Introduction
In recent years, the issue of corporate disclosure has received a great deal of attention
from many researchers (for example, see Benjamin & Stanga, 1977; Carol & Pownall, 1994;
Cooke, 1989; Forker, 1992; Inchausti, 1997; Ingram & Frazier, 1980; Lang & Lundholm,
1993; Singhvi & Desai, 1971; Wallace, 1988). Why corporations should and do disclose
information is articulated in various theories, namely, stakeholder theory, agency theory,
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legitimacy theory, and political economy theory (Choi, 1973). While different theoretical
perspectives make different arguments, they all agree that companies release information
mostly for traditional user groups such as shareholders, creditors, financial analysts, and
security consultants who find this information usefiil when making investment decisions
(Cooke, 1989). The agency theory implies that companies increase disclosure in order to
mitigate conflicts between shareholders and managers. In addition, companies wishing to
enhance their firm value may do so by increased disclosure (Lobo & Zhou, 2001 ). Corporate
disclosure is, however, subject to potential pressures from regulatory bodies.
Disclosure is generally made in company annual reports through the statements or
accompanying notes. Although other means of releasing information, such as medial
release, interim reporting, letters to shareholders, and employee reports, are used by the
companies, the annual report is considered to be the major source of information to various
user-groups (Marston & Shrives, 1991 ). Nevertheless, all parts of the annual reports are not
equally important to all users. The income statement is believed to be the section most
preferred by investors, whereas cash flow statement and balance sheet are the most usefijl
sections to bankers and creditors (Eccles & Mavrinac, 1995; Ho & Wong, 2001 ). Likewise,
users of accounting information weight audit reports, directors' reports, accounting
policies, and historical summary differently. The annual report should contain information
that will allow its users to make correct decisions and efficient use of scarce resources.
Much prior research has focused on corporate transparency and capital market
development. Since the fall of Enron in the United States, there has been a wider
recognition of the importance of corporate transparency and disclosure. The effective
fiinctioning of capital markets, however, significantly depends on the effective flow of
information between the company and its stakeholders. Information disclosure is seen as a
means to improve marketability of shares, to enhance corporate image, and to reduce the
cost of capital (Meek, Roberts, & Gray, 1995). Companies provide information on the
ground that such disclosure will not respond to the negative impact on the company image
(Choi, 1973). It is seen that a company discloses information in line with legislative
fi-ameworks (Alam, 1989; Karim et al., 1998). Brownlee et al. (1990) argue that regulatory
agencies should be more concerned with the fiill and fair disclosure of information than
with the specific accounting methods used to measure or report economic transactions.
The Companies Act 1994 provides the basic requirements for disclosure and reporting
applicable to all companies incorporated in Bangladesh (Government of Bangladesh,
1993). The Act requires companies to prepare financial statements in order to reflect a true
and fair view of the state of affairs of the company. The Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), another regulatory body, requires all listed companies to comply with
accounting standards promulgated by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of
Bangladesh (ICAB), in addition to its own disclosure provisions (Government of
Bangladesh, 1993). Disclosure provisions of the Security Exchange Rules are, in fact,
restricted only to companies listed on the stock exchanges. It is often alleged, however,
that company annual reports do not comply with the disclosure requirements stipulated by
the regulatory agencies, resulting in poor disclosure compliance by the listed company
(Ahmed & Nicholls, 1994; Hossain, 2000; Karim, 1996).
Considerable research (e.g., Benjamin & Stanga, 1977; Cooke, 1989; Inchausti, 1997;
Lang & Lundholm, 1993; Meek et al., 1995; Singhvi & Desai, 1971; Wallace, Naser, &
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Mora, 1 994) has been undertaken in the recent past to enhance our understanding of the
factors influencing disclosure practices in Western society. Little is known about this
phenomenon in developing countries, particularly in Bangladesh. Moreover, prior research
focuses mostly on voluntary disclosures. There is little empirical evidence that looks
explicitly at mandatory disclosures, especially since the 1994 Companies Act. Again,
Hossain and Taylor (1998) used company reports that were prepared before the enactment
of the Companies Act 1994. On the other hand, Hossain (2000) specifically investigated
the compliance of International Accounting Standards (lASs) adopted in Bangladesh. He
found that compliance with the disclosure practices mandated by the three regulatory
bodies (Companies Act 1994, disclosure requirements of the stock exchange, and the
approved lASs) in Bangladesh is rare.
This paper investigates the disclosure practices of listed companies in Bangladesh to
see how they comply with mandatory rules established by the three regulatory bodies. In
addition, it examines the association between company characteristics and the extent of
disclosure. The findings of the study would be of immense interest to listed companies,
investors, and those involved in standard setting processes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the regulatory
framework for disclosure in Bangladesh. Section 3 presents a review of the literature and
develops the study's hypotheses. The research method is outlined in Section 4. Section 5
presents the results. Finally, Section 6 presents the conclusions, possible policy
implications of the results, potential limitations and directions for future research.
2. The legal framework for disclosure
Corporate reports generally include information in conformity with reporting and
disclosure laws, because laws require them to provide minimum amount of information
to facilitate evaluation of the securities. Every country, in general, has its own regulatory
framework that governs disclosure in corporate reports within that country. In
Bangladesh, corporate disclosure is governed by a number of statutes. For example,
companies limited by liabilities are guided by the Companies Act 1994. The extent and
nature of disclosures of the listed companies are influenced by Securities and Exchange
(SEC) Rules 1987 (Government of Bangladesh, 1987), the lASs adopted by the Institute
of Chartered Accountants of Bangladesh (ICAB) and the disclosure provision of the
Companies Act 1994 (Government of Bangladesh, 1994). These three regulatory bodies
provide the framework for corporate disclosures in Bangladesh. There is, however, no
one set of generally accepted standards based on these three sources. Again, industries
like railways, electricity, insurance, and banks have their own distinct regulations that
govern disclosures in their annual reports. Disclosures are also influenced by
Nationalized Order, 1972, Banking Companies Act (Government of Bangladesh,
1991), and Income Tax Ordinance 1984 (Government of Bangladesh, 1984). Like other
countries of this region, Bangladesh adopted the Companies Act 1913 of the then British
India. This Act was in force in Bangladesh before the promulgation of the Companies
Act of 1994, which is largely influenced by the British Companies Act. The Companies
Act 1913 required limited public companies to submit an annual balance sheet containing
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a summary of their capital, liabilities, and assets. But no specific formats were
prescribed. Profit and loss accounts were prepared without mentioning the nature of
activities in detail. These two statements needed to be audited and presented at the annual
general meeting for approval prior to publication. The fundamental weakness of the
regulation is that it does not provide any guidelines regarding the contents or how the
value of the respective items has been arrived at. The Companies Act 1994 made major
alternations to the financial reporting practices and disclosures of limited liability
companies (Ahmed & Kabir, 1995). Under the new law both statements also have to be
audited and reported before the annual general meeting. The statements can be prepared
either horizontally or vertically. The law requires that fixed assets are to be shown at cost
or valuation. The provisions for depreciation are the annual charge to be disclosed
separately. The required disclosures are classified and specified in far more detail and
include reserves and the changes that occurred during the year, director's remuneration,
commission, tax provision, and the flow of foreign currency. Section 185 of the
Companies Act provided mandatory items to be disclosed on the balance sheet and
income statement and Section 186 provides a list of information items that must be
disclosed in the director's report (Government of Bangladesh, 1994). Legislative
requirements prior to 1994, however, failed to indicate the actual level of corporate
disclosure. No particular formats were prescribed and even the necessary contents of the
accounting reports were not specified. In contrast, the Companies Act 1994 included
many provisions, which are mandatory and, some of those are also required by the
approved lASs (Hossain & Taylor, 1998).
The accounting profession in Bangladesh is guided by two professional institutes,
namely, the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Bangladesh (ICAB) and the Institute of
Cost and Management Accountants of Bangladesh (ICMAB). The financial audit is done
by members of ICAB and the cost audit by members of ICMAB. However, both are under
the control of the Ministry of Commerce Bangladesh. The two institutes are run and
managed by council members, who are elected internally, and representatives fi"om the
government. The council is responsible for the development of the accounting profession
in Bangladesh. Moreover, the ICAB has been given the sole authority to develop and issue
accounting and reporting standards and to monitor their application throughout the
country.
Stock exchange authority governs disclosure in company reports as a part of listing
requirements. At the time of independence in 1971, Bangladesh inherited only one stock
exchange, the Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE). It was formed in 1954 and registered as a
limited liability company. The Chittagong Stock Exchange (CSE), another stock exchange
of the country, was set up in 1999 and functions in Chittagong. Both stock exchanges are
regulated under the Securities and Exchange Rules 1987 and the Companies Act. Stock
exchange companies must disclose the following information in compliance with SEC
regulations: company history, outline of business, profile of top employees, profile of
directors, information on capital, changes in share capital, number and types of
shareholders, audited financial statements, consolidated statements, post-balance-sheet
events, holdings in associate and subsidiary companies with relative percentage and
payment of dividends. The stock exchange thus places a continuing disclosure and
reporting obligation on listed companies. Security exchange authority has, therefore, a
M Akhtaniddin / The International Journal ofAccounting 40 (2005) 399-422 403
positive role in determining the level of disclosure in company reports (Wallace & Naser,
1995).
It is recognized that lASs issued by the International Accounting Standards Committee
(lASC, 2001) have made important contributions toward harmonization in accounting and
reporting practices in individual countries. The lASC has, however, no authority to enforce
the accounting practices of its member countries. The implementation of accounting
standards is left to the local accountancy bodies. In countries where professional
accounting institutions are not strong, the implementation of accounting standards will not
be effective. The professional bodies may persuade the government to amend the law so
that the standards issued by the lASC can be adopted. It should be noted that lASC was
reconstituted (April 01, 2001) and is now known as the International Accounting
Standards Board (lASB). The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Bangladesh as a
member of this body (lASB) is entrusted with the task of adoption and enforcement of
standards in Bangladesh. The Technical and Research Committee of the ICAB selects,
reviews, and modifies the standards, where necessary, to conform to local requirements.
Members of the ICAB comply with the adopted accounting standards and disclosure
provisions of the Companies Act, as well as the disclosure requirements of the stock
exchanges. Like the lASC, the ICAB are, however, recommendatory in nature, as the
ICAB has no legislative power to enforce compliance with the disclosure requirements of
the accounting standards they issue (Hossain, 2000). Since members of the ICAB are kept
constantly aware of the development of accounting and auditing standards, they therefore
contribute to the improvement of financial reporting in Bangladesh. Once accounting
standards adopted by the ICAB gain mandatory status through the SEC's directives they
become applicable to all listed companies. Specifically, all listed companies are to abide by
accounting standards adopted by the ICAB and hence, accounting standards are mandatory
only for the companies listed on the stock exchange.
The SEC in Bangladesh plays a central role in monitoring and enforcing mandatory
disclosure compliance of listed companies. Listed companies are required to prepare
financial statements in accordance with the approved lASs along with the disclosure
provisions of the Companies Act and the stock exchanges. The SEC also prescribes penal
provisions for non-compliance. These include: barring the auditor who conducted the non-
complying audit from acting as an auditor for a listed company for a period of up to five
years; fining the auditor and the company officer up to one thousand taka for non-
compliance with stipulated provisions under the Companies Act. Like the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), the SEC in Bangladesh uses a review process to
monitor and enforce compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements. The primary
objectives of monitoring company annual reports are to examine whether they adhere to
regulatory frameworks and to encourage compliance. In contrast to the U.S. SEC that uses
a hard approach, the SEC in Bangladesh employs a lenient approach to enforce
compliance. The weak enforcement approach of the SEC may lead to the withholding of
mandatory disclosure information. To enforce existing rules, the SEC Bangladesh has the
power to suspend companies or remove their listing privileges if they do not comply with
the listing requirements. The power to reward the reporting entity is also embedded in the
enforcement process. Since the SEC Bangladesh hardly ever imposes sanctions for non-
compliance of mandatory disclosures, better enforcement procedures appear warranted.
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3. Literature review and hypothesis development
The demand for published financial information of companies has increased worldwide
as users ofthe information become more aware. But often disclosure does not serve the need
of the users because managers are likely to consider their own interests when exercising
managerial discretion. In fact, this might enhance the disclosure gap—the difference
between expected and actual disclosures, also known as the principal-agent problems. In
other words, improved disclosure reduces the gap between management and the outside
world, enhances the value of stock in the capital market, increases liquidity, reduces cost,
and so on (Cooke, 1989; Hossain, 2000; Karim, 1996). One striking feature in corporate
reporting is that a company generally provides information to discharge specific
obligations: to society, investor, supplier, creditors, and legal authorities. However, the
decision to provide or not provide certain information is likely to be influenced by a variety
of factors. Prior research has examined factors like size, profitability, and listing status to
find out their links with disclosure. Cooke ( 1989), for example, examines three categories of
companies, namely, unlisted, listed, and multiple listed, and suggests that disclosure is
lower for unlisted companies than listed companies, and that disclosure by listed companies
is lower than that of multiple listed companies. Lang and Lundholm (1993) suggest that
disclosures are higher for larger firms. Lobo and Zhou (2001 ) demonstrate that companies
that are performing well are likely to provide more information than poorly performing
companies. Also, cultural value is no less important a determinant of disclosure. For
example, in countries, which support a culture that has a high sense of secrecy, management
is less likely to pursue a high level of disclosure (Gray & Vint, 1995). Earlier research has
examined various company attributes and their association to the levels of disclosure. The
present study focuses on the level of disclosure in relation to the age, size, status, and
profitability of the companies. Additionally, prior studies (Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Wallace &
Naser, 1995) define mandatory disclosure as the presentation of a minimum amount of
information required by laws, stock exchanges, and the accounting standards setting body to
facilitate evaluation of securities. Similarly, the present study concentrates on mandatory
disclosure for items of information required by the Companies Act 1994, the listing rules of
the stock exchanges, and the approved lASs that listed companies in Bangladesh to disclose
those in their annual reports.
3.1. Size
Prior studies have identified size as significantly associated with the level of disclosure
(Cooke, 1989; Hossain, 2000; Lang & Lundholm, 1993; Owusu-Ansah, 1998). The size
variables considered in these studies include sales, total assets, number of employees, and
number of shareholdings. In the present study, the size of the company was determined by
taking into account the capital employed and the annual sales of the company. Capital
employed is the total of net worth and long term loans. Alternatively, it is defined as total
of fixed assets (net of depreciation) and net working capital, or total net assets less current
liabilities. Sales as a proxy for size, is equal to net annual sales.
Consistent with prior research, it is hypothesized that there is a significant association
between company size and the extent of disclosure. Larger companies may tend to disclose
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more information than smaller companies in their annual reports due to their competitive
cost advantage (Lang & Lundholm, 1993; Lobo & Zhou, 2001).
3.2. Age
For this study, 1 conjecture that company age is a critical factor in determining the
level of corporate disclosure. Older companies with more experience are likely to
include more information in their annual reports in order to enhance their reputation and
image in the market. Thus, I infer a positive association between the age of the
company and the level of disclosure. That is, old companies disclose information to
a greater extent than that of new companies. Companies are classified into three
categories for this variable: companies registered prior to 1 January 1972 are grouped as
"very old" companies; companies registered after 1 January 1972 but before 1 January
1986 are "old" companies; and companies registered after 31 December 1985 are "new"
companies.
3.3. Industiy type
Association between the level of disclosure and industry types provides mixed
evidence. Cooke's (1989) findings report that manufacturing companies disclose more
information than other types of companies. But the findings of Inchausti (1997) and
Owusu-Ansah (1998) provide no evidence of this association. I use industry type as an
explanatory variable in this study, because disclosures differ from one industry type to
another. For this study, companies have also been divided broadly into two categories:
traditional and modem. Traditional companies are food, textile, jute, synthetic, paper,
cement, and sugar. Bangladesh has a long history in these industrial activities which use
old technologies for the most part. Financial institutions tend to place the companies in
the traditional. Modem companies, which tend to place use new technologies include
engineering, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and metal alloys. The hypotheses drawn for
this variable would be: A particular type of company discloses different amount of
information than that of other types of company.
3.4. Profitability
Previous research (Hossain, 2000; Inchausti, 1997; Karim, 1996; Owusu-Ansah,
1998; Wallace & Naser, 1995; Wallace et al., 1994) use profitability as a determinant
of disclosure in corporate annual reports. However, empirical results from the research
are mixed. Findings of Wallace et al. (1994), Karim (1996), Owusu-Ansah (1998), and
Hossain (2000) suggest that companies having higher profitability disclose more
information than those with lower profitability. Also, the relationship between these
two variables is found to be positive in a study by Wallace and Naser (1995).
Additionally, researchers have used net profit to sales, earnings growth, dividend
growth, retum on assets, and retum on equity as proxies for profitability. In the present
study, the rate of retum on capital employed and sales have been used as a measure of
profitability. It is hypothesized that companies with a higher rate of retum (either on
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capital employed or sales) disclose information to a greater extent than companies with
a lower rate of return on capital employed. Thus, the hypothesis developed for the
study is as follows:
HI. There is a significant positive association between a number ofcompany characteristics
in respect of size, age, industry type, profitability and the extent of mandatory disclosure.
4. Method
4.1. Selection of sample
This study covers companies listed both on the Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) and the
Chittagong Stock Exchange (CSE). The total number of companies listed on either stock
exchange at the end of 1999 was 212. These companies fall into 11 categories: banks,
engineering, food and allied products, phamiaceuticals and chemicals, paper and
printing, fuel, jute, service and real estates, insurance, and miscellaneous. As the study is
limited to only non-financial manufacturing companies, the companies under the
categories of banks, insurance, service and real estates were excluded. The number of
companies was thus reduced to 174. The addresses of these companies were collected
from the DSE and letters were prepared and sent to the 174 companies requesting them
to send a copy of their annual report published in the year 1999. Responses from the
company offices were very poor. Only seven annual reports were available by post. I
then decided to visit the company head offices in order to obtain reports. This yielded
another 87 annual reports of non-financial companies. These 94 (7 + 87) companies
whose annual reports were collected, constitute the sample of the study. Hence, the
actual sample represents about 54% of population of non-financial companies listed on
the stock exchanges.
The comparative distribution of the companies in the population and the sample are
given in Table 1.
Table 1
Distribution of sample by industry type
Industry type Population Sample
Number % Number %
Engineering 22 12.6 19 20.2
Food and allied product 33 19.0 16 17.0
Fuel and power 4 2.3 2 2.1
Jute 7 4.0 0.0
Textile 42 24.1 24 25.5
Pharmaceutical and chemicals 25 14.4 16 17.0
Paper and printing 8 4.6 1 1.1
Cement 5 2.9 4 4.3
Miscellaneous 28 16.1 12 12.8
174 100.0 94 100.0
M. Akhtamddin / The International Journal ofAccounting 40 (2005) 399-422 407
4.2. Construction of the disclosure index
Although there are several ways of communicating company information, such as
interim reporting, press releases, letters, etc., the annual report is still considered the
major medium disclosing information. It has been argued that the information
contained in the report usually differs from company to company. Selection of proper
items of information that are expected to be disclosed in the annual report is not an
easy task. 1 consulted the mandatory disclosure checklist used in prior studies while
preparing the disclosure index for this study. However, the disclosure index employed
in this study is based mainly on the three regulatory sources in Bangladesh. They are,
as previously stated, the Companies Act 1994, disclosure requirements of the stock
exchanges, and the approved lASs. As each source is separate, I included most of the
requirements of each source in the disclosure index. The disclosure index was
finalized after consultation with the relevant experts. Appendix 1 presents the disclosure
index.
Table 2 shows the distribution of 160 items of information across the annual report:
balance sheet items 41%, income statement 28%, accounting policies \4%, historical
sunmiary 12%), and directors' report 5%).
4.3. Scoring the disclosure items
There are two methods for determining the level of corporate disclosure: weighted
and unweighted approaches (Cooke, 1989). The weighted approach allows distinctions
to be made for the relative importance of information items to the users (Inchausti,
1997). The advocates of this approach are of the opinion that all items of information
are not equally important and, therefore, allocation of weights is done somewhat
arbitrarily by the researchers. Another approach and the one adopted for present study is
the unweighted approach. This approach is based on the assumption that each item of
disclosure is equally important. Additionally, all disclosure items are equally important
to the average users (Wallace, 1988). Specifically, attention is given to all users of
annual reports rather than particular user groups. Here items of information are
numerically scored on a dichotomous basis. Score one is assigned if a company
discloses an item of information. In the case of non-disclosure the score is zero. An
unweighted index is defined as the ratio of the number of items a company actually
Table 2
Distribution of index items
No. of Items " o
Balance sheet items 66 41
Income statement items 44 28
Accounting policies items 23 14
Directors' report items 08 05
Historical summary items 19 12
160 100
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discloses to the total that it could disclose. The total disclosure (TD) score thus arrived
at for a company is additive as follows:
TD = ^ d,
Where, J = one if the item di is disclosed; zero, if the item dx is not disclosed;
/J = number of items.
A major issue for the weighted approach is that if different user groups are asked to
weight the importance of various items, they may give weight the same items of
infomiation differently. The weighted approach has, in fact, encountered several
problems. Prior studies, which have examined both weighted and unweighted
approaches, draw similar conclusions about the methods (Choi, 1973; Inchausti,
1 997). The equal weighting system is, therefore, viewed to be superior to the differential
weighting system (Owusu-Ansah, 1998) and for that reason this study uses the
unweighted disclosure index approach to measure the level of corporate mandatory
disclosures. Similar studies in other countries also have used the unweighted disclosure
index approach (Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Wallace & Naser, 1995). But the unweighted
approach should be employed with a caveat. One main problem of this approach is that
a company may be penalized by assigning a score of zero for the absence of an item of
information that is not applicable to it. In order to overcome this problem, the relevance
of each absent item needs to be investigated and then classified as non-disclosure for a
relevant item of reporting and non-applicable otherwise. For companies having non-
applicable items, the use of a relative index is suggested (Owusu-Ansah, 1998). The
relative index approach is the ratio of what a particular company actually disclosed to
what the company is expected to disclose. In spite of the subjective discrimination
between non-disclosure and non-applicable items, this approach is considered to be a
more accurate measure than one that assumes that all companies are identical and,
therefore, no difference need exist in disclosure requirements. This approach has been
employed in several prior studies (see, e.g., Cooke, 1989; Inchausti, 1997; Owusu-
Ansah, 1998; Wallace & Naser, 1995; Wallace et al., 1994).
4.4. Test of hypothesis
In order to test the hypothesis I used both non-parametric and parametric statistics.
Cooke (1989) used these two approaches in his study. A non-parametric analysis was
used for measuring the disclosures of an individual company based on indexes and the
level of disclosure practices. This approach used chi-square, and Lambda. Another
approach used based on the mean of each category of company, is the contingency
coefficient of the correlation. The contingency coefficient of the correlation along with
chi-square is considered useful to measure association. When the expected value of
one or more cells in the table is less than five, however, chi-square is not a
meaningful way to measure association. In that situation, an ahemative measure.
Lambda, overcomes the limitation of the expected frequencies (Cooke, 1989, p. 201).
Lambda varies between zero and one, where zero indicates no association and one
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indicates that the variables are perfectly associated.The regression technique used to
test HI is as follows:
TDE = a + Bi Size + 5.Age + ^aProfit + 54lndustry + g
Expected sign (+) (+) (+) (+)
Where:
TDE = total disclosure score received from each company
a =the constant, and
£ =the error tenn
5. Results and discussion
5.7. Level of disclosure and disclosure performance by age
The study reveals that disclosure compliance is poor among listed companies. They
disclosed an average of 43.53% of the items selected. The minimum score found in the
study is 17.3% and the maximum is 72.50%, showing a decreasing trend in the level of
corporate disclosure with an increase in the disclosure score. This finding compares
favorably to Hossain and Taylor's (1998) findings where the mean score is 29.33.
Compliance with accounting standards disclosure by listed companies was better in
another study by Hossain (2000), where the average compliance level is 69.05% with a
minimum and maximum level of 35.85% and 94.34%, respectively. Nevertheless,
conformity with mandatory disclosure by Bangladeshi firms is low compared to firms
in other countries. For example, the average mandatory disclosure for Zimbabwe firms is
74.43% (Owusu-Ansah, 1998).
Whether or not company age influences the level of disclosure is examined by using
lambda analysis (Table 3). For purposes of this analysis, the sample companies are
Table 3
Disclosure of infonnation by age
Disclosure index Age of the company Total
Very old company Old company New company
Up to 20 1 1
21-30 1 3 4 8
31-40 4 14 16 34
41-50 1 8 12 21
51-60 4 10 5 19
61-70 2 7 1 10
71 and above 1 1
Total 12 43 39 94
X' Significance Contingency coefficienit ;.
12.213 .429 .0339 .000
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Table 4
Disclosure of information by status
Disclosure index Status of the company
Traditional Modem
Total
Up to 20
21-30
31^0
41-50
51-60
61-70
71 and above
Total
7
17
11
9
2
46
Significance
17
10
10
8
1
48
Contingency coefficient
34
21
19
10
1
94
10.162 .312 .000
classified as very old, old, and new companies depending on when they first registered
with the Registrar of Companies. The results did not support the hypothesis that old
companies will provide more information than new ones.
5.2. Disclosure performance by status
Disclosure was expected to depend on the status of a company. Modem companies are
likely to disclose more information than that of traditional companies. Table 4 shows that
out of 94 companies. 49% falls in the category of traditional companies and the remainder
5 1% in the category of modem companies. It can also be seen from the table that 24% of
traditional and 40% ofmodem companies have a score of more than 51%. Lambda reveals
no association between disclosure and status of the companies.
5.3. Size-wise disclosure
Corporate size can be represented by many different indicators. Karim (1996) uses
annual sales, total assets, and market value of the firm to measure size, whereas Hossain
(2000) uses sales turnover and total assets as size variables. In this study capital employed
and annual sales are used as the measures of company size. The relationship between size
and disclosure is shown in Tables 5 and 6.
Larger companies are expected to disclose more information. As can be seen fi-om
Table 5, at 51-60%) the disclosure level of 21% have capital employed of Tk. 100 to 200
million. The same percentage was also found for companies with Tk. 200 to 400 million,
whereas 53%) of the companies have capital employed at the Tk. 400 million and above
level. Again, for ten companies at the 61% to 70% disclosure level, 50% have capital
employed of Tk. 200 to 400 million, 20% of Tk.400 to 800 million, and 30% of Tk. 1600
million and above.
From Table 6 it can be seen that no company with sales of less than Tk. 100 million
51%, to 60% level. Out of the 19 companies at this level, 37% had sales of Tk. 200 to 400
million, and 37%) had sales of 400 to 800 million. Three companies had sales of Tk. 800 to
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Table 5
Disclosure ot ' intbmiaiion by size
Disclosure Total capital employed Total
index Up to 50 50-100 100-200 200-+00 400-800 800-1600 1600 and above
Up to 20
21-30 3 1
31^0 7 7
41-50 1 1
51-60 1
61-70
71 and above
Total 12 9 19
34
21
19
10
1
94
/" Significance Contingencv coefficient
64.631 .002 .638 IS.-
1600 million and one company had sales of Tk. 1600 million and above. At the disclosure
levels of 61% and abo\e there are no smaller companies.
This analysis indicates that the size of the company in regard to capital employed and
sales does have a little impact on the disclosure of infonnation. Lambda, too, re\ eals the
same conclusion. However, the influence of size was found to be significant in the studies
of both Karim (1996), and Hossain (submitted for publication).
5.4. Projitabilit}- and disclosure
The profitability variable is used by many researchers (Hossain, 2000; Inchausti, 1997;
Karim, 1996; Owusu-Ansah. 1998; Wallace & Naser, 1995; Wallace et al., 1994), although
the measures of profitability were not similar in all these studies. These studies used net
profit to sales, rate of return on assets, earnings growth, and di\ idcnd stabilit>'. The two
profitability measures used in this study are net profit on capital employed and net profit
Table 6
Disclosure of information by size
Disclosure Amiual sales Total
inde.x Up to 50 50-100 100-200 200-400 400^800 800-1600 1600 and above
Up to 20 1 1
21-30 4 1 3 8
31-^0 12 2 9 9 2 34
41-50 2 4 3 4 6 2 21
51-^0 1 7 7 3 1 19
61-70 4 2 1 3 10
7 1 and above 1 1
Total 19 7 13 24 20 7 4 94
/.' Significance Contingency coeffic:ient /
79.592 .000 .677 .217
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Table
-
Profitabilitv and the level of disclosiare
Disclosure
index
Net profit on capital employed
LO: Up re : 2^ 32 and abc
Total
Up to 20
21-30 8
31-10 11 9
41-50 3 3
51-60 1
61-70
71 and above 1
Total
-»:> 14
7 3 34
4 .* 1 21
4 7 > 1 19
-» 6
1
1 1 10
1
7 23
-
-) 94
r Signiticanci Continaenc^' coefficient
77.950 -OO'J
on sales. The relation between net profit on capital emplo\ ed and the disclosure index is
presented in Table 7.
About 25° o of the companies under study suffered losses, whereas 32*^0 enjo>ed profits
between 8°o and 32° o on capital employed. At these profit levels. 20^0 of the companies
fall at the 60° o and below disclosure level and 12° o face at the disclosure le\ el of 6 1 -' o and
above. Thus, anahsis indicates a ver>" low degree of association ber\\ een net protlt on
capital emplo\ed and corporate disclosure.
An examination of the association between net profits on sales and ihe disclosure level
also reveals that association was not significant enough to reject the null h>poihesis ( Table 8 ).
Lambda accepts a low level of association beuveen disclosure and profitabilit> in terms of
bofli net profits on capital employed and net profits on sales. Both Kanm ( 1 996 ) and Hossam
(2000) fotmd a positive association between profitabiht>" and disclosure. The finding of the
present smdy is not incongruent with them; it show s a low le\ el of association ben^een
profifltabilil^ and disclosure. According to Zubaidah and Koh (1999). a more profitable
company couldhave disclosed more infonnation in order to impro\e its image. The standard
T^kS
Profitatrilit%' and ibe le\'el of disclosure
DisclosuFe Net {Hofit aa sales \="I profit Total
index
Loss Up to 2 ;^ -^^ <-\f. 1^32 -* -» and abo\ e
Up to 20 1 1
21-30 8 8
31^0 11 8 4 5 4 1 1 34
41-50 3 3 5 5 1 4 21
51-60 2 2 7 "^ 1 19
61-70 2 6 2 10
71 and above 1 1
Total 23 14 11 19 18 8 1 94
r Significance CiHiiiugeiicv coefficient /
75. ^"^
~
.000 66" .If'i
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Table 9
Descriprive statistics
Mean Std. de\ iation
Disclosure index
Age of the company
Status of the company
Total capital employed
Size of annual sales
Net profit on capital emplo\ ed
2.29
1.51
3.71
3.60
3.34
1.23
.68
.50
1.61
1.74
1.79
94
94
94
94
94
94
deviation of each group is approximately equal suggesting that the equal variance
assumption is met (see Table 9, descriptive statistics).
The degree of variability in the case of age and status of the company is much lower
compared to other \'ariables in the study. Thus we can reject the null hypotheses that there
is no association bet\veen disclosure and size and between disclosure and profitability.
5.5. Multivariate test
Regression analyses were run using ordinary' least squares (OLS) estimates and are
reported in Table 10. Estimates of regressions are substantially better than that of
univariate analysis. Regression has been used in much previous research (e.g., Cooke,
1989; Owusu-Ansah, 1998: Wallace & Naser, 1995; Wallace et al.. 1994). The results of
the estimation procedure report that company size, profitability, and the intercept have a
statistically significant effect on the extent of mandatory' disclosure, but at different levels.
Table 10
Regression results
Coefficient of multiple regression .759
Coefficient of determination (R') .577
.A.djusted R- .547
Standard error .830
Analysis of variance
Sum ot squares df Mean square F
Regression 81.711 6 13.619 19.746
Residual 60.002 87 .690 -
Variables in the equation
Unstandardized coefficients Standardized coefficients / Sig.
P Std. error P
(Constant) 1.789 537 3.328 .001
Age of the company -.195 136 -.108 -1.431 .156
Status of the company .298 184 .121 1.614 .110
Total capital employed -3.603--' 100 -.005 -.036 .971
Size of annual sales .307 108 .432 2.833 .006
Net profit on capital emp oved .170 120 .246 1.420 .059
Net profit on sales .134 107 .189 1.254 .213
414 M Akhtaniddin / The Intenuitional Joiirmil ofAccounting 40 (2005) 399-422
The intercept is significant at the .001 level. Company age is significant at the .15 level,
whereas profitability is significant at .05 level.
The disclosure score, a continuous variable, is used as the dependent variable. The
disclosure score for each company is related to company characteristics, the independent
variables for the study, such as age, status, size and profitability. The four company
attributes were measured on a continuous scale. The explanatory power of the OLS model,
as indicated by the adjusted /?", is 54.7% (p<.001). The R~ is .577, which reveals that the
model is capable of explaining a 57.7% variability in disclosing information in the annual
reports of the selected companies. The F statistic indicates that the model employed to
explain the variations in mandatory disclosure in company annual reports is significant at
the conventional levels (/?<.01).
The results show that some variables are significant in explaining disclosures. Companies
that are larger in size measured by annual sales (/'<.01) are likely to disclose more
information. The positive association between company size and mandatory disclosure is
consistent with prior findings (see, e.gAhmed & Nicholls, 1994; Cooke, 1989; Meek et al,
1995; Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Wallace & Naser, 1995). Lang and Lundholm (1993) also report
that disclosure is higher for larger firms. It is argued that larger firms provide more
information because they are likely to face lower cost of disclosure (Ho & Wong, 2001).
Furthermore, since larger firms tend to disclose more to meet the increased demand in
reducing uncertainty about quality and expected return, they arguably face lower
competitive cost of disclosure (Ferguson, Lam, & Lee, 2002).
The hypothesis that companies having higher profitability disclose more information
than companies with lower profitability is supported {p < .05). Lang and Lundholm (1993)
suggest that well-performing firms provide more information in the annual report than do the
poor-performing firms. The positive effect of profitability on financial disclosure is con-
sistent with Wallace et al. ( 1 994), Karim ( 1 996), Owusu-Ansah ( 1 998), and Hossain (2000).
The managers of profitable firms are motivated to disclose more information to appease
shareholders, to enhance company image leading to marketability of shares, and above all to
justify their compensation (see Meek et al., 1995; Zubaidah & Koh, 1999).
The /-statisfic of industry type is insignificant, indicating that it has a negligible effect
on the mandatory disclosure practices of the sample companies. It is consistent with results
of Owusu-Ansah (1998), where firms are classified into four broad heads, namely, mining,
conglomerate, manufacturing, and others. Inchausti's (1997) findings also do not support
an association between industry type and level of disclosure.
Similarly, company age was not found to be as significant a predictor of compliance
with mandatory disclosure as expected. An older company was expected to disclose more
mandatory information than a younger one. For this study company age is measured fi'om
the date of registration with the Registrar of Companies not ft^om the listing date. A listed
company has to comply with disclosure and reporting regulations and may require some
time to adapt to the new disclosure environment. Public companies having pre-listing
experience may, therefore, have no link to a specific level of disclosure. This needs further
investigation. Owusu-Ansah (1998) finds a positive association between company age and
mandatory disclosure. He defines company age as the experience gained by public
companies during the listing periods. Thus, the possible explanation for his findings is
that company age in terms of listing status is related to mandatory disclosure.
I
1
\
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6. Conclusions, limitations, and suggestions for future research
The aim of this study is to examine the level of mandatory disclosure made by listed
companies in Bangladesh. It also investigates the factors that influence mandatory disclosure
practice. The findings would be used to improve the quality of corporate disclosure by
Bangladeshi companies. The study finds that many corporate annual reports do not meet the
disclosure requirements of the regulatory bodies in Bangladesh. On average, the sample
companies disclose information on only 43.53% of the items asked for indicating poor
compliance with the mandatory rules. This result is better than the findings of Hossain and
Taylor (1998), where the mean score is 29.33%. A later study, Hossain (2000), is more
encouraging, with average compliance rates for accounting standards disclosure reported at
69.05% with a range of 35.85% to 94.34%. These results indicate that listed companies in
Bangladesh place more emphasis on lASs disclosures. This may be the result of the ICAB's
efforts to persuade its members who work as either professional accountants or auditors to
comply on the results of the ICAB's monitoring. Nevertheless, the available literature
reveals that overall compliance with mandatory disclosure by Bangladeshi firms is low
compared to firms from other countries. For example, the average mandatory disclosure for
Zimbabwe firms is 74.43% (Owusu-Ansah, 1998). The lack-lustre disclosure perfomiance
by Bangladeshi firms can be attributed to organizational culture, poor monitoring, and lapse
in enforcement by the regulatory body. Disclosure decisions are culture-driven (El-Gazzar,
Philip, Finn, & Jacob, 1999). Ho and Wong (2001 ) argue that in countries where the culture
supports a high level of secrecy, managements become less transparent and are less likely to
favor a high level ofdisclosure. Further analysis is required to impound cultural factors. With
regard to regulations, Karim et al. (1998) suggest that at present they are ineffective when it
comes to monitoring disclosure practices in Bangladesh. Again, regulations alone,
according to Ho and Wong (2001), can do little to ensure disclosure because companies
view that disclosure excellence lies in the hands of regulatory bodies who work for
safeguarding the company's value for shareholders. What the regulatory bodies need to do is
to create an environment that helps become aware of the companies consequences of non-
disclosure of adequate information in the annual reports.
This study examines the relationship between mandatory disclosure and four corporate
attributes; i.e., company age, status, size, and profitability. The four company attributes
were measured on a continuous scale. Analysis reveals that the age of the company is not a
factor for disclosure. The investigation did not support the hypothesis that old companies
will provide more information than new companies. Similarily, company status has no
effect on disclosure. Contrary to prior findings (Cooke, 1989; Meek et al., 1995; Owusu-
Ansah, 1998), this study finds little support for the relationship between size and the level
of disclosure, however, except in respect to sales, where size is marginally significant. The
same result is found in the case of disclosure and profitability.
Based upon the findings of this study, the following obserxations and recommendations
have been outlined which may be useful to company managers, financial analysts,
investors, and policy makers for the capital market development of the country:
• Companies disclose more information on the cost of sales, providing details of
expenses, but there is less compliance with disclosure regulations. Steps should
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be taken to ensure that mandatory information items are covered in the annual
report.
• The Securities Exchange Commission has already introduced a reward-punishment
program to ensure that listed companies disclose adequate infonnation in their annual
reports. The enforcement program, however, has not been effective. A committee could
be formed representing investors, financial institutions, and academicians to appraise
the published accounts and give their observations.
• The Companies Act 1994 does not include a provision for publication of either a
Statement of Sources and Application of Funds or a Statement of Cash Flow. The lAS-
7, however, adopted a cash flow statement for use in Bangladesh. This standard allows
a cash flow statement to be prepared in two ways, viz. the direct or indirect method.
The Companies Act should also include a provision about the preparation of cash flow
statements.
The Bangladeshi capital market is not efficient and well structured. An increase in the
flow of free and accurate disclosure would help the capital market develop. Government
needs to come forward to protect the interests of the different user groups.
• The responsibility of the auditor is to check whether the accounts are prepared in
accordance with accounting policies and requirements of the Companies Act 1994. He
or she has to state his or her opinion that the audited accounts give a true and fair view
of the state of affairs of the company. Audit reports should also state whether or not
disclosure rules are properly complied with.
• With a view to improving disclosure level, an Accounting Board should be set up by
the Government with members from both from the Institute of Chartered Accountants
of Bangladesh and the Institute of Cost and Management Accountants of Bangladesh.
In addition to the adoption of accounting standards and the development of accounting
in Bangladesh, the board should have the responsibility of determining the degree of
compliance with the disclosure regulations.
• An accounting court could be created to deal with litigations regarding the
disclosure of information. An individual who has a direct interest in the annual
reports of a company could bring a charge of non-compliance with the disclosure
requirements.
• The present study is limited to only 54% of the companies listed on the stock
exchanges. Future research could investigate disclosure performance of all the listed
companies. Research could also explore the variations in disclosure between listed and
unlisted companies. Examining similar research issues within different industry sectors
would also be an interesting extension of this study. This might reveal interesting
results in terms of variations within the industrial sectors.
• Any opinion survey of users of company annual reports could be conducted. Such a
survey would provide additional insights on corporate disclosure practices in
Bangladesh.
• Finally, this study covers the annual reports for a single year only. Additional research
is needed to assess the trends of disclosure and to know whether the quality of
disclosure has improved over time.
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Appendix A. Disclosure index
Historical suinmuiy
1
.
A brief description of the nature and principal activities of the company and its subsidiaries
2. The country of incorporation and the address of the registered office
3. Names of the top employees, lines of authority and their remuneration
4. List of directors
5. Outside affiliations of the directors
6. Audited fmancial statements (balance sheet and profit and loss account)
7. Audit report
8. Report of the chairman or CEO
9. Statement of cash flows
10. Holdings in associates and subsidiaries with the relative percentage
1 1
.
Statement of changes in the share capital
12. Number and types of shareholders
13. Names and size of holdings of largest shareholders
14. Significant changes in the company's or its subsidiaries' fixed assets and the market value of land,
if the value differs substantially from the book value
15. The date when the financial statements were authorized for issue and who gave that authorization
16. Post-balance-sheet events
17. Discussion of major factors which will influence next year's results
18. Forecast of company performance
19. Comparative balance sheet for two years
Balance Sheet Items
20. The total carrying amount of inventories
2 1
.
Inventories are sub-classified as merchandise, production supplies, materials, work in progress,
and finished goods
22. Inventories carried at net-realizable value
23. Amount of inventories pledged as security for liabilities
24. Cash and cash equivalents
25. The components of cash and cash equivalents should be disclosed and a reconciliation of the amounts in
the cash flow statement with the equivalent items reported in the balance sheet should be presented
26. Trade and other receivables
27. Receivables are analyzed by amount Irom trade customers, fi"om other members of the group,
and from related parties
28. Advances and loans to staff" or directors
29. Advances and loans to partnership firms in which the company or any of its subsidiaries is a partner
30. Advances recoverable in cash or in kind or for value to be received, e.g., rates, taxes, and insurances, etc.
3 1 Interest accrued on investment
32. Provision for provident fund scheme
33. Secured short-term borrowings
34. Unsecured short-term borrowings
35. Unpaid dividends
36. Provision for doubtftil debts
37. Trade and other payables
38. A brief description of the nature of the contingent assets/liabilities
39. Provision for taxation
40. Provision for proposed dividends
41. Provision for gratuity
42. Provision for contingencies
43. Provision for insurance, pension, and similar staff-benefit schemes
(continued on next page)
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Appendix A (continued)
44. Provision for liabilities
45. Deferred tax liabilities
46. Classification of assets and liabilities
47. Aggregate value of intangible assets
48. Breakup of intangible assets
49. Aggregate amount of investments
50. Investment in subsidiary companies
51. Investment in associated companies
52. Investment in quoted and unquoted shares other than group
53 Investment in government securities
54 Value of land and buildings
55. Amount of the leasehold property
56. Reconciliation between the total of minimum lease payments at the balance sheet date and their present
value
57. Cost of furniture and fittings
58. Expenditure upon development of property
59. Patents, trade marks, and designs
60. A company with subsidiaries should annex a set of consolidated financial statements to its own
financial statements
61. Minority interests in the consolidated financial statements to be shown separately
62. Total carrying amount of property, plant, and equipment
63. The measurement bases used for determining the gross carrying amount of property, plant, and equipment.
When more than one basis has been used, the gross carrying amount for that basis in each category
should be disclosed
64. A reconciliation of the carrying amount of property, plant, and equipment at the beginning and end of the
period showing additions/disposals/acquisitions/impaimient losses
65. The existence and amounts of restrictions on title, property, plant, and equipment pledged as security for
liabilities
66. Accumulated impairment losses at the beginning and end of the period
67. The amount of commitments for the acquisition of property, plant and equipment
68. In case of revaluation of property, plant, and equipment it should include: the firm's policy on
revaluation; the basis used to revalue the assets; and the effective date of revaluations
69. Research and development costs recognized as an asset
70. The amount of goodwill/negative goodwill arising on the acquisition
71. The gross amount of depreciable assets and the related accumulated depreciation
72. Non-current interest-bearing liabilities
73. Loans from directors
74. Long-term liabilities are disclosed separately showing the nature of the recipients such as secured
loans, unsecured loans, inter-company loans, and loans from associated companies
75. The amount of borrowing costs capitalized during the period
76. The capitalized rate used to determine the amount of borrowing costs eligible for capitalization
77. Share capital: authorized, issued, subscribed, called up and paid up
78. Number of shares hold by directors
79. A reconciliation of the number of shares outstanding at the beginning and at the end of the year
80. Par value per share, or that the share have no par value
81. The rights, preferences, and restrictions for each class of share including restrictions on the distribution of
dividends and the repayment of capital
82. Shares in the enterprise held by the enterprise itself or by subsidiaries or associates of the enterprise
83. If any shares or debentures have been issued, the number, class, and consideration received and the reason
for the issue
84. Particulars of any option or unissued share capital
85. A description of the nature and purpose of each reserve
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Income Sialemem
86. SaksiE^einie, ablegate amount
87. Amount of levenne in eatit signiScant cabcgary of revenue
88. The cost of in^^entoiies sold dmins ibe period.
89. Finance costs
90. Share of lesuhs ofjointly amtioUed «uit\' and associates
91. Profit or loss from mdinaiy activities
92. Any excepticMial cm* mmsual ctedils «" dtaiges
93. Profit «- loss ari^ng fi«n sale «- disposal of fixed assets
94. Break XMp of incmne fimn in\'estmeats
95. DnecttMS* remunetaticMi
96. Auditors' mnuneialioa for services as auditras
97. Amount paid to or iEcei\'able by tiiiid paities in respect of services rendei^ b\ an> past or present
directcHS to the craiqiain'' or its subsidiaries
98. Recognition and depreciati(Mt^'anioitization of tangible assets
99. Recognition and depFeciaiion amoitizaticHi of intaiigible assets
00. The amount adjusted to net profit or loss due to change in acoountmg p>oLicy
01. The amount of the otmectioD lecognized in adt profit or k»s for ifae cuireni period
02. The efiect of the acquisition di^iosal of subsidiaiies on the financial position
03. The net {Hofit ot loss for the penods
04. The tax expense (inccMne) related to profit w loss fipwn (Hdtnaiy at^vities ^lould be presented on the
fxe of the income statement
05. The major craiqmnents of tax expense (income) should be disclosed separately
06. Tax expense relating to ex(raoidinai>' items
07. Brokerage and discount on sales otho^ than the usual trade discounts
08. The amount set aside to any reserve but not including provisions made to meet an^' specific liabilitv;
contiiigaic>'. (H^ commitment
09. Amount set aside or jwoxisions made for meeting specific liability, contingency, or commitment
10. Workmen and staff w^lfere e3q>aases
11. Separate disclosure of staff Fammaadon not less than Tk. 36,000
12. Conmiission or other i«nimeiati(» payable separately to a managing agent or his associate
13. Research and development costs recognized as an expaise
14. Disclosure of pension costs
15. Pa>"ment for gratuit\'
16. Information regarding the licensed capacii\'. installed capacitx. and actual production
17. ExpoKliture in foreign curroicy on accotmt for roj^ah},, know-how professional consultation fees.
intei^st. and other maitas
1 8. \'alue of percentage of all imported and local raw mataials. spare paits. and components consumed
19. Amount remitted in tbreign currencies on account of dixndends to non-resident ^areholders. the numbo^
of shares held by them, and die year for which the dividend is being paid
20. Foreign exchange earnings for expon of goods (FOB price. ro\'alt\?. know-how professionals and
consultation fees, interest and dividends, other income and its nature
2 1
.
Ad\ ertisement expenditure
22. Social securitv' costs
23. Pension costs contribution plan
24. Contributions in excess of Tk. 50.000 made to government approv ed chanties or other charities
25. Basic earnings per share
26. Diluted earnings p>er share
2". The amounts used as the nimierators in calcidating basic and diluted eamings per share, and a
reconciliation of those amounts to the net profit or loss for die period
28. The weighted average nimiber of ordinarv' shares used as the denominator in calculating basic and
diluted eamings per share, and a reconciliation of these denominators to each other
2*J. Comparative pa^fit and loss accounts tor two years
Icontinued on next page
i
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Appendix A (continued)
Accounting Policies
130. The measurement basis used in preparing the financial statements
131. The reason and nature of a change in an accounting policy
132. Statement of compliance with approved lASs
133. Basis of consolidation
134. The accounting policies adopted in measuring inventories, including the cost formula used.
135. The accounting policies adopted for the recognition of revenues
1 36. The accounting policies adopted for research and development costs
137. The amortization methods used and the useful lives or amortization rates used for research and
development costs
138. Disclose firm policy for foreign currency risk management
139. The depreciation methods used
140. The useflil lives or the depreciation rates used
141. Method of valuing goodwill
142. The methods used to account for investments in associates
143. Accounting policy for borrowing costs
144. Accounting policy for actuarial gains and losses
145. Treatment of retirement benefits
146. Treatment of preliminary expenses
147. Methods of advance payments
148. Purchase policy
149. Sales policy
150. Deferred taxation system
151. Conversion or translation of foreign currencies
152. Treatment of contingent liabilities
Director s Report
153. The state of the company's affairs
154. Amount proposed to carry to any reserve
155. Recommended dividend
156. Material changes and commitment affecting the financial posifion of the company that occurred between
the year and the date of report
157. Changes in the nature of the company's business during the year
158. Changes in the company's subsidiaries or in the nature of their business
159. Changes in the classes of business in which the company has an interest
160. Explanation and information of every reservation, qualification, or adverse remark in the auditor's report
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Book reviews
Kevin Keasey, Steve Thompson, Mike Wright (Eds.), Corporate governance:
Accountability, enterprise and international comparisons, 2005, xviii + 464 pages,
£34.95, ISBN 0-470-87030-3
This is a collection of 17 essays commissioned especially for this volume on various
aspects of coiporate governance with contributions from 3 1 authors. Many are the leading
researchers in their specialist area within corporate governance. The book has a distinctly
Anglo-Saxon flavor, with all but a few contributors coming from the United Kingdom or
United States.
In the interests of depth, rather than breadth, the editors have restricted their coverage to
four disciplines: Accounting, Finance, Economics, and Governance. As a result, other
perspectives, for example, from the social sciences including politics and sociology, are
not to the fore in this volume. Chapters comprise overviews of recent research on
corporate governance topics, and on governance developments within particular countries
and institutional regimes.
The collection takes both a micro and macro perspective. At the micro level, a
traditional Anglo-American approach is taken. In their introductory chapter (Chapter 1),
the editors comment that this Anglo-American perspective involves protecting the
downside risk of shareholders (i.e., accountability of managers) while encouraging
managers to take risks to increase shareholder value (i.e., encouraging managers to act
entrepreneurially)—which strikes me as a difficult conflict to reconcile, and which
merits more discussion.
Keasey, Short and Wright (Chapter 2) deal with developments in corporate governance
codes in the United Kingdom. This is a handy summary from publication of the Cadbury
Report in 1992 to the 2003 Combined Code. The chapter contains two useful tables: the
first summarizing the chronology of these corporate governance developments in the
United Kingdom (Table 2.1), and the second summarizing governance requirements from
the Cadbury Report to the 1998 Combined Code (it is a pity Table 2.2 did not cover the
requirements of the latest 2003 Combined Code).
At the micro level, specific governance issues are addressed including capital stmcture,
institutional shareholders, boards of directors and non-executive directors, executive pay,
board compensation sub-committees, governance and strategic leadership, and the
governance roles of takeovers and of venture capitalist and buy-outs. In a short chapter,
Watson and Ezzamel (Chapter 3) review the agency cost literature starting with Jensen and
Meckling's (1976) seminal paper and consider whether firms are better financed by debt
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rather than by equity. Other stakeholders, in particular employees, are also discussed as
residual claimants of the firm.
Short and Keasey (Chapter 4) examine institutional shareholders in the United
Kingdom. A number of useful tables summarize the pattern of share ownership from 1963
to 2002, the extent to which shares are directly or indirectly (through pension funds and
life assurance products) owned by individuals, and the value of institutional holdings at the
end of 2002. Corporate governance interventions (or lack thereof!) by institutional
shareholders are reviewed, together with the effect of size, the free-rider problem, and
conflicts of interests on behavior. Mechanisms of intervention are also considered. The
chapter ends with a review of the empirical literature on these topics.
In a chapter on the role of the board and of non-executive directors (Chapter 5),
Ezzamel and Watson start by reviewing the literature, attempting to relate board
composition with firm performance. The authors adopt the generally accepted perspective
that the primary or sole objective of boards is to further the interests of shareholders—
a
questionable view in my opinion. The United Kingdom Combined Code's comply-or-
explain approach, and the value to good governance of disclosure, is then considered.
Bruce and Buck (Chapter 6) review executive pay in the United Kingdom, including
empirical findings. The evolution of pay structures is also discussed, in particular
performance-related pay such as executive share options and long-term incentive plans.
Performance indicators used as the basis for measuring company performance in long-term
incentive plans and other discretionary elements are considered.
All but one chapter in the book comprises a review of the literature. However, Bonet
and Conyon report the results of a study of the compensafion committees of 819 United
Kingdom listed firms in 2002 (Chapter 7). They document size and number of insiders
(defined as executive directors) on these committees. They define poorly constituted
compensation committees as those containing insiders. Only 87 (11%) firms have insiders.
14 of which have two or more insiders. Executive compensation is found to be higher
where insiders are present on the compensation committee.
Takeovers have long been considered to play an important role in governance and
O'Sullivan and Wong review the literature in this area (Chapter 8). Their review covers
each stage of the takeover process, starting with firm performance at the pre-bid stage,
followed by the likelihood of takeover success, post-acquisition performance, and
management turnover subsequent to takeover. The consequence of takeover failure is
also considered and the chapter ends by acknowledging the value of abandoned takeovers.
Dalton, McDougall, Covin and Dalton (Chapter 9) consider the relationship between
governance, strategic leadership and firm performance. They focus on entrepreneurial
firms and select only studies where firm performance is the dependent variable. They
identify four firm performance categories: financial performance (accounting and market-
based measures), performance at initial public offering, growth of the firm, and firm
survival. Strategic leadership is examined by reference to CEO founders/non-founders and
the demography of top management teams. Their governance constructs comprise CEO
duality (i.e., role of chairman and CEO separated/combined), board composition, and
board size. The role of venture capitalists in imposing governance structures in fledgling
firms is also considered. Usefully, for research students, the authors conclude their chapter
by identifying many promising areas for future research.
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Wright, Thompson, and Burrows' chapter that follows further develops our under-
standing of the role of venture capitalists and buy-outs in dealing with corporate
governance problems (Chapter 10). They examine corporate governance problems likely
to lead to buy-outs and the intervention of venture capitalists, and corporate governance
problems associated with buy-outs and venture capital investments. The chapter has two
parts: a discussion of theoretical issues, followed by empirical evidence.
At the macro level, international corporate governance is examined, with chapters on
Germany, France, Japan and China. This macro-orientated part of the book starts with a
chapter by Roe on western securities markets, in which he provides legal and political
explanations for securities markets (Chapter 11). Denis and McConnell then provide a
chapter on international corporate governance (Chapter 12). This starts by summarizing
internal and external corporate governance mechanisms. They then review what they call
"first generation" coiporate governance research, followed by "second generation"
international corporate governance research. They conclude their chapter by identifying
convergences in coiporate governance systems, and point to areas for further research.
Goergen, Manjon, and Renneboog contribute a chapter on corporate governance in
GeiTTiany (Chapter 13). Using the Japanese banking industry. Wan, Hoskisson, Kim, and
Yiu take a social exchange perspective that examines the complex and rich social
relationships including embedded social systems of roles, power, reciprocity, expectations,
and obligations that influence governance (Chapter 14). Mary O' Sullivan contributes a
chapter on corporate governance in France (Chapter 15), as a continental European system
of governance (described as insider systems) subject to the pressure of financial markets.
She concludes her analysis of the French system of corporate governance by noting that
there has been little shift from an insider to outsider system of governance.
Liu and Sun (Chapter 16) take an ownership and control perspective to examine China
as a state-dominated governance system. They report the results of their forthcoming paper
on the perfomiance effects of different levels of state and private ownership in Chinese
firms. They also report the results of a study of the economic and regulatory determinants
on ownership in state-controlled Chinese public companies. This chapter provides insights
on efficient governance structures in the context of emerging markets and transition
economies.
Wright, Buck and Filatotchev contribute the concluding chapter which reviews
corporate governance mechanisms in transition economies (Chapter 17). They examine
different approaches to privatization, using the experiences of Hungary, Poland, Russia,
Ukraine, Czech and Slovak republics, and Bulgaria by way of illustration. The
contribution of various stakeholder groups to governance of central and east European
countries is discussed, including inside ownership, banks, domestic and foreign
companies, venture capitalists the state, etc. The chapter concludes by reviewing studies
of the effects of different ownership and governance forms, and contains two excellent
tables summarizing prior research (Tables 17.4 and 17.5).
This is primarily a book for academics, not practitioners. It is a one-stop shop
summarizing most of the recent corporate governance literature and as such is suitable for
researchers and research students beginning to study this area. For existing researchers it
presents a readable and comprehensive opportunity for a refi^esher of the literature. Every
chapter ends with a long and thorough list of references on the topic (including the latest
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literature). However, I do not believe (as stated in the flier for the book) that it is ""essential
reading for students studying corporate governance for undergraduate, MA or MBA
degrees" In my opinion, such students need a more introductory text on corporate
governance, such as Mallin (2004), Monks and Minow (2004), or Solomon and Solomon
(2004).
Taking account of the track record of many of the contributors, it is not surprising that
the quality of the contributions is of the highest standard. Most of the chapters are written
in an accessible style. The book has a useful and extensive index.
I prefer this book to another similar series, also edited by Keasey, Thompson, and
Wright, and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. The Edward Elgar series (of which
there are six volumes published/due for publication) comprises reprints of previously
published academic articles in each volume, rather than original commissioned articles as
in this book.
In my opinion, this is a must-have book for researchers and scholars of corporate
governance.
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D.R. Myddelton, Unshackling Accountants, The Institute of Economic Affairs (lEA),
London, 2004 (194 pages, £12.50, ISBN: 255 36559-4)
This short nine-chapter text is published by a U.K. free-market think tank, The Institute
of Economic Affairs (lEA), whose goal is to explain free-market ideas to the public,
including politicians, students, journalists, businessmen, academics, and anyone interested
in public policy. As the organization's website professes, 'TEA authors. . .are. . .always on
the lookout for ways of reducing the government's role in our lives." This text supports this
aim by providing a cogent and fierce attack on accounting regulation and regulators. It
argues that accounting regulators are mistakenly promoting "revolutionary" principles and
(measurement) standards that impose the view that the primary purpose of financial
statements is to enable the prediction of fiature cash flows (a decision-usefulness
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approach). This conflicts with the author's view that the key role for financial statements
should be to monitor managers' stewardship. The "vast majority" of companies and
practicing accountants, it is claimed, oppose these principles and standards. They are
frequently motivated by tenuous evidence linking accounting scandals to deficiencies in
accounting regulation and often operate to ignore accounting's inherently subjective
nature. While accounting may require rules, it is argued that these will most likely evolve
through competition in use rather than through standardized imposition.
The author initially reviews the purpose of company accounts, the emergence of United
Kingdom and international accounting standards, and somewhat selective arguments for
and against these standards. He also explores resistance to emergent conceptual framework
projects, political interference in standard setting and the role of various private and public
sector bodies in setting standards.
The trend by regulators towards viewing company accounts as instruments for
predicting future cash flows is strongly criticized. At the same time, the author vehemently
defends monitoring the stewardship of managers as the primary purpose of company
accounts ("the least imperfect approach" [p. 27]). Here is the core of the arguments in
chapter 1 which dismisses perceived attempts by accounting regulators to turn company
accounts into quasi-prospectuses:
"By putting the emphasis on decision-usefulness for investors, the ASB (the U.K.
accounting standards setting body) is in effect regarding company accounts as if they
were annual prospectuses" (p. 30).
The various conceptual-framework projects in the U.S. and U.K. are accused of
ignoring "most professional accountants' preferences" and of failing to "characterise
accounting as it is, only how it might be" (p. 39, quotation from Page, 1992). This
apparently digresses from what "most people" think accounts are actually for and
represents a "revolution" by a regulatory elite. It is deemed a "fact" that fundamental
analysis of accounting reports is "not very useful to investors" for predicting future profits.
No allusion is made, however, to the growing popularity of residual income valuation
models drawing mainly on accounting numbers as the basis of fundamental company
valuation. Furthermore, in quoting Beaver in support of this argument (p. 44), a rather
unquestioning adherence to the efficiency of markets is betrayed.
The emergence of accounting standards in the United Kingdom, the European Union
and United States of America is critiqued in chapters 2 and 3. Throughout the text, the
author promotes the view that "professional" accountants should be free to "make up their
own minds" as "the question remains whether any group of people should tell professional
accountants in great detail how to do their job" (p. 59). However, given widespread
concerns about the role of the accounting profession, it would have been helpfial if the
author had elaborated on this notion of "professionalism" among accountants he believes
should be left to their own devices. The trend towards "hannonization" is also challenged
by suggesting that a strong empirical case linking more "informative" disclosure to lower
costs of capital has not yet been made.
Chapters 4 and 5 argue for and against accounting standards. Preventing dishonesty
among account preparers and combating a perceived lack of auditor independence are
briefly outlined and dismissed as arguments in favor of standards. It is suggested that
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possible damage to investors from an absence of standards is unproven but this point
requires more development and stronger support. For example, it is partially supported by
stating that
"Between 1945 and 1969 the ICAEW issued Recommendations to its members,
while the Scottish Institute preferred not to. But no one suggests that Scottish
company accounts were therefore of lower quality than English ones. So is there any
reason to suppose that the absence of accounting standards after 1970 would have
damaged UK investors?" (pp. 87-88).
We are also informed that the best way to get stock markets to reflect relevant news
managers possess is to allow insider trading in order to make stock prices better guides to
value for the investing public. Many readers may ponder long and hard about this
suggestion.
It is fiirther maintained that the complexity of accounting decisions could be reduced by
merely providing advice (or "suggestions") on technical issues as opposed to mandatory
guidance. However, a rather alarmist example is used to support this point:
"Relying on authority to compel truth can be dangerous, as the examples of Nazi
mathematics and Soviet biology from the last century remind us" (p. 89).
Some standards are accused of complicating measurement and presentation. FRS 3's
profit and loss account layout is deemed "hard to follow" although later it is recommended
that this standard be kept (given its focus on disclosure as opposed to measurement). In
essence, more complexity requires more discretion on the part of directors and auditors
and less regulation. The role of standards in enhancing comparability is deemed irrelevant
if one does not regard valuation as one of the main purposes of accounts.
The arguments against standards include their tendency to stifle independent judgment
given that accountants and company directors are required to follow orders. This
apparently outlaws thinking and imagination thereby potentially crippling the profession.
However, how exactly this might prove "crippling" is not explored. It is also contended
that standards prevent competition in ideas in contrast to voluntary regimes which permit
pondering on difficult subjects with views changing slowly. Standards are also blamed for
legitimizing some "bad" accounting with recent standards on goodwill receiving critical
treatment. Finally, standards raise "public" expectations and create "a climate of false
security" (p. 108, quotation from Clarke, Dean, & Oliver, 1997, p. 37) whereby too much
is expected from accounts. Accountants are requested to resist pandering to ignorance by
implicitly promising the public something they cannot deliver.
The responses of the (then) Big 8 to the U.K. ASB's initial Statement ofPrinciples draft
are subsequently used to highlight the disdain "practical" accountants feel for this "balance
sheet approach." The way some principles have been "fudged" in subsequent standards is
highlighted and in a typically provocative manner the author claims that:
".
. .the ASB sometimes gives the impression of a highly exclusive religious sect,
vouchsafed from heaven, whose destiny is to steer the benighted masses of old-
fashioned accounting professionals towards the promised land, even against their
own instincts" (p. 113).
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Chapter 7 is devoted to highlighting pohtical interference in standard setting and a
particular emphasis is placed on the interference in the development of forms of inflation
accounting in the U.K. in the 1980s. Government interference from all sides of the
political spectrum appears to have rendered current purchasing-power accounting (favored
by the author) redundant as a potential solution.
At this stage of my reading, I was beginning to beg for some balance in the narrative,
given its often overbearing "government regulation/standards bad-free markets/free
"professional" accountants good" philosophy. The author challenges the reader to consider
if there really were so many more or worse accounting scandals before standards were
introduced. He also asserts that some accounting scandals were due to public ignorance
but fails to support this with convincing evidence. In essence, he argues that scandals will
always be with us, so there is little point issuing standards to try to prevent them. We must
accept their inevitability and place our faith in an expert "free" accounting profession
unburdened by restrictive regulation.
Chapter 8 proceeds to consider various regulatory agencies and discusses some
perceived costs and benefits of regulation. Its concluding section entitled "An accounting
regulator from hell" effectively summarizes many of the author's key points in the form of
this regulator's "ten deadly sins." This is an amusing, if somewhat alarmist and sometimes
contentious list.
The author's conclusions are clear and somewhat more reasoned than much of the
preceding narrative. He recommends very short, voluntary guidelines ("suggestions") on
basic matters of disclosure for public listed companies only with no compulsory accounting
standards, no standards on measurement and no standards whatsoever for unlisted or small
companies. He reiterates his view that revolutionary regulators are overtuming "orthodox"
accounting despite little evidence that investors have been damaged in the absence of
accounting standards. His so-called "sensible proposal" (p. 168) is that standards on
measurement should be abandoned but that disclosure standards could remain. Auditors and
management would simply agree on how items should be measured and then relay this in the
accounts. He concludes that in an ideal world, accounting standards would not be necessary.
His faith in professional practicing accountants is undimmed throughout and this "class" of
professional seems to be implicitly beyond rebuke.
In conclusion, this is a stimulating book with many controversial proposals. It is
somewhat polemical and is selective with its evidence. "Self-evidenf claims which it is
assumed brook no argument litter the text and there are too many references to "most
people" or "everyone" agreeing with statements by the author. I found the rather stark
uncritical "free markets" agenda pervading the contents devoid of any attempt at balance in
places. However, this bias also serves to excite interest throughout and the arguments
presented invite rebuttal and debate from all sides of the accounting (and political)
spectrum, particularly from accounting regulators. I look forward to the accounting
regulators' responses.
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